Joint United Nations Framework to Support the Transition in Yemen, 2012-2014

A multi-dimensional framework to support a peaceful and inclusive transition

30 March 2012
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MAP

Joint UN Framework Yemen - Final 30 Mar 2012
I. INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

1. In recent years Yemen has been suffering from growing unrest and violent conflict which have been caused by underlying problems of unequal access to power and resources. The unrest and violence have been manifested by six rounds of fighting in the Sa’ada Governorate since 2004; a separatist movement in the southern governorates; the active presence of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, including in open confrontations with government forces in the south; conflict between pro- and anti-government groups and contenders to the presidency (e.g. tribal and military factions) in Sanaa, Taiz and Aden; and sustained demonstrations and sit-ins by youth and other sections of the population, which have often met with violence. Since January 2011 this background of discontent and unrest has been brought to a head by mass demonstrations throughout the country. Clashes between pro- and anti-government groups have resulted in hundreds of deaths and thousands of injuries. The deterioration in security has hindered provision of humanitarian and development assistance to vulnerable groups, especially in remote areas.

2. The unrest and violence have exacerbated Yemen’s under-development and caused a severe humanitarian crisis, requiring the launch of two flash appeals and two Consolidated Appeals over just the past three years. Yemen’s malnutrition levels are among the world’s highest, and every night roughly one in four of the country’s population of 22 million goes to bed hungry. In some parts of the country, one in three children is malnourished. The risk of outbreaks of disease in conflict- and displacement-affected regions is high, and with violence often concentrated in urban areas the protection of civilians is a major challenge. These factors have made day-to-day life more difficult for a large part of the population — including more than 300,000 people displaced by past conflict in northern Yemen and more than 150,000 people displaced by recent fighting in the south, and hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Horn of Africa.

3. As the economic, humanitarian and political situation in the country have deteriorated, the need to change the collective international responses to the situation has grown. The effectiveness of existing standard responses may have declined; customary partners may not be available or ready to cooperate; former operational arrangements may not be working as expected; and access to some places has been restricted by security conditions. The changed situation in Yemen, and the prospect of further change in the imminent future, with risks and opportunities, thus make different and innovative approaches necessary. While longer-term development goals must not be jettisoned, the current framework of immediate- and short-term assistance needs to be adapted to help create the conditions for a peaceful national transition.

4. An agreement about the transfer of power, brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was tabled for signature by the President and the opposition parties in May 2011. Following delays in the signing of the GCC Initiative, UN Security Council Resolution 2014

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1 Reflecting these conflicts, between 2007 and 2010 Yemen fell 34 places in the ‘Peace Index’, a ranking of 149 countries based on indicators such as mortality, political instability and crime levels. For background on the conflicts in Yemen, see United Nations, ‘Common Country Assessment: Republic of Yemen, 2011’, p. 12 and Annex 2, p. 58ff.

2 Yemen is likely to miss most of its Millennium Development Goals in 2015.

3 GCC member states are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
in October 2011 called on the parties to take necessary steps to end violence and to engage fully in implementing a political settlement based on the GCC Initiative. The resulting transition agreement (‘The Agreement on the Implementation Mechanism for the Transition in Yemen Pursuant to the GCC Initiative’), signed on 23 November 2011, stipulates the transfer of authority to the Vice-President, who will in turn call for early elections in 90 days; appoint a Prime Minister from the opposition and form a Government of National Unity; facilitate and secure humanitarian access and aid delivery wherever it is needed; and set up a military committee for stabilisation and security, which will end the division of the armed forces and take the steps needed to bring the armed forces under professional, national and unified leadership, and under the rule of law.

5. A Government of National Unity was sworn in on 10 December 2011. The transition agreement calls on the Vice-President and the Government to:

a. Establish and implement an initial programme of economic stabilisation and development and address the immediate needs of the population in all regions of Yemen; approve an interim budget and supervise the administration of all aspects of state finance ensuring full transparency and accountability;

b. Ensure the orderly fulfilment of government responsibilities, including local government, in accordance with the principles of good governance, rule of law, human rights, transparency and accountability;

c. Set up a Constitutional Commission and undertake constitutional reforms that will address the structure of the state and the political system and submit the reformed constitution to the Yemeni people in a referendum;

d. Call and hold a national and inclusive Conference for National Dialogue with the participation of all political parties and actors;

e. Reform the electoral system;

f. Conduct elections for the house of representatives and presidential elections if the new constitution so provides.

6. Furthermore, the transition agreement calls on the United Nations Secretary-General, in cooperation with other agencies, to provide ongoing assistance for the implementation of the agreement. He is also requested to coordinate the assistance from the international community for the implementation of the agreement, and the continuation of mediation and facilitation under the Secretary-General’s good offices.

7. Against this background, the Joint UN Framework was elaborated to respond in an integrated manner to the crisis and anticipated transition in Yemen. The Framework represents the support of the United Nations to the political transition in Yemen, which includes the Secretary-General’s good offices as well as the agencies, programmes, funds and departments of the United Nations. The Framework aims to complement the Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan 2012, and to bridge the gap between that plan and the longer-term United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Yemen (which covers 2012-2015 but was formulated before the events of 2011). The Joint UN Framework therefore aims to maximise the effectiveness of UN assistance in Yemen’s anticipated transition, drawing on
the capacity, expertise and position of the various UN agencies, funds and programmes to help bring about a peaceful and inclusive transition. The Joint UN Framework can also serve as a basis for mobilising resources from development partners interested to support Yemen’s transition.

8. The UN agencies, funds and programmes that operate in Yemen cover a wide spectrum of programmatic areas, from emergency and humanitarian assistance to capacity building and development. This in-country capacity also benefits from strong global and regional support provided by the respective organisations’ headquarters and regional offices. Although the Joint UN Framework takes advantage, primarily, of this existing in-country capacity, it will also rely on a wide network of implementing partners, such as international non-governmental organisations, non-governmental organisations, bilateral cooperation agencies, state and non-state organisations, community-based organisations, and the private sector.

THE CRISIS IN YEMEN

Political situation

9. Although the events in Yemen in 2011 can be interpreted as part of the Arab Spring and the democratisation movement that spread across the Arab world during 2011, the events in Yemen are grounded in the country’s problems of chronic underdevelopment, weak governance, political marginalisation and social exclusion. In both the north-west and the south, the state’s failure to meet the needs of local populations resulted in their disengagement from the approved political sphere and the strengthening of tribal leadership in the north, and, critically, the re-emergence of separatist agendas in the south. Local conflicts between farmers and nomadic tribes over declining natural resources have also increased. Finally, terrorist activities have increased in recent years, bringing a cross-border dimension to the Yemeni conflict.

10. The GCC Initiative envisions the safeguard of the unity, security and stability of Yemen and respect for the aspirations of the Yemeni people for change and reform. It also calls for a smooth and safe transfer of powers to avoid anarchy and violence and for an immediate end to the protests. The implementation steps for the GCC Initiative, covered by the November 2011 transition agreement, include the transfer of power to the Vice-President and the formation of a Government of National Unity. In accordance with the transition agreement, Phase 1 of the transition requires the Vice-President to call for presidential elections within 90 days, and a date of 21 February 2012 was set. In accordance with the terms of transition agreement, the Vice-President issued a decree appointing a Prime Minister from the opposition and tasking him to form a Government of National Unity.

11. The Vice-President also set up a Military Committee for Establishing Safety and Security. This is tasked with taking steps, in consultation with other relevant actors, to ensure the cessation of all forms of violence and violations of international human rights law and humanitarian law; to end the fighting between the armed forces and other armed groups and militias; to bring about the return of the armed forces to barracks and freedom of movement for all throughout the country; to protect civilians; and to ensure that control of the country

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4 For example, ratings compiled in the World Bank’s ‘Worldwide Governance Indicators’ for Yemen for 2006-2010, indicate some deterioration in government effectiveness and no improvement in combating corruption. On the weakness of elections and governance, see UN ‘Common Country Assessment: Republic of Yemen, 2011’, p. 11.
reverts to law-abiding state institutions. The possibility of a prolonged standoff and further clashes cannot be ruled out.

12. In Phase 2 of the transition, which begins with the election of the new president, the Government of National Unity is required to undertake constitutional and electoral reform, to convene a Conference for National Dialogue, and to hold new elections according to the terms of the new constitution. The GCC Initiative calls for a committee to be set up to organise the Conference for National Dialogue, with the aim of resolving the crisis in Yemen through inclusive dialogue with youth, women, the Houthis, the Hirak and other concerned parties. The conference should discuss:

- The establishment of a commission to draft a new constitution, the process of drafting, and amendments to be subject to a referendum;
- How the southern issue and the tension in Saada can be resolved justly and maintaining national unity and stability;
- Steps for building a fully democratic system and reforming the civil service, the judiciary and local governance;
- How national reconciliation and transitional justice should be pursued, and how to prevent future violations of human rights and humanitarian law;
- Legal and other means to strengthen protection of the rights of vulnerable groups, including children, and to help the advancement of women;
- Priorities for reconstruction and development programmes that will lead to equitable and sustainable development and job creation.

**Economic situation**

13. Yemen’s economy has been badly affected by the crisis and events of 2011. According to the Yemen Chamber of Commerce and Industry, during the first seven months of 2011 private sector revenues in construction, tourism and other commercial and industrial sectors fell by around USD8 billion. During the second half of 2011 transport costs rose by around 60%, raising commercial risks due to traffic interruptions and insecurity, and the (often unregulated) exodus of migrant labour to neighbouring countries. Public services such as healthcare, education, power and water supply, public transportation and others are semi-functioning or not functioning at all.

14. According to government data, Yemen relies on oil revenues to finance around 70% of the general budget, with customs and tax revenues accounting for only 18% of the budget.\(^5\) However, oil reserves have been dwindling and violence and the withdrawal of workers have forced oil production down. The ensuing drop in oil revenues and depletion of the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves have therefore caused severe fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances, and prompted cuts in public spending. Prior to the political crisis, the economy had been forecast to grow by about 3.4% in 2011; instead it has shrunk substantially.

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\(^5\) For further background on the economy, see UN 'Common Country Assessment: Republic of Yemen, 2011', p. 3.
15. During 2011 prices of foodstuffs such as wheat, flour, sugar, yogurt, milk and dairy products rose by between 40% and 60%, and prices of bottled drinking water by as much as 200%. Prices of petroleum products like gasoline and diesel rose steeply and faster than internationally, contributing to the rise in prices of all goods and services, and leading to the disruption of some sectors of the economy and some service activities. Inflation averaged around 20% in 2011.

16. Yemeni households are vulnerable to new food price shocks, with about 96% of Yemeni families being net buyers of food, and around 17.5% of the population living below the poverty line. The poorest Yemeni households spend a third of their income on bread alone, making them very vulnerable to further increases in bread prices. Price increases in rural areas, where the majority of the population live, have been greater than in urban areas. State-funded social protection for the poor is very limited.

Humanitarian situation

17. The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the south continues to rise. According to the IDP Executive Unit, as of 31 December 2011 there were over 150,000 registered IDPs in the south and 463,452 IDPs across the country as a whole. As the Houthi consolidate their power base in Sa’ada, the relative stability in Sa’ada has facilitated dialogue about humanitarian needs, leading to sustained and improved levels of humanitarian access. However, elsewhere in the north armed clashes between the Houthi and opposing tribal groups have caused new displacement.

18. The country’s underlying economic and fiscal weaknesses mean that humanitarian needs may yet increase among Yemenis who so far have not been directly affected by violent conflict or displacement. Other factors continue to cause difficulties for the wider population who have not been affected by conflict and violence. Factors include a decline in access to clean water and reduced access to primary health care, particularly in rural areas. Many Yemenis are also vulnerable to natural disasters, as was illustrated by flooding in Hadramout and Al Mahra in October 2008, which killed 80 people, displaced some 20,000 people, and affected over 100,000 people in total.

19. Malnutrition levels nationwide for children under age 5 have been increasing. In Hajjah governorate, malnutrition rates have been at near-crisis levels. Wasting is highly prevalent, and the Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rate has reached emergency levels (for example 31.3% in Hajjah in June 2011, with 9% severe cases, and 31.7% in Hudeidah in October 2011). This is much higher than the national averages measured in 2006 of GAM at 15% and severe acute malnutrition at 3.9%. Wasting is higher among IDPs than in the host communities, and is more prevalent among girls.

20. More generally, Yemen’s health indicators are among the worst in the region. The maternal mortality rate in 2008 was around 210 per 100,000 live births, and the infant

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7 For further data see United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan, 2012’.
8 In 2008 approximately 52% of the population did not have access to an improved water source. See MDG Report 2010.
9 Data from surveys in 2011 by Ministry of Public Health and Population and Unicef.
mortality rate in 2009 was 69 per 1,000 live births. Only about 60% of the population have access to basic or better health services, and 60% of the population are at risk of being affected by malaria, while the incidence of other communicable diseases is high. Yemen’s health system was already over-stretched, under-funded and weak, and has been only further neglected or harmed during the recent political, humanitarian and security crises. Delivery of essential health services such as immunisation, management and treatment of child illnesses, and control of communicable diseases, has deteriorated; and vulnerability to outbreaks of cholera, chikungunya (haemorrhagic fever), dengue fever, diarrhoea, malaria, measles and other diseases has increased. This has been illustrated by the ongoing outbreak of watery diarrhoea / cholera that started in Abyan in April 2011 and rapidly spread to neighbouring governorates; and by recent outbreaks of dengue and chikungunya in Hudeidah. Another illustration has been the decline in measles vaccination coverage, from 73% in 2010 to 68% in 2011, and the re-emergence of measles cases. A current outbreak of measles in the southern governorates has so far affected 2,411 children and killed 74 children under the age of five. In comparison, between 2007 and 2010 only a few cases of measles infection were reported, with no fatalities.

21. The geographical location of Yemen at the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula bridging the Horn of Africa with the Middle East and Europe has made it a concentration point for large mixed migration movements composed of people fleeing insecurity, armed conflict, drought, poverty and human rights violations. Since 2008, over 265,000 people from the Horn of Africa have arrived on Yemen’s shores on the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea, the majority of them Ethiopians and Somalis. The number of arrivals in 2011 reached a record high, nearly double the number in 2010. Although many try to reach the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, many stay in Yemen and look for means of protection, survival and livelihood. Refugees and migrants arrive in Yemen through organised smuggling and trafficking networks, with cells located in different locations in countries of origin, transit and destination. Evidently the unrest in 2011 and the associated decrease in the authorities’ presence and controls over the borders and coast has contributed to the increase in smuggling and trafficking. The influx of migrants from the Horn of Africa has also caused an increase in overall humanitarian needs in the country at the same time as the response capacity of state structures has shrunk. The humanitarian needs of all migrants and refugees must be handled with due respect for human rights.

THE MAIN CRISIS DRIVERS

22. Political and social exclusion. As highlighted by the waves of protests and demonstrations during 2011, feelings of political exclusion and dissatisfaction with the government are two of the most important drivers of conflict in Yemen. In essence, too few Yemenis are satisfied with their representation in government, and the performance of the government. This is compounded by problems which include: systems of discrimination and patronage which try to buy loyalty of tribal leaders to the state at the expense of the rights and needs of their people; limited participation of people in local government and development; lack of accountability of the government and of parliament; inadequate access to justice and a parallel tribal system that uses customary practices to seek justice and resolve disputes often violently; security and police services that do not uphold the rule of law and are not responsive to public needs; the proliferation of small arms in the country (with more than 8 million small arms estimated to be in private hands); exclusion of young people and

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minorities from many economic and political opportunities; severe gender inequalities and disparities which prevent women from fully participating in the economic, social and political life;\textsuperscript{11} marginalisation of certain groups (such as the Akhdam); and a poor human rights record.

23. **Economic inequities.** Oil exports account for around 20% of Yemen’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and up to 70% of the national budget, making the economy vulnerable to future declines in oil production or oil prices. Economic growth has failed to keep pace with population growth, which at 3% is one of the highest in the world. As a result, the number of people living in poverty has tended to increase, for example from 34.8% of the population in 2006 to 37.7% in 2008 and 42.8% in 2009. Unemployment cuts across urban and rural areas and is estimated to be 52.9% among the 15-24 age group and 44.4% among the 25-59 age group. Resources are also strained by the wide geographic dispersal of the population, with a majority (69.9% as of 2009) living in small rural settlements.\textsuperscript{12} Job creation opportunities are extremely limited especially among youth who account for approximately 60% of the total population. Those particularly affected by poverty include women, youth and children, small-scale farmers, sharecroppers, landless people, ethnic minorities, nomadic herders and artisanal fishers. With the exception of the capital and a few resource-rich districts, the authorities have consistently failed to provide sufficient basic services and development opportunities for most of the population. Failure to provide basic social services and their uneven distribution have compounded grievances and been a major factor contributing to conflict.\textsuperscript{13}

24. **Impunity and lack of accountability.** Ineffective enforcement of the law, coupled with an inefficient and politically controlled judiciary, are sources of discontent in Yemen today and contribute to conflict. Public service delivery is also hampered by lack of public confidence in the judiciary and the security forces, public sector inefficiency, and widespread corruption. This is particularly problematic for the public judicial and security services, which suffer from weak capacity and geographic presence, lack of democratic oversight of the security forces, and weak enforcement mechanisms for judicial decisions. Furthermore, although the traditional justice system is superficially more efficient in settling conflicts, it does not provide adequate access or equal treatment for parts of the society, and the law is not applied systematically, impartially, or equally. State institutions of justice and security, including the police, public prosecution service, judiciary and prisons, do not meet the needs of the public for equitable and accountable governance and rule of law. According to the Global Integrity Report 2010, Yemen’s performance in combating corruption in recent years has been very weak and has even deteriorated. Major challenges remain in promoting and developing a free media that can aggressively report on corruption; enforcing effective conflict of interest safeguards across all branches of government; and developing and protecting the independence of the civil service, the law enforcement agencies, and the judiciary.

\textsuperscript{11} On the challenges of women and youth empowerment, see UN ‘Common Country Assessment: Republic of Yemen, 2011’, p. 53.
\textsuperscript{13} For a more detailed analysis of the opportunities for and barriers to development, see UN ‘Common Country Assessment: Republic of Yemen, 2011’, p. 41ff.
SCENARIO ANALYSIS

25. This plan has been developed in the context of a still unfolding crisis in Yemen. To take account of the uncertainty about the path of events, the plan has therefore been framed around three broad and contrasting scenarios, with varying implications for short-term programmatic priorities and interventions. The following is a description of the scenarios, their political, economic and security aspects, and their possible implications.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario I</th>
<th>Scenario II</th>
<th>Scenario III</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POLITICAL AGREEMENT AND TRANSFORMATION</td>
<td>DELAYED AND UNEVEN IMPLEMENTATION</td>
<td>PROLONGED STATUS QUO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A best-case scenario is one in which the political and security environment are conducive to the smooth implementation of the transition agreement and its steps are completed in a timely and peaceful manner. Such an environment would open the space for a broader and more inclusive process to redefine the political and social compact between the state and the people of Yemen. This scenario may include numerous opportunities for international support for the transition in Yemen. All the same, even in this positive scenario, some obstacles and risks would still be present, such as:</td>
<td>A middle-case scenario is one in which the political and security environment for implementing the transition agreement is unstable, leading to uneven or inconsistent implementation but no decisive setbacks. This scenario (which is in effect a cautious view of what is most likely to occur) could comprise:</td>
<td>A worst-case scenario is one in which the political and security environment for implementing the transition agreement is severely troubled, and is characterised by disagreements, refusal of the armed forces to comply with requirements under the transition agreement, and violence. This could comprise:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Widespread mistrust among political players and the people, making it difficult for a stable and publicly supported government to form;</td>
<td>• Temporary delays occur in the implementation of the transition agreement, or parts of it;</td>
<td>• Prolonged delays to the implementation of the agreement, due to prolonged disagreement among the signing parties or with youth organisations and other movements;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Weak ability of government to achieve transitional benchmarks or deadlines;</td>
<td>• Delays in implementing some facets of the agreement cause tensions among stakeholders and disappointment among the public more widely;</td>
<td>• Public and political confidence in the transition agreement weaken, to the point of abandon or where a new agreement becomes necessary;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Some delays in the implementation of the transitional process;</td>
<td>• Pockets of the country remain difficult for the authorities or international organisations to access;</td>
<td>• The government is unable to exercise control over large areas of the country, and access for international organisations deteriorates;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Difficulties in ensuring the state’s sovereignty and authority throughout the national territory; and</td>
<td>• Economic recovery is slow and efforts to re-establish basic social services, across the country, make slow progress, particularly in urban areas, causing tensions and ongoing insecurity in some areas;</td>
<td>• Little or no economic recovery, but further deterioration in basic service provision, across the country, particularly in the urban areas, fuelling social tensions and increasing insecurity;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Insufficient funding for the implementation of the transition agreement.</td>
<td>• Humanitarian assistance needs do not decline sharply, but international aid for the transition increases; and</td>
<td>• Worsening food and humanitarian crises; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Outbreaks of violence continue and improvements in monitoring or responding to human rights violations are patchy.</td>
<td>• The level of violence and human rights violations increases.</td>
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26. Indicative trajectories for Yemen under the different scenarios are illustrated below.

II. JOINT UN FRAMEWORK: OBJECTIVES AND STRUCTURE

27. The Joint UN Framework is the plan of United Nations support for the political transition in Yemen, which was requested in the November 2011 transition agreement, and which includes support from the UN Secretary-General’s good offices and the agencies, programmes, funds and departments of the UN. To support this transition, and to end the deterioration in human security, the Joint UN Framework provides for an immediate, concerted and multi-dimensional response from the United Nations in Yemen, which will be consistent with and complement existing humanitarian and development plans.

28. A core assumption underlying the Joint UN Framework is that the ongoing efforts to bring about a political transition in Yemen constitute an historic opportunity for the people of Yemen to move towards a more inclusive and participatory system of democracy and development. In this context, supporting the human, material and institutional conditions needed for such a political transition is a priority for the United Nations in Yemen.

29. Based on the November 2011 transition agreement, the Joint UN Framework is a focused two-year plan of support, with two overall objectives:

(i) To provide the national stakeholders in Yemen with the assistance required to successfully complete the political transition as stated in Part VI of the Concluding Provisions of the transition agreement.
(ii) To contribute to the creation of an environment which is conducive to a transition to greater democracy and development in Yemen;

30. Given the complexity of the transition in Yemen, and the need to support the transitional process in a timely and effective manner, the Joint UN Framework requires a broad-based partnership with state and non-state stakeholders, including national and international organisations, community-based organisations, and the private sector. The plan makes the most of the national and international implementing and advisory capacities available in the country, as well as the comparative advantages of the United Nations in Yemen.

31. To support the steps outlined in the transition agreement and to address the above-mentioned drivers of crisis, the Joint UN Framework is organised around four core components:

(i) **Political dialogue and transition**: helping national stakeholders to hold the Conference for National Dialogue, to build consensus and conflict resolution mechanisms, and to bring about an inclusive and non-violent transition.

(ii) **Democratic governance**: accelerating institutional reforms which are essential to support the electoral cycle, to empower democratic institutions, and to foster local governance.

(iii) **Sustainable livelihoods and basic social services**: accelerating pro-poor and inclusive economic growth, creating immediate jobs and income generating opportunities for groups at risk (youth, women and poorer segments of society), and re-establishing and boosting basic social services and other social protection mechanisms.

(iv) **Transitional justice, rule of law, and security sector reform**: supporting institutional reforms to fight impunity, empowering state and non-state actors to tackle abuses of power, enhancing the state’s accountability in justice and security, and supporting the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms.

32. The following diagram illustrates schematically the interaction of the four core components of the Joint UN Framework with key underlying causes or drivers of conflict and crisis in Yemen.
COMPONENT 1: POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND TRANSITION

33. The success of the political transition in Yemen will depend heavily on trust, confidence and inclusive dialogue. Beyond phases and benchmarks, the political process should evolve in a context where participation and consensus building become the norm and stakeholder empowerment the priority. This component aims at creating a conducive environment for the political transition and reinforcing the foundations of a new inclusive social and political dynamic in Yemen.

34. According to the proposals currently under discussion, the political transition period can be divided into the following stages: (i) preparation and organisation of early presidential elections; (ii) drafting of a new constitution and approval of a new election law; (iii) conduct of a public referendum to approve the new constitution; (iv) preparation and organisation of parliamentary elections including the update of the voters register and strengthening electoral institutions; (v) holding a comprehensive and inclusive national dialogue; and (vi) reform of the security forces. As outlined in the transition agreement, this process should have broad public participation, including from youth, women, civil society organisations, political
parties and the media. Public communications about the dialogue and transition process will be important for building confidence. Support in this area will be provided from the Secretary-General’s good offices and the agencies, programmes, funds and departments of the UN.

35. **National dialogue.** In preparation for the Conference for National Dialogue the UN will support the transitional Government of National Unity, political parties and media and civil society organisations (including youth and women’s groups, and employers’ and workers’ organisations) to set up forums to discuss and build consensus about political and social reforms and the subjects of the conference (e.g. elections, a new constitution, transitional justice, and economic and security reforms). The UN will assist national stakeholders in the design and management of the dialogue process, and the organisation of the Conference for National Dialogue. It will facilitate inclusive dialogue and visioning processes, and support events which help to build a common shared vision for Yemen’s future.

36. **Stakeholder empowerment.** The UN will explore ways of bringing new support to civil society organisations and groups (including women’s and youth organisations), to help them play a full and proper role in political dialogue and the wider transition. It will map initiatives to support the development of civil society organisations and establish an appropriate coordination mechanism. The UN will promote South-South exchanges with countries that have experienced similar transition processes (for example in the Arab world, Eastern Europe and Latin America).

**COMPONENT 2: DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND ELECTIONS**

37. The transition agreement requests the UN Secretary-General to support the implementation of the agreement and coordination of international assistance. The UN will therefore support efforts to strengthen the capacities of state institutions involved in the transition, and to increase their accountability and transparency, in order to build public confidence in the state and to increase the prospect of a successful transition. The transition agreement stipulates a transition period of two years and three months, comprising two phases: 1) delegation of presidential authorities to the vice-president, to appoint a prime minister who will then form a government of national unity and oversee elections within 90 days; and 2) the government of national unity and parliament embark on a process of constitutional reforms as well as electoral, governance and institutional and economic reforms. During both phases the development of the capacities of political parties, governing institutions and civil society organisations will be vital to the success of the transition.

38. **Elections.** The UN will coordinate international electoral assistance through the two phases of the transition. The UN has already established a mechanism for the international community and the UN specialised agencies to provide technical and operational support to the Supreme Commission for Elections and Referendum and other relevant stakeholders to conduct the Early Presidential Elections on 21 February, as well as a referendum and parliamentary elections. The UN will coordinate the efforts of the international community to support the elections, using a multi-donor basket fund and other appropriate means. Specific areas of UN assistance will include: building the capacities of national institutions, NGOs and electoral committees; supporting the conduct of voter education campaigns; printing and distribution of electoral guides, manuals and promotional material; promoting an environment which is conducive to peaceful elections; preparing local monitors for the pre-election period and election day; developing capacity to manage electoral disputes without violence; and
technical assistance to draft a new election law. Based on the recommendations of a UN needs assessment mission in December 2011, the UN has already been helping the national electoral body with the logistics, operations and technical assistance needed for transparent and credible elections, including, for example, the procurement of election equipment and materials, the distribution of electoral materials, and the training and deployment of election observers. A future needs assessment will inform support for the elections in the second phase of the transition.

39. The UN may also provide technical assistance for political parties, for example to help advance women and young candidates in the parliamentary elections. In the second phase of implementing the transition agreement the UN will provide technical support for a review of the election law, to conduct a referendum and to prepare for new elections. This will strengthen the electoral system in Yemen and provide an opportunity to: develop the register of voters; reform the Supreme Commission for Elections and Referendum; set up reliable information systems; build capacity for media centres; and support other regulatory reforms that will be required by the new constitution.

40. **Constitutional reform.** In co-ordination with other development partners, the UN will provide technical support to the Constitutional Commission, which is responsible for drafting the new constitution. The UN will help the commission to learn from experience from other countries, for instance through seminars with global and regional constitutional experts, study visits and training courses. It will provide technical advice and training in a conflict-sensitive manner, and will facilitate nationwide dialogue about constitutional reform.

41. **Comprehensive governance reform.** In the short term, and in close collaboration with other development partners, the UN will support the national authorities to prepare a comprehensive governance reform programme, including local governance, the justice system, the security sector, and policy and practice on human rights, anti-corruption and transparency. Some of these reform areas (such as the security sector, decentralisation and local governance) are likely to remain high on the national political agenda for some time to come, and the related reforms may not be fully determined or implemented within the period covered by this plan. The Joint UN Framework therefore aims to increase public participation in debate about the reforms, at the same time as supporting the provision of relevant technical expertise. Specific areas of support in local government will include technical and legal advice to review the existing national programme for local governance; to develop new fiscal allocation policy; to build the capacities of concerned state institutions; and to pilot new local government programmes in Governorates particularly affected by conflict.

42. **Accountability and transparency.** The UN will provide and support assistance to improve public accountability and transparency in Yemen. The Government has in the past acknowledged that corruption is a major problem in the country and has established authorities intended to combat it. However, progress in reducing corruption has been poor. In order to maintain and build public confidence in the transitional government and associated changes, it will therefore be important to strengthen anti-corruption policy, law and enforcement. As part of this, it will be beneficial to strengthen the protections available for media and civil society organisations which monitor or report on corruption.
COMPONENT 3: SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS AND BASIC SOCIAL SERVICES

43. The transition agreement calls for “establishing and implementing an initial programme of economic stabilisation and development and addressing the immediate needs of the population in all regions of Yemen”. In response to this, the UN in Yemen will focus part of its assistance on improving basic social services and social protection mechanisms, and on increasing resilience and livelihood opportunities. The assistance will aim to help overall economic recovery and in particular to increase growth and service delivery that benefits the poor and other disadvantaged sections of the population. Some of the projects in the Humanitarian Response Plan will contribute to these goals.14

44. Sustainable local livelihoods. The UN in Yemen will provide assistance to revive livelihoods that were disrupted by the events during 2011, and to increase productivity. Assistance will cover agriculture, fishing, industry, trade and other sectors. The UN will promote mechanisms and tools that can help economic reintegration in areas severely affected by the crisis, such as micro-finance, and community savings schemes. Support will be provided for technical education and vocational training institutes, and for skills training for youth and poorer segments of society, to increase their ability to find work domestically and abroad, within the GCC. Other assistance for livelihoods and income will include short-term labour intensive public works programmes and conditional cash transfer programmes.

45. Food security and livelihoods. In view of the precarious food security situation of poor Yemeni households and the near-critical malnutrition rates, the UN will support recovery-oriented initiatives to improve the food and nutrition security of vulnerable households and individuals, as well as providing life-saving assistance under the Humanitarian Response Plan. Food security and livelihood activities targeting rural, food-insecure households will aim to build their self-reliance and provide incentives for households with girls attending school. At-risk children and women living in camp settings and conflict-affected areas will receive therapeutic and supplementary feeding, where needed. Other programmes will provide financial assistance to help vulnerable refugees become more self-reliant and resilient to future crises, for example through improved access to employment, skills training, and micro-credit.

46. Disaster risk reduction and management. Given the vulnerability of many Yemenis to natural disasters, and the impact these can have on lives, livelihoods and politics, the UN will increase support for disaster risk reduction and management in strategy, policy and practice at the national and local levels. Reducing the vulnerability of communities and people to natural disasters such as flooding and droughts is integral to making livelihoods more stable and sustainable. Increasing resilience to events such as flooding and droughts can prevent them becoming catastrophes and can increase political and economic stability more widely.

47. Pro-poor and inclusive economic growth. The transition provides an opportunity to adjust the policies and structures of key national economic institutions, so that they may better promote economic growth which is more inclusive and beneficial to the poor (rather than growth which widens inequalities), and which creates more jobs. Key departments for this are the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Fish Wealth, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, and the Ministry of Trade. Related areas of assistance will include: encouraging

14 The Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan 2012 addresses other needs too, notably immediate life-saving needs. For an overview of the plan, see Appendix B.
private sector participation and public-private partnerships through financial and tax incentives; strengthening the ability of employment offices to guide job seekers and reduce recruitment costs; enforcing laws on working conditions; and developing an effective labour market information system and database.

48. **Policy and strategy for social services.** The provision of basic social services and protection was severely affected by the crisis, leaving parts of the population with few if any basic services, and of poor quality when available. It is therefore imperative to support government counterparts to revise or finalise key social service policies and strategies to bring about an improvement in the provision of social services and social protection. This will include:

- Using the Development Plan for Poverty Reduction (2012-2015) to foster participation, knowledge management, analysis and technical capacity;
- Agreeing an action plan and concrete steps to put into operation the National Food Security Strategy;
- Supporting the multi-sectoral Child-Friendly Schools Policy and the Ministry of Education to convene other ministries that provide services relevant to health, water and sanitation, nutrition, and social protection;
- Mainstreaming in national programmes action to address child labour;
- Strengthening health sector policy, leadership and management, and building the capacities of health sector managers;
- Supporting the establishment of a health sector human resources strategy;
- Supporting the national midwifery programme;
- Advocacy, awareness training and material support for the delivery of basic services to vulnerable groups, in particular refugees and internally displaced persons;
- Expanding the social protection monitoring mechanism so that cash transfer schemes better serve those who are most in need of help;
- Making the current welfare safety net function more efficiently and as an emergency safety net, by using food security concepts and indicators (including household food consumption) to better inform targeting.

49. **Social service delivery.** In light of the deterioration in basic service delivery, the UN will provide support to build the capacity of government and civil society organisations (at governorate, district, and community level) to provide basic social services, for local populations and internally displaced persons and refugees. Support will particularly be directed towards primary health care services (e.g. immunisations, maternal and child health, reproductive health commodity security, and control of communicable diseases); community management of acute malnutrition; increasing school enrolment and retention rates; and increasing the number of schools adopting the Child-Friendly Schools standards.
COMPONENT 4: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, RULE OF LAW AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

50. The transition agreement stipulates that the transitional period will include steps to move towards a fully democratic system and to reform the civil service, the judiciary and local administration. It also calls for national reconciliation and transitional justice, and for measures to be taken to prevent violations of human rights and humanitarian law in the future. Recognising that political and social exclusion have been a key cause of conflict and instability, the UN system in Yemen will therefore work to promote improvements in the rule of law, access to justice, and security. Assistance will be focused on (i) justice and security sector capacity development, through training and institutional development; (ii) improving access to justice and protection for vulnerable groups, including women, children, tribal minorities, displaced persons and victims of violent conflict; and (iii) supporting the establishment and functioning of transitional justice mechanisms.

51. National rule of law institutions. Drawing upon existing partnerships with the four main justice-related ministries (human rights, interior, justice and legal affairs) and concerned civil society organisations, the UN will support preparation and implementation of a rule of law capacity development plan, covering service delivery, law enforcement, the prison system, and legal procedure. The capacity development plan will focus on addressing identified weaknesses, and will build appropriately on existing mechanisms that function well.

52. With the backing of the Secretary-General and the relevant UN agencies and departments, the UN will prioritise support for the following initiatives:

- Establishment of an independent National Institute for Human Rights to support the development of public oversight of the judicial system and its reform, including by establishing new mechanisms to address human rights violations.

- Creation of legal aid clinics and mobile courts to help women, the poor and other vulnerable groups (such as IDPs and people affected by conflict). Increasing the number or reach of legal aid clinics and mobile courts will help disadvantaged groups to gain legal redress for human rights violations and other disputes. The UN will also support new training of police, crime investigators, judges, prosecutors and lawyers, and efforts to increase recruitment and training of women judges, prosecutors and lawyers.

- National reconciliation and transitional justice. The UN will also provide technical and coordination assistance to Yemen to implement the proposed process of transitional justice. This process will most likely consist of the establishment of a commission of inquiry and a truth commission which will issue, amongst other outputs, a report on compensation for victims of human rights abuses, and recommendations for transitional justice. The UN will also advise on the design of the transitional justice process, and advocacy for it. The UN will aim to ensure that transitional justice is fully covered in the national dialogue process, that it builds appropriately on traditional and informal reconciliation mechanisms, and that it is consistent with reforms of the justice sector more broadly.

53. Child-friendly protection services. The government has made considerable progress towards providing a legal framework that protects, respects and promotes children’s rights as they come into contact with the law. In order to strengthen the protection system for children, the UN will re-engage with the Ministry of Justice on the juvenile justice programme initiated
in 2011. This programme aims to build capacity, refine the legal framework, and provide technical and financial support to ensure that boys and girls in selected governorates are able to access a minimum package of justice and protection services.

54. **Support for internally displaced persons and refugees.** The UN will provide technical assistance and capacity-strengthening support to the authorities to review and further develop national legislation pertaining to IDPs, asylum seekers, refugees, trafficking and migration management. This assistance will help Yemen to comply with the international conventions to which it is a state party, as well as to build a national asylum system, and to develop and put into practice an effective national policy for addressing internal displacement.

55. **Reform of the security forces.** Defections within the army, conflicts in the chain of command, abuse of power, and lack of accountability and civilian oversight, are just some of ways in which the national security and defence forces have shown themselves to be suffering from major internal weaknesses and problems. This situation, coupled with the presence of non-state armed groups in the country, the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and the threat of terrorist activity, illustrate why reform of the security forces and system is one of the most important but difficult tasks of the transition. As called for in the transition agreement, the UN will therefore seek to support the national authorities in undertaking reforms that catalyse positive change in the security sector. In preparation for medium- and long-term reform, the UN will provide the support that the democratic institutions of government (such as the parliament) need to assess the security sector and design appropriate reforms. Particular attention will be paid to developing civilian oversight of uniformed forces.

56. **Small arms control.** Yemen is reportedly the second most heavily or intensively armed country in the world. Current estimates suggest that Yemen’s 22 million inhabitants possess approximately 11 million firearms (with estimates ranging from 6 million to 17 million). Reduction of armed violence, and the disposal of mines and unexploded ordnance, will require a holistic approach simultaneously addressing the causes of supply and demand for weapons, mines and other ordnance. To address the issue of supply and demand, the UN will seek to support the national authorities in closing the gaps in the existing legal framework on weapons, as well as measures for small arms control, collection and destruction in areas highly affected by armed violence.

**III. STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION**

57. UN support in Yemen under the Joint UN Framework has been structured and prioritised based on the transition agreement and UN experience in other situations of conflict, political transition, and peacebuilding. The strategy of the Joint UN Framework has been shaped by a set of strategic principles, which the UN will follow in order to make its response to the course of events in Yemen as coordinated, effective and timely as possible, with the overall aim of developing the economic, institutional and social foundations for the transition, recovery and development of the country.

**Strategic principles**

58. The UN will follow these strategic principles in implementing the Joint UN Framework:
(a) Implement with a sense of urgency, and with flexibility, to meet the timeline of the transition agreement and to effect quick wins and urgent changes.

(b) Support the transition agreement in line with its clause requesting the United Nations Secretary-General and agencies to support the implementation of its components and to coordinate the support of the international community.

(c) Uphold humanitarian principles, support the protection of humanitarian space, and complement ongoing humanitarian assistance by finding ways of bridging from relief to more durable solutions, both in terms of early recovery and in short-, medium- and long-term capacity development.

(d) Prevent a deterioration of the humanitarian crisis by supporting the functioning of markets for food, fuel and other key commodities, and by helping national partners to deliver essential services.

(e) Continue implementing ongoing development initiatives to the extent feasible, and initiate catalytic development interventions which are foreseen in the UN Development Assistance Framework 2012-2015 and which build on the existing humanitarian relief plan.

(f) Target new interventions in priority areas where the UN has a definite comparative advantage and where maximum gains for stabilisation can be achieved quickly, responding appropriately to new developments and updated situation analyses.

(g) Prepare for and support national efforts to implement the agenda of the negotiated agreement once reached. Particular attention should be given to areas requiring specialised technical support from the United Nations (elections, political dialogue, economic revitalisation, security sector reform and rule of law).

(h) Use the existing implementation capacity of national and international partners such as government at central, governorate and district level, international non-governmental organisations and inter-governmental organisations, civil society organisations, parastatal institutions, the banking system, community-based and religious organisations, and the private sector. Use updated databases of qualifying implementing partners and regular monitoring of shifts in the institutional environment to guide decisions about implementation partners.

(i) Ensure interventions are geographically distributed in a conflict-sensitive manner, in line with the three geographical profiles (north, centre and south) set out in the 2011 Consolidated Appeal for Yemen.

(j) Prioritise multi-dimensional initiatives that address the underlying causes of crisis, including integrated interventions that target democratic governance, early recovery, security sector reform and rule of law. Coordinate closely with the UN Department of Political Affairs and encourage sustained interagency cooperation.

(k) Prioritise interventions addressing quick capacity development to empower national partners, and state and non-state institutions. Short-term interventions must support the medium- and long-term goal of building the national capacity needed to build a stable, peaceful and prosperous state.
(l) Prioritise interventions that **generate coalitions and alliances** with and amongst national and international partners seeking to address the same underlying drivers of crisis. Use thematic groups or clusters to support such alliances.

(m) **Ensure interventions uphold, promote and protect human rights.** The Human Rights-Based Approach adopted by the United Nations Development Group should guide the components of the Joint UN Framework and its implementation.

(n) **Integrate gender and conflict sensitivity** in the design and implementation of all interventions.

(o) **Support durable solutions to internal displacement** as an essential component of stabilisation, including by building the capacity of relevant institutions and developing law and policy.

(p) **Draw on lessons and experience from other transition countries** in the region and elsewhere. The UN should systematically draw on and make available to its partners the knowledge and expertise on stabilisation and transition available inside and outside the UN’s global networks.

**Implementation**

59. In implementing the Joint UN Framework the UN will take into account the recommendations of the 2011 Busan High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness and those of a forthcoming UN review of public administration reform in conflict countries. The Busan declaration re-stated the importance of the principles of local ownership of development priorities; focus on results; inclusive development partnerships; and mutual transparency and accountability.\(^{15}\) To support the transition in Yemen and the Joint UN Framework, the UN will encourage strategic discussion and partnerships within the GCC region in relation to Yemen.\(^{16}\)

60. The exact timeframe for the implementation of the Joint UN Framework will be determined by the course of events during 2012; trigger points for launching particular initiatives under the Joint UN Framework will be monitored closely. An indicative timeline for the transition and implementation of the Joint UN Framework to support the transition is included in **Appendix A**.

61. This framework sets out the strategic principles, approach and scope of planned UN support to the transition in Yemen. It will be complemented by an action plan developed in close consultation with Yemeni stakeholders and development partners. The action plan will set out in further detail the sequence of activities needed to achieve the intended objectives; the key benchmarks for measuring progress towards those objectives; practical arrangements for co-ordination and funding; and arrangements for the end of the Joint Framework in 2014 and for planning for the subsequent period.

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\(^{15}\) *Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation*, November 2011, www.aideffectiveness.org/busanhlf4/.

\(^{16}\) See key recommendations of OECD, *Strategic Building Blocks for International Engagement in Yemen*, DAC-INCAF issues brief, October 2011.
APPENDIX A  INDICATIVE TIMELINE FOR TRANSITION

This is an indicative timeline for the transition in Yemen, with implementation of the Joint UN Framework to Support the Transition expected to begin immediately.
APPENDIX B  YEMEN HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN, 2012

A full version of the Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan is available at www.humanitarianappeal.net and financial tracking is available at www.fts.unocha.org.

The plan and appeal were launched on 14 December 2011, covering the following 12 months (Jan-Dec 2012) and with the following key parameters:

Key milestones in 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School year</td>
<td>Sept-May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration to south coast</td>
<td>Jan-April, Sept-Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration to west coast</td>
<td>Jan-Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planting</td>
<td>June-July and Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvest</td>
<td>March-April, Oct-Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floods</td>
<td>Feb, April-May, Aug-Oct, Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storms</td>
<td>March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drought</td>
<td>June</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Target beneficiaries

- 2,057,000 severely food insecure
- 407,203 IDPs
- 116,830 conflict-affected
- 140,000 returnees
- 169,885 refugees and asylum seekers; 26,000 migrants
- 466,337 under-five girls and boys affected by acute malnutrition
- 339,280 small- and medium-scale farmers

Total: 3,722,535

Total funding requested USD447,138,200

Funding request per beneficiary USD120

The following table summarises the funding requirements and funding gaps as of 3 March 2012:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Original requirements USD</th>
<th>Revised requirements USD</th>
<th>Unmet requirements</th>
<th>% Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CLUSTER NOT YET SPECIFIED</td>
<td>5,854,450</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COORDINATION AND SUPPORT SERVICES</td>
<td>5,907,797</td>
<td>5,429,948</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EARLY RECOVERY</td>
<td>26,165,188</td>
<td>25,730,239</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
<td>12,276,958</td>
<td>12,276,958</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOOD AND AGRICULTURE</td>
<td>154,013,036</td>
<td>107,008,215</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEALTH</td>
<td>56,180,512</td>
<td>54,467,334</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MULTI-SECTOR : REFUGEES, ASYLUM SEEKERS &amp; MIGRANTS</td>
<td>43,207,047</td>
<td>40,212,067</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUTRITION</td>
<td>70,849,812</td>
<td>64,809,272</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROTECTION</td>
<td>21,509,879</td>
<td>21,443,212</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHELTER/NFI/CCCM</td>
<td>26,958,236</td>
<td>26,958,236</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WATER, SANITATION AND HYGIENE</td>
<td>30,091,315</td>
<td>29,070,590</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total:</td>
<td>447,138,200</td>
<td>381,551,621</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C  REFERENCES AND RESOURCES

‘Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation’, November 2011, (www.aideffectiveness.org/busanhlf4/)


Gulf Cooperation Council, ‘GCC Initiative to Resolve the Yemeni Crisis’, May 2011


OECD, ‘Strategic Building Blocks for International Engagement in Yemen’, DAC-INCAF issues brief, October 2011


