BUSINESS CASE ASSESSMENT FOR
Accelerating Development Investments in Famine Response and Prevention

CASE STUDY
NORTH-EAST, NIGERIA
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The main research and text of the report was conducted by Spyros Demetriou, with coordination support from Bettina Woll (UNDP Crisis Response Unit) and Pedro Conceicao (UNDP Bureau for Policy and Programme Support).

The Business Case Assessments would not have been possible without the contributions and inputs of colleagues at country level (Nigeria, South Sudan, Somalia and Yemen), including Edward Kallon, Samuel Bwalya and Ojijo Odhiambo for Nigeria; Alain Noudehou, Kamil Kamaluddeen, Jean Luc Stalon, Biplove Choudhary and Benjamin Moore for South Sudan; Peter de Clercq, George Conway, Usman Qazi and Abdul Qadir for Somalia; Jamie McGoldrick, Auke Lootsma, Hyewon Jung and Zarak Jan for Yemen.

Significant contributions to the research and coordination of the report were also made by Bruno Lemarquis, Ruby Sandhu-Rojon, Sophie de Caen, Abdullah Alkulaib, Jane O Yeboah, Celine Moyroud, Lars Jensen, Silke Von Brockhausen, Colin Furness and Xavier Hernandez. Stephanie Julmy, OCHA, also provided inputs and overall guidance to the report.

The report was edited by Kinza Hasan and designed by Laurie Douglas.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction
2. Understanding famine causation in north-east Nigeria
3. Elements of a comprehensive approach for mitigating famine risk in north-east Nigeria
4. Overview of previous and current famine response efforts in north-east Nigeria
5. Costs and benefits of resilience and development interventions
6. Country-specific recommendations on better integrating humanitarian, development and peace interventions to prevent, mitigate and address famine risk

Figures and tables

6  |  Figure 1: Estimated food security outcomes for north-east Nigeria, August 2017
10 |  Figure 2: Market and trade activity in north-east Nigeria, June 2017
11 |  Figure 3: State-level losses in GDP between 2011-2014 (in billions of Naira)
19 |  Figure 4: Levels of international humanitarian assistance (appealed and funded): 2014-2017

5  |  Table 1: Breakdown of the population affected by the conflict in north-east Nigeria (2016)
11 |  Table 2: Estimated damages to social services, by State (in US$ millions)
20 |  Table 3: Overview of humanitarian cluster response coverage, January-July 2017
21 |  Table 4: Overview of recovery and peacebuilding needs by component (US$ million)
24 |  Table 5: Overview of selected interventions aligned with ‘Buhari Plan’/RPBA
26 |  Table 6: Overview of damages to selected infrastructure and services by state (2011-2015, in US$)
27 |  Table 7: Overview of recovery needs for selected infrastructure and services by state (2011-2015, in US$)
28 |  Table 8: Overview of benefits and costs of selected infrastructure and service rehabilitation interventions
29 |  Table 9: Overview of humanitarian needs for selected clusters (based on 2017 appeal)
1. INTRODUCTION

Since 2009, the Boko Haram insurgency along with military operations conducted by the Government of Nigeria have had a devastating impact on the north-east region of Nigeria (and specifically the states of Borno, Adamawa, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba).

Armed conflict, direct violence against civilians, and widespread insecurity—all of which escalated significantly following 2014—has resulted in over 20,000 deaths, the forced displacement of over 2 million people, and the widespread loss of livelihoods and access to essential social services. At present, the humanitarian situation is rapidly approaching famine levels and is characterized by extreme levels of food insecurity, malnutrition and exposure to disease. Fourteen million people across the six states (out of a total population of 18 million) are estimated to have been affected by the conflict, with 8.5 million people in need of humanitarian assistance (see Table 1 below). In the three worst-affected states (Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe), 5.1 million people are currently in food insecurity IPC Phases 3 to 5 (with an estimated 100,000 people at famine levels of food insecurity), representing a 50 percent increase since March 2016. In addition, 1.2 million children under 5 and pregnant and lactating women are malnourished and an estimated 6.9 million people are vulnerable to disease in the absence of access to health care.

The current humanitarian situation is aggravated by high levels of conflict-induced displacement (with an estimated 1.8 million people currently displaced) as well as spontaneous returns or relocation to areas with inadequate living conditions.

As in Yemen, South Sudan and Somalia, the main drivers of food insecurity and famine risk are the ongoing conflict and pervasive violence in which civilians are primary targets. The resulting loss of human life, population displacement and destruction of productive assets, economic infrastructure and social services, have significantly disrupted economic and social systems essential for livelihoods, social cohesion and individual well-being. The destructive impact of the conflict has been exacerbated by pre-existing structural factors stemming from the region’s historical, economic and social marginalization relative to the rest of the country. With an economy dependent on agriculture (with 80 percent of the population engaged in farming), and in the absence of additional investments from the federal government, growth has been below the national average for decades, constrained by high poverty levels, underdeveloped and inadequate economic infrastructure and social services, and the weak presence of state institutions and governance. This structural fragility severely circumscribed the resilience of both economic systems.

TABLE 1: BREAKDOWN OF THE POPULATION AFFECTED BY THE CONFLICT IN NORTH-EAST NIGERIA (2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATES</th>
<th>TOTAL PEOPLE IN NEED</th>
<th>HOST COMMUNITY</th>
<th>INTERNALLY DISPLACED</th>
<th>RETURNEES</th>
<th>% FEMALE</th>
<th>% MALE</th>
<th>% CHILDREN, ADULTS, ELDERLY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Borno</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>64% 31% 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>59% 35% 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adamawa</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>54% 42% 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yobe</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>59% 35% 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gombe</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>59% 35% 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taraba</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td></td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>54% 39% 7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>58% 37% 5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


FIGURE 1: ESTIMATED FOOD SECURITY OUTCOMES FOR NORTH-EAST NIGERIA, AUGUST 2017

Source: FEWS NET
and households to conflict-induced shocks. While some military progress has been made in pushing Boko Haram out of some areas, the devastation and dislocation left in their wake, together with continuing violence in others, underscores the continued urgency of the situation.

Since 2014, the Government of Nigeria and the international community have provided significant levels of humanitarian assistance, with a focus on saving lives in the three states most affected by the conflict. In recent years (2016-2017), this has been accompanied by a mobilization of development partners, led by the government, to support the stabilization and recovery of conflict-affected areas, working in tandem with the humanitarian community. The evolution of these efforts provides an important opportunity to address the causes of current food insecurity crisis in a holistic manner, and as part of a broader strategy for peacebuilding, recovery and development in the north-east. Key priorities include:

- **Maintaining the provision of live-saving support**, with a particular focus on populations lacking access to livelihoods and services. These include populations living in current conflict zones, IDPs, recent returnees, and host communities. Levels of destitution and lack of coping capacity are most acute in these groups and must be urgently addressed if famine conditions are to be averted in the immediate and short-term;

- **Expanding and strengthening investments in livelihoods and access to services**. In areas that have been indirectly impacted by the conflict (due to trade disruptions or hosting of IDPs) or former conflict areas that are now under government control, medium-term measures are essential to restore economic productivity and livelihoods, restart provision of public services, and reconstruct damaged infrastructure.

- **Achieving a definitive resolution of the conflict** is a prerequisite for ending the disruptions currently generating acute humanitarian needs. In this regard, military action must be accompanied by efforts to address the root causes of the conflict, which include historical social and inter-communal grievances and disputes, as well as to prevent other sources of tension and conflict, which have arisen as a by product of population displacement, food insecurity and competition for livelihoods, from escalating further.

- **Long-term solutions to the various structural deficits and constraints need to be addressed through development interventions** in order to both strengthen the resilience of institutions, productive and social systems to future shocks, enhance economic and social development prospects for the population and consolidate peacebuilding efforts through inclusive and equitable growth.
While the ongoing conflict in north-east Nigeria is the key driver of acute famine risk, the severity and scale of its impact are influenced by a number of pre-existing economic, social and governance constraints which, over the past several decades, progressively weakened individual, household and systemic resilience and ability to manage shocks.

Based on the ‘complex emergencies’ model of famine causation outlined in chapter 1, the following section and accompanying diagram illustrate the linkages between conflict and structural constraints as key drivers, their disruptive impact on regional economic productive systems, institutions and social cohesion, and the resulting consequences for individual and household food security and exposure to malnutrition and disease. An important characteristic of this causal chain is its geographic differentiation and consequent variable impacts throughout the six affected states. Conflict has directly impacted the states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (henceforth referred to as BAY states), and most predominantly in rural areas, given government control of most major urban centers. The other three states of Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba have been impacted indirectly by population displacement from the other states, where they have exerted considerable pressure on weak, pre-existing levels of livelihood and service provision.

**PRIMARY DRIVERS (STRESSES AND STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS)**

In north-east Nigeria, the combination of primary drivers (the dynamics of the conflict since 2009 and pre-existing structural constraints) explains the nature, magnitude and severity of the disruptions and losses caused to livelihoods, economic productivity, exposure to disease and social cohesion.

**Conflict dynamics (2009 to present).** The trigger to the current conflict was the death of Mohammed Yusuf, the leader of an anti-government movement in Borno state, in 2009, which resulted in armed confrontations between his group and the government and soon escalated into a broad campaign of violence against the state and the civilian population. The tactics of the Boko Haram movement have been particularly violent and destructive, given the direct targeting of community leaders, churches, mosques, markets and other public facilities, including the use of terrorist attacks (suicide bombings), massacres and the abduction of hundreds of women and children. From 2014 onwards, the group escalated its attacks and considerably gained territory under its control (both in Nigeria and in neighbouring countries) in an attempt to establish a ‘caliphate’. The Nigerian government’s response was in the form of a robust military operation which, by 2015, resulted in the progressive ‘roll-back’ of Boko Haram forces from most occupied territories in the BAY states. These counter-insurgency operations generated significant collateral damage to the civilian population, triggering further waves of displacement.

---

6 Ibid.
and obstructing delivery of humanitarian assistance.\footnote{International Crisis Group. \textit{Instruments of Pain (IV): The Food Crisis in North-East Nigeria}. May 2017.} Although at present Boko Haram’s ability to take and hold territory has been compromised, it is still active in rural area, particularly in the eastern regions of Borno state, and are utilizing suicide bombers, IEDs and raids against both government and civilian targets to perpetuate the conflict.\footnote{United Nations. November 2016.}

Pre-existing structural constraints and deficiencies. Over the past two decades, the north-easter states of Nigeria have not benefited from the same levels of development and investment as other states in the country (notably the oil-rich states in the south). This is partly due to the structure of the regional economy, characterized by sub-optimal productivity, endemic poverty and chronic unemployment, as well as historical under-investment in economic infrastructure, basic social service provision and governance. These structural constraints meant that the ability of the population...
and social and economic systems to cope with conflict-induced disruptions was already eroded and weak, and susceptible to collapse. For the purposes of explaining current causes of food insecurity, the following constraints can be highlighted:

■ Deep social and economic disparities within the population, which has deepened perceptions of marginalization and exclusion, strengthened tensions and conflicts and facilitated radicalization;

■ Widespread and increasing poverty: since 2004, the poverty rate has increased to 69 percent of the population, compared to the national average of 60.9 percent in 2010;¹⁹

■ Weak economic productivity (below national average), with a predominant focus on subsistence agriculture, which has eroded progressively over the past decades due to a lack of government support and investment, poor management and lack of access to new technologies and inputs resulting in chronically high levels of unemployment;¹⁰

■ Historically limited state presence and governance capacities, which has contributed to low rates of economic growth and development, popular discontent and loss of legitimacy, and lack of ability to manage tensions and conflicts;

■ Low human capital development due to the limited provision of education, health and water/sanitation services, reflected in pre-conflict levels of literacy (28 percent), access to safe drinking water (under 50 percent), and access to health services (between 40-50 percent)—which are all below the national average;¹¹

■ Low levels of investment in economic infrastructure (market and transport infrastructure), which have constrained economic productivity due to insufficient and deteriorated infrastructures.

SECONDARY DRIVERS (SYSTEMIC DISRUPTIONS)

The two primary drivers have directly impacted the functioning of economic and social systems, causing destruction, disruption and instability, which in turn have had a direct ‘knock-on’ effect on individual, household and community welfare. These secondary drivers include the following systemic shocks:

Conflict related displacement and deaths. The ongoing conflict has had a significant impact on the civilian population, particularly following the escalation of violence in 2014. Since 2009, over 20,000 people have been killed through conflict-related violence (most are direct targets of Boko Haram), while 2 million people (80 percent of whom are estimated to be women and children) have been displaced within the region and neighboring countries (200,000 people).¹² The majority of IDPs (over 80 percent) live in host communities, primarily in urban centers, in areas that do not have adequate absorptive capacity in terms of livelihoods and social services, leaving them almost entirely dependent on humanitarian assistance.¹³ Of these, an estimated 7 percent have settled in the neighboring states of Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba, placing additional pressure on already weak capacities and livelihoods. At the same time, an estimated 1 million people have attempted to return to areas of origin, but due to inaccessibility and/or inexistence of livelihood options and services, have remained in displacement in makeshift settlements close to security forces.¹⁴

Productivity and market disruptions. The conflict has significantly impacted economic productivity in the north-east region, which is largely based on farming, pastoralism and fishing, and accounts for 80 percent of all livelihoods. The main impacts of the conflict include inaccessibility and loss of productive assets and inputs due to displacement and destruction, the disruption of markets due to the physical destruction of facilities and disruption of

---

¹¹ UNDP. May 2016.
¹² Most displacement occurred in 2014-2015, with IDPs originating from Borno (77.4 percent), Adamawa (8.6 percent) and Yobe (6.3 percent). (United Nations, February 2017).
transportation (an estimated 50 percent of markets are non or intermittently functioning), and increased prices for agricultural inputs and food (with the latter increasing at an average of 7 percent annually in all six affected states). As a result, agricultural production has declined sharply between 2010-2015. In Borno, for instance, production of sorghum declined by 82 percent, rice by 67 percent and millet by 55 percent, resulting in widespread loss of livelihoods and employment.\textsuperscript{15} While some people have managed to preserve or regain livelihoods in areas that have returned to government control, displaced populations have been unable to resume productive activity and are thus the most affected.

According to the RPBA undertaken in 2014-2015, the total losses in the agricultural sector (farmlands, buildings, equipment, livestock and equipment) due to the conflict amount to US$ 3.7 billion. The majority of losses have occurred in Borno state (64 percent), followed by Yobe (23 percent) and Adamawa (12 percent).\textsuperscript{16} In addition to direct losses in productive assets, productivity of the sector has also been significantly impaired by damages to the road network, which is estimated at US$ 526 million.\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{Disruptions of essential social services.} The conflict has significantly impacted the provision of

\textsuperscript{15} International Crisis Group. 2017.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
CASE STUDY: FAMINE RESPONSE AND PREVENTION IN NORTH-EAST NIGERIA

essential social services (education, health, and water/sanitation) through the deliberate targeting and destruction of infrastructure, facilities and equipment. In the health sector, 45 percent of all health facilities (including 21 hospitals) have been destroyed, damages and destruction to school infrastructure have left 2.9 million children without access to education, and an estimated 75 percent of all water and sanitation infrastructures are estimated to have been destroyed, compounding an already bad pre-2009 situation where less than half of the population had access to safe drinking water. Displaced populations suffer the most due to the disruption of these services, given competition for access to limited services in areas of displacement, and their inadequate availability in IDP camps. Table 2 below provides an overview of losses to the social services sector, broken down by state. While humanitarian assistance is addressing some of the gap in service, needs continue to surpass available resources.

**Regional economic deterioration.** As a result of the conflict, macroeconomic conditions (which were already in decline prior to 2009) have significantly deteriorated. According to World Bank estimates, the estimated economic losses due to the conflict in the six affected states amounted to 1.66 trillion naira, or approximately US$ 8.3 billion between 2011-2015. The vast majority of these losses (75 percent) are in the three most affected states (the BAY states, and associated with the decline in agricultural production). In the other three states which were

---

**TABLE 2: ESTIMATED DAMAGES TO SOCIAL SERVICES, BY STATE (IN US$ MILLIONS)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTORS</th>
<th>ADAMAWA</th>
<th>BORNO</th>
<th>YOBE</th>
<th>GOMBE</th>
<th>TARABA</th>
<th>BAUCHI</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>143.8</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health/nutrition</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>147.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water/sanitation</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>237.8</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>466.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

**FIGURE 3: STATE-LEVEL LOSSES IN GDP BETWEEN 2011-2014 (IN BILLIONS OF NAIRA)**

not directly impacted by the conflict, losses are attributed to ‘knock-on’ impacts of the conflict in the BAY states, including disruption of economic activities due to disrupted transportation, increased prices of agricultural inputs and food, and the influx of IDPs. The fiscal impact of the conflict has also been severe due to decreased state-level revenue generation as a result of decreased tax collection, and increased public expenditures related to security and reconstruction, resulting in an average increase in the budget deficit from 2.8 percent in 2011 to 20 percent in 2015 across the affected states.\(^{18}\) The net impact has been on the population has been a sharp increase in unemployment and poverty, decreased purchasing power due to price inflation, and progressive impairment of the state’s ability finance emergency programmes and service delivery at scale.

**TERTIARY DRIVERS (DIRECT IMPACTS)**

The significant deterioration, and in some cases, collapse of economic systems of production and social services due to conflict in the north-east contributed directly to acute levels of food insecurity, malnutrition and disease which, in some localities, have reached famine levels. Because of the ‘variable geography’ of the conflict, these impacts are not generalized throughout the regions, with the most affected populations located in areas that currently constitute active conflict zones (large parts of Borno, northern Adamawa and eastern Yobe).\(^{19}\)

**Food insecurity.** As of September 2017, food insecurity has reached extreme levels in parts of the BAY states, with an estimated 5.1 million people

---

18 Federal Government of Nigeria. 2015.
in IPC Phases 3 to 5, representing an increase of 50 percent in levels of extreme food insecurity since March 2016. Of this population, an estimated 100,000 are in IPC phase 5 (famine). While humanitarian assistance is reaching millions of people and helping mitigate food insecurity to an extent, access remains difficult in the conflict zones where needs are greatest. Direct causes of food insecurity include a combination of factors, including physical displacement and loss of access to productive assets and employment, declining purchasing power due to decreased income and high food prices, and low availability of food due to disruptions in production, markets and transportation. IDPs, including populations residing in urban areas and secondary makeshift settlements close to areas of origin, are the most affected due to the unavailability of livelihood and income generating opportunities. While food security conditions are expected to improve in late 2017 in certain locations in the BAY states due to favorable climatic conditions and relative stability in some government-controlled areas, productive capacities and socioeconomic systems remain fragile and prone to destabilization in the absence of measures to end the conflict.

Loss of livelihoods. Even prior to the crisis, livelihoods in north-east Nigeria were fragile due to dependence on subsistence-level agriculture, low average income levels, and scarcity of other revenue generating sources. The destruction or loss of access to productive assets has decreased livelihoods and employment for many, resulting in a decline in labor force participation for that sector from 43 percent in 2009 to 27 percent in 2012-2013 (with the rate likely lower in 2017). The situation is particularly severe for IDPs who lack access to productive assets and employment (over 80 percent), as well as host communities, who are obliged to share their resources with IDPs in a context of declining economic conditions. As a result, negative coping strategies have increased among both displaced and host communities, including reduced food consumption, distress selling of productive assets, and prostitution.

Malnutrition and disease. During the current conflict, exposure to malnutrition and disease have increased significantly in the BAY states due to worsening food insecurity and the destruction and inaccessibility of essential health and water/sanitation services. Acute food insecurity and lack of access to healthcare has led to emergency levels of malnutrition, with 1.2 million children under 5 and pregnant and lactating women currently acutely malnourished. Lack of access to health care facilities have left 12 million people highly susceptible to diseases, with 6.9 million in the BAY states requiring urgent assistance. The risk of diseases is compounded by the widespread destruction of WASH facilities, which has left an estimated 3.6 million people without access to safe water, 1.9 million people without basic sanitation, and 6.2 million people without proper hygiene. Conditions in areas of high IDP concentration, including camps and informal settlements, are particularly troubling due to the unavailability of adequate health and WASH services. This situation has led to increased incidence of diseases, including outbreaks of polio and measles over the past year.
3. ELEMENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH FOR MITIGATING FAMINE RISK IN NORTH-EAST NIGERIA

As in the cases of Yemen, South Sudan and Somalia, the complex and multi-faceted nature of famine dynamics in north-east Nigeria underscores the need for a comprehensive approach to prevention and recovery that brings together life-saving assistance with support for strengthening individual and systemic resilience, within an overall long-term framework for addressing core structural constraints and the underlying causes of grievance and conflict.

As a way to define the theory of change for a holistic approach in north-east Nigeria, consideration should be given to individual, systemic and structural resilience as a key organizing concept for structuring and prioritizing humanitarian, recovery, development and peacebuilding interventions in an integrated fashion. Based on FAO’s classification, these consist of:

- **Capacity to absorb shocks** – the ability to minimize exposure to shocks and stresses through preventative measures and appropriate coping strategies to avoid permanent, negative impacts;

- **Capacity to adapt to a changing environment** – making proactive and informed choices about alternative livelihood strategies based on an understanding of changing conditions; and

- **Transformative capacity of an enabling institutional environment** – the governance mechanisms, policies/regulations, infrastructure, community networks, and formal and informal social protection mechanisms that constitute the enabling environment for systemic change.

Based on the famine causality dynamics and the above tenets of an integrated approach, the following four response levels can be identified, understood as distinct but temporally overlapping and programmatically interlinked sets of interventions:

1. **Level 1 Response: Humanitarian life-saving assistance.** At present, asymmetric attacks carried out by Boko Haram and government counter-insurgency operations in parts of the BAY states, as well as insecurity in rural areas outside government-controlled urban centers, continue to generate high levels of food insecurity. In these areas, life-saving humanitarian assistance is essential to prevent a deterioration of conditions due to near total disruption of livelihoods and access to services. In addition, urgent humanitarian needs are also present in areas recently re-occupied by the government, as well as in areas of high IDP concentrations, particularly urban zones, where access to livelihoods and income is extremely limited. Provision of this support corresponds to the first level of resilience, with the aim of improving food security and provision of essential services on an emergency basis until conditions stabilize sufficiently for more durable forms of assistance.28

2. **Level 2 Response: Short-term stabilization and recovery.** In areas that are outside of direct conflict zones, and where security and economic conditions have stabilized sufficiently, the focus of efforts should be on strengthening the resilience of individuals and households, economic productivity and trade, and provision
of social services. The objectives should be to enhance capacities to prevent further deterioration of food security and vulnerability, facilitate the return and sustainable reintegration of displaced people, and enable socioeconomic recovery. Determining target populations and geographic areas, as well as the overall focus and sequencing of this support, should be based on the presence of enabling factors, including: sufficient security (defined in terms of reduction of violent incidents and presence of effective law and order), the degree of access to the target population, and the presence and capacity of state administration and service provision in target areas. Depending on the presence and sustainability of enabling conditions, two sets of interventions can be considered:

- **Strengthening individual and household coping capacities**: In areas that are just beginning to stabilize, or in which enabling factors such as security and government/state presence are still nascent (i.e. many areas in the BAY states), the focus should be on transitioning from life-saving assistance to restoring livelihoods and access to social services. Short to medium term objectives of this assistance would be to enhance resilience to shocks and promote recovery through restoring access to productive assets, increasing economic production (notably of food) and increasing income and employment opportunities. Specific measures could include: facilitating access to productive assets (e.g. land distribution and livestock replenishment, particularly...
targeting IDPs and returnees), provision of agricultural inputs (e.g. seeds and livestock), short-term employment creation through cash for work, provision of social safety nets (cash transfers), and restoration of access to essential services (including through provisional delivery systems and rehabilitation of small community infrastructure).  

■ Enabling medium-term recovery and systemic resilience: In areas that have stabilized sufficiently, or areas indirectly impacted by the conflict (notably the states of Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba), strengthening systemic resilience at the local and community levels can help prevent future destabilization and promote recovery and growth despite a constrained regional economic environment. Medium term objectives of this assistance could include increasing and improving economic production, ensuring full access to high quality services on a sustainable basis, and achieving full social integration (including IDPs) in the above. With respect to economic productivity, measures could include access to financing for business recovery and development (credits and grants), diversification and development of agricultural value chains, strengthening of agricultural extension services and skills training programmes, and rehabilitation of priority economic infrastructure to facilitate economic recovery (notably roads, markets and water/irrigation systems). In the area of service provision, priority should be accorded to strengthening and expanding institutional service delivery systems, including through the rehabilitation of infrastructure, restaffing, and allocation of financing for adequate and high-quality service delivery. Additional investments will likely be required in areas of protracted displacement, both to provide additional absorptive capacities to host communities and enable IDPs to generate income pending their return.  

3. Level 3 Response: Long-term transformation and development. While level 2 interventions can help strengthen the resilience of local economies and institutional capacities, these will not be sustainable over the long-term without a focus on core underlying structural constraints and deficiencies. Three priorities will be essential for sustainable long-term recovery and to mitigate structural constraints directly impacting the resilience of livelihoods and local economic and social systems. 

■ Transformational economic growth and development. The first priority is to promote transformational economic development in the north-east, in line with the region’s potential, with a focus on expansion, modernization and growth of the agricultural sector to enable it to move beyond subsistence-level production. This will necessitate significant investments in economic infrastructure; the development of agri-business value chains with a focus on achieving large-scale production; promotion of regional and cross-border trade; private sector development; and a policy and investment framework at state level for long-term development of the sector. 

■ Macroeconomic stabilization and development. A second major priority is to strengthen the macroeconomic foundations and fiscal capacities of the six states in the north-east to sustain recovery and development efforts, and address core pre-crisis structural constraints. This requires scaling up of public capital expenditures and strengthening of public financial management systems (including fiscal transfers) at federal, state and local levels, strengthening state-level revenue mobilization systems, including tax and customs duty collection, and development of adequate macroeconomic and fiscal policies to promote private sector development, investment and structural growth over the long-term.

29 Federal Government of Nigeria. RPBA Volume 1 – Component Reports. 2015.
Governance and institutional development. Addressing historical governance weaknesses will necessitate a substantial investment in state-level institution-building, with a focus on strengthening policy, regulatory and oversight capacities (particularly in the area of economic and social development), service delivery planning and management, as well as investments in expanding and strengthening institutional capacities and governance at local levels, with a focus on development planning, budget/resource management and service delivery. Across all levels of governance and institutional strengthening, priority should be placed on enhancing accountability, transparency and inclusion.

Level 4 Response: Security, peacebuilding and restoration of social cohesion. Despite gains against Boko Haram in 2015, which have led to the stabilization of large areas of the BAY states, insecurity and violence continue at high levels due to asymmetric tactics (raids, IEDs and suicide bombings), which in many cases directly target civilians. While the further roll-back or neutralization of Boko Haram (ideally peacefully) constitutes the single most important factor in reducing famine risk, a number of additional measures can be identified which would diminish insecurity and its disruptive impacts on food security, and reduce the risk of new conflicts. These include:
**Restoration of law and order.** In the immediate short-term, measures to secure areas recently retaken from Boko Haram should transition from military to law and order measures, with a focus on safeguarding civilians, protecting efforts to restart agricultural production, and facilitating the safe return of IDPs. The use of military and other law and order assets should be strategically balanced between both counter-insurgency and civilian protection priorities. Over the medium to long-term, priority should be placed on the strengthening of state and local level police and justice capacities to enable responsive, accountable and effective services to the civilian population;

**Strengthening conflict resolution and peacebuilding capacities.** In order to mitigate and resolve inter-communal, ethnic and IDP/host community tensions that have emerged as a result of disruptions to social cohesion caused by the conflict, priority should be placed on strengthening local conflict resolution capacities (formal and informal) at local level, promoting inclusive governance and decision-making on economic recovery and development issues, targeting youth and other at-risk population groups with assistance to promote alternatives to violence-based livelihoods, and strengthening formal and informal justice mechanisms to support the rights of the most vulnerable, with particular focus on victims of violence (including SGBV), IDPs and returnees.31

---

4. OVERVIEW OF PREVIOUS AND CURRENT FAMINE RESPONSE EFFORTS IN NORTH-EAST NIGERIA

National and international attention to the situation in north-east Nigeria expanded significantly following the escalation of the conflict in 2014 and its devastating impact on the civilian population. The government’s military counter-insurgency efforts in 2015 were followed by the development of the ‘Buhari Plan’ for rebuilding the north-east—a comprehensive strategy for addressing humanitarian, security, peacebuilding and development needs—which highlighted the priority accorded to the north-east by the Federal Government.

This has been accompanied by a significant increase in international support, including both humanitarian assistance to address emergency needs related to mass population displacement and loss of livelihoods and access to e-services, as well as development financing, which is being aligned against the analysis of recovery and reconstruction needs and priorities identified through the North-East Nigeria Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment undertaken with support from the UN, World Bank and EU in 2015. This section provides an overview of these various efforts in relation to the four levels of an integrated response to addressing food insecurity outlined in the previous section.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

The humanitarian community scaled up the provision of assistance drastically following the escalation of the conflict in late 2014, during which the bulk...
of violence-related deaths (over 20,000) and population displacement (up to 2 million people) took place. The focus of humanitarian efforts has been on the populations most directly affected by the conflict, which in late 2017 consists of 8.5 million people, 5.1 million of which are facing acute levels of food insecurity (IPC levels 4 and 5), and approximately 2 million of which are currently displaced. From 2014 to present, over US$ 1.5 billion out of a total of US$ 1.7 billion required has been allocated for humanitarian assistance, which has played a critical role in addressing immediate live-saving needs and mitigating the scale of food insecurity and exposure to malnutrition and disease (see figure 4, below). As in other humanitarian emergency contexts, the humanitarian response strategy for north-east Nigeria addresses food insecurity from the perspectives of both emergency food assistance (provision of in-kind food or vouchers) and emergency livelihoods support (including provision of agricultural inputs, training/capacity building and income generating activities). In addition, it defines a clear interface between humanitarian and longer-term recovery and development priorities identified through the ‘Buhari Plan’, RPBA and other frameworks, underscoring the importance of strengthening socioeconomic resilience and ensuring sustainable recovery over the long-term.

At the same time, humanitarian efforts have been constrained by lack of access due to continuing insecurity and conflict, in some cases preventing the delivery of life-saving assistance to populations in conflict zones who are facing acute levels of food insecurity (which in some areas has reached famine levels). In addition, and while the overall 2017 humanitarian response has been well-funded to date, funding for food security has been insufficient (with 27 percent of overall requirements funded to date). Both constraints have impacted the response coverage: at present, only 2 million out of 5.1 million people in IPC phase 4 and 5 have been reached, while only 27 percent of people targeted for livelihoods assistance have been reached. In the face of continuing high levels of violence and needs among conflict affected and IDP populations alike, there is a growing concern that gains achieved to date could be eroded.

### TABLE 3: OVERVIEW OF HUMANITARIAN CLUSTER RESPONSE COVERAGE, JANUARY-JULY 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>INTERVENTION</th>
<th>TARGETED</th>
<th>REACHED</th>
<th>RESPONSE COVERAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food security</td>
<td>Food assistance</td>
<td>5.1 million</td>
<td>2 million</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Livelihoods support</td>
<td>1.5 million</td>
<td>410,000</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>SAM treatment</td>
<td>283,100</td>
<td>143,950</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supplementary feeding</td>
<td>472,000</td>
<td>236,300</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Outpatient health services</td>
<td>2.1 million</td>
<td>2.4 million</td>
<td>114%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mobile medical activities</td>
<td>3.8 million</td>
<td>1.7 million</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Safe drinking water</td>
<td>2 million</td>
<td>1.3 million</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hygiene kits</td>
<td>1.1 million</td>
<td>625,950</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response &amp; Recovery</td>
<td>Cash for work</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OCHA, North-East Nigeria Humanitarian Situation Update, July 2017

---

32 The 2017 HRP addresses only humanitarian needs in the BAY states, on the basis that support for needs in the other three states will be provided from development frameworks. (United Nations. December 2016).
TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO RECOVERY AND PEACEBUILDING

As stated at the outset, Federal and State level governments have been pro-actively engaged in addressing the crisis in the north-east, particularly since the escalation of the conflict in 2014. The main vehicle for this is the 2016 ‘Buhari Plan’, which provides a comprehensive strategy for addressing the impacts of the conflict as well as its underlying drivers, and coordinating the efforts of national and international actors. Within this framework, six areas of intervention are identified, consisting of: emergency humanitarian assistance and social cohesion; early recovery (livelihoods and job creation); rehabilitation, relocation and resettlement of IDPs and refugees; peacebuilding (with a focus on strengthening social cohesion); security (with a focus on law and order); and social and economic development (with a focus on infrastructure reconstruction, agricultural development, social service delivery, and governance, among other priorities).35

Within the framework of the ‘Buhari Plan’, the Government requested the UN, World Bank and EU to undertake an assessment of recovery needs to inform the prioritization and operationalization of the former. The resulting RPBA, which was conducted between 2015-2016, provided a comprehensive assessment of damages and losses due to the conflict in the six states, and identified needs for recovery and reconstruction focusing on priorities that would also address some of the structural drivers of economic and social fragility identified in section 2 of this paper. According to the RPBA, estimated economic output losses (in terms of state-level GDP) amounted to over US$ 8 billion, while estimated damages and losses to infrastructure and services amounted to over US$ 9 billion, with the BAY states disproportionately affected. Identified recovery needs over a 4 year period were costed at US$ 6.7 billion.

In addition to assessing losses and recovery needs, the RPBA also articulates a 4-year strategy for addressing recovery and peacebuilding priorities that is directly complementary to the HRP, with operational and coordination linkages envisioned to a) facilitate progressive transitions from humanitarian assistance to recovery interventions; and b) co-leverage the value-added of humanitarian and recovery interventions to maximise support provided to affected populations. The rationale for an approach that integrates peacebuilding, stability and social cohesion with economic recovery and the reconstruction of infrastructure and services is founded on recognition that peace is a prerequisite for sustainable recovery, and that a broad ‘systems’ approach is needed to address the multi-faceted nature of conflict impacts and underlying structural drivers. Accordingly, the RPBA proposes four strategic indicators to measure progress against this overall approach:

- Improved socio-economic resilience of communities affected by conflict and forced displacement through the provision of integrated, holistic and sustainable solutions to needs and impacts of the conflict.

### TABLE 4: OVERVIEW OF RECOVERY AND PEACEBUILDING NEEDS BY COMPONENT (US$ MILLION)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENTS</th>
<th>ADAMAWA</th>
<th>BORNO</th>
<th>YOBE</th>
<th>GOMBE</th>
<th>TARABA</th>
<th>BAUCHI</th>
<th>FEDERAL/REGIONAL</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding &amp; social cohesion</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure &amp; social services</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>3,933</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>5,768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic recovery</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>4,040</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>6,392</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

Strengthened community security and social cohesion in communities reached by reconciliation, violence prevention and community security initiatives.

Strengthened social fabric in the North-East by building trust in government institutions through improved governance capacities, mechanisms and practices, and enhanced transparency, accountability and citizen engagement.

Reduced service delivery and livelihoods gaps between individuals and communities affected by conflict and displacement and those not affected by them.36

Although not focused specifically on famine prevention or response, it is important to note that this strategic approach—and the panoply of needs and priorities identified through the assessment—have a direct bearing on the primary and secondary drivers of famine causation identified in section 2, as well as the various levels of intervention identified to address them as outline in section 3. The distinction made in the RPBA between stabilization interventions (years 1-2) and recovery interventions (years 3-4) also mirrors the dual focus on short-term resilience (in terms of strengthened absorptive and adaptive capacities) and long-term resilience (transformational development of capacities).

UN VISION ON COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Within the UN, the ‘New Way of Working’ is being operationalized through a strategic platform for the delivery of humanitarian and development assistance, which is founded on an integrated three-pronged approach to strengthening resilience over the medium-term consisting of support for:

■ Facilitating the voluntary return of IDPs and refugees to safe areas of origin;
■ Promoting investment in local infrastructure and social services, notably health, education, water and sanitation; and
■ Rebuilding of livelihoods to stimulate investment, recovery and growth.37

Building on both the HRP and the Sustainable Development Goals, this approach is intended to enhance a more integrated and coherent approach within the UN system, building on the comparative advantages of its respective entities, to ensure effective action across humanitarian and development areas of engagement.

COORDINATION AND FINANCING OF RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTIONS

The ‘Buhari Plan’ and the pro-active engagement and leadership of the Nigerian government together provide a basis for the coordination of national and international efforts across humanitarian, peacebuilding and recovery/development areas. Responsibility for the overall coordination and oversight of the ‘Buhari Plan’ rests with the Nigerian Presidential Committee for the North East Initiative (PCNI), while at state level a number of structures have been established to drive coordination of efforts and guide priority setting and project formulation.38 Additional coordination structures include federal and inter-state platforms, a ‘North-east Development Coordination Group’ (donor forum led by DFID), and the IMTF and subsidiary bodies, which ensures coordination between the government and humanitarian partners.

Under its leadership and with support from the UN, World Bank, EU and other international partners, a roadmap has been developed for the operationalization of the RPBA assessment and strategy, which is considered an integral part of the ‘Buhari Plan’, and a vehicle for its implementation. As of September 2017, considerable progress has been achieved in the implementation of the roadmap, including:

■ Establishment of the institutional and implementation architecture, including the PCNI, state-level coordination structures, and coordination platforms at federal, inter-state, and state levels;
■ Development of implementation strategies for operationalizing the ‘Buhari Plan’ and the RPBA is progressing, while at state level prioritized plans of action (Strategic Action Plans for Recovery and Stabilization) are being developed to identify priority needs and financing requirements;
■ Technical and capacity development assistance is being provided by DFID, the World Bank, the UN and the EU to the PCNI and state-level governments to strengthen their capacities in the areas of recovery planning, priority setting, coordination and programme management;
■ A number of programmes aligned with the ‘Buhari Plan’ and the RPBA are currently operational or under development (see following sub-section);
■ A comprehensive mapping of the existing policy environment at Federal and State levels has been undertaken to identify gaps and additional requirements to enable implementation of ‘Buhari Plan’ and RPBA priorities.

38 In Borno state, a Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement has been established to coordinate and manage recovery and stabilization efforts, while in other states steering committees and project coordination units have been established for this purpose. (World Bank, 2017).
FINANCING FOR RECOVERY

Since the adoption of the ‘Buhari Plan’ and the completion of the RPBA, and in the context of ongoing efforts to operationalize both frameworks, a number of development-oriented interventions have been developed which are expected to contribute significantly to medium to long-term resilience strengthening and recovery goals. Four main themes emerge from these projects, which directly address a number of primary and secondary drivers of food insecurity in north-eastern Nigeria: support for the return of IDPs and restoration of productive livelihoods among this population as well as host communities; strengthening of economic productivity and employment creation; enhancing social cohesion; and improving delivery of essential social services. Table 5 below provides a non-exhaustive overview of current projects implemented by the UN, EU, World Bank and ADB, illustrating the broad scope and significant scale of financing (over US$ 1.3 billion). A number of other development interventions, many of which predate the ‘Buhari Plan’, also exist, underscoring the importance of strengthening coordination and alignment of efforts within this framework.39

Table 5: Overview of Selected Interventions Aligned with ‘Buhari Plan’/RPBA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Targets/Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Budget (US$ Million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Durable Solutions Strategy for the Return and Recovery for Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees in Northeast Nigeria</td>
<td>UNDP/UNHCR</td>
<td>To support solutions of voluntary return, local integration or resettlement of displaced populations, and in doing so, contribute to the resilience of communities affected by the conflict in the states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, with overall expected effects on recovery and peacebuilding.</td>
<td>Displaced populations, host communities and returnees</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Community Stabilization Package</td>
<td>UNDP/WHO</td>
<td>To strengthen local communities through stabilization of livelihoods, restoration of basic services, strengthening of local governance and enhancing social cohesion and community security.</td>
<td>10 villages/1 million conflict-affected people</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project on early recovery and reconstruction in Borno State</td>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>Address immediate needs and support restoration of basic services stimulate employment and create livelihood opportunities.</td>
<td>1.3 million IDPs and affected communities</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive Basic Service Delivery and Livelihood Empowerment Integrated Program</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
<td>To contribute to reduced poverty and vulnerability in Nigeria in the context of the Northeast emergency transition, recovery and peacebuilding framework. The specific objective is to improve the quality of life by increasing access of the poor and vulnerable to basic social services in water, sanitation, hygiene, health and education; livelihood opportunities; food security and strengthened safety net systems in affected states in the Northeast.</td>
<td>9,000 IDPs; 2,032 SMEs; 2,900 construction artisans; 2,000 unskilled youth; 7,740 permanent and 4,700 temporary jobs</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

39 See annex 5 of the World Bank “Multi-Sectoral Crisis Recovery Project for North Eastern Nigeria (P157891)” for a list of other ongoing programmes in north-east Nigeria. A donor/aid tracking mechanism is currently being developed as part of the Buhari/RPBA implementation roadmap.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT TITLE</th>
<th>INSTITUTION</th>
<th>OBJECTIVES</th>
<th>TARGETS/ BENEFICIARIES</th>
<th>BUDGET (US$ MILLION)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Sectoral Crisis Recovery Project for North Eastern Nigeria</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>To (a) support the Government of Nigeria towards rehabilitating and improving critical service delivery infrastructure, improve the livelihood opportunities of conflict and displacement-affected communities, and strengthen social cohesion in the North East Participating States of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa; and (b) in the event of an Eligible Crisis or Emergency, to provide immediate and effective response to said Eligible Crisis or Emergency, through the proposed Contingent Emergency Response Component.</td>
<td>150,000 people in conflict-affected areas (including IDPs and host communities)</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria State Health Investment Project (Additional Financing)</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>To increase the delivery and use of high impact maternal and child health interventions and improve quality of care available to the people in Nasarawa and Ondo and all the States in the NE.</td>
<td>Displaced populations and host communities</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Education Program Investment Project (Additional financing)</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>The project development objective is to strengthen the educational system by supporting: (a) need-based teacher deployment; (b) school-level management and accountability; and (c) measurement of student learning in the Participating States.</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community and Social Development Project (Additional Financing)</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>To support the immediate provision of basic social and natural resource management infrastructure and services in the communities affected by the Boko Haram insurgency, thus assisting the promotion of resettlement, recovery, and welfare of the internally displaced persons (IDPs), the returnees, i.e. those willing to return or relocate to safe environments, and the host communities.</td>
<td>3,750 communities (1.5 million households) 1,500 health centers rehabilitated 2,000 classrooms rehabilitated 50,000 students enrolled</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Employment and Social Support Operation (Additional Financing)</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>To increase access of the poor and vulnerable, using improved social safety net systems, to youth employment opportunities in all Participating States and to provide Targeted Cash Transfers to the poor, vulnerable and internally displaced people (IDPs) in the North East States.</td>
<td>300,000 youth among the poor, vulnerable and IDPs 50,000 households</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third National Fadama Development Project (Additional Financing)</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>To increase the incomes for users of rural lands and water resources in a sustainable manner and to contribute to restoration of the livelihoods of conflict affected households in the selected area in the North East of the Recipient’s territory.</td>
<td>192,000 direct beneficiaries 24,000 households</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polio Eradication Support Project (Additional Financing)</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>To assist the Recipient, as part of a global polio eradication effort, to achieve and sustain at least 80 percent coverage with oral polio vaccine immunization in every state in the Recipient’s territory, and sustain national routine immunization coverage.</td>
<td></td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF RESILIENCE AND DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTIONS

An understanding of the cost and benefits associated with development-oriented interventions for strengthening resilience to conflict-induced disruptions and enabling medium to long-term recovery is essential in informing decisions on financial allocation over the short to long-term, and the phasing and sequencing of interventions (including the transitioning from life-saving to resilience focused interventions).

In north-east Nigeria, the comprehensive assessment of damages and recovery needs undertaken through the RPBA in 2015 provides important data that can be used to understand and quantify the costs entailed, as well as ensuring economic returns and benefits. While further data is needed to calculate costs and benefits of specific interventions, the example of selected infrastructure projects serves to illustrate the value of these investments.

### INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGES AND NEEDS

According to the 2015 RPBA, the conflict resulted in over US$ 9.2 billion in damages and losses to public infrastructure and services which, when combined with the total economic output loss across the six states for the same time period (US$ 8.3 billion), highlights the scale and extent of the destruction that took place. In terms of the damage to infrastructure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>ADAMAWA</th>
<th>BORNO</th>
<th>YOBE</th>
<th>GOMBE</th>
<th>TARABA</th>
<th>BAUCHI</th>
<th>FEDERAL</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>31,852,500</td>
<td>16,032,500</td>
<td>4,295,000</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>6,991,250</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>129,537,500</td>
<td>188,708,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>21,067,200</td>
<td>58,996,800</td>
<td>32,936,400</td>
<td>399,600</td>
<td>6,472,800</td>
<td>27,824,400</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>147,697,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protection</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>73,808,500</td>
<td>306,137,824</td>
<td>116,852,000</td>
<td>29,043,500</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>525,841,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water &amp; Sanitation</td>
<td>7,378,000</td>
<td>35,022,000</td>
<td>3,613,000</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>46,013,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>591,960,853</td>
<td>2,793,918,124</td>
<td>1,026,414,283</td>
<td>34,327,547</td>
<td>25,434,875</td>
<td>35,386,950</td>
<td>129,537,500</td>
<td>4,636,980,132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and services directly related to food security and disease exposure (notably agriculture, energy, health, transport, and water/sanitation), the total amount is estimated at US$ 4.6 billion (table 6 below provides a breakdown of damages for these sectors, by state).40

The RPBA also assessed needs for post-conflict recovery, determined on the basis of requirements for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of essential infrastructure and the resumption of services for areas and population groups most affected by the conflict. A two-phase approach is recommended for addressing needs over a period of four years: a stabilization phase (years 1-2) focused on restoring essential infrastructure and services and recovery of (agricultural) livelihoods; and a recovery phase (years 3-4) focused on reconstruction of major economic infrastructure (transport, irrigation), housing and rebuilding of education and health facilities. The costing of recovery needs within this framework is based on the replacement value of assets and infrastructure, and includes premiums relating to enhancements (on the basis of ‘building back better’ principles) and expanded capacity to cater to additional needs (notably of IDPs). On this basis total needs for reconstruction and rehabilitation for the 4-year period amount to US$ 6 billion. For the sectors most directly relevant for addressing food insecurity and exposure to disease (agriculture, energy, health, transport, and water/sanitation), total needs amount to US$ 2.9 billion for the same period (see table 7 below).

 ELEMENTS OF A COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICE RECOVERY INTERVENTIONS

Medium to long-term development investments in infrastructure and services are essential for enhancing resilience to shocks at both individual and systemic levels, and can help address underlying structural constraints and deficits (including lack of adequate access and coverage of services, and productivity losses due to inadequate economic infrastructure). These benefits are illustrated in both quantitative and qualitative terms in the economic analysis of infrastructure and service rehabilitation interventions envisioned in the World Bank-financed Multi-Sectoral Crisis Recovery Project for North-Eastern Nigeria. For a total investment of US$ 99 million targeting the BAY states, the project aims to promote economic recovery by rehabilitating priority transport networks, reduce exposure to disease and promote agricultural productivity through improved access to clean water and irrigation, and reduce exposure to disease and morbidity. All three interventions are expected to generate direct

<p>| TABLE 7: OVERVIEW OF RECOVERY NEEDS FOR SELECTED INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES BY STATE (2011-2015, IN US$) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>ADAMAWA</th>
<th>BORNO</th>
<th>YOBE</th>
<th>GOMBE</th>
<th>TARABA</th>
<th>BAUCHI</th>
<th>FEDERAL</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>141,109,690</td>
<td>485,443,689</td>
<td>170,029,316</td>
<td>18,487,489</td>
<td>29,700,262</td>
<td>36,602,990</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>881,373,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>31,852,500</td>
<td>15,938,500</td>
<td>3,318,000</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3,391,250</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>92,477,500</td>
<td>146,977,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>50,636,400</td>
<td>481,690,400</td>
<td>86,168,000</td>
<td>4,047,600</td>
<td>12,744,800</td>
<td>29,286,000</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>666,775,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protection</td>
<td>93,764,839</td>
<td>180,263,768</td>
<td>69,565,531</td>
<td>34,290,979</td>
<td>30,556,067</td>
<td>91,080,398</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>499,521,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>74,531,000</td>
<td>337,522,671</td>
<td>126,711,650</td>
<td>37,001,900</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>575,767,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water &amp; Sanitation</td>
<td>25,890,554</td>
<td>115,323,061</td>
<td>17,211,969</td>
<td>2,955,809</td>
<td>4,682,627</td>
<td>5,788,496</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>171,852,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>417,784,983</td>
<td>1,616,182,088</td>
<td>473,004,466</td>
<td>96,783,777</td>
<td>81,075,007</td>
<td>162,757,884</td>
<td>94,680,000</td>
<td>2,942,268,205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

benefits (in terms of the people whose welfare and income is directly improved by the project) as well as indirect benefits (productivity gains accruing through economic improvements of avoided productivity losses due to illness or death as well as the strengthening of institutional capacities). These benefits, which are outlined in the table below, are expected to generate an economic rate of return of 17.6 percent, which is expected to remain positive even if adjusted downwards to reflect increased costs or decreased benefits.\(^\text{41}\)

Taking a step back, it is also useful to compare the total costs for recovery in those sectors essential to famine prevention and recovery (agriculture, energy, health, transport, and water/sanitation) with the costs of humanitarian interventions focused on addressing life-saving and short-term needs in the same sectors. If the humanitarian appeal requirements for 2017 as used as a basis for calculating needs over four years, total requirements amount to approximately US$ 3.5 billion, compared to US$ 2.9 billion for recovery-oriented interventions identified in the RPBA (see table 9 below). Taking into account the additional economic benefits accruing to development-focused interventions as illustrated by the example of the World Bank project, development investments demonstrate considerable cost effectiveness. At the same time, such a comparison must be qualified to take into account the fact that humanitarian interventions also include some resilience-focused activities, and in the prevailing context cannot be substituted for the time being by development interventions due to continuing insecurity and violence.

---

\(^{41}\) This assumes a 15-year period for the project to yield results; a discount rate of 6 percent, and 10 percent security premium given the operating environment in the BAY states. (World Bank. \textit{Multi-Sectoral Crisis Recovery Project for North Eastern Nigeria (P157891)}, 2017.)
### TABLE 9: OVERVIEW OF HUMANITARIAN NEEDS FOR SELECTED CLUSTERS (BASED ON 2017 APPEAL)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLUSTER/SECTOR</th>
<th>2017 APPEAL (US$)</th>
<th>4 YEARS PROJECTED (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early Recovery and Livelihoods</td>
<td>44,553,589</td>
<td>178,214,356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Security</td>
<td>480,260,433</td>
<td>1,921,041,732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>93,827,598</td>
<td>375,310,392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>110,268,668</td>
<td>441,074,672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>88,274,151</td>
<td>353,096,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Sanitation</td>
<td>49,736,246</td>
<td>198,944,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>866,920,685</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,467,682,740</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OCHA, Financial Tracking System
6. COUNTRY-SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS ON BETTER INTEGRATING HUMANITARIAN, DEVELOPMENT AND PEACE INTERVENTIONS TO PREVENT, MITIGATE AND ADDRESS FAMINE RISK

Based on the analysis of famine drivers in north-east Nigeria and ongoing efforts to promote greater integration across humanitarian, development and peacebuilding efforts, the following observations and recommendations can be made:

- **The non-linear and geographically variable evolution of the conflict in north-east Nigeria underscores the importance of a multi-faceted and differentiated approach to targeting different population/area needs.** As the epicenter of the conflict, the BAY states will likely require a concerted focus on life-saving assistance in those areas still impacted by conflict or recently retaken by government forces; in other areas where relative stability has returned after conflict or were never directly affected by conflict, priority should be given to resilience strengthening and recovery—both to consolidate stability and prevent further deterioration of social and economic conditions. In the other three states, which were indirectly impacted by the conflict due to the presence of IDPs and the ‘knock-on’ impacts of conflict-induced economic and trade disruptions, the focus should be on strengthening the resilience of social and economic systems to enhance capacities to withstand such shocks and prevent their destabilization.

- **Attention to underlying structural constraints and weaknesses that created high levels of vulnerability to the impacts of the conflict need to be addressed as a matter of priority**—both in order to create capacity to withstand future shocks and to prevent current levels of disruption, destitution and destruction from generating new forms of conflict over the medium to long-term. At the same time, a phased approach to longer-term development will be required, beginning with a first phase of systemic stabilization and consolidation, due to the enormity of the needs and the consequent long-term horizon for achieving results.

- **The considerable assets of the Nigerian state can be leveraged to support the recovery, stabilization and further development of the north-east.** Unlike Somalia, Yemen, and South Sudan, the north-east region can benefit significantly from being part of a well-functioning and resourced federal structure, with the capacity to provide long-term support at the policy, institutional and programme levels, as well as long-term financing through the national budget.

- **The important gains made in restoring security and law and order to areas previously controlled or destabilized by Boko Haram should be consolidated** through additional investments to strengthen the responsiveness and accountability of security and justice institutions, and provide an enabling environment for economic recovery. Increased stability also provides an important opportunity for long-standing social, ethnic and economic tensions and grievances to be resolved, to prevent these from becoming the source of future conflicts.
CASE STUDY: FAMINE RESPONSE AND PREVENTION IN NORTH-EAST NIGERIA