Discussion Paper

The role of governance assessment and measurement tools in the context of political transitions

8 February 2013
Introduction

Major political upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa in the last two years make this an opportune time to examine what makes a successful political transition and how such a transition can be evaluated. Although measuring governance has clear relevance to political transitions and has been well-analysed, the particularities of a political transition – the factors that influence its outcome, and the special environment it engenders – merit a specific discussion of the tools that apply to these contexts. With these tools, policymakers, advocates, and academics can better understand political transitions and help realize more positive results. In some cases, the measurement process itself may help consolidate a democratic transformation.

This discussion paper examines existing methods for measuring aspects of political transitions\(^1\). It does not propose a new set of indicators to measure political transitions at the country level, but reviews existing methodologies with a view to sketching out some of the strengths and limitations of existing measurements tools. There are no existing frameworks that are able to measure or assess transition processes holistically, that capture the social, economic, and political dynamics. The paper canvasses and examines existing measurement tools that focus on some, but not all, relevant dimensions of transitions and, in many cases, require the use of proxies. The measurement challenge is exacerbated by the many existing tools that focus on consolidation of democracy rather than on the unique characteristics of transition processes. For example, vital issues such as transitional justice, return of funds stolen by principals of deposed regimes, instituting measures of social justice, and security sector reform are important analytical categories that try to assess issues that are not readily captured by standard indicators of the 'business and economic growth' tools.

By their nature, transitions require more time-sensitive measurements than do democratic consolidation. Several indices examined in this paper are slower to change and are not suited to measuring short-term changes, particularly qualitative changes in times of societal transitions. For example, changes in the Human Development Index in the short term are essentially a function of changes in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, which are most likely to suffer after upheavals. Frequency of measurement is therefore a crucial factor in assessing the relevance of specific measurement tools in a transition environment. The paper highlights the six countries that were the focus of the Conference “The Political Economy of Transitions – Analysis for Change”, jointly organized by the UNDP Oslo Governance Centre (OGC) and the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) on 8-9 November 2012; recent transitional countries Egypt, Myanmar, and Tunisia; and three experiences of transition conducted or initiated in Latin America and Asia since the mid-1980s – Brazil, Chile and Indonesia\(^2\). These six countries are a heterogeneous group in terms of the factors that catalysed their transitions, the changes that occurred during the transition, and the extent of the transition’s eventual success. That heterogeneity in terms of the political economy contexts, the pre-transition economic and political grievances, the demographic profiles of each country, and other factors makes it difficult to apply a single conceptual and measurement framework to all transitioned countries.

This paper is structured around the themes discussed in the background paper prepared for the UNDP-NOREF conference on the political economy of transitions. The first section focuses on methods to measure the challenges of economic transformation. Then the measurement of perceptions, experiences, and dynamics at the local level is considered. Tools to measure strategies for depoliticization and legitimation of state institutions in cases of military tutelage are examined, while the final section looks at policy support measures. The paper concludes with an overall mapping of tools relevant to the measurement of political transitions.

\(^1\) There is no consensus on a clear definition of political transitions. O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) argue that “transitions are delimited, on the one side, by the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other, by the installation of some form democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative” (p.6). O’Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe Schmitter (1986): “Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies.”, in O’Donnell et al., eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Part 4, pp. 1-78.

\(^2\) As some of these countries, particularly Myanmar, are not covered in many existing measurement methods, other countries are included where illustrative.
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Section 1 – Measuring economic and social transformation in transitions

Political transitions are often combined with systemic changes to a country’s economy. There are two main economic transitions: from a command to a market economy, and from a state-led market economy to a more free market or neo-liberal model. Both have implications for studies of transition and in the understanding of those transitions. There is also the role for regulation as economies make a transition. Making such reforms successful comes with many associated challenges, from internal country dynamics to external pressures and the bureaucratic capacity to follow through with good intentions.

This section will cover some existing methods for measuring these challenges and the signs that reformers may be overcoming them. It covers measurement of macroeconomic stability, social measures, corruption and illicit financial flows, and institutional and technical capacity.

1.1 Macroeconomic stability

Socioeconomic problems have played a major role in triggering transition processes around the world. It is therefore not surprising that addressing macroeconomic stability is usually the main challenge immediately following a transition, especially in countries that are facing hyper-inflation or runaway debt and massive deficits. But macroeconomic stabilization is often achieved at great social, and often economic, cost. Stabilizing prices has usually involved massive cuts in public expenditure, which has led to higher poverty rates and often depressed growth rates. If high poverty and inequality are two of the reasons for political transition, then any political transition must be careful not to reinforce the very conditions that led to it in the first place.

The Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) is a methodology focused specifically on democratic transitions. It aims to provide a knowledge base of factors leading to success or failure in development and transformation. Experts evaluate seven criteria for economic transformation, four of which are relevant to a standard understanding of macroeconomic stability (the others are discussed under Social Measures, below). Using slightly different terminology from the BTI, those four criteria are market-based competition, financial stability, property rights, and economic performance. Many of the indicators refer to economic liberalization, a bias toward liberal economic models.

The first facet of macroeconomic stability, according to the BTI, is the existence of “clear rules for stable, market-based competition.” While the BTI provides indicators to measure this, the ‘Open Markets’ indicators contained in the Heritage Index of Economic Freedom (HIEF)—which aims to cover all countries and is not specifically focused on transitions—are more quantitative and comprehensive. They include a score for trade freedom, calculated from the trade-weighted average tariff rate and non-tariff barriers; investment freedom, which is calculated by deducting points for various restrictions on investment; and financial freedom, which is measured on a scale that assigns a score based on a qualitative description of the level of government interference in the financial sector. Egypt, for example, saw a big jump in investment freedom after the revolution, but a fall in financial freedom from 2011 to 2012. In contrast, Tunisia’s and Myanmar’s scores remained steady.

The second facet of macroeconomic stability is financial stability, specifically in currency and prices. This relates to official fiscal, debt, foreign exchange, and inflation policies as they impact macroeconomic stability. Some relevant currency indicators include the rate of debt and deficit spending, the interest rates set by the central bank, the size of the money supply, the interest rate on government

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3 www.bti-project.org/ueber-das-projekt/goals/index.nc
4 BTI Criterion 7
bonds, and the rate at which banks lend to each other. The existence and level of targets for inflation, deficits, and debt are important policy indicators. The most common indicator of prices is a consumer price index, based on a representative basket of goods.

The next facet is property rights. According to the HIEF, property rights comprise the ability of individuals to accumulate private property, secured by a clear and enforced legal framework. In Freedom House’s *Countries at the Crossroads* methodology—which focuses on countries with mediocre governance performance, many of which have undergone a transition—property rights comprise a legal right to own property, adequate state enforcement of contracts, and protection from land seizure. The BTI adds protection of private companies, as well as the extent to which privatization processes are conducted according to market principles. All are measured on various descriptive scales. The HIEF showed a major improvement in property rights in Myanmar from 2011 to 2012 but a slight decrease in Egypt and Tunisia. The BTI did not record a change in any of these three countries between 2010 and 2012.

Economic performance is most commonly measured by GDP. However, many alternative measures have been proposed to better reflect the complexities of modern economies. For example, the *Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress*, chaired by Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz, recommends incorporating measures of government output into economic performance. This can be done by including net rather than gross measures of economic activity to account for depreciation; improving measurement of all services by taking account of service quality; emphasizing outputs instead of inputs when measuring government services; changing the way in which household consumption and production are measured; and considering income, wealth, and consumption together in one measurement.5

The final component of the macroeconomic dimension is income inequality. This variable is important in understanding transition processes. It is often a factor in demands for wealth redistribution within societies that can precipitate calls for regime change and reforms to taxation and social expenditures policies. The question of whether income equality and poverty reduce after political transitions is also often the subject of policy debates in understanding the effect of democratization on income inequality, the effects of economic growth on inequality, and the effects of corruption on income inequality.6 Estimating income inequality is a highly technical exercise and there are a number of international agencies that compute and post income inequality indicators for countries using comparable methods based on household survey data and other domestic information sources. The UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID) collects and stores information on income inequality for developed, developing, and transition countries. The database covers 156 countries from 1960 to 2005. It includes calculations for Gini coefficients and income distribution by quintiles or deciles. The latest update also includes “survey means and medians along with the income shares of the richest 5 percent and the poorest 5 percent.” Indicators are also being developed to measure a different type of inequality, that of opportunity, to capture the non-income dimensions of inequality, such as education and health.7

### 1.2 Social Measures

While macroeconomic stability is a short-term concern after a transition (although it may constitute a longer-term challenge as well), the implementation of policies aimed at tackling poverty and social inequalities is generally not the first priority of a new regime. However, social tensions and a collective national identity under a new economic system can be major challenges after a transition. Therefore, social measures are often among the second most important reforms to be put in place.

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7 ADB Outlook 2012.
The primary social indicator is human development. The most comprehensive examination of human development, both in terms of indicators examined and years and countries covered, is the UN’s Human Development Report, launched in 1990. Each report includes a narrative section on a particular theme, as well as an extensive set of statistical tables covering different topics. One of these is the Human Development Index (HDI), a single statistic to measure development comprising health (measured as life expectancy at birth), education (measured as the average of mean years and expected years of schooling), and living standards (measured as gross national income per capita). Since the first report, Human Development Reports have been published annually at the global level as well as in all regions and many countries of the world.

In addition to general human development, social measures relevant to political transitions include other indicators of the well-being of a society and its inhabitants. One is social exclusion. The Human Development Report has included several indicators in addition to the HDI that are relevant to this topic, such as an inequality-adjusted HDI to account for inequalities in the three dimensions, a gender inequality index, and a multidimensional poverty index that takes account of individual deprivations.

In 2011, a regional Human Development Report was published for Europe and Central Asia on the theme of building inclusive societies. That report examined three dimensions of social exclusion: from economic life, from social services, and from participation in civil and social life and networks. The report developed a multidimensional index to measure and monitor social exclusion, including how people experience it. Data were gathered through household surveys conducted in six post-transition countries: Kazakhstan, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, Tajikistan, and Ukraine. One main conclusion was that the structures, institutional inefficiencies, and attitudes present before the transition played a major role in determining whether or not people will experience social exclusion.

Closely linked to social exclusion is equality of opportunity. To measure this, economists from the World Bank developed a Human Opportunity Index. This focuses on children’s access to basic opportunities, as children cannot be expected to make an effort to access basic goods on their own. The index consists of a single indicator that combines measurement of the absolute level of basic opportunities and how equitably they are distributed in a society.

The BTI combines equality of opportunity with evaluation of the social security system, which can be a primary means for reducing inequality and promoting equitable economic growth. Social security systems may be measured directly, for example by comparing spending on different social protections as a percentage of GDP. In the BTI, the indicator is the extent to which social safety nets provide compensation for social risks.

Finally, environmental sustainability is an additional challenge for political transitions, as it impacts the health and well-being of the population. The 2011 Human Development Report focused on the intersection of sustainability and equity, analysing the challenges to increasing both simultaneously. It contains a set of environmental statistics, including measures of sustainability, the impacts of environmental threats on human development, and national perceptions of the environment and related policies.

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9 There are many other available methods for measuring various aspects of health and education services. While all cannot be described here, “The MDG Assessment Framework” (UNDP, forthcoming) is a useful reference.
11 BTI criterion 10.
12 Another interesting set of environmental indicators is that contained in the European Union’s annual Environment Policy Review, which monitors trends and policy developments in member states and at the EU level. Although none of these countries has undergone a transition since the review has been implemented, the 37 indicators could be used in other contexts. The review has not been published since 2009. See [http://ec.europa.eu/environment/policyreview.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/environment/policyreview.htm)
A measure of state policies for the environment is the **Environmental Performance Index** (EPI), which in 2012 was implemented in 132 countries globally. The EPI considers ten categories of environmental policy, and uses both recent data (from 2010) and historical data (from as close to 2000 as possible) to calculate a trend ranking. Of those countries included that have undergone a political transition during that time period, Ghana, Mexico, and Senegal all appear among the top 40 countries for their positive trend. In contrast, Peru and Serbia are in the lower third. Although Egypt is ranked fifth, indicating a very strong improvement (and Tunisia at 40), this is due to changes in environmental health that were already underway when the transition took place.

### 1.3 Corruption and illicit financial flows

Corruption is a perpetual challenge in all contexts, and in transition situations it is exacerbated by instability, changing rules, and weak rule of law. Measuring corruption has been covered in other publications, but some tools are worth mentioning here.

First, the **Corruption Perceptions Index** (CPI) is the tool that most commonly springs to mind for measuring corruption. However, in the context of measuring transitions, it is less useful: CPI methodology has been designed precisely to minimize large fluctuations in scores from year to year, while comparisons of before and after are of prime importance in measuring transitions.

Other measures of corruption are more useful when considering transitional countries. The broadest is the report from **Global Integrity**, which includes more than 300 actionable indicators. Global Integrity has covered such transition countries as Egypt, Tunisia, Indonesia, Brazil, and Chile, although none both before and after the transition. However, the 2011 edition of the report did find increases in corruption leading up to the protests in Egypt, Morocco, and Yemen in that year.

One indicator set that can be used for effective comparisons is the World Bank’s **Worldwide Governance Indicators**, which aims to cover all countries annually. For example, before its transition, Indonesia ranked just below average at the 30th percentile. It then experienced a sharp drop at about the time of the transition, since when its rank has steadily increased even if it has not regained its 1996 level.

One area of corruption that is especially difficult to measure, but can have great relevance for transition contexts, is illicit flow of capital into and out of a country, for example, the assets of the outgoing leader to a safe haven, or the return of assets to an oligarch inside the country. Because this form of corruption involves immense sums of money connected to very powerful actors with high incentives for maintaining secrecy, it is particularly poorly evaluated. In an attempt to better understand illicit flows, including the fact that money may flow both into and out of a country illegally, **Global Financial Integrity** developed a methodology for estimating illicit financial flows. It combines the World Bank’s widely used Residual model for measuring unrecorded outflows with an estimate of trade mispricing, which is a major means for capital flight.

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1.4 **Institutional and technical capacity**

After the dust has settled from the transition process and the reform agenda has been launched, many countries are faced with a lack of capacity to implement the desired changes. Thus, institutional and technical capacity is fundamental, especially to the medium-term and long-term prospects for progress.

Methodologies that specifically focus on democratic transitions recognize the importance of capacity, incorporating explicit indicators. In the BTI, this is done most thoroughly in its Transformation Management indicators, which result in a single Management Index. Topics include structural constraints on political governance, the efficiency of use of resources, a government’s ability to define a coherent policy in the face of conflicting objectives, and the leadership’s ability to benefit from international support. In the 2012 BTI, for example, Tunisia and Egypt ranked 87th and 88th respectively out of 128 countries. While this indicates low capacity for carrying out the promised reforms, these countries far surpass fellow transition country Myanmar, which ranks 126, with a score of just 1.77 out of 10.

Freedom House’s **Nations in Transit**, which covers reform in all former communist countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, includes a more limited number of questions on capacity. In addition to examining whether the legislature and executive have sufficient resources to fulfil their responsibilities, Nations in Transit asks about the capacity of local governments and civil society groups. The latter in particular highlights the need for external mechanisms for accountability in order for the transition process to progress.

Transparency International’s **National Integrity System** (NIS) methodology, which has been implemented in many countries including some pre- and post-transition, has a set of ‘capacity’ indicators for each of its 13 ‘pillars’ of governance. Examples include the extent to which the public sector or executive has adequate resources to effectively carry out its duties, as well as independence from other actors. The NIS focus on building a system to fight and prevent corruption could also make it relevant for measuring other aspects of the transition process. An NIS study was undertaken in Egypt in 2009, although no quantitative indicators were produced. This pre-transition report found weak governmental capacity.

Institutional and technical capacity is also measured in most general governance assessments, although more holistically. For instance, Freedom House’s **Countries at the Crossroads** does not use the word capacity in its methodology, but it is representative of a general governance assessment that includes indicators on effective government and rule of law. When taken together, these convey how well a system is functioning and are therefore a sign of how much capacity is in place. The 2012 edition of **Countries at the Crossroads** included Egypt, Indonesia, and Tunisia.

Another approach to measurement of the rule of law was developed by the **Folke Bernadotte Academy** in Sweden specifically for transition, post-crisis, and developing countries. It is a self-assessment tool for governments and donors to identify, understand, and address challenges to the rule of law in public administration. The tool emphasizes qualitative and rights-based aspects of the public administration, such as whether it provides predictable, prompt, and transparent decisions and services. It is being piloted in 2012.

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19 BTI criteria 13, 15, 16, and 17.  
20 [www.bti-project.org/index/management-index](http://www.bti-project.org/index/management-index)  
The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) developed a **Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit** that is designed specifically for countries experiencing transition or reconstruction. While criminal justice is not directly tied to capacity, it can be a proxy in some cases, and without an effective system there will not be sufficient rule of law to progress far with other reforms. For example, in the section on assessment of the judiciary, the methodology emphasizes the need for judicial training in transitional countries, as there is often a high volume of new laws. Under access to justice, the methodology notes the particular need for protection of, and assistance to, crime victims in transitional contexts. These portions are important, because the methodology may not be implemented in its entirety, and therefore evaluators of transitional countries will need to decide which portions are most relevant. The description of how to do a crime prevention assessment notes that, “In many developing, transitional and, in particular, post-conflict countries, there are likely to be many challenges, including weak criminal justice systems, abuse of power, human rights violations and corruption.”

Finally, the **Morsimeter** is a very different sort of measurement tool. The Morsimeter is an independent effort to monitor the achievements of Egypt’s President Mohamed Morsi, who was elected in June 2012, compared to his stated reform commitments. It provides a coloured bar indicating how many of his promises he has fulfilled in areas such as security and cleanliness of public spaces. Although the results are somewhat subjective, the Morsimeter represents a simple, appealing tool with which to assess the extent of post-transition reform, which is closely tied (although not directly analogous) to the President’s capacity.

### Section 2: Measuring perceptions, experiences, and dynamics at the local level

The second important measurement in contexts of political transition is of local perceptions, experiences, and dynamics, because they can help make the link between collective anger and constructive action. This section will consider tools for measuring popular perceptions, public experiences with transition, and citizen participation.

#### 2.1 Popular participation during a transition

The role of ordinary people in a transition can reveal much about its inclusivity, how representative it is of the general population, and therefore how democratic and sustainable it may be. Many recent transitions have been portrayed as people’s movements, but only by asking these people to share their experiences can this dynamic be fully understood.

The **Arab Barometer** covered popular participation very thoroughly for Egypt and Tunisia in 2010. Respondents in each country were asked around 20 questions specifically on their activities during and after the revolution in their country. Examples include whether they participated in protests before the president stepped down, when and for what reasons, whether they protested subsequently, what information sources they used at the time, and what type of political system they preferred post-revolution. In addition, respondents were asked about their use of social media, which played a key role in the revolutions.

Another interesting examination of the role of people’s use of the internet in transition was conducted by academics Anita Breuer, Todd Landman, and Dorothea Farquhar. In **Social Media and Protest Mobilization**, the authors describe the results of a survey of Tunisian internet users conducted in early 2012. They found that people who used the internet during the revolution were able to break the media blackout and provide information for mainstream media. They also had an impact on public emotions by spreading news of atrocities. The report gives empirical support to much of the anecdotal evidence of popular participation in the Tunisian revolution.

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2.2 Popular perceptions of the transition process

Popular perceptions of a transition process are important both because of what they may say about the success or failure of reform, and because an unhappy population could choose to derail even an otherwise effective transition. While any public opinion survey is a measure of public perceptions, some tools have been specially designed for and implemented in these contexts.

The Global Barometer Surveys are widespread and systematic efforts to measure social, political, and economic attitudes of people around the world. With a separate barometer for each region, they have covered a wide range of transition countries at many stages of progress. In 2010—the year of the transitions in Egypt and Tunisia—the Arab Barometer included two large sets of questions specific to each of these countries in order to gauge opinion at this crucial moment. Topics included satisfaction with the previous regime, evaluation of the current government’s management of the democratic transition process, trust in local media, and personal sense of security at the time of survey versus one year before. There were questions on the extent to which respondents believed the interim authority would undertake reforms, and whether the country was ready to conduct free and fair elections. Respondents were also asked to choose the two most important challenges for their country from a list that included ‘Trying figures of the former regime’ and ‘Return of looted funds.’ In Tunisia, maintaining gender equality was an additional choice, a question of particular relevance in this country of strong women’s rights relative to the region. In Egypt, respondents reported how well they believed the government was handling sectarian strife, whereas in Tunisia they had the opportunity to speak about the government’s performance in limiting economic and political divergence between regions of the country.\(^{28}\)

The Latinobarometro has covered opinions in countries such as Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Peru nearly every year since 1995. In 2012, it released special reports on the latter three reviewing changes in public opinion over this time period. In Peru, for instance, fewer and fewer respondents perceived progress, from a high of 79 percent in 1995 to a low of 18 percent in 2008, but since then the percentage that sees progress has steadily increased to the 2012 level of 49 percent. Meanwhile, in a positive sign for the transition process, in 1995 only 15 percent of Peruvians reported satisfaction with their lives, versus 57 percent today. Support for democracy has remained reasonably steady, with a slight drop from 63 percent in 1996 to 58 percent in 2011.\(^{29}\)

International IDEA’s State of Democracy methodology is a flexible, locally led approach to measuring how democratic a country or government is. The methodology has been adapted to varying contexts, some of which have undergone a recent transition. Of particular interest is the state of Nepal’s transition in 2008. The study was based on two public opinion surveys, one during the conflict between the state and Maoist rebels, and a second after a ceasefire was instituted. While capacity was not explicitly addressed, the report considered areas such as rule of law, government effectiveness and accountability, and government responsiveness to the needs of the people, all of which reflect capacity. A main finding was that there had been remarkable progress made on the transition objectives only a short time after peace and that ‘democracy has many stories’ in which service delivery was seen as part of an understanding of democracy.\(^{30}\)

The democracy audit, released in 2012 in Chile, is another implementation of the IDEA methodology. This audit is a joint project of four Chilean think-tanks of different political slants, along with UNDP. The outputs included a series of reports, including findings of a public opinion survey conducted in 2010, as well as new long-term data generated on topics such as elections, political parties, and the parliament.\(^{31}\)

\(^{28}\) “Data merging questionnaire,” Arab Barometer, 2010.
\(^{31}\) www.auditorialademocracia.org
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has conducted Life in Transition, a major survey of public opinion in Eastern Europe and Central Asia that aims to improve understanding of the impact of the transition from communism on the lives and views of people in the region. The survey was conducted in 2006 and repeated in 2010. On the whole, the latest survey found that, in most countries, positive attitudes towards democracy and markets between the two surveys, although democracy is still supported by more than half of the people. More encouragingly for the ongoing transition processes, satisfaction with public service delivery rose after 2006, with higher rates in those countries that have joined the EU than those of Central Asia.32

One important feature of the Life in Transition survey is the disaggregation of men’s and women’s opinions. The report devotes a full chapter to the separate experiences of these two groups.33

2.3 Opportunities for participatory governance in transitions

There are two ways to assess opportunities for participatory governance in transitions. The first is to examine the measurement tools that focus on participation (active civil society and civic life) or provide the enabling environment for participation (e.g., access to information, decentralisation). The second is to appreciate that any assessment process or development and application of a measurement tool provides opportunities for groups and stakeholders to engage on democracy and governance issues that affect them. It is considered good practice that governance assessments not only serve to strengthen accountability after a policy has been implemented (ex-post), but also to strengthen accountability before it is implemented, namely at the policy formulation stage (ex-ante). This means that the ideas, visions, and principles of governance agreed through a multi-stakeholder process should also guide the formulation of new policies, to strengthen consistent policy making. The Indonesia Democracy Index (IDI)34 is a good example of this. This democracy measurement tool developed by provincial and national partners in Indonesia aims to provide an inclusive and consultative framework for the systematic assessment and monitoring of democratic governance goals and targets expressed in Indonesia’s national and regional development plan. Since it is applied across the country, it can be used to rank and compare provinces.

Another example is the measurement tool for participatory and inclusive democratization in Indonesia. It was developed jointly by the Universities of Gadjah Mada and Oslo. Defining democracy in terms of the actual integration into the political process of people from below, i.e., both as voters and contenders for office, the tool uses three indicators to measure the state of democratization in Indonesia. First is the performance, spread and substance of 32 intrinsic instruments/institutions of democracy developed in accordance with mainstream theories. Second, the extent to which the most important actors promoted, used, abused or avoided those instruments. And third, the capacity of the actors to promote and use the instruments. The tool was applied at the Center for Democracy and Human Rights Studies’ (Demos) two national assessments (2003-4 and 2007-8). The surveys describe Indonesia’s post-Suharto democratization as a held-back, top-down process dominated by elites with economic and cohesive power. The tool and surveys’ reliance on the perception of ‘campaigners-cum-experts’ with close proximity to the ordinary citizenry in all provinces give them the edge in offering a more realistic picture of the dynamics of democratization at the grass-roots level.35

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34 www.gaportal.org/undp-supported/indonesia
Led by a consortium of four think-tanks, the Chilean democracy audit (Governance Assessment: How Democratic is Democracy in Chile?) aims to foster political debate and advance policy reform for political parties, elections, and democratic consolidation. The actual assessment process is one of its most distinguishing features, because it includes broad participation and engagement of politically diverse think-tanks (representative of the full political spectrum) that worked across party lines in a country that was divided post-transition. This feature of the Chilean democracy audit is critical. It means that the democracy audit is not seen as a partisan project, which is important to the continued official endorsement of the audit project, even as power has changed hands. Indeed, even though the political leadership changed since the project got underway, the new government continued to support the project. As party leaders see the democracy audit as a product of their think-tanks, the political establishment’s buy-in is greatly facilitated. One of the most immediate ways in which the democracy audit has had an impact is through its effect on the actors that are part of the project itself. In that regard, the preparation of the democracy audit was an exercise in confidence-building between political coalitions.

For a democratic transition to be successful, citizens must have the opportunity to participate in the design and functioning of the new governance system. This may be through strong civil society, access to information, decentralization, or representation of the views and needs of women, youth, and other disadvantaged groups. Some methods for measuring these are discussed below.

### 2.4 Civil society

While there are many methods for evaluating civil society, this section will focus on those of greatest relevance to a political transition. In Tunisia, Civicus—which is known for its widely cited Civil Society Index (CSI)—launched a CSI Rapid Assessment in 2012 to help strengthen civil society under the new regime. The assessment considers dynamics such as institutional strength, perceived impact, and enabling environment for civil society. Issues specific to the post-transition context include the large number of newly created organizations that lack capacity and resources, disconnects between old and new CSOs, and a new regulatory framework. Using a locally adapted framework and methodology, the project will produce indicators, a mapping of CSOs’ internal and external relationships, and reports and analytical papers on the state of civil society in Tunisia.

Freedom House conducted a study of political transitions (‘How Freedom Is Won’) that considers the relationship between the actors involved in a transition and the type of state that subsequently emerges. It looked at 67 transitions between 1972 and 2002 and evaluated the strength of nonviolent civic coalitions, the forces driving the transition (civic, military, powerholders, or mixed), and the sources and level of violence. It paired those with Freedom House’s scores for political rights and civil liberties for each country the year before the transition and in 2005. It found that broad-based, nonviolent resistance was the agent of change in more than 70 percent of cases. Moreover, these transitions were more likely to lead to a democratic political system than those launched entirely by elites. The most important factor in determining how free a political system became was the presence of a strong and cohesive nonviolent civic coalition. The study was followed by qualitative country reports examining whether there are political or socioeconomic factors that inhibit or facilitate the development of civic movements in these cases.

### 2.5 Access to information

An important feature of political transitions is the role played by free information flows in exposing corruption, informing domestic and international publics, and in mobilizing groups for reform or revolt, including through different social media, but also through traditional

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36 [www.gaportal.org/resources/detail/project-review-report-how-democratic-is-democracy-in-chile](http://www.gaportal.org/resources/detail/project-review-report-how-democratic-is-democracy-in-chile)
broadcast and print media, satellite links, mobile texting, and the internet. The two most cited and used measures of access to information are the Worldwide Press Freedom Index produced by Reporters Without Borders (RWB) and the Freedom of the Press Index produced by Freedom House. The Press Freedom Index is based on a questionnaire sent to RWB’s partner organizations (14 freedom of expression groups in five continents) and its 130 correspondents around the world, as well as to journalists, researchers, jurists, and human rights activists. The survey asks questions about direct attacks on journalists and the media, the access of the public to information, e.g., whether there is a state monopoly over TV or radio; whether they are aware of instances when access to news, cultural or political websites has been blocked by filtering mechanisms or closed down by the authorities, and whether there are independent or opposition news media operating in the country. Freedom of the Press is a yearly report that measures the level of freedom and editorial independence enjoyed by the press in every country. Levels of freedom are scored by internal analysts on a scale from 1 (most free) to 100 (least free). Depending on the basics, the nations are then classified as ‘Free’, ‘Partly Free’, or ‘Not Free’.

Freedom House also produces Freedom on the Net 2012, a global assessment of internet and digital media, which is the third in a series of studies of internet freedom covering developments in 47 countries conducted between January 2011 and May 2012. The Freedom on the Net index aims to measure each country’s level of internet and digital media freedom based on a set of questions addressed by in-country researchers, who analyse laws and practices relevant to the internet, testing the accessibility of select websites, and interviewing a wide range of sources. The index focuses particularly on three main areas: obstacles to access, limits on content, and violations of user rights.

2.6 Decentralization

As many political transitions mark the end of a highly centralized authoritarian regime, they are often followed by a process of decentralization. Decentralization can be measured by evaluations of local government. For example, the Partnership Governance Index is a methodology developed by the Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia, a multi-stakeholder organization created in the late 1990s to help promote reform after the transition. The index assesses and compares provinces and institutions within the country to generate productive competition. The index covers four so-called arenas—government, bureaucracy, civil society, and economic society (business)—including indicators of efficiency and effectiveness. It is a thorough and useful locally designed tool that can be a model for more recent transition countries.

In 2012, the World Bank published a new set of indicators on localization and decentralization. These indicators focus solely on local governments below the intermediate level (e.g., below the state level, in a federal system) to increase comparability across systems. It produced indices for fiscal, political, and administrative decentralization, as well as an overall Government Closeness Index. Of 182 countries, Brazil ranked very high at 15 for the closeness of government to its people. Indonesia was ranked at 40 and Chile at 48. As the data were collected before the transitions in Egypt, Tunisia, and Myanmar, it is unsurprising that these countries ranked far lower: Tunisia ranked 102, Egypt at 114, and Myanmar was nearly at the bottom at 173.

2.7 Measuring the views of diverse groups

Measuring the views and needs of women, youth, and other disadvantaged groups, this can be done in four ways. First, their views can be measured directly, such as through the Life in Transition survey. Similarly, the Nepal State of Democracy report deliberately included sampling from all regions of the country, where different ethnic groups are represented, and provided disaggregated results by gender,
age group, education level, and more. Unfortunately, sufficient data is rarely collected to enable disaggregated results by these different groups, and there is consequently a dearth of information on how transitions impact them. In particular, more work needs to be done to collect the views of disadvantaged groups, such as racial minorities, in transition countries.

Second, areas that disproportionately impact these groups can be measured, thus addressing them implicitly. For example, more young people use social media than others, so the results of Social Media and Protest Mobilization can be assumed to largely represent younger viewpoints. This is not a replacement for direct measures as it is not representative, but it can nonetheless provide interesting information.

Third, the impact of transition on various groups can be externally evaluated. Although evaluations have been done on the impact of the revolution in Tunisia on women, or in Egypt on Coptic Christians, until now there have been no strong measurement tools that have produced comparable quantitative indicators specific to transitions. However, more general tools can be used, comparing results before and after a transition. For instance, consider the case of gender equality in Nepal. The World Economic Forum's Gender Gap Index measures women's political and economic power as well as access to services. In 2006, before attaining peace and holding elections, Nepal scored weakly at 0.55 out of 1.0. This increased steadily to 0.62 by 2009, the year after elections, but dropped back to 0.59 in 2011. So Nepal's transition cannot be said to have had a major effect on women's equality.

To date, few indicator sets have been implemented consistently and long enough to draw conclusions about many transitions. Nor are there data on many groups of interest. As more data become available, more reliable results will be possible.

Finally, indicators can be developed by specific groups. The benefit of this method is that it ensures that topics that may be very important to an individual group, but which may not be well understood by other groups, are taken into account. Such tools could be designed through a participatory process involving representatives of all target groups.

Section 3: Measuring strategies for depoliticization and legitimization of state institutions in cases of military tutelage

Many political transitions are characterized by a move from a military regime to civilian rule, or there may be a period of military rule before a fully democratic transition takes place. It can therefore be important to measure the state-military relationship, as well as processes for holding accountable those who may have committed crimes under a previous system. This section discusses two types of relevant tools: those that can be used to evaluate the extent of security sector reform, and those that evaluate mechanisms for transitional justice.

3.1 Security sector reform

Most general governance assessments evaluate civil control of the military in some way. For example, Freedom House's Countries at the Crossroads includes a group of indicators on de facto accountability of security forces and military to civilian authorities. In a transition context, the hope would be for indicator scores to improve after the regime change. This was not the case in Egypt as measured by Freedom House. While the results of the civilian control indicators are not disaggregated from the overall rule of law score,

45 www.weforum.org/issues/global-gender-gap
it is notable that the rule of law score in Egypt scarcely changed between 2007 (2.65 out of 10) and 2012 (2.68 out of 10). Thus, according to this measurement tool, civilian control has not significantly improved since the transition in Egypt.  

IDEA’s State of Democracy framework also contains questions on civilian control of the police. In 2000, in the midst of Peru’s political transition, a State of Democracy report was conducted, which included much qualitative analysis of the lack of civilian control over the military and the reasons for that. 

One of the most extensive measurement methodologies available is the Index of Democratic Governance of Defence, which was developed as part of the democracy audit in Chile. The index was created to examine this topic from the perspective of 20 years after the transition from an authoritarian regime, thus specifically for the transition context. The index produced retrospective results for each year from 1990 to 2010, detailing progress over time. It covers civilian control, effectiveness, efficiency, and conduct of the military. Chile’s reform of civilian control of the military has been successful, but has faced many challenges during this period, including slow and incomplete reform. The graphical representations of results show a clear positive trajectory since the transition, one that we can assume has been consolidated after so many years. 

3.2 Evaluating transitional justice mechanisms

Transitional justice has been part of the debate surrounding nearly all transitions over the last 30 years. In her book, Justice Cascade, Kathryn Sikkink examines empirically the thirty-year record of Latin American prosecutions in national courts and the fate of the region’s amnesty laws. She notes that while amnesties and impunity are still common, there has been a dramatic new trend in democratizing countries holding individuals, including heads of state, to account for past human rights violations, especially though the use of domestic trials. The primary institutions for enforcement are domestic criminal courts, with the International Criminal Court and foreign courts as the last resort when domestic enforcement fails. The factors identified in explaining the rise of human rights trials in Latin America included the demonstrated effects of the severity of human rights violations, as well as institutional features such as the nature of the transition to democracy, the strength of domestic human rights organizations, and types of legal systems in many countries in the region. 

Priscilla Hayner offers another comprehensive examination of transitional justice in her book, Unspeakable Truths, which includes an evaluation of 40 truth commissions and, more broadly, their implications for transitional justice. While the book does not include a systematic methodology, the author does name the five strongest examples (South Africa, Guatemala, Peru, Timor-Leste, and Morocco) and also systematically evaluates all 40 commissions based on their reparations, prosecutions, vetting, apologies, and reforms. A chart on ‘what works best’ includes relevant indicators for all commissions. The lessons Hayner presents can be used to examine future commissions. 

The Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit also considers special tribunals, such as those with exclusive jurisdiction over crimes against humanity or war crimes, within its methodology. Interestingly, it combines coverage of special tribunals with an evaluation of military tribunals. This may be because the toolkit is less concerned with the efficacy of these tribunals (in contrast to Priscilla Hayner) and is

50 Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths (Routledge, 2010).
more focused on whether they are acting within human rights standards. Both of these types of tribunals operate outside of the normal system. The toolkit asks questions about, for example, the kind of legal representation defendants are entitled to and how their powers and procedures differ from the standard court system.

Another important contribution is the Transitional Justice Data Base (TJDB) project, which seeks to understand whether transitional justice practices strengthen democracy and reduce human rights violations. The project was designed to analyze the ‘success’ or impact of transitional justice by examining which mechanisms, or sets of mechanisms, achieve two central transitional justice goals: reducing human rights violations and improving democracy.\textsuperscript{51} The project includes data on five transitional justice mechanisms—trials, truth commissions, amnesties, reparations, and lustration—for all countries in the world from 1970 to 2007.

To analyze the adoption of transitional justice mechanisms, the project used the following data: length and type of the previous authoritarian regime, the level of repression, the type of democratic transition, the history of democracy in the country, the background of new democratic leaders, and the strength of civil society. The key independent variable – transitional justice – was an ordered measure of the mechanism with the ‘most accountability’ each country adopts. If a country adopts trials at any point in its history, this variable is coded as a 3, representing the maximum form of accountability. Truth commissions, coded as 2, represent the middle level of accountability, and amnesty, coded as 1, is the lowest form of accountability.

The project used four data sets of human rights and democracy: for democracy – Polity IV and Freedom House and, for human rights, the Political Terror Scale, along with Cingranelli and Richards’ Physical Integrity Rights Index. The Physical Integrity Rights Index and the Political Terror Scale both use the same sources for their data (Amnesty International reports and the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices). CIRI’s PHYSINT provides a scale to measure government protection of the following human rights violations: torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance. The scale ranges from 0 to 8, with 0 being no government respect and 8 being full protection. The Political Terror Scale provides a five-level ‘terror scale’, in which 5 means that terror has expanded to the entire population, while 1 indicates that citizens are relatively safe and protected from wrongful imprisonment and torture.

The project found that no single transitional justice mechanism had a statistically significant, positive estimated effect on reducing human rights violations and improving democracy. Indeed, it found that truth commissions on their own had a negative impact on several measurements of human rights. The research did, however, find a positive estimated effect when trials and amnesties are combined with truth commissions. Amnesties and trials combined without truth commissions also had a positive estimated effect on changes in human rights and democracy measures. The upshot of the research was that justice mechanisms only work to improve democracy and human rights in specific combinations: trials and amnesties; or trials, amnesties, and truth commissions. Combining trials and amnesties to achieve political objectives seems counter-intuitive, since trials would undermine amnesties and vice versa. They termed the explanation for these findings “the justice balance”, because in certain contexts particular types of amnesties and trials coexist and have a positive impact. In other contexts, trials follow amnesties and the sequencing of the mechanisms contributes to their positive impact on human rights and democracy.

\textsuperscript{51} The findings are published in the book Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy (USIP Press, 2010)
Section 4: Measuring the impact of policy support centres in transition processes

Think-tanks and other public policy centres can play a crucial role in providing the knowledge base necessary to build an effective reform process. Many transition countries have no history of policy support centres, and growing these while building a new system is a major challenge. While public policy centres are part of civil society and can therefore be measured as such, their particular role in a transition process merits specialized methodologies. As there are not many such methodologies, tools to measure both the innovation and efficiency of public policy centres will be discussed together in this section.

4.1 Innovation and efficiency of think-tanks and public policy centres

The leading global evaluation specifically of think-tanks is the Global Go To Think Tank report and index, produced by James McGann at the University of Pennsylvania. The report combines nominations by more than 6,500 think tanks in 182 countries in addition to 1,500 journalists, donors, and policymakers, to produce a ranking, which is reviewed by an expert panel. There are 17 criteria for nominations, including a direct relationship between the organization’s work and a positive change in societal values, access to policymaking elites, usefulness of its products in advocacy, and including new voices in the policymaking process. Separate lists are published for different regions as well as by areas of research, such as economic policy, social policy, and good governance.

Some statistics are worth noting in the context of this project’s transitional focus countries. Brazil’s Fundação Getulio Vargas of Brazil ranked 29th in the world’s top non-US think-tanks, and Brazil hosts six of the top 30 think-tanks in Central and South America. Of these, two are among the top social policy think-tanks globally, and one is among the best for transparency and good governance. Chile hosts four of the top centres in that region, including the second highest rated. Indonesia’s Centre for Strategic and International Studies ranked third in the Asia region, while two other Indonesian think-tanks rank among the top 30 for transparency and good governance. Egypt is also represented among the top non-US think-tanks, with the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies ranked 35th. This organization was also ranked at 34 among think-tanks with the greatest impact on global public policy in the previous 18 months. Egypt hosts four of the top 30 think-tanks in the Middle East and North Africa, while Tunisia hosts none.52

In 2009, UNDP published a framework for evaluation of think-tanks specifically in post-conflict contexts. Rather than evaluating the organizations themselves, this framework evaluates the environment that exists in a country and whether or not it supports think-tanks. It includes eight policy issues/processes including technical expertise, strength of economic interests, and level of internationalization.53 The framework was piloted in a more streamlined way in Nepal, Peru, and Serbia. Although it is difficult to make generalizations based on three cases, the report found that the policy context was the greatest determinant of the strength of think-tanks.54

As there are only few methods with which to measure think-tanks specifically, other civil society evaluation methods (of which there are many) can be used. Two in particular are worth noting. Civicus’s Civil Society Index is the most comprehensive method for measuring any type of civil society, including think-tanks. However, think-tanks are not specifically identified in the methodology, and no special consideration is therefore given to their particularities.55 USAID’s CSO Sustainability Index is also focused much more broadly, but

55 “Civil Society Index Conceptual framework and research methodology,” Civicus.
some of its country reports consider the unique role of think-tanks. For example, in Armenia think-tanks were mentioned for helping to develop CSO laws. A strong advocacy score for the index should in part be measured by the ability of think-tanks to produce alternative policy analysis. The methodology also encourages representation of think-tanks on the country panel that helps produce the results.56

**Section 5: Conclusion**

Political transitions encompass many smaller changes that take place through a policy system and an economy, and measuring these can give insights into the potential progress or achievements of a given transition process. But any evaluation must take place with the understanding that we are measuring individual pieces that may or may not add up to a whole. That is, measuring the level of corruption in a country or the achievements of its policy centres, for example, can provide valuable information on challenges or opportunities as well as potential avenues for advocacy or reform, but with so many different factors at play, only a holistic view (generally combined with years of hindsight) can determine a transition’s success or failure. Moreover, the reasons behind specific changes in indicators or particular results are generally complex and may go beyond what took place in the transition context. For instance, women’s rights may improve in a country because of changes in the education system and exposure to other cultures, which could occur in parallel – but unrelated to – a political transition. So it is important not to confuse correlation with cause and effect, and never to use an indicator in isolation from analysis.

There is certainly more research and development needed in designing new measurement tools and adapting existing tools to be more sensitive to transition dynamics and processes. Nevertheless, the tools outlined in this paper provide a foundation on which to build an empirical understanding of political transitions. The areas with the largest gaps in measurement are transitional justice, illicit flows of capital, and policy centres. Measurement of policy centres in particular has been seriously neglected in the transition context, and more work should be done to build new tools and to implement them in a range of transition countries. More opinion surveys need to disaggregate results by gender, ethnicity, and other groups to provide better information on the varying impacts of transition on peoples and societies.

**Mapping of sources and methods**

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<tr>
<th>Measurement tool</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Website</th>
<th>Country coverage</th>
<th>Transition themes covered</th>
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<td>195 countries Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Indonesia,</td>
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56 See, for example, “2011 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia,” USAID, 2011.
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