LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SETTINGS

BUILDING A RESILIENT FOUNDATION FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT
UNDP partners with people at all levels of society to help build nations that can withstand crisis, and drive and sustain the kind of growth that improves the quality of life for everyone. On the ground in more than 170 countries and territories, we offer global perspective and local insight to help empower lives and build resilient nations.

United Nations Development Programme
One United Nations Plaza
New York, NY, 10017 USA

© 2016 United Nations Development Programme. All rights reserved. Content may not be reproduced, stored by means of any system or transmitted, in any form or by any medium, whether electronic, mechanical, photocopied, recorded or any other, without prior permission. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on maps that appear within this report do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations, its Member States or affiliated agencies.

EDITOR: Julia Stewart    GRAPHIC DESIGN: Suazion

COVER: Villagers discuss community affairs in Bangladesh. (Photo: DRIK by Shehab Uddin)
LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SETTINGS
BUILDING A RESILIENT FOUNDATION FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Guide on Local Governance in Fragile and Conflict-affected Settings: Building a Resilient Foundation for Peace and Development is a publication of the United Nations Development Programme.

The production of this Guide was made possible through the contribution of time and insights by many individuals. Their tireless efforts to improve the lives of those suffering from the effects of violence and armed conflict and their unwavering commitment to the United Nations’ core values and goals should be singled out. This Guide cannot do justice to their innovative thinking and work around the world, and we are thankful for their engagement throughout this exercise.

The project team is especially appreciative of the continuous support of Jordan Ryan, former Director of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery in UNDP; Magdy Martínez-Solimán, Director of the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support (BPPS); Patrick Keuleers, Director/Chief of Profession, Governance and Peacebuilding Cluster, BPPS; and José Cruz-Osorio, Team Leader for the Responsive and Accountable Institutions team, Governance and Peacebuilding Cluster, BPPS.

AUTHORS AND PROJECT TEAM

The author of the Guide is Nicolas Garrigue. Jago Salmon and Amita Gill have also contributed textual inputs to this Guide.

The project team consisted of Eugenia Piza-Lopez, Jairo Acuña-Alfaro, Nicolas Garrigue, Jago Salmon, Amita Gill and Kodjo Mensah-Abrampa. Benjamin Rogers and Samuel Gerstin provided valuable research and editing support during the drafting process. Gillian Chalmers was immensely helpful in overseeing the design and production stages of the Guide.

The Guide benefited from eight case studies on UNDP local governance programmes completed by the lead author with the invaluable support of UNDP/UNV staff and experts in Country Offices and in Headquarters.

- El Salvador: Marcella Smut, Daniel Carsana and Jenny Espinosa (UNDP El Salvador)
- Colombia: Paloma Blanch (UNDP Colombia) and Lurdes Gomez (UNDP New York)
- Liberia: Jago Salmon (UNDP New York)
- Somalia: Kodjo Mensah-Abrampa (UNDP New York)
- Sri Lanka: Rajendrakumar Ganesarajah (UNDP Sri Lanka) and Amita Gill (UNDP New York)
- South Sudan: Kwabena Asante-Ntiamoah and Tapiwa Kamuruko (UNV Bonn)
- Mozambique: John Barnes (UNDP Mozambique)
- Palestine: Sakher Al Ahmed, Ahmed Shurafa, Ibrahim Bisharat and Abla Amawi (UNDP Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People)

The Guide was edited by Julia Stewart and designed by Julia Dudnik Stern (Suazion, Inc.). Their patience, flexibility and thoroughness in helping with the finalization of this complex publication have been greatly appreciated.

REVIEWERS

The project team is especially grateful for all those at UNDP and in partner agencies, as well as individual experts and scholars, who contributed time and effort to review this Guide at various stages of its development. These individuals helped immeasurably to improve its contents and user-friendliness. All errors or omissions are the project team’s alone.

The project team wishes specifically to give credit for their feedback and inputs to Aleida Ferreyra (UNDP BPPS New York), Faiza Effendi (UNDP RBAP), Deborah Mekonnen and Assem Andrews (UNDP Oslo Governance Centre), Johannes Krassnitzer (UNDP ART), Fiona Bayat (UNDP MPTF), Lurdes Gomez (UNDP BPPS Panama), Alessandro Mrakic (UNDP BPPS Amman), Mylène Lavoie and Rose Akinyi Okoth (UNDP BPPS Addis Ababa), Patrick Doung (UNDP BPPS Bangkok), Aferdita Mekuli (UNDP BPPS Istanbul), Victoria Nwogu (UNDP Somalia), Alessandro Petti (UNDP Colombia), Richard Musinguzi (UNDP Uganda), Yam Nath Sharma (UNDP Nepal), John Barnes (UNDP Mozambique), Marco Donati (UN DPKO), Marjia de Wijn (UNICEF), Jochen Mattern (DeLog), Timothy Sisk (University of Denver), Zoë Scott (independent expert), Adam Burke (independent expert), George Nzongola-Ntalajja (University of South Carolina) and Ahmed Rhazaoui (Al Akhawayn University, Morocco).
The 21st century has ushered in a new era of global threats to peace and security. In 2015, over a quarter of the world’s population live in fragile and conflict-affected settings, and the number of displaced persons has reached levels comparable to those recorded after the Second World War. The interpersonal, criminal and political violence they face does not only threaten their safety, but also the enjoyment of their inherent political, economic, social and cultural rights.

The nature of fragility and conflict is increasingly complex, context-specific and protracted. With short-term, security-focused policies proving ineffective, and at times counterproductive, there is a growing recognition that multi-dimensional approaches are more attuned to helping restore a robust social contract between the state and its people, which is an essential foundation for durable peace and sustainable development.

Given that local institutions, systems and processes represent for most people the daily interface between state and society, local governance is a critical arena for these efforts. Inclusive and accountable local governance can help restore social cohesion in divided communities, facilitate participation in public life, distribute resources and opportunities equitably, safeguard minority rights, and test new forms of decision-making that blend formal and informal processes of representation and participation.

UNDP strongly advocates for more focused policies and a greater share of development resources to be allocated to building responsive local governments and inclusive local governance systems. Such investment is especially needed in fragile and conflict-affected settings, where communities drained by the debilitating effects of conflict and insecurity will face additional challenges in realizing the ambitious goals set forth by the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.

Accordingly, UNDP has also adjusted its own programming, with UNDP interventions in the governance sector in crisis-affected countries dedicated increasingly to local governance interventions. For example, in war-torn Somalia, UNDP and its partners are helping to rebuild a functional local administration that collects taxes and delivers services. In Lebanon, UNDP supports municipalities in maintaining social cohesion in communities challenged by the arrival of more than one million Syrian refugees. In Colombia, UNDP helps build inclusive territorial alliances for peace to support the implementation of a much-anticipated peace accord.

The challenges and risks associated with local governance programming in the immediate aftermath of conflict or in contexts of systemic fragility, unbridled criminal violence or protracted conflict, remain immense. UNDP’s support to local governance in these settings needs to be guided by a set of options and a theory of change cognizant of the complex political economies that influence the pace and trajectory of development outcomes in such environments. The Guide on Local Governance in Fragile and Conflict-affected Settings: Building a Resilient Foundation for Peace and Development is UNDP’s first comprehensive effort to respond to these programming needs.

The Guide draws upon the extensive experience of UNDP and the United Nations system in working with local governance institutions in fragile and conflict-affected settings. It emphasizes the need to secure a strong social contract at the local level for building state legitimacy, improving livelihoods, and ultimately, strengthening resilience against the recurrence of violence and conflict.

I hope that users of this Guide, within but also outside of UNDP, will find it to be a valuable tool in support of their efforts to effectively respond to the immediate needs of vulnerable populations in situations of fragility and conflict, while laying the foundations for resilient local governance systems over the long term.

Patrick Keuleers
Director, Governance and Peacebuilding Bureau for Policy and Programme Support United Nations Development Programme
CONTENTS

ACRONYMS ix
INTRODUCTION x
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY xiv

PART I: CONCEPTUAL AND PROGRAMMATIC FRAMEWORKS 1

CHAPTER 1: UNDP’S APPROACH TO LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SETTINGS 2

1.1 Clarifying terminology and concepts 3
1.2 Theory of change: How transforming local governance can contribute to building resilient peace and restoring development pathways 7
1.3 Dealing with the diversity of contexts 32
1.4 An integrated framework for action for local governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings 34

CHAPTER 2: ASSESSING LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN SITUATIONS OF FRAGILITY AND CONFLICT AND DESIGNING A PROGRAMME: PRINCIPLES AND TOOLS 40

2.1 Situation analysis 41
2.2 Building the programme strategy 44
2.3 Cross-cutting considerations 49
2.4 Identifying and mitigating risks in programme design 54
2.5 Setting targets for meaningful results 58
CHAPTER 8: ENABLING FRAMEWORKS FOR LOCAL GOVERNANCE 112

8.1 Policy dialogue on local governance and decentralization 113
8.2 Strengthening the horizontal and vertical articulation of subnational institutions 117
8.3 Professionalizing the local civil service 119
8.4 Effective management of aid to local governance 120
8.5 Building strong peer networks 121

PART III: PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION 123

CHAPTER 9: BUILDING STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS 124

9.1 Partnership opportunities for supporting local governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings 125
9.2 Resource mobilization 128

CHAPTER 10: MANAGING LOCAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMMES IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SETTINGS 130

10.1 Management arrangements 131
10.2 Operational aspects 134

CHAPTER 11: DOCUMENTING AND COMMUNICATING ON RESULTS 136

11.1 Monitoring and evaluation 137
11.2 Programme communications 139

ANNEXES 141

Annex 1. Key definitions 142
Annex 2. Examples of multiple forms of violence at country level 144
Annex 4. The use of social accountability tools in fragile and conflict-affected settings 147
Annex 5. Supporting local government capacities for local economic recovery 149
Annex 6. Rapid local governance diagnostic tool 151
Annex 7. Risk matrix 162
Annex 8. Model terms of reference 164
Annex 9. Bibliography 166
CASE STUDIES

CASE STUDY 1: MAKING THE STATE VISIBLE IN LIBERIA 28
CASE STUDY 2: OPENING LOCAL SPACES FOR BUILDING PEACE IN COLOMBIA 38
CASE STUDY 3: SONSONATE, EL SALVADOR – A CITY REBORN 48
CASE STUDY 4: RE-BOOTING THE STATE FROM BELOW IN SOMALIA 59
CASE STUDY 5: BUILDING LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEGITIMACY IN MOZAMBIQUE 118
CASE STUDY 6: LOCAL RECOVERY FROM CONFLICT AND DISASTER IN SRI LANKA 133

BOXES

BOX 1: THE “LOCAL” IN LOCAL DEVELOPMENT 5
BOX 2: DRIVERS OF CONFLICT 6
BOX 3: ELEMENTS OF THE THEORY OF CHANGE 7
BOX 4: FRAGILE STATES AND THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 8
BOX 5: STATE LEGITIMACY AND FRAGILITY 9
BOX 6: KEY ASSUMPTIONS IN UNDP’S APPROACH TO LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SETTINGS 18
BOX 7: UNDP SOCIAL CONTRACT FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNANCE 20
BOX 8: POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE 42
BOX 9: LESSONS LEARNED FROM LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENTS CONDUCTED IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SETTINGS 44
BOX 10: DO NO HARM FRAMEWORK 50
BOX 11: MONITORING AND EVALUATION GUIDANCE 58
BOX 12: FILLING CRITICAL STAFFING GAPS IN SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS – UNDP/UNV IN SOUTH SUDAN 66
BOX 13: REVIVING THE ROLE OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS – UNDP IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS 69
BOX 14: BOOSTING MUNICIPAL INCOME FROM THE PROPERTY TAX IN PALESTINE 72
BOX 15: MAPPING AND CAPACITY ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS IN DARFUR – THE EXPERIENCE OF UNDP IN SUDAN 78
BOX 16: BUILDING A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF DRIVERS OF INSECURITY IN EL SALVADOR 80
BOX 17: EXAMPLES OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVES IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SETTINGS 80
BOX 18: UNDP’S GLOBAL ART INITIATIVE 85
BOX 19: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO LAND TENURE MANAGEMENT AND PEACEBUILDING IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 90
BOX 20: THE NORTH LEBANON LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AGENCY 93
BOX 21: TAPPING INTO CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OIL SECTOR IN IRAQ 93
BOX 22: LOCAL YOUTH COUNCILS IN PALESTINE: INCUBATORS FOR A NEW GENERATION OF POLITICIANS 98
BOX 23: UNDP’S APPROACH TO ELECTORAL VIOLENCE MITIGATION 100
BOX 24: EMPOWERING THE INDEPENDENT ROLE OF PROVINCIAL COUNCILS IN AFGHANISTAN 102
BOX 25: SUPPORTING FLEDGLING LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES IN POST-WAR SUDAN 106
BOX 26: BUILDING LEGITIMACY THROUGH COMMUNITY SECURITY AND SMALL ARMS CONTROL IN SOUTH SUDAN 108
BOX 27: EXAMPLES OF UNDP CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLICY DEBATES ON DECENTRALIZATION 114
BOX 28: QUANTITY VERSUS QUALITY IN STATE RESPONSE IN EL SALVADOR 117
BOX 29: MAKING LOCAL GOVERNMENT TRAINING MORE PROFESSIONAL IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 119
BOX 30: BUILDING A STRONGER VOICE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS – UNDP IN CAMBODIA 121
BOX 31: CITY DIPLOMACY AND THE ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN PEACEBUILDING 126
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYMS</th>
<th>EXPLANATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIM</td>
<td>Direct implementation modality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster risk reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and communication technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium development goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSME</td>
<td>Micro, small and medium enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIM</td>
<td>National implementation modality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCNA</td>
<td>Post-conflict needs assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public-private partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable development goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSE/TC</td>
<td>South-South exchanges/triangular cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAC</td>
<td>Total resources allocated to core</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCDF</td>
<td>United Nations Capital Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHABITAT</td>
<td>United Nations Human Settlements Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNV</td>
<td>United Nations Volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

WHAT IS THIS GUIDE ABOUT?

The Guide on Local Governance in Fragile and Conflict-affected Settings: Building a Resilient Foundation for Peace and Development presents UNDP’s renovated approach, including a Theory of Change and programming guidance, to supporting local governance and local development actors and systems in countries prone to chronic fragility, recurrent conflict and/ or high levels of criminal violence.

This Guide comes under the umbrella of the new Integrated Framework for Local Governance and Local Development of the United Nations Development Programme/United Nations Capital Development Fund/United Nations Volunteers (UNDP/UNCDF/UNV). It forms part of UNDP’s management response to the independent evaluation of the UNDP contribution to local governance conducted in 2010. The Guide is also meant to support implementation of the UNDP Strategic Plan 2014 – 2017, which emphasizes local governance as a critical locus of intervention for its three main areas of work: (1) sustainable development; (2) inclusive and effective democratic governance; and (3) resilience.

WHO CAN THE GUIDE BE USEFUL TO AND WHEN?

The Guide is primarily meant to support UNDP Country Offices in countries considered as fragile or already affected by high levels of violence, instability and/or conflict (including post-conflict countries). The Guide can help these Country Offices define strategies, umbrella programmes and projects that more effectively help realize the potential of local governance for peace and recovery. To this end, the Guide provides concrete programmatic recommendations, a framework for action, toolkits and UNDP-specific management advice. Yet, as the Guide starts with proposing a theory of change to address the fragility and local governance nexus, it can also be useful to policy specialists outside of UNDP, in development agencies or partner country institutions.

Concretely, THE GUIDE CAN BE USED...

- in different fragility contexts to:
  - tackle certain locally-rooted drivers of violence and potential conflict in situations of heightened fragility;
  - increase the resilience of critical local governance functions, such as service delivery and conflict management, in situations of protracted conflict;
  - craft rapid response interventions to restore the functionality of local governance systems and start reconstruction in the immediate aftermath of conflict, before more long-term programming can be launched; and
  - support a long-term transition from early recovery to sustainable local development and effective local democratic governance, and reduce the risks of renewed conflict, in post-conflict situations and political transitions.

1. This evaluation recommended that UNDP improves its policies and programmes directed to local governance and local development issues in fragile and conflict-affected settings (see: http://web.undp.org/evaluation/evaluations/thematic/lg.shtml).
for different programmatic instruments, such as:

- comprehensive country-level local governance/local development strategy to address drivers of fragility and conflict, in line with UNDP’s Integrated Local Governance and Local Development Framework and toolkit;
- an umbrella programme or a joint programme with other UN and non-UN actors, in support of an integrated area-based approach to peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery focusing on specific target areas; and
- a single project on a particular aspect of the integrated local governance model (with the assumption that projects relevant to the other aspects of local governance are already in place or will be addressed soon by UNDP or other development partners).

THE GUIDE DOES NOT:

- discuss at length the relevance of and best models for decentralization in fragile and conflict-affected settings;
- provide in-depth technical advice for sectors relevant to local recovery, such as livelihoods support, basic services, infrastructure, security, justice, disaster risk reduction, etc. (this is already covered in other UNDP knowledge products);
- address the specific case of rebuilding local governance systems following a disaster (see UNDP Signature Product on Restoring Local Governance Functions in the Aftermath of a Disaster); and
- discuss climate change adaptation and the effects of climate change on societal resilience, other than highlighting that climate change has the potential to make societies more prone to violence (these issues are also covered in other UNDP publications).

HOW WAS THIS GUIDE FORMULATED?

The Guide was developed taking stock of the large body of policy and knowledge products produced by UNDP in the areas of governance, conflict prevention, rule of law and livelihoods for fragile and conflict-affected countries. The Guide is strongly connected to UNDP’s Governance for Peace Report (2012) in which UNDP presented its overall framework for engagement in governance support and reform in fragile settings, centred on the notion of the social contract; and to the UN’s Restore of Reform Report (2014), which analyses lessons learnt from UN support to public administration reform in the immediate aftermath of conflict.

A number of seminal research and policy publications in areas of interest to this Guide, in particular the World Development Report of the World Bank (2011) and the OECD’s report States of Fragility 2015: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions, were also amply consulted and are quoted throughout the document. Six case studies on UNDP local governance programmes in fragile and conflict-affected settings were developed for the Guide: Colombia, El Salvador, Liberia, Mozambique, Somalia and Sri Lanka. The case studies provide stimulating questions and reference points; they do not offer programmatic blueprints. Additional snapshots of UNDP projects implemented in various other countries are also presented in boxes throughout the Guide.

Six case studies on UNDP programmes in fragile and conflict-affected settings were developed for the Guide: Colombia, El Salvador, Liberia, Mozambique, Somalia and Sri Lanka.

Photo: UNDP Sri Lanka
HOW TO USE THE GUIDE?

The Guide is structured into three main parts further sub-divided into thirteen chapters as shown in the table at left. The first part remains general in scope while the second and third parts are more specific to UNDP programming needs and practices.

The flowchart on the next page provides additional guidance for readers to quickly locate the information they need.

WHAT’S NEXT?

The below actions to be undertaken by UNDP will complement the present Guide.

- Produce a Programming Toolkit to complement this Guide. The toolkit will include templates and examples that can be used when conducting needs assessments and programme appraisals, developing proposals (including risk management strategies and monitoring and evaluation frameworks, also for monitoring citizen perceptions). The tools will also be useful when building partnerships, mobilizing resources and for communicating effectively on results. Training modules will be developed as well to facilitate the roll-out of the Guide in the field.

- Launch an open, web-based Knowledge Bank on local governance programming for peace and recovery. This Knowledge Bank will gather together in one location relevant knowledge products from UNDP and other development institutions.
## WHERE TO FIND WHAT IN THIS GUIDE

### WHAT DO YOU WANT TO KNOW?

| How LG can better contribute to peace and recovery | All readers | Chapter 1. Sections 1.1 to 1.4 |
| How to design an integrated LG programme strategy in FCS | All readers, especially UNDP LG programming teams | Chapter 1. Section 1.4 | Chapter 2. Sections 2.1 to 2.5 |
| How to assess LG needs in FCS | LG programming teams | Chapter 2. Section 2.1 | Annex 6. LG Diagnostic Tool |
| In-depth description of useful activities for LG in FCS | LG programme staff, LG experts | Chapter 3. Local capacities for service delivery |
| How to better mainstream gender equality in LG in FCS | All readers, especially gender specialists | Chapter 4. Voice and participation at the local level |
| UNDP experience and lessons learned in supporting LG in FCS | All readers, especially UNDP LG staff | Chapter 5. Land, natural resources and local economy |
| How to build partnerships and raise resources for LG in FCS | UNDP Country Office management | Chapter 6. Local political processes |
| How to implement an LG programme in FCS | UNDP programme teams | Chapter 7. Conflict management and local security |
| | | Chapter 8. National enabling frameworks |

### RECOMMENDED READING FOR:

- Chapter 3. Local capacities for service delivery
- Chapter 4. Voice and participation at the local level
- Chapter 5. Land, natural resources and local economy
- Chapter 6. Local political processes
- Chapter 7. Conflict management and local security
- Chapter 8. National enabling frameworks

### WHERE TO LOOK:

- Case Study 1. Liberia
- Case Study 2. Colombia
- Case Study 3. El Salvador
- Case Study 4. Somalia
- Case Study 5. Mozambique
- Case Study 6. Sri Lanka

---

LG = Local governance  
FCS = Fragile and conflict-affected settings
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A global consensus has emerged that fragility and conflict, in all their forms, seriously impede development. Recognizing this, Goal 16 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development specifically links peace, security and development.2

One fifth of the world’s population – and more than one-third of the poorest – live in fragile settings.3 Worse, the proportion of people in fragile environments is rising fast due to a surge in conflicts over the last decade, resulting in the highest number of displaced people (59.5 million) since record-keeping began, including World War II.4 The large majority of the 50 countries considered fragile, conflict or crisis-affected5 only reached one or two targets of the Millennium Development Goals in 2015, out of fifteen.6 The annual costs of violence stand at approximately US$ 100 billion per year—by far exceeding the amount of aid received by these countries.7

In this century, the nature of violence and conflict has changed. Rather than primarily inter-state wars between strong nations, conflict now is more decentralized, sometimes affecting only sub-areas of a country, especially in emerging economies, and often occurs where high levels of poverty and corruption, marginalization, displacement, damaged infrastructure and lesser access to basic services stunt and reverse development. Increasingly violence, insecurity and conflicts find their roots in the inequalities experienced by certain groups and in a resulting loss of trust in the will and power of the state to address these. When these fault lines coincide with ethnic, religious, political and other forms of identity, conflict can become entrenched and spread fast across a country and region, and even globally. More generally, vulnerability to conflict and other natural or man-made disasters is a product of the social, economic and political systems in place that generate governing institutions and processes unable to legitimately wield authority and protect the social contract, i.e. a mutual understanding of the respective roles of state and society.

Local governance is inherently where the state intersects with society and the point at which national policies meet local aspirations. The central message in this Guide is that the local governance sphere remains a crucial focus of intervention to reshape the social contract and make it an engine of peacebuilding, statebuilding and recovery. In fragile and conflict-affected settings, transforming local governance arrangements is essential in order to:

- extend the presence, authority and protection of the state, under a more responsive and inclusive model, to all regions, cities, villages and quarters;
- build confidence in the political settlement by enabling resource distribution to the local level;
- direct efforts of the state toward responding to the needs of affected communities in a more inclusive manner; and
- address drivers of insecurity and conflict by strengthening social cohesion and supporting local resilience.

Local governance is recognized by international policymakers as a core government function8 that needs to be supported and transformed in order to attain peace and recovery in fragile and conflict-affected settings. Local governance arrangements are increasingly being placed at the centre of peace agreements (e.g. Kenya, Kosovo, Libya, the Philippines). Even if transforming local governance arrangements by itself is not enough to stabilize a country and bring it onto a resilient path to development, without such a transformation, the best peace agreements can unravel.

Yet, challenges and barriers to transforming local governance are daunting in fragile and conflict-affected settings as the local level is where the unmet needs of populations and the institutional weakness of the

2. Sustainable Development Goal 16: ‘Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.’
5. OECD, 2015, pp. 15.
7. $48.7 billion in 2011; sources: World Bank and OECD.
8. Local governance is one of the five core government functions prioritized for support by the United Nations and World Bank in the aftermath of conflict (UN Working Group on Public Administration, 2014).
state interact in the most explosive manner. Local governance can actually exacerbate fragility and conflict. This happens, for example, when:

- the central and local polities remain divided over the basic premises on which the state is built and are poorly connected to each other by inefficient institutional set-ups;
- the state’s lack of control of the rule of law opens opportunities for rent-seeking, corruption, exploitation and criminality;
- local political institutions have lost their legitimacy and are increasingly embattled by alternative sources of public authority;
- local governments are left stagnating in administrative weakness and starved of the financial resources needed to translate local policies into basic services and economic development; and/or
- deep divides running through conflict-affected communities and undermining social capital are not effectively overcome.

As a consequence, many local communities in fragile settings remain trapped in a vortex of violence, elite pacts and weak institutions. The high level of risk inherent to local governance programming in such settings also means that aid volumes allocated to this domain remain often too low to affect significant change. Moreover, aid delivery mechanisms can contribute to further estranging society from the state at the local level when development partners prefer working through parallel delivery systems in spite of the imperative of building a functioning state at all levels over the long term.

In order to make local governance a more effective venue to build a solid and resilient foundation for the social contract between state and society in fragile and conflict-affected settings, this Guide proposes a change pathway where confidence in collective action is restored while local institutions are transformed. Adopting this three-pronged approach implies exerting more efforts toward implementing integrated local governance and local development programmes, not limiting interventions to building local government administrative capacities. In fragile and conflict-affected settings, this means that local governance programmes need also to embrace support to local infrastructures for peace, local democratic processes, basic service delivery, women’s empowerment, community security, livelihoods recovery, extractives management, disaster risk reduction, and more. Recognizing and supporting the multifunctionality of local governance, especially in fragile and conflict-affected settings where it is often overlooked, is central to the process of localizing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

To support this programmatic shift, the Guide proposes a holistic Framework for Action built on six inter-linked components: (1) local capacities for service delivery; (2) public voice and participation; (3) land, natural resources and local economic recovery; (4) local political representation; (5) management of local conflicts and access to justice and security; and (6) national enabling frameworks for the reform of local governance. This Framework is focused on enhancing the role and capacities of local governance institutions within each component. It can deliver tangible and sustainable results at scale when applied through area-based intervention models and with a strong commitment to developing national and local institutional ownership and capacities at all stages.

Change pathways should be broadly organized using three tracks and according to each country’s context. In post-conflict situations, where the international community needs to do much more in supporting local governance, this implies first, supporting the extension of state presence and authority as a foundation for peaceful conflict transformation; second, ensuring that local governments, in collaboration with other local actors, play an effective role in organizing the recovery of conflict-affected communities; and third, helping the maturation of local governance systems with more efficient intergovernmental relations, full democratic legitimacy, institutional capacities and sustainable financial resources. More generally, while decentralization remains a valuable long-term goal in the transformation of local governance arrangements, and can in principle help increase societal resilience, it should happen through a gradual transfer of responsibilities and resources, underpinned by considerable efforts in building local
This Guide proposes a holistic Framework for Action built on six inter-linked components. The Guide also presents a Diagnostic Tool on Local Governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings to support programme design.

A conflict dimension must be mainstreamed into all programmatic aspects as the UNDP approach is premised on the need to transform conflict-prone situations while maintaining do-no-harm safeguards at all times. Mainstreaming applies as well to reducing the inequalities and exclusions facing women, as well as youth and other marginalized populations, in accessing local governance. Everyone’s active and meaningful involvement in local decision-making is paramount to renovating the social contract and making it more resilient to stress and shocks.

Dealing with the complex task of transforming local governance systems in settings in which political, security and logistical constraints are manifold, and over and above those faced in mainstream situations, demands that UNDP seek strategic partnerships, starting right from the situation analysis stage. Considerable pooled resources, effective coordination mechanisms and a harmonized results framework are also critical to affecting transformation at scale across a variety of local contexts. UNDP Country Offices need to be ready to adopt innovative and flexible operational modalities when dealing with local governance support in fragile and conflict-affected settings, or else UNDP runs the risk of failing to translate the approach proposed in this Guide into concrete results on the ground.

UNDP’s record of achievements in supporting the recovery of crisis-affected communities across a wide variety of contexts and in leading large-scale, joint programmes at the local level gives it a strong comparative advantage in local governance programming. UNDP can play a lead role in rallying development partners behind realistic, nationally-owned, local governance strategies and in supporting national and local actors in their implementation.
Part I:

CONCEPTUAL AND PROGRAMMATIC FRAMEWORKS
Chapter 1:

UNDP’s APPROACH TO LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SETTINGS
Local governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings has suffered from “systematic neglect” by policymakers and development partners, not only due to the high risks involved with programming in such environments, but also because of the difficulties of adapting approaches to the complex political and social realities shaping local governance in these settings.

The choice of approach has often been between two extremes: on one hand, community-driven development, which fails to contribute to statebuilding, and on the other hand, top-down decentralization reforms, which ignore the complex political economy of fragile and conflict-affected settings. Both have shown their limitations in fragile contexts. Nowadays, the importance of establishing or restoring the capacity of local governance systems, and in particular local governments, to stabilize fragile or conflict-affected communities, support their socio-economic recovery and increase their resilience is increasingly recognized. This Chapter proposes a renovated approach to local governance in crisis contexts (outside of natural disasters), based on a theory of change that takes stock of the latest evidence on the correlation between fragility, conflict and governance and of concrete UNDP experiences on the ground. The approach is centred on the critical assumption that securing the social contract between state and society at the local level is essential to the long-term success of peacebuilding, statebuilding and recovery processes. After setting the conceptual framework, this Chapter moves on to propose a programmatic framework for action and presents principles and tools that can help practitioners customize programmes to the particular context in which they are working.

### 1.1 CLARIFYING TERMINOLOGY AND CONCEPTS

#### GLOSSARY

A glossary of important terminology used in this Guide is presented in Annex 1. Chapter 1 presents only some of the most critical concepts for framing the proposed theory of change.

**Local Governance** is defined by UNDP as the combined set of institutions, systems and processes at the subnational level through which services, including security and welfare, are provided to citizens and through which the latter articulate their interests and needs, mediate their differences and exercise their rights and obligations. As such, local governance is an open, evolving and multi-dimensional system, involving formal and informal stakeholders of different institutional nature and legitimacies. Local governance works in layers, from the community level to municipalities, districts or counties, and all the way up to regions, provinces or governorates. Local governance arrangements are also in large part defined, influenced and often controlled, by political, legal and economic environments regulated by national actors. Therefore, the issue of central-local relations, and in more decentralized countries including federal states, of intergovernmental relations, is of tremendous importance when analyzing and working on local governance. The distinction also needs to be made between local governance and decentralization, the latter being a national process of reform of an institutional, legal, fiscal and political nature piloted from the centre of government. Local governance exists equally in centralized and decentralized states.

---

LOCAL GOVERNMENT is defined by UNDP as a set of governing institutions imbued with statutory public authority over a subnational area. It includes institutions with different mandates and powers, and at various territorial levels, such as:

- mayor or governor (political head);
- local council of representatives (usually elected);
- chief executive officer (if a separate function from that of the political head);
- technical and administrative units that deliver public goods and services assigned to local governments; and
- local offices of semi-autonomous government agencies (such as regional development agencies, water authority, environmental authority, etc.)

Local governments are traditionally considered (local) state institutions.

In many countries and societies, and especially in countries where state legitimacy is shallow and non-state actors perform several functions devolved to a full-fledged state apparatus in ‘modern’ democracies, the role of local governments may in fact be played by informal institutions not statutorily mandated but...
enjoying sufficient legitimacy – or just plainly using force to assert their authority – to do so. A combination of formal and informal local authorities is also frequent. A broader terminology, i.e. local public authority, is therefore sometimes used to capture all the different forms of local leadership that matter for local governance in any given context.

Figure 1 provides a simplified visual representation (the multi-layered dimension is missing) of what an “ideal” people-centred democratic local governance system would look like. The main message behind the concept is that the capacity of state institutions to manage multiple linkages and networks that cross the central-local, formal-informal dichotomy and public-private dichotomies is fundamental to building effective, responsive and rights-based local governance systems.

**LOCAL DEVELOPMENT** is not just development that happens at the local level, as all development ultimately does anyway. Local development describes a specific manner of addressing identified developmental gaps using processes locally-driven by women and men of a particular area, and maximizing the use of local resources, partnerships and ideas. Local governance and local development are closely related as the main purpose of local governance is to achieve better development outcomes for all at the local level.

Local development requires local authorities using the resources available to them to provide infrastructure and social services responsive to needs of local populations, in particular the poorest among them. Local development is also dependent on enabling policy and institutional frameworks that support an effective use of funds allocated to local needs – hence the link to the development of appropriate national decentralization policies. Local governments need capacities to promote and improve dialogue and partnership between the state, citizens, civil society and the private sector in planning for service delivery and long-term economic growth, including quality local employment.

The above applies as well to situations in which the priority is to bridge the gap in communities affected by crisis between humanitarian life-saving interventions and those that seek to restore pathways to sustainable development goals. This is what can be broadly defined as local recovery.

**BOX 1: THE “LOCAL” IN LOCAL DEVELOPMENT**

Local development leverages the comparative and competitive advantages of localities and mobilizes their specific physical, economic, cultural, social and political resources. In ‘local development,’ the adjective ‘local’ does not refer to the ‘where’ but to the ‘who’ and the ‘how.’ It is about the actors that promote development and the resources they bring to bear on it.

Development is local if it is:

- **ENDOGENOUS** making use of locality-specific resources and responding to a locality-specific vision;
- **OPEN**, by combining with national/global resources and priorities; and
- **INCREMENTAL** by contributing to national development as an additional benefit in a positive sum game.


**FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SETTINGS**

can be characterized using the broader notion of “states of fragility”, as delineated by the OECD in its States of Fragility Report (2015). Fragility in a country, on whole or part of its territory, is not a static condition but rather a situation of dynamic vulnerability to the slowing or reversal of development gains due to risks affecting all or several of the following dimensions: (i) violence; (ii) access to justice; (iii) accountable and inclusive institutions; (iv) economic inclusion and stability; and (v) capacities to prevent and adapt to social, economic and environmental shocks and disasters.10

Countries presenting a state of fragility have either weak institutions or, in some cases, strong but abusive institutions. They may be unable to meet the aspirations of their citizens for equitable and inclusive development, and also face heightened risk of experiencing crisis. Historical, political and social factors, often including a weak social contract and a lack of capacity to respond to shocks and stresses, can mean that the chances of a future political, social or humanitarian failure are high.

While fragility can take many forms and is by nature multidimensional, as exposed above, this Guide focuses more particularly on contexts where a state of fragility can lead to or is marked by high levels of violence, whether criminal and/or conflict-related. A crucial aspect of the fragility characterization in such contexts is the pronounced deterioration in

---

10. The World Bank defines fragility according to its Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) Index, but this approach is not shared by all OECD/DAC donors.
the relationship between state and society and, as a consequence, the inability of the state to effectively mediate between citizen groups, making them vulnerable to violence. Fragility can also be resilient and managed by the prevailing political settlement without actually ever leading to violent conflict. Many countries, in particular those in the middle-income category (e.g. Colombia, Ukraine), may also demonstrate fragile conditions in only certain parts of their territory while more stable conditions sustaining actual development gains prevail elsewhere. This is why the term “settings” rather than “country” is used in this Guide. Fragility can also be circumscribed to certain functions and institutions of the state.

An important consideration when attempting to characterize fragile contexts is the entrenched nature of fragility in many countries. In fact, recent research by the World Bank shows that 90 percent of civil wars occurring in the first decade of the 21st century took place in countries that had already experienced bouts of conflict in the preceding 30 years. Although the origins of fragility are connected to specific histories and triggers for conflict can change over time, the vicious circle of fragility and conflict can generally be connected to a combination of push factors, such as unmet socio-economic needs, unfulfilled civic and political rights or gun cultures and pull factors, in which conflict advances the economic, political or ideological supremacy of certain groups (sometimes referred to as greed factors). Institutional weaknesses increase the feasibility of conflict but would not alone necessarily trigger it. Also, fragile situations remain very sensitive to external shocks (e.g. food commodity price increases, transnational terrorism, organized crime, natural disasters) that act as catalysts and can make difficult situations fall into outright violence. Fragile contexts present therefore a complex web of grievances, opportunities, feasibility factors and catalysts of conflict that challenge the effectiveness of traditional programmatic responses that have in the past focused on the institutional variables of the fragility equation.

For the purpose of this Guide, fragility is seen therefore as a continuum of dynamic situations, marked by recurrence or heightened risk of violence, among other sources of risk, whether it is organized or interpersonal, conflict or criminal. It involves countries displaying acute political, social, economic and/or environmental vulnerabilities to shocks; countries affected partially or totally by deadly conflict; countries emerging from armed conflict; and emerging or middle income countries displaying extremely high levels of organized criminal violence. Certain countries will show a medley of situations in different parts of their territory at the same time or consecutively (see Annex 2 for examples). Evidence shows that fragile and conflict-affected states are subject to multiple forms of violence that interlink both historically and structurally with disastrous consequences on affected populations. The category of ‘post-conflict country’ is in fact highly controversial because of the blurred line from conflict to post-conflict status and the fact that transitions are often marred by repeated conflict.

**Resilience** is defined in the UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017 as an inherent as well as an acquired condition achieved by managing risks over time at individual, household, community and societal levels in ways that minimize costs, build capacity to manage and sustain development momentum and maximize transformative potential. The concept of resilience is inseparable from that of ‘risks’ – factors of a magnitude and intensity able to disrupt development progress and inflict significant direct and indirect costs. Resilience in developmental terms is not just applicable to disaster risks but also to risks of political, social and other kinds of tensions that can escalate into outright violence and conflict. Conflict is a normal part of human interaction; it is the natural result when individuals and groups have incompatible needs, interests or beliefs. What matters, therefore, is a state or society ability to manage conflict so that it does not reverse development and to

---

**Box 2: Drivers of Conflict**

**Grievances:** when some groups face discrimination and inequality, and feel their needs are unmet, becoming easier to mobilize for violence as a result.

**Opportunities:** when conflict provides opportunities for livelihoods, accumulation and power.

**Feasibility:** when the state is unable to counter or buy off rebellion because it is weak, illegitimate and/or absent.

** Catalysts:** when external shocks (security-related, economic, political, environmental) increase the intensity of internal fragility factors.

Adapted from Department for International Development, UK, Building Peaceful States and Societies, and World Bank, World Development Report, 2011.
prioritize constructive collaboration as the principal approach of social interaction. In stable, resilient societies, conflict is managed through numerous formal and informal institutions which form the basis of a resilient governance system, i.e. a system that demonstrates acceptance of uncertainty and change, adaptability, robustness, resourcefulness, integration of its different parts, diversity and inclusiveness.14

Increasingly, international policymakers look at the issue of fragility and conflict as one of strengthening the resilience of complex social and political processes that need to be worked with rather than against, and less as one of ‘mechanistic’ eradication of discrete causal factors of conflict through the transfer of ‘best’ practices. This implies considering two sides of the resilience equation: prevention and crisis response. A resilient society is able to manage risks so that the probability of serious crises emerging is reduced. A resilient society is also able to respond to an emerging crisis early, effectively and durably so that the ramifications of this crisis on its development pathway is minimized. Resilience-strengthening puts the development of self-organization and internal capacities at the heart of the approach to the conflict-poverty nexus.

UNDP priorities for resilience strengthening in fragile and conflict-affected settings fall into three categories: (i) early economic revitalization in post-conflict and post-revolution; (ii) peaceful resolution of disputes to stabilize volatile conditions; and (iii) statebuilding to improve capacities, accountability, responsiveness and legitimacy. These priorities underpin the approach to local governance presented in this Chapter.

1.2 THEORY OF CHANGE: HOW TRANSFORMING LOCAL GOVERNANCE CAN CONTRIBUTE TO BUILDING RESILIENT PEACE AND RESTORING DEVELOPMENT PATHWAYS

A theory of change is used to describe the process by which UNDP envisions that local governance can contribute more effectively to building and maintaining peace, strengthening the state and providing peace dividends to affected populations. This theory of change seeks in particular to clarify the elements detailed in Box 3.

BOX 3: ELEMENTS OF THE THEORY OF CHANGE

PROBLEM STATEMENT: how the potential of local governance for peace-building, statebuilding and recovery is often limited.

LONG-TERM CHANGE: how local governance systems driving peace, state legitimacy and recovery should look.

ASSUMPTIONS: that underpin the causality links sustaining the change pathway and the influence of external factors.

PATHWAY TO CHANGE: the sequence of change that can lead to local governance having a greater effect on peace and recovery.

STAKEHOLDERS: who play the most critical roles in improving local governance according to the proposed change pathway.

RISKS: that may steer the change process the wrong way and produce the opposite effects from those intended.

PROBLEM STATEMENT:
The potential of local governance for increasing societal resilience to violence and conflict, and securing development pathways is not sufficiently realized in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

A snapshot of the consequences of fragility and violence on human development

Approximately 27 percent of the world’s population, or 1.5 billion people, live in fragile and conflict-affected settings. Many of these settings are not subject to widespread conflict, such as inter-state or civil wars. But they may suffer nevertheless from high levels of violence linked to unbridled criminality buoyed by the spread of organized crime, local conflicts over land and other natural resources, organized inter-ethnic, religious and communal violence or repression of social and political contestation movements by oppressive regimes. The latest estimates indicate that there are a total of 740,000 victims of violent death on average every year in the world, two-thirds of which are in non-conflict settings15 (although this proportion could be changing due to a new rise in armed conflicts over the last five years).16

Beyond the deaths and injuries of individuals, the impact of fragility and conflict on sustainable human development is considerable. The OECD estimates


15. Annual figure quoted from the Geneva Declaration Secretariat website, 2015 (www.genevadeclaration.org/the-geneva-declaration/what-is-the-declaration.html); women make up about 17 percent of all victims of intentional homicides.

16. There have been more conflict onsets than concomitant war terminations since 2007 (Themnér and Wallensteen, 2014, cited by Sisk, 2015, p. 6).
that only about 33 percent of fragile and conflict-affected countries have met the poverty targets of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Not surprisingly, the World Bank also points out that progress achieved towards the MDGs can be reversed for countries relapsing into conflict.17 Below are a few more striking facts and figures (mostly taken from the World Development Report 2011, unless otherwise indicated) on the consequences of fragility and violence on various dimensions of sustainable human development and democratic governance.

Security and justice: People in crisis-affected countries experience massive displacement (51.2 million in 2014), loss of contact with loved ones, imprisonment, humiliation, physical violence and enduring trauma.18 This heavily disrupts life patterns and social cohesion for years, even after a conflict ends. In Central America, after the wave of civil wars in the 80s and 90s, homicide rates shot up by 60 to 100 percent in just ten years, with gangs springing up and criminal networks linked to drug trafficking becoming bolder. Conflict deeply undermines the strength and impartiality of rule of law institutions, making them incapable of stopping the spread of insecurity and violence – when they do not actively condone it – and of providing legal redress to victims.

Access to basic social services: The figures presented in Box 4 on MDG attainment attest to the highly negative effect of fragility and conflict on the capacity of states to deliver social services.19 The three major dimensions of availability, accessibility (physical and economic) and quality of services are severely limited when infrastructure, capacities and resources for service delivery are lacking in large swathes of a country and insecurity limits freedom of movement. The overall productivity of the civil service remains a formidable challenge for service delivery, especially when qualified professionals have emigrated en masse due to conflict or are directly targeted by conflict actors.

Economic growth: Not only is the majority of the world’s poverty concentrated in conflict-affected countries, but these countries are also where economic growth is the most difficult to resume. Indeed, trade can take on average 20 years to recover to pre-conflict levels. High economic costs are also incurred because of stress and trauma, lower productivity, increased policing and health care costs, and so forth. Conservative estimates of the economic costs of high levels of violence for countries affected in terms of lost GDP range from two to more than 10 percent annually. At the global level, the economic impact of violence on the world’s economy; including the productive value of lost lives, the cost of IDP/Refugee assistance and GDP losses, is estimated at US$14.3 trillion – or 13.4 per cent of world GDP in 2014.20

Voice and participation: Fragile and conflict-affected states are characterized by underlying patterns of exclusion of parts of the population – at times the majority – from enjoying freedom of expression and participating in decision-making. Conflict situations reduce the opportunities for civil society and civic actors to influence government policies and achieve social change because of the overall breakdown of governance systems and also the deliberate targeting of independent voices.21 Such curtailing of civic and political liberties does not cease once

--

18. The Physical Rights Integrity Index, a measure of respect for human rights, drops on average by 3.6 points during a major civil war (World Development Report, 2011).
19. Also, 64 percent of unattended births worldwide take place in and 43 percent of persons living with HIV/AIDS reside in fragile states (World Development Report, 2011).
21. In a global survey by CIVICUS of civic activists in 30 fragile states (Dufranc, 2011), nearly all confirmed an increase of government regulations during phases of political violence and 76 percent placed direct security threats as the main impediments to their ability to influence policies and their outcomes.
peace is won or political stability is retrieved; in fact, evidence shows that the negative effect of conflict on voice and participation remains long after it has ended.22

Marginalization: Fragility and conflict exacerbate patterns of marginalization and social injustice. Among the most common victims of marginalization across the world, women face systematic abuse of their rights as a direct outcome of state fragility.23 While rarely directly at its origin, women see their lives deeply disturbed by conflict due to displacement, sexual and gender-based violence, trafficking and the rapid decline of their socio-economic status.25 Women’s free-willed exercise of voice is also highly curtailed in such settings due to greater vulnerability to security threats, lesser access to educational opportunities and conservative cultural norms. The effect of conflict on women’s marginalization is felt long after conflict recedes, as post-conflict settings often see a rise in criminality, domestic violence and post-conflict political settlements tend to lock out women’s participation. Children and youth also represent a disproportionate amount of victims of conflict and violence (50 percent of the world’s refugees are under 18). Children and youth experience lost opportunities for education (77 percent of primary school absenteeism worldwide occurs in fragile states), lack access to peaceful jobs,26 are often forced into armed groups and have limited opportunities to participate in decision-making and political processes (for those of voting age).

State-society relations: In fragile and conflict-affected settings, the different sources of state legitimacy27 are eroded, contested or work in opposition. Output legitimacy is usually very low, due to the state’s incapacity to meet people’s expectations for security (first of all), but also due to lack of justice and jobs. Input legitimacy is battled by the excessive use of patronage systems and the unfair redistribution of public resources. Corruption in particular is highly damaging to state-society relations and conflict-affected countries are among the most corrupt in the world.28 Religious or traditional beliefs may be at odds with international pressure to launch democratic reforms. A common consequence of the legitimacy crisis seen in fragile countries is the rise of alternative and competing forms of public authority, further eroding state legitimacy.

The vicious circle of conflict, poverty, marginalization and state weakness, as described above, is not just demonstrated by the negative cases of countries trapped in fragility and recurrent outbursts of violence; it is also proven by virtuous cycles of peace and development witnessed in certain post-conflict countries that have succeeded in transforming their institutions, restoring the social contract and dealing peacefully with conflict legacies. Examples of durable change include most of Latin America after the 1980s, South Africa, Mozambique and Ethiopia.29

Local governance and the fragility trap

If fragile states often display high levels of economic, social and political inequalities, it is the overlapping of these inequalities with group identity differences

22. In 2014, out of the 49 countries listed as not free (Freedom House Index), 35 percent had experienced a severe conflict in the last 10 years, as opposed to only two percent of the 87 countries listed as free (www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.U_YgA_k7um4).
24. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, an estimated 400,000 women are raped yearly under an ongoing civil conflict (World Development Report, 2011). In El Salvador, femicides increased in the 2000s faster than male homicides as gang violence skyrocketed. In 2007, El Salvador was the most dangerous place on earth for women (12.94 deaths per 100,000 women).
25. Female-to-male unemployment ratio is on average 18 percent higher in fragile and conflict-affected settings (of 41 countries sampled) than the world average (World Bank, Gender Statistics, 2012).
26. In countries of the Arab Spring, youth unemployment stands at 23 percent compared to an average of 10 percent for the adult population (ILO, 2011).
27. State legitimacy refers broadly to the public status of a state based on a governed people’s perceptions that the institutions and actions of their governors are appropriate – meaning inclusive, free of corruption and responsive to their needs.
28. According to the 2011 Global Integrity Report, seven out of the 10 conflict and post-conflict countries surveyed scored in the ‘weak’ to ‘very weak’ categories.
29. Ethiopia has reduced extreme poverty by 30 percent since the end of its civil war in 1991 (Sisk, 2015).
Horizontal inequalities have many different sources, some historical (especially in post-colonial states), others geographical or environmental (when regions inhabited by specific groups are more subject to disasters or resource-deprived), but overwhelmingly have political and governance roots. It is in countries where the state is unable to wield authority, to guarantee democratic inclusivity and ensure the redistribution of public resources according to needs, rather than patronage, that horizontal inequalities are most likely to materialize. This leads back to the fundamental interaction between security, inclusion (in decision-making, in enjoying public goods and in accessing opportunities) and capacity (of the state, of civil institutions, of the private sector) to create economic and social well-being for all. Governance remains at the centre of this interaction and is the pivotal variable for fostering peace and creating an enabling environment for development.

The importance of local governance actors and processes in reducing sustainably horizontal inequalities cannot be overstated. Even if the political economy of horizontal inequalities plays out at a larger scale than solely the local level, as fragile states are often marked by discriminatory policies engineered from the highest political and administrative levels, it is at the local level where governance and its consequences are the most concretely experienced by people. It is where, naturally, those affected by horizontal inequalities would hope to have some influence on decisions affecting their well-being. Yet, in fragile states, the local level is where the central government most often fails to transform governance arrangements in a way that could start durably addressing violence- and conflict-inducing inequalities. Weak local governance, often captured by powerful elites linked to criminal networks, or the plain absence of state authority at the local level, contribute to horizontal inequalities and to the rise of violence and conflicts. Below are a few illustrations of this causal link.

### Exclusion from accessing public goods and governance

is experienced mostly in the local sphere. In Sierra Leone, young people who were barred by local elites from using communal natural resources to sustain their livelihoods resorted to violence to assert their rights. In the slums of El Salvador’s capital city, women heads of households (their husband or male supporter killed by gang violence, in prison or emigrated) do not receive the social assistance to which they are entitled due to inefficiencies, corruption and bias in the local administration. They must work longer hours to sustain their families (and at lower pay rates due to gender-based salary inequality) and as a consequence are unable to provide sufficient parental guidance to prevent their sons (who often drop out of poorly-funded local schools) from joining criminal gangs. Meanwhile, in Yemen, the al-Akhdam minority is barred from representation on local councils of the large cities where they mostly live because of biased electoral systems. With no influence on city policies, their quarters remain desperately marginalized.

### Institutional weaknesses

are usually greater at the local level than the national level but rarely receive from central government the policy focus and investment needed to be efficiently addressed. In Haiti, the central government — that barely able to effectively perform its core functions before the devastating 2010 earthquake — for lack of political will and institutional

---

30. See the 2010 comparative study of eight multi-religious and multi-ethnic countries, some conflict-affected, by the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRSE).
33. According to Vincent (2003), in Sierra Leone, disaffection of many young men with their local chiefs, whom they felt were denying them access to communal land and resources, is seen as one of the main push factors to their joining the rebellion led by the Revolutionary United Front.
34. In El Salvador, statistics show that gang members come mainly from women-headed households.
35. According to Al-Naggar (2012), “Rapid urbanization and subsequent overcrowding in the Yemeni cities of San'a, Aden, Hodeida and Taiz has led to further marginalization of the al-Akhdam minorities, who are barred from participating on local councils.”
36. Core government functions in post-crisis situations are defined by the United Nations as: center of government, public finance management, civil service management, aid coordination and local governance (UN-WGPA, Restore or Reform? UN Support to Core Government Functions in the Aftermath of Conflict, 2013).
capacities failed to create an enabling framework for local governments that could spur effective local development. As a consequence, the state’s disaster recovery strategy to balance national development more equally between its territories with hopes of stemming the terrible overcrowding of its capital city (which is also in the most earthquake-prone part of the country) has failed. The population in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area is now higher than it was before 2010. This unfulfilled promise of investing more for territorial development feeds social and political unrest in the country’s provinces, where Haitians feel excluded from aid provided for the country’s recovery.

### Opportunities for armed violence

At the local level also appear when local governance institutions are not able, not willing or not supported enough by national institutions (police, military, justice system) to contribute to citizen security and access to justice for all. In these environments, the possession of small arms by disgruntled citizens usually thrives and public finances meant to develop communities are at times diverted by local strong men-cum-officials to maintain their private militia. In such situations, without the arbitration role of a functioning judicial system, including legal aid and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, interpersonal and community disputes can quickly escalate into full-blown violence.

### Key underlying issues affecting local governance actors and processes

While few would contend that local governance is highly relevant to the goals of reducing horizontal inequalities and building resilient state-society relations, this potential in fragile and conflict-affected settings is strongly limited by a number of key underlying issues (see Figure 2) that eventually further estrange citizens from the state and contribute to breed violence. These issues create momentous challenges in the path of any transformational change process and often drastically limit the effectiveness of local governance programming, especially when it fails to acknowledge the complexity of the socio-political processes at stake.

### Fragmented governance spaces

State fragility is often accompanied by loss of central government control over parts of the national territory. This can happen when the state and its rule of law institutions are simply absent, especially outside of urban areas, allowing the rise of non-state armed actors and governance systems. Loss of control may also be caused by oppressive central government policies that trigger political secession and armed insurgency. Localities, towns and regions can behave competitively with each other and argue over their borders, leading to the emergence of disputed internal territories. Such situations lead to the disintegration of the national space and polities and can sometimes last for extended periods, as seen in Iraq, Libya, Somalia and Yemen.

Fragmented governance spaces magnify the difficulties faced by post-conflict states in rebuilding themselves. For example, when cohesion between localities is lacking, trying to engineer inter-municipal arrangements for service delivery and rebuilding of damaged infrastructure or trying to establish a fair system of equalization of state transfers to the subnational level as a means to address regional inequalities becomes a real challenge. In such situations, resource flows to regions, districts and villages depend more on the influence that their chief executive (e.g. governor, mayor) yields over the central government – which is often equal to the level of threat this leader can pose to the country’s stability – than on fair rules for the redistribution of public resources. Local power holders remain keener on seizing the opportunity of peace to further entrench separation from each other than on rebuilding a unified state and the different governance layers that it entails, and which often implies relinquishing some of the power they have acquired by force or opportunity during conflict.

### Insecurity and failing rule of law

State-imposed rule of law may only prevail in certain communities, usually the more affluent urban areas, while elsewhere non-state armed groups, including criminal gangs in certain contexts, take control of security and carry out their own justice. More often than not, protection is only available to those who can buy it. Women in particular find themselves at risk of sexual...
and gender-based violence. The concept of the rule of law as a value borne by all state institutions, including local governments, is rendered meaningless.

In post-conflict contexts, if no credible and locally-endorsed process of transitional justice, reconciliation or disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants is taking place, local conflict management capacities are put under hard test and the emergence of local political actors not rooted in entrenched identities is limited. If the state fails to re-establish its authority rapidly at the local level, the persistence of war economies, the spread of human trafficking and the proliferation of small arms and organized crime into the post-conflict period is more likely. A lingering defiance towards the state remains even long after the specter of the deadly conflict has been put to rest and community isolationism is reinforced.

**Local leadership lacking legitimacy:** As seen earlier, the legitimacy of state institutions is a composite construct. At the local level, building legitimate local governance institutions often stumbles when central governments fail to engage with informal belief-based leadership and other non-state actors (in particular armed groups and warlords) and to find sustainable formulas to let hybrid local governance systems emerge from below, rather than trying to impose legitimacy mainly through electoral processes. Local elections – while certainly the
most democratic form of statebuilding and a good way to strive for inclusivity – also bring risks in contexts of limited political culture and nascent political organizations. With local elections, at the end of the day, identity-based politics may just win and further entrench horizontal inequalities. The aim of building state legitimacy through local elections is also not achieved when such contests draw a poor turnout – as is often the case.\textsuperscript{39} The output legitimacy of elected local governments is also stunted when they fail to deliver public goods and when local councils have weak mandates and remain marginalized by local executives who feel more accountable to their patronage networks than to elected representatives.

**Reduced local government capacities:** An embryonic presence of the state all over the national territory and/or only through poorly-resourced local governments (among other state institutions at the local level) remains a serious constraint for the transformation of local governance, particularly in the aftermath of conflict. It limits the ability to respond to citizen expectations and this situation may remain for years while statebuilding priorities tend to focus on refitting the centre of government, rule of law agencies and the social service sectors. The lack of public resources allotted to local governance means that local government infrastructures remain largely neglected and not conducive to improved administrative performance. It means also that local government staff (mostly men) continue to be hired on the basis of patronage rather than merit and generally have low qualifications, especially when very low pay scales exist in the local civil service. Bloated payrolls of poorly qualified local government staff can end up taking the lion’s share of local budgets, leaving a near-zero capacity for investing in local development. Administrative procedures and internal control systems are rudimentary and not transparent, curtailing rather than stimulating local government responsiveness to immediate needs. Guidance and capacity development from central government may be insufficient or just not available, except through donor-funded programmes that tend to concentrate on the most accessible and secure areas (such as in Afghanistan).

**Local finances** remain the biggest issue. Fiscal decentralization is not common in fragile and conflict-affected settings\textsuperscript{40} (with the notable exceptions of Kosovo and Sierra Leone) due to the fear from national politicians that it would lessen their power base and increase centrifugal dynamics in already poorly cohesive nations. The lack of trust of the capacity of local authorities to manage public funds accountably is also a strong deterrent from increasing their share of national expenditures. Given the low-income status of most fragile and conflict-affected states, the amounts of state transfers are insufficient and are further eroded by inefficient public financial management mechanisms. Local governments can hardly make up for the meagre state subsidies through their own revenue generation as their taxation autonomy is curtailed and their tax base usually mostly comprised of impoverished populations. In contexts of limited rule of law, high levels of corruption and poor administrative capacity, tax evasion is also rife. When localities are endowed with a wealth of natural resources, illicit financial flows or the exclusion of local governments from negotiating deals with foreign extractive companies limit the income localities can earn from it. Dominant families or clans may also capture local government leadership to assert their control over local land and natural resources and wield them as their personal riches.

**Increasing competition, marginalization and declining social capital:** The combination of competition over livelihoods, marginalization of certain groups and the loss of trust in the role of the state as an honest broker of grievances can have disastrous effects on social capital. Competition for livelihoods intensifies when poor governance, corruption and violence all combine to derail local economic dynamics and trigger a rise in unemployment and greater pressure on land and natural resources. Access to the latter may be adjudicated by corrupt local authorities to the benefit of the richest and most powerful; often, the result is that those excluded from these public riches emigrate to urban centres or abroad where livelihood opportunities seem more accessible to them. In rarer occasions, they may protest and ultimately resort to violence to challenge the political order that cuts their access to land and capital.


\textsuperscript{40} In the Shah Study (2012), 86 percent of the fragile states ranked in the lowest quartile for budget autonomy (% vertical imbalance x % unconditional amounts in state transfers).
When survival becomes increasingly competitive, collective action constricts to the inner spheres (extended family, clan, block, etc.) and cross-group civic engagement suffers. Social capital declines and disputes between individuals can escalate more rapidly into inter-group conflict. The cohesion of communities can be further destabilized by the arrival of displaced populations and/or the presence of armed groups or ex-combatants. Seen through a conflict-resilience lens, the state should take seriously situations of increased competition over livelihoods and dwindling social capital. Yet, making governance more inclusive is not necessarily at the top of the agenda of local leaders, as inclusivity can threaten their rent-seeking and political survival strategies. When local participation is promoted from outside as a means to restore social capital and heal conflict legacies, it does not necessarily effectively address marginalization unless real efforts are made to prevent the control of established social and business elites over these new governance processes.41

Unmanaged expectations: Local populations often harbour unrealistic expectations of fast improvement, especially after the signature of a peace settlement, the drafting of a new constitution, the holding of local elections or the adoption of a decentralization reform. Unrealistic expectations are likewise found among local governments which expect a rapid increase in support from the central government (and its international sponsors). At the same time, central government expects rapid and docile application of the new policies and regulations it produces. In post-conflict and transition environments, expectations from different stakeholders, at times mutually contradictory, are notoriously hard to manage and the resulting frustrations can build up to dangerous levels if governance processes remain opaque to citizens and information does not flow between central and local governments. Also, government capacities for information management and strategic communications, among other skill domains essential to managing expectations, are often neglected in capacity development policies.

While not exhaustive, this list of key issues affecting local governance actors and processes underlines the strategic risk that when weak local institutions continue disappointing society’s needs and aspirations, they further entrench proneness to conflict. In such settings, institutional weaknesses are often as much a product of competing or misaligned incentives as capacity deficits. The underlying agreements and arrangements that establish the rules of the game – for example in the allocation of resources (‘who gets what’) – and that articulate the nature of state-society relations are deeply flawed.

In short, in fragile and conflict-affected settings there is often no social contract binding the state and society in mutually reinforcing ways. This in turn creates friction within society, as public goods and resources are allocated in a partisan manner, fostering competition and vertical and horizontal inequalities, often on a geographical basis as well, which can result in a further breakdown of social cohesion and fragmentation of the national space.

The dilemmas facing international policymakers

Recognizing the intimate relationship between local governance, fragility and conflict is critical for donor policies and programming in fragile states. Given the complex web of issues interacting at the local level, replicated over hundreds or thousands of local governance units, each with its own peculiar set of conditions, the tendency among international policymakers has often been to adopt minimum-risk strategies, especially in the aftermath of conflict. Schematically, policy responses from the international community tend to align with the below options.

- Focus primarily on building a strong centre of government and national political institutions, while managing local needs through community-driven development programmes until such time as state stability, capacities and resources are sufficient to roll out a modern system of local governance. Recent in-depth evaluations have shown the limited success in actually effecting lasting change in terms of peace, extension of state authority and recovery at the local level through such a strategy.42

41. Research shows that participants in civic activities, especially when donor- or government-driven, tend to be wealthier, more educated, of higher social status (by caste and ethnicity), male and more politically connected than non-participants (Mansouri, G. and R. Vijayendra, 2013).

42. Ibid, p. 11: “Participatory interventions have been used in post-conflict settings as a quick way of getting funds to the ground. The limited evidence on their effectiveness suggests that such projects have made little headway in building social cohesion or rebuilding the state.”
Jumpstart decentralization reforms to appease claims of autonomy and threats of local unrest, hoping that a sudden change of paradigm in the state would empower local governments to achieve their core missions, even if the massive input of resources and capacity development that is needed to make decentralization succeed is not forthcoming (due to the high fiduciary risks involved). The outcomes of such an approach in the fragile counties where it has been followed is not convincing.43

Address local governance needs primarily through ad hoc, short life-span efforts to build capacities of local governments for specific tasks (mostly service delivery). This attempts to strengthen local governance on the basis of existing arrangements, without acknowledging where the challenge really lies: the political economy that created the crisis situation in the first place. Such an approach ignores the risks of exacerbating drivers of fragility and conflict by strengthening, rather than transforming, prevailing local governance arrangements.44

The dilemmas facing central governments and their international supporters when contemplating policies and programming for local governance can be summarized in a number of tensions and trade-offs represented in Figure 3 on next page.

As listed below, some lessons can be drawn on the nature and ramifications of international responses to local governance challenges in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

- **Context**: Too often, the complexity and uniqueness of each local context is brushed off. If context matters at central government, it matters even more at the local level. Local and regional specificities need to be understood, as well as the political economy of central-local relations.

- **Time span**: More than any other core government function, local governance needs long-haul support to achieve change at scale. Donor support often comes too late in post-conflict situations and stops too early (e.g. tied to the completion of local elections).

- **Level of action**: Programming can be too localized, focusing on the community level, or on the contrary too centralized, focusing mostly on policy aspects. Comprehensive multi-layered support to the various echelons of sub-national governance is rarely seen; instead the concept that these levels of local governance need to be built one after the other sequentially is commonly applied.

- **Diversity of roles**: Donors tend to focus on the service-delivery function of local governance institutions in a conflict or post-conflict situation. Yet, expectations from local populations on what their local governments should do may be different. The complex set of functions of local governance systems needs to be built into more holistic change strategies.

- **Modern versus old**: Policy choices on the shape of local governance systems in fragile and conflict-affected settings are often reduced to a simplistic dichotomy: new or old. The focus on resilience-strengthening acknowledges the need to use local solutions and engage with informal actors and processes, even if they may be at odds with the democratic paradigm. A risk, however, is that too much focus on ‘resilience’ justifies maintaining problematic socio-political orders in place.

As a result of the above, the potential of local governance for peacebuilding, statebuilding and recovery often remains neglected. For example, a quick look at the (thin) available empirical evidence45 shows that, in fragile states:

- the share of subnational expenditures in the national budget remains low compared to other countries (71 percent of sampled fragile states rank in the lower half);
- the dependency of local governments on state transfers (referred to as vertical imbalance)46 remains very high (70 percent against a world

43. “While the issue of strengthening local government is widely seen to be important in post-conflict environments, in particular as it can improve service delivery and promote inclusion and accountability […], the value of decentralization is much more contested. In fragile and conflict-affected states, it is often argued that political and fiscal decentralization, if implemented too rapidly, can promote conflict and even weaken the state.” UN-WGPA, 2014, p. 54.


45. All first four indicators come from the study by Ivanyna and Shah (2012) that covers 182 countries, including 29 fragile states (Haiti, Myanmar, Timor-Leste, Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Chad, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Mali, Yemen, Burundi, Syria, Nepal, Libya, Papua New Guinea, Iraq, El Salvador, Lebanon, Guatemala, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Honduras, Sudan, Pakistan, Moldova and the occupied Palestinian territories).

46. Ratio intergovernmental transfer/subnational expenditures.
The potential of local governance for peacebuilding, statebuilding and recovery often remains neglected.

average of 52 percent); as state transfers are nominally very low in most fragile states, this means that local governments have limited capacities to efficiently affect local development and economies;

the administrative and legislative independence of local governments is not guaranteed (58 percent of fragile states ranking in the lowest quartile);

local authorities are mostly appointed rather than elected (59 percent of fragile states rank in the bottom quartile for the level of direct election of local governments); and

direct donor assistance to ‘decentralization and subnational governments’ in fragile states is extremely marginal (in 2012, 1.2 percent of total ODA in fragile and conflict-affected states was classified under this thematic area).47 Aid to the local level in these countries is still overwhelmingly channeled through central government or parallel systems such as social funds or community-driven development programmes.

47. Query on OECD database for 2012 ODA to 39 fragile and crisis-affected states comparing ODA to “decentralization and subnational governments” sector versus ODA to all sectors for this group of states.
LONG-TERM CHANGE:
Local governance as a driver of peace, state legitimacy and accelerated recovery

Ultimately, more effective local governance systems that are responsive to people’s needs and aspirations, inclusive and resilient to crises should play a decisive role in delivering improved quality of life for all, reducing inequalities and cementing a resilient state-society relationship based on a shared understanding of respective roles and responsibilities. Local governance should also – and this is the most political and complex part of the formula – participate in nation-building and the assimilation of regional peculiarities into a larger coherent and cohesive whole.

While the above remains a valuable goal for any country, the reality of fragile and conflict-affected settings calls for a more measured long-term ambition on a 10-15 year timeline. Indeed, transforming local governance in such settings, or any aspect of governance and public administration for that matter, is a long-term endeavour. Evidence shows that governance reforms do not usually produce quick results. The fastest reformers since 1985 in terms of state capability took no less than 12 years to significantly improve core areas, such as bureaucratic quality, government effectiveness, control of corruption or rule of law. In fact, the average timespan for such changes to be fully implemented seems to be closer to 20 years and above for most countries.48

Nevertheless, setting an aspirational overall goal is necessary to chart a change pathway. Hence, UNDP seeks to support countries affected by fragility, violence and conflict to build, strengthen and transform their local governance so that all people, men and women, enjoy improved stability in their communities, urban or rural, can access better socio-economic status and can overcome, individually, collectively and as a nation, the legacies of violence and conflict.

A more intermediate outcome, which is needed to guide UNDP programming, is that local governance actors become collectively stronger drivers of resilient peace, legitimate state capacity and sustainable recovery so that local governance provides a solid foundation for a renewed social contract between state and society. The key principles of resilience, inclusivity, responsiveness and accountability are all embedded in this desirable outcome – and it is their very realization through transformed local governance practices that can bring about the change desired.

The onus is put indeed on transforming local governance in the long term, not just strengthening existing institutions and mechanisms shaped by socio-political orders that are often at the root of horizontal inequalities and other conflict drivers and provide too many conflict opportunities. ‘Transforming’ should not be understood as the drastic and mechanistic transposition of external rules-based policies and models, oblivious of the realities of local governance, and in particular of the endogenous resilience and coping mechanisms that define any society, even under conflict. Transformation should come from within: external support becomes then more an element of facilitation and ‘fueling’ of such mechanisms, rather than one of authoritative ‘guidance.’ Existing capacities should be strengthened, new ones introduced when needed, and old rules can be accommodated and made to fit into renovated frameworks.

Defining an ambitious long-term impact does not take away the fact that improved and expanded support to local governance is not a silver bullet for peacebuilding, statebuilding and recovery. The pathway out of recurrent crises and onto a more resilient road to sustainable development needs also a stronger centre of government, public administration, national economy, democratic culture and geopolitical consensus to succeed. In the shorter-term as well, without a marked improvement in the security situation and a viable national political settlement (including a so-called ‘secondary’ settlement between the centre and the periphery), the best-crafted local governance strategies and programmes will not achieve the intended outcome. At the end of the day, the most complex and risky part of the process of keeping or bringing a country back together is not the work of building capacities of local governments nor of introducing democratic rules of the game to the local level, but rather of negotiating issues of power, rights and resources between the centre and the periphery.

ASSUMPTIONS:
Beliefs and hypotheses underpinning UNDP’s approach to the transformation of local governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings

The theory of change proposed rests on a number of assumptions that are taken for granted, sometimes based on deeply-held values, but often as well on evidence gathered from the literature or from lessons learned in UNDP programmes. Two of these fundamental assumptions have already been explored in the problem statement section.

- Peace, governance and development outcomes are inter-related.
- Violence and fragility undermine development.

Additional assumptions that underpin UNDP’s approach to local governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings can be arranged in three categories: (i) assumptions dealing with causality links used in the chain of results; (ii) assumptions about external factors necessary to enable the chain of changes; and (iii) assumptions about UNDP’s programmatic capacities to implement the actions needed to support the proposed change pathway (see Chapter 9).

Below is a selection of key causality assumptions.

1. Strengthening the social contract between the state and the people is key to building societal resilience against conflict and setting societies on a more stable course toward sustainable human development.

2. Reducing violence and taking actions to enhance the accountability and inclusivity of institutions are initial steps to generating a state’s legitimacy. With better security, populations can access and demand state-provided services and increase their engagement in economic activity and governance processes. Reducing the exploitation of formal institutions for personal gain helps increase the state’s control over the rule of law and hence lessens opportunities for violence and conflict to flare up. Fomenting the participation of marginalized groups in governance systems in a way that actually brings about the lessening of horizontal inequalities signals a positive change in the way the state relates to society. A virtuous cycle of governance, peace and development demands institutions that can provide for inclusion of all major social forces, divide public monies and give access to natural resources and opportunities proportionally to needs. Importantly, it is not an either-or choice: states rely on different sources of legitimacy. So, for example, improving security and providing other much needed services but keeping in place corrupt and exclusionary governance practices would not lastingly bolster trust in the state.

3. Social cohesion and institutional coherence are essential building blocks of a strong social contract. In deeply divided societies, a lack of social cohesion, i.e. the inability of various groups to agree on how they can live together, including governing together, negatively affects the relationship of individuals and groups with the state. On the other side, a lack of coherence of the state in its vision, rules, policies, actions and attitudes to citizens complicates building a trust-based relationship with society. It also constrains achieving better development results.

4. Peace, democracy (and in particular inclusivity) and prosperity can emerge from the bottom-up. "The greatest resource for sustaining peace in the long-term is always rooted in the local people and their
culture,” wrote JP Lederach,49 the great peace theorist who developed the concept of Infrastructure for Peace.50 Peacebuilding strategies that place a strong emphasis on empowering local stakeholders and are driven by local needs, interests and practices, including for local governance, have a much better chance of sustaining themselves. Also, a good place to find democratic practice is often in the ways in which those in poverty or duress self-organize to create their own public goods.

5. Hybrid governance arrangements between formal and informal institutions at the local level help rebuild the state. In fragile and ungoverned societies, with deep-seated defiance towards the state, building the state from above only (through centrally-planned and led policies and programmes for extending state authority, for example) is not sufficient and may backlash.50 Traditional forms of public authority are not necessarily inimical to the gradual extension of more rules-based local governance systems. Traditional authorities will remain in any case influential in shaping how formal authority works. The challenge is to understand how the two interact and to look for ways of constructively combining them, especially at the lowest level of governance, closest to communities, where fragile states often do not have the resources needed to rebuild a strong formal state presence.

6. Local government weaknesses can be tackled by building their capacities while providing them with incentives for change. Emphasizing the role of local governments in delivering public goods and services and managing conflicts without paying attention to their needs for capacities (including financial resources) and for incentives to change their ways will result in entrenching ineffective and corrupt practices and increase the likelihood of a return to conflict. Sources of incentives are multiple, from political (the possibility of re-election) to financial (e.g. performance-based state grants), but there should also be the possibility of sanctions (through internal or external accountability systems).

7. Integrated interventions accelerate the transition to peace and development. Programmes should bring together under one approach local institution-building, security and justice, poverty alleviation, sustainable development and so forth (based on context needs). Addressing the root causes of violence and building resilience requires supporting local processes and institutional capacities capable of identifying and managing a complex web of issues: such as linking poverty with marginalization, social fragmentation, elite capture, environmental degradation, gender inequality and so forth. Mechanistic and reductionist approaches that treat problems in isolation of each other do not work.

8. Equal opportunities for women in the local public, political, economic and social life are closely associated with peace and development. Countries with greater participation of women in public and economic spheres often see lower levels of corruption and lower vulnerability to conflict.51 The most critical factors to achieve greater women’s influence on peace and development start with reducing risks of sexual and gender-based violence, improving access to justice (including for equal property and inheritance rights) and promoting women’s entrepreneurship and employment. Women’s participation in local governance needs to go beyond a mere increased physical presence in local governments or community platforms as gender inequality is closely linked to the underlying political settlement, including the balance of power between local formal and customary authorities.

**Pathway to change:**
A social contract-based approach to transforming local governance

**Domains of change**

Supporting the pathway to the proposed long-term overall goal requires inducing and accompanying change not only in the legal and political rules of the game, but equally in the operational systems and capacities and, most critically, in the values and attitudes of local governance stakeholders, whether formal or informal, and of citizens in general. The main manifestations of that change should be in the ability of local governance systems to:

- deliver more and better public goods and services, responding to priorities expressed by all men and women;
- increase representation and participation in decision-making, in particular of marginalized groups; and
- reduce violence and peacefully manage contestations driven by local issues.

50. “Donors need to recognize that trying to strengthen state capacity and legitimacy in very fragile environments by imposing or supporting the creation of rational-legal political institutions will not work,” OECD, 2010, p. 15.
51. Hudson V. et al., cited in Sisk, 2015, p. 11.
This helps define three main domains of change for the proposed pathway, described below.

**Responsive institutions**: Local public administrators need to be able to govern well in partnership with informal institutions, civil society and the private sector in order to build consensus around collective strategies and action plans for service delivery, conflict management and local development. Services delivered should respond to the needs of men and women and must not be captive of elite interests or biased against certain groups. Responsiveness is also motivated by strong accountability frameworks.

**Inclusive politics**: Local-level political processes (in the broad sense of interest aggregation and representation) that see citizens, political structures and state institutions exhibiting attitudes and using mechanisms that allow for legitimate and peaceful expressions of ideologies and interests should prevail.

**Resilient society**: Violence should not be used to solve disputes; rather, state and society should work together to improve the management of disputes and ensure that society plays a role in monitoring, assessing, mediating and responding to social and political conflict, as well as in preventing criminal violence.

These three domains of change correspond to UNDP’s framework for promoting governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings, which is committed to securing the social contract between state and society (see Governance for Peace Report, 2012). The core objective of the social contract framework is to transform state-society relations towards more understanding, confidence, responsiveness and effective conflict management. The concept of a ‘social contract’ is not unique to fragile settings. It is valuable in all societies, but in fragile and conflict-affected settings it often remains elusive and unable to withstand shocks and prolonged tensions.

**Chain of changes**

The theory of change illustrated in Figure 4 demonstrates how interventions pertaining to what is commonly called **integrated local governance programming** can trigger incremental positive change towards peace, state stability and recovery.

The three **domains of change** of the social contract underpin the entire change pathway and work in synergy. It is their close interaction, in time and in space, that can bring about the changes sought after. Often, local governance programming focuses on only one domain of change at a time, e.g. building local government institutions or organizing local elections, or improving community security, in a reductionist manner. UNDP’s approach is strongly rooted in the belief that in fragile and conflict-affected settings, development policies and programmes should facilitate change in the three domains concomitantly to sustainably overcome fragility.

The change pathway starts with six main interconnected **intervention areas** related to the three domains of change, which can be considered as ‘outputs’ of a single programme or outcomes of separate – yet closely coordinated – projects (see Section 1.4). These areas are: (1) capacities for service delivery, (2) voice and participation, (3) land, natural resources and local economy; (4) local political processes; (5) conflict management and local security; and (6) national framework.
Combinations of activities pertaining to these six intervention areas should trigger rapid changes to local capacities and conditions and in as many locations as political will, security conditions, technical capacities and financial resources would allow. From these rapid changes or ‘shifts’, breakthroughs in terms of stabilization and recovery are expected, as well as a positive evolution in state-society relations. This is how in the mid-term, and with the assumed ability to operate growingly at scale (hence not in isolation in a handful of pilot locations), tangible results and impacts can be expected at the societal level.

Lessons learned from early stages of peacebuilding, statebuilding and recovery at the local level will inform future reforms in local governance and local development, including for decentralization. Through these reforms, greater predictability and stability in intergovernmental relations should be achieved. The prerogatives of local governments and other local institutions become recognized and supported with policies, qualified staffing, assets and funds. At the same time, local governance processes become sufficiently inclusive and accountable to enroot in society the notion that public goods and services are provided for all and if grievances arise, they can be handled peacefully through due processes. A culture of established rules and mechanisms for dealing with social and political violence provides a binding framework for peaceful conflict prevention and transformation.52

The chart also highlights the causality assumptions and critical external conditions, pertaining to the broader security, institutional, political, economic and social context of a country, that provide the enabling framework for the proposed change pathway to unfold. These external conditions are not necessarily within UNDP’s direct mandate and if they are, they would not usually be tackled through a local governance programme alone.

- Central power holders accept that change needs to be negotiated with local actors.
- Policy-makers have sufficient will to reform over time local governance all over the country on the basis of experience (rather than ideology or other private interest-driven agenda) and to push the reform through steadily.
- Changes in local governance arrangements are gradually framed in legal frameworks, including in the constitution.

### Economic and financial conditions
- Financial resources to support local government operations and local development and extend successful approaches to the whole country are increasingly available. This implies, in particular, steady donor support in the long-term to build local governance using national systems (versus parallel structures).
- The national economy is growing and can pull local economies upward.

### Institutional conditions
- Core government operations are able to support local governments, in particular by paying salaries and channeling development funds to the local level.
- Vibrant civil society networks are in place that advocate for inclusivity and accountability in local governance.
- Policies are being implemented for greater gender equity in state institutions.

### Social conditions
- Positive attitudes increase across society towards democratic values, including the rule of law and rights-based gender equity, and participation in (local) governance.
- Women and youth empowerment is supported at all levels of public life through concerted donor, government and civil society efforts.

Of course, an enabling framework as described above will never be fully in place while UNDP deploys support to local governance systems in fragile and conflict-affected states. It is, therefore, critical in the pre-programming assessment phase (see Chapter 2) to review these external conditions (and possibly others that may be more context-specific) to better
The potential of local governance for increasing societal resilience to violence and securing development pathways is not sufficiently realized in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

**Barriers**
- Insecurity and failing rule of law
- Local leadership lacking legitimacy
- Reduced local government capacities and depleted local finances
- Increasing competition over livelihood means and declining social cohesion
- Unmanaged societal and institutional expectations
- Fragmented governance spaces
- Competing incentives for change between central and local level

**Responsive Institutions**
- Capacities for service delivery
  - Extending local government presence
  - Systems and skills
  - Local finances
- Voice and participation
  - Civil society support
  - Citizen participation, social accountability
  - Civic education
  - Access to information
- Land, natural resources and local economy
  - Land-use control
  - Capacities for local economic recovery
  - Local management of extractives
- Local political processes
  - Inclusive political party structures at local level
  - Support to peaceful local elections
  - Local parliamentary support

**Inclusive Politics**
- Conflict management and local security
  - Local infrastructures for peace
  - Fight against gender-based violence
  - Community security and social cohesion
  - Access to justice at local level

**Resilient Society**
- National framework
  - Central-local relations
  - Local civil service management
  - Decentralization policy design
  - Partnership building

**Causality Assumptions**
- Violence reduction and inclusive governance key to change momentum
- Weak local governments can be responsive to capacity development with the right incentives
- Peace, democracy and prosperity emerge from the bottom-up
- Multidimensional interventions accelerate change

**Interventions**
- Local governments and service delivery
  - Local governments capable of carrying out basic management functions
- Local political processes
  - Local politics and elections more open to women, youth, minorities and ex-combatants
- Local economic recovery
  - Systems and rules applied to control use of land and natural resources for the benefit of all

**Shifts in Capacities and Conditions**
- Voice and participation
  - Increased collaboration between civil society and local governments
  - Channels available to communities for voicing their demands peacefully
- Conflict management and local security
  - Multi-stakeholder platforms to reduce insecurity and deal with conflict legacies in place
- National framework
  - Regulatory and resource flows from central to local levels better organized

**External Conditions**
- Major sources of insecurity neutralized
- Core government functions fulfilled
- Democratic values take root and attitudes to gender equity change
- Central-local secondary settlement negotiated
- Steady and coordinated donor support
RESULTS

INCREASED OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROGRESS FOR ALL

RESILIENT STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS

SUSTAINABLE DECREASE OF VIOLENCE AT ALL LEVELS

Local governance stakeholders are stronger drivers of resilient peace, effective state capacity and sustainable recovery. Local governance provides a solid foundation for a renewed social contract.

**OUTCOME**

Social cohesion and institutional coherence help reinforce state-society relations

Hybrid local governance models are compatible with statebuilding

Gender equality is conducive to peace and development

A stronger social contract makes societies resilient and prosperous

- **RESULTS**
  - Increased performance of local governments due to stronger accountability frameworks, clearer rules and increased partnerships and resources
  - Basic services and means of livelihood accessible to a growing share of the local population irrespective of gender, age, identity or income level
  - Local governments and their partners provide improved basic services to all and support to local economies with increasing financial effectiveness
  - Formal and informal leadership institutions play complementary roles in exercising public authority
  - Local decision-making is less elite-centered with more inclusive democratic representation and active citizen participation
  - Local political institutions are inclusive, produce noticeable change and alternate peacefully
  - Grievances and disputes over conflict legacies, resources and ideologies are handled locally, without systematic use of violence
  - Public spaces are safer for political, social and economic interactions, in particular for women and other vulnerable groups
  - Relations between social and political groups at community level are resilient to shocks
  - Shared vision among all actors on local governance reform emerging
  - Local governance reform supported by strong political will
  - Economic growth and increased government revenues at all levels
  - Social change not barred by elites
gauge the feasibility of different interventions, their probable effects, the risks involved and the mitigation measures needed. Also, certain regions may present better enabling context than others. If so, this may call for an asymmetric approach to driving change, whereby programmes are rolled out first in particular regions where conditions are more conducive, or the breadth of programming may be different from one area to another.

The sequencing of interventions

Charting a general sequence for change when embarking on a local governance programme in fragile and conflict-affected settings is important to build trust among local and national actors, including citizens, but also to secure steady external support. Yet, it would be arguable to define a sequence that applies to all fragile contexts. The rationale underpinning the sequencing of interventions should be given by the starting state in state-society relations at the local level. The level of involvement and responsibility of local governments in explaining fragility and conflict varies from one situation to the next. Often local governments are part of an exploitative and marginalizing system, when they do not actually spearhead it. In other cases, local governments are simply considered illegitimate because of their incapacity to respond to local demands for services. Capacity and legitimacy are distinct but interdependent. In fragile settings, a lack of legitimacy of local governments undermines their capacity; equally, their lack of capacity undermines their legitimacy.53

The broad rule that applies to fragile and conflict-affected settings when the state-society relationship is highly strained is that there is a need to quickly improve conditions at the local level for societal recovery (e.g. make quick progress in violence reduction, service delivery, access to justice, job creation).54 And this must happen through collaborative and inclusive co-production mechanisms with the participation of communities and leadership of local governments, as a sign that the state is committing to a different relationship with society. The objective is to restore confidence between groups, between formal and informal actors and, finally, between state and society. Simultaneously, the hard work of transforming institutions, which is a long-haul endeavor, needs to be pursued.

The main mechanisms to restore confidence at the local level are:

- to deliver early results in areas reflecting the priorities of communities, but also, as far as possible, of other key local stakeholders, including potential ‘ spoilers’ as a means to assuage their opposition to change;
- to foster collaborative and inclusive local coalitions of state and non-state actors to address immediate needs, in order to bridge problems of low trust between communities and between communities and state institutions; and
- to use signals and commitment mechanisms, in particular in terms of undoing previous discriminatory practices and fighting corruption in the management of local affairs, to show that a break from the past is underway.

The main principles for transforming institutions are:

- to help local institutions focus on immediate priorities of men and women for services and guide them away from trying to tackle everything at once; and
- to pursue best-fit changes in the way local institutions function – rather than best practices – allowing flexibility and innovation and avoiding overly normative frameworks (e.g. insisting that local elections have to come first to build legitimate decisions rather than supporting temporarily broad-based consensus-building platforms, or waiting for new local government laws to be in place before starting to build capacities of local governments). Eventually, changes in local governance arrangements called for to reshape the social contract must be framed into reforms, but they should be mainly informed by feedback from pilot experiences, rather than by imported norms.

Following are a narrative description and graphic representation (Figure 5) of a three-track approach that would apply to a number of fragile and post-conflict situations, in particular conflict-affected settings and situations of low presence of the state outside of major urban centres. The first two tracks can be undertaken in specific geographic areas for a start.

54. Beyond guaranteeing public security, the World Bank, based on research carried out for the 2011 World Development Report, also highlighted the critical importance of justice and job creation.
but the third track implies a much larger geographical scope and strong national leadership. It is important to go to scale quickly as a means to address historical imbalances between different regions, which may also drive conflict, and therefore to provide peace dividends to a large share of society. The three tracks are not consecutive and will always overlap in time and space.

**TRACK 1:** Support the extension of state authority and constructive engagement with society at the local level.

The greater proximity of local governance to populations makes it a privileged entry point to restore the state-society relationship, help rebuild social cohesion of conflict-affected communities and renegotiate links between central and local polities and institutions. Extending state presence and authority in areas where the experience of the state by local societies has been marked by violence and abuse can be contentious. One on hand, a state’s legitimacy comes in good part from its ability to re-establish the rule of law and protect populations from harm – hence the need for extending the presence of its institutions closer to people – on the other hand, just restoring or extending the presence of a reviled state can backlash. Therefore, the extension of state authority should not be understood as merely replicating old structures, systems and attitudes, but as redeploying state institutions, including the police, justice, the public administration and local governments, under a new paradigm to be negotiated with local elites and populations. Given the focus of this guide, the emphasis is put here on the need to allowing a constructive engagement between local governments, as basic as these may be at first, and society.

For this engagement to happen, local governments need to be physically present and operational at intermediary and lower levels. This may require the rehabilitation of facilities (or provision of temporary ones), the deployment of standard packages of basic equipment, the replacement of missing staff (using the opportunity to increase the access of women to local government positions), the resumption of payroll payments for local government staff while at the same time making efforts to guarantee their security and that of local governments’ assets and facilities. In situations of extremely low capacity or where conflict has eroded basic agreements on the institutions, roles and boundaries of state administration, this requires stabilizing and empowering hybrid forms of leadership that can help restore the legitimacy of local governments (e.g. Puntland, Somaliland). When the issue is mostly one of lawlessness in deprived urban areas, supporting the extension of state authority consists in creating additional outposts of local government offices, alongside police presence, at neighbourhood level so that violence-affected populations can more safely engage with local authorities.55 At the same time, efforts must be made to help the growth of local infrastructures for peace in order to support communities to manage local disputes more effectively and deal with conflict legacies and to reduce the occurrence of interpersonal violence, in particular violence against women. This track also puts emphasis on rebuilding the most basic elements of the central-local intergovernmental architecture, such as communication means and protocols, financial transfer systems, a clarified division of roles in delivering basic services and a simple monitoring system for central government to be able to respond more swiftly to local governments’ needs and detect early possible serious issues in their relations with local communities that could degenerate into violent confrontation.

**TRACK 2:** Ensure that local governments and other important local actors (civil society, traditional leaders, the private sector) can play an effective role in (early) recovery processes.

This step requires outreach to populations, mobilization of public-private partnerships (including with civil society organizations), reconstruction and the delivery of essential services Planning for and implementing the recovery of local communities affected by violence or conflict provides excellent opportunities to strengthen inclusive local governance practices, rebuild social links and boost local government capacities to lead collective action. Suitable interventions include:

- supporting participatory needs assessments and the preparation of local recovery plans;56
- establishing local recovery funds accessible to local actors for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of community spaces and infrastructure;

55. As demonstrated by the rapid impact on reducing petty crime and violence in El Salvador’s urban areas after the opening by municipalities (supported by UNDP) of Citizen Liaison Offices (or Casetas de información in Spanish) in each crime-ridden neighbourhood, staffed with municipal and national police officers and social workers.

56. In recent years, the use of community and citizen perception surveys in post-conflict environments, as now practiced routinely in United Nations peacekeeping missions, has contributed to better needs assessments and impact evaluations used as a foundation for early peacebuilding and recovery efforts.
It is important to keep local governance relatively depoliticized during times of peacebuilding and statebuilding, especially after internal conflict, for fear of political competition again dividing communities.

- supporting the delivery of key basic services by promoting co-production mechanisms (state/society), improving coordination between different state institutions involved in service delivery, and providing funding for quick-impact capital investments in upgrading service delivery assets and for supporting basic operating and maintenance costs;
- conducting emergency zoning and urban planning in towns that have suffered heavy damage and/or face a high influx of displaced persons;
- bolstering the role of local governments in providing support to local productive livelihoods (e.g. cash-for-work, skills development programmes, micro-capital grants to local MSMEs); and
- deepening monitoring and evaluation practices on service delivery, including through the use of social accountability tools (e.g. community report cards) to identify immediate gaps and plan long-term development of service delivery capacities.

In order to create momentum in the level of citizen engagement needed to sustain the many participatory governance processes taking off under this track, support to local civil society capacities and civic awareness on the role of the state, citizenship, rights and basic democratic principles is also crucial. When the social cohesion of local communities is threatened by a large number of displaced people or the return to civilian life of ex-combatants, the capacities of local governments to implement conflict-sensitive hosting and reintegration activities is also critical in this phase.

**Track 3:** Consolidate renovated local governance systems and strengthen their resilience by stabilizing leadership, structures, capacities and performance in delivering services and supporting local development.

This track depends critically on linkages to broader policy and programming processes led by the centre of government. Building capacities of local governments is a long-haul endeavor and will continue in Phase 3. This track involves more advanced skills (e.g. financial and project management, tax collection, local economic development) than those tackled under the other tracks. It is also here that decisions on the future shape of local governance in the country, possibly through decentralization, would normally happen on the basis of the lessons learned from the first two tracks and building upon capacities already created.

This is also the stage at which local politics start to take shape. Comparative experience shows that keeping local governance relatively depoliticized during the initial phases of peacebuilding and statebuilding, after a violent conflict, decrease the risk of divisive political dynamics reappearing. Nonetheless, politics are never absent from local governance. To stabilize leadership over local governance systems and guarantee an inclusive representation of all interest groups, including women, formal rules of local political competition can gradually be institutionalized and capacities developed for participating in it. Yet, local elections are not a panacea nor an exit strategy for international support. There are no hard and fast rules for the timing of local elections and it might always seem too early or too late depending which constituency is consulted. Guaranteeing inclusive, credible and peaceful elections can go a long way to prevent progress made during the transition period from unraveling. Prior to elections, civic education is needed to raise voter understanding of the roles and responsibilities of local governments (especially if the mandate has been reformed).

**Timelines**

Timelines for institutional change are highly contextual. After a conflict, administrative capacities at the local level will vary widely between countries and between regions inside the same country, and so will the political stamina of national and local leaders to push for change in the way local affairs are governed. Even if rapid improvements can be achieved in service delivery and community security (within two to three years), and even if some level of trust in state institutions among the public can be restored, resilience in local governance takes much longer to build. Eventually, democratic and effective local governance systems can flourish when certain core values and principles, including respect for the rule of law, have penetrated all parts of society; however, these may be generational changes.

Nevertheless, a few reference points, based on UNDP programming experience in fragile settings, can be highlighted.

- **Early recovery** in post-conflict contexts is usually set by UNDP up to 18 months to three years – although this time span primarily serves for programmatic and resource mobilization purposes and is aspirational above all. This is supposedly the period needed to restore the majority of livelihoods, public services and
deal with the most superficial conflict legacies related to social cohesion and peace. It is usually not sufficient to achieve the ‘build-back-better’ principle, which, in the case of conflicts, means very much increasing the resilience of local societies against social and political crises. It is also not really applicable to protracted crises (e.g. Iraq, Palestine, Somalia) but rather to ‘clean-cut’ post-conflict situations (e.g. Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka after 2009) often benefiting from a strong peacekeeping presence. There is value, however, in setting, even ‘artificially,’ a timeline for early recovery, as it is critical to restore trust quickly in fragile and conflict-affected societies to enable taking steps on the pathway to building resilient local governance systems.

**Full recovery** from a conflict or the completion of a political transition, with real changes in the political settlement and ‘build-back-better’ progress in the infrastructure, social, economic and institutional spheres, can take a decade or more. This, of course, depends on the severity of the conflict, its geographical spread, the country’s...
In 2003, Liberia emerged from a 14-year civil war that devastated the country's already poor infrastructure and caused enormous civilian casualties. Following the intervention of the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) and the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement, a UN peacekeeping mission – UNMIL – was deployed in September 2003. By that time, government presence had been reduced to a third of the country and the most basic public services were non-existent.

To a large extent, the civil war in Liberia was born out of a century-old division between Americo-Liberians who held political and economic power in the coastal cities and the mass population of indigenous Liberians who lived in the hinterlands, the majority impoverished, and who were subject to land disputes resulting from the war. The war itself was one of the most relevant initiatives in restoring the Liberians' state's authority at the subnational level and in promoting peace and stability.

The work was far from being completed though, nor were the restored local government structures viable without significant continuing donor support, including financial support. In fact, it is arguable whether the CST and LDLD projects showed clear linkages to a holistic capacity development strategy or coherent vision of statebuilding. As a result, neither project had connections to ongoing public sector reform programmes which could have sustained gains. Also, if the projects managed to re-establish (or simply establish in some locations) links between society and state institutions, more could have been done to institutionalize participatory governance beyond the ad hoc short-lived District Development Committees.

The main LESSONS LEARNED from this experience with extending state authority at the subnational level in Liberia are listed below.

- Keep it simple. The CST project was able to deliver results at scale across all of Liberia because it was sequenced simply and focused on essential needs first.
- National political will expressed at the highest level was the key determinant to pushing the UN and donors to shift strategy and start rebuilding local governments.
- Flexible funding, iterative programme design and capacity-based leadership by each agency involved over a particular programmatic sector explains the rapid results of the CST project.
- Local governance interventions need to be anchored in broader statebuilding strategies looking at the restoration of state capacities as a whole and paying close attention to resilience and legitimacy.
- Laying down a foundation of sustainability at subnational level is a very long process.
income status and the level and steadfastness of international support. With relation to local governance, a decade is seen as the minimum time needed to design, start implementing and seeing the first benefits of a decentralization reform. Fortunately, state-society relations at the local level can be improved much faster and are not per se conditioned to the implementation of a full-fledged decentralization reform.

Most UNDP local governance programmes in fragile and conflict-affected settings are designed typically for three years, with a focus on restoring local governance, supporting the delivery of peace dividends and initiating some policy changes, but are usually extended to five years in their first phase and often up to ten years or longer. Gradually extending a programme through consecutive phases allow to scale up programme impact geographically, but also to strengthen more effectively drivers of resilience in local governance at the upstream policy level.

**STAKEHOLDERS:**

The key variables in a complex change equation

The theory of change follows a representation of local governance where the roles of different actors are distinct and complement each other rather than being interchangeable. How stakeholders drive, adapt themselves to or resist change, and how stakeholders relate to each other in the process is critical to directing the change pathway.

At the centre of the theory of change stands the relationship between local and central politics and institutions. Local governments need to be empowered by the state – alongside other state institutions such as the police, the justice system, the public administration and the army – to become a vehicle for re-establishing the presence and legitimacy of the state in all regions and for demilitarizing politics in divided societies.\(^{57}\) Local governments also play the critical role of coalescing and representing local aspirations to higher-level political powers. Their legitimacy to represent is not just acquired through elections, it requires also negotiating with non-state actors wielding public authority (see Thematic Note 1).

Table 1 on the next page presents what the division of roles between local governance stakeholders should be in ideal to achieve the intended change process. A more detailed analysis of the roles, constraints and support of each of the local governance stakeholders in order to fulfill their obligations is presented in Annex 3.

**RISKS:**

What could go wrong in the change process and how to minimize the probability that it does

Local governance is at the heart of the assumption that when peace and state legitimacy are rebuilt from below, and not simply imposed from above, societies can find or retrieve their path to sustainable development. For this process to unfold successfully, powers and resources need to be redistributed between different stakeholders and at different levels. The risks that this process goes astray, or that the external support that it needs to succeed falters along the way or is misdirected, are enormous. Some have already been discussed, like the dilemma of extending state authority in post-conflict situations, or the risk of rushing into decentralization in fragile contexts. Below are three fundamental strategic risks that need to be considered upfront when devising a support strategy to local governance in fragile settings and possible mitigation processes. More specific programmatic risks are discussed in Chapter 2.4.

1. The political settlement between central and local power holders does not emerge or does not hold

**EXPLANATION** A ‘secondary’ settlement is not required to start supporting the transformation of local governance systems, but it is a must in the longer-term to organize the sustainable division of powers between levels of governance, the flow of public resources, the control over land and extractives, the place given to regional identities in nation-building, etc. The central state may fail to engineer comprehensive enough bargains in this regard and/or may exclude certain regions or actors from it (e.g. traditional leaders or warlords), or fail to translate political commitments into concrete governance acts (e.g. political decentralization without transfer of fiscal resources and technical capacities). Some local actors may refuse settling central-local relations or never abide by any agreement as their long-term goal is secession.

---

**TABLE 1: DIVISION OF ROLES BETWEEN STAKEHOLDERS IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE TO ACHIEVE THE INTENDED CHANGE PATHWAY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOCAL GOVERNMENTS</strong></td>
<td>are needed to help communities stabilize politically and coordinate the provision of security at the local level. They can take a lead role in building power-sharing arrangements with influential non-state actors, while working towards more inclusive and participatory local decision-making practices – avoiding repeating exclusionary patterns. Local governments, as part of the overall state machinery, should become the main channel for providing peace dividends, including basic services, livelihood support and reconstruction. Their capacity to ensure a fair and accountable use of public resources to answer local needs is critical to restore confidence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRADITIONAL STRUCTURES</strong></td>
<td>contribute to stabilization by organizing local security maintenance and sharing power with local governments, rather than competing for legitimacy. They support the extension of state authority by acting as a link between local governments and communities. Traditional structures can contribute to delivering state functions (e.g. tax collection, civil registry). They are essential for crafting conflict management mechanisms (including for transitional justice and reconciliation) that can reconcile local norms, basic human rights and democratic standards – in particular with regard to women’s rights. On the negative side, traditional structures can act as powerful spoilers of any attempt to rebuild the state from below if they feel excluded from that process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMMUNITIES</strong></td>
<td>are at the epicentre of the stabilization and recovery process. Community readiness and capacity to participate actively and peacefully in local governance (including local elections) and peacebuilding platforms is a fundamental entry point to rebuilding state-society relations. Communities should gradually abandon previous patterns of social discrimination, though this is a notoriously long process. Local communities are often mobilized for the co-production of goods and services (e.g. community-driven development), a potentially effective way to build peaceful relations between groups. Finally, by abiding by norms and rules adopted by local governments, including for paying local taxes, local communities, by their attitudes, contribute to restoring the rule of law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CIVIL SOCIETY</strong></td>
<td>contributes to building peaceful communities by providing skills and channels for conflict resolution, transitional justice and reconciliation. By raising people’s understanding on the meaning of citizenship in a democratic system, civil society organizations contribute to more peaceful and inclusive political processes. They also do so by monitoring elections and local government performance. In fragile settings, civil society provides a much-needed channel for carrying the voice of citizens, especially when legitimate representative local bodies are missing. Civil society, including religious institutions, play a critical role in service delivery in contexts of fragility and conflict, and this role should be nurtured and incorporated into the general state-led service delivery framework in the post-conflict period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRIVATE SECTOR</strong></td>
<td>contributes to stability and recovery by creating jobs, including for vulnerable groups, in particular those at risk of perpetrating violence. Local companies are also important for service provision in their own name or through public-private partnerships. Their readiness and capacity to invest in local economies and to contribute to the reconstruction effort, by paying local taxes as well, is critical to create peace dividends. Yet, some business interests may have strong incentives for maintaining extractive war economies and can also contribute to heightening corruption and keeping local institutions poorly responsive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS</strong></td>
<td>can contribute, in an interim period, to restoring security and the legitimacy of state institutions if provided with sufficient incentives, such as viable opportunities and support to lay down arms and integrate into lawful activities (whether security forces, political or civilian life). Often, leaders of former non-state armed groups become local political figureheads in the immediate post-conflict moment. Without such opportunities, non-state armed groups easily turn into spoilers of attempts to restore normalcy and the rule of law at the local level, including by forming criminal networks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CENTRAL GOVERNMENT</strong></td>
<td>provides key elements of the enabling framework for the gradual transformation of local governance, starting with policies and resources supporting the extension of state authority and service delivery, as well as negotiating a ‘secondary settlement’ (in peace processes) with local political forces on power-sharing, resource-sharing and rights, without which peace will not hold. Central government gradually codifies the regulatory, administrative and fiscal frameworks defining the mandates of the various layers of government and their relations and should, in principle, provide capital to local governments to support local development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY</strong></td>
<td>facilitates coalition-building for local governance through political mediation, funding and capacity development. The international community can provide comparative experiences to inform the change process managed by central and local actors. In situations of early recovery when the capacity of the state is extremely weak, international partners can organize service delivery while building capacities of local actors to gradually assume this role. By providing funding for integrated programmes in sensitive areas, it supports early stabilization and recovery. Later on, international partners can shift to strategic budget support to back state policies for consolidating an effective local governance system nationwide.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Traditional structures represent the combination of traditional institutions (values + rules) and the traditional authorities given societal legitimacy to uphold them (leader + governing body) (Lutz, G. and W. Linger, 2004).
1. Conceptual and Programmatic Frameworks

**Mitigation** Peace negotiations and political reforms in transition settings need to tackle local governance arrangements early on and be inclusive and as connected to the grassroots as possible. Principles for power sharing and other key topics at stake should come first and then legal and administrative procedures can be refined according to experience. Building a strong advocacy movement in civil society for the transformation of local governance, and empowering it to monitor progress, can put additional pressure on politicians to fulfill commitments.

**Explaination** Central government chooses the path of excessively re-centralizing the state as a means to pacify it and guarantee the delivery of services through its own public administration, or relies mostly on parallel delivery systems (e.g. national recovery agency, social funds, community-driven development, foreign NGOs), marginalizing local governments and local bargains reached with non-state actors. It may opt for the de-concentration of public administration in lieu of devolving real powers and resources to elected local governments, creating a problem in the long-term when the state promotes at the same time democratic values and practices but does not empower local governance systems. Local governments fail to build legitimacy as they have little means to influence the well-being of local populations.

**Mitigation** Agreement is needed on a long-term vision for local governance that charts a gradual transfer of responsibilities while capacities are built (related to Risk 1). The choice does not have to be between immediate decentralization or open-ended recentralization. Mechanisms can be built so that de-concentrated administration supports the strengthening of local governance capacities for the future. Parallel delivery systems are useful if they are time-bound and support local stakeholder coalitions for planning and delivery, involving local governments, rather than bypassing them.

2. Local governments are marginalized in the peacebuilding and recovery processes

**Explaination** Local politics are captured by politicians playing divisive identity lines (to remain elected) and politics of the community erode a common identity and produce a lack of social consensus needed for sustainable democracy. Pathways to democratization at the local level are often unstable and conflict-ridden, in large part by elite predation and mobilization. In particular at the local level, where the state has limited authority and capacity to impose the rule of law, predation and corruption may intensify during transitions since time horizons are short and resources have to be accumulated to give an elite an advantage in the electoral process. Connections between politicians and post-conflict criminals may intensify. Politicians use criminals to engineer outcomes and later on criminals become politicians. Ultimately, the liberalization of local politics has further eroded the state legitimacy.

**Mitigation** Local politics take shape more organically than at national level, especially after a conflict. How leaders appear and what their agenda is cannot be controlled without limiting democratic freedoms. Yet, the rules of the game (e.g. electoral systems) can be shaped in a way that limits ethnic-based politics, incentivizes coalition-making, facilitates the renewal of the local political class (including with youth and women) and balances the role of local elections with participatory governance. Local elections do not have to happen quickly since transitional governance arrangements allowing inclusiveness and social accountability can be supported in the meantime. The development of inclusive local chapters of political parties can be nurtured during local electoral events. Fostering civil society and media freedom at the local level (and not just in capital cities) is critical to put more pressure on local politicians to perform.

3. Local political processes bring more division and corruption

**Explaination** Peace negotiations and political reforms in transition settings need to tackle local governance arrangements early on and be inclusive and as connected to the grassroots as possible.
1.3 DEALING WITH THE DIVERSITY OF CONTEXTS

Three important principles underpin the approach proposed in this Guide to support local governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings: context, context and context! The theory of change discussed in this chapter remains generic, broad, linear and somehow idealistic when realities on the ground, at country level, are intricate, contrasted, volatile and made of a mosaic of unique local situations. Increasingly, charting and supporting change in local settings involves analyzing a context and devising interventions that reach far beyond the mere boundaries of the locale. The difference between rural and urban settings is also better understood and acknowledged nowadays as evidence shows that the same recipes to support local governance cannot be applied indiscriminately to rural villages, mid-size towns and large metropolises.

Context matters when devising the most fit-for-purpose pathway to change, not only because of each country’s peculiar conflict or crisis history and manifestations of violence, but also because of other variables, as listed below (this is a non-exhaustive list). A distinction is made between primary variables or factors directly affecting local governance arrangements and secondary variables that have a more diffused effect and would also be hard to influence through local governance programming – but are nonetheless important to consider when contextualizing the theory of change and designing a programme.

Primary contextual variables58

- the state’s overall institutional capacity
- the state’s overall democratic nature
- the state’s capacity to operate equitably across identity groups
- the nature of the state: unitary or federal
- the scope (political, fiscal, administrative) and nature (devolution, delegation, de-concentration) of decentralization between levels of government
- the number and type of subnational governance tiers and the division of responsibilities between these
- the nature, strength and legitimacy of non-state actors involved in local governance

Secondary contextual variables

- the channels available for the exercise of voice at the local level: elected representation, bureaucratic action,59 lobbying, social action, consultation
- the capacity of civil society at the local level to bring people together across cleavages
- the strength, policies and level of coordination of donor support towards local governance

Secondary contextual variables

- the ethnic, religious and cultural make-up and the rigidity of these boundaries and political cleavages coinciding with these
- the form of nationalism (liberal, ethnic, ideologically, religious, etc.)
- the neutrality of security forces
- the country’s income level
- the country’s wealth in natural resources and their distribution over the territory
- the regional and global geopolitics interfering with the country’s sovereignty and political destiny
- the vulnerability to global threats (e.g. price shocks, terrorism, transnational organized crime, disasters and climate change).

The Guide cannot present customized approaches to local governance for each type of context due to length considerations, and also because any typology is a simplification, is subjective and is bound to disappoint end-users. The customization work is indeed better carried out by those involved with country programming at a specific point in time. Nevertheless, to give a hint on how pathways to change may play out differently in varying situations, below are three schematic narratives on initial priorities for action in local governance in three diverse broad-brushed settings.

In IMMEDIATE POST-CONFLICT CONTEXTS (e.g. Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste), early recovery support to local governance should focus first on stopping the institutional haemorrhaging in local governments (loss of revenues, staff, legitimacy) and on resuming the provision of services, in parallel with stabilizing the local political bodies that can inspire sufficient public confidence to deal peacefully with conflict legacies and new grievances. In the case of extensive conflict-related damages or if the state

-----------------------------
58. Adapted from Jackson, 2010.
59. Bureaucratic action means the voice and action of non-elected officials on behalf of local interest groups and citizens.
The notion of ‘public authority’ is useful to delineate what transitional local governance arrangements in post-conflict contexts may be. Public authority in such environments comes from both formal and informal institutions that can undertake core governance functions, such as maintaining security, managing relations with central government and between communities, resolving conflicts and providing or facilitating the provision of a range of collective goods and services. A shared public authority at the local level in such environments is justified because:

- local governments cannot muster the necessary legitimacy to be the main (or sole) source of public authority; they may be politically weaker than informal actors and fail to provide a similar level of support to communities that the latter does;
- difficulties encountered in ‘democratizing’ local politics may result in local elections being delayed, creating situations in which public authority has to be embodied by a hybrid mix of institutions with different sources of legitimacy; and
- the capacity of the state to negotiate with a large diversity of actors wielding some level of authority at local level and to influence and regulate them without a top-down imposition of its authority is critical to the resilience of governance systems.

Acknowledging the idea of shared public authority implies recognizing the role of non-state actors in mediating between state and society and in restoring peace and normalcy. If some non-state actors in certain settings follow socio-political norms that promote exclusion of women or other groups, or are militarized, or refuse statebuilding as they pursue separatist goals, this should not be the tree that hides the forest: non-state actors also include community-based organizations and peaceful traditional and religious leaders, who in many cases are open to participating in local governance based on democratic principles. In fact, most ‘formal’ political actors at the local level would also be members of non-state groups. Experience shows that refusing to engage with those who oppose in principle transformation of local governance, for instance by excluding them from running in local elections, is counterproductive to building stable socio-political order.

Among non-state actors, traditional structures are the most commonly involved in sharing public authority with state institutions. Their relative strength comes from the fact that they do not take their legitimacy from the state but nevertheless strongly influence people’s lives in many respects, including providing services and defending their communities’ interests to the ‘outside’ world. Traditional structures may have a long history in power, as well as socio-cosmic legitimacy, but they may also be structures inherited from a recent or colonial past. The administration of justice remains a common prerogative of traditional structures with both positive examples of separation and collaboration with the formal system (e.g. Bolivia, Botswana) or on the contrary competition in terms of jurisdiction and norms (e.g. South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Regulating community and individual access to land and natural resources is also a common function of traditional structures.

Traditional structures are often capable of evolving when faced with competition from other options available to community members to settle grievances and find answers to their needs. People can also challenge the powers of traditional structures through legal means when available. The more that traditional structures interact with pluralistic and inclusive formal institutions, the more likely that traditional structures can evolve and blend well with these institutions.

Modern states have either tried to: (i) repress traditional structures; (ii) actively collaborate or use them (to prop up their legitimacy); or (iii) ignore them. Yet much of the time, the actual relationship between traditional structures and the modern state is determined informally at the local level – and with a strong bias towards continuity. The political settlement between national and local polities that underpins local governance arrangements, should reflect the actual strength and legitimacy of non-state actors and provide them with incentives to contribute to building peace and the state, rather than act as spoilers. Yet, the process of blending traditional structures into modern local governance systems is also fraught with risks if it is not accompanied by a deliberate effort from the state to transform these structures.

Finding the right balance between recognition and coercion can be difficult – as shown in the case of Sierra Leone (see inset).

a. In recent years, traditional institutions have been given formal roles in Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Fiji, Ghana, India, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, Uganda, Zimbabwe and more (IDS, 2013).

### The difficult incorporation of traditional chiefs into local governments in Sierra Leone

The Local Government Act in post-war Sierra Leone included extensive devolution of powers to locally-elected councils and reserved up to three seats for traditional chiefs. This was done to counter traditional authority resistance to decentralization and make local councils more effective, as during the war chiefs played a major role in controlling resources, taxation, security and the allocation of land.

In practice, however, the incorporation of chiefs in local councils has challenged the process of democratization as the chiefs seek to control the choice of candidates and bypass councils in questions related to their old functions (taxation, land). The problem is that the integration of the chiefs has not been accompanied with a reform of the chieftaincy system. Illicit and non-democratic practices, such as the exclusion of young people, gender inequality, forced labour, imposing illegal fines and revenues and involvement in the illegal diamond trade, have not been addressed yet by the central state.
was barely present outside of large cities before the conflict, the first priority remains extending the state presence as closely to communities as possible through security, logistical and staffing support so that a modicum of state functions are delivered by local governments. Supporting the peaceful completion of important turning points in the peacebuilding process at the local level (e.g. reconciliation, transitional justice, local elections, improving community security) is also high on the list of priorities.

In countries where MORE PEACEFUL TRANSITIONS towards democracy take place (e.g. Indonesia, Tunisia, Ukraine60) and local governments remain functional throughout the political change, support to policy dialogue and early policymaking on decentralization might take precedence if it is an essential part of the political transition process and a commitment of the new leadership. A local governance programme would have to balance policy support for the new authorities to steer reform, including through testing different options, with supporting pilot actions on the ground to immediately increase local democracy, tackle rampant corruption inherited from the previous regime and improve services where needed and feasible. Local governments must remain functional during the transition period and capable of managing high expectations for more participatory local governance and quickly-improving services. Support to increased vertical and horizontal integration is also opportune at an early stage in such contexts.

In SITUATIONS OF HIGH CRIMINAL VIOLENCE that seriously weakens the authority and development of the state and tears through the social fabric of affected communities (e.g. El Salvador, Honduras, many large cities in Sub-Saharan Africa), local governance programming should prioritize building capacities of local governance actors to implement community security initiatives. In such contexts, achieving a rapid and marked decrease in violence is a top priority to create space for a deeper engagement between local authorities and affected communities and to build a close state-society partnership to tackle some of the structural roots of violence. Relationships between local authorities and security institutions should be strengthened; the police should extend a permanent presence in lawless areas and provide a response that is not only military but also social (community policing). Communities should be mobilized around small arms control and physical violence issues (sexual and gender-based violence, school bullying, domestic violence, etc.). Once security has improved, local governments must make sure that services are restored or extended quickly to these neighborhoods as often service providers deserted them for reasons of high insecurity. The private sector also has an important role to play in the initial stages to create vocational training and job opportunities for at-risk youth.

The six case studies presented in this Guide (Colombia, El Salvador, Liberia, Mozambique, Somalia and Sri Lanka), covering six very distinct contexts, help illustrate the diversity of programming paths used by UNDP within the same broad approach to local governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

1.4 AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION FOR LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SETTINGS

This section aims to operationalize the theory of change and in particular how the six areas of intervention proposed in the theory of change (see Figure 4) can be translated into a logical framework for action that applies to a large array of fragile settings and can be later customized to particular situations.

One of the key contextual assumptions for this framework is that it can only contribute to sustainable change, and in particular in building peace, state institutions and achieving recovery, when wider national and regional environments are broadly conducive to change and a minimum set of security guarantees and favourable political conditions apply (such as demand from national and local echelons for change in local governance).

THE FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION AIMS TO:

- help build capacities of all relevant actors in local governance for inclusive and sustainable local governance arrangements (concrete recommendations and tools for this are provided in Chapters 3 to 8); and
- show how programming areas pertaining to other sectors directly relevant to peacebuilding, statebuilding and recovery (e.g. livelihoods and economic recovery, rule of law, natural resources management, conflict prevention) can contribute

60. Regions outside of the Donbas in Eastern Ukraine.
to transforming local governance. In-depth policy and technical guidance for these sectors is not provided in the Guide but can be found in a number of UNDP knowledge products.

**General priorities**

The framework for action is based on UNDP’s overall framework for governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings, centred on the assumption that rebuilding the social contract helps societies move out of fragility. Underneath this conceptual umbrella, the priorities listed below summarize the main tenets of the theory of change and have guided the formulation of the proposed framework for action.

Support to local governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings should contribute to…

- **Reducing armed violence and sexual and gender-based violence in people’s daily lives.** Reducing violence opens spaces for participation, access to services, the rebuilding of social links and enables socio-economic development in general. Achieving rapid and noticeable reductions in violence in affected communities is a prerequisite to gaining their confidence for other actions. Focusing right from the start on violence against women is a must as women are drivers of peace and development.

- **Redefining the central–local relationship.** Fundamental facets of this relationship, including political, economic, cultural and social, often need to be renegotiated by the main parties at stake to build the ‘secondary settlement’ on which peacebuilding and recovery also rest. At the same time, many day-to-day regulatory, administrative and financial aspects need to be worked out so that services are delivered at the local level and local government’s legitimacy is built. Support is needed at both levels and early on.

- **Re-establishing local government presence and capability at different levels.** Local government presence needs to be brought as close to the people as is politically, technically and financially feasible61 – for service delivery and also for incarnating public authority. It can be shared with other legitimate sources of local authority if it helps build peace and link grassroots communities into the bigger common project that is nation-building.

- **Recognizing and nurturing the versatile role of local governance systems.** Local governance is not just about the delivery of basic services – which might not ever be the main expectation of affected populations. Local governance systems have other functions, such as maintaining local peace, managing access to local natural resources, helping markets grow, representing communities to external actors, etc. Local governance institutions can help restore normalcy in the daily life of traumatized communities and in their relation to the state as a whole. They are important in restoring peaceful community identities. When supporting local governance institutions: their mission, and not just their basic functions, needs attention.

- **Reconciling formal and informal governance institutions.** Local governance needs to be where state and non-state actors find a common ground for collective action. External support - be it logistical, capacity development, funding or advocacy - needs to be provided to all relevant actors, on the basis of needs and the political realities on the ground. Support to non-state actors is driven by their relevance to the overall peacebuilding and statebuilding goals and by their popular legitimacy, not by their level of institutionalization.62 While engaging with non-state actors, the longer-term statebuilding goal should not be lost in sight.

- **Reducing social distance.** Because conflict disables the rules of constructive human interaction and destroys positive social capital, rebuilding reciprocal trust is critical and actions to facilitate ‘bridging networks’ among social groups are therefore important. Creating non-violent spaces for conflict resolution and consensus-building around priorities that affect all (e.g. service delivery, job creation, land management) within a local governance approach contributes to this.

---

61. The main constraints remain: the acceptance of crisis-affected communities for the return of the state, the availability of qualified human resources and the financial costs of establishing and maintaining a full layer of local government.

62. Example: refrain from restricting UNDP support to only formally-registered civil society organizations, as some non-registered groups might be intrinsic to local societies and have a more effective role in collective action.
Reforming the style of local governance. Introduce, step-by-step, a more pluralistic, participatory and accountable style in how local priorities are set, public land and natural resources are managed, local finance available for the common good are spent and accounted for and how grievances are handled. Representation through local elections is eventually how citizens will mostly partake in local governance. But in fragile settings, even more in post-conflict contexts, this is a process that is fraught with risks and can create more exclusion than inclusion if not complemented by more direct and less politicized participation channels.

Reducing horizontal inequalities and other forms of exclusion, including for women, youth, people living with HIV/AIDS, disabled people and other sources of exclusion specific to each society. Exclusion takes place in access to services and economic opportunities, but also in power and decision-making, voice, security, justice, etc. In post-conflict and in transitions to new state paradigms, if the reduction of inequalities is deprioritized, inequalities can become entrenched in the new systems being built and generate new conflicts later on. Local governance is a natural entry point to start reducing structural factors of inequalities.

Reducing dependency on aid, not just financially but also institutionally. At the local level in many fragile and conflict-affected settings, change in governance arrangements and improvements in living conditions are overly prescribed and managed outside of country systems (hence not sustainable). Local sources of revenue to finance projects contributing to the common good, be it through local taxation (e.g. extractive industries, property tax, service fees) or public-private investments, should be explored early on and mechanisms for better aid effectiveness reinforced.

The framework for action

The framework for action shown in Table 2 is aligned with the chain of results of the theory of change and adopts the same overall outcome and three intermediary objectives, as listed below.

1. Local governments and their partners provide improved basic services to all men and women, according to their needs, and support local economies with increasing cost-effectiveness;
2. Local political institutions are inclusive, produce noticeable change and alternate peacefully; and
3. Relations between social and political groups at community level are resilient to shocks.

Each of the six intervention areas of the theory of change defines a programme component, itself guided by an expected programmatic result, or output, as described below.

**COMPONENT 1:**

**Capacities for service delivery**

Local governments are better equipped to deliver on priority needs of the population. Needs may include facilities, qualified male and female staff, financial resources and managerial and technical capacities to be able to take charge of planning, budgeting, implementing and monitoring service delivery and development projects in an accountable and inclusive manner. This output is primarily about the extension of the state and building core capacities of local governments (and their partners) so that they fulfill a number of essential functions statutorily or socially assigned to them.

**COMPONENT 2:**

**Voice and participation**

Local populations are accessing more effective channels to carry their voices and participate in local decision-making. Participatory governance requires the empowerment of communities and civil society actors to help voice people’s demands and establish effective mechanisms for collective action in cooperation with local institutions – or independently through civic action. A major focus of this output is on discontinuing the exclusion of certain groups from public goods and services.

**COMPONENT 3:**

**Managing land, natural resources and local economic recovery**

Risks of violent competition over land, natural resources, capital and jobs are lessened by inclusive policies led by local actors. Local authorities have a major role to play in regulating access to public land, including urban spaces, and the natural resources they bear so that these are exploited more equitably for the benefit of different groups and support local economic recovery while avoiding to create environmental vulnerabilities. Local policies and programmes...
## TABLE 2: AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION FOR LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SETTINGS

**Goal:** Local governance actors become collectively stronger drivers of resilient peace, legitimate state capacity and sustainable recovery so that local governance provides a solid foundation for a renewed social contract between state and society.

**Outcomes**
- Local governments and their partners provide improved basic services to all men and women, according to their needs, and support local economies with increasing cost-effectiveness.
- Local political institutions are inclusive, produce noticeable change and alternate peacefully.
- Relations between individuals and between identity groups at community level are resilient to shocks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENT</th>
<th>OUTPUT</th>
<th>INDICATIVE ACTIVITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacities for Service Delivery</td>
<td>1. Local governance institutions are better equipped to deliver on priority needs of the population</td>
<td>- Extension of the state: infrastructure, staffing (including payroll support), basic security of local government facilities, information technology, equipment&lt;br&gt;- Building core capacities of local governments: leadership, policy-making, planning and budgeting, coordination, crisis response, communications and gender mainstreaming&lt;br&gt;- Support to local service delivery: support to coordination among actors, public-private partnerships, low-cost technological innovations&lt;br&gt;- Improving local finances: local development funds, local revenue generation, integrity of financial management and fight against corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice and Participation</td>
<td>2. Local populations have access to more effective channels to carry their voices and participate in local decision-making</td>
<td>- Building local civil society capacities: civil society mapping/assessments, training, small grants, networking&lt;br&gt;- Support to participatory governance mechanisms: participatory assessments, multi-stakeholder decision-making structures&lt;br&gt;- Social accountability: advocacy for citizen supervision of local governments, capacity development of civil society, grant fund for local initiatives&lt;br&gt;- Access to information: strategic communications, civic education, public outreach, support to local media, e-governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing Land, Natural Resources and Local Economic Recovery</td>
<td>3. Risks of violent competition over land, natural resources, capital and jobs lessened by inclusive policies led by local actors</td>
<td>- Spatial and urban planning and urban management: including land management and property rights&lt;br&gt;- Local economic recovery and development: labour-intensive employment, support to MSMEs, local economic development (LED) strategies, business support services, market development&lt;br&gt;- Natural resources management and extractive industries: community involvement, local environmental and social safeguards for extractive industries, contribution of extractive industries to local development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Political Processes</td>
<td>4. More inclusive representation in local polities achieved through peaceful and credible political processes</td>
<td>- Promoting inclusive politics: dialogues for local power sharing, awareness-raising on political party development, codes of conduct, civic education on political participation, training of women and youth candidates, political platform development&lt;br&gt;- Local electoral processes: capacity-building of the electoral management body for local elections, civil registry, civic and voter education for local elections (with focus on marginalized groups), electoral violence mitigation&lt;br&gt;- Local parliamentary processes: conflict-solving skills of local councils, secretariat support to local councils, public outreach support, training of representatives of local councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Management and Local Security</td>
<td>5. Local infrastructures for peace empowered to tackle issues of social cohesion, community security, gender-based violence and access to justice</td>
<td>- Establishing local peace infrastructures: peace committees, dialogue, early warning systems, local peace and development plans, peace education, funding of local peace initiatives&lt;br&gt;- Community-based reconciliation and transitional justice: support to traditional reconciliation mechanisms, support to reparation measures, cultural and sporting events&lt;br&gt;- Community security and social cohesion: security and violence diagnostics, community policing, small arms control, re-integration of ex-armed groups, small security infrastructure, unexploded ordinance removals, host community programmes&lt;br&gt;- Fighting sexual and gender-based violence through community-based mechanisms: reporting, rehabilitation of victims, advocacy campaigns, women's affairs units in local governments&lt;br&gt;- Access to justice through local organizations: alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, human rights training, legal aid centres, legal documents (IDs, property titles)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Enabling Frameworks</td>
<td>6. Stronger policy, institutional and partnership frameworks help build an effective central – local relationship to support the transformation of local governance</td>
<td>- Promoting institutional convergence: policy and regulatory development support, intergovernmental coordination and communications support, support to central ministry over local governments&lt;br&gt;- Dialogue and design support for decentralization: options studies, public debates and advocacy, policy and legal support&lt;br&gt;- Professionalization of local government workforce: capacity development strategy, capacity development funds, regulatory framework for local civil service and diversity in local civil service&lt;br&gt;- Aid management: national aid coordination for local governance, M&amp;E system on local governance, local governance forums&lt;br&gt;- Peer networking: support to local government associations, regional networking and south-south exchanges on local governance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The roots of the Colombian conflict are well known and include unfinished agrarian reform, the political exclusion of minorities, the weakness of state institutions and the overtaking of remote areas by corrupt elites and armed groups. Even though many functions of the State were decentralized by the 1991 Constitution, rural municipalities remain structurally weak and show little concern for accountability in the management of local affairs. Rural municipalities are highly dependent on the support provided by higher-level state institutions who fail to provide this support in a coordinated and effective manner.

The programme took an incremental approach. First, a comprehensive study of local conflict dynamics and the potential for peace and community visioning were conducted. Second, UNDP supported local governments to develop territorial development strategies with the participation of groups traditionally excluded from local governance. In order to build trust, quick impact projects coming from these strategies were funded by various donors through UNDP brokerage. Third, UNDP supported the institutionalization of citizen participation and the creation of social contracts through which political actors formally committed to implement collectively-identified priority projects. Fourth, the programme consolidated inclusive local politics by supporting participation of marginalized groups in local elections. The approach piloted in Nariño was disseminated and inspired national policies on gender equality, youth citizenship, anti-corruption and land restitution.

Since 2014, a new initiative, called the Territorial Partnership for Peace, fosters peacebuilding at the local level in preparation of the peace accord. Its goal is to foment strategic, transformative and inclusive alliances of territorial actors to galvanize conflict-sensitive peacebuilding, governance and local development and to bring not only concrete peace dividends but also to create a strong enabling environment for the ongoing negotiations. The government today actively promotes the concept of territorial peace. All of the results above were achieved thanks to a steady investment in building dialogue and improving technical and managerial capacities of civil society actors, interest groups (women, youth, indigenous peoples, political parties, conflict victims, etc.) and local governments.

LESSONS LEARNED from UNDP support to inclusive peacebuilding and local governance in Colombia are listed below.

- Rebuilding social fabric and promoting good local governance are effective building blocks for peacebuilding, even in situations of open conflict, and is as important as generating concrete development results.
- Local authorities need support to elaborate peace strategies, promote human rights and oversee conflict transformation.
- Multi-level governance mechanisms led by local actors are the cornerstone of strategic development alliances.
- Participatory governance processes are effective socially, politically and financially, as they leverage more external resources, contribute to improving the accountability of public actors and increase trust in the state.
- Long-term strategic planning is essential to create positive dynamics towards peace and development superseding the uncertainties of political cycles; conflict should not justify only thinking short-term and modestly.
- Participation does not mean just creating more dialogue spaces, it is empowering those who are traditionally-excluded to transform the local political settlement and claim their permanent right to a shared responsibility in local governance.
- Managing complex local governance programmes in conflict areas requires decentralizing UNDP presence, decision-making and operations and adopting a truly integrated programmatic approach among all teams.
are carried out by local governments, in partnership with the private sector and civil society, to generate jobs and encourage business development.

**COMPONENT 4:**
Local political processes

Grassroots participation in inclusive and peaceful local political processes increases. Political actors such as traditional leaders, political parties and independent candidates (both men and women) need to be engaged in political processes – dialogues, local elections, local assemblies. This is important to a) promote non-divisive political discourse and cross-identity political structures; b) expand debate around local issues to a wider number of groups; c) ensure a greater diversity among the local political leadership; and d) increase citizen participation in the political life.

**COMPONENT 5:**
Conflict management and local security

Local infrastructures for peace are empowered to tackle issues of social cohesion, community security, gender-based violence and access to justice. Mechanisms such as local peace committees, local peace and security observatories, community-based reconciliation and transitional justice, community security planning tools, etc. can be used to increase access of affected populations to effective dispute resolution and justice. Infrastructures for peace participate in the rebuilding of constructive social relationships between groups, a prerequisite for peaceful local politics and stronger state-society relations. These efforts will help make villages and neighbourhoods safer from crime and individuals less exposed to violence, in particular women.

**COMPONENT 6:**
National enabling frameworks

Stronger policy, institutional and partnership frameworks to support the transformation of local governance. Partnerships need to focus in particular on improving the effectiveness of the central-local relationship, facilitating the emergence of a long-term vision for local governance, institutionalizing capacity development mechanisms for local governments, improving aid management to local governance support and strengthening local governance peer networks.
Chapter 2:

ASSESSING LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN SITUATIONS OF FRAGILITY AND CONFLICT AND DESIGNING A PROGRAMME: PRINCIPLES AND TOOLS
Building resilience in local governance means understanding and working *with* the complex political and social processes at the origin of fragility and conflict at the local level, and improving from *within* systems and capacities to accept and define a change pathway. It is a complex programming area that requires a fundamentally different approach — one that is flexible, long-term but iterative, self-critical and infused with the spirit of learning by doing.

One of the main challenges with adopting a new approach to building lasting development pathways away from fragility, violence and conflict is that it questions deeply-ingrained habits among international policymakers — that is the practice of transferring best policies and good practices from one context to another, and often from the North to the South. Therefore, when programming in local governance more effort needs to be exerted in understanding the complex processes that generate fragility and insecurity at the local level and their repercussions on human development, local institutions and state-society relations; and this needs to be done before strategies and programmes are prepared. On the basis of this knowledge (which should be strongly grounded in the political economy of local governance), the relevance of generic approaches, like the ones proposed in this Guide, can be assessed.

Based on such an initial assessment and appraisal phase, the framework for action can then be translated into a concrete time-bound customized programme, or projects.63 This Chapter provides recommendations and tools to: (i) conduct a situational analysis that can inform the design of a local governance programme; (ii) build a coherent programme and connect it to other UNDP portfolio areas; and (iii) introduce three critical cross-cutting dimensions in programme development: 1) conflict sensitivity; 2) gender and youth; and 3) state-society relations.

## 2.1 SITUATION ANALYSIS

A local governance assessment is the principal step in analysing the situation on the ground. The general objectives of a local governance assessment in situations of fragility and conflict are listed below.

- To build a political economy understanding of the overall local governance system, including links between formal and informal actors, central and local levels and how resource flows are conditioned by it.
- To better understand how fragility at the local level translates and how it fuels (or could fuel) violence and conflict and what might be the consequences.
- To measure the quality of state-society relations at the local level and identify key influential factors.
- To assess the contribution of local governance, in different subnational contexts, to peacebuilding, statebuilding and recovery and development.
- To identify the main capacity and resource gaps and strengths that condition the response of local governance systems to population needs.
- To analyse processes of exclusion from local governance that may affect particular vulnerable groups, in particular women and youth.
- To gauge the feasibility of change by considering incentive frameworks and external factors.

### INFORMATION NEEDS:

**What needs to be covered in a local governance assessment in fragile and conflict-affected settings**

Given the pressure that UNDP finds itself under to respond urgently to emerging crises or post-crisis situations, local governance assessments usually need to produce actionable results in a short time span. Therefore, the content of the assessment must be prioritized, which means that certain areas, or levels of detail, may be relegated to later assessments or parallel assessment exercises conducted under other programming streams. The topics prioritized for a proposed local governance assessment in a fragile or conflict-affected situation are presented in Table 3. This list will need to be further refined on the basis of the characteristics of the actual situation being researched.

### METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS:

**How to collect the information needed**

Not all of the information listed in Table 3 needs to be directly collected by programming teams or through a single assessment methodology, and existing knowledge on the country’s situation — including conflict

63. For the rest of the document, ‘programme’ is used to describe either an umbrella programme covering several projects or a single project.
These include: their implications on the development of strategies and programmes. A political economy analysis focuses on the drivers of political behaviour and how land management issues are shaping local conflicts and political claims.

- The UNDG Conflict-Related Development Analysis guides practitioners on assessing linkages between development and conflict to accelerate the success of development support on conflict drivers. It is useful to relate conflict analysis at the local level with national, regional and international conflict dynamics.

- The UNDP Institutional and Context Analysis tool provides detailed guidance on how to conduct a political economy analysis for programming by assessing the relationship between institutions, resources and political influence in a given context and determining the effect of these factors on the achievement of development outcomes.

- The UN/EU/WB Post-Conflict Needs Assessment methodology maps key needs in a country emerging from conflict and is jointly coordinated with national stakeholders. A Post-Conflict Needs Assessment tends to focus on more pressing needs associated with the delivery of basic services and reconstruction and it can be a long exercise (several months). Post-Conflict Needs Assessments are important for appraising the quantitative damages and losses of local governments.

- The Joint UN/WB Diagnostic Tool for Core Government Functions in an Immediate Post-Conflict Environment provides a conceptual and methodological framework to analyse a number of core government functions (centre of government, public financial management, civil service management, aid management and local governance) that matter most to government operations and the political settlement in post-conflict contexts.

For more specific local governance-related data, programming teams should conduct a dedicated assessment that will include desk reviews, expert panels, workshops, questionnaires, perception surveys, field visit observations, etc. and involve a large range of stakeholders. It is crucial to mainstream political economy analysis in this assessment phase, if it has not been covered yet from other sources.

In Annex 6, a generic Rapid Local Governance Diagnostic Tool, inspired by the joint UN/WB tool (see above), is proposed. It is designed as a checklist to help programming teams customize and conduct country-specific assessments of local governance.

Depending on the programming context and available resources, programming teams might have the flexibility to conduct deeper assessments, before or at programme inception. It is always good to add a specific line for additional assessment work in a programme budget as specific aspects of local governance (e.g. institutional and economic environment in which local governance systems operate. Below are descriptions of some of the tools commonly used by UNDP and partner UN and multi-lateral agencies to build such an understanding in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

- Diagnosing the political economy of local governance: This involves assessing the political economy of local governance, including the role of different societal groups and how this may encourage or hinder development; the role of formal and informal institutions in shaping human interaction and political and economic competition; and the impact of values and ideas, including political ideologies, religion and cultural beliefs, on political behaviour and public policy.

Below are some issues relevant for a political economy analysis exercise applied to local governance systems:

- Organizational dynamics and sources of power and legitimacy of non-state armed groups and warlords;
- Prevalence and impact on stability of communities of rent-seeking political systems at the local level;
- Expectations of citizenry from local authorities (executive, security, justice);
- Networks linking local public and private (civil society, business actors); and
- How land management issues are shaping local conflicts and political claims.

For more specific local governance-related data, programming teams should conduct a dedicated assessment that will include desk reviews, expert panels, workshops, questionnaires, perception surveys, field visit observations, etc. and involve a large range of stakeholders. It is crucial to mainstream political economy analysis in this assessment phase, if it has not been covered yet from other sources.

In Annex 6, a generic Rapid Local Governance Diagnostic Tool, inspired by the joint UN/WB tool (see above), is proposed. It is designed as a checklist to help programming teams customize and conduct country-specific assessments of local governance.

Depending on the programming context and available resources, programming teams might have the flexibility to conduct deeper assessments, before or at programme inception. It is always good to add a specific line for additional assessment work in a programme budget as specific aspects of local governance interventions require additional field research (e.g. vulnerability mapping, capacity assessments, perception surveys) that usually cannot be completed during programme design.

The following list offers a few additional UNDP tools to support in-depth assessment efforts.

- Capacity Assessment Framework. This is used to analyse current capacities of local governments against desired future capacities. It generates an understanding of capacity assets and needs, leading to the formulation of capacity develop-
### TABLE 3: KEY INFORMATION NEEDS FOR A LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT IN FRAGILE AND CRISIS-AFFECTED SETTINGS (TO BE DISAGGREGATED BY AGE AND GENDER WHENEVER RELEVANT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEME</th>
<th>SUB-THEME</th>
<th>DETAILS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mapping of local governance system</td>
<td>Stakeholder analysis</td>
<td>Presence, legal status, overall functionality and relative influence of different local governance stakeholders (including central government, donors, armed groups, etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intergovernmental relations</td>
<td>Support made available and autonomy allowed by central government to local governments in terms of policymaking, staffing, assets, finances, policymaking and capacity-building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Horizontal relations</td>
<td>Relations and issues between local governance units for border delimitation, cooperation for service delivery, development and advocacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal framework</td>
<td>Main applicable laws and regulations organizing local governance, level of enforcement, issues, gaps and on-going or planned reform processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict and violence analysis</td>
<td>Underlying causes</td>
<td>History of violence in different subnational units, major drivers of conflict (political, social, economic, ideological, environmental, institutional, etc.), gender dimensions of root causes to conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consequences</td>
<td>Key conflict and violence-related statistics in a few sample locations, including statistics on violent deaths and injuries, infrastructure damage, population movements, food security, access to services, poverty, etc., and differentiated effects on women and men.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trends</td>
<td>Conflict escalation or reduction dynamics in different locations, triggers and drivers of both conflict and peace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local governance processes</td>
<td>Local elections</td>
<td>Statistics on last local elections including turnout rate, violence and credibility of process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local government capacities</td>
<td>Main challenges for local government resources and capacities: staffing, local finance, infrastructure and assets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local leadership</td>
<td>Formal and informal leadership and relations; legitimacy and functionality of local councils (versus local executives), capacity to fulfill assigned functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local development planning and implementation</td>
<td>Local capacities for data collection and information management, local development planning methods and tools, budgeting (annual, investment), horizontal and vertical policy integration methods, project management capacities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Citizen engagement</td>
<td>Frequency, types and inclusiveness of citizen participation mechanisms in local governance, public outreach capacities in local governments, grievance-handling practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women's participation</td>
<td>Women in local government leadership positions, among local government staff, and women as peacebuilders at the local level. Measures for greater attention to women's needs, sexual and gender-based violence campaigns at the local level, civic education for women, local government support to women civil-society organizations and businesses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service delivery</td>
<td>Local responsibilities</td>
<td>Inventory of basic services under the main responsibility of local actors for delivery (and not of public administration, military or foreign NGOs) and stakeholders involved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delivery performance</td>
<td>Focus on key services: division of responsibilities and coordination, local innovations and coping mechanisms, access issues, quality, financial efficiency, capacity gaps, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace, security and social cohesion</td>
<td>Conflict management</td>
<td>Existing local peace infrastructures, traditional and modern conflict management mechanisms and norms, role of local governments, early warning systems, types of cases solved and responses given, reconciliation and transitional justice practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community security</td>
<td>Main providers of security at community level, coordination, gaps, security assets, small arms use, unexploded ordnance, involvement of communities in violence prevention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social cohesion</td>
<td>Social structures (civil society organizations, community-based organizations, religious groups), socio-economic integration, cultural identity, IDP host community issues, reintegration of ex-combatants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land, environment and livelihoods</td>
<td>Livelihoods and economic recovery</td>
<td>Livelihood coping mechanisms, labour market, key private sector actors, local economic development planning and support by local governments, inclusive micro-finance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land and environment</td>
<td>Role of local actors in managing access to land and natural resources, regulation methods, access inequality issues, revenue generation for local communities and local authority budgets, relations with extractive industries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enabling framework</td>
<td>Secondary settlement</td>
<td>Dis/agreements on subnational political, administrative and fiscal autonomy, local vs. national identity, central and local levels and between regions, negotiation process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>Neutrality of rule of law institutions, presence on the ground, interferences in governance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disasters and climate change</td>
<td>Level of risks, risk preparedness, role of local institutions in disaster prevention and response and in climate change adaptation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Be sure to mobilize all relevant UNDP practice teams for the assessment: it is, by essence, a multidisciplinary exercise and should not be conducted by governance teams alone.

Use the right mix of tools to cover the longer-term reform needs while addressing short-term challenges. Avoid assessment protocols that would focus only on listing immediate priorities.

Coordinate the local governance assessment with other development partners, making use of existing pre-funded multi-agency mechanisms (if applicable); use the assessment as an incentive to build a unified understanding of issues and a framework for action.

Map the physical and functional presence of local state institutions across the country as precisely as possible to detect orphan areas and the feasibility of closing the gap between citizens and local governments.

Use area-based methodologies (e.g. GIS) to understand vulnerability pathways using various criteria (gender, income level, mortality, literacy, housing density, etc.). Data gathering methods should encourage community participation to benefit from local knowledge and trigger collective problem-solving dynamics.

Both rural and urban areas should be part of the sample locations for the local governance assessment exercise. Analyzing local governance in cities is notoriously more complex than in rural areas (see Thematic Note 6).

2.2. BUILDING THE PROGRAMME STRATEGY

In Chapter 1, a generic framework for action is proposed, based on the theory of change on local governance for peace and recovery and a number of general overarching priorities derived from it (the what). In this section, guidance is given on how to operationalize the framework for action, meaning how to tailor, combine and sequence outputs and interventions inspired from the framework into an umbrella programme or into a number of coordinated projects best fitting with the particular peacebuilding, statebuilding and recovery needs of a country and UNDP’s overall programme structure in that country.

Strategic guidelines

The strategic guidelines below are based on UNDP comparative experiences in supporting local governance systems in fragile and conflict-affected settings. The guidelines are meant to help programming teams to define and sequence entry points, structure their results framework and establish partnerships.

**Strategic guideline 1:** Build an integrated programme strategy from the start and along two dimensions: (i) social contract: the three domains of change need to be tackled; and (ii) multi-functions: different sectors corresponding to the breadth of functions provided by local governance systems (and not just local governments) need to be tackled.

**Strategic guideline 2:** Follow an area-based approach in which a territory is analysed in depth and a coordinated multi-sectorial and multi-partner intervention is proposed. Large enough regions should be targeted because supporting local governance in conflict-affected setting means recreating social links by working across identity and administrative borders, not entrenching them. Also, a critical mass of change in any given location is needed to build lasting impact.
Strategic guideline 3: Support domestic leadership and stewardship. Avoid deploying support to local governance in pilot areas without coordinating with central government and other development partners. Domestic leadership over local governance programmes starts from the design phase and involves local and central actors – recognizing that this can turn at times into a complicated and time-consuming process, which can also be handled in stages.

Strategic guideline 4: Build on existing foundations as all countries, even after a devastating conflict, have a basis and legacy of public authority at the local level, and this is the basis on which a transformed local governance system will have to be gradually built, retaining those elements and modalities that show efficiency and legitimacy and introducing new ones. Post-conflict contexts offer opportunities to build new institutions, but beware of tabula rasa temptations when programming.

Strategic guideline 5: Be conflict-sensitive in different ways. Working on local governance in these settings is inherently tackling conflict drivers to alter conflict dynamics. But it is also trying to do-no-harm and anticipating possible conflict-exacerbating consequences of every programme activity and decision (see 2.4 for more details).

Strategic guideline 6: Be flexible with timelines as in these settings the risk of mistakes is often greater and their potential costs can be much higher than in normal development situations. At the same time, firm actions are needed early on to re-establish state presence, credibility and the rule of law. It is critical to identify areas of intervention where gradualism and caution are required (e.g. local political processes) and areas where moving fast and with resolve is possible (e.g. establishing platforms for participatory problem-solving).

Strategic guideline 7: Address the simplest before the most complex, which means, for example, dealing with immediate capacity needs before policy reforms. When building capacities, start with those needed for the most basic functions. When supporting reforms, help test a few options before long-term choices are made.

Strategic guideline 8: Maximize UNDP’s comparative advantage by working in partnerships as UNDP is often best positioned to provide policy leadership, technical assistance, capacity development and coordination, and less for mobilizing and managing the large capital investment sums required to strengthen local governance systems and deliver peace dividends.

Positioning local governance programming in fragile and conflict-affected settings with other UNDP programming areas

The proposed framework for action must be customized to the context of each country where it will be used, not only with regard to that country’s specific drivers of fragility and conflict, but also in relation to UNDP’s country programme structure, operational capacities and positioning vis-à-vis other development partners. The customization process involves two steps:

- selecting the relative weight given to each component of the framework and within it, the actual activities pursued; and
- selecting the programmatic vehicle that best suits an integrated approach.

These steps are largely influenced by the current overall crisis prevention and recovery approach followed by the Country Office, if existing.

Local governance and UNDP’s programmatic approach to crisis prevention and recovery

Local governance is a relevant entry point for different types of responses to fragility and conflict, often categorized in UNDP as: 1) peacebuilding; 2) statebuilding; 3) early recovery; 4) community security and social cohesion. Local governance is also very relevant to the cross-cutting purpose of building resilience against different kinds of risk factors. All of these approaches have in common an emphasis on restoring healthy, trust-based and effective relations between state and society as a prerequisite for recovering from crises and preventing further ones. In any given fragile or conflict-affected setting, local governance programming should therefore be guided by the objective of supporting the dominant approach taken by UNDP (or approaches) in that particular setting or country. This can be done by putting emphasis on one or more of the components of the framework for action in the programme strategy (as shown in Figure 6) while still keeping an integrated approach, hence attempting to programme across the six components.
Programme or projects?

As underlined in the evaluation of UNDP’s contribution to local governance and local development (2010), local governance and local development have often been treated in UNDP as separate sectorial areas, including in fragile and conflict-affected settings. As a result, rather than having a coherent approach to local governance, systematically employed in all programme areas (e.g. rule of law, environment, poverty alleviation) across a country, a number of distinct projects have been implemented, each separately addressing different functions of local governance (human security, service delivery, infrastructure, local economic recovery, disaster risk reduction, etc.) without sufficient integration from design to implementation. Working this way has thwarted opportunities to strategically address effectively drivers of fragility and conflict at the local level.

Three options to achieve more integrated programming, from least to most integrated, are described in Figure 7.

- **Option 1:** Mainstreaming local governance interventions into each sector-based project, focusing on building capacities of the local state and non-state institutions to more effectively deliver services in the area(s) of interest of that project (e.g. building local government capacities for managing cash-for-work activities in an early recovery project, or supporting local civil society organizations to monitor local elections in an electoral support project). Local governance should be mainstreamed during the design of each sectorial project and effective coordination on local governance aspects maintained between the different projects throughout implementation.

- **Option 2:** A light model of integrated local governance programming, centered on a core project focusing on strengthening local institutional capacities and governance arrangements for planning and implementing the main functions assigned to local governance systems. Meanwhile, sectorial support (rule of law, livelihoods, social cohesion, etc.) is provided...
by separate projects attached to the core local governance project and provide additional specialized technical inputs where needed in their respective area of focus. Such a model gives a better guarantee of maintaining a coherent approach to the goal of transforming local governance systems and helps improve the quality and impact of UNDP’s capacity development support. Close coordination between the different UNDP projects involved remains critical for the success of this programming model.

- **Option 3:** A strong model of integrated local governance programming that incorporates all relevant interventions (related to the six components) under one single programme or project with a single results and resources framework and management structure. This is the ultimate model of area-based programming.

Each option comes with pros and cons, depending on the country’s context, UNDP positioning in that country and on its Country Office capacities. **Option 1** is suitable in contexts of immediate crisis response when time is limited to develop new integrated programmes and the re-programming of existing projects, often sector-based, is the most effective strategy to deliver time-critical results. Yet, **Option 1** makes it more elusive to maintain a coherent approach to local governance transformation across the Country Office’s portfolio, and economies of scale in supporting local governance actors are more difficult to achieve. **Option 2** is both realistic and sufficiently flexible in contexts of early recovery programming; it is also fairly effective in rolling out the local governance approach. **Option 3** is the best from a conceptual point of view, but may prove too time-consuming as an initial response (except in contexts of protracted fragility that are not in a post-crisis state). This option is also less flexible to quickly-changing conditions and mobilizing resources for it may prove challenging. The three options are not necessarily mutually-exclusive; they can be seen as consecutive in a long-term programming continuum, with **Option 1** chosen as the very immediate response to a crisis,
Coase Study 3: Sonsonate, El Salvador – a city reborn

El Salvador underwent a ruthless civil war from 1979 to 1992 which took the life of 75,000 people. The Chapultepec Peace Accords opened the way to the country’s rapid social, economic and institutional reconstruction and the country has not experienced any new bouts of conflict since then. Still, unmanaged conflict legacies and an unfavourable regional context have made El Salvador the second most dangerous country in the world (70 homicides per 100,000 in 2011)1 and its development is severely constrained as a result of the exploding crime and violence.2

UNDP started working on violence reduction in El Salvador in 1998. Initially, its response focused on improving the policing response. Then, it shifted to tackling drivers of violence rather than just trying to control its manifestation. In 2007, UNDP and five other UN agencies launched an integrated programme on citizen security and social cohe- sion in three municipalities. Today, UNDP supports more than 20 Salvadoran municipalities in their efforts to sustainably reduce all forms of violence. The UNDP approach rests heavily on the belief that localized strategies led by coalitions of local actors (with municipalities in charge) work best. Violence needs to be tackled in its various manifestations, in the streets, in households, at school and among law enforcement institutions as well. Through this strong human rights-based approach, an area-based focus and a conjunction of interventions in physical infrastructure, basic services, livelihoods and job creation and social cohesion, it was possible to recreate social links and trust-based state – society relations. From there on, building upon early improvements in security to restore the social contract requires strong support at the policy, capacity development and financial levels from the central government.

The results achieved with UN support are well illustrated in the city of Sonsonate, as told by its Deputy Mayor (see the box below).

"Ten years ago in 2003, Sonsonate was among the most dangerous cities in El Salvador. Sonsonate was in chaos – public space was invaded by informal trade, traffic and other municipal rules were ignored, public infrastructure was decrepit and, with at least 13 homicides per month, insecurity reigned everywhere, even in the centre of town. Public trust towards the municipality and the police was very low; community participation almost unheard of. Public services were dysfunctional, especially power supply and waste management. The municipality lacked skills, a mandate and the resources to act on the spiraling violence. Cooperation between the central government and the municipality was absent, due to their being led by historically opposed political parties. Ten years later, Sonsonate only had one homicide in the first five months of 2013 and better security is reported everywhere. Seven Citizen Liaison Centres (outposts of national and municipal police) are spread across the city, while before the police was only in the main square. A Municipal Security Plan, developed with neighbourhood committees, state institutions and NGOs, is updated every year. With the help of UNDP, the municipality runs a socio-economic reintegra- tion programme for 35 ex-gang youth. On the institutional side, the municipal administration is restructured and includes a Gender Unit which oversees a network of social workers to curb domestic violence. Service delivery is more effective: for example, all areas now have good street lighting and drinking water is more accessible in isolated settlements. The population is more cooperative with the municipality and when street merchants were moved to a new modern market facility away from the centre of town, there were no problems because all had been negotiated by the Mayor. Nowadays in Sonsonate, when a resident comes to the municipality to lodge a complaint, it is immediately entered into an intranet system and goes straight to the unit in charge. The Mayor can monitor how quickly the staff reacts to citizen issues and this creates motivation among the staff. Even if it remains a real struggle every year to find the money needed to maintain improved services and con- tinue with projects, the municipality has increased its tax revenues (70 percent of duties collected versus 50 percent before), because people are now more inclined to pay their taxes as they see what the municipality is doing for them."

b. In 2008, the economic costs of violence and crime in the country amounted to 10.8 percent of its GDP (World Bank).
while Option 2 applies to recovery programming and Option 3 is the target to deliver longer-term resilience strengthening and development results.

**Linking a local governance programme to UNDP Strategic Plan 2014–2017**

As a corporate practice, all UNDP programmes must be linked to the UNDP Strategic Plan. For the period 2014–2017, three outcomes of the strategic plan are directly relevant to the goal of transforming local governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings. They are shown below together with the related outputs under each most relevant to the same goal.

### OUTCOME 3

**Countries have strengthened institutions to progressively deliver universal access to basic services**

- **Output 3.2:** Functions and financing capacity of subnational level institutions enabled to deliver improved basic services and respond to priorities voiced by the public
- **Output 3.5:** Communities empowered and security sector institutions enabled for increased citizen safety and reduced levels of armed violence

### OUTCOME 5

**Countries are able to reduce the likelihood of conflict and lower the risk of natural disasters, including from climate change**

- **Output 5.5:** Policy frameworks and institutional mechanisms enabled at the national and subnational levels for the peaceful management of emerging and recurring conflicts and tensions

### OUTCOME 6

**Early recovery and rapid return to sustainable development pathways are achieved in post-conflict and post-disaster settings**

- **Output 6.2:** National and local authorities/institutions enabled to lead the community engagement, planning, coordination, delivery and monitoring of early recovery efforts
- **Output 6.4:** Recovery processes reinforce social cohesion and trust and enable rapid return to sustainable development

Two other outcomes are also relevant, although they do not have explicit result targets for the subnational level.

### OUTCOME 2

**Citizen expectations for voice, development, the rule of law and accountability are met by stronger systems of democratic governance**

- **Output 2.1:** Parliaments, constitution-making bodies and electoral institutions enabled to perform core functions for improved accountability, participation and representation, including for peaceful transitions
- **Output 2.4:** Frameworks and dialogue processes engaged for effective and transparent engagement of civil society in national development

### OUTCOME 4

**Faster progress is achieved in reducing gender inequality and promoting women’s empowerment**

- **Output 4.2:** Measures in place and implemented across sectors to prevent and respond to sexual and gender-based violence
- **Output 4.4:** Measures in place to increase women’s participation in decision-making

### 2.3 CROSS-CUTTING CONSIDERATIONS

Three categories of cross-cutting considerations are reviewed in this section: (i) conflict-sensitive programming; (ii) gender and youth; and (iii) state-society relations.

**Conflict-sensitive programming**

A local governance programme can be designed at different states of a conflict continuum, as shown in Figure 8.

These categories are useful as long as they do not strait-jacket programming. Indeed, different conflict stages can coexist in a single country (e.g. Colombia, Eastern versus Western Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somaliland versus Somalia) and each will require a specific programme strategy. Also, programmes may straddle different conflict stages over the years. Thus, flexibility in programme design is necessary to cater for such possible evolution.

UNDP’s Conflict-related Development Analysis methodology (see Section 2.1) is relevant for each of the three stages (and for contexts of high criminal
Preventing, managing and resolving violent conflict is at the core of UNDP’s approach to building resilience in local governance. Hence, UNDP does not work around conflict – which is a principle applying commonly to humanitarian action – but rather works on conflict, i.e. makes deliberate attempts to design programmes that seek to exploit opportunities to positively affect conflict dynamics and address their structural causes. Even ‘technical’ aspects of UNDP work in support of local governance in fragile settings (e.g. building managerial capacities of local governments or supporting technical solutions for improved service delivery) can influence the dynamics of a conflict.

There are two important questions to ask when reviewing ex-ante the conflict sensitivity of a proposed programme strategy and content:

- Does it work on conflict and help reduce conflict drivers?
- Does it minimize the potential negative effects on conflict dynamics? This is known as the Do No Harm approach (see Box 10). In conditions of heightened violence and high risks for project staff, adopting a Do No Harm approach is crucial to being able to maintain a presence on the ground.

Table 4 provides an illustrative list of further questions to consider when examining whether a programme works on conflict and minimizes the potential for unwanted side effects.

Gender and youth

It is essential to empower women and youth in local governance not only for reasons of access to rights, but also because their active participation reinforces the chances of success of any effort to strengthen societal resilience and recover from conflict. (Section 1.1 and Thematic Note 2 analyse this in more detail)
### TABLE 4: PROGRAMME CONFLICT-SENSITIVITY CHECKLIST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTPUT</th>
<th>SAMPLE OF KEY QUESTIONS ON PROPOSED PROGRAMME STRATEGY AND CONTENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Output 1: Local governance institutions better equipped to deliver on priority needs of the population | - Are grievances over lack of services (including security) for marginalized and spoiler groups addressed?  
- Is a constructive interaction on service delivery issues between local governments and powerful non-state actors facilitated?  
- What is planned to mainstream conflict-sensitivity skills into core local government capacities?  
- Will a more diverse (inclusive) local civil service emerge as a result of the programme support? |
| Output 2: Local populations accessing more effective channels to carry their voice and to participate in local decision-making | - Are the links between local civil society and local power-holders well understood and factored into programming?  
- How is the emergence of issue-based rather than group-based civil society at the local level promoted?  
- What measures are taken to guarantee the utmost inclusivity in participation for policy-making and budgeting?  
- Are several distinct channels for the expression of voice supported, including for spontaneous civic action?  
- If social accountability and access to information activities are planned for the programme, have the potential risks for citizens, civil society and the media, of increased participation and scrutiny of government performance been considered? |
| Output 3: Risks of violent competition over land, natural resources, capital and jobs lessened by inclusive policies led by local actors | - What is planned to increase the response of local authorities to spatial determinants of inequalities in housing, social, economic and environmental well-being in the short- and long-term?  
- Are land and property tenure issues (access exclusion, status insecurity, corruption) tackled through a range of activities, including involving customary authorities?  
- Are job creation activities targeting groups most prone to using violence for fulfilling their livelihood needs?  
- How are livelihood needs of displaced populations and demobilized combatants catered for with minimum negative upshots on local communities? |
| Output 4: Increased grassroots participation in more inclusive and peaceful local political processes | - Have the risks of increasing local divisions through support to local political parties been carefully assessed?  
- Is local political dialogue closely linked to national dialogue?  
- How is the emergence of platform-based rather than group-based political parties at the local level promoted?  
- Are electoral violence risks addressed through an integrated electoral-cycle approach?  
- What is planned to make local councils more apt to achieve peaceful political debate and conflict resolution? |
| Output 5: Local infrastructure for peace empowered to tackle issues of community security, gender-based violence, social cohesion and justice, including those linked to conflict legacies | - Is support to existing infrastructures for peace prioritized over creating new structures? If not, is it based on a risk and stakeholder analysis?  
- How are links between infrastructures for peace and local authorities strengthened?  
- What is done to reinforce early warning capacities at different levels and coordinate them?  
- What is done to increase the involvement of populations in preventing crime and violence?  
- Are the urgent access to justice needs of disadvantaged groups addressed?  
- What is planned to help rebuild social links at the community level? |
| Output 6: Stronger policy, institutional and partnership frameworks are in place to support the transformation of local governance | - Is the political economy of the central – local settlement conducive to strengthening intergovernmental relations? If not, what is planned to address this issue?  
- Is there a unity of demand regarding local autonomy among areas? If not, what is proposed to help build consensus for a transitional period, until such time that national legal frameworks are settled?  
- How is gradualism applied to professionalizing the local government workforce to avoid backlash?  
- What is proposed to avoid that restive areas less prone to accept state extension become aid orphans?  
- Have regional resources for South-South and triangular cooperation from countries successful at decreasing conflict and violence been identified? |

Actions aiming to reduce the unequal access to local governance of women and youth, both in terms of processes and outcomes, should be fitting with the three objectives listed below:

- Strengthening constitutional, legislative and policy frameworks for women and youth inclusion in local governance;
- Promoting institutional change within local governance institutions, in particular local governments, traditional structures and civil society; and
- Making better linkages between the equal participation and leadership of women and youth in local governance and the global equality agenda in development policies.
Table 5 below provides a list of key entry points for mainstreaming women and youth issues into local governance programmes.

State-society relations

Rebuilding trust-based and resilient state-society relations is a basic tenet of the rationale behind increasing support to local governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings. Rebuilding this relationship is not assigned to a particular programme component, but can only result from a combined approach across domains of change and interventions. This is largely because of the complex and multi-dimensional nature of this relationship, as shown in Figure 9.

Relations between state and society at the local level are not a solid block; they are made up of a multitude of interactions due to the variety of constitutive elements building these relations.

**TABLE 5: ENTRY POINTS FOR MAINSTREAMING WOMEN AND YOUTH NEEDS IN A LOCAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTPUT</th>
<th>KEY ENTRY POINTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Output 1: Local governance institutions better equipped to deliver on priority needs of the population**                   | • Support greater access of women and adult youth to leadership or staff positions in local governments  
• Build capacities for disaggregated (gender, age) needs analysis, planning and budgeting in local governments  
• Create special funding windows to support local governments in addressing women and youth basic service needs  
• Support the institutionalization of women and youth units in local administrations |
| **Output 2: Local populations accessing more effective channels to carry their voice and to participate in local decision-making** | • Build capacities of local women and youth civil society organizations and networks for advocacy and participation  
• Raise the profile of women and youth organizations with local authorities and power-holders  
• Conduct civic education on the rights of women and youth to services and to participation  
• Implement social accountability initiatives on women and youth access to services and monitor local government commitments in this regard  
• Support women- and youth-run local media and visibility of women and youth issues in local media |
| **Output 3: Risks of violent competition over land, natural resources, capital and jobs lessened by inclusive policies led by local actors** | • Increase the fairness toward women and youth of local processes for regulating access to and solving disputes on land, natural resources and property  
• Ensure equal access of women and young girls to temporary job schemes, skills training and MSME support (as young adult men are usually primary targets of such programmes).  
• Incorporate women and youth agendas into local economic recovery strategies  
• Support women’s secure access to local markets |
| **Output 4: Increased grassroots participation in more inclusive and peaceful local political processes**                     | • Support women and youth membership and leadership in local branches of political parties  
• Support campaigning by women and youth candidates in local elections  
• Mainstream women and youth agendas in local candidates’ platforms and monitor compliance  
• Support women and youth participation in electoral processes (as voters, candidates or electoral staff)  
• Support women and youth caucuses in local councils to increase the responsiveness of local policy agendas to their specific needs and issues |
| **Output 5: Local infrastructure for peace empowered to tackle issues of community security, gender-based violence, social cohesion and justice, including those linked to conflict legacies** | • Raise general awareness on the importance of women and youth for peace and recovery  
• Create action plans for implementing SCR 1325 at the local level  
• Increase the role of women and youth in local peace/reconciliation/conflict management committees  
• Conduct civic education to counteract gender norms that drive conflict and insecurity  
• Prioritize sexual and gender-based violence issues in community security agendas  
• Target youth at-risk of perpetrating violence with socio-economic and small arms control activities  
• Ease access to justice for women and youth (customary systems, legal aid), including for conflict reparation |
| **Output 6: Stronger policy, institutional and partnership frameworks are in place to support the transformation of local governance** | • Policy framework on women’s participation in local governance employment and local elections  
• Role of women and youth platforms in shaping and monitoring decentralization reforms  
• Promote women and youth chapters in local governance associations and women and youth agendas in national local governance platforms  
• Increase policy integration between national women and youth institutions and local governments |
**VARIETY OF ACTORS.** From the public viewpoint, relating to the state is not limited to the experience of relating to one single state entity. Indeed, the state as the repository of the rule of law and purveyor of public goods is embodied by many distinct institutions, which all contribute to building a sense of relationship and to influencing the perception of it.

For example, building trust among the state and communities coming out of a long conflict might depend on the municipality being able to resume utility provision quickly to all neighbourhoods (and not just affluent ones), but also on the local police units curbing crime without breaching human rights, or on soldiers dispatched to neutralize militias not predating on young women; or again, on local judges dealing equitably with poor and rich landowners over conflict-related property disputes. On the other hand, local populations are also diverse by nature and include men, women, children, youth, seniors, different ethnic and religious groups and different socio-economic classes and professions. They can be victims or perpetrators of violence, and sometimes ‘losers’ or ‘winners’ in a political settlement. Each will have their own perception of the quality of the state-society relationship and will influence others around them accordingly.

**VARIETY OF MEANS OF INTERACTION.** Citizens can interact with the state at the local level, its agents, its rules, its public goods, directly or through a mediator (e.g. armed group, civil society organizations and traditional leaders). Perceptions on state capacities, values and attitudes are also built second-hand from exposure to information disseminated through social interaction and the media.

**VARIETY OF TYPES OF TRANSACTIONS.** In democratic and resilient societies, state-society relations hinge on different types of transactions: legitimation and rule of law (citizens give the state its legitimacy and accept its rules in return), representation and accountability (citizens delegate their voice in policy-making to governments but expect accountability in return), service provision and taxation (citizens contribute to state resources and expect services in return), etc. Each transaction participates to building a healthy and resilient state-society relationship. If one is weak or broken, the others cannot function properly.

**FIGURE 9: STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS**
**Importance of Enablers.** The quality and strength of state-society relations in local governance are highly dependent, on the one hand, on social cohesion among the diverse groups in society and, on the other hand, on the state’s capacity to engineer some level of coordination, if not policy integration, among its different constitutive parts, and project similar values and attitudes in all. This is what is referred to as ‘institutional convergence.’ Local governance programmes cannot focus on the state-society interface if these powerful enablers of a functioning relationship are left out of the picture.

There is a dearth of research on which actors, means of interaction and transactions in state-society relations at the local level are most critical for building trust and making societies more resilient. Such research would, in any case, be very context specific. Therefore, when seeking to transform state-society relations through local governance programmes, it is necessary to engage with the different channels and modalities through which the relationship is expressed, and the perceptions of all, and not just one particular group, need to be considered to assess the issues the relationship faces and measure its evolution.

The following list of questions can be used to assist in programming more holistically in support of strengthening state-society relations.

- **Which state-society links are most directly targeted by the programme and are these the most critical to affect the state-society relations as a whole?** Which state actors and society groups are affected by the programme and are they the most influential on resilience and other programme objectives? Are any critical actors and relationships left out? Is the balance right between different types of relationships affected by the programme?

- **Are the relations supported by the programme mostly direct or mediated or both?** Are certain groups only involved in mediated relations and why? How can their direct experience of the state be improved and, vice-versa, direct engagement of the state vis-à-vis these groups and their needs be strengthened?

- **Are measures in place to guarantee that multiple perceptions are taken into account and disaggregated when being monitored?** Are efforts made to guarantee that mediated perceptions are based on trustworthy and unbiased information?

- **Are different types of transactions between state and society addressed in the programme and in particular is the reciprocity dimension in each strengthened (e.g. accountability versus representation, services versus taxation)?**

- **Are there activities specifically looking at improving policy integration and coordination of state institutions at the local level and vertically between levels of governance?**

- **Are there activities specifically working on rebuilding social links and social cohesion?**

- **Is the need to strengthen state-society relations considered in each output area?**

**2.4 Identifying and Mitigating Risks in Programme Design**

Working at the local level in fragile and conflict-affected settings is fraught with risks, and a certain tolerance to risks is needed if UNDP is going to engage in a comprehensive manner at that level. Donors in these settings, especially for local governance programming, tend to focus on risk avoidance in terms of fiduciary and reputational aspects and this risk avoidance often overshadows the critical need to first diminish the hazards of state collapse and a return to conflict (or aggravation of tensions all the way to conflict). Therefore, while high risks are inherent to local governance programming in these settings, risks need to be prioritized in terms of possible programme ineffectiveness on drivers of fragility and conflict rather than fiduciary risk only. 64

Below is a generic typology of risks relevant for UNDP programming in fragile and conflict-affected settings, including political risks (referred to already in more detail in Section 1.2) and those directly linked to UNDP technical and operational capacities, and their translation in a local governance context.

- **Political Risks:** when the political economy realities of the central–local relationship precludes fruitful intergovernmental cooperation and/or could endanger UNDP’s do-no-harm approach. Commonly, high levels of instability

Increasing the role of signals to affected populations that a more opportunities. Such progress sends strong ices and providing equal access to livelihood harm, improving their access to basic serv-
cies. This includes allocating sufficient public resources to guarantee their protection from
redistributing fairly public resources essen-
society, including the most vulnerable and convening the various components of
in fragile states to assume their core mission in conflict settings. Empowering institutions
of such an endeavor should be the progress made in convening women and youth, who together form the majority of the population, to play a meaningful part in decision-making and in reflecting their needs in public poli-
cies. This includes allocating sufficient public resources to guarantee their protection from harm, improving their access to basic services and providing equal access to livelihood opportunities. Such progress sends strong signals to affected populations that a more inclusive social contract is underway.

Women and youth suffer disproportionately and, sadly so, increasingly from vio-
ence, whether crime- or conflict-related. Gender equality and children and youth
ights agendas are commonly pushed back in conflict settings. Empowering institutions in
entrenched conflicts and oppressive regimes. Women’s enrolment presented among police officers (e.g. Liberia, Philippines, Uganda). Women’s enrolment in security and justice sectors is crucial for creating an environment more conducive to fighting crimes against women, in particular sexual and gender-based violence, and for expanding public confidence in women as holders of public authority.

Women’s representation in political institutions (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Local Councils</th>
<th>National Assembly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Finally, women’s participation in the secu-
structure of the terms of state-society relations, the post-conflict
of state-society relations, the post-conflict moment should offer opportunities to better incorporate the voice of women in governance, including at the local level. If gender is deprioritized in such times, inequalities can become entrenched in new systems. Making local governance programmes more gender-responsive is therefore crucial given the importance of local governance to reshape the social contract. Yet, starting with peace agreements, women remain largely excluded from local infrastructures for peace, given how these infrastructures are often immersed in traditional institutions and led by local wise-men. Women’s role in peacebuilding is still largely confined to civil society and civic campaigns, some of which has, however, resulted in creating tipping moments in entrenched conflicts and oppressive regimes (e.g. Argentina, Guatemala, Liberia).

Women’s participation in local politics is not well researched but recent evidence shows that women tend to have a harder time accessing political offices in fragile countries at the local level than at the national level. Local politics in such environments are dominated by conservative values where political leadership is seen as a male domain and immersed in informal patronage systems. Training women candidates and establishing quotas is important, but not sufficient. And even with quotas, the public space in these settings remains more dangerous for women during electoral campaigns. In poorer countries and in rural areas finding female candi-
dates is a great challenge given their limited political awareness, reduced access to education and the weight of socio-cultural barriers. Even with women elected in local offices, the gender-responsiveness of local policy agendas is not guaranteed, as women representa-
tives will face during policy-making the same structural barriers to their voice and participation that they faced when running for office. Also, women officials sometimes fail to prioritize women’s issues on their own agenda or adopt the same conservative positions on women’s rights and needs than their fellow men officials.

Women usually have an easier time influ-
local decision-making through civic engagement in advocacy, participatory and social accountability processes, which provide channels for their engagement on public issues outside of traditionally male-dominated channels. Women’s civic activism can have a great influence on social attitudes, such as sexual and gender-based violence and domestic violence, or for obtaining better services and the ability to enter the job market, or to vote in local elections. However, local women’s organizations face more difficulty in accessing technical and funding assistance compared to national (elite) organizations and may remain cut from the broader peacebuilding and state-building agendas as a consequence.

The role of women in rebuilding state-society
relations comes also from their position as the main users of basic services. Indeed, if women gain a better opinion of the role and performance of state institutions in delivering basic services, they can positively influence perceptions among their family and the wider community. In terms of women’s opportunities to benefit from job creation and local economic recovery, the situation can contrast greatly between and within...
countries (especially between urban and rural areas). Post-war economies may provide more job opportunities for women, but in order to avoid being cantoned into low-paying unskilled jobs, women need access to gender- and market-sensitive vocational training and other support. This is necessary for women to obtain access to productive assets and reach longer-term economic empowerment. In this regard, access to land and natural resources for women in fragile and conflict-affected settings remains a major problem as conflicts make these assets more vulnerable to spoliation – even more so for widows and orphans. Women in these settings routinely experience physical insecurity when carrying out daily tasks related to the collection and use of natural resources. Women are less likely to be involved in the communal management of public land and assets and in negotiating their use with extractive industries, as these roles are reserved for more traditional stakeholders, such as customary leaders and mayors (men).

Therefore, in spite of the great potential for women to have a positive influence over peacebuilding and statebuilding from the bottom up, evidence shows that this role remains marginal and uneven. Women’s mere physical presence is not enough to ensure that a particular process is gender-responsive. Gender inequalities are intrinsically linked to the underlying political settlement, including gender norms that reinforce systems of inequality and the balance of power between formal and customary authorities. Since institutional hybridity and a weak state presence across the national territory is often a prevalent feature in fragile and conflict-affected settings, gender-responsive approaches cannot just focus on formal state institutions or civil society. Working with informal institutions and community-level gender norms can provide the most effective entry points for addressing gender inequalities and discrimination at the local level, as well as renegotiating women’s role in local governance.

More than 600 million youth (15-24) live in fragile and crisis-affected settings. Youth maturation trajectories, which are based on finding identity, purpose and value in society, are highly susceptible in these settings to strong push factors and pull factors that render youth both victims and perpetrators of violence. The reduced opportunities for education and skills training during times of conflict, along with high rates of migration and the legacies of conflict reinforcing the stereotype of youth thuggery, places youth at a trust disadvantage in local governance. The trust disadvantage has led to a culture of neglect, in which elites tend to shun younger populations in their own communities. For example, many conflict-affected countries require minimum levels of education and/or literacy to run in legislative elections, as well as upfront deposits upon registering as a political party. These policies disproportionately disenfranchise youth in rural and underserved communities.

Youth also find that access to building blocks of economic growth, such as land and capital, are restricted from them. These disparities may be due to formal legal restrictions (e.g. the ban on owning land until 18 years of age in many African countries) or due to localized values which are entrenched by nature (e.g. traditions of young adults living on family farms until marriage as opposed to starting their own businesses). Youth in fragile and conflict-affected settings are also more vulnerable to HIV transmission and sexual violence.

All told, such exclusions and disparities have a profound effect on youth livelihoods. These disadvantages when combined with pull factors, such as personal empowerment given by membership in radical groups or organized crime or the proliferation of small arms and light weapons outside of military control, leads to an increasing role of youth in perpetuating situations of violence and conflict.

Youth, however, can be powerful agents of change in their communities and have a strong potential to build bridges between communities. In many fragile and conflict-affected settings, a desire among youth for better representation and participation in politics and governance is on the rise. At the local level, where state authority may wane, these aspirations tend to be channelled through civil society organizations and youth movements. In Afghanistan, for instance, youth have been trained in water meter reading, payment collections and public awareness raising, which has increased revenues for public water utilities across the country. To encourage at-risk youth to turn away from violent activities and take a more proactive role in civic life, local governments, civil society organizations and aid groups need to be enabled to invest in the short-term in youth-oriented infrastructure and transitional job skills. They must also increase the availability of school credits and micro-loans for startups and promote recreational and cultural activities through which youth can express their creativity and positively and safely unleash their competitive spirit.

Strategic entry points for youth as positive agents of change in post-crisis contexts

1. Early stabilization of youth livelihoods.
2. Mobilize youth in peacebuilding, leading non-violent transitions, using new technologies to mobilize communities and bring about change.
3. Support youth organizations to play a pivotal role in renewing social links and rebuilding the social contract.


a. Reference documents for this thematic note include the UNDP Gender Equality Strategy 2014–2017 and the UNDP Study on Gender Equality in Public Administration.

b. Ibid.
c. Overseas Development Institute, 2013.
d. United Nations definition of ‘youth.’
f. Net migration among fragile states is negative and conflict accounts for 6.6 percent of youth migration (see Annexes 4 and 6 of the UN World Youth Report, 2011).
g. Examples include the Central African Republic, Sierra Leone and Kyrgyzstan.
h. Only 0.5 percent of people worldwide (young men) account for 75 percent of homicidal violence in major cities (see: John Vidal, “Why fragile cities hold the keys to stability and development,” The Guardian, 26 January 2014).
i. International City/County Management Association, 2013.
in local politics in some post-conflict contexts can cripple programme implementation and reverse results achieved.

**institutional risks:** when local institutions show sheer incapacity to assume their participation in the programme due to lack of qualified staff, capable leadership and/or financial resources. Setbacks in building capacities at the centre of government will also affect the implementation of institution-building activities at the local level.

**reputational risks:** when UNDP is not able to deliver on the planned results in a sustainable and scaled-up manner due to a weak programme design, and/or limited implementation capacity in the Country Office, and/or underestimated budgetary needs and/or insufficient resource mobilization to support implementation.

**operational risks:** due to difficult access to programme locations caused by poor communication networks, tough physical features, and bad security conditions. Working in remote and/or dangerous locations limits the availability of reliable implementing partners and calls for implementation procedures that carry more risks in terms of quality and financial control.

**fiduciary risks:** linked to operational risks and to the lack of a culture of integrity among local governance institutions. Fiduciary risks are among the most critical risks that push donors to skirt local governments and opt for community-based mechanisms and non-governmental implementation instead.

**targeting risks:** when results generated are not sufficiently benefitting the most marginalized and conflict-affected groups. In particular, the emphasis put on women’s participation in local governance during programme design, often supply-driven, can be lost in the face of pressure to deliver fast and hence avoid antagonizing local power-holders and value systems that are not receptive to gender equality.

Annex 7 provides more details on the nature of the risks identified above and possible mitigation measures. While each risk category calls for specific mitigation measures, the following strategic aspects of risk mitigation apply to all and need to be considered at the time of programme design.

- Applying a strong **political economy lens** to the initial situation analysis cannot be overstated. It helps map out the complex web of incentives for change (or against it) that influences local stakeholders’ attitude to and participation in UNDP local governance programmes.
- Balancing carefully engagement with national, intermediary and local government institutions and supporting intergovernmental relations can help reduce the risk of seeing the programme taken hostage by one level of governance. Many local governance programmes in fragile and conflict-affected settings have made the mistake of entrusting too much control to central government in leading programme implementation when in many cases, central authorities are weak, not legitimate enough for local actors and possibly controlled by politicians that only pay lip service to the objective of empowering local governance systems.
- Providing incentives for change to the various categories of local governance stakeholders, and not just local governments (or community structures or civil society organizations). It means working outside of local government structures for certain service delivery or peacebuilding activities, at least during a transitional period, and early promoting early on local public-private partnerships.
- Discussing upfront during programme design the issues of exclusion, discrimination, horizontal inequalities and other vulnerability situations with national and local authorities. Yet, a strong human-rights based approach needs to be matched by a realistic assessment of local values and available entry points to address exclusion. Inclusion criteria cannot just be supply-driven, there is a need to understand as well what inclusion means locally. Also, a gradual approach to fighting exclusion might be recommended. For instance, building first capacities of local governments in a post-conflict context to make service delivery more gender-sensitive might raise less resistance than pushing for immediate access of women to senior leadership roles.

While high risks are inherent to local governance programming in fragile and conflict-affected settings, risks need to be prioritized in terms of possible programme ineffectiveness on drivers of fragility and conflict rather than fiduciary risk only.
2.5 SETTING TARGETS FOR MEANINGFUL RESULTS

Setting targets for expected results and longer-term effects of an integrated local governance programme in fragile and conflict-affected settings is a complex exercise given the breadth of areas covered, the numbers of stakeholders involved, the intangibility and slow-moving nature of some of the change processes sought by the programme and the constraints that may exist, in terms of data availability and access to target communities, for building up a solid, yet realistic baseline and updating it regularly.

Indeed, a peculiarity – and difficulty – in setting targets for local governance programmes relates to the fact that such programmes rely heavily on improving capacities of various categories of local actors and helping them act more collaboratively as a means to trigger sustainable change. A solid baseline on pre-existing capacities at individual, organizational, sectorial and enabling environment levels for local governance, as well as state-society relations at the local level, should therefore be ideally built during programme design. Yet, this is often too complex and time-consuming of an endeavour to undertake for Country Offices operating in contexts of crisis (especially post-conflict). Some baseline data can be collected during the situation analysis, but because of time and political pressures, certain programme activities will have to be designed before a detailed baseline is established. Definitely, efforts should be made to complete the baseline rapidly during the programme inception phase. UNDP’s various capacity and training needs assessment tools (see UNDP’s Capacity Development Toolkit) can be used for this purpose. Community perceptions surveys, increasingly used in the context of UN peacekeeping missions, including through affordable ICT solutions adapted to low-technology environments, are also advisable to build a baseline on certain aspects of local state-society relations.65

Setting targets for output-level results

Given the importance of the social contract in the programme strategy, output indicators should make sure to capture the aspects listed below.

-------------------------------

65. See guidance from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in Understanding and integrating local perceptions in multi-dimensional UN peackeeping.

BOX 11: MONITORING AND EVALUATION GUIDANCE

Guidance on UNDP corporate approaches and tools for monitoring and evaluation is available in:

• the Results and Accountability chapter of the POPP;
• the UNDP Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results; and
• the UNDP Compendium for Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Prevention and Recovery Settings.

■ The quantity, quality and outcomes of interactions between state institutions operating at the local level and citizens. Not all such interactions have the same level of sway in shaping the state’s legitimacy among the public. It is therefore important during programme design to identify those interactions and transactions that are the most decisive, in building trust, focus programme activities around these and develop indicators describing these interactions. The same applies to interactions between various state institutions at different levels of governance (for harmonizing service delivery, for example) or between different community groups (for conflict resolution, reconciliation, etc.).

■ Mutual perceptions between local governance stakeholders. Public perceptions of local government performance need to be captured in areas such as service delivery, local security and justice, etc. Reciprocally, the perceptions of local officials and staff on public attitudes to participating in local governance and abiding by the rule of law must be captured. Finally, mutual perceptions between local and central-level institutions should be gathered. Perception indicators are key to maintaining effective early warning systems on a possible decline in the strength of the social contract.

■ Inclusion of vulnerable and marginalized groups in local governance and of their issues in local policy agendas. To a great extent, this is achieved by planning to systematically collect disaggregated data on all indicators relating to participation in local governance and to access to and delivery of public goods and services. Data should at minimum be disaggregated by gender, but also where possible by age and by the main factors underpinning horizontal inequalities. Spec-
For two decades – from the downfall of the central government under Siad Barré in 1991 to the return of constitutional order in 2012 – Somalia existed as a country of disparate parts, with the unitary Somali state only existing in a de jure capacity. Today, the control of the Transitional Federal Government does not extend over much of the country. Somalia remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with an estimated 42 percent of its eight million people living in extreme poverty. Access to basic services is severely limited; less than 30 percent of Somalis have access to clean water (2010) and less than one third of Somali children are enrolled in primary education.

Local governance systems in the three main areas of the country are diverse. In the South Central region, emerging self-government administrations that have been increasingly providing basic services and security face resistance from the new Transitional Federal Government that favours a more centralized state. Somaliland, a self-declared independent state, has adopted a unique system of local governance integrating modern and clan-based structures. It has had great success in maintaining stability, but still lacks considerable capacity to improve local development planning and deliver universal access to services. In Puntland, an autonomous state in the Somali federation, the rule of law is weak and this is reflected in an incomplete local government structure (no elected councils, outdated legislation) with basic capacities for administration and service delivery.

With the main objective of increasing the delivery of basic services to rural populations living in extreme poverty, and moving away from a humanitarian assistance model that was prevailing at that time in Somalia, UNDP and four other UN entities (ILO, UNCDF, UN-HABITAT and UNICEF) launched the Joint Programme on Local Governance in 2008. This programme was designed to support the establishment of district-level autonomous and accountable local governments and the development of effective linkages with constituent communities and the private sector. By empowering local governments with systems and resources to deliver services, improve security, manage conflicts and build peace, the programme hoped in the process to strengthen their legitimacy and contribute to statebuilding. The Joint Programme on Local Governance took place first in Somaliland and Puntland and started implementation in South Central Somalia in 2010. Working from the bottom-up, the programme’s strategy was to increase sector outputs (local-level economic and social infrastructure and services), build local institutions and provide policy inputs into the development of a conducive decentralization framework.

In an extremely challenging context, the Joint Programme on Local Governance has made a major contribution to the emergence of autonomous and accountable local authorities in Somalia, while such authority is still poorly established at the central level. The programme is helping improve access to services (health, education, sanitation, transport, marketing), reflecting community priorities. Yet, with very limited investment funds and difficulty in ensuring a steady co-production of services locally, the overall impact on poverty remains constrained. The programme came at a time of very low trust in communities towards local governments but managed nonetheless to establish institutionalized relationships between state and society through participatory governance mechanisms and an innovative local taxation-against-services programme. Finally, on the peacebuilding side, local governments have now taken more direct responsibility in community security maintenance.

LESSONS LEARNED from the joint UN support to rebuilding the local government system in Somalia are listed below.

- A bottom-up approach to building subnational institutions is relevant, even in the most adverse environments.
- Investing time and resources in trust-building is paramount in contexts where local governance stakeholders have grown very suspicious of each other and of central government institutions.
- Paying attention to the marginalized (women, youth) energizes grassroots participation in the programme.
- The rigidity of programme documents need to be sacrificed for practical realities and increased local ownership; but a clear assignation of roles to programmes partners in such a complex conflict environment is essential.
- Providing funding to local governments from day one, even in high risk environments such as Somalia, including by such creative solutions as tapping into local and diaspora resources, is the only way to promote comprehensive development of local institutions. It also creates a sense of shared responsibility at the core of renewing state-society relations.
Specific indicators to capture progress in undoing certain exclusion processes (e.g. sexual and gender-based violence) will also be needed.

Country Offices must customize output indicators to best fit the context and the programme content. The indicators must also reflect constraints to collecting reliable data in a cost-effective and in a cost-effective and conflict-sensitive manner. Some output indicators may only apply to specific subnational areas with a peculiar set of challenges (e.g. urban areas). As a source of inspiration, a number of indicative output indicators (some of which are also output indicators in the UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017) are listed in the Toolbox at the end of each chapter in Part II – Programme Review.

Evaluating programme impact at outcome level

The impact of local governance programming in fragile and conflict-affected settings can be measured in different areas, including:
- violence and conflict occurrence, with special focus on gender-based and domestic violence;
- changes in local government leadership, accountability and responsiveness;
- evolution in multi-dimensional poverty (income, basic services, human security) in targeted communities;
- existence of sustainable and inclusive power-sharing arrangements as a means to increase resilience;
- levels of trust and collaboration between local governance actors (including citizens);
- social cohesion; and
- existence of an institutional compact around a nationally-owned vision for a long-term role of local governance institutions.

Usually an impact assessment is carried out at the country level, as it is supposed to measure the dissemination and scaling-up of effective approaches and capacities built by UNDP local governance programmes.

As per UNDP corporate guidelines, the outcome indicators of the UNDP’s Strategic Plan should be used as a matter of priority as outcome-level indicators in country-based development programmes. As per UNDP corporate guidelines, the outcome indicators of the UNDP’s Strategic Plan should be used as a matter of priority as outcome-level indicators in country-based development programmes. As per UNDP corporate guidelines, the outcome indicators of the UNDP’s Strategic Plan should be used as a matter of priority as outcome-level indicators in country-based development programmes. Table 6 shows the most relevant outcome indicators taken from the Strategic Plan 2014-2017 (sometimes slightly rephrased to fit local-level results) that can be used to measure the proposed outcomes in the framework for action for local governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

As is the rule with outcomes, what matters is discerning the contribution of a particular programme to their achievement – and not determining whether the programme was successful in achieving the outcome on its own. For all outcome results listed in Table 6, it is therefore expected that responsibility in producing them is shared with other UNDP programming streams (e.g. rule of law, livelihoods, conflict prevention and social cohesion) and other governmental and development partners’ efforts in the countries at stake.

Country-specific indicators can also be devised by the Country Office at outcome level, if called for by the context. For this, certain global indicator frameworks on fragility and conflict, some also tackling changes at the subnational level, can be useful. The UNDP User’s Guide on Measuring Fragility provides a good compendium of such frameworks (up to 2009). More recent examples include the Fragility Assessments conducted as part of the implementation of the New Deal, and the indicators used to measure targets selected by the international community for the Sustainable Development Goals.

66. Country Offices should be able to map and analyse new channels of state-society interaction, not necessarily introduced by the programme but appearing as a result of the increased trust and collaborative capacity between local governance stakeholders that the programme helped nurture.
**TABLE 6: LIST OF SUITABLE OUTCOME INDICATORS FOR UNDP’S FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION ON LOCAL GOVERNANCE FOR PEACE AND RECOVERY ADAPTED FROM INDICATORS OF THE UNDP STRATEGIC PLAN 2014–2017**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDICATOR</th>
<th>SOURCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 1: Local governments and their partners provide improved basic services to all men and women, according to their needs, and support local economies with increasing financial efficiency.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of public confidence in the delivery of basic services by local governments, disaggregated by sex, urban/rural and income groups</td>
<td>SP Outcome 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of subnational institutions able to lead and coordinate the early recovery process (following conflict) six to 18 months after crisis</td>
<td>SP Outcome 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of local government units with open access to data on local government budgets, expenditures and public procurement</td>
<td>SP Outcome 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of affected populations meeting critical benchmarks for social and economic recovery within six to 18 months after a crisis (disaggregated by sex and age)</td>
<td>SP Outcome 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment rate at the local level, disaggregated by sector and sub-sector, sex, age and excluded groups and by wage category when available</td>
<td>SP Outcome 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 2: Local political institutions are inclusive, produce noticeable change and alternate peacefully.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter turnout at local elections, disaggregated by sex, age and excluded groups</td>
<td>SP Outcome 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful completion of local elections</td>
<td>SP Outcome 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of women to men in local councils</td>
<td>SP Outcome 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of decision-making positions (executive, legislative, judicial) occupied by women at subnational level</td>
<td>SP Outcome 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of decision-making positions in local peacebuilding processes occupied by women</td>
<td>SP Outcome 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 3: Relations between individuals and between identity groups at community level are resilient to shocks.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to local justice services by sex and population group</td>
<td>SP Outcome 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicide rate by and age per 100,000 inhabitants</td>
<td>SP Outcome 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of subnational areas with evidence that prevalence of sexual and gender-based violence has decreased</td>
<td>SP Outcome 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Employed by their municipality, Burundi villagers rebuild community infrastructure destroyed during the civil war. (Photo: UNDP Burundi)
Chapter 3:

BUILDING LOCAL CAPACITIES FOR SERVICE DELIVERY
The capacity of the state to provide a range of essential goods and services to all members of society is central to rebuilding the social contract. If state authority is to be extended where it was absent or largely dysfunctional, it means first of all addressing the serious capacity gaps and harmful incentives that make local state institutions unable to respond to society’s basic needs.

**OBJECTIVE:** Local governance institutions are better equipped to deliver on priority needs of the population

Building capacities for service delivery – infrastructural as well as human, financial, managerial and technical – of local governance institutions so that they can play their roles as providers of public goods and services, in addition to being conveners of local coalitions for peace and recovery, is essential in any fragile and conflict-affected situation. In most cases, local governments, statutorily mandated and formally linked to the central government, are the main local institution concerned with service delivery but other, often non-state, local governance actors may also play an important role in certain contexts and need capacity-building support as well.

In the immediate aftermath of a conflict, the rapid restoration of local government capacity is a prerequisite to rebuilding state legitimacy, even if state legitimacy needs also to come from other sources. In fragile, non-conflict settings, addressing gaps in local government outreach to all territorial sub-divisions, especially isolated rural areas or urban slums, and improving the capacity of local governments to fight against inequalities and bring public goods and services to those that have been deprived of them, can usher in positive change in state-society relations and reverse conflict trends.

Rebuilding local capacities for service delivery is therefore central to any programme supporting the extension of state authority for stabilization, peace and recovery. It can be implemented in any context, regardless of the existing level of decentralization, although the level of decentralization will be an important factor to take into account in designing programme activities. Building multi-dimensional capacities of local governments, and other essential local governance actors where needed, will contribute to increasing the rate of success of all other programme components.

This chapter covers the programmatic entry points listed below.

- **Restoration or upgrading of local government’s operational capacities, including staffing.**
- **Building core capacities of local governments.**
- **Enhancing the local organization of service delivery.**
- **Improving local finances, including revenue generation.**
- **Fighting against corruption in local governance.**
The high institutional instability of post-conflict environments (quick turnover of national staff and managers) limits the long-term effectiveness of such programmes.

The other critical dimension concerns the human resources of local governments, including payroll operations. Local administrations might be severely depleted of staff, especially at managerial and technical levels, if conflict has caused massive displacements, deaths among public servants or attrition. Local governments may be relying on personnel with no contracts or volunteers who have been promised eventual employment. An initial support package should look at filling the most critical staffing gaps and stabilizing the existing workforce until more permanent measures, including also reading the local civil service of ghost workers and double-dippers, can be taken to professionalize the local civil service and increase its diversity (see Chapter 8).

Guaranteeing the security of local government officials, staff and facilities is a prerequisite for the resumption of their functions. It usually does not fall within UNDP mandate, but UNDP can work closely, in UN mission environments for example, with peace-keeping elements to pay attention to the security needs of local governance bodies. In non-mission environments, UNDP can facilitate a stronger cooperation between local governments and the national police to secure their facilities and staff.

Finally, UNDP can also support the piloting of restoration and extension of state authority programmes by central government so that plans prioritizing geographical areas and the deployment of needed services (local administration, justice, police, line ministries, etc.) are well coordinated.

Possible activities falling under this entry point are listed below.

- Local government mapping (location, buildings, assets, staff, level of operations, security threats).
- Support to central government for the design and phased implementation of a strategy for the restoration and extension of state authority, including defining basic standard operating procedures for local governments.
- Rehabilitation and upgrading of local government infrastructures and provision of basic equipment packages (e.g. office-in-a-box).
- Temporary staff capacity substitution (consultants, TOKTENS67 or UNVs – see Box 12).
- Support to payment of local government staff salaries (payroll operations).

67. UNDP/UNV operates a special technical assistance volunteer category called the ‘Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals’, or TOKTENS.

3.1 THE RESTORATION OR UPGRADE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONAL CAPACITIES, INCLUDING STAFFING

Restoring the operational capacities of local governments when they have been heavily disrupted or damaged by a conflict or are in a very poor state of repair and staffing due to years of neglect is a prerequisite to their delivery of useful functions to the local population.

For infrastructure needs, temporary solutions may be provided (e.g. prefabs for local administrations, temporary co-housing in other public buildings) as an emergency measure until (re)construction programmes for local administrative buildings are implemented. A slow or delayed response in providing local governments with functional working environments, including office, communications and transportation means, will hamper the success of any other support provided to them.

The UNVs made a decisive impact on the public financial management capacities of state governments. For the first time ever, in 2011, all 10 states had annual plans and budgets. Local revenue generation, ICT and urban planning and management capacities also improved.

The main lessons learned from this project include:

- co-location and in-line reporting are critical to capacity-building through capacity substitution programmes;
- national governments must play a strong quality assurance role for consistency across all targeted administrations;
- a minimum of two years deployment is needed; and
- the high institutional instability of post-conflict environments (quick turnover of national staff and managers) limits the long-term effectiveness of such programmes.

BOX 12: FILLING CRITICAL STAFFING GAPS IN SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS – UNDP/UNV IN SOUTH SUDAN

From 2010 to 2012, 98 UNV SPECIALISTS from neighbouring countries were deployed to state administrations of South Sudan, to undertake the following roles:

- immediate gap filling of essential positions; and
- building capacities of nascent state structures through training, mentoring, legal drafting, etc.

The UNVs made a decisive impact on the public financial management capacities of state governments. For the first time ever, in 2011, all 10 states had annual plans and budgets. Local revenue generation, ICT and urban planning and management capacities also improved.

The main lessons learned from this project include:

- co-location and in-line reporting are critical to effective capacity-building through capacity substitution programmes;
- national governments must play a strong quality assurance role for consistency across all targeted administrations;
- a minimum of two years deployment is needed; and
- the high institutional instability of post-conflict environments (quick turnover of national staff and managers) limits the long-term effectiveness of such programmes.

67. UNDP/UNV operates a special technical assistance volunteer category called the ‘Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals’, or TOKTENS.
Building capacities of local governments remains a daunting challenge in any country, let alone in fragile and conflict-affected settings. This ‘capacity cliff’ still deters many central governments and development actors from investing early and sufficiently in building local government capacities; the cliff pushes them instead to create or reinforce parallel delivery systems that are less demanding in capacity-building investments. Such a response is in part due to the prevalent thinking that a ‘whole-of-local-government’ approach, a significantly costly and long process, is needed to make impact. In fact, experience shows that local governments do not need to assume all of their statutory functions at once for local governance paradigms to transform: a gradual empowerment model can be followed. For example, strengthening leadership and the capacity to organize inclusive decision-making is more important at first in divided communities than the capacity to administer local taxation. In terms of administrative capacities, planning and budgeting can be supported first while financial execution remains handled by other agents (decentralized services, provincial governments or contracted NGOs).

Establishing early on a hierarchy of capacity development needs in any context is therefore critical to make the capacity cliff less daunting and to reap faster results. Criteria that can be used to prioritize such needs include: (i) existing capacities found in local governments; (ii) the level of criticality given to stabilization: the higher, the more priority given to leadership, conflict management and strategic communication skills; (ii) the ranking of recovery priorities by local communities; and (iii) central government’s plan and schedule for the transfer of responsibilities to local governments.

Capacity development of local governments needs to tackle several dimensions, not just the individual level (the most commonly targeted in fragile and conflict-affected settings) but also the organizational, sectoral and enabling environment levels as well. The sectoral level refers also to other local governance actors and to their capacities to contribute to a functional and competent local governance system. The needs of non-state actors are usually less complex than those of local governments, given their more limited political, administrative and financial roles. A capacity development strategy should propose a schedule of competencies and functions that need to be acquired at each dimension.

Also, capacity development must come with financial resources. It is pointless to train local governments on local public expenditure management if they are not going to have access to investment funds at the same time to execute projects.

Capacities are better built when using a variety of methods that go beyond skills training and knowledge transfer through workshop-based events. It is an integrated process in which training programmes for local governments (including through mentoring and on-line courses) are complemented with:
- user-friendly guidance (e.g. administrative regulations, procedures manuals);
- oversight and technical backstopping;
- peer (horizontal) networking;
- vertical integration (for more efficient inter-governmental cooperation); and
- the gradual improvement of the regulatory environment to organize more effectively the roles and powers of local governments (in particular in fiscal areas) and the subsidiarity between levels of local government.

**Example of hierarchy of capacity development needs in a low-income post-conflict context**

**Dimensions in capacity development for local governance**
Nevertheless, skills training and knowledge transfer remain prominent features of any capacity development strategy for local governments in fragile and conflict-affected settings given the usually low qualifications of local government staff and elected officials in such contexts. While addressing gaps in a small number of pilot locations is relatively feasible through intensive training programmes, doing it at scale brings up a number of critical challenges as summarized in the above table.

---

Challenges and mitigation measures for building local government capacities at scale in fragile and conflict-affected settings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenges</th>
<th>Possible mitigation measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to muster the broad political and financial support of central governments and donors for comprehensive capacity development programmes for local governments.</td>
<td>Test capacity development approaches and tools in pilot locations before launching comprehensive, multi-year strategies. Pool funds for capacity development of local governments under national piloting schemes (e.g. those of the Ministry of Local Governments).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity development strategies need to be tailored for varying contexts (peaceful/conflict, urban/rural, wealthy/poor, etc.)</td>
<td>Use a cross-section of representative pilot locations in the design phase. Involve clients (e.g. local government associations) in strategy design and piloting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to physically access many ‘clients’ due to rough geography, poor road networks and/or insecurity.</td>
<td>Establish regional capacity development hubs with facilities and resource personnel. Use online training if feasible, deploy mentors (e.g. UNVs) and promote peer training (through local government associations).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor to non-existent infrastructure and resources of local governments stifle their ability to practice their new skills and knowledge.</td>
<td>Upgrade local government infrastructure in synchrony with the roll-out of capacity development strategies (e.g. provide office-in-a-box packages at the time of the training cycles).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local civil service status of staff is not secure or undefined, and high staff turnover due to political patronage.</td>
<td>Support revision of local civil service status as part of a larger civil service reform or decentralization reform (see Output 6).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulty maintaining quality standards in training activities due to a plethora of initiatives and the use of cascade training.</td>
<td>Use competency-based frameworks for training needs assessment (linked with public sector reform). Establish a central clearing-house for all training initiatives to ensure quality standards. Strengthen donor coordination on local government training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient number of professional trainers to cover local government needs; international trainers too expensive for operating at scale.</td>
<td>Invest early in developing national training resources (public academies, private institutes, etc.) and create a national certification system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classroom-based training is not adapted to the educational background, lifestyles or availability of local government staff.</td>
<td>Establish decentralized resource centres with internet access for more flexible self-development methods, peer exchanges between local governments, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulty keeping track of multiple capacity development initiatives, their coverage (who, where) and their impact.</td>
<td>Establish a national M&amp;E framework to monitor local government output indicators (not just training activity indicators) and promote adoption by all donors.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

a. Jackson (2010) speaks of “capacity fallacy” to denounce the common excuse of insuperable capacity gaps that push donors to reconsider working through local governments in post-conflict contexts.

b. UNDP’s 2012 report on Supporting Capacity Development in Conflict and Fragile Contexts provides further recommendations on how to best address capacity development needs in such contexts.
3.2 BUILDING CORE CAPACITIES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

In a fragile context, the most needed ‘core’ capacities that local governments need to assume to assume a strong role in organizing service delivery, include:

- **Basic Skills**: numeracy, literacy, legal awareness, simple administrative tasks, computer literacy;
- **Leadership Skills**: legal awareness, understanding roles and responsibilities, policy formulation, consensus-building, convening and coordination, strategic communications;
- **Administrative Skills**: human resources management, procurement, financial and asset management, tax administration;
- **Project Skills**: data collection and analysis, planning and budgeting, resource mobilization, monitoring and evaluation;
- **Crisis Resilience Skills**: conflict prevention and resolution, disaster risk reduction, emergency response; and
- **Gender Mainstreaming Skills**: identifying women’s specific socio-economic, protection and voice needs, budgeting and organizing service delivery, building infrastructure and livelihoods support that respond to these needs, increasing women’s access to employment in the local public sector, including at managerial levels.

Whole-of-local-government approaches that address gaps in all the above capacities at once should be avoided (see Thematic Note 3). Prioritization and gradualism are essential in establishing a strategy and workplan to reinforce individual skills and organizational capabilities. This process should be led by: (i) the prioritization of local government functions and services that are most important to stabilize communities and bring them on the path to recovery; (ii) existing capacity levels; and (iii) central government capacities and funding resources available to support the process. Priorities may also vary from one geographical area to the other in the same country.

The steps outlined below correspond to the immediate response phase when quick results are needed before more elaborate capacity development strategies can be prepared by central government and in consultation with local governments, as part of an

**BOX 13: REVIVING THE ROLE OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS – UNDP IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS**

In 2008, when UNDP and UNCDF started the Provincial Governance Strengthening Programme in the Solomon Islands, the country’s provincial governments were caught in a negative feedback loop of low capacity, limited mandated responsibilities and very limited resources. Service delivery was mostly managed centrally through line ministries and fiscal transfers to provincial governments had declined to a mere 2.9 percent of the national budget.

UNDP supported negotiations between the country’s provincial and central governments. Policy options were presented, a capacity development fund for provincial governments was established and staff morale was improved by computerizing the payroll system. As a result, by 2013, a revived provincial governance was on its way, with the following achievements:

- all provinces had valid annual plans and budgets and transfers from central government had increased;
- 400 investment projects had been funded through provincial governments; and
- a new and improved relationship was being forged between the national and provincial governments.

Heavy frontloading to address the marginalization of provincial governments at the project start produced quick-wins. However, political interferences in the management of provincial government human resources limited the sustainability of capacity development inputs.

Solomon Islands, road between Auki and Malu’u, 2007. (Photo: Rob Maccoll for AusAID)
overall strategy to professionalize local civil service and increase the autonomy of local governments (see Chapter 8).

Possible **Activities** falling under this entry point are listed below.

- Capacity assessments, building upon initial gap analysis conducted during the situation analysis.
- Preparation of short/mid-term capacity-building frameworks negotiated with recipients (topics, timeline, expected results, necessary commitments, staff involved, women representation, incentives, etc.).
- Capacity-building of local governments using workshop-based and on-line courses, mentoring, organizational restructuring, peer exchanges, knowledge banks, etc.
- Formulate standardized guidelines for administration, service delivery and project management by local governments.
- Create a national framework and tools for monitoring local government capacity-building activities and impact on local government performance.
- Provide support to the emergence of specialized institutions for the capacity-building of local governments.

### 3.3 Support to Local Service Delivery Systems

This is a vast area of intervention, involving not only local governments but also other actors (e.g. civil society, the private sector, traditional authorities and de-concentrated services) which warrants policy and capacity-building and, consequently, substantial funding support. The delivery of basic social services in fragile, and even more often in conflict-affected contexts, is usually supported by specialized agencies (e.g. UNICEF, WHO, UNFPA) as well as the World Bank and bilateral donors. This requires devising **transitional service delivery frameworks** that put forward costed strategies for resuming basic service delivery, defining the roles of various actors in bridging existing gaps and prioritizing the capacity inputs needed on the delivery side (e.g. teachers, medical personnel). The same applies to the rule of law sector for the provision of security at the local level through the police and justice through the court system. Often, the roles and responsibilities of local governments is neglected in these transitional policy frameworks, while local governments are an essential node of coordination between central, local, formal and informal actors during a transitional period.

UNDP support should ensure that local government interests and capacities are well represented in service delivery policy frameworks, especially in post-conflict situations. UNDP can also help establish partnership agreements between local governments, civil society, the private sector, traditional institutions and communities, in which responsibilities for delivering the needed services are defined and co-production arrangements hammered out. Local governments can play an important leadership, oversight and possibly co-funding role in such processes.69 On the content side, UNDP should support home-grown innovations for delivering services in resource-depleted environments, as often the case in fragile settings, and help introduce relevant solutions from outside, such as e-governance activities that can improve access to and quality of certain local administrative services, even in low-technology environments.

Possible **Activities** falling under this area of intervention are listed below.

- Support to local coordination platforms for service delivery.
- Conducting bottom-up participatory service delivery audits.
- Cost-benefit analysis of different service delivery modalities, in particular for access by marginalized groups.
- Facilitation of central-local consensus on transitional service delivery frameworks (in anticipation of sector-wide reforms).
- Testing options for public-private partnerships in service delivery by local stakeholders and monitoring impact.
- Introduction and dissemination of appropriate innovative technology for service delivery, including from local sources.
- Support to resource mobilization by national and local governments for investment in and running costs of basic service delivery (see 3.4 on improving local finances).

68. In particular for access to justice where traditional and informal institutions often retain a dominant role in spite of the establishment of a modern state judicial structures.
Public service delivery is a core function of states the world over, but one rarely fulfilled properly in terms of quality, quantity and consistency in fragile countries and those emerging from conflict. For decades, crisis response policies of the international community have in effect led to by-passing state structures, including local governments, for service delivery because of the (extremely) weak state capacity and/or ruined infrastructure. Such an approach ignores local capacity, delays statebuilding and creates dependency. It reduces opportunities for post-conflict or transition governments to establish their legitimacy.

It is important to understand that state-led service delivery can cover a wide range of public services (see the box) and modalities. While there is a growing consensus that service delivery has a role to play in peacebuilding and statebuilding, it should not be seen merely as a technical issue. Political elites engage in service delivery for different reasons, such as promoting social cohesion or consolidating their power base. This is not a problem in itself, but it calls for a careful political economy analysis before designing interventions in support of service delivery. A frequent element of policy debate in fragile and conflict-affected settings is the extent of the role local governments should play in service delivery, as it has both pros and cons (see the box).

Choosing a service delivery framework does not imply making a categorical choice between central or local government channels, or between state and non-state actors. Different actors can work complementarily following viable service delivery models. In fragile and conflict-affected settings, viability cannot be reduced to mere issues of cost-effectiveness, and standards applying to normal development conditions need to be adapted to the challenging situation. Choosing to support local governments in service delivery is first of all a strategic commitment to statebuilding. Building functional service delivery frameworks in these settings starts with reducing the duplication of responsibilities between layers of government and between state and non-state actors. Unclear legal frameworks and the use of parallel delivery systems entrench unsustainable de facto arrangements. Temporary solutions need to be worked out until service delivery can be re-organized comprehensively through sector-wide reforms and decentralization.

The challenge is how to achieve a better integration between the actors involved in service delivery from policy to implementation. It takes great efforts to do this in countries with little institutional capacity and politicized public administrations. Building a strong capacity of local governments to act as conveyers of local public action is effective in that regard. A number of context-specific considerations need to be taken into account when discussing the types of services most suited for local government responsibility in fragile and conflict-affected settings: (i) previous experience; (ii) existing capacity; and (iii) capacities of alternative providers (central government, civil society, etc.). Basic social services (e.g., health, education) usually need to remain more centralized given the high negative impact on the recovery of affected societies in case of local government failure. Services less demanding in technical and managerial skills (e.g., solid waste management) and services at the juncture of formal and informal institutions (e.g., land management), requiring a good understanding of local norms, are often more indicated for greater local managerial autonomy.

The importance of service delivery for state legitimacy is not just quantitative, but qualitative as well. Ensuring dignified treatment for all and certain quality standards is important in fragile and conflict-affected settings, just as it is in other contexts.a

THREATIC NOTE 4: Service delivery, many options to support a critical function

Involving local governments in the delivery of basic and social services in fragile and conflict-affected settings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pros</th>
<th>Cons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increases local ownership.</td>
<td>Danger of elite capture and use of service delivery for patronage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective action is encouraged and there is a stronger accountability to users.</td>
<td>Local service delivery plans are delinked from national policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local governments have a greater legitimacy than central governments to know and respond to local needs.</td>
<td>Priorities match very local interests rather than regional concerns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There may be lower quality standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordination of line ministry services at the local level by local governments is difficult to achieve when the latter are run as deconcentrated units of a particular line ministry (e.g. Ministry of Public Works in Iraq, Ministry of Municipalities in Jordan).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Services commonly delivered by local governments

- **Security, justice and safety:** community policing, traffic control, first instance courts, civil registry, mediation, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, disaster risk reduction, fire service, civil defense, property/land titling and dispute resolution.
- **Social services:** primary healthcare, hygiene and pest control, primary education, social assistance, culture and recreation.
- **Infrastructure:** local roads, sanitation, social housing, social and other public infrastructures.
- **Utility provision:** water, electricity, gas, others.
- **Urban services:** waste management, lighting, street and road maintenance, public transportation, building licenses, cemeteries.
- **Livelihoods and economic recovery:** agriculture, food security, markets, employment and skills training, job placement, business development support, income-generating investments, business licensing.
- **Urban planning:** land zoning, building permits.
- **Environmental management:** natural area protection, extractive industry licensing, environmental education, pollution control.

---

Following the last Intifada (2000-2003), Palestinian municipalities faced huge reconstruction costs. However, they were cash-strapped due to the economic crisis caused by the Intifada, which impeded the local population from paying local taxes and which nearly caused the bankruptcy of the Palestinian Authority at that time.

In 2008, UNDP started working with the Ministry of Finance and municipalities in Palestine to increase revenues collected through property taxes. A UNDP diagnostic study laid out an action plan for supporting government capacities for property valuation, while legal reform for more efficient tax collection and distribution was completed.

At the start of the project, only 26 out of 134 municipalities collected property taxes. Six years later, 66 municipalities were collecting taxes and tax returns jumped by 350 percent.

For every one U.S. dollar invested by donors, $25 in additional municipal revenues have been generated and are used for local development projects. Municipalities have also improved communication with the public on the purpose and use of property taxes. In 2013, a new legal framework, created through a broad-based consultative process, was ready, foreseeing a better distribution of tax revenues between richer and poorer municipalities.

**3.4 IMPROVING LOCAL FINANCES**

Without strengthened local finances, the capacity of local governments and local actors to produce peace dividends and restore confidence in a sustainable manner is seriously compromised. Local finances need to be supported both in terms of revenue and in terms of expenditures, with greater accountability in financial management of local governments and other local actors involved in service delivery and local development (Thematic Note 5 details the challenges of building sustainable local finances in fragile and conflict-affected settings).

In the immediate aftermath of conflict or in situations of severe deficiencies in core government functions – and in particular deficiencies in the public finance management that is supposed to redistribute public monies between the different echelons of government – the main priority for programming in local finances remains setting up viable funding mechanisms for local governments. This might be done through dedicated local development funds or through budget support to the national budget to increase intergovernmental transfers, if the national budget can absorb additional funds and channel them downward quickly, efficiently and fairly. Usually, the former option is the most pursued in fragile settings as the latter option is more complex; it requires in general heavy institutional engineering at the central government level and strong trust between the central and local levels that donor funding paid to the national budget for the benefit of local governments will effectively find their way to them.

UNCDF is UNDP’s partner of choice to establish Local Development Funds to finance local service and recovery needs. Local Development Funds are great tools to help build planning and project management skills in local governments as they offer direct incentives to local governments for improving their managerial performance. Within a Local Development Fund, funding windows may be created to support civil society projects or specific thematic issues (e.g. women’s empowerment, peacebuilding). Local Development Funds can be operated under direct, shared or local execution modalities. The latter, under which funds are remitted entirely to the local recipient (local government or local committee) who is responsible for all execution steps and financial reporting, has the greatest capacity-building impact and increases local ownership, but it is also riskier from a fiduciary point of view.

Local revenue generation from taxation and other sources is also a growing area of programming in fragile and conflict-affected settings – even if a recent one that still needs to be better researched and conceptualized. The small amount of financial and technical inputs needed to improve tax administration compared to the usually rapid increase in returns (see Box 14) makes it a very profitable investment for donors. Socially, taxation is accepted (if at a reasonable level and respecting social justice principles) when it can be directly related to service provision and improvements (see Somalia Case Study). The political feasibility might be more problematic as the biggest potential tax payers are also the more capable of corrupting the local leadership to win exemptions.

**3.5 FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE**

A necessary corollary to increasing local revenues is strengthening the integrity of local governments and fighting against corruption in local governance. Corruption at the local level can be widespread in fragile contexts, even more after a conflict when war economies still pervade local
A common complaint of local governments in fragile and conflict-affected settings is a severe lack of financial resources to sustain their operations, let alone invest in local recovery. In certain countries, civil society organizations and communities have easier access to external funding than their own local governments do. Traditional leaders, non-state armed groups and religious groups may also access revenues from informal taxes, links to illicit activities and/or foreign support. The lack of state funding to local governments may be explained by depleted national budgets and/or high fiduciary risks. It is also a means to control local autonomy and reward allegiance to the national leadership.

This is a catch-22: without sufficient financial resources, local governments cannot deliver the public goods that would prop up their legitimacy and feel little incentive to improve their accountability. Local governments can be reduced to playing only the role of brokers between funding sources (donors, members of parliament, etc.) and civil society organizations or community structures that are often more trusted and controllable by external sponsors. A big challenge remains nevertheless to secure sufficient and regular financing for local governance systems that would allow them to plan, budget and implement (with the population) the services under their responsibility and carry out local recovery plans.

In fragile and conflict-affected settings, the main source of local government funds remain state transfers. The nature of intergovernmental fiscal relations is a complex matter that is also very political, especially when the transparency of public financial management is not established. In such contexts, accusations that state transfers are based on political patronage or ethnic/sectarian preferences (e.g. Iraq post-Saddam) are not uncommon and potentially destabilizing.

A proper fiscal decentralization framework may take years to put in place. In the meantime, efforts must be made to improve the transparency of revenue-sharing between levels of government, the effectiveness of the transfer system and the financial management of local governments. A constant issue remains the excessive amount of funds allocated to running costs versus investments. Employment in local governments is often used by officials as a patronage tool, leading to bloated workforces of low-qualified staff with little performance incentives and prone to corruption.

Local government efficiency is also strongly tied to increasing local revenue generation through authorized local taxes, utility charges, service fees, income-generating projects and so forth. But in contexts of limited rule of law and minimal state transfers, local governments may be tempted to raise taxes for which there is no legal basis. Local revenue generation is an area still neglected by donors as the assumption is that with rampant poverty, lack of rule of law, weak administrative capacity and low state legitimacy, local taxation in fragile settings is not viable. Yet in countries where it has been supported, surprisingly encouraging results were met when the right mix of capacity-building of local administrations and incentivizing of citizens was meted out. Large cities in fragile settings may have a sufficient tax base to raise significant revenues through property and business taxes without endangering social justice.

Donor funding is critical for local governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings, but to this day, it remains primarily channeled through non-state actors or parallel systems (e.g. social funds). Yet, local governments can receive donor funds through project-based grants, Local Development Funds or through the state transfer system (budget support). The latter modality is the most effective for building capacities of the intergovernmental structure but not so useful for quick funding of local governments in situations of crisis.

Local Development Funds managed by an international agent (e.g. UNDP or UNCDF) are preferred by donors because they offer flexible funding modalities and often have an element of competitiveness (performance-based granting). Local Development Funds are considered essential tools for building local governance capacities and for the stabilization of conflict-affected areas.

---

Building the social contract through local taxes in Somalia

In 20 districts of Somalia, UNDP helped modernize local revenue management to support service delivery. District Councils identified revenue sources from markets, local businesses, livestock corrals and harbours. Simple revenue collection guidelines were developed and district staff kept track of revenues and expenditures, producing balance sheets for verification by council members and community platforms.

Since services, such as water supply, waste management and clean market spaces, that were absent before started to be provided as a result of the collection of local taxes, fees and taxes were paid in full by citizens.

UNDP helped modernize the financial accounting systems with IT solutions and introduced a GIS-supported property registration system to collect property taxes and boost local revenues.

A particularly effective incentive against tax evasion was devised: district staff would remove the door of a tax evader’s compound, shaming the evader in front of the community.

All in all, local revenues increased up to 300 percent between 2005 and 2012. Taxation helped re-establish trust between local governments and communities.

---

a. While formal taxation accounts for 14 percent of GDP in fragile and crisis-affected settings, informal taxation is more impactful to peoples’ lives. In many sub-Saharan African villages where state transfers never reach, local authorities collect and redistribute non-legislated taxes. Local strong men in such contexts often levy excess taxes for their personal coffers – particularly during periods of upheaval or conflict. (International Centre for Tax and Development, 2013).

b. In Kosovo, any administrative service required from the municipality is conditioned on presenting a local tax payment receipt.

c. In 2014, a block grant system rather than budget support was chosen by donors to support Jordanian municipalities hosting large numbers of Syrian refugees and on the brink of bankruptcy because of an increased service delivery bill.
Corruption cannot be eliminated at the local level through a localized strategy only—it requires a strong commitment and framework from the national level and concerted efforts of the international community to reduce perverse transnational incentives which keep the political elites at all levels of governance away from building effective public authority.

The effectiveness of local governments in providing public services depends on the integrity of their financial management and the use of local public funds in order to track possible corruption. Corruption at the local level does not exist; rather combating corruption demands a very good understanding of the social and political factors behind it. An ensemble of angles to approach the issue should be pursued: enforcement, internal capacity-building and external accountability frameworks. The high political risk of tackling corruption of local officials too publicly and upfront in fragile environments should not be played down, especially since the key players involved (local governments, local police and courts, local media, etc.) are often linked by strong patronage ties giving incentives not to address the problem forcefully.

Finally, guaranteeing free and fair elections at the local level in which informed voters can vote out corrupt heads of local governments are also a good deterrent to corrupt practices.

Possible activities falling under the broader entry point of local finances and anti-corruption are listed below:

- Establish Local Development Funds managed in partnership with central or provincial governments and accessible to local governments, civil society organizations, communities and the private sector in order to fund projects contributing to the provision of public goods and services.
- Support local governments to increase the generation of local revenues through:
  - diagnostic studies on the existing potential for local revenue generation;
  - capacity-building of the local tax administration system for valuation and collection;
- Public outreach campaigns to motivate citizens to pay their taxes, fees and fines;
- Support to legal reform to increase local revenue generation potential by local governments; and
- Sponsor social accountability initiatives to independently monitor tax collection and tax revenue use.

Consolidate integrity frameworks in local governance through enforcement and incentives:

- Conduct local corruption risk assessments (see the Toolbox at the end of this chapter);
- Establish Public Expenditure Tracking Systems (PETS) at subnational level to monitor on a regular basis the flow of resources from origin to destination and determine the location and scale of anomalies;
- Build local government capacities for accountable financial management and local council capacities for oversight;
- Strengthen intergovernmental internal control frameworks and procedures;
- Support social accountability initiatives led by local civil society organizations with community participation (see Chapter 4);
- Increase capacities of the local courts system to investigate and prosecute claims of corruption in local governments; and
- Build a culture among citizens of non-tolerance of corruption, through the school system or radio campaigns for example, and by framing the fight against corruption as well within the local cultural and religious value systems and citizen’s rights.

Ultimately, it is the combination of all such activities that can truly bring about change in local finances, both in terms of availability and transparency. For example, providing access to local development funding on the basis of performance and transparency of financial management creates strong incentives in local governments to apply better integrity standards. With an increase in availability of local finances and more efficient use, citizens see more services provided and stronger incentives thereof to comply with local taxation rules.
Examples of indicators for measuring results in building local capacities for service delivery

**ADMINISTRATIVE DATA**

- percentage of local governments in post-conflict situations with physical and human resources in place within 18 months to lead the design and implementation of early recovery efforts (UNDP SP 6.2.1)
- ratio of expenditure to budget allocation received at the subnational level (recurrent and capital) (UNDP SP 3.2.1)
- number of local governments with functioning planning, budgeting and monitoring systems (UNDP SP 3.2.2)
- frequency of use of gender-specific indicators for gender mainstreaming in local governments
- number of functioning public services managed by local governments (averaged between locations surveyed)
- percentage of locally-resourced revenues in local government yearly income
- percentage of local governments with yearly financial accounts approved by an auditing authority

**SURVEYS**

- percentage of individuals and businesses who paid a bribe to a local public official or asked for a bribe in the last 12 months
- percentage of individuals satisfied with municipal services
- percentage of women heads of departments in municipalities
- percentage of individuals who believe the services provided by local governments are accessible to them (by age, gender and other identity groups)

**Lessons learned and recommendations**

1. **EXTENDING STATE AUTHORITY DOES NOT HAVE TO BE TOP-DOWN** only (i.e. provincial level first, then district, then municipal). It should also be bottom-up and offer rapid support to the layer of local government closest to conflict-affected communities. The extension of state authority is also needed in informal urban areas.

2. **A BALANCE BETWEEN STRATEGIC AND ORGANIC CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT** needs to be maintained given the fluidity of the context. Capacity development activities for local governance actors need not, and cannot, always be strategic. Responding rapidly to a particular training need, for example, may build trust with local actors and lead eventually to more strategic interventions in the future.

3. **CONCERNS FOR COST-EFFICIENCY IN SERVICE DELIVERY SHOULD NOT OVERRIDE STATEBUILDING AND PEACEBUILDING IMPERATIVES.** Building an important role for local governments in service delivery will not be the most efficient method at first; what matters eventually is that cost-efficiency of service delivery by local governance systems increases over time.

4. **PATH DEPENDENCIES NEED TO BE RECOGNIZED.** The choice of a particular division of responsibilities during an interim period in post-conflict situations will deeply influence future service delivery arrangements. Over-emphasis on resorting to non-state actors and parallel systems during that period needs to be carefully measured against statebuilding objectives.

5. **BUY-IN FROM LOCAL LEADERSHIP TO TACKLE CORRUPTION IS ESSENTIAL.** Building too much pressure too soon on weak local institutions to perform with higher standards of integrity is counterproductive. Without buy-in, initiatives to support greater integrity may be compromised.

**Knowledge products**

**TOOLS**

- UNDP Guide to Measuring Capacity
- UNDP Users’ Guide to Measuring Gender-Sensitive Basic Service Delivery
- UNDP Guidance Note on Transparency and Accountability to Combat Corruption in Local Governance
- UN Global Anti-Corruption Programme portal
- UNCDF Guide to Best Practice in Local Government Procurement in Least Developed Countries
- Corruption Risk Assessments
- World Bank Public Expenditure Tracking Systems
- OECD Handbook on Contracting Out Government Functions and Services in Post-Conflict and Fragile States

**SUGGESTED FURTHER READING**

- UNDP, From Connectivity to Service Delivery: Case Studies in E-Governance, 2013
- UNDP, Fighting Corruption in Post-Conflict and Recovery Situations, 2010
- OECD, Service Delivery in Fragile Situations: Key Concepts, Findings and Lessons, 2008

---

a. Output indicators from the UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017 are listed when relevant.
Chapter 4:

VOICE AND PARTICIPATION
State institutions, whether at central or local level, do not become more responsive to societal needs just out of strengthened managerial and technical capacities. Responsiveness comes also in great part from accrued societal pressure to respond to its needs and aspirations.

**OBJECTIVE:** Local populations have access to more effective channels to carry their voices and participate in local decision-making.

Demands from society are not just confined to material goods and tangible services, but also include access to civic and political rights – being able to express an opinion, to complain about bad services, to be heard, to influence decision-making on matters that directly affect them and to be kept informed on what authorities do with the power delegated to them. Achieving these rights is a fundamental dimension in the long-term process of evolving out of fragility and conflict to resilient peace and sustainable development. Participation is also an important trigger for positive peacebuilding dynamics at the community level and it is usually the starting point, even if loosely structured and even in violent environments, to start solving problems collectively.

Supporting voice and participation in fragile and conflict-affected settings is also a means to help local governments harness the power of people through building and strengthening non-governmental and community-based organizations and networks. A strong and active civil society provides effective avenues for civic engagement but also helps local authorities to govern better. Local governments have it within their power to strengthen the voice and advocacy of their communities.

This chapter deals with building voice and participation of women and men into local governance so that it becomes more inclusive and accountable, and produces better development results for all. The chapter covers the entry points below.

- Building civil society capacities to carry voice and engineer participation at the local level.
- Establishing viable mechanisms to increase local participatory governance.
- Social accountability.
- Access to information.

**4.1 BUILDING LOCAL CIVIL SOCIETY CAPACITIES FOR VOICE AND PARTICIPATION**

Civil society organizations at grassroots level (taken in the widest sense of the term, hence including NGOs, community-based organizations, social movements, religious institutions, etc.) are sometimes the only trusted institutions in communities deeply affected by violence and the sole entry points to generate participation in peacebuilding, service delivery, recovery and other collective processes.

While the critical role that civil society actors play in mediating the relationship between state and citizens in general is well recognized by UNDP, in its local governance programming, UNDP has often failed to acknowledge where it is working in fragile and conflict-affected settings the lack of pre-existing capacities in local civil society to perform a strong advocacy and mediating role. Local populations may also not be perceiving local governance and participation as an important need, compared to their basic livelihoods and social needs. Hence building civil society capacities for raising awareness on the linkages between poor governance and lack of basic services is crucial. UNDP support to building civil society capacities in fragile settings needs to move to a system-based approach and maintain sustained engagement in this area, just like UNDP needs to embrace long-term capacity development strategies to reform local governments.

Possible **Activities** falling under this entry point are listed below.

- Rapid civil society assessments and mapping exercises (that can be complemented later by more in-depth participatory assessments) inclusive of a gender dimension (see Box 15).
- Civil society capacity development, based on strategic needs defined with civil society organizations during the mapping and assessment phase.
A UNDP study mapped the profiles and experiences of civil society organizations in Darfur, Sudan, which are in the unique position of providing services to local populations in the absence of a functioning state apparatus.

The study examined how civil society organizations were contributing to peacebuilding and advocacy. The study followed a highly participatory approach using individual and group interviews, workshops and surveys.

The main conclusions of the mapping exercise were:
- conflict led to the dramatic expansion in the size and scope of civil society organizations in Darfur (65 percent of them emerged directly as a result of the conflict);
- the organizations are highly centralised in urban areas in Darfur;
- the organizations are highly divided along ethnic, tribal, geographical and political lines;
- the organizations are mostly donor-driven and operating in the humanitarian sector, rarely in peacebuilding and advocacy - the latter being the focus of Khartoum-based civil society organizations working on Darfur; and
- most of the organizations (67 percent) have less than seven staff and/or volunteers.

Source: Mapping and Capacity Assessment of Civil Society Organizations in Darfur, 2009

---

**4.2 ESTABLISHING VIABLE MECHANISMS TO INCREASE PARTICIPATORY LOCAL GOVERNANCE**

UNDP’s role is to provide the technical engineering and process support to move from the concept of participatory governance to its concrete realization. This involves also, if necessary, advocating with local (and central) governments to obtain their genuine commitment to work with civil society since often in fragile and conflict-affected settings distrust is high among state institutions towards non-state actors and cooperation is limited.

Many possibilities exist for participatory governance mechanisms, falling broadly under four different categories: 1) information gathering and sharing; 2) consultation; 3) decision-making; and 4) dispute resolution. These areas do not exclude each other and participatory processes falling under them can be programmed simultaneously or as a sequence. One of the key concerns with participatory governance is whether it actually brings about increased inclusion of traditionally-marginalized groups, like women and youth or groups suffering from discrimination leading to horizontal inequalities, and whether it supports and complements, rather than competes and delegitimizes, political representation established through elections or other locally-legitimated processes. Participatory governance is not a panacea and the process of participation can lead at times to more exclusion than less. Also, the sustainability of participatory governance is often a problem when it is highly supply-driven. These issues are tackled more in depth in Thematic Note 6.

Possible **ACTIVITIES** that fall under this entry point are listed below.

- Capacity-building of local operators (NGOs, national consultants) providing the technical and managerial support needed by communities to adopt participatory governance mechanisms.
- Participatory needs assessments and participatory vulnerability mapping.
- Participatory action planning adapted to the local context (see Box 16).
- Establishing long-term participatory governance mechanisms linked to formal state institutions, for consultations, decision-making (on annual planning and budgeting, for example) and monitoring.
- Continuous capacity development and knowledge-sharing support to local governance actors for leading and innovating in participatory governance (including e-governance).
- Impact evaluation of participatory governance mechanisms on fragility and conflict drivers, including lack of inclusiveness.
Citizen participation is not an end in itself; it is a way to make local governance systems more accountable and inclusive, to defuse conflict and gradually transform local power dynamics. The assumption behind participation (or participatory governance) in fragile and conflict-affected settings is that it is necessary to instill or restore trust among affected communities towards the value of peaceful and inclusive collective bargaining and action. Participation can help undo prejudices and barriers that have formed between groups during the course of a conflict and cement a sense of shared responsibility with the state in preserving the common good.

Finding a rationale for participatory governance is not the issue, implementing it is more so. Recent researcha shows that participatory interventions in post-conflict settings are used mostly as a quick way of getting funds to the ground through community-driven projects. However, the ability of community-driven projects to build social cohesion or rebuild the state can be very limited because of the issues discussed below.

The antagonism between community-driven approaches and local governance approaches is still vivid. Pressured to deliver quick peace dividends with minimal fiduciary risks, donors skirt the rebuilding of local governance systems and do not take the time to design and test sound participatory processes. Instead, imported models that provide limited opportunities to rebuild trust between state and societyb are often pursued.

Participation does not equate inclusion. The capture of community-driven processes by (male) elites well-connected to political, social and economic power-holders interested in maintaining existing patterns of exclusion is frequent.

Community-driven initiatives usually limit themselves to supporting instrumental participation driven by ad hoc (short-term) objectives and rarely open opportunities for transformative participation that can lead to real social change.

Local state institutions are often reluctant to significantly and effectively engage in citizen participation, as they see it as a threat to their rent-seeking logic or their fledging political legitimacy.

Participation can exacerbate tensions between groups and state and society where high expectations for rapid change, reparation of past injustices and a rebalancing of power are met by a weak response capacity from institutions.

The recommendations below can be applied contextually to help better tap into the transformative potential of participation.

- Avoid simplistic dichotomies between supply and demand sides of governance. Instead, collective action bringing society and state together is needed (community-driven and local governance approaches need not be in opposition to each other).
- Supporting participation calls for a thorough understanding of local political economies to avoid participation agendas being overly built upon conflicting interests or producing unrealistic expectations.
- The participation of women can only bring tangible results for all women if efforts are exerted to transform the perception and attitude of local officials on women's issues. Increasing women participation is not enough.
- Effective collective action is built around broadly shared goals and continuous action, not around narrow self-help initiatives.
- Beware of creating a demand overload. Too much collective action in contexts of weak institutions and poorly structured civil society is counter-productive.
- Learn-by-doing. Over-prescriptive programming for participation in uncertain contexts is not likely to work.

Participation requires organic civic processes (not just external interventions), as a necessary counterbalance to state power.

Participation is most effective when it works within a ‘sandwich’ between the support from state institutions and bottom-up spontaneous civic action. Local decision-making needs to cater to the respective roles and comparative advantages of participatory and representative structures. The ballot box, though far from perfect, remains a more effective way of sanctioning unpopular policy choices or excessive rent-seeking by traditional or political elites than do informal forums of participation.

The role of UNDP should remain that of a sponsor and facilitator in participatory local governance, being the least prescriptive as possible. While day-to-day support to communities and local governments for setting-up participatory governance mechanisms is provided by local operators, who can be present full time, regardless of accessibility conditions, and who understand better the local cultural and political context.

---

b. According to the World Bank, participation is more effective where functional and strong state institutions exist.

---

Representation + Participation = Local Governance

Source: Adapted from IDEA, 2004
80

4.3 SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Social accountability is a specific area of participatory local governance which deserves to be treated on its own given that it directly leads to building trust-based state-society relations. Social accountability has tremendous potential for making local institutions more responsive to public needs. Social accountability relies on civic engagement, whereby ordinary citizens participate directly or indirectly in holding providers to account, for example by monitoring actions taken by the state to deliver services or execute local budgets. It is a natural extension of participatory planning and budgeting.

Thematic Note 7 unpacks the rationale for social accountability in fragile and conflict-affected settings within a broader objective of making local governance systems less corrupt. In such settings, the most common domains in which social accountability initiatives take place include policy formulation, the execution of local development plans and budgets, service delivery, peace and security agreements and natural resources management. Social accountability tools can also be used to verify, for example, commitments of local officials to increase women's participation in local governance and for pursuing more gender-sensitive local policies. Annex 4 provides an exhaustive list of potential social accountability mechanisms that can be promoted in local governance programmes in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

Possible activities falling under this entry point are listed below.

- Social accountability checks\(^\text{70}\) to identify gaps in local accountability systems and gauge the feasibility of social accountability initiatives.
- Advocacy towards local/central authorities and service providers to accept and support social accountability initiatives.
- Capacity development for communities, members of civil society organizations and local government officials on principles and methods of social accountability.
- Grant fund for social accountability initiatives.
- Support the emergence of national social accountability platforms.

4.4 ACCESS TO PUBLIC INFORMATION

Increasing access to public information is a fundamental condition for the success of all activities meant to enhance voice and accountability. Individuals, communities and organizations need timely, reliable and accessible information on a wide range of public matters affecting their lives. Without this, policies and budgets cannot be debated, projects cannot be monitored, marginalization cannot be substantiated by evidence, corruption can go unchecked and opinions can be manipulated.

Access to information is a key ingredient in building a more balanced relationship between state and society as it is a prime channel to create change in citizens'...
Corruption at the local level and the use of social accountability

International organizations and national governments are increasingly paying attention to the issue of corruption at the local level in fragile and conflict-affected settings. This arises from the realization that:

- improvements in peace are ultimately dependent on decreases in corruption;\(^a\)
- state failure at the local level due to high levels of institutional ineffectiveness (partly due to corruption) brings renewed conflict; and
- corruption in local governance endangers the outcome of decentralization reforms and defeats their very purpose.

Bringing government and decision-making closer to the people should make government more accountable to citizens. Yet, it often also increases corruption if the incentives are high (e.g. very low pay of local civil servants) and control systems are weak. In fact, in many fragile countries more corruption is thought to exist in local governments than in the national government.\(^b\) This situation is further compounded in countries with the characteristics below.

1. **Corruption and patronage are a central part of the underlying political economy.** In such situations, addressing corruption ultimately requires changing the underlying political settlement that drives it.

2. **The control and enforcement framework is weak.** It is difficult to tamp down corruption when a central government is unable to establish proper audit capacities down to the lowest level and/or the judicial system suffers from a sheer lack of investigative and enforcement capacities.

3. **The incentive framework is weakened** by a lack of credible electoral accountability in local governments, limited control of local councils over chief executives and a difficult operating environment for independent media and civil society.

4. **High levels of aid are available and/or there are vast unexploited natural riches.** These factors create opportunities for the misuse of funds and trigger high inflation, can breed resentment among populations and reduce local state actors’ interest and incentives to deliver public goods in an accountable way.

Building a truly independent and effective enforcement framework (e.g. an anti-corruption commission) is a long-haul effort. In the meantime, newly-established anti-corruption bodies rarely put fighting corruption among local governments at the top of their agenda when corruption thrives in so many other strategic sectors of the national budget and economy (e.g. customs, extractive industries, large reconstruction programmes).

The long-term investment required for institutionally-driven accountability to take root does not allow tackling effectively the short-term risk that corruption, in particular at the subnational level, remains a strong driver of fragility and conflict. This is why social accountability in fragile states is becoming an increasingly popular approach to fighting corruption at the local level. It also reinforces downward accountability of the state, which is critical to building trust and legitimacy. Social accountability is closely tied to the transformation of social relationships and structures of discrimination and marginalization. In fragile and conflict-affected settings, social accountability is particularly important to:

- monitor the implementation of peace agreements (including demobilization processes) and reparation programmes;
- measure the effectiveness of service delivery and job creation, in particular for populations marginalized or at risk; and
- pressure for increased transparency in the use of public finances for recovery (including aid) and the extraction of natural resources.

The many challenges to social accountability in fragile societies include:

- lack of independence of civil society from the local elite – the latter of which is the most prone to corruption;
- difficulty in mobilizing citizens due to security restrictions, lack of coherent civic leadership, limited access to information and often direct threats to watchdog organizations;
- difficulty for local civil society to secure funding and find the right staff, especially to stimulate collective action; and
- weak capacities of civil society and local governments to negotiate, design and implement social accountability initiatives.

Social accountability can also be a double-edged sword if local institutions are weak and lack legitimacy. Too much of it can be unhelpful when it creates unrealistic expectations from the public for rapid and drastic changes while local governments have limited capacity to effect such change. Support to social accountability should, therefore, be carefully balanced with support to local government capacities, including building their internal financial control systems. Also, social accountability cannot become an alternative to a failing judicial system. Reinforcing capacities of the administrative justice system at the local level, which citizens can use to denounce corruption and wrongdoing of their local governments and other local state institutions and seek redress, remains a necessity in any context.

---

\(^a\) Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015.


Photo: Lars Plougmann
attitudes towards, engagement in and ownership of development and governance processes. For instance, with sufficient and reliable information, citizens can:

- build realistic expectations on what institutions can provide and be informed on their plans and limitations;
- shape their opinion on the performance of local governments and their level of accountability and legitimacy;
- participate in an informed manner in political contests and other forms of civic and political engagement;
- understand the meaning of their citizenship, their rights and duties and those of the state – as well as its limitations; and
- handle peacefully their grievances and disputes.

Yet, freedom of access to information is a human right rarely fulfilled in many settings, let alone in fragile and conflict-affected ones, especially in remote communities, and certainly when there is a general lack of democracy in a country. Even in more liberal regimes, corruption and the fear of being held accountable may hinder the use of strategic communications and open government policies by state institutions, including local governments.

Even if regimes are keen on governing in a more open way, they may lack staff and technical capacities to devise communication strategies and tools. A capable local media that can convey timely and independent information on local affairs may also be missing. Broader socio-economic and cultural factors that create inequalities in literacy, education level, access to information and communications technologies and media sources between societal (e.g. women, youth, linguistic minorities), income and geographic groups (e.g. urban and rural areas) also explain why in fragile and conflict-affected settings reliable information can become a rare commodity for most.

In UNDP, access to information programming is sometimes disconnected from local governance programming and is instead relegated to short-term priorities linked to political events (e.g. elections, constitution-making). It is necessary to ensure that access to information at the local level is a key element of local governance programmes seeking to increasing participation and accountability.

Possible **activities** under this area of intervention are listed hereafter.

- Building strategic communications capacities in local institutions (including rule of law agencies, schools, etc.).
- Supporting civic education programmes on local governance, covering topics that include legislation, policies, plans and budgets used to manage local public affairs.
- Sponsoring public outreach campaigns driven by local coalitions on issues of importance to local peace and recovery.
- Supporting local media maturation and expansion, including community media and social media.
- Establishing e-governance and grievance-handling systems in local governments.

The **use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)** is not only relevant in fragile and conflict-affected settings to enhance certain local government functions and facilitate access to services, but also for easing access to information and supporting social accountability initiatives, and more generally voice, participation and conflict prevention across the board. This is true even in crisis countries where the mobile penetration rate may be substantial (for example, penetration stands at 50 percent in the DRC) – though limited broadband penetration in low-income fragile states still curtails more elaborate uses of ICTs in local governance. ICTs cannot remove institutional barriers to participation, but where access to ICTs reaches key thresholds, they can effectively capture a multiplicity of new voices, including from the marginalized, and can potentially open-up policy-making processes. ICTs are also instrumental to improving state capacity and making the state-society relationship more direct, functional and transparent. With the exponential advances in ICT capabilities in recent years, the concept of ‘open government’ is spreading fast and the creation of the Open Government Partnership, with which UNDP collaborates at global and country level, is an opportunity for central and local governments in fragile and conflict-affected settings to receive technical support in availing their governance to public scrutiny and taking a big step in building confidence in the state.

............................

71. For example, citizens of South Kivu Province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo used mobile texting to vote on pressing infrastructure and service development needs and after implementation used texting for monitoring and assessment. Nearly half of the country’s population has access to a mobile phone.

72. UNDP, Guidance Note on Democratic Governance, Conflict Prevention and ICTs, 2014.

73. Among the 65 signatory countries to the Open Government Partnership, eight can be considered as fragile or affected by violence or conflict, with the most notable being Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liberia and Sierra Leone.
Examples of indicators for measuring results in strengthening voice and participation

**ADMINISTRATIVE DATA**

- number of civil society organizations with an area-based mandate formally registered per 100,000 people
- number of local civil society organizations implementing local governance-related activities (including women’s organizations)
- percentage of local government units with recovery and development plans based on a participation assessment
- percentage of public membership (men/women/youth) in local civil society organizations engaging with local governments in participatory governance
- number of men and women who attended a participatory governance event for the first time in the previous 12 months
- number of local governments with institutionalized connections to citizen committees
- percentage of local governments that take measures to communicate their by-laws to the public
- trend in readership and audience of local media receiving capacity development support

**SURVEYS**

- level of awareness of communities on local recovery and development plans and results
- percentage of men and women aware of specific changes in local governance arrangements happening in their district
- percentage of men and women willing to scrutinize directly their local government’s performance

**Lessons learned and recommendations**

1. **DIVERSITY AND CONFLICT-SENSITIVITY MUST BE APPLIED CAREFULLY WHEN WORKING WITH LOCAL CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS AND THE MEDIA.** UNDP should not limit itself to articulate urban-based groups. Conflict-sensitivity calls for engaging organizations that cut across dividing lines and making efforts to represent marginalized groups. Organizations that are well connected to influential decision-makers, including non-state actors, but not necessarily elite-controlled, are particularly useful to bear greater results. Also, aptitudes to provide information adapted to the needs of different population groups (e.g. linguistic groups, youth, women, illiterates) must be supported.

2. **ROBUST OVERSIGHT OVER PARTICIPATORY PROCESSES** is needed. Parachuting participation and funds into communities with little monitoring can result in their capture by elites and failure in reaching marginalized groups. Monitoring the real impact of participation needs to be taken far more seriously, including by using new, more cost-effective ICT tools that can help enormously. Feedback loops on participation and redress mechanisms need to be created.

3. **VOICE AND PARTICIPATION INTERVENTIONS NEED LONG-TERM AND FLEXIBLE DONOR SUPPORT,** not project-bound assistance organized around rigid deliverables. Civil society organizations behave more organically than state institutions; the same applies to participatory processes and civic engagement. Programming must be driven by emerging opportunities and trends rather than the obligation to meet pre-defined results.

4. **YOUTH ENGAGEMENT AT ALL LEVELS OF VOICE AND PARTICIPATION PROCESSES IS CRUCIAL** as they are generally the best source of innovation in methods and tools. For example, youth inclination to use social networks provides powerful avenues to increase the reach of social accountability initiatives. More traditional forms of youth volunteerism and civic engagement are also important in contexts where technological constraints may exist.

5. **PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES SHOULD BE ISSUE-BASED AND NOT PROGRAMME-BASED.** Participation is costly, both time and money-wise. Local governance systems cannot afford establishing separate participation mechanisms for each donor or government programme. Lean, integrated and area-based participation architectures, organized around issues (e.g. social welfare, economic growth, youth, security) and used by all donors, are more effective.

**Knowledge products**

**TOOLS**

- UNDP Civil Society Organization Capacity Assessment Tool
- UNDP Users’ Guide to Civil Society Assessments
- UNDP Guidance Note on Fostering Social Accountability
- UNDP Practice Note on Access to Information

**SUGGESTED FURTHER READING**

- UNDP, Reflections on Social Accountability, 2013
- UNDP, e-Governance and Citizen Participation in West Africa
- UNDP, Mobile Technologies and Empowerment – A Primer, 2012
- CIVICUS, Civil Society Organizations in Situations of Conflict, 2011
Chapter 5:

MANAGING LAND, NATURAL RESOURCES AND LOCAL ECONOMIC RECOVERY
A more equitable, cost-effective and sustainable management of the public space, natural resources and other local economic assets that can sustain job creation and inclusive economic growth is critical to reduce drivers of conflict over time. Yet, in fragile and conflict-affected settings, institutional weaknesses and rent-seeking behaviours among power-holders usually impede such evolution.

OBJECTIVE: Risks of violent competition over land, natural resources, capital and jobs lessened by inclusive policies led by local actors.

Addressing spatial and economic determinants of inequalities in accessing services and livelihood opportunities, security and safety is critical in the pathway to societal resilience against violence and conflict. Most of these determinants are man-made and therefore can also be addressed by human efforts. This involves equitable planning and management of the access to and use of public spaces, land, natural resources and of the support provided to local economic actors. This is something that local governance stakeholders should be capable of doing better than outsiders and have a high motivation to achieve, given their intimate knowledge of the territory in which they live and from which they also draw their prosperity.

Inclusive local economic recovery and development in fragile and conflict-affected states requires enabling macro-economic policies and broader national development strategies, it also demands that local governance actors are capable of organizing and regulating equitable access to the economic assets of their territory. This requires, in particular, building viable local systems and capacities for integrated territorial development planning that link local economic aspirations and comparative advantages with sector-based strategies and available financial resources, and that reconciles the physical, human, institutional and economic dimensions of development at the level of a defined territory or area. This should take place through inclusive public-private collaborations. Much greater emphasis also needs to be put on supporting sustainable urban regeneration strategies in fragile and conflict-affected settings, as the potential of cities in such contexts to pull societies out of the vicious circle of poverty and conflict (and conversely, if neglected, to pull societies down) is often overlooked.

This Chapter covers the three entry points listed below:

- Spatial planning and territorial management.
- Local economic recovery.
- Natural resources management and extractive industries.

UNDP has extensive experience in integrated territorial planning through its global Articulation of Territorial Networks for Sustainable Human Development (ART) Initiative which supports sustainable local economic development (see Box 18), including in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

5.1 SPATIAL PLANNING AND TERRITORIAL MANAGEMENT

Links between sound territorial management, especially in urban areas and their outskirts, and peacebuilding and poverty reduction, are lately receiving greater attention. Indeed, the needs of human settlements in fragile and conflict-affected settings are massive and the use of space available for housing, working, producing, moving, accessing services, recreation and more, is profoundly affected by fragility and conflict. A poorly planned use of space for different human settlement needs and unfair distribution of space between social groups creates serious grievances that can lead

**BOX 18: UNDP’S GLOBAL ART INITIATIVE**

The ART Initiative (Articulation of Territorial Networks for Sustainable Human Development) is a global UNDP programme that promotes sustainable human development at the local level. Since 2005, ART has been working on enabling processes that improve the articulation between local, national and international levels. This is done to promote a more effective use of resources and foster sustainable partnerships between territories and development partners. To date, the ART Initiative has been active in 21 countries (including eight fragile and crisis-affected settings). Also, 1,600 decentralized cooperation partners and 40 regional networks have been mobilized through this process.

The ART Initiative approach activates an array of coordination and planning processes at subnational level and mobilizes local and external resources and partnerships. It facilitates dialogue among territories and creates mechanisms to boost local economic activities and expand competitiveness.

In line with the UNDP Local Governance and Local Development Strategy, the ART Initiative intends to enhance a territorial governance system, strengthening the role of local and regional authorities in local development. ART also promotes innovations, capacity development, best practices and knowledge-sharing by facilitating and creating the necessary links for South-South and triangular cooperation at the territorial level.
to violent protests and other forms of conflict. Failures in spatial planning also increase the vulnerability of human settlements to climate change and natural disasters. On a larger scale, disparities in access to services and investments for development between urban and rural areas can generate internal tensions and add fuel to underlying conflict trends.

Emergency spatial planning is usually one of the first steps taken in crisis contexts to deal with immediate issues, such as organizing housing for displaced populations or returnees and their socio-economic integration into urban spaces (e.g. Syrian refugees flocking to towns in Jordan and Lebanon), controlling haphazard reconstruction activities in cities heavily destroyed by war so that portions of the public space can be reserved for future strategic development interventions (e.g. Beirut, Kabul, Sarajevo), or rationalizing the expansion of basic service delivery in rural areas expecting rapid peace dividends (e.g. Timor-Leste).

For the longer-term, spatial planning is a powerful tool to introduce territorial development planning and guarantee a more equitable and sustainable use of space and natural resources that responds to the many needs of human settlements in fragile countries, which are often characterized by fast demographic growth and exploding urbanization. Spatial planning contributes to designing sound territorial management policies looking to achieve a more balanced development between urban, peri-urban and rural areas. Such balance can counter rural exodus and lower violent grievances among both rural and urban populations.

Spatial planning provides an integrated framework for assistance providers by linking housing needs with basic services and infrastructure and the essential recovery elements of environmental remediation and livelihoods. The process of devising spatial plans itself is a great vehicle for bringing together different local actors in divided contexts and helping them to build, through dialogue, a common vision for the territories they all depend on for their future. Also, territorial approaches allow zooming out from the community level to rationalize the sharing of space and resources at a more strategic level between small areas sharing the same resource base (e.g. bodies of water, watersheds, coastal areas, areas tied by similar economic value chain). By doing so, conflict drivers related to access to life-sustaining resources can be diffused.

Serious challenges, however, remain that affect the use of spatial planning, and more generally of territorial management approaches, in fragile and conflict-affected settings, as described below.

- The methodologies available for spatial planning are technically complex. The expertise and technology required, and therefore the costs involved, limit their use in such settings. More needs to be done to develop and disseminate low-tech approaches that can be quickly owned and operated by national and local actors.

- Given the complexity mentioned above, spatial planning is often introduced later in a recovery process (for post-crisis contexts). If introduced early and it takes too long to produce actionable results, the opportunities to use technical precision - with its leveling potential - to guide the reconstruction process can be lost.

- Spatial planning is commonly seen as purely a technical endeavour and treated as a top-down bureaucratic and technocratic exercise. It is not often enough viewed as a negotiated, broad-based attempt to define a common vision nourished by local aspirations. When seen as purely technical, the opportunity is lost to use spatial planning to advance a long-term aspirational vision (often based on very optimistic development scenarios) and to raise consensus in a non-threatening environment on realistic beacons for short/mid-term planning timelines.

Urban management is concerned with the day-to-day management and maintenance of built areas and their physical infrastructure in addition to the delivery of urban services (water and sanitation, drainage, solid waste management, road and street maintenance, public transport, traffic control, street lighting, etc.). In fragile and conflict-affected settings, urban management is often neglected (as is urban planning) and relegates cities to being harsh and chaotic places to live for the great majority of residents. Deficient urban management brings dire consequences when it is unable to reduce risks (including against natural hazards and urban violence) and does not react rapidly to early warnings of deterioration in a city’s functioning and to crises. (Thematic Note 8 presents the main challenges – and opportunities – of cities in fragile and violent contexts.)
Increasingly, urbanization, fragility and conflict are closely related. This phenomenon is reaching an unprecedented scale as over the next 25 years virtually all the world's population growth will be absorbed by cities in low-income countries, many of which are nowadays trapped in the fragility predicament. As demonstrated in a series of recent crises, violent civil conflict is often linked to state failures to provide security, growth and welfare in urban areas. Where such failures are further compounded by the very nature of urbanism and a lack of capacity and political will for planning and managing urban development. Moreover, civil conflicts tend to drive rapid uncontrolled urbanization, adding to existing urban fragility and conflict potential. This is how, for example, in the city of Homs in Syria, just one neighbourhood (Al Wa’er) saw a four-fold increase in its population in just a few months from people fleeing other parts of the war-ravaged city.

Also, cities, as centres of power, money and identity, create competition between groups over their control.

The chart below shows how poorly managed cities become drivers of conflicts and are vulnerable to external conflicts. This diagram could represent, in their time, Abidjan, Bangui, Kabul, Medellín – or Freetown (see Box on next page).

The reality of cities and fragility make some authors consider that “cities are where state-building projects in the developing world unravel rather than consolidate.” This calls for shifting priorities onto urban areas when working to improve local governance in fragile and conflict-affected states. If successful, such programmes can trigger a positive ripple effect on the entire country’s stability and prosperity.

Photo: UN/David Manyua

Smoke billows skyward in the aftermath of a June 2012 shelling in the city of Homs, Syria. (Photo: UN Photo/David Manyua)
Urban governance programmes should capitalize on the strong endogenous potential of cities to fix themselves, for the reasons listed below.

- **Politics in cities work differently:** their compact size and the mix of identities make elections more a test of competence in governance than a contest between different ethnic, religious-based or ideological narratives, as compared to that found at the national level or in rural areas. Officials in cities can be more easily held accountable than at the country level.

- **The concentration of different kinds of elites** (political, social, intellectual and economic) means also greater capacity to challenge the bargains on which the political settlement rests.

- **Inclusive institutions for managing political conflict** are more common in cities because of the concentration of diverse actors; cities become critical spaces for institutionalized forms of political debate and participation.

- **Cities are better at generating their own revenues** and are usually less dependent on foreign aid and state subsidies. The more a city depends on its own taxes, the greater the motivation to enhance services and invest in activities beneficial to its economy. In short, the better a city works, the more money it earns.

- **Improving services is easier in a city** than for a whole country, since there are fewer geographical, infrastructure and political bottlenecks. City administrations have easier access to qualified human resources and inter-governmental coordination is easier.

- **Urban economies generate more employment and profits** than rural economies; they lend themselves more to foreign investment and to the formalization of their economies.

- **Cities are cradles of innovation** in the political, social, economic and cultural fields. The regenerative capacity of cities following a conflict is higher than in rural areas.

In order to tap into the incredible potential of cities for statebuilding and political transformation, national and city governments need to be supported to devise integrated urbanization strategies that provide an enabling framework and a long-term vision for inclusive urban planning that increases universal access to services, supports economic growth and job creation, reduces socio-economic segregation and fosters human security. In particular, experience shows that the most far-reaching investments for strengthening fragile cities should involve measures to boost social cohesion and mobility, reliable public transportation, inclusive public spaces and pro-poor policies. In all of this, the use of information and communication technologies has an enormous role to play.

Given the complexity and urgency of urban situations in fragile and conflict-affected settings, a new model of urban management in crisis-prone contexts, involving a broad range of actors, needs to be supported.

---

**10 years after peace... is Freetown condemned to remain a fragile city?**

The capital of Sierra Leone, Freetown, houses about a quarter of the country's population. Most of this population are people who were displaced from rural areas by a devastating civil war. The displaced families settled in slums built on hazardous sites without access to any basic services. Consequences at times have been disastrous, as with the 2012 cholera epidemic that left hundreds dead and the more recent Ebola epidemic that started in 2014.

The country of Sierra Leone has experienced economic growth since the end of the war ten years ago, fueled by extractive industries. However, very few local jobs have been created. The majority of Freetown’s youth population are unemployed – a ticking bomb if nothing is done to support a diversified private sector and create more jobs.

Local economic growth in Freetown is constrained by a lack of investment in public infrastructure and services and the absence of urban planning. City authorities have limited revenues for investment as tax returns are affected by the growing informality of the local economy – itself a result of the absence of an enabling environment for the formal private sector. Thus, the vicious cycle of urban degeneration continues.

Source: UNDP Sierra Leone

---

Unsanitary living conditions pose multiple health risks and facilitate the spread of infectious diseases in the slums of Freetown, Sierra Leone. (Photo: UNDP/Dylan Lowthian)

---

c. Urbanism is defined as the economic, social and political effects of density, proximity, heterogeneity and interdependence (Crisis States Research Centre, 2014).
f. In towns of Sierra Leone, endogenous systems to handle conflict comprised of youth, women, men and elders appeared during the war outside of any government or donor influence; they helped create safer havens for populations in the midst of a terrible conflict (Vincent, 2013).
g. In Haiti in 2010, the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince generated 81 percent of all local municipal income in the country (UNDP, 2010). Lagos earns 75 percent of its income from local taxes and fees, while Nigeria earns only 20 percent of its national budget through taxation (Kaplan, 2013).
In crisis contexts, the possibility of planning and managing the use of space and natural resources for public and private purposes is highly constrained by unresolved claims and disputes on land use and property rights. In urban areas, reconstruction and transformation plans are confronted by de facto situations of ‘illegal’ settlements of displaced populations or economic migrants pushed into cities by conflict or poverty. Land (including water sources) and property issues are therefore critical to the goal of addressing the root causes of conflict and building resilient communities. Insecure land tenure, partly due to faulty legal frameworks but also to weak local administrations for managing land registration and disputes, is a major compounding factor for poverty. It is critical therefore to improve local capacities to build preventative and responsive systems of land and property rights management.

Possible activities falling under this entry point are listed below:

- Support to spatial planning capacities in crisis contexts, such as:
  - rapid land use mapping exercises to identify absorption capacity in situations of population influx (e.g. IDPs);
  - emergency support to city planning departments (including budget, staffing and equipment);
  - policy and legal development for long-term spatial planning;
  - capacity development of planning departments in local authorities;
  - procurement of GIS technology; and
  - facilitation of inclusive participation of communities and non-state stakeholders in long-term spatial planning processes.

- Urban management, such as:
  - supporting the capacity of planning and building licensing departments in city administrations;
  - setting up early warning systems to reduce overloading of municipal urban services (e.g. waste management, traffic control, public transportation, drainage networks);
  - upgrading municipal regulations and building codes;
  - improving local capacities for enforcing municipal laws (e.g. training of municipal police, field engineers, computerization of contravention systems, civic education campaigns);
  - devising cost-effective solutions to improve the delivery of urban services\(^75\), including making them more accessible to women and other vulnerable groups; and
  - defining service delivery quality standards in citizen charters.

Land management and property rights, such as:

- support local government and local court capacities to regularize/replace ownership titles lost during conflict;
- strengthening traditional land dispute resolution mechanisms;
- establish land conflict mediation centres;
- protect and increase women’s tenure rights;
- securing land rights for long-term IDPs and slum dwellers; and
- capacity development for land registration and cadasters.

For all of the above, it is essential to recall the global technical lead of UN-HABITAT\(^76\) and the opportunities for joint programming.

5.2 LOCAL ECONOMIC RECOVERY

Local economic recovery is closely related to spatial planning and territorial management. Indeed, economic recovery is conditioned by many interlocked variables; it cannot be planned in isolation from other recovery needs, such as security, health or education, and it depends heavily on available land, natural resources, public infrastructure, communications and urban services.

Local governments have a major role to play in linking spatial planning and local economic recovery, as they should be leading policy-making for both. More generally, local governments should have greater responsibility in fragile and conflict-affected settings in improving livelihoods and transforming local economies towards more inclusivity, more employment and resilience to shocks.

\(75\) UNDP in Jordan supports municipalities hosting Syrian refugees to expand and upgrade their solid waste management systems to make them more cost-efficient and environment-friendly. A focus is put on devising economically-viable recycling chains that can create jobs for host community members.

\(76\) See UN-HABITAT, Toolkit and Guidance for Preventing and Managing Land and Natural Resources Conflict, 2012.
find a way out of victimhood or armed violence and into economic reintegration in society. Local government capacities to fulfill such a role will bear directly on the capacity of local governance systems as a whole to reduce conflicts around sources of livelihoods. It is also essential that local governments play a role in gradually undoing war economies and in limiting the criminalization of local economies in the post-conflict period. This last objective is hard to achieve as in fragile and conflict-affected settings it is sometimes the very local government leadership that profits the most from illicit economic activities.

The role of local governments for local economic recovery77 is not always aptly recognized and supported by development partners and central governments, especially in immediate post-crisis situations where the priority goes to livelihoods stabilization. The marginalization of local governments in the initial phase of a local economic recovery process (Track A – see Thematic Note 9), can entrench a backstage role for local governments in the subsequent phases. Yet, with proper financial and capacity support, local governments in fragile and conflict-affected settings, in particular in urban areas, could perform a number of important functions in partnership with the private sector, civil society organizations and central government.

77. Local economic recovery encompasses the period stretching from early recovery (Track A) to the early stages of strengthening inclusive growth (Track C).
Local economies that fail to create sufficient livelihood opportunities for all, to reduce absolute poverty and to exploit natural resources sustainably and equitably exacerbate state and societal fragility. Local economies are also always the first hit by conflict, even if so-called war economies can provide temporary relief to some. Systemic fragility takes a huge toll on the potential for local economic growth.

In a post-conflict context, access to decent employment and economic opportunities is one of the most prized peace dividends – often above access to basic and social services. Holders of private capital who have the capacity to generate employment need a functioning public authority to provide security, public order and physical and financial infrastructure. They also need credible assurances that their benefits will not be arbitrarily taken from them. Therefore, the capacity of local governance systems to reshape socio-economic structures and processes so that they deliver inclusive livelihood opportunities and catalyze economic development is critical to recovery and resilience-strengthening. This capacity depends on the availability of a number of critical inputs that are usually in short-supply in fragile and conflict-affected settings, as shown in the diagram below.

The difficult road to local economic prosperity in fragile and conflict-affected settings

**THREATIC NOTE 9:** Local governance and the recovery of local economies

**INSTITUTIONS**
- Limited planning skills
- Limited public-private partnership experience
- Corrupt procurement
- Low number of support agencies

**INFRASTRUCTURE**
- Destroyed, obsolete or absent
- Poor road network
- Low connectivity

**SECURITY AND RULE OF LAW**
- Racketeering
- War economies
- High threat to business
- No litigation capacities
- Corrupt justice

**POLICY FRAMEWORK**
- Low incentives for investment
- No SME policies
- Not evidence-based

**INPUTS AND CONDITIONS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE LOCAL ECONOMIC PROSPERITY**
- and the corresponding challenges in fragile and conflict-affected settings

**FINANCES**
- Limited public/private investment capital
- Archaic banking system
- Capital flight

**MARKET LINKAGES**
- Supply and market chains disrupted
- Market shares lost
- Local consumption dropped
- No territorial integration

**COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT**
- Poor social cohesion
- Limited support networks
- Innovation not rewarded
- Lack of CSO capacity for LED promotion

**WORKFORCE**
- Loss due to conflict
- Indecent work conditions
- Low qualification
- Lack of vocational training

**LOCAL ECONOMIC PROSPERITY**
- ?

Local economic prosperity and the corresponding challenges in fragile and conflict-affected settings
This challenging context calls for an incremental approach to recovering and transforming local economies. The main difficulty remains sustainably moving away from a conflict-generating economic system rather than bandaging it with firefighting measures (e.g. food for work/cash for work, short-term MSME trainings). The process starts with stabilizing and recovering the ingredients needed for a sound foundation on which the local economy can grow in an inclusive manner (see the box below). The ‘local’ in local economic recovery or local economic development implies an approach consisting of:

- giving a voice to local stakeholders;
- valorizing local assets and resources of a territory;
- building upon traditional forms of cooperation and production;
- identifying and fighting vulnerabilities and exclusions;
- fostering resilience; and
- applying conflict-sensitivity in policy and investment choices made to support the local economy.

UNDP’s approach to transforming local economies in fragile and post-conflict conditions involves pursuing three interconnected tracks as shown in the figure below.

The underlying assumption is that the transition from unemployment to employment, from exclusive to inclusive growth and from a fragile to a resilient economy (capable of adapting to future stresses), is based on sustainable models of economic development recognizing and promoting a locality’s comparative advantages.

The multi-stakeholder nature of recovering and transforming local economies is critical first because neither the government nor the private sector can do it on their own; and second because it contributes to building a new local governance paradigm that promotes collective problem-solving. Civil society’s role is also essential for creating safety nets and diffusing the benefits of a local economic development approach down to the poorest citizens.

Local economic development strategies are far more successful if built as part of broader local development strategies carried out by local governments that link the social, economic, environmental and political development tracks together. In a local economic development approach, the state (central government, local governments and also semi-public development bodies) should play three fundamental roles:

1. convener of interested stakeholders to build a common strategy for economic recovery beyond competing interests;
2. inclusion broker to guarantee that economic dividends benefit those that need it the most because of their poverty level, the effect of the conflict on their well-being (e.g. widows, orphans, displaced, owners of destroyed businesses, ex-combatants) or exclusion status, all of which threaten local stability if not corrected;
3. redistributor that allocates public resources to support local economic development through infrastructure, business services, loans and grants, skills training programmes, etc. in a way that benefits all – including all sub-areas within a constituency – rather than a small elite and their particular economic sectors of interest.

Fulfilling these roles calls for major progress in local capacities to regulate, invest and correct governance faults, in particular the misuse of public funds. Building such capacities is very much the core of an integrated local governance programme and it will benefit all aspects of local development, not just the economic dimension of it.

---

b. Local economic recovery strategies are often hastily put together in response to crisis and may fail to recognize the need for an overall market-driven rather than supply-driven process.
c. Local economic development is typically an area of local development that needs strong support from central institutions, not just through the definition of enabling macro-economic and fiscal policies, but also through technical, marketing, training, infrastructure and financing inputs.
d. Chambers of commerce, business support services, regional development corporations, etc.
Support project execution capacities of local governments for infrastructure works essential for economic recovery (roads, electricity grids, water networks, markets, harbours, etc.)

Involve local governance actors in targeting conditional cash transfers and small business micro-grants for vulnerable individuals, including women heads of household, youth at-risk and ex-combatants.

Increase understanding of local actors on local economic recovery and development dynamics.

**Track B**

Support the leadership and coordination role of local governments in planning for local economic recovery.

Develop capacities of municipal business support services (licensing, tax payments, business standards, etc.).

Support local governments to implement employment and income-generation projects for specific groups (e.g. women, youth, IDPs)

Initiate the establishment of Local Economic Development Agencies for transitioning from local economic recovery to inclusive growth and institutionalizing multi-stakeholder coalitions around local economic issues. If a Local Economic Development Agency is already active in an area affected by political crisis or conflict (see Box 20), it should be involved in all stages of local economic recovery, starting from Track A.

Increase the voice and capacities of women civil society organizations to generate more economic opportunities for women affected by conflict.

**Track C**

Provide technical assistance and funding for productive infrastructure projects (e.g. business incubators, micro, small and medium enterprise parks)

Facilitate and provide technical support to conduct vocational and skills training programmes with local businesses for youth-at-risk.78

Offer technical assistance to local governments for improving their business environment policies (when the legal mandate to do so exists).

Develop capacities of small regions and cities for external investment promotion.

---

**BOX 20: THE NORTH LEBANON LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AGENCY**

Lebanon has long suffered the effects of war, instability and the resulting increase in poverty and regional disparities. This has considerably weakened the population on a social and economic level nationwide while impacting more broadly the most vulnerable groups of youth and women. With the massive arrival of Syrian refugees since 2011, the fragile political, social and economic balance of many Lebanese communities is being again upset. Poverty and social tensions are on the rise, at the risk of re-igniting conflict.

UNDP launched the ART-GoLD programme in Lebanon in 2007 with the objective of converting local governance actors into effective leaders of sustainable local development. The programme benefitted over 150,000 people in the four neediest regions of the country. These beneficiaries gained enhanced access to health care services, economic opportunities and local governance. The programme also helped set up the North Lebanon Local Economic Development Agency (LEDA) to support micro, small and medium enterprises, municipalities and cooperatives in strategy development, coaching, capacity-building, marketing and project financing.

The North Lebanon LEDA is now a prominent institutional actor in building socio-economic resilience in communities affected by the Syrian crisis. With UNDP assistance, the LEDA has increased its support to local governments, civil society and local businesses for dealing with the immediate consequences of the Syrian refugee influx. The LEDA also helps with conflict-sensitive strategic planning and project development.

**BOX 21: TAPPING INTO CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OIL SECTOR IN IRAQ**

UNDP in Iraq has been implementing a Local Area Development Programme in Basra Governorate in the south of the country since 2008. A major focus of the project is building local actor capacity for promoting and managing local economic development pathways.

The Basra Governorate is one of oil-richest areas of the country. Yet, unemployment figures remain high (11 percent) and are even higher among youth. A major hurdle in ensuring that more local residents find work within the oil sector is the lack of suitable qualifications. Also, local communities continue living deprived of quality basic services while a multi-billion dollar extractive industry is at their doorstep.

To remedy this situation, UNDP Iraq and Petronas/Shell Iraq signed a cooperation agreement in 2012 to:

- support local vocational training institutions (managed by the government) to better respond to the workforce needs of the oil and gas sector;
- promote the local micro, small and medium enterprises sector that Provide services to the large oil and gas sector companies; and
- assist local authorities to improve the quality of basic service delivery in Basra Governorate.

---

**5.3 NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES**

Natural resources play a critical role – positive and negative – on the pathway to resilience for many fragile and conflict-affected countries. Environmental degradation (and the food insecurity that comes as a result), energy scarcity and corruption in the exploitation and trade of natural resources and the distribution of rents all exacerbate or cause conflicts. If exploited sustainably and accountably, natural resources can provide much needed sources of local economic growth and job creation.
Traditionally, the management of natural resources is a function closely embedded in local communities. Yet, in growingly complex and open local governance systems that face, especially in fragile and conflict-affected settings, tremendous internal and external pressure on their natural resources, one cannot rely on local arrangements and traditions to guarantee a sustainable use of natural resources for the common good.

The world of extractive industries is a tough one for local actors. Newsfeeds are replete with stories of local activists and mayors trying to defend community interests in the exploitation of their natural resources by mining corporations but seeing their voices muted or even losing their lives. Weak local governments likewise have a hard time regulating mining, especially when local and incoming populations are impoverished and in dire need of a source of livelihoods. More often than not, local executives participate in the plundering and unsustainable exploitation of nature. The collusion of the extractive industry sector with parties to a conflict helps create monstrous war economies that have no interest in resolving conflicts.

However, increasingly, success stories are emerging in which development of the extractive industry sector has contributed positively to peace and recovery, and ultimately sustainable local development. International campaigns supported by more and more representatives of this sector have also helped raise the standards of this industry and shed light on its harmful practices. Support is growing for greater involvement of local communities and institutions in regulating the access to resources and receiving benefits from their exploitation.

Local governance actors can play an important role in the management of natural resources in their territory by:

- defending local livelihoods, environmental needs and cultural norms when negotiating access to natural resources;
- organizing community participation, both men and women, in the management of natural resources;
- obtaining sufficient compensation in the form of leases, taxes and funding for local community development from extractive companies;
- promoting local employment in the extractive industry sector through policies and programmes that build a skilled local workforce; and
- investing their own resources and attracting themselves the external capital needed to develop the local extractives sector.

In its Strategic Plan 2014-2017, UNDP has prioritized the development of sustainable solutions for the management of natural resources at national and subnational levels. To that end, UNDP must support local actor capacities in fragile and conflict-affected settings to transform the management of natural resources from a threat to an opportunity for local development.

Possible activities under this entry point are listed below.

- Develop local capacities for promoting community involvement in the management of extractive resources, including the ability to hold local dialogue platforms with the extractive industry sector and to conduct participatory social and environmental audits.
- Support local authorities to devise and enforce environmental and social safeguards through local regulations.
- Maximize the capacity of local authorities to extract revenues and benefits for the local economy from the exploitation of their natural resources.
- Support initiatives that increase the protection of vulnerable groups (e.g. indigenous populations, women) in extractive deals and the benefits these groups derive from them.
- Increase dialogue and coordination between local governments and central government institutions or independent authorities in charge of environmental protection and the regulation of extractive industries.

79. For example, the Kimberly Process (diamonds), the Voluntary Principles on Human Rights and Security (oil, gas and mining) and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (mining, hydrocarbons, forestry).

80. See Output 1.3: “Solutions developed at national and subnational level for sustainable management of natural resources, ecosystem services, chemicals and waste.”
### Examples of indicators for measuring results in improving local management of land and economy

**ADMINISTRATIVE DATA**
- number of local governments equipped with spatial plans regulating land use for diverse human needs
- number of cities with guidelines and tools for emergency urban planning (including housing absorption maps)
- number of cities with urban development strategies
- percentage of land disputes referred to local institutionalized channels effectively solved (versus through other channels)
- number of local governments with policies, systems and/or institutional measures in place to generate employment and livelihoods
- number of local governments with policies and institutional frameworks in place for conservation, sustainable use and access and benefit sharing of natural resources, biodiversity and ecosystems (UNDP SP 2.5.1)
- number of sustainable local jobs created through extractive industries, by gender and age
- number of local MSMEs supported as a result of local economic plans, by gender and age of owner
- number of local public-private partnerships facilitated
- amounts of tax revenue generated by extractive industries made available to local governments’ budgets

**SURVEYS**
- level of awareness among local communities on contracts and revenues related to the commercial exploitation of natural resources in their locality
- percentage of families under the poverty line with secure tenure rights on their housing or farming land (recorded by male-headed and female-headed households)
- percentage of population consulted by local governments on needs to improve their livelihood sources.

### Lessons learned and recommendations

1. **LOCALIZE DEVELOPMENT PLANNING TO BUILD A COHERENT NATIONAL PROJECT.** Localities do not develop or achieve resilience in isolation of others. Spatial plans should not boil down to a collection of disjointed small-scale plans but stress the interconnectedness of territories. For instance, rural communities can be grouped into agro-ecological units, neighbourhoods into sustainable cities, cities considered with their outskirts, networks of cities pooled into vibrant economic regions and regions into countries. Spatial planning supports nation-building by subsuming particular interests into a larger vision.

2. **MANAGE SPACES TO REDUCE INEQUALITIES.** Tensions arise in cities when fragmented urban space leads to social and economic marginalization of the majority, and when politically biased redistricting practices appear. Visible and invisible boundaries that maintain unequal access to opportunities and segregate needs must be broken down.

3. **RULES-BASED LOCAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL PRE-CONDITION FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY.** Evidence shows that positive informal relationships between owners of capital and local governments can help boost investment in the short term; more inclusive and institutionalized arrangements are needed to sustain growth in the long-term.

4. **EARLY SUCCESSES IN LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN REPLICABLE SUCCESSES.** Supporting the creation of a few hundreds MSMEs as a means to stabilizing livelihoods in a crisis-affected area is relatively easy; however, multiplying this 10- or 100-fold cannot happen without a strong national policy framework including sector strategies and empowerment programmes (e.g. youth, women, ex-combatants).

5. **STRONG VERTICAL POLICY INTEGRATION** is essential to sustain local economic development dynamics. Local governments need bargaining power to demand macro-economic changes, large infrastructures, accrued fiscal decentralization and a coordination role over the implementation of centrally-funded employment and economic development schemes. The ART Framework Programme is a very useful tool to support the consolidation of separate local economic development initiatives into a more coherent whole under the helm of local governments.

### Knowledge products

**TOOLS**
- UNDP Guidance Note on Urban Governance for Sustainable Development
- UN Habitat Urban Governance Index
- UNDP Guide on Livelihoods and Economic Recovery in Crisis Situations
- ILO Local Economic Development Operational Guidelines in Post-Crisis Countries
- UN Toolkit and Guidance for Preventing and Managing Land and Natural Resources Conflict

**SUGGESTED FURTHER READING**
- Issue Papers for the HABITAT-III Conference (Quito, 2016)
- ARUP, City Resilience Framework, 2014

---

Chapter 6: LOCAL POLITICAL PROCESSES
To achieve a shift in the way public authority is exercised at the local level, and so that patterns of discrimination and exclusion are lessened, inclusive local representative bodies legitimized by the free-willed and equal-weighted choice of all adults in the society need eventually to be formed and function effectively.

OBJECTIVE: More inclusive representation in local polities achieved through peaceful and credible political processes.

When state legitimacy is strongly challenged and political processes are not trusted or nonexistent, power at the local level is often carried out via systems of representation and leadership that, while they may not comply with democratic standards, nevertheless hold legitimacy among society and guarantee a certain stability. However, such systems also tend to marginalize important segments of society, starting with women. If local public authority can gradually be made to function more inclusively and accountably, patterns of inequality that can or have already fueled violent protestation may be undone.

The only political system that guarantees, in principle, inclusive representation is the one based on open and competitive electoral processes. Such processes allow aggregating interests in society along lines not necessarily tied to social or cultural determinants or patronage networks (the latter being all too common in fragile and conflict-affected settings). Elected political representation remains, therefore, a central feature of building local institutions that can manage crises and guarantee a more equitable delivery of public goods and services.

While strengthening local political processes helps bring about more equitable societies, it is not the only variable. Indeed, and particularly in fragile and conflict-affected settings, underlying networks of power and influence maintained by state and non-state actors outside of the reach of local elected bodies and of the programmatic interventions of external actors who seek to support them, will remain. These undercurrents can work against the concept of inclusive local governance.

Electoral representation always works better when combined with other, more direct and less formal types of participation that provide checks-and-balances on local politicians and increase the voice of the most marginalized. While Chapter 4 covered rebuilding state-society relations using participatory governance approaches, Chapter 6 focuses on representation at the local level through political processes with the goal of supporting the transformation of local governance towards more inclusivity, tolerance and stability.

Component 4 covers the entry points below.

- **Promotion of inclusive politics.**
- **Local electoral processes.**
- **Parliamentary development in local representative councils.**

### 6.1 PROMOTION OF INCLUSIVE POLITICS

Supporting the development of local level political structures is important to help local governance systems evolve from patronage and kinship-based systems (that tend to produce local authorities less responsive to incentives for greater inclusivity and accountability) to issue-based polities (that give rise to inclusive representation and genuine electoral contests). This is not a straightforward process, however, as political parties in conflict-affected societies may be entrenched along divisive communitarian lines. Especially at the local level, political parties may actually amplify exclusionary decision-making and complicate reconciliation after a conflict.

If external support is accepted, and can be provided impartially, the goal should be to bring results in three areas: rules of the game, capacities and attitudes.

- In terms of **rules**, dialogue is necessary to build consensus around the desired forms of political representation at the local level and how to achieve them. In fragile and conflict-affected settings, political parties may be reviled at the grassroots as they are often considered the source of the problem (for example, when a national crisis evolves out of the greed or
Local politics in Palestine are still characterized by informal power networks, patronage and clientelism. As a result, people show little interest in local governance. For example, in the 2011 local elections, only 90 out of over 300 Local Councils were elected; the rest were simply proclaimed for lack of contestants. More worryingly, 73 percent of Palestinian youth are very distrustful of political factions and their role in governance (2013).

Thanks to a civil society initiative supported by UNDP, 24 Youth Local Councils have been established since 2009. These Councils are voluntary bodies elected by youth to mirror the official Local Councils. The Youth Local Councils provide a platform for representation of youth in local governance as they participate in decision-making with the Local Councils on all matters affecting youth.

The Youth Local Councils are also a channel for mobilizing youth on community issues. In 2013, UNDP supported four Youth Local Councils to carry out social accountability initiatives that pressured local governments to improve service delivery.

Beyond the immediate results achieved by these Councils in terms of local governance and service delivery, they also incubate a new generation of Palestinian politicians that have experience upholding democratic governance principles.

In terms of capacities, local political processes need candidates. Candidates may be independent – which is common at the local level in any setting – or belong to political parties. Parties, therefore, need functioning structures at the subnational level and an increased presence and capacities across a larger number of constituencies. They must be able to enroll memberships, select candidates and prepare them for electoral contests.

In terms of attitudes, civic education is required to foster a better understanding among the electorate of the roles and necessity of political parties, candidates (who can be independent) and elections.

Ultimately, supporting local political development, in particular outside of large urban centres, contributes to linking local and national politics, a prerequisite for building a more coherent and cohesive state. National political parties are often less subordinated to communitarian lines, however, barriers to political development at the local level are numerous. Political parties may have trouble taking root outside of main cities, especially opposition parties and new entries into the game, because they often have a thin membership and resource base, especially after a conflict or a long period of one-party rule. Limited means of information dissemination in low-income countries, and in rural areas in particular, further constrains the capacity of national-level parties and politicians to make themselves known to a wider share of the population. In fact, regional or locally-based parties, responding to more narrow interests, often dominate in local elections in fragile and conflict-affected states.

UNDP does not usually become involved with the full spectrum of support to political party development. It leaves the strengthening of core capacities in political parties to other actors, and certainly does not provide party funding. When active in this area, UNDP focuses on interventions that help increase the representation of excluded and marginalized groups as well as the holding of peaceful political contests.

Possible activities under this area of intervention include:

- support to organizing local political dialogue processes, especially with informal leadership representatives;
- civic education on political processes, political parties and basic freedoms;
- provision of facilities and logistical means for political parties and candidates in remote areas;
- training for electoral campaigning and supporting transparent campaign finance management during local elections;

81. Several countries ban political parties from local contests, allowing only independent candidates. This was the case for Rwanda until 2007, with the official explanation being that the people stood against all parties who had a role in the 1994 genocide. In practice, this allowed local strongmen to capture a majority of seats (Lutz, 2005).

Politics at the centre still catch the limelight in peacebuilding and transition processes. It is often assumed that an elite-based or inclusive-enough settlement negotiated by national actors will naturally be supported by subnational politics. The complexity of local-level politics, often deeply intertwined with informal institutions for which anthropology is more useful than political science, runs counter to the pressure to deliver results under which international sponsors of post-conflict settlements operate. Supporting local governance in such settings often then becomes reduced to building a bureaucratic machinery to help peace dividends trickle down (e.g. Timor-Leste 1999 – 2002) and little effort is made to assist transformative politics at the local level. Often, local elections are the last priority on the transition road map, when they happen at all (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq), as they could upset fragile ‘secondary’ political settlements with local warlords, criminal gang leaders or tribal chiefs. Elsewhere, local politics are simply neglected because local governments are seen as powerless: the stakes are too low to mobilize voters. Nonetheless, local politics in fragile and conflict-affected settings are not just the local translation of political processes taking place at the top, they present real specific characteristics that need distinct policy responses.

The table below provides a more detailed review of local politics in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who</th>
<th>How</th>
<th>Where</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political parties are usually poorly represented outside of cities and prefer to co-opt local strong men as candidates rather than search for new local political talents. After elections are held, political allegiances wane and individual survival strategies dominate. Where people have been traumatized by political violence or excessive corruption, traditional parties may be rejected outright and independent candidates or ‘apolitical’ movements preferred. Traditional leaders often maintain a strong legitimacy and power base, not conferred by democratic elections, although they would most probably run in local contests to increase their hold on power. If barred by law to do so, members of their patronage networks would run as proxies. Civil society actors are often political at the same time, including old guard politicians looking for a new depoliticized legitimacy, genuine rights activists, former combatants or popular movements aligned with major political forces. The line between civil society and political society is blurred. Non-state armed groups may remain a major source of political power at the local level, even after a settlement. They can remain influential while staying out of the state structures. In the long run, their survival as a political force may depend though on their capacity to join the formal polity. In the aftermath of conflict, local councils can be formed through elections or caucuses, but are often at first self-nominated or appointed. Such transitional structures can remain in place for years (Iraq). Local elections may also be run first outside of a legally-defined framework (Libya), or only held in certain parts of a country (Palestine, 2005) or only for certain levels of the subnational governance system (Haiti). The powers of local councils will vary according to the level of decentralization and the local political culture. In fragile settings, local councils tend to be marginalized by local executives (mayors, governors) and/or traditional leaders and/or armed groups. They suffer from poor logistical support, unclear definition of procedures and limited qualifications of their members.</td>
<td>Local political systems vary greatly between and within fragile states: • Urban areas: political power is more formal in cities, with active political parties and more assertive local councils. Also, women have better political representation in cities. Urban politics are more connected to national politics and prominent local politicians may use local offices in large cities as a springboard to national functions. • Strength of the state: the weaker it is, the less ‘formality’ in local politics. • Decentralization: raises the stakes and profiles of local elected office, generates more formality in local politics and participation. • Electoral systems: proportional representation favours party-based politics while majoritarian systems favour individualized politics. Whether the chief executive is directly elected or not has a strong influence on local political processes. • Level of local governance: the closer to the grassroots, the more informal the local politics. • Conflict history: highly destructive conflicts increase the weight of informal political actors in the conflict aftermath. • Rule of law: insecurity increases the weight of non-state armed groups and threatens emerging political actors. • Displaced and returnee populations: may upset a fragile political balance (Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lebanon, Timor-Leste).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. As of 2014, district and sub-district council elections in Iraq have not yet taken place, more than 10 years after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime.
b. The average turnout during Haiti’s 2007 local elections was 35 percent, but as low as 19 percent in the capital Port-au-Prince.
c. Civil society organizations and civic movements are allowed to register as electoral contestants at the local level in a number of countries.
BOX 23: UNDP’S APPROACH TO ELECTORAL VIOLENCE MITIGATION

To tackle the enabling conditions of electoral violence at the local level requires addressing important drivers, such as real and perceived electoral fraud, patriarchy, a belief that politics is merely a mechanism for solidifying business interests and ethnic, religious and socio-economic conflicts and grievances.

Actively engaging civil society and the media are vital for mitigating electoral violence. This can be done through advocacy campaigns and public outreach as these have the potential to either inflame or cool friction.

One method used by UNDP is to create conflict management panels in which mediators drawn from respected community and religious leaders, lawyers, etc., that belong to different ethnic and religious groups, as well as youth, women, civil society actors and academics are identified by political stakeholders. These Panels can play an extremely positive mitigating role in many volatile electoral contexts and should be established for the entire electoral cycle in places were risks are deemed high.

UNDP has also found that non-partisan citizen observation of local elections helps in some difficult contexts with the acceptance of results. At the same time, support is often needed for control functions, such as electoral dispute resolution mechanisms and security maintenance institutions. Guaranteeing that the same level of attention is given by these bodies to local elections as to national elections, and supporting them equally for both types of events, is critical.

- supporting the active participation of women, youth, demilitarized combatants, minorities and other disenfranchised groups in political parties and processes, through policy reform (e.g., quotas in party primaries), capacity development, caucus building, advocacy campaigns, etc. (see Box 22); and

- supporting platform-building by educating local political leaders on local governance and local development issues.

6.2 LOCAL ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Holding credible and inclusive local elections remains a major test for the level of inclusivity of local politics in fragile and conflict-affected settings, especially after a conflict or during a political transition. The results of local elections can have greater consequences on the daily lives of citizens as compared to national elections, especially when local governments are endowed with significant mandates, capacities and resources.

Yet, in many countries, and in particular in fragile and conflict-affected settings, local electoral contests attract lower voter turnouts than national contests and referenda. This can be explained by a number of challenges applicable to local elections in such contexts: (i) the low credibility of the process, especially when local elections are organized by other institutions than the electoral management body organizing national elections; (ii) more complex operations given the high number of candidates, constituency-specific nature of local elections and multiple electoral events that may be held on the same day (e.g., provincial, district, municipal); (iii) contestation of constituency boundaries, especially after a conflict, where new local governance units appear but are not sanctioned by law and old ones are rejected by voters; (iv) lesser availability of external support than for national elections; and most importantly (v) high risks of electoral violence, as certain candidates may have direct links to non-state armed groups or these have an interest in spoiling the process and maintaining instability.

As the focus of this Chapter is on making local politics more inclusive, it is critical to increase opportunities for marginalized groups to participate in local elections as voters and candidates. To this end, a few main elements (listed below) should be considered.

- **Electoral quotas:** Legislation guaranteeing seats to women has been chosen by several countries to increase gender balance in local legislatures and they may also exist for other groups (religious minorities, lower castes, indigenous people, youth, etc.). Quotas are effective at increasing the representation of specific groups in legislatures and can break down prevailing stereotypes. They also provide an incubator for new political leadership. However, lasting change requires that quotas remain in place long enough for deep-seated perceptions and social norms to change.

- **Voter turnout:** Women’s turnout in elections remains lower than that of men in general in emerging democracies and in particular in fragile and conflict-affected settings. This applies to 

83. In some cases, elections for the lowest level of local government may be entirely community run, falling outside of any formal legal framework.

84. Examples: Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Kenya, Pakistan, Peru and Serbia. In Serbia, the 2002 Law on Local Elections set a 30 percent female quota on party lists; as a result, women won between 15–25 percent of contested seats in local assemblies (Mnevic, 2009). In Kenya, the 2010 Constitution enforces a minimum 33 percent female representation in County Assemblies.

85. Evidence shows that women are more likely to run for seats not controlled by quotas once they have had some experience on a quota seat (IDS, 2010).
as well to local elections.\textsuperscript{66} The same can be said for other marginalized and minority groups in different contexts. Different factors prevailing in these settings can explain this: cultural conservatism, insecurity, lower literacy, lack of adapted voter information, higher rate of deprivation of identity papers, lack of candidates representing their interests, etc.

- **Participation in electoral management**: Increasing the role of marginalized groups in the management of local electoral processes should have a positive effect and help ensure more inclusive elections. Yet, gender mainstreaming policies (for example) within electoral management bodies focus mostly on the national level. Even where policies for increasing the diversity of staff and management structure are officially parts of an electoral management body’s strategic plan, application is usually slow.

- **Access to fair electoral justice**: Candidates from non-traditional categories (i.e. not middle-aged men) not only have a hard time winning over party nomination processes (even with the help of quotas), but also often face bias in electoral tribunals. Legal aid support to candidates from marginalized groups in electoral disputes can increase their chances of success.

Possible **activities** falling under this area of intervention include those listed below.

- Policy and technical advice in the design of regulatory frameworks for local elections, especially when rules governing local elections are defined and implemented from the subnational level.

- Capacity-building of electoral management bodies in charge of local elections.

- Operational support to local electoral processes (usually done in the context of broader electoral assistance programmes to national electoral management bodies).

- Support civil and voter registry operations (if distinct) before local elections, including campaigns to facilitate the registration of marginalized groups who are known to not have high voter turnout.

- Conduct voter education campaigns using low-cost tools (given the smaller budgets usually available for local elections).

- Facilitate the training and operational needs of local election monitors.

- Implement special integrated programmes (legislation, capacities, advocacy) for increasing the vote of marginalized groups.

- Work with civil society, traditional leaders and media actors to conduct electoral violence mitigation activities (see Box 23) based on risk evaluations made during programme assessments.\textsuperscript{66}

### 6.3 **Parliamentary Development in Local Representative Councils**

Building capacities of local councils to function as parliamentary institutions is the last building block for strengthening the inclusivity of local political processes. The UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017 (Output 2.2) underlines the need to enable parliamentary bodies to perform their core functions of accountability, participation and representation. This objective is relevant for elected councils at any sub-national level in fragile and conflict-affected settings, but emphasis in such contexts, when peacebuilding and statebuilding are first priorities, needs to be put on the following capacities: (1) the peaceful management of conflicts at the local level; and (2) the rebuilding of popular trust in local authorities.

Below are a few important characteristics of local councils that need to be understood when programming in this area.

- The smaller size of local councils gives them an advantage in conducting effective negotiations and building compromise. However, this small size can also work against a good-enough representation of various interest groups, including minorities, women and youth – an issue that can be exacerbated by the choice of majoritarian electoral systems without quotas.

\textsuperscript{66} In South Africa, the disparity in voter turnout between local and national elections was so high (48 percent local compared to 89 percent national) that the Independent Electoral Commission partnered with municipalities for awareness campaigns targeting primarily women, the biggest consumers of municipal services (sadelivery.co.za/files/back_issues/delivery/Edition4/elections2507.pdf). In Sierra Leone, quotas and civic education helped achieve 15 percent female representation in local assemblies in 2008 (www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/publications/201012WomenElectionsViolenceWestAfrica.pdf).

\textsuperscript{67} Local radio stations’ incitement of violence in Rwanda in 1994 and Kenya in 2007-2008 is well documented; similar patterns were reported during the Côte d’Ivoire post-election violence. In South Africa (1999), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1996), Lesotho (2002) and Zambia (2006), trained mediators were used during elections and even afterwards to resolve community disputes, including household conflicts, land disputes and other problems at grassroots level.
Local councils in post-conflict contexts may receive little guidance from central government on rules and procedures that favour consensus-building (e.g. by systematically using sub-structures in which minority representation has a better chance to be heard).

The inherent proximity of local councils to their constituents favours moving disputes quickly to the local political arena rather than leaving them to fester in the ‘battlefield’. Yet, local constituencies can also cover large swathes of territory with difficult access to many sub-areas (e.g. Afghanistan, the DRC, South Sudan) or local councils may only be present at the intermediary level (e.g. Iraq), rendering outreach by council members to their constituents more problematic.

The relationship between local councils and local executives has great bearing on their conflict management capacity. In many fragile and conflict-affected settings, local executives (mayors, governors) keep a dominant role, even for conflict management, and marginalize local councils.

Limited administrative support to local councils, which often have no or very limited dedicated secretarial capacity, thwarts their maturation and effectiveness.88 Possible activities falling under this area of intervention are listed below.

- Enhance conflict-solving skills of local councils through the design of appropriate rules of procedures and skills training.
- Provide capacity-building and logistical support for better oversight functions, including secretariat services (especially at provincial and regional level).
- Strengthen public outreach capacities to encourage interaction with and reporting to constituencies.
- Support the effective representation of marginalized groups and of their issues on legislative agendas through capacity-building of local council members, caucuses, policy-making tools (e.g. gender-sensitive budgeting), and more.

---

88. Dedicated administrative and technical support is particularly important, and usually feasible, for governorate and provincial councils that have larger numbers of members; unfortunately municipal and village councils cannot as easily justify such support.
Examples of indicators for measuring results in promoting more inclusion in local politics

**ADMINISTRATIVE DATA**
- number of parties running in local elections that have candidates from a variety of identity groups
- percentage of women running as candidates in last local elections
- voter turnout in the last local elections, disaggregated by gender and age
- number of violent incidents in the last local elections
- diversity (by gender, age, identity group) in local elected offices (councilors, chief executives) compared to national government figures
- percentage of women in local governments (at different levels, legislative and executive)
- number of local councils that meet minimum benchmarks to perform core functions effectively (UNDP SP 2.1.1)*

**SURVEYS**
- percentage of eligible voters in local elections who believe that party-based local elections provides better representation of their interests
- percentage of youth (18-24) and women with active memberships in political entities (by gender)
- percentage of eligible voters who think that the last local election was credible, by sex, age and identity factors
- percentage of voter turnout among minority identity groups (exit polls)
- percentage of the public considering that local councils are where decisions affecting their everyday life are made

**Lessons learned and recommendations**

1. **TRANSITIONAL POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL THAT BUILD ON EXISTING INTERESTS AND RELATIONSHIPS WORK THE BEST.** No blank slate exists in local politics, even in the aftermath of conflict. Focus should start with functions (representation, consensus-building, inclusiveness) of local representative bodies, rather than form. This means that transitional (non-elected) political arrangements can be supported at first if they help restore stability and build confidence in the state. Building rules-based democratic local governance remains a long-term goal in many fragile and conflict-affected settings.

2. **STRONG LINKS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN PROGRAMMING IN CIVIC EDUCATION, LOCAL ELECTIONS AND SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY.** Civic education must enlighten voters on local government mandates and their rights in local governance in order to create interest in local elections. This in turn can translate into increased attention to local affairs and civic engagement in social accountability initiatives.

3. **SUPPORT TO LOCAL ELECTIONS THROUGH LOCAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMMING IS EFFECTIVE IN DECENTRALIZED CONTEXTS.** Responsibilities of local governments and other local bodies in organizing local elections is greater the more decentralized a country is. Existing capacity-building programmes for local governance actors can be used to serve the purpose of supporting the organization of credible elections; it is more cost-efficient than creating new electoral assistance projects.

4. **ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE FOR LOCAL CONTESTS CAN BE TARGETED TO POLITICALLY-SENSITIVE AREAS,** especially in countries where electoral management capacities are already strong, but where difficult political and security conditions in more restive sub-national areas call for increased external support for the management of local elections. This may help create trust among voters and lessen the risks of electoral violence. Such support is also granted for cases when there is a high risk of disenfranchisement of certain groups* and external scrutiny of the electoral process may reduce it.

5. **LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE BODIES IS A TECHNICAL AS MUCH AS A POLITICAL CHALLENGE.** Legislative assistance is highly linked to the competencies of political groups at the local level and their ability to function democratically and to relate to each other peacefully. Local governance programming cannot shy away from engaging directly with political parties at the local level and helping to level the playing field in local politics.

**Knowledge products**

**TOOLS**
- UNDP Handbook on Working with Political Parties
- UNDP Guidebook on Empowering Women for Stronger Political Parties
- UNDP Report on Promoting Local Elections as Part of An Electoral Cycle Approach
- UNDP Agora Portal (Parliaments and Crisis)
- ACE Portal (Administration and Cost of Elections)

**SUGGESTED FURTHER READING**
- NDI, Monitoring and Mitigating Electoral Violence, 2014
- IDEA, Democracy at the Local Level, 2001

---

*As per the UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017, minimum benchmarks for UNDP-supported local councils are: strategic plan development and implementation, dialogue and lawmaking on core issues, budget oversight, inclusion of marginalized groups in council processes, communication and outreach and local council administration.

b. Indigenous people, for example, or returnee minority populations.
Chapter 7:

MANAGING LOCAL CONFLICTS AND INCREASING COMMUNITY SECURITY
Fostering effective interactions between state and society in managing local conflict and in curbing insecurity is essential for bolstering a resilient society.

A resilient society requires a state with the capacity to forecast, manage and respond to crisis in an equitable manner. It also entails a society that can persevere and rebound from stresses with self-sufficiency: a society capable of healing internal divisions, reconciling its members and restoring peace.

In some societies, informal structures, often customary in nature, are regarded as more effective and legitimate than local governments in setting societal norms and standards, regulating behaviour and mediating conflict. Yet, such traditional structures are known to lack inclusivity and do not always treat all community members fairly, especially women, minorities or social outcasts. In contexts of heightened and prolonged violence, the traditional processes often cannot cope alone with the complex ramifications of violence on social cohesion and need external support.

The value of going ‘local’ for supporting peacebuilding and improving human security in fragile and conflict-affected settings is widely recognized. Donors are paying increasing attention to local infrastructures for peace and community security and social cohesion programming is on the rise in areas plagued by criminal violence, in contrast to securitized-only responses (for example, the wave of ‘Iron Fist’ operations in Central America against gang warfare during the 2000s).

At the heart of this area of intervention is the bringing together of the main repositories of public authority – local governments, rule of law institutions and traditional leaders – with communities, non-state armed groups and others that suffer from or contribute to violence. The goal is to work as inclusively as feasible with all parties to chart a way out of violent situations. This chapter does not pretend to lay out a comprehensive approach to restoring the rule of law, peace and security; it deals only with activities taking place at the local level and requiring the active involvement of a variety of local governance actors. In this way, it seeks to complement more traditional rule of law programming in UNDP by helping to, and lay down local-level foundations for building strong national rule of legal and institutional frameworks.

Chapter 7 covers the entry points listed below.

- Local peace committees and their networks.
- Community-based reconciliation and transitional justice.
- Community security and social cohesion.
- Fighting sexual and gender-based violence in local communities.
- Access to justice at the local level.

7.1 SUPPORT TO LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES AND THEIR NETWORKS

Peacebuilding cannot rely solely on elite bargains and national dialogue processes; it is essential that peace agreements resonate in local communities and involve their commitment and active engagement in reconciliation. Local peace committees, as homegrown structures (sometimes incentivized by external support), have a central role to play in mainstreaming the concepts and realities of peace into the everyday life of all citizens. Local peace committees gather stakeholders imbued with sufficient legitimacy and authority in a community to negotiate in their name the resolution of local conflicts or to help prevent future ones. Local peace committees address issues of relevance to the communities they emerge from and act as fora for dialogue, reconciliation and early warning and response. These are particularly appropriate for situations of crippling polarization between political actors in which coercion into peacemaking is sure to fail and softer approaches are more appropriate.89 Such structures are most effective when they have a bearing on local policy-making (e.g. influencing how peace dividends in terms of public goods and services...
Local Peace Committees started appearing in Sudan after the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement ended a decades-long civil war. One such committee was the South Kordofan Collaborative, an inter-communal network of local activists.

UNDP in Sudan supported these homegrown structures in six areas: (1) executive leadership; (2) rule of law and law enforcement; (3) fiduciary management; (4) public administration; (5) security; and (6) natural resource management. Complementary to these efforts, concluding local agreements between communities and pastoralists was supported as well.

According to various evaluations, more than 50 percent of those communities in which local peace committees intervened avoided a relapse into violence.

Source: UNDP and van Tongeren, 2013

are distributed among groups). Hence, building clear and effective links between local peace committees and local governments and state institutions is critical.

Local peace committees need to be designed and implemented as inclusive and participatory platforms enjoying the buy-in from the main local stakeholders. Ultimately, the objective is to support the establishment of viable and self-sustaining institutionalized mechanisms at the local level capable of decreasing the risks of conflict legacies and of future disputes. Such structures can help limit opportunities for extremist groups and ideologies to grow, as these flourish where conflict exists. Local peace committees unfold their influence not only at the grassroots and district level as a network of local bodies, but they also should be constitutive for strengthening national peace infrastructures.

Possible activities falling under this entry point are listed below.

- Mapping and assessing local peacebuilding initiatives and structures.
- Providing neutral technical and logistical support to local peace committees’ operations.
- Supporting community dialogues on conflict drivers.
- Funding, including through local governments, local peace and development plans produced by local peace committees.
- Training local media for unbiased reporting on local peacebuilding efforts.

---

Advocating for women’s representation on local peace committees and supporting women members of these committees.

Peace education in local schools and universities.

Supporting local peace committee networking and connections with national peace infrastructures and dialogue processes.

7.2 COMMUNITY-BASED RECONCILIATION AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

Conflict-affected societies need to face their history of violence and deal with some of the legacies of conflict – noting that the heavier legacies, such as war crimes or crimes against humanity, are usually dealt with by national or international jurisdictions. By generating some level of individual and group accountability for damages and abuses committed by local actors, community-based reconciliation and transitional justice can help pave the way for power-sharing at the local level. If well managed, reconciliation and transitional justice can also limit the probability of spoilers wrecking local peace-making and statebuilding efforts as they can offer to some of the perpetrators of violence opportunities to become accepted partners in local governance processes. Local reconciliation and transitional justice committees can pardon certain agreed-upon conflict-related crimes and/or enforce non-penal sanctions (e.g. community service). Reparation measures decided locally may involve local governments for implementation, such as redistributing public land to victims of conflict or prioritizing the most victimized communities for the urgent provision of public services and infrastructure.

Possible activities falling under this area of intervention are listed below.

- Raising awareness of local populations on transitional justice principles and mechanisms, using comparative experience.
- Building capacities of local civil society organizations and judicial bodies to support local reconciliation and transitional justice committees.
- Funding and assisting in the implementation of reparation schemes designed and endorsed locally, including through local governments.

90. According to norms usually defined through national consensus and with involvement of the judicial branch.
Thematic Note 11: Security and justice through a local governance lens

Fragility and violence fuel one another (see Chart). Apart from socio-economic determinants, insecurity and perceptions of injustice are potent drivers of armed violence, creating a vortex of criminality, impunity and more insecurity. In these contexts, rapid restoration of the rule of law, including access to justice and improved community security, can prevent violence, help societies deal with its legacy and ultimately provide foundations for building inclusive and well-governed societies.

Traditionally, the provision of justice and security have been treated as sovereign functions of the central state. This vision has long shaped the approach of the international community in post-conflict states, whereby international forces train the national army and police and rebuild a judicial system from the centre out. Similar policies have been pursued in countries plagued by spiraling criminal violence where ‘iron-fist’ responses, highly securitized and led by central government, are applied in crime-ridden areas. These approaches have bred disappointing results as they treat mostly the symptoms of violence and create more legacies for future violence.

Nowadays, more governments and donors support local strategies to respond to situations of acute insecurity and lack of access to justice, such as Community Security and Social Cohesion or Alternative Dispute Resolution, both involving community-based violence prevention mechanisms and greater decentralization in the management of security and in the administration of justice. Such strategies seek to maximize the endogenous capacity of local societies to prevent violence and resolve disputes with acceptable standards of justice, with support and oversight from the state and civil society, to guarantee respect for human rights and a fair treatment for women and marginalized groups.

Using a local governance lens to deal with issues of security and justice is a recognition of the potential of local governance institutions to:

- **Convene** coalitions of state and non-state actors who cannot bring alone a durable reduction of insecurity and injustice;
- **Reveal** the potential of informal dispute resolution and justice processes while providing incentives for their normative evolution;
- **Create** a flexible support network for helping victims receive justice and recover, as well as for helping perpetrators reintegrate into peaceful livelihoods after being held accountable; and
- **Make communities** look inward for explanations of the violence plaguing them – and in particular acknowledge that violence starts in the private sphere and hits the weakest, mainly women and children.

**Strengthening the rule of law with a strong involvement of local governments** has the additional value of accelerating the rebuilding of trust between state and society. While local governments may face serious constraints to deliver services effectively in fragile contexts – in particular a sheer lack of financial resources - they are often more apt to act as facilitators between rule of law authorities and communities to find acceptable solutions to criminality and lack of access to justice. In certain Latin American cities where criminality has been reduced by an impressive margin in a few years, it was the municipalities that led the implementation of citizen security strategies designed with communities and law enforcement agencies.

**Challenges to a successful localization of rule of law strategies** are plentiful, including the permanence of strong external violence and conflict drivers; putting communities under levels of stress that endogenous solutions, even packaged under a local governance model, cannot defeat. Decisive progress in strengthening national rule of law frameworks is critical to fashioning an enabling environment for the sustainability of locally-devised strategies, beyond successful donor-funded pilots. Also, the relationship between elected officials, public administrators and the police is frequently tainted, complex and at times antagonistic, especially when the police is not inclusive enough (gender, minorities, language groups) and maintains discriminatory practices.

---

**What drives people to join armed groups?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unemployment/idleness</th>
<th>Feel more secure/powerful</th>
<th>Belief in the cause/revenge/injustice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>39.5%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel participation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gang participation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

a. UNDP, Strengthening the Rule of Law in Crisis-Affected and Fragile Situations, 2011.
b. Homicide rates were reduced by 48 percent in San Salvador and 42 percent in Sonsonate, El Salvador, after four years of community security programming (2007-2011) – following 10 years of constant increase since 1998 (UNDP El Salvador, 2013).
c. "In South Kivu (DRC), security will remain precarious and justice partial as long as unemployment remains severe, the army continues to be unevenly controlled and disciplined, civil servants are left in miserable conditions and uncontrolled militias from within and neighbouring countries control large portions of the Congolese land." Ferdinand Mugumo Mushi, 2013.
7.3 COMMUNITY SECURITY AND SOCIAL COHESION

Community security and social cohesion refers to the everyday security of individuals in the communities where they live and how it can be improved. This can be achieved – in addition to and in synergy with necessary law enforcement responses – by nurturing positive linkages, peaceful transactions and increased solidarity between individuals and community sub-groups. It involves, in particular, establishing and protecting democratic civic order, eliminating threats of physical and psychological violence in households and communities and allowing for safe and peaceful coexistence, especially in violence-free public spaces.

To achieve community security and social cohesion demands a comprehensive and multi-faceted approach that emphasizes strengthening of community resilience by ensuring that communities understand better what is at the core of threats and challenges to their security and taking action accordingly. It is the community's own assessment of the security environment that drives societal behaviour.

Community action must be integrated with civilian and security responses with the ultimate goal of freeing individuals from the fear that prevents them from accessing opportunities to improve their lives.

Community Security and Social Cohesion is a signature approach of UNDP for local-level programming at the nexus of security and development. This broad area of work stretches from decreasing criminal violence in urban slums to creating conditions for a more peaceful coexistence between long-term displaced populations and their host communities, to the reintegration of ex-combatants in the context of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

It is important to stress that the Community Security and Social Cohesion approach supports peaceful involvement of civilians in local security maintenance, through problem-solving and action-taking, including by increasing cooperation with security forces (through neighbourhood watch systems, for example), but NOT the arming of civilians to provide security to their communities.

In Eastern Equatoria State in South Sudan, cattle raiding is a predominant cause of conflict. Women have also been, increasingly, victims of theft and sexual violence while walking long distances to perform household chores.

UNDP, through the Community Security and Arms Control programme in South Sudan, supported State and Payam governments and the police to interact closely with communities in the search for solutions to insecurity.

One answer has been to build more police posts in locations deemed problematic by community members, including close to water wells where women congregate.

The programme has helped extend state presence and authority and reduce the incidence of violence and thefts. For the first time, many community members are aware of the presence and role of local governments, and are placing greater confidence in them.

In the first instance, women have access to the police who can help them report, including by increasing cooperation with security forces (through neighbourhood watch systems), but NOT the arming of civilians to provide security to their communities.

Source: UNDP, Strengthening the Rule of Law, 2011.

91. Or ‘Citizen Security’, as it is more commonly referred to in Latin America.
Possible **activities** falling under this entry are listed below.

- Local security diagnostics (including surveys on citizen perceptions of insecurity), led by local stakeholder coalitions (communities, local governments, police forces).
- Support to community security committees and action plans to decrease violence at all levels.
- Build capacities of national and municipal police forces for community policing.
- Organize civic campaigns against small arms in public spaces.
- Establish violence monitoring systems (e.g. citizen peace and security observatories) and early warning systems.
- Assist local authorities, civil society and the private sector to support the socio-economic reintegration of ex-criminals or combatants.
- Fund small community security infrastructures (e.g. fences, street lighting, video cameras).
- Support community-based mines and unexploded ordnance removal, education and victim rehabilitation programmes.
- Support local governments to mitigate the effects of influxes of IDPs on service delivery, social cohesion and the local economy of host communities.

### 7.4 Fighting Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

In fragile and conflict-affected settings, women’s social, political and economic empowerment – which is paramount for the recovery of conflict-torn societies – is stunted by high levels of physical and psychological violence directed towards them. The urgency of the problem is becoming more acute with each new violent conflict, in which women are increasingly becoming direct targets for taking revenge on a specific group. Women’s protection from violence has become a global humanitarian goal since the adoption in 2000 of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (see Thematic Note 2).

Improving national legal frameworks to protect women’s fundamental rights, especially in times of conflict, is crucial for their long-term empowerment, as are efforts to change gender norms through educational and political reform. Yet, there is also an urgency in many fragile and conflict-affected settings to take immediate appropriate action at the local level to reduce domestic violence, sexual violence, trafficking, prostitution and the greater vulnerability of women in general to criminal activities (e.g. theft, extortion).

As sexual and gender-based violence is deeply rooted in families and communities, local actors are often best positioned to detect cases, counsel victims and implement prevention and reparation activities. In contexts of debilitated rule of law systems and second-rank priority given to sexual and gender-based violence in the police and judicial establishments, addressing it through community-based approaches, with sufficient support of local governments, is crucial. While fighting sexual and gender-based violence is a top priority for peace and recovery, it is best fought when a wide scope of possible drivers are addressed and actions to reduce it are integrated in broader women’s empowerment strategies (see Section 2.3).

Possible **activities** falling under this entry point are listed below.

- Support local actors to organize advocacy campaigns mobilizing influential local actors on fighting sexual and gender-based violence and other gender-related issues in an effort to bring an immediate decrease in violence levels and a gradual social change.
- Training of community volunteers to better detect and refer sexual and gender-based violence cases to judicial and psycho-socio-medical care institutions.
- Support to local governments to establish women’s affairs units in their administration with a strong focus on sexual and gender-based violence.
- Facilitate the recruitment of female officers in local police contingents, municipal police and courts of justice.
- Fund multi-stakeholder initiatives with a local government leadership to provide victims of sexual and gender-based violence with safe houses, psycho-social assistance, skills training and cash assistance to rebuild their lives.

In fragile and conflict-affected settings, women’s social, political and economic empowerment – which is paramount for the recovery of conflict-torn societies – is stunted by high levels of physical and psychological violence directed towards them.
7.5 INCREASE ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR ALL

Increasing access to justice for everyone, regardless of social class and geographical location, is critical to restore citizen faith in the rule of law and the state. It also helps diminish discrimination against certain groups that can otherwise generate violent grievances and address conflict legacies, especially those that cannot be dealt with through transitional justice mechanisms (e.g. spoliation of widows, orphans of war).

Access to judicial services is also important for more administrative matters, such as receiving identity papers, birth and death certificates and land and property titling (see Chapter 5), which all play a role in facilitating livelihoods in fragile and conflict-affected settings, especially when the loss of personal documentation is widespread and precludes access to services.

Access to justice is a vast programming area that usually combines support to building local justice services, the provision of alternative redress mechanisms and making legal counsel accessible to those that need it the most. It is not considered an intrinsic part of local governance programming, yet, recognition is growing that local governments can contribute significantly to building a more accessible judicial system, be it through infrastructure or service delivery interventions.

Possible **activities** falling under this area of intervention are listed below.

- Assist local governments in prioritizing a more accessible judicial infrastructure in their investment plans, in particular for building integrated justice centres (national police, municipal police, courts, legal aid and social protection services) and in raising resources from different institutions and donors to support such objectives.
- Support municipal legal aid services and/or mobile clinics funded and operated in partnership by local governments, civil society organizations, bar associations, etc.
- Organize human rights training for local councils and local government staff dealing with security and social issues.
- Support local offices for civil and property registration to extend their reach to remote, crisis-stricken locales and areas with displaced populations to increase access to legal documentation (identification documents, property titles, etc.).
Examples of indicators for measuring results in managing local conflicts and reducing insecurity

**ADMINISTRATIVE DATA**

- number of localities with functioning locally-managed mechanisms for early warning, conflict prevention and resolution
- rate of return of conflict in communities where local peace committees are active and supported for at least four years
- frequency of inclusion of reparation initiatives in local recovery plans in post-conflict areas
- number of community security mechanisms adopted under local government leadership and with police participation
- trends in crime rates during the post-conflict phase, disaggregated by type of crime and victim's sex, age and identity group
- number of individuals trained on conflict resolution methods (disaggregated by gender and organizational background)
- number and types of initiatives taken by local governments to curb sexual and gender-based violence
- number of legal aid facilities established through local partnerships with local government support
- percentage of women in the membership of local peace committees

**SURVEYS**

- percentage of men and women who feel safe walking in the area where they live
- percentage of men and women in target areas with improved perceptions of social cohesion within 18 months after conflict ends (disaggregated by age)
- victimization survey among women for sexual and gender-based violence
- percentage of men and women considering that sexual and gender-based violence is a threat to peace

Lessons learned and recommendations

1. **LOCAL INFRASTRUCTURES FOR PEACE SHOULD NOT BE LOADED WITH UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS.** These infrastructures should provide viable avenues for dialogue, consensus-building and balancing day-to-day interests in intra-communal settings. However, it should be understood that they cannot prevent mass violence, enforce security and peace, deal with the structural root causes of a conflict and encounter and override national political imperatives.

2. **HOLISTIC APPROACHES TO REDUCING VIOLENCE ALWAYS WORK BETTER.** Violence takes place in homes, streets and institutions. Exclusion from the political, legislative, social, economic and cultural spheres is also a form of violence and needs to be tackled. Violence in fragile and conflict-affected settings is not just an issue of conflict legacy; it can also be cultural or fueled by extremist ideologies. Adopting a human-rights based approach to violence prevention, and partnering with UN actors mandated to fight violence against women, children and other marginalized groups, is critical.

3. **ENGAGEMENT WITH TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS TO INCREASE ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND SECURITY** should come after a critical assessment of their values, functions and influence on people’s lives, especially women and other marginalized groups. Supporting traditional institutions (often under the guise of local ownership or romantic notions of traditional societies), or at least the actions of these institutions, that do not advance the goals of access to justice and security should be avoided.

4. **LOCALIZED APPROACHES TO PEACE, SECURITY AND JUSTICE ARE OFTEN HELD HOSTAGE TO SHIFTING POLITICAL COALITIONS.** Community security, transitional justice and alternative dispute resolution programming can be opposed by central governments as a sign of loss of state authority in areas traditionally under its sole sovereignty (security, justice). They can also meet strong opposition from wealthier and influential sectors of society that support harsher security policies.

5. **LOCAL CAPACITIES TO GENERATE ACCURATE AND TIMELY INFORMATION ON VIOLENCE FROM CRIME AND CONFLICT IS ESSENTIAL FOR SOUND ACTION PLANNING IN COMMUNITY SECURITY PROGRAMMING.** Reliable monitoring data serves to demonstrate results generated by such approaches versus more militarized responses. However, accurate statistics on crime and violence are notoriously complicated to maintain, especially for sexual and gender-based violence. Over-reliance on perception surveys as a proxy to hard data is not a sound approach.

Knowledge products

**TOOLS**

- UNDP Community Security and Social Cohesion: Towards a UNDP Approach
- UNDP Guidance Note on Infrastructures for Peace
- Safer World – Community Security Handbook
- Stimson Center – Engaging Community Voices in Protection Strategies

**SUGGESTED FURTHER READING**

- UNDP, Global Report on Strengthening the Rule of Law in Crisis-Affected and Fragile Situations, 2014
- Federation of Canadian Municipalities, The Role of Local Government in Peacebuilding, 2004

Chapter 8:

ENABLING FRAMEWORKS FOR LOCAL GOVERNANCE
Building (or restoring) a strong yet balanced, central-local relationship that can act as an engine for powering the recovery of conflict-affected communities and for gradually driving the reform of local governance systems is essential for the success of peacebuilding and statebuilding strategies.

**OBJECTIVE:**

Stronger policy, institutional and partnership frameworks help build an effective central-local relationship to support the transformation of local governance.

Effecting change in local governance in a number of pilot locations through direct support to local communities and institutions is feasible in fragile and conflict-affected settings, and can be done relatively fast using the right amount of incentives and capacity development. Yet, the replicability, sustainability and long-term impact of localized programming during limited timespans in countries with weak state structures and unstable political settlements is questionable. Scaling up and disseminating local successes or even just sustaining in the long-term the initial progress made in a programme context, requires a number of enabling conditions and frameworks that need focusing beyond – or rather above – the ‘local.’

In fragile and conflict-affected settings, the first priority in terms of enabling framework is usually negotiating a settlement on the broad parameters of co-existence between the central and local polities. These concern existential considerations of nation-building versus local aspirations for autonomy (if not independence) and national versus local identities, especially in multi-cultural contexts, which need to be publicly debated and resolved before they can be enshrined in legal frameworks.

Building a functional and resilient intergovernmental framework is a long and complex process influenced by a number of key factors: (i) the existence of effective mechanisms for better policy integration among state institutions at different levels of the governance ladder; (ii) steady central government support to the empowerment of local governments; (iii) the development of local institutional capacities in coherence with national development goals; (iv) aid flows to local governance that effectively support statebuilding; and (v) the existence of mechanisms to bring up lessons learned from the field into reform design.

This chapter deals with these enabling factors; it does not go into debating the pros and cons of decentralization in fragile and conflict-affected settings nor how decentralisation reforms should be implemented in such contexts as this would require going into technical considerations that are beyond the focus of this Guide.

Chapter 8 covers the entry points below.

- Policy dialogue on local governance and decentralization.
- Strengthening the horizontal and vertical articulation of subnational institutions.
- Professionalizing the local civil service.
- Effective aid management for local governance.
- Peer networking.

## 8.1 POLICY DIALOGUE ON LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND DECENTRALIZATION

Post-conflict situations in which a complete overhaul of the state is expected usually open the door for constitutional reforms during which the central-local political settlement can be addressed, providing good opportunities for a broad national dialogue on local governance – in the widest sense of the term.

Constitutional reforms also take place in countries at peace but under popular pressure to profoundly transform the state and its institutions. In this case, similar opportunities exist for a broad dialogue on reforming local governance, usually leaning towards more decentralization.

In situations of protracted conflict or during negotiations for a peace settlement when different armed groups may be fighting against the central government, dialogue on the central-local settlement is essential to the broader peace agreement, but may need to unfold at a more political level, or at least with different tracks being pursued at the same time – one of them engaging citizens widely.
In PALESTINE, in 2004, UNDP produced a Local Governance Diagnostic Study commissioned by the Palestinian Authority and the donor community. The study identified immediate priorities after three years of a very damaging Intifada and laid down necessary reform components. In 2010, UNDP produced a Diagnostic Study on the Property Tax System in support of debate on a fiscal decentralization framework. A new property tax law was issued in 2012.

In AFGHANISTAN, UNDP helped the Independent Directorate for Local Government produce the first-ever Afghan Subnational Governance Policy in 2007. Since the policy was adopted, UNDP assisted the government to prepare the necessary by-laws to implement it. This process has been very slow due to its complexity, but also for lack of commitment to decentralization by some key ministries.

In TIMOR-LESTE, in 2004, UNDP and UNCDF commissioned a Local Government Options Study which laid down seven scenarios to build a brand new local governance structure. The study presented different formulas for and intensities of decentralization. The government decided to test two of the proposed options in four districts (out of 13). Local councils gathered elected representatives, community elders and civil society members and developed participatory plans later supported by a Local Development Fund. Results achieved under both models were closely evaluated and provided important lessons for the conception in 2009 of the country’s first Decentralization Strategic Framework.

In all the cases mentioned above, dialogue on the general principles organizing the state (e.g. unitary or federal, amount of decentralization, sharing of resources, minority rights, delimitation of subnational boundaries) should happen early enough and feed into the actual design of local governance reforms and the many elements that constitute them, which is by definition a long-haul endeavour. At the start of the reform process, it is essential to clarify concepts attached to reform and potential decentralization and to debate collectively the pros and cons, implications and risks, as well as the timeline, road map and costs involved.

UNDP’s role lies in facilitating an inclusive debate and providing policy options.

Possible ACTIVITIES falling under this entry point are listed below.

- Technical and process inputs into political negotiations needed to reach a settlement between central and local power-holders after a serious crisis or in the context of constitutional reform.
- Support to public debate on local governance (and if appropriate decentralization) through workshops, awareness-raising campaigns, media events, etc., emphasizing the participation of youth as youth are the future implementers and beneficiaries of long-term changes in local governance. Attention must also be paid to the private sector given the greater role (and stakes) it is given to fuel local development in improved local governance and decentralized contexts.
- Produce evidence-based policy options through diagnostic studies, consultations, scenario-building exercises, comparative reviews of global lessons learned, south-south exchanges, etc. (see Box 27).
- Test and measure the impact of different policy options in various subnational areas, over a number of years, to evaluate their suitability to local needs and capacities and their effects.
- Help establish local governance and decentralization observatories, focusing on a few key variables that reflect the stabilization and resilience of the central-local relationship, that show progress in reforming local governance arrangements and that can prove concrete effects on the lives of citizens.
- Facilitate the delimitation of local administrative borders, including through amalgamation and inter-municipal cooperation.
- Offer high-level technical advice and process support to local governance framework design and decentralization planning, including through installing local governance- and decentralization-related cells in key ministries, supporting inter-ministerial coordination on local governance and decentralization and working closely with parliamentarians.
- Guarantee and facilitate gender-mainstreaming in all aspects of local governance, constitutional and decentralization reforms.

8.2 STRENGTHENING THE HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL ARTICULATION OF SUBNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Strengthening the integration between various state institutions engaged in the delivery of public goods and services to citizens – whether the central administration, semi-autonomous governmental programmes and agencies or local governments – and helping these institutions to stop operating in silos will lead to more and better development results at a lesser cost. Indeed, the amount of institutional
Strengthening local governance in any development context does not automatically equate pushing for full decentralization (political, administrative, fiscal). In fragile and conflict-affected settings, the public expects first of all from their local governance system concrete improvements in their living conditions, starting with better security, justice, services, more jobs and a stable public authority; whether these dividends are provided directly by their local authorities or mostly by the central government is usually not their first concern.

Yet, the UN Working Group on Public Administration noted in 2013 that “decentralization reforms are increasingly part of peace agreements, along with civil service reforms, reorganization of public administration, anticorruption strategies and revenue collection.” Indeed, decentralization is often seen by populations in distress or going through revolutionary phases as a promise of rapid improvements, and is considered an inherent right of citizens in any democratic society. However, if there is some evidence that decentralization can accelerate local development in normal conditions, similar evidence on the effectiveness of bold decentralization reforms in post-conflict or fragile environments is at best inconclusive and, at worst, negative.

On the optimistic side, several authors argue that a decentralized approach is particularly important in post-war contexts to acknowledge the fact that local structures have become critical for providing goods and services while central government institutions remain weak or contested (e.g. Sierra Leone, Somalia). Decentralization could also help address drivers of conflict through reducing regional imbalances hence tackling real or perceived inequalities. In the longer run, decentralization would increase pro-poor service delivery, as it gives a greater voice and representation for traditionally-marginalized groups.

On the pessimistic side, authors highlight that research shows no straightforward correlation between decentralization, service delivery and conflict reduction. In fact, decentralization reforms in areas where the central state had hardly any control have often aggravated state fragility as they reinforced the role of ad hoc local governance structures dominated by non-state actors and delayed the building of a coherent state. Because decentralization is principally about redistributing power, any disruption to fragile political settlements can prompt resistance from potentially nefarious power-holders. Decentralization also bears the risk of fragile states of pushing corruption down to local institutions, in particular if reconstruction efforts involve large amounts of donor funding and in areas rich in natural resources. The results of many politically-motivated decentralization reforms in fragile settings has also been to establish elected councils but stopping short of really empowering them through adequate administrative or fiscal decentralization.

What the above says is that decentralization reforms in fragile or post-conflict contexts need to surmount even greater challenges than in normal development conditions. They include the challenges below:

- Territorial fragmentation: as many fragile countries remain divided geographically along ethnic, religious or political lines. Decentralization can be seen by emerging political forces as a way of undermining the regime in place.

- Policy decisions in the aftermath of conflict have a disproportionately large influence over later development. Decision-making power in such times is both highly coveted and not easily shared.

- Fragile states often face an extreme scarcity of qualified human resources to work in local governments (brain drain, capture by foreign organizations, limited financial incentives, etc.).

- Local governments in fragile states can rarely rely on own-source revenues to cover their needs.

- Because post-conflict political settlements often distribute ministries among former political rivals, the level of inter-ministerial cooperation needed to implement a decentralization reform is very difficult to achieve.

What does decentralization consist of exactly?

Decentralization is a division of power, resources and responsibilities between the central state and local government organizations. The scope and nature of decentralization can vary significantly from one situation to another, and a number of combinations of these two dimensions can be envisaged as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scope of decentralization</th>
<th>Nature of decentralization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Devolution</td>
<td>Delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Devolution: legally enshrined autonomy in which local government exercises full authority over a particular set of responsibilities.

- Delegation: exercise of responsibilities by local governments on behalf of a higher-level agency retaining legal mandate for them.

- Deconcentration: operation of territory-based organizational units pertaining to a higher-level agency.
As a result, a broad consensus has emerged that too rapid and too comprehensive political, administrative and fiscal decentralization bears serious risks in fragile states, including renewed conflict and state weakening. However, decentralization does not have to be comprehensive and involve all responsibilities at once (see the box on previous page). In fact, decentralization can take different shapes and be rolled out incrementally. Political functions can be decentralized while administrative ones remain handled by more capable de-concentrated services until local governments improve their capacity for service delivery and accountable resource management (e.g. Mozambique after the civil war, see Case Study 5).^6^ There is no doubt that most fragile and conflict-affected states need a change of paradigm in their local governance arrangements. Restoring or maintaining ineffective, corrupt or discriminatory arrangements that may have fueled conflict is counterproductive and does not respond to people’s expectations. A change in local governance arrangements sends a strong signal that the state is serious about renovating the social contract. The recommendations below can help better respond to expectations for change in local governance without necessarily leapfrogging to full devolution of powers to the local level.

- Recent research on the impact of decentralization in the developing world has helped outline a few prerequisites for effective decentralization. These are: (i) the political will to make it work; (ii) a strong enabling legal framework; (iii) strong political parties and a competitive party system; (iv) substantial allocation of resources to local governments; and (v) strong social cohesion. Many of these are in short supply in fragile settings. Working first on establishing these prerequisites, before embarking into full decentralization, is recommended.

- Context matters tremendously for decentralization. Not only the political and institutional context at the time of designing a reform, but also what it was before the conflict, transition or descent into endemic fragility.\(^7^\)

---

### Three forms of localism

**Managerial localism**: conditional devolution of delegated decision-making or delivery, under a strict regulatory framework and centrally-defined targets.

**Representative localism**: powers and responsibility for specific tasks devolved directly to elected local governments. Success is evaluated on the basis of re-election.

**Community localism**: devolution of rights and support directly to citizens in communities to allow them to engage in decisions and actions.

---

- Producing and testing different options for decentralized governance in different locations of a country – and carefully monitoring the results – is a good way to minimize design mistakes in a future decentralization reform.

- Addressing separately the political, fiscal and administrative scope of decentralized local governance helps give rise to creative and safer solutions. Flexibility and incremental adaptation are key ingredients to a process that remains, in any case, fraught with risks.

- Two fundamental issues must be discussed prior to decentralization: the delimitation of local government borders and intergovernmental arrangements, in particular between the local and intermediary levels. A lack of clarity on either or both provides a wobbly foundation upon which to build a decentralized governance system.

- Asymmetric reforms may suit certain contexts. For example, it may be useful for large urban centres that are way ahead of rural areas in terms of political power and administrative capacity or for regions where awarding increased autonomy is critical for political stability (e.g. the Kurdistan region in Iraq, Serb provinces in Kosovo).

Increasingly, the concept of **localism** is used to describe hybrid approaches to the emancipation of local governance systems in settings in which full-blown decentralization is not advisable or possible. This umbrella concept refers to the devolution of power, functions and/or resources away from central control towards front-line managers, democratic structures, local institutions and local communities – hence not exclusively from central to local governments only.

There are three basic forms of localism as shown in the box above, and achieving the right balance between the three depending on contextual factors is really what matters. Localism has been a key policy instrument in many post-conflict contexts (e.g. Community Development Committees in Afghanistan, Angola, Colombia, Indonesia and Mozambique).

At the end of the day, UNDP engagement with the matter of decentralization/localism in fragile and conflict-affected settings should be highly demand- and context-driven, rather than academic. In all cases, UNDP should not approach local governance in these situations solely through the entry point of support to decentralization reforms. Restoring trust-based and resilient state-society relations at the local level remains the priority and it calls for pursuing a number of entry points, decentralization being just one of them.

---

a. UNWGPA, Restore or Reform? UN Lessons Learned on Core Public Administration Functions in the Aftermath of Conflict, 2014.


c. UNESCAP, Local Governance and Basic Service Delivery in Conflict Affected Areas, 2009, p. 4.

d. Decentralization in Sierra Leone started in the 1990s may have sparked the 1997 civil war as it threatened the power of certain military individuals (Rosenbaum et al., 1997).

e. After the civil war in Mozambique, district local governments were established with some political devolution, but the administrative and fiscal implementation of plans drawn up by local councils was given to de-concentrated services with more technical capacity and internal controls (Jackson, 2010).

f. In some cases, this will mean going back to analysing local governance arrangements under colonization.
wastage due to lack of policy integration can be very problematic for countries with limited resources.\textsuperscript{92} Better articulation and integration at sub-national level is also essential to replicate, enlarge and institutionalize successful pilot localized approaches to peacebuilding, statebuilding and recovery. Articulating, coordinating and, ultimately, integrating policies and actions of the state machinery at all levels of governance is at the core of the statebuilding process.

The main challenge resides usually in integrating sectorial and territorial policy-making processes and making sure they support each other. The more decentralized the country, the greater policy-making roles are devolved to local authorities, the more complex and political institutional integration can become. Better integration of subnational institutions means pursuing, on a territorial basis, common problem analyses between sectors. It means defining common goals and targets, integrating action plans, better allocating and pooling resources for key actions needed for enabling change. It should result in more consistency and the building of local capacities, more effective feedback loops and stronger communication strategies.

Local governments have, in theory at least, an inherent advantage in leading policy integration at the sub-national level as the fragmentation of thematic ministries in charge of delivering services can be mitigated at the local level by the smaller number of actors and greater overlaps in practice. Also, simpler coordination and the visible need for integration may make integration easier at the local level. Yet, the capacity of local governments to assume their role in policy integration depends heavily on their capabilities, available resources and on the broader aspects of the central-local relationship (see previous entry point). Vertical integration between layers of local governments can also be greatly complicated by different political alignments, unclear division of responsibilities and limited communications infrastructure.

Finally, it is important to reiterate that institutional and policy integration does not stop at state actors: it should involve all stakeholders in delivering public goods and services and fomenting local development.

\textsuperscript{92} In Haiti, not less than four levels of government have a role in the delivery of public primary education services. Yet, about 80 percent of primary school students in Haiti attended private schools in 2010 for lack of quality primary education services offered by the state outside of the main urban centers. (OECD, 2010).

**BOX 28: QUANTITY VERSUS QUALITY IN STATE RESPONSE IN EL SALVADOR**

The city of Sonsonate, El Salvador, has been one of the five most dangerous cities in the country. Prior to UNDP intervention, the state’s response to insecurity had been spread across 21 institutions from three levels of government, involving 11 coordination spaces (none of which were chaired by the municipality). These state activities lacked articulation and the homicide rate continued to increase from 2003 to 2008.

Specific problems that arose when making efforts to improve institutional coordination were:

- frequent turn-over of staff in coordination bodies;
- often insufficient decision-making power;
- individual and institutional agendas were dominating; and
- weak commitment to implementing joint decisions.

When UNDP launched its citizen security programme in Sonsonate in 2008, the first effort was to design a completely new institutional coordination system at municipal level, chaired by the Mayor, and closely supported by UNDP through technical assistance. Gradually, a Municipal Citizen Security Plan emerged as the sole integrated response of state and local actors to the plague of criminality and violence. In 2012, for the first time, homicide rates decreased by 40 percent in Sonsonate.

The challenge of policy integration is greater in low-income and fragile countries, or areas affected by conflict, given the often low level of institutional integration to start with, i.e. limited connectivity between institutions across and between governance layers. Therefore, improving policy integration and strengthening institutional coordination in such settings usually starts with more pragmatic aspects, such as policy articulation, i.e. working towards greater complementarity of different sectorial policies and programmes implemented at the local level.

Full policy integration might be a long-term goal in countries with low administrative capacity (e.g. the Central African Republic, Timor-Leste), while it might be attained faster in countries going through a change of political settlement that already have strong public administrations (e.g. Tunisia, Ukraine).

UNDP has a long experience and useful tools to support policy integration at the territorial level through the global ART Initiative. The ART approach is being increasingly used in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

Possible activities falling under this entry point are listed below:

- Conduct institutional mapping and value-chain analyses starting from the local level up (and not the opposite).
- Conduct SWOT analyses of existing horizontal and vertical coordination mechanisms leading to improved structural designs.
CASE STUDY 5: Building local government legitimacy in Mozambique

Mozambique has undergone a remarkable transition since the end of conflict in 1992, enjoying peace, stability and economic growth for over 20 years. During this period, the gradual introduction of key legislative and governance reforms have re-established the legitimacy and authority of local government and contributed to the maintenance of peace and security. UNDP, in partnership with key central government institutions, has been one of the main proponents and facilitators of this change.

In 1998, UNDP and UNCDF, in partnership with the government of Mozambique, agreed to pilot a participatory planning project in Nampula Province. The project sought to improve local service delivery and stimulate local development through the participatory elaboration of local development plans. Local Development Funds provided capital grants for the reconstruction of public infrastructure prioritized by local communities. Consultative councils were established as the conduit for articulating local priorities and the means through which local communities would interact with local government.

The approach was quickly considered successful and the government sought its replication in adjoining provinces with support from UNDP/UNCDF and, later, the World Bank. The most significant aspect of this intervention was its impact on government policy in relation to local governance and local development. Legislation introduced in 2003 established district governments as legal entities with a duty to prepare strategic and operational development plans in a participatory way. Consultative councils were established in every district and district governments were made budgetary units that would receive fiscal transfers. In 2005, districts were allocated an investment budget for the first time, effectively replicating and mainstreaming the UNCDF’s Local Development Funds.

UNDP projects continued to innovate in three provinces. Measures were introduced to strengthen local revenue collection, to improve financial management and to increase public accountability. An approach to local economic development was devised that used community-based businesses to construct public infrastructure financed via district government investment budgets.

In 2007, the government invited UNDP and other development partners to support the establishment of a National Decentralized Planning and Finance Programme. Launched in 2010 and managed by the government, this national programme supports local governments to propagate inclusive development in all 128 districts. Finally, in 2013 the government approved a policy and strategy for decentralization largely inspired by the approaches to local governance and inclusive development introduced with UNDP support.

Below are the main LESSONS LEARNED from UNDP support to the introduction of decentralized and participative planning in Mozambique.

- **Piloting sensitive governance reforms in a post-conflict scenario** is an effective means of securing central government support and building confidence. Involving central government from the beginning, as a partner in the pilot, is critical to both its success and the possibility for future replication and up-scaling.

- **Adopting a bottom-up approach for re-establishing the legitimacy of the state through local governments** (as the institution closest to conflict and crisis-affected communities) is a manageable and effective entry point for local governance intervention.

- **Participatory planning** is an important tool for mobilizing consensus around development priorities, facilitating dialogue between stakeholders, promoting inclusive development and reducing the risk of a return to conflict.

- **Local development funds** are critical for strengthening local government planning and financial management capacity; they give incentives to prepare development plans in a participatory way and also help legitimize the planning process. However, it is important that these funds are ultimately absorbed into the state budget to guarantee sustainability.

- **Even where recovery appears consolidated, underlying fragility in local government institutions** may remain and be quickly exposed by natural disasters or renewed outbreaks of conflict. Permanent and robust mechanisms for dialogue and participation are required to overcome this and the potential effects of climate change and natural disasters must be contemplated and provided for in local development planning processes.

In 2013, the Government of Mozambique approved a policy and strategy for decentralization largely inspired by the approaches to local governance and inclusive development introduced with UNDP support.
Build coordination capacities of local governments and the leadership and negotiation skills of their chief executives.

Support the effective de-concentration of line ministries and state agencies.

Support institution-building of the central authority overseeing local governments.

Help reform local development planning processes (for example proposing integrated sectorial and territorial planning models, such as the ART Initiative).

Support joint communications campaigns that deliver an integrated state response to complex issues (e.g. fighting sexual and gender-based violence, local economic recovery, unexploded ordnance removal).

8.3 PROFESSIONALIZING THE LOCAL CIVIL SERVICE

A professional and capable local civil service is a *sine qua non* condition for the sustainable strengthening of local governments, in synchrony with an incremental transfer of responsibilities and resources from the central to the local level. As developed in Thematic Note 3, the individual level is the foundation of the multidimensional capacity development model used by UNDP. Successful capacity development of local governance staff involves using a variety of techniques and, increasingly, technological solutions (especially in fragile and conflict-affected settings where the national training infrastructure is often very poor) such as on-line courses.

Training for local civil servants in fragile and conflict-affected settings is still often done through piece-meal and poorly coordinated initiatives focusing on rapid skills transfer using short-term training plans and traditional workshop techniques. Even if this may be justified in certain immediate post-crisis situations, such approach is detrimental in the long run. The issue at stake is not just training and building skills of local government staff, it is also about making the local civil service sufficiently attractive to qualified professionals.

In terms of employment status, the local civil service should be among the most protected, merit-based and career-oriented of all public sector employment. However, in fragile and conflict-affected settings, patronage is rife in accessing local government jobs and contracts are often insecure, opening the door to extensive staff turn-overs with each change in leadership. Pay scales are lower than in the national civil service, even at similar levels of qualification and responsibility, and the discrepancy is even higher for women staff versus their male colleagues. As a result, typically, qualified professionals may start jobs with local governments following a crisis but they move quickly up the public sector ladder or jump ship to work at better paying and more incentivized jobs at non-governmental organizations or in donor programmes.

Possible *activities* falling under this entry point are listed below.

- Develop mapping tools to monitor local government staffing according to employment status, gender, qualifications, etc.
- Support central governments in devising policies and mechanisms to gradually rid local civil service of double-dippers and ghost-workers.
- Design a competency-based national capacity development strategy for local governments.
- Support the emergence of national training providers (such as local civil service academies, private training institutes, qualifying courses at...

---

93 In some countries, local government jobs are not recognized as public sector employment. This encourages fraudulent practices such as non-commissioned appointments of temporary workers – often on a patrimonial basis – and under-the-table remuneration. For example, in 2009, Nigeria’s Akwa Ibom State Governor ordered the termination of local government employees illegally appointed by local council chairmen over the previous two years (Point Blank News).
universities), and help equip them with effective training tools (training curricula, training of trainers programmes, business plans, etc.) (see Box 29).

- Offer capacity development funds, and capacity development block grants to local governments (demand- and performance-driven),94 in support of the implementation of national capacity development strategies.

- Support diagnostic and prospective studies to inform the revision of the regulatory framework applying to local civil service – ideally within the context of broader public sector and decentralization reforms.

- Mainstream policies to increase diversity among local government staff and officials, and reduce capture by older men of the dominant identity group.95 Support the design and implementation of affirmative action policies straddling the supply and demand side.

8.4 EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF AID TO LOCAL GOVERNANCE

Donor support to local governance is growing96 – even if it still remains comparatively low in fragile and conflict-affected settings. Increasingly, pressure is exerted on donors to recognize the role of local governments in the aid effectiveness agenda and to raise the share of their aid packages channelled through local governments rather than through parallel delivery mechanisms. At the same time, decentralized aid flows, from local government to local government, have expanded tremendously, bringing valuable development opportunities to communities in the south – yet at times also weakening the overall aid effectiveness in a country given the often short-term and piecemeal nature of decentralized cooperation assistance.

In a context of increased aid amounts channelled to local governance, improving the strategic, programmatic and operational coordination of such aid to facilitate greater subnational ownership, alignment and harmonization in local recovery and development cooperation and to avoid aid ‘orphans’ among regions and localities of a country is therefore essential.

Achieving this objective is particularly challenging in fragile and conflict-affected settings given: (i) the weaknesses of local government institutions; (ii) the difficulty access to the field in most situations; (iii) the lack of detailed reporting by donors on what their support to the local level consists of; and (iv) the multitude of small projects implemented by non-governmental organizations and other non-overseas development aid actors (including decentralized actors) that often go unreported in national aid coordination mechanisms. In addition to this, central governments are usually reluctant to reinforce the role of local governments in managing aid channelled through budget support and sector-wide approaches. There may also be reluctance among donors to increase coordination at the local level as support to service delivery and recovery in fragile and conflict-affected settings still engenders opposing approaches: community-driven versus local government-driven; service delivery first versus local democracy first; embedded with stabilisation (e.g. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan) versus separate tracks.

UNDP can play a critical role in bringing about better coordination among donors and other assistance providers. When working to improve aid coordination to local governance, one of the first requirements is that aid coordination platforms be closer to the subnational level (province, region, cities) and give a more prominent role to local governments – instead of them being informed post-facto of decisions made at higher levels on the use of aid allocated to their areas and to their own capacity development. Aid coordination should also facilitate the pooling of operational means between development partners given the challenging conditions for working at the local level in fragile and conflict-affected settings, be it logistical access and/or security risks.

94. UNCDF builds capacity development windows into its local development funds (i.e. a fixed percentage of any capital grant is to be spent on capacity development activities).

95. In Burundi, the constitution sets a maximum of 67 percent of local elected leadership positions to any ethnic group.

96. ODA to local governance is up from 10 percent in 2000 to just over 15 percent in 2010 (OECD, 2013). Awareness and recognition of the role of local governments in development cooperation is increasing as well, and the United Cities and Local Governments partnership has become a permanent member of the OECD/DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and the United Nations Development Cooperation Forum.
government down to subnational government entities (usually regions, provinces and cities). For example, UNDP’s ART Initiative is actively supporting recipient local governments to establish aid cooperation units in their structures and create local aid monitoring frameworks.

- Support the use of ICT and other solutions at the local level for data collection and reporting on aid.
- Organize regular development partner forums on local governance to discuss progress, challenges, gaps and exit strategies.
- Advocate with central and local governments for open data on aid flows and support civil society actors to analyse and report on the use of aid resources at the local level.

8.5 BUILDING STRONG PEER NETWORKS

Connecting and increasing networking among local governments for knowledge sharing, resource pooling and more effective policy advocacy contributes to strengthening the horizontal integration of local governance systems in a country and to creating a more demand-driven enabling environment for local governance reforms. Regions and countries undergoing important changes in their local governance system following a crisis or in an effort to avert more have much to learn from other countries that have undergone similar experiences; therefore, transnational peer networks should also be supported. UNDP’s role as a facilitator of peer networking in local governance is aligned with its strong commitment to South-South cooperation, as emphasized in its Strategic Plan 2014-2017.

Possible ACTIVITIES that fall under this entry point are listed below:

- Support the creation of local government associations.
- Assist countries and regions to create local government knowledge sharing platforms, mechanisms to pool resources and joint advocacy strategies; and
- Establish and nurture South-South exchanges and triangular cooperation.

In regards to the latter activity, governments can be pointed in the direction of existing regional and global networks of local authorities as listed below.

**GLOBAL LEVEL**

- United Cities and Local Governments (www.uclg.org)
- Cities Alliance, active in the fight against urban poverty and the promotion of the role of cities in sustainable development (www.citiesalliance.org)
- The Sustainable Urban Development Network sponsored by UN-HABITAT (http://mirror.unhabitat.org/categories.asp?catid=570)
- ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability, provides technical consulting and training support to member towns and cities (www.iclei.org)
- The Development Partners Working Group on Decentralization and Local Governance works for harmonization and effectiveness in local development (DeLoG www.delog.org)

**REGIONAL LEVEL**

- United Cities and Local Governments of Africa (www.africlocale.org)
- The Arab Towns Organization seeks to raise the standard of municipal services in Arab cities, while preserving traditional identity (www.ato.net)
- The Network of Local Government Training and Research Institutes in Asia and the Pacific facilitates the technical capacity of member local government associations (http://logotri.hypermart.net)

In Cambodia, UNDP supports the National League of Communes (sangkats) to represent and advocate for the interests of their members and citizens towards the national government during the process of major decentralization reform underway in the country since 2006. As a result, the League is now able to represent not only commune councils (the lowest unit of local government in the country) but also district and urban municipalities. This wider representation has given the League heavier weight in negotiations with the national government. The League has also increased its level of services to its members in terms of information and knowledge exchange.
Examples of indicators for measuring results in building an enabling environment for local governance

**ADMINISTRATIVE DATA**

- percentage of country’s provinces and municipalities represented in a national dialogue process on local governance
- number of draft legislations on local governance making use of lessons learned from programme results
- percentage of local policy articulation mechanisms chaired by local governments (per subnational governance level)
- level of duplication or contradiction in service delivery responsibilities among layers of government (qualitative evaluation)
- existence of a national local governance capacity development strategy
- percentage of local government staff trained in administrative, planning and financial management
- existence of a unified local governance strategy used by all partners and donors
- percentage of overseas development aid spent on the decentralization and subnational government categories (OECD category) channeled through local governments
- number of functional local government associations

**SURVEYS**

- percentage of citizens placing local governance reform among their top five policy priorities
- percentage of local government employees with qualifications that actually fit their job category requirements (male/female)
- percentage of local government employees in management roles staying in their post for more than five years (male/female)

**Lessons learned and recommendations**

1. **THE DEBATE ON DECENTRALIZATION SHOULD BE ANCHORED ON PEACE, SECURITY AND RECOVERY OBJECTIVES.**
   Discussing democratic values is inspirational in fragile and conflict-affected settings, but all actors, including citizens, need to be reminded constantly of the risks and trade-offs linked to decentralization with regards to progress on peace, security and recovery. Also, the period for debating and testing options before a reform is launched in earnest should be time-limited to avoid frustrations arising from expectations heightened by debate but not met by lack of actual changes in local governance arrangements.a

2. **ENCOURAGING INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS TO OVERCOME SECTORIAL THINKING RATHER THAN FORCING THEM TO DO SO** is more effective to achieve policy integration. Money flows through the sectors and sectors can resist local government coordination, even if inscribed by law, unless they see it as a ‘win’ situation. Demonstrating the positive impact of locally-led coordination on sectoral results is a very good incentive: this is why priority must be given early on to reinforcing the leadership and coordination capacities of local executives. Support to local coordination at the intermediary level first is recommended, as this is where convincing results can be accrued faster.

3. **VERTICAL INTEGRATION BETWEEN SUB-NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IS ALSO RELEVANT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT.**
   Intermediary sub-national institutions play an important role in supporting local governments at lower levels located within their administrative borders with policy guidance, funding, technical support, regulatory oversight and more. Weak intermediary institutions push mayors, for example, to seek assistance directly from the national level of government, putting a strain on fledgling central institutions and entailing excessive transaction costs on poorly-resourced local governments.

4. **BUILDING STAFF CAPACITIES HELPS REDUCE PATRONAGE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT MORE THAN IMPOSING PRINCIPLES.**
   Introducing merit-based recruitment practices up-front in local administrations in fragile and crisis-affected settings will probably not work. Rather, building strong capacities for key staff positions (e.g. secretary-general, accountant and heads of units) reduces the prevalence of clientelistic appointments after a change of administration, as a new chief executive has more incentives to keep capable staff already in place when they can help him or her start delivering quickly on his or her electoral promises.

5. **A STRONG MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEM IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OVER PROGRESS IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE** is key to improving capacity-building strategies and incentivizing stronger donor coordination.

**Knowledge products**

**TOOLS**

- UN-HABITAT International Guidelines on Decentralisation and Access to Basic Services for All
- UNDP Practice Note on Decentralized Governance for Development
- UNDP Signature Product on Aid Management in Disaster Response Situations

**SUGGESTED FURTHER READING**

- UN, Restore or Reform: UN Support to Core Government Functions in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, 2014.
- UN-DESA, Policy Integration in Government in pursuit of Sustainable Development Goals.

---

*a. In Haiti, decentralization has been on the table since 2002 and as of 2015 is still being debated. Only two of the four echelons of local government are fully established. In Timor-Leste, the first comprehensive Decentralization Strategic Framework was produced in 2009, but the first piece of legislation launching decentralization in earnest was not passed until 2014.*
Part III:

PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION

Note: This section of the Guide makes use of UNDP Programme and Operations Policies and Procedures (POPP) for many of the themes discussed. Country Offices should consult the POPP for more guidance on the corporate requirements applying to programme management.
Chapter 9:

BUILDING STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS

Community members shake hands after reaching an agreement at a dispute resolution meeting in Kenya. (Photo: UNDP Kenya)
Effective support to local governance in settings where the political, security and logistical constraints are manifold and above what is applicable to mainstream development situations, requires a system-wide response; no single actor can do it alone.

9.1 PARTNERSHIP OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUPPORTING LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SETTINGS

UNDP programming modalities in support of local governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings will depend heavily on the partnership environment available in each country. There are several reasons why UNDP Country Offices should actively seek strategic partnerships with a wide range of development partners, including other UN entities, international financial institutions, bilateral agencies and national actors, to design and implement local governance programmes in fragile and conflict-affected settings. These include:

- the multidisciplinary nature of the social contract-based approach, which calls for specific expertise in areas (e.g. social services, urban management, public finance management, agriculture) in which other organizations may have stronger comparative advantages than UNDP;
- working at the local level in fragile and conflict-affected settings requires operational and security arrangements often too costly to be borne by one single organization;
- the ultimate goal is to affect change on local governance at scale, not just to create islands of excellence; the costs and complexity of implementing programmes covering a significant portion of the national territory calls for partnerships;
- reputational and political risks of operating in fragile and conflict-affected environments are more manageable when shared with other organizations;
- partnerships help UNDP widen platforms to disseminate its integrated approach to statebuilding and peacebuilding through the transformation of local governance systems; and
- partnerships have a catalytic effect on implementing the principles of aid effectiveness and therefore can ease the immense challenges faced by recipient countries in defining a strategy for the extension of state authority, universal service delivery and increased local democracy, and implement it through well-coordinated donor support.

Partnering for local governance programming is particularly indicated in UN mission environments. Working with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the UN Department of Political Affairs at the local level, in particular through their Civil Affairs component, allows bringing political, security and justice dimensions together with institution-building and development preoccupations. This partnership model, successfully piloted in recent years in countries such as Liberia, the DRC, the Central African Republic and Mali, allows supporting in a more holistic and systematic fashion national strategies for the restoration and extension of state authority in post-conflict contexts.

Different partnership modalities that can be used for local governance programming in fragile and conflict-affected settings are described below.

- **COORDINATED PROGRAMMING:** If development partners do not coordinate closely with each other when implementing local governance programmes in fragile and conflict-affected settings, there is a real risk of overwhelming national and local country institutions. This risk is particularly high when donors pursue different approaches to local governance and their target areas overlap. Lack of donor coordination in local governance, more frequent than in other areas of work, especially in post-conflict settings, has often delayed the sustainable transformation of local governance arrangements. UNDP has the mandate and capacity to play a coordinating role and to broker alignment and forge synergies between development partners who are supporting local governance.

- **JOINT PROGRAMMING:** A joint programme consists of two or more UN agencies jointly carrying out assessment of problems, designing interventions consisting of shared objectives, actions, timeframes, resource requirements and clear delineation of responsibilities. It is a common modality for local governance and early recovery programming in fragile

---

Increasingly, large cities from emerging and developed countries engage in international activities. This role is now accepted by international institutions and national governments as part of their mandate. Many cities positioned as leaders of the twenty-first century urban development agenda have a deep history of dealing with violence, conflict and destruction, for example Beirut, Belfast, Berlin, Medellín and Zagreb. These lead cities are keen to help other cities going through similar phases to benefit from their experiences in promoting social cohesion, conflict prevention and resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.

City diplomacy activities usually consist of:

(i) **lobbying** for human rights, peace and democratic transition agendas in recipient cities;

(ii) **supporting projects** technically and financially, either directly or through peacekeeping missions; and

(iii) **facilitating local, regional and global dialogue** and exchanges, as well as mediation and reconciliation.

UNDP supports city diplomacy initiatives, often in partnership with the United Cities and Local Governments or other regional and global local government associations, such as VNG International.

### SOUTH-SOUTH PARTNERSHIPS AND DECENTRALIZED COOPERATION

UNDP is strongly committed to increasing South-South exchanges and Triangular Cooperation (SSE/TC). UNDP acts as a knowledge broker, builder of capacities and a facilitator of exchanges driven primarily by recipient countries. SSE/TC concerns as well decentralized cooperation between local governments from different countries. UNDP has global leadership in facilitating decentralized cooperation through the ART Framework, including in fragile and conflict-affected settings. Decentralized cooperation is particularly relevant for urban governance programmes, as cities in recipient countries are usually more open to and capable of absorbing innovative local governance solutions, especially when involving the use of ICT or public-private partnerships, than local governments in rural areas. Large cities in emerging or developed countries have many worthwhile experiences to share in addressing rapid urbanization problems as well as social cohesion and conflict issues. This role of City Diplomacy, which could be increasingly supported by UNDP in the context of urban governance programming in fragile and conflict-affected settings, is presented in Box 31.

### REGIONAL AND CROSS-BORDER PROGRAMMING

As conflicts often take on a regional dimension, joint programmes can also happen between two or more UNDP Country Offices to promote cross-border cooperation between local governments and communities as a means of more effectively addressing drivers of conflict and supporting recovery, in particular by promoting local cross-border trade.

Table 7 presents the more prominent opportunities for strategic partnerships at the regional and global level for local governance programming in fragile and conflict-affected settings. UNDP Country Offices need also to actively seek partnerships with national actors, including research networks, academic institutions, civil society organizations and private contractors for capacity development, just to name a few, for programme design and implementation.

---

98. In Colombia, the 23 agencies of the UN Country Team work together on local-level peacebuilding through an area-based UN Development Assistance Framework.


### TABLE 7: KEY MULTILATERAL PARTNERS FOR UNDP LOCAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMMING IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SETTINGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROSPECTIVE PARTNER AGENCY</th>
<th>AREA OF PARTNERSHIP</th>
<th>COUNTRY EXAMPLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DPKO/Civil Affairs</td>
<td>DPKO/Civil Affairs supports peacebuilding and the extension of state authority in countries in which United Nations missions are deployed. It contributes to understand local perceptions on security and the political and socio-economic occurrences affecting the peace process. Through partnership with DPKO/Civil Affairs, UNDP can operate at scale at the subnational level and benefit from political expertise provided by a United Nations mission to advance its work on core government functions, including on local governance.</td>
<td>Liberia, DRC, Central African Republic, Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Capital Development Fund</td>
<td>UNCDF interventions are designed to introduce local development and financial innovations, including in risky environments, which can be scaled-up through partnerships with UNDP.</td>
<td>DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Volunteers</td>
<td>UN Volunteers participate in enhancing the implementation capacity of programmes and strengthening local capacity and participation. Increasingly, UNV promotes south-south exchanges through volunteerism.</td>
<td>South Sudan, Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN-Habitat</td>
<td>UN-Habitat supports cities in fragile and crisis-affected contexts to deliver effective urban governance. This entails policy and programming in areas of urban management and planning, building regulations, housing, land tenure and human security.</td>
<td>Iraq, Somalia, Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
<td>ILO is a regular partner of UNDP in early recovery programmes. Their core technical and training capacity in employment creation and local economic recovery can be sourced to support local authorities to play a more effective role in supporting local economic growth following a conflict.</td>
<td>Mozambique, Rwanda, Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>UN WOMEN plays an important role in enhancing women’s empowerment through facilitating inclusive local governance and gender-responsive planning, budgeting and service delivery at the local level. In 2015, UNDP and UN WOMEN launched a global programme for Advancing Gender-Responsive Local Governance, with pilots in 15 countries, including fragile states. The programme provides strategies and tools to position gender equality in local governance, including through technical assistance and grant funding.</td>
<td>Mozambique, Rwanda, Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO, FAO, UNESCO and other agencies</td>
<td>Specialized United Nations agencies support the resumption of service delivery and livelihoods in post-crisis settings and, for this, support also local governance actors with assets, capacity development and partnership-building between state and non-state actors for improved service delivery.</td>
<td>El Salvador, Iraq, Somalia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

b. The Safer Cities Programme is a flagship programme of UN-HABITAT on human security in megacities.
9.2 RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

The combination of a high-risk environment, limited control over outcomes – given the multitude of unstable programming variables in fragile and conflict-affected settings – and high domestic pressure to achieve rapid tangible results makes mobilizing sufficient resources for the long-haul effort of transforming local governance systems really arduous.

A key challenge lies in justifying that assistance to local governance, and in particular local governments, is both necessary and feasible in contexts of high institutional weakness, limited extension of state authority and/or high levels of corruption in local authorities – among other difficulties plaguing local governance systems in such settings. However, because of a growing evidentiary base, brought up numerous times in this Guide, that even in such challenging contexts adopting a long-view, integrated local governance approach to peacebuilding, state-building and recovery is more effective, the resource mobilization situation is slowly improving. More donors seem ready to stand by global commitments to work through country systems for local recovery and development – and even for crisis response and humanitarian assistance to some extent – made with the New Deal and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.

A common modality in post-conflict settings is the use of pooled funding mechanisms (e.g. country-level multi-donor trust funds) often managed by UNDP and/or the World Bank. The degree of ownership and control over pooled funds by country authorities can vary depending on the level of state legitimacy and functionality. In most cases, though, pooled funds are co-managed by state authorities. Programmes funded through such facility need to be aligned with national priorities and preference usually goes to programmes supporting country systems. Besides its mandate as an administrative agent for pooled funds, UNDP is particularly well placed to access such funds in support of local governance systems given its strong focus on working through and in support of state institutions. UNDP proposals to pooled funds should carefully balance assistance to local governments and to other local governance actors, insisting on the necessity to ensure a pluralistic and inclusive local governance system.

Where pooled funds are not available, bilateral funding and global thematic trust funds can be accessed (see Table 8). The UNDP Crisis Response Website also provides guidance to Country Offices for accessing common internal and external sources of funding in crisis and post-crisis settings, including TRAC 3, Category 2 emergency grants, seed funding for UNDP early recovery interventions and non-UNDP administered funding options.

More donors seem ready to stand by global commitments to work through country systems for local recovery and development – and even for crisis response and humanitarian assistance to some extent – made with the New Deal and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.

## TABLE 8: RESOURCE MOBILIZATION OPPORTUNITIES FOR LOCAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMMES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENTRY POINT</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portfolio restructuring</td>
<td>When starting a local governance programme in a crisis or post-crisis setting, UNDP offices should look first at the possibility of restructuring their pre-crisis portfolio based on the needs of crisis-affected communities. TRAC resources can be used flexibly to respond quickly to a crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country-level multi-donor trust funds</td>
<td>Examples: the Central African Republic, Darfur, Haiti, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, etc. UNDP is the largest recipient of such funds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Response Plan</td>
<td>In protracted crisis situations, the Humanitarian Country Team creates a Strategic Response Plan (SRP) which presents to donors and the public the scope of the response to assessed needs and resource mobilization targets. SRPs are multi-year plans made up of two components: (i) a country strategy consisting of a narrative, strategic objectives and indicators; and (ii) cluster plans consisting of objectives, activities and accompanying projects, which detail implementation and costing of the strategy. They can be funded from various sources (bilateral, pooled funds, Central Emergency Response Fund). In case of sudden-onset emergencies, Flash Appeals are produced to cover immediate needs for up to 18 months. UNDP leads the Early Recovery Cluster and is in a good position to emphasize local governance needs in this area, in particular to support increased involvement of local institutions and stakeholders in planning and implementing humanitarian responses. More details are available on <a href="https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/programme-cycle">https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/programme-cycle</a>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP Trust Funds</td>
<td>UNDP non-core funding architecture contains two Trust Funds relevant to local governance programming in fragile and conflict-affected settings: (1) The Governance and Peacebuilding Trust Fund; and (2) the Crisis Response and Early Recovery Trust Fund. Both funds support primarily country-level impact-oriented programmes (but also regional and global initiatives) with results frameworks directly linked to the UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017. Country Offices can be supported by substantive experts from regional hubs and headquarters during the project design phase. Proposals are reviewed by headquarter-based committees. Allocations are made on the basis of the delivery performance of applicant UNDP business units and a clear budgeting of at least 15 percent of the project budget for measurable gender equality outputs. South-South and Triangular Cooperation should be also prioritized in programme design.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (European Union)</td>
<td>The Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace of the European Union is meant to provide a swift crisis-response in political conflicts and when natural disasters occur, complementing humanitarian relief and interventions of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defense Policy. It can be programmed in cooperation with international, regional and civil society organizations and EU member states. The Instrument covers virtually all areas considered relevant under a local governance programme in fragile and conflict-affected settings. As the Instrument is meant to cover only the immediate post-conflict/post-disaster response, programme duration is limited to 18 months (extendable to 30 months). All proposals must be discussed first by UNDP Country Offices with the EU delegation and EU member state representations present in the target country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding Fund</td>
<td>The Immediate Response Facility and the Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility – two windows of the Peacebuilding Fund – offer funding opportunities for local governance programming. The Fund has among its priorities: (i) the promotion of coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict and to carry out peacebuilding activities; and (ii) the establishment or re-establishment of essential administrative services and related human and technical capacities which may include, in exceptional circumstances and over a limited period of time, the payment of civil service salaries and other recurrent costs. All proposals must be submitted through the Office of the Senior UN Representative in-country (often the Special Representative of the Secretary-General).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security</td>
<td>The objective of the UN Trust Fund for Human Security is to finance activities carried out by UN organizations and/or designated non-UN organizations which translate the human security approach into practical actions, in particular those at the field level. This fund is relevant to most activities proposed under the integrated local governance approach presented in this Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN/World Bank Trust Fund</td>
<td>This Trust Fund is available to enhance strategic dialogue and operational and programmatic collaboration at headquarters, regional and field level in line with the principles and priority areas outlined in the 2008 Partnership Framework Agreement. The Trust Fund supports focused strategic interventions conducted in a joint UN/World Bank format, including rapid assessments and planning exercises, technical assistance to inform national development policies, full-fledged programmes including in areas directly relevant to local governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings (early recovery of government-led service delivery, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, core government functionalities), research and knowledge activities, preparation of operational tools and guidelines, outreach activities and staff secondment. This Trust Fund is managed by the World Bank, with a portion of the resources set aside for a UN window managed by the UN Development Operations Coordination Office to facilitate disbursements to UN implementing partners.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 10:

MANAGING LOCAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMMES IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SETTINGS
Implementing local governance programmes in fragile and conflict-affected settings is not ‘business-as-usual.’ Without supportive, flexible and, at times, unconventional management and operating systems the impact of UNDP programming in this area will be limited.

10.1 MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

Implementation modality and responsible parties

In most fragile and conflict-affected settings, UNDP implements programmes under a DIRECT IMPLEMENTATION MODALITY (DIM). This ensures a speedy delivery and prevents national and local institutions, which are already overwhelmed by assuming their core responsibilities, from being distracted by the burden of programme administration under donor requirements. It is also recommended as a modality in situations where the legitimacy of the state is challenged, or the state is absent or largely unresponsive, in all or part of the sub-national areas where the local governance programme is due to be implemented.

However, in countries where the NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MODALITY (NIM) is already well established and conflict may appear only in specific areas of the country, UNDP Country Offices may also choose to continue with this arrangement to implement a local governance programme in conflict-affected areas. A programme can also be started under DIM until such time as national capacities for project implementation are deemed sufficient and modalities can be shifted to national implementation – which remains the modality of preference for national ownership and capacity-building.

A local governance programme involves distinct work streams and requires different fields of technical expertise. This might call for different responsible parties to deliver specific programme components. Responsible parties may include government entities, private sector firms, UN agencies, NGOs or civil society organizations (see Figure 10).

Under the DIM, local governments can be engaged as responsible parties for executing programme funds. This option is encouraged for capacity- and legitimacy-building whenever the level of risk is deemed tolerable. Four main questions need to be considered when making this choice.

- Is the administrative capacity of local governments sufficient (considering technical assistance provided by UNDP) to successfully execute this work and in a timely manner?
- Do the ultimate beneficiaries trust that the local governments will handle these programme funds properly?
- What is the level of fiduciary risk given the integrity and accountability track record of the concerned local governments?
- Would engaging local governments as responsible parties possibly taint UNDP’s position vis-à-vis the parties in (or formerly in) conflict?

As underlined in Section 2.4, fiduciary risks should not overshadow the benefits of handing over the responsibility of certain programme activities to local governments. A standard practice before concluding a Letter of Agreement (LOA) with a state institution is to conduct a capacity assessment to verify minimum compliance with some of UNDP’s most essential financial rules. Such an exercise will also help calibrate UNDP’s capacity development assistance towards partner local governments.

UNDP Country Offices should budget enough time during the programme planning phase to carry out the processes involved in assessing, selecting and formalizing engagement with partners, including any contracting and procurement actions, and consider time-saving measures that may be applied, such as UNDP fast-track procedures (see Section 10.2).
Programme management leadership

The management of an integrated local governance programme in a fragile context is a complex undertaking that requires skills not always readily available within a UNDP Country Office. In the case of a short-crisis scenario, if local governance and local development programmes are already in operation, the most effective option – in consultation with government and donors – is to build upon existing programmes. Resources need to be redirected towards the most urgently needed logistical and capacity-building support to respond to the crisis. This will enable local authorities and their partners to deal with immediate conflict management and early recovery needs of the population. If participatory governance mechanisms are already in place and can provide an acceptable and inclusive interface between communities and local governments to solve the crisis, they should be used to assess needs and define participatory recovery plans.

In settings where UNDP must start programming an integrated local governance response from scratch – alone or in partnership with other development partners – a programme manager responsible for all programme components needs to be recruited. This manager should have substantial expertise in local governance (see job description in Annex 8.). If the Country Office decides to hire a Programme Manager with another focus of expertise (for example, in livelihoods and local economic recovery activities, or rule of law), a senior advisor in local governance will need to be hired to support the Programme Manager.

Short-term support, of up to 6 months, is available to Country Offices through the UNDP SURGE facility, which is designed to provide a temporary injection of experienced in-house or external capacity to jump-start programme planning and implementation. Ideally, during the period of the SURGE deployment, the Country Office is able to recruit a long-term Programme Manager, Chief Technical Advisor or Senior Local Governance Advisor (depending on the programme strategy followed).
Sri Lanka’s modern history is fraught with internal instability and disasters. In May 2009, the Sri Lankan army defeated the Tamil independence movement in the North, ending a conflict that had started soon after independence between the majority Sinhalese population and the largest minority, the Tamils. The Sri Lankan Civil War took an estimated 80,000-100,000 lives. The suffering of the Sri Lankan population was further compounded when the country was hit by its worst natural disaster in history, the December 2004 tsunami, which caused 40,000 deaths and displaced 418,000 people.

In spite of this very challenging environment, or maybe pushed by it, the Sri Lankan local governance system has evolved towards more autonomy since independence. Local governance is organized, from the provincial down to the village level, around devolved and de-concentrated structures. The village level plays the main role for the delivery of development and administrative services, while the provincial level is imbued with political representation and organizing basic services. Disputes remain with regards to the sharing of functions and powers between both levels and this was particularly acute in areas that experienced both the civil war and the tsunami. Since the conflict ended, local governance in Sri Lanka has become more fluid.

UNDP has been a major supporter of local governance in Sri Lanka throughout the various crises that have hit the country. After the tsunami, UNDP continued to support local government crisis responsiveness through a series of projects which culminated into the integrated Governance for Local Economic Development Project. This project focuses on building capacities across the country of local governments, civil society, the private sector and communities to foster access to enhanced public services, socio-economic development and social cohesion, while securing the transition from recovery to development in crisis-affected areas. In addition, UNDP supports Provincial Councils in managing local development (ART-GoLD project) and works nationally to increase women’s political participation in local settings.

After a decade of UNDP support to recovery from both disaster and conflict, important progress has been made in the capacities of provincial and local governments and de-concentrated structures. UNDP support has been multidimensional and included both hardware and human resources in the immediate post-crisis phases. UNDP has supported capacity-building of local civil service and civil society actors and the overhaul of local governance processes, in particular information management, planning and inclusive community engagement. Provincial and local governments now play a leading role in recovery not just for rebuilding physical infrastructure but also for economic recovery and social cohesion.

A good example of the structural shifts achieved rests with the Citizen Charter Scheme, in which 14,000 communities and their local governments have agreed to a set of principles for improved local governance. According to an Assessment of Development Results conducted in 2012, UNDP had a considerable positive effect on the lives of the poor and vulnerable in the country.

Below are the main Lessons Learned from UNDP support to recovery from complex crises at the local level in Sri Lanka.

- Integrating recovery and support to local governments is more effective, in the short and long-term than working only through community-driven development models.
- Post-disaster recovery in a conflict context makes prioritization of activities and beneficiaries very sensitive.
- Social cohesion interventions in deeply-divided communities must be mainstreamed into all project activities; it cannot be accomplished through stand-alone interventions.
- UNDP physical presence in project locations, including through embedding staff within key partner institutions, ensures the success of local governance programming in crisis-affected settings.
- Establishing Sub-Offices for co-hosting all field-based cluster team staff, under co-management of the Head of the Sub-Office and cluster leader can be an effective structure when implementing local governance initiatives.
- Area-based reports and reviews, contributed by all cluster teams and against targets set in an integrated local governance and local development programme framework greatly benefited the overall programme implementation process.
- Local government involvement in supporting local economic recovery needs to be activated from the start; this helps leverage more financial and technical resources and facilitates the recovery-to-development linkage later on.

- Including the Capacity Development for Recovery Project and the Project for Sustaining Tsunami Recovery by Organizations Networking at the Grassroots Project. Both projects were combined in 2008 into the Local Governance Project (LoGoPro). In the post-war period, the LoGoPro was combined in 2013 with the economic recovery work carried out by the Transition Recovery Programme to form the Governance for Local Economic Development project.

133
Maintaining an integrated approach during programme implementation

The approach proposed for country-level programming in local governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings is by definition multi-sectorial and hence premised on the capacity of UNDP Country Office programme teams in different clusters (governance and peacebuilding, sustainable development, climate change and disaster risk reduction, gender) to assess needs, plan and implement activities, and measure results in an integrated fashion in the territories targeted. Country Offices should make use of the detailed guidance provided in UNDP’s Integrated Local Governance and Local Development Strategy and corresponding Toolkit on how to re-organize internal programming and management systems for achieving better integration in pursuing local development results.

Some key recommendations for achieving greater integration among cluster teams during implementation are found below.

- Establish early on Country Office Development Solutions Teams to address needs of a particular sub-area affected by conflict or violence and maintain these teams active from assessment through to programme design and implementation.

- Adopt an area-based programming approach, in which all cluster teams contribute an output (or more) into an umbrella programme using a single integrated results and resources framework. Ideally, the area-based approach should also be reflected in the Country Programme Document. An area-based reporting system should also complement existing vertical/sectorial monitoring frameworks.

- Assign a Local Governance and Local Development focal point in each sectorial cluster of the Country Office. The focal point will work under the technical coordination of the overall local governance Programme Manager (or Senior Advisor) and help guarantee that results delivered by his/her cluster team in the target areas are aligned with the overall integrated local governance programme framework and, more generally, follow UNDP’s approach to local governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

- Maintain Sub-Regional/Field Hubs with representation of all programme teams active in the area(s) concerned and under the day-to-day guidance of a single Hub manager reporting to the overall Programme Manager.

10.2 OPERATIONAL ASPECTS

UNDP presence and level of support at the local level

In fragile and conflict-affected settings, UNDP Country Offices face many challenges in operationalizing local governance programmes as listed below.

- Complexity and cost involved with maintaining UNDP presence in poorly accessible areas and/or areas with high security risks, especially when a programme needs to cover significant portions of the country to create a critical mass of results to achieve impact (e.g. Afghanistan, the DRC, South Sudan, Libya).

- Difficulty to entrench local ownership during implementation and keeping UNDP in the role of facilitator rather than doer.

- Need to maintain flexible implementation modalities and timeline to respond to the fast-changing political, social and economic situation.

- Need to maintain a light UNDP footprint in contexts where security and/or national ownership imperatives are great.

Depending on the context, different strategies can be pursued to address such challenges.

- In UN mission contexts, UNDP can work jointly with Civil Affairs, embedding programme staff in Civil Affairs team and offices and/or using Civil Affairs staff to perform certain programme activities or monitor implementation and progress. More generally, UNDP should seek to build a common strategic approach and workplan with the UN mission on support to local governance systems.

- Pool resources with other UN agencies through joint programmes to reduce logistical and security costs of maintaining field presence for the programme.

- Locate programme management teams in national partner institutions and deliver as much technical and financial support to local actors as possible through their own teams on the ground.
In non-UN mission countries, or in more secure contexts, establish regional programme hubs co-located in provincial local governments (e.g. the governor’s office).

At the local level, provide programme implementation support through:
- existing local government staff, trained and supported to play a lead role in building local capacities;102
- UNVs or TOKTENs;
- national implementing partners (NGOs or consultancies), if capacities exist; and
- international implementing partners (but the costs involved may be prohibitive to cover large number of locations).

Invest in building reliable ICT networks connecting the programme office, field offices and beneficiary institutions to maintain close interaction and deliver capacity development support even in situations of remote programme management due to very limited access to the field, due to high levels of insecurity or difficult road access.

UNDP operational modality in crisis situations

Operational support encompasses finance, human resources, procurement, security, communications technologies and administrative aspects.

Procurement remains one of the main operational challenges when implementing programmes at the subnational level in fragile and conflict-affected settings, especially when UNDP plans to provide extensive reconstruction and logistical assistance to support the extension of state authority. This is why the crisis-specific FAST-TRACK PROCEDURES in UNDP’s POPP should be used in such circumstances.

These corporate measures to accelerate and simplify administrative processes are necessary, but not sufficient: Country Offices still must prime local committees to be able to rapidly review and approve bidding documents, as considerable pressure will be placed on the procurement and contracting teams. While fast-tracking allows for the simplification and acceleration of delivery, it is important to emphasize to staff that they do not erase responsibilities and accountabilities for proper utilization, oversight, monitoring and reporting.

102. In Yemen, UNDP and UNCDF established Facilitation Teams, in the context of the Local Governance Development Programme (2005 - 2012), composed of civil servants from Governorate and District-level technical and local government services. The Facilitation Teams were trained intensely to play the role of champions in local change processes and provide further training and mentoring to local governance institutions to achieve programme results.
Chapter 11:

DOCUMENTING AND COMMUNICATING ON RESULTS
UNDP can rally development partners behind a more effective approach to local governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings if it can demonstrate more clearly, and with solid evidence, the positive impact such approach has on peace and recovery.

11.1 MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Methodological steps

1) **MONITORING** captures objective data directly related to programme activities and should also capture subjective feedback from partners and participants. Monitoring helps inform real-time decision-making, and ensures there is a solid base of evidence to support project management and advocacy with partners. Monitoring provides the data needed for evaluating progress in meeting targeted output-level results (see Section 2.5 for details on output result indicators for integrated local governance programmes).

Activity monitoring is one of the major regular functions of a local governance programme team. The type of data recorded through activity monitoring should be determined by the output indicators chosen in the programme results framework. Below are some examples of activity-level data that are commonly monitored in local governance programmes.

- **Number of local state institutions participating in the programme and benefiting directly from it.** Local councils, village, municipal and governorate administrations or de-concentrated services of line ministries. Distinction should be made between executive and legislative bodies. The type and location of each beneficiary institution and how many of its staff or members took part in each programme activity (disaggregated by gender, and if possible by age and identity group) should be recorded.

- **Number of beneficiary local non-state entities, along with their characteristics and the constituency they represent.**

- **Number of communities directly participating or benefiting from a programme activity, including strength of participation (i.e. share of the community actually participating) and general characteristics of participants (quantitative and qualitative appreciation on gender, age, poverty level, identity group, etc.).**

- **Progress made in rehabilitating and rebuilding local administrative buildings.**

- **Number of participatory diagnostics conducted and local recovery and development plans created,** with details on the type and level of citizen participation, in particular for women, youth and other categories at risk of being marginalized.

- **Number of functioning community structures established (or pre-existing) and used by the project and activities conducted.**

- **Progress in debris removal and rebuilding public infrastructure, in livelihood support work, in resuming basic service delivery, etc., to capture quantitatively recovery results attributable to the local governance programme.**

- **Number of coordination committees led by local governments, type of attendance and results achieved.**

- **Number of individuals trained through formal training workshops, disaggregated by topic, organization, gender and age.**

- **Number of local civil society organizations receiving sub-grants and for which purpose.**

- **Number and types of public-private partnerships established between local governments and local civil society organizations or private companies for service delivery.**

- **Number of events organized between national government and platforms of local authorities to discuss intergovernmental relations, decentralization reform, etc.**

- **Satisfaction level of participants in formal project events and on project realizations.**

103. E.g. needs assessments, dialogue, planning, training, grant allocation, in-kind assistance. Process meetings are not considered as programme activities.

104. Some small projects might be funded through other channels than the local governance programme, but if the programme builds capacities of local stakeholders to implement these projects, their results should be captured for M&E purposes.
Activity data, whether administrative or perceptual, should be compiled using national and local statistics, other secondary data, staff reports and surveys that can contribute to the measurement of output indicators. All data collected should be disaggregated by gender at the very least, and if possible by age and other criteria related to possible horizontal inequalities (e.g. minority groups, indigenous population, ex-combatants), if collecting data disaggregated at such levels does not present risk for programme teams nor affect UNDP's neutral positioning in the conflict.

2) Periodic Reviews need to be scheduled to take place during programme implementation and after completion, especially if a second programme phase is planned. During periodic reviews, the programme’s contribution to achieving the stated programme outcomes is assessed. An inherent contradiction exists between the purpose of programme reviews (which mostly focus on impact) combined with the short-time frames of development programmes and the slow and diffuse nature of change in local governance arrangements. It is therefore often more indicated to pick up possible positive trends in progressing towards outcomes, rather than absolute values of outcome indicators, and to try to link the trends with programme’s inputs.

In addition to formal periodic reviews carried out according to UNDP corporate guidance on outcome-level programme assessments (or Country Office-level Assessments of Development Results), there is also value in conducting regular conflict-related development analyses, or repeating the initial situation analysis, to provide insights into how the programme may have affected some of the drivers of violence, conflict, institutional weaknesses and low state legitimacy.

Implementation

Effective and credible monitoring and evaluation of programme activities and impact is usually premised on full access by programme staff and external reviewers to programme beneficiaries, whether individuals, informal groups, civil society organizations, private enterprises or state institutions. In many fragile and conflict-affected contexts in which UNDP implements local governance programmes, this direct access is not guaranteed for security reasons (e.g. Iraq, Libya and Somalia). If access is possible, it might be highly constrained by the remoteness of programme locations and limited communications means.

Administrative data, on which part of the monitoring process is based, might also be missing in country institutions, or just too unreliable. It is therefore critical that Country Offices carefully identify constraints applicable to data collection, transmission and analysis at the local level during the programme design phase in order to build a realistic monitoring and evaluation plan – rather than using standard practices and templates followed in mainstream development contexts. This plan should identify mitigation measures to the lack or difficulty of access to programme locations and beneficiaries guaranteeing reliable activity monitoring even under the difficult implementation conditions faced, as these costs need to be factored into the overall programme budget from the start. Mitigation measures may include:

- contracting a monitoring agent that has easier and wider access to field locations than UNDP staff. This is the best solution for remote-control operations but also usually the most costly;
- investing in building strong data collection and monitoring capacities among local partners, so that ‘raw’ activity data can mostly emanate from them instead of UNDP staff;
- supporting participatory monitoring methods involving citizen committees and different channels for data aggregation (e.g. civil society, local governments) to better triangulate monitoring data and increase reliability. This has the added advantage of engendering local ownership of the programme and of building the downward accountability of local state institutions;
- setting aside programme funds to invest in ICT solutions to monitoring in remote-control contexts (e.g. use of online data entry interfaces, building local IT infrastructure, use of webcams, social media, mobile telephones); and
- using coordinated and joint programming modalities to share the monitoring work between different organizations, some having possibly wider access to field locations and beneficiaries than UNDP (e.g. working with DPKO Civil Affairs).
11.2 PROGRAMME COMMUNICATIONS

Clear and transparent communications about such a complex and wide-reaching programming area as local governance are essential. As rebuilding the social contract through the transformation of local governance arrangements is largely an issue of public acceptance and backing, perceptions about the success, or not, of the activities and results of the programme need to be managed throughout all phases of the programme’s life, from the design phase through to evaluations.

Dedicated efforts need to be made to set up internal communication channels among programme implementers and recipients, as well as external communication channels with the wider public, media and development community. Established and open channels will allow a steady flow of information, and should include methods for continually receiving and responding to feedback.

In the current free information age bolstered by cheap communications technology, throughout the world populations have greater access and are more in tune to events occurring in their communities and regions, and this information access is actually fomenting change. Programmes should consider creative uses of technology to move information back and forth within integrated local governance programmes.

The first step in ensuring managed communications for a programme is to create a communications strategy. This strategy must respond to the informational needs of the audiences described below.

- **LOCAL GOVERNANCE STAKEHOLDERS**, as the main direct beneficiaries, need access to clear information on the programme design, work plan and results. It is important to make sure that implementation details, in particular capacity-building opportunities, are widely disseminated within beneficiary organizations (state and non-state) to avoid elite capture.

- **COMMUNITIES** need to be made aware of the roles and responsibilities of local governments and non-state actors supported by UNDP, and to be able to make a clear distinction between their roles and those of the central government and international actors. Community members should be advised of opportunities to participate in consultations, planning and monitoring activities and other participatory processes. They should also be made aware of efforts made by local governments and other local actors, and results achieved, to restore peace and stability and support local livelihoods. Communication strategies must prioritize the sharing of information on actions taken to address marginalization patterns – this is a critical feature to signal a change in local governance.

- **CENTRAL GOVERNMENT**, including key ministries (e.g. ministries of local governance, planning, finance, interior and sector line ministries) and the Chief Executive Office, must fully understand the rationale for strong support to local governance, both in the short-term, through transitional arrangements, and in the longer-term through reform programmes. For example, the senior leadership of line ministries should ensure that staff in their de-concentrated units sufficiently involve local authorities in planning (e.g. systematically sharing sector-wide plans with local actors) and negotiate a workable division of responsibilities with them and with relevant non-state actors for service delivery and other recovery assistance.

- **MEDIA, DONORS AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC** should be informed of results achieved by the programme and be made aware of potential issues before misinformation occurs. Communication channels between local governance actors (speaking in the name of the programme) and communities and the media need to be increased or created. Methods to achieve this include organizing site visits for media and donors, press conferences at key points in the programme’s trajectory, media training on concepts related to local governance and its role in peace and development.

- **THE WIDER, GLOBAL PUBLIC** are a more important audience than ever before due to the far reach of modern communications technologies. Some fragile and conflict-affected settings will be highly visible on a global scale.
(e.g. Libya), while others may trend less in social and traditional media (e.g. Guinea). The importance of reaching these wider, and seemingly less relevant, audiences cannot be understated. Diasporas can have a strong influence on local issues and general populations can influence government responses and donor interest in certain situations.105

The communications strategy should include:

- a public information component that clearly articulates the respective roles and responsibilities of UNDP, national government, local governments and other stakeholders. This serves the dual purpose of mitigating the risks to the organization as well as instilling a sense of national ownership in the programme. If local governance support activities are part of a wider early recovery programme, it is important to make sure that they are given enough visibility within the overall programme messaging;

- statements of key messages; and

- a knowledge management component that produces and disseminates policy documents and programmatic tools utilized for programme design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and incorporating lessons, to support scaling up and institutionalization and to help build regional and global communities of practice on local governance for peace and recovery.

The communications strategy should be backed up by a sufficient and dedicated budget line that can be used to finance a range of communications tools and activities, such as:

- a variety of printed promotional materials on the programme;

- a public website and social media sites mapping the location and tracking the progress of activities (this will provide transparency, accountability and the visibility of results);

- periodic radio and television documentaries about progress made to generate general public awareness;

- public events, such as concerts, sports competitions and exhibitions to increase direct dialogue opportunities between programme stakeholders and the public;

- large lessons learned events; and

- knowledge products for different kinds of audience (from specialized to the general public).

Since access to correct and factual information is the basis of empowering people to play a significant role in governance, the communication strategy should specifically include actions that will reach out to categories often left out of decision-making processes — women, youth, socially-marginalized groups (disabled, poorest, illiterate, etc.) and minorities. These activities should respond to the specific information needs of these groups and use communication methods adapted to their circumstances. Youth, for example, form a crucial audience as drivers of change in local governance systems, but may not be receptive to traditional communication methods and instead may better be reached via social media or entertainment or sporting events.

Gender-empowering, rather than gender-neutral, language should be used. Communications activities should present a balanced representation of men and women among decision-makers and beneficiaries of the programme, devoting attention to portraying women and other marginalized groups in non-stereotypical roles.

105. This article talks about the reach of social media in/from Somalia and mentions that the president and foreign diplomats maintain twitter accounts: https://sahanjournal.com/somalia-social-media-internet/#.VqZYC4-fIU.
ANNEXES
Annex 1.

KEY DEFINITIONS

COMMUNITY: All actors, groups and institutions within a geographic area including civil society organizations, informal institutions and local authorities responsible for delivering services, and security providers as well as the general population. In addition to being defined geographically, communities can also be defined by shared interests, values and needs of their members.

COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT: An approach that gives community groups control over planning decisions and investment resources for local development projects.

DECENTRALIZATION: The process of dispersing decision-making from the centre, closer to the point of service delivery or action. It is primarily a national political, legislative, institutional and/or fiscal process. It involves the transfer of power and resources from national to subnational governments or from national to subnational administrative units. A concept central to the notion of decentralization is that of subsidiarity (an organizing principle that calls for matters to be handled by the smallest, lowest or least centralized competent authority).

DE-CONCENTRATED SERVICES: Field or subordinate offices of central government ministries and agencies (with no distinct legal entity) that exercise public authority at the local level (i.e. ‘local authority’), in particular for regulations and sometimes managing the delivery of public services. De-concentrated services have varying levels of responsibilities and capacities which are transferred and established by the central government, and these services always remain under the supervision of central government ministries. De-concentrated services are distinct from elected local governments with which they coordinate (and sometimes partially report to).

EARLY RECOVERY: Early recovery is a multidimensional process of recovery that begins in a humanitarian setting. It is an integrated and coordinated approach, using humanitarian mechanisms, to gradually turn the dividends of humanitarian action into sustainable crisis recovery, resilience building and development opportunities.

FRAGILE CONTEXT: When public authorities at national and/or in subnational levels exhibit a weak capacity, accountability and/or legitimacy to provide for and administer a population and its territory.

INTEGRATED LOCAL (AREA-BASED) RECOVERY: Both a process and an outcome or result. As a process it involves a range of stakeholders – civil society organizations, local communities, local governments, private sector companies, national government and international partners – linked by a web of complex interactions in their attempt to plan for and achieve recovery from conflict or a disaster. As an outcome, it is the collective response to the challenge of restoring living conditions and opportunities for sustainable human development to what they were before crisis hit and with increased resilience against future crises. Integrated local recovery involves immediate life-saving needs (clean water, sanitation, food, shelter) but also the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure and housing, preserving human security, restoring economic livelihoods and sources of sustainable income for the most affected populations and re-establishing the functionality of governance institutions.

LEGITIMACY: A political order, institution or actor is legitimate to the extent that people regard it as satisfactory and believe that no available alternative would be vastly superior. As a result, people are willing to live and function under its control.

LOCAL DEVELOPMENT: Development that leverages the comparative and competitive advantages of localities and mobilizes their specific physical, economic, cultural, social and political resources.

LOCAL GOVERNANCE: The combined set of institutions, systems and processes, at the subnational level, through which services are provided to citizens, groups and local communities and through which the later articulate their interests and needs, mediate their differences and exercise their rights and obligations. As such, local governance is an open, evolving and multi-dimensional process, usually led by the elected local authority and its administrative arm.
**LOCAL GOVERNMENT (OR AUTHORITY):** A generic term that refers to a set of governing institutions imbued with statutory authority over a subnational territorially defined area. The catch-all term ‘local government’ covers a wide array of entities with different mandates and powers and at different territorial levels (e.g. region, province, governorate, county, department, district, municipality), with the main examples being:

- mayor or governor (political head) and her/his office;
- Chief Executive Officer (when this is a separate function from that of the mayor or governor) and her/his office;
- local council of representatives (designated via elections or other means) and its sub-committees;
- technical and administrative units organizing the services delivered by local governments to citizens; these services may be reporting directly to the local authority (mayor, governor) or to line ministries (in which case, they are referred to as ‘de-concentrated services’ and are subject to dual reporting); and
- local offices of semi-autonomous government agencies (e.g. regional development corporation, water, transportation, housing, or environmental authority)

**PATRONAGE:** The support, encouragement, privilege or financial aid that an organization or individual bestows to another. Political patronage then describes the use of state resources to reward individuals for their electoral support.

**RESILIENCE:** Building resilience is a transformative process of strengthening the capacity of people, communities, institutions and countries to anticipate, prevent, recover from and transform in the aftermath of shocks, stresses and change.

**SOCIAL COHESION:** Social cohesion emerges from tolerance of and respect for diversity (in terms of religion, ethnicity, economic situation, political preferences, sexual orientation, gender, age, etc.) both institutionally and individually. While interpretations of social cohesion may vary, there are two principal dimensions to it:

- the reduction of disparities, inequalities and social exclusion; and
- the strengthening of social relations, interactions and ties.

**SOCIAL CONTRACT:** Refers to a dynamic, implicit agreement between state and society on their mutual roles and responsibilities. It emerges from the interaction between: (i) expectations that a given society has of a given state; (ii) state capacity to provide services, including security, and to secure revenue from its population and territory to provide these services; (iii) the political, social and economic elite’s willingness to direct state resources and capacity to fulfill social expectations; and (iv) the existence of political processes, through which the bargain between state and society is struck, redefined, reinforced and institutionalized.
### Annex 2.

**EXAMPLES OF MULTIPLE FORMS OF VIOLENCE AT COUNTRY LEVEL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Local Intergroup Conflict</th>
<th>&quot;Conventional&quot; Political Conflict (Contests for State Power or for Autonomy or Independence)</th>
<th>Widespread Gang-Related Violence</th>
<th>Organized Crime or Trafficking with Accompanying Violence</th>
<th>Local Conflicts with Transnational Ideological Connections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Multiple incidents involving militias</td>
<td>Taliban, other actors (2002-present)</td>
<td>Warlordism (2002 – present)</td>
<td>Opium production and trafficking</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda links with Taliban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Democratic and Islamist opposition groups (1992-96); Movement for Peace in Tajikistan (1998)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Major transit route for Afghan narcotics; human trafficking</td>
<td>Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Local clan conflicts</td>
<td>Muslim separatist groups in Mindanao (Moro Islamic Front and Moro National Liberation Front)</td>
<td>Kidnap for ransom; human trafficking; methamphetamine source for East and Southeast Asia</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah links with Abu Sayyaf (Mindanao)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from the World Development Report 2011, p. 54.
### Annex 3.

**STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SETTINGS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Roles and Responsibilities in Change Processes</th>
<th>Possible Constraints</th>
<th>Support Needed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local government</td>
<td>Maintain stability in cooperation with security forces. Build local coalitions for peaceful conflict transformation and inclusive decision-making. Provide and channel peace dividends, including basic services and livelihoods support. Manage public resources for recovery and development in a fair and accountable manner. Demonstrate inclusiveness and accountability internally and externally.</td>
<td>Limited or no effective presence. Lack of legitimacy. Captured by local partial interests biased against certain groups. Weak administrative capacity. High level of corrupt practices. Limited experience in participatory governance, reconstruction and recovery. Strongly dominated by older men.</td>
<td>Support needed to retrieve and increase their legitimacy as a purveyor of stability and public goods and services. This implies logistical, financial and technical assistance provided within an incentive framework that includes increasing pressure from the bottom-up for accountability and strengthening the top-down intergovernmental support system. The incorporation of women staff and adoption of gender-sensitive policies should also be supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional leadership</td>
<td>Contribute to stability by solving local disputes under locally-accepted norms. Support extension of state authority. Assume a strong role in the reconciliation processes. Provide moral support and guidance to recovering communities. Carry the voice of communities towards state institutions. Gradually incorporate basic human rights standards in local customary judicial practices.</td>
<td>Might have lost legitimacy during conflict or, on the contrary, gained more legitimacy than the state and resist relinquishing authority. Often holding private armies. Limited administrative capacity and openness to new forms of governance. Rent-seeking behaviour. Norms applied are discriminative to certain groups or not sufficiently human rights-based.</td>
<td>Traditional leaders need to be listened to and engaged with to avoid making them spoilers of extension of state authority. Support should be given for their active representation in local governance processes, possibly in a formal capacity. Capacity development in conflict resolution and awareness-raising on democratic local governance systems and practices. Involvement needed in campaigns to reduce violence towards women and other vulnerable groups, and for incorporating basic human rights standards in local customary justice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed groups</td>
<td>Contribute to stability by cooperating with security forces and laying down arms. Re-integrate into society by pursuing non-violent livelihoods. Participate in transitional justice and reconciliation processes. Compete peacefully in democratic political processes to maintain some influence in society. Avoid fueling electoral violence.</td>
<td>Unwillingness to disarm due to political, social and economic benefits. Lack of viable avenues and support for civilian reintegration. Threats of retribution from community members. Grievances not properly addressed by the political settlement. Links to organized crime and gangs.</td>
<td>Early engagement with non-state armed groups is necessary, when security conditions allow, to mitigate risks of them becoming powerful spoilers of any change process. Reintegration support (social, economic, political) is paramount and should be community-based and incorporate intense civic education and capacity development. Specific support to promising members for political careers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Support needed to retrieve and increase their legitimacy as a purveyor of stability and public goods and services. This implies logistical, financial and technical assistance provided within an incentive framework that includes increasing pressure from the bottom-up for accountability and strengthening the top-down intergovernmental support system. The incorporation of women staff and adoption of gender-sensitive policies should also be supported.
## ANNEX 3: STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SETTINGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN CHANGE PROCESSES</th>
<th>POSSIBLE CONSTRAINTS</th>
<th>SUPPORT NEEDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Civil society  | • Contribute to stability by supporting peaceful conflict resolution processes, transitional justice and reconciliation  
• Provide civic and electoral education and observation  
• Carry the voice of citizens into participatory governance processes  
• Call for higher standards of social accountability in local governments  
• Co-produce basic services, social assistance and livelihood support                                                                                                                                 | • Captured by local elite interests and/or too politicized  
• Limited legitimacy and accountability  
• Weak capacities  
• Subject to threats due to lack of rule of law  
• Participation of CSOs in local governance opposed by state institutions and traditional leaders  
• Too ideological                                                                                                                                 | Intense capacity development on civil society's role and ethics, organizational management and technical fields related to peace and development. Advocate for and facilitate civil society's participation in local governance and help increase its accountability to citizens. Provide funding through grant schemes. |
| Private sector | • Contribute to stability by creating local jobs and in an inclusive manner (women, youth, minorities)  
• Co-produce services through public-private partnerships  
• Invest in local economic recovery  
• Execute public reconstruction projects  
• Shift from war to peace economies, in particular for extractive industries  
• Avoid corrupting local officials  
• Pay local taxes to support recovery and service delivery                                                                                                                                 | • No incentives to abandon war economy mode  
• Absence of rule of law limits local investment capacity  
• No access to capital and business development support  
• Limited availability of skilled workforce  
• Terms for public-private partnerships in service delivery not favourable                                                                                                                                 | Private sector needs to be given space and incentives to engage in planning for and implementing recovery, especially for the infrastructure and economic sectors. Among incentives are better security for business actors and facilities, availability of capital and banking facilities at local level, appropriate regulations to protect investments in local ventures (in particular public sector projects), functional administrative services, easier access to innovation, technology and other business development services. |
| Community      | • Contribute to stability by participating in local governance and conflict resolution and reconciliation platforms  
• Abandon previous patterns of exclusion of certain groups  
• Participate peacefully in local elections  
• Express voice through available peaceful channels  
• Co-produce services and contribute to reconstruction through community development ventures  
• Respect local rules and regulations adopted by local governments  
• Pay local taxes to support recovery and service delivery                                                                                                                                 | • Deeply entrenched conflict legacies hard to overcome and seriously affecting social capital necessary for communal action  
• High defiance towards the state and its rules  
• Inequitable access to services  
• Cultural and social norms limit adoption of new forms of local governance (e.g. women's participation)                                                                                                                                 | Communities need support to increase their self-healing and recovery potential including economically. Civic education and training is needed to demonstrate the value of participating in formal and informal local governance processes as a means to receive more and better support from the state. Community-based groups should be supported with skills development and small grants. Compliance with government rules, including paying taxes, can be promoted by increasing access of citizens to information on local government performance through social accountability measures. |
Annex 4.

THE USE OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY TOOLS IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SETTINGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOCUS AREA</th>
<th>EXAMPLE OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY TOOLS*</th>
<th>SUITABILITY TO FRAGILE SETTINGS</th>
<th>MAIN CHALLENGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Policy dialogue          | Citizen juries, public hearings, study circles, appreciative inquiry summits, public forums, town hall meetings (real and virtual), future search public workshops, policy audits, social impact analysis, democratic dialogue | ++                              | • Lack of a culture of peaceful debate, local tensions and insecurity level too high for bringing together citizens and local authorities in large gatherings  
• Local policy creation remains haphazard; policy-making is centralized |
| Advocacy and voice       | Public opinion polls, referendums, deliberative polling | +                               | • Low polling capacities (but innovative ICT solutions may work in certain contexts)  
• Risk of violence surrounding electoral events |
| Budgets and expenditures | Local public revenue monitoring, independent budget analysis, alternative budgets, local public expenditure tracking and survey (PETS), community-led procurement, participatory budgeting | ++                              | • Low transparency of local budgets  
• Unclear allocation of funds from central to local levels (difficult to track flow of funds) |
| Monitoring public services | Stakeholder surveys, citizen report cards, community scorecards, participatory output monitoring, social audits | +++                             | • Low literacy levels (for report cards)  
• Reluctance of service providers to be monitored – lack of cooperation |
| Peace and security agreements | Citizen monitoring of security sector reform, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, reparations, restitution (following transitional justice processes) | +++                             | • Opacity of peace deals and instability of political settlements  
• Potential risks involved with scrutinizing security-related matters, including intimidation by arm bearers. |
| Extractive industries    | Stakeholder and natural resource mapping, participatory environmental impact assessments, extractive industries revenue monitoring | +++                             | • Lack of cooperation from the business sector; secrecy on resource and revenue data  
• Conflict and security risks |

* Adapted from Fostering Social Accountability, UNDP, 2010.
FURTHER EXPLANATION OF TOOLS

**Citizen Jury:** randomly-selected citizens question experts, witness policy processes and challenge decision-makers

**Public Hearing:** public body obtains public testimony or comments on an issue from citizens

**Study Circle:** small group meets regularly to learn about and discuss critical public issues, with expert facilitation

**Appreciative Inquiry Summit:** process by which citizens focus on what works in their community and how to improve it

**Public Forum:** structured public debate dedicated to the free exercise of the right to speech and assembly

**Town Hall Meeting:** participants submit questions to local officials to respond publicly; can also be web-based

**Future Search Public Workshop:** 60 to 80 residents gather during three days to discuss their desired future

**Policy Audit:** systemic review of existing policies to identify barriers or gaps impeding policy implementation

**Social Impact Analysis:** analyse the impact of policy reforms on various stakeholders, especially the poor and vulnerable

**Deliberative Polling:** random sample of citizens polled on an issue before and after debating with experts and politicians

**Local Public Revenue Monitoring:** tracking and analysing the revenues of local governments

**Independent Budget Analysis:** civil society reviews local budget to assess if allocations match the mayor’s commitments

**Alternative Budgeting:** citizen groups make known their budgeting priorities to influence the local government’s budget

**Community-Led Procurement:** participatory procurement mechanisms

**Participatory Budgeting:** citizens participate in the formulation and monitoring of their local government’s budget

**Citizen Report Cards:** participatory surveys solicit user feedback on the performance of public services

**Community Scorecards:** same as the above with the addition of public meetings to allow feedback to service providers

**Participatory Output Monitoring:** local actors monitor achievements of state project and policy outputs

**Social Audit:** analysis of resources of local governments and how they are used for social objectives

**Stakeholder and Natural Resource Mapping:** participatory mapping of natural resource locations (by type) and use

**Participatory Impact Assessment:** civil society and citizens assess impact of proposed extractive activities on their lives

**Extractive Industry Revenue Monitoring:** tracking and analysing revenues generated by extractive industries and returns for communities
### Annex 5.
**SUPPORTING LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAPACITIES FOR LOCAL ECONOMIC RECOVERY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENTRY POINT</th>
<th>AREA OF INTERVENTION</th>
<th>TRACK</th>
<th>RESPONSIBILITIES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS</th>
<th>CAPACITIES REQUIRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategies and policies</strong></td>
<td>Livelihoods assessment in crisis and post-crisis situations</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Convene assessment participants, pilot process, provide secondary data. Participate in results analysis and formulation of action plans.</td>
<td>Leadership, Process management, Information analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local economic recovery strategies: assessment, planning, regional and sectoral consolidation, strategic communications</td>
<td>B/C</td>
<td>Lead local economic development strategic planning through technical units – or external partner if capacities not sufficient. Head of local government unit provides leadership to ensure ownership and communication on results.</td>
<td>Information analysis, Leadership, Economics, Integrated planning, Communications, Monitoring-evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Business support policies: licensing, tax policies, procurement, PPPs, investment climate</td>
<td>B/C</td>
<td>Amend administrative rules and processes based on policy audits done as part of local economic development assessment. Negotiate amendments with higher authorities if required.</td>
<td>Policy formulation, Reform management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment support</strong></td>
<td>Emergency high-intensity employment: cash/food-for-work, community contracting</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Lead prioritization of public works projects with communities, endorse workers’ lists. Design projects and supervise execution (if engineering capacity exists in local government)</td>
<td>Participatory planning, Payroll management, Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vocational and skills training and placement: technical vocational education and training, apprenticeships, job placement services, self-employment support</td>
<td>B/C</td>
<td>Negotiate with local businesses for apprenticeships. Partner with the ministry of labour for job placement offices. Provide facilities and co-fund vocational and employment skills training and small and medium-enterprise training. Compile local business directories for job seekers.</td>
<td>Partnership building, Employment support skills, Project management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infrastructure development</strong></td>
<td>Emergency infrastructure rehabilitation: transport, social and energy infrastructure</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Prioritize infrastructure projects with communities and the private sector to revive local economy (after crisis). Project design and execution if technical capacities exist; otherwise project supervision only.</td>
<td>Participatory planning, Engineering skills, Project management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Productive infrastructure, including special economic zones (business incubators, MSME parks, etc.)</td>
<td>B/C</td>
<td>Same role as above but list of projects comes out of a longer integrated local economic development strategy process. Negotiate public-private partnerships for building and operating new infrastructure. Manage income generated through productive projects.</td>
<td>Engineering skills, Project and business management, Resource mobilization, Establishing PPPs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Annex 5: Supporting Local Government Capacities for Local Economic Recovery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entry Point</th>
<th>Area of Intervention</th>
<th>Track</th>
<th>Responsibilities of Local Governments</th>
<th>Capacities Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Business Development Support</strong></td>
<td>Self-employment support: cash/in-kind grants for MSMEs</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Participate in definition of targeting criteria (conflict-sensitive) and monitoring of impact.</td>
<td>Conflict-sensitivity Monitoring-evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conditional cash transfers: support to condition-based programmes</td>
<td>A/B</td>
<td>Facilitate local programme implementation through community outreach, beneficiary selection and grievance handling.</td>
<td>Conflict-sensitivity Project management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Business Support Service: licensing, tax payments, business and employment standards</td>
<td>B/C</td>
<td>Run services for business licensing, business tax administration, requests and grievances. Negotiate with business community and unions. Supervise workplace standards for health, safety and workers' rights.</td>
<td>Administrative services Tax services Negotiations Regulating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Investment promotion</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Create and implement strategy for promoting local investment opportunities (e.g. outreach materials, multi-media campaign and attending investment fairs).</td>
<td>Marketing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Special Programmes</strong></td>
<td>Targeted employment and income generation (women, youth, ex-combatants, IDPs, etc.)</td>
<td>B/C</td>
<td>Design programmes to increase targeting of local economic development activities towards specific vulnerable groups, enlisting support from other public and private partners.</td>
<td>Project design Project implementation Poverty alleviation Resource mobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area-based urban regeneration</td>
<td>A/B/C</td>
<td>Create integrated recovery and regeneration programmes in poorest areas or new development areas to attract businesses and create jobs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the Rapid Local Governance Diagnostic Tool (hereafter called the Diagnostic Tool) is to provide broad and actionable evidence on the state of local governance (and local recovery) challenges in a fragile or conflict-affected context in order to support the design of the initial phase of a long-term programme that increases local resilience against recurrence of political and social crisis, violence and severe conflict. This Diagnostic Tool is based on the UN/WB Diagnostic Tool for Core Government Functions in an Immediate Post-Conflict Environment.

The Diagnostic Tool prioritizes the following six areas:

- the enabling environment: conflict, political economy and legal framework;
- mapping of local governance systems;
- local governance capacities and processes;
- community security and social cohesion;
- basic and social service delivery; and
- livelihoods and local economic recovery.

Institutionally, the Diagnostic Tool focuses on the roles and capacities of local governments and also looks at the role of de-concentrated branches of the central government, civil society and other non-state actors when their actions at the local level are directly relevant to the resilience-building and recovery agendas.

Methodologically, the Diagnostic Tool uses two main approaches:

- desk study that can be completed remotely; and
- field data collection in a number of sample locations (or local government units) through a combination of interviews, administrative data collection, observations and opinion surveys – as operationally feasible.

It is critical to ensure that the Diagnostic Tool researches and reports on the current de facto situation at the time of assessment and not on a modelled de jure situation or to the pre-conflict situation. When relevant, the Diagnostic Tool can highlight discrepancies between the de facto and de jure situation.

The outline in the proceeding pages defines the main themes and sub-themes to be researched. These are not actual questionnaire and data collection, compilation or analysis forms. Programming teams need to design such forms and templates after contextualizing the Diagnostic Tool to the particular context in which they are conducting the assessment.
A – CONFLICT AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT: WHAT ARE THE LINKAGES BETWEEN LOCAL GOVERNANCE, THE CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION?

**Goal:** Analyse the causality factors between local governance and the conflict and how local governance priorities are being framed and affected by the political settlement during the immediate post-conflict period.

A.1. **Conflict analysis** (complementing a full-fledged conflict-related development analysis if available)

(LG = local government)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>DESK REVIEW AT NATIONAL LEVEL</th>
<th>FIELD DATA COLLECTION AT AREA LEVEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Underlying causes</strong></td>
<td>• Importance of local versus national social, political and economic drivers of conflict (did conflict originate from specific localities and if so, was it linked to grievances related to the management of local affairs, rather than national governance or both?)</td>
<td>• Short history of conflict in the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consequences</strong></td>
<td>• National statistics on conflict-related destruction, displacement, deaths, economic losses, instability of political institutions, environmental impact, gender equality, etc.</td>
<td>• Latest conflict-related incidents in and around the area and consequences (gender disaggregated).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trends</strong></td>
<td>• Recent conflict dynamics in country and how different sub-national areas influenced them.</td>
<td>• Recent conflict dynamics in the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Are there pressing demands from some or all LGs for reform, accrued resources, conflict reparations or other issues that need to be answered before conflict can diminish?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peace engines and conflict management</strong></td>
<td>• National level peace champions and their connections with certain sub-national areas and positioning vis-à-vis local autonomy and future local governance arrangements.</td>
<td>• Role of local council and mayor, or local coalition of actors, in managing conflicts in the area and with other areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Conflict management, resolution and dialogue processes and how far local actors are involved.</td>
<td>• LG and local civil society capacities and resources to support conflict resolution.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A.2. Central – local secondary settlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>DESK REVIEW AT NATIONAL LEVEL</th>
<th>FIELD DATA COLLECTION AT AREA LEVEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Politics settlement and local governance | • Importance of federalism and of decentralization topics in national dialogue.  
• Level of consensus among main political actors for local governance reform.  
• Level of consensus on local governance reform between national and local actors.  
• Possible antagonistic dynamics between recentralization by central government and de facto decentralization by local-level power holders.  
• Role and influence of informal local governance institutions during conflict period.  
• Role of civil society, if any, in advocating for increased decentralization and citizen participation in local governance.  
• Importance of local elections discussions on the political settlement. | • Level of competition between formal and informal governance institutions in the area.  
• Role of local council and the mayor in national dialogue for a political settlement. |

A.3. Legal framework

Ascertain the below items to understand the legal framework.

- Legislation pre-existing the conflict that organizes local governments and local governance processes (in particular the role of civil society and partnerships with state institutions) that are still applicable and their level of application.
- Ongoing government-led policy processes that are directly relevant to the functioning of local governments, including local election reforms.
- Provisions related to local governance and decentralization in constitutional debate or a new constitution (if already passed).
B – MAPPING OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS: HOW IS PUBLIC AUTHORITY EMBODIED ON THE GROUND?

**Goal:** Map out the current actors, whether formal or informal, state or non-state, that play an influential role in local decision-making with implications on security maintenance, conflict management, the delivery of administrative and social services and the livelihoods of conflict-affected populations and local economic recovery. Also identify the types of relations and transactions linking these different actors together.

**B.1. General stakeholder mapping**

Note: this mapping is based on the model of a two-tier local governance system (province + municipality). The assessment team will need to cover the entire local governance architecture in the country considered and add therefore stakeholder categories to this mapping as required.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>DECK REVIEW AT NATIONAL LEVEL</th>
<th>FIELD DATA COLLECTION AT AREA LEVEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Local Governments (Governorates, Municipalities) | • Number and geographical distribution of LGs according to electoral status.  
• Categories of LGs based on: level, size, urban/rural classification, legal status.  
• Level of functionality of LGs, distinguishing between executive and administrative functions. | • Electoral status and date of elections (if applicable) or date of formation of current local council and modality of selection.  
• Level of functionality of local councils.  
• Level of functionality of LG administration.  
• Main roles played by LGs (e.g. security maintenance, conflict management, social cohesion, service delivery, local development, natural resource management, justice). |
| De-concentrated services and state agencies | • Presence of line ministries and state agencies at subnational level  
• General assessment of current capacities (human, financial).  
• Main functions fulfilled. | • Ministerial directorates or state agency offices present and functional in area of interest, and which ones support or interact with lower-level LGs.  
• Main functions played and services delivered in lower-level LGs.  
• Modes and quality of interaction with local council and with administrations. |
| Law enforcement and justice | • General assessment of presence and functionality of the police and justice systems at subnational level. | • Presence and functionality of police forces (state, municipal) in area.  
• Presence and functionality of judicial courts in area (civil, criminal, administrative, etc.).  
• Main functions played and services delivered.  
• Modes and quality of interaction with local council and administration. |
| Civil society | • Mapping of civil society presence and categories of civil society organizations (use existing mapping if available).  
• General assessment of current roles of civil society organizations in responding to crisis impact.  
• Level of implication of civil society organizations in local governance decisions. | • Number of registered civil society organizations in area, including figures on women and youth organizations.  
• Main functions played by civil society organizations and services delivered.  
• Modes and quality of interaction with local council and administration.  
• Sources of human and financial resources. |
| Other non-state actors | • Identify other main categories of non-state actors that are influential on local governance and per region: political parties, militias, religious groups, tribal leaders, private enterprises (trade unions, business organizations, cooperatives), etc.  
• Legal status of non-state actors and relations with the state. | • Identify other local stakeholders influential on local decision-making and/or supporting local service delivery, livelihoods and the local economy.  
• Main functions played and services delivered.  
• Modes and quality of interaction with LG.  
• Sources of human and financial resources. |
### B.2. Intergovernmental relations

This section analyses relationships between central government institutions and local governments, and in particular the support made available to them by the former.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>DESK REVIEW AT NATIONAL LEVEL</th>
<th>FIELD DATA COLLECTION AT AREA LEVEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Regulatory oversight            | • Central institutions that have regulatory mandate over municipalities and actual level of control exercised.  
• Main modalities used for oversight.  
• Sanction system. | • Central institutions to which LGs feel most accountable to whom it must report.  
• Modalities for communication and reporting.  
• Quality of interaction.  
• Incidence of sanctions and modalities. |
| Staffing                        | • Presence of national civil servants detached in LGs: numbers, recruitment and payroll modalities.  
• Trends in staffing support by central government to LGs.  
• Existence of national registry of LG staff, accuracy, use made by central government. | • Percentage of LG workforce on central government payroll.  
• Control exercised by central government on recruitment and human resources management at municipal level. |
| Assets                          | • Hardware support provided directly by central government to municipalities, if any, and modalities. | • Materials and equipment received by LG from central government (regular or emergency support?). |
| Financial                       | • Amount of state transfers to front-line LGs in previous and current fiscal year, sources of funds, transfer formula, transfer modalities (ministry of finance? line ministries? earmarked or programme-based?). | • Amounts of funds received in previous and current fiscal year from central government (earmarked, unearmarked).  
• Timeliness of transfers.  
• Amounts received versus transfers budgeted in national budget. |
| Policy-making                   | • General issues in division of responsibilities in policy-making between levels of government and how impacted by conflict.  
• Level of compliance of central government with division of responsibilities in policy cycle between central and local governments. | • Assessment by local officials of degree of autonomy from central government in policy-making for local affairs.  
• Assessment by local officials on quality and modalities for coordination and division of responsibilities for delivering services and planning / implementing local development (for details per service line, see section D). |
| Technical guidance and capacity-building | • Existing programmes and resources for formally building LG capacities through training (including on-line) and other means.  
• Modalities for providing regular technical guidance to LGs. | • Support received for building staff capacities in current year versus previous years.  
• Level of technical guidance provided to LG on regular basis by central government (through de-concentrated services or other means). |
B.3. Horizontal relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>DESK REVIEW AT NATIONAL LEVEL</th>
<th>FIELD DATA COLLECTION AT AREA LEVEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Border delimitation</td>
<td>• Extent of border disputes between areas.</td>
<td>• Status of LG borders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Dispute adjudication procedures through official and non-official means (including use of force.)</td>
<td>• If any issues, how handled and impact on relations with neighbouring LGs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Modalities and possible issues with classification of urban LGs.</td>
<td>• External support received for solving border issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation between LGs</td>
<td>• Current trend in inter-LG cooperation: amalgamation, joint governance structures, joint initiatives for service delivery, networks, etc.</td>
<td>• Existence of any cooperation arrangements with neighbouring LGs and description.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Impact of conflict on existing pre-conflict inter-LG cooperation arrangements (if any).</td>
<td>• Suggestions for inter-LG cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Hurdles to inter-LG cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government associations</td>
<td>• Existence, status and roles of any possible LG association.</td>
<td>• Membership in a LG association.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Benefits received from such membership.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C – LOCAL GOVERNANCE CAPACITIES AND PROCESSES: HOW AND HOW WELL DO LOCAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS FUNCTIONS?

**Goal:** Identify the resource and capacity gaps that limit the ability of local governments and local governance systems to perform their functions, both in quantitative terms and in qualitative terms (more inclusivity and accountability).

For each item below, highlight main (performance) issues that should be analysed later on (during programme inception) using capacity and training needs assessment tools. This section is only conducted through field data collection at the LGU level. This section can be run at different levels of the local government structure (governorate/province, district, municipality, village).

**C.1. Human resources**
- Number of staff in LG per category:
  - permanent/temporary (consultants)
  - technical/administrative – support
  - male/female
  - below 30/above 30
  - per educational level
  - per grade
  - per identity group (if feasible and relevant)

- Number of vacant positions and why
- Recruitment practices and possible issues
- Contractual status and possible issues

**C.2. Local finances**
- Current and past year LG budget figures; next fiscal year budget proposal (if available)
  - expenditures and income
  - operating and investment costs
  - share of salary costs in total expenditures
- Rate of execution of past two fiscal year budgets
- Source of funds (all three years): state transfers, own revenues (detail: taxes, fines, fees, income-generating activities, etc.), loans, donor, other sources
- Date last financial audit conducted, how and by whom
- Specific issues with financial management
- Efficiency of local tax and other revenue administration

**C.3. Assets**
- List number and type of assets in LG, if possible, state of repair, maintenance methods and unmet needs:
  - buildings
  - IT equipment
  - vehicles
  - technical equipment (e.g. for road repairs)
- Specific issues with asset procurement and maintenance
C.4. Executive leadership
- Composition of Local Council (political, age, gender, ethnicity)
- Ability to function as per legal provision (including regularity of meetings and internal procedures)
- Role and modalities for policy-making on local area affairs and examples of recent decisions made
- Role and modalities for oversight of LG administration and finances
- Difficulties faced by local council for fulfilling its functions

C.5. Planning and project development
- Existence of Strategic Local Development Plan for the area and method followed for producing it
- Existence of annual plan and budget and method followed for producing it
- Methods of and capacities for regular data collection and analysis for evidence-based planning
- Use of vulnerability analysis or other method to identify most vulnerable citizens in need of LG assistance
- Level of integration of top-down (by sector) and area-based (by LG) planning streams
- Methods used and capacities for technical project design and costing
- Methods and capacities for monitoring and evaluation of LG programmes

C.6. Citizen engagement
- Description and evaluation of possible participatory governance methods used in LG such as: information-sharing, participatory needs assessment and planning, community development structures, citizen advisory committees, citizen monitoring committees, social accountability tools, etc.
- Description of groups traditionally-marginalized from decision-making and possible measures taken by LG to increase their inclusion
- Modes of public outreach by LG on their policies, programmes and results, towards population
- Existence and effectiveness of grievance-handling systems in LG
- Existence and effectiveness of one-stop shops to facilitate user access to basic, social and administrative services

C.7. Women’s participation in local governance
- Leadership positions held by women in local council and administration
- Possible measures used by LG for greater attention to women’s issues in local governance: e.g. LG’s gender policy or strategy, women’s affairs unit in local administration, gender-sensitive budgeting, gender-sensitive outreach campaigns, use of gender-sensitive indicators in monitoring and evaluation, etc.
- Education campaign towards women for civic and political participation
- Support to women’s civil society organizations and women-run businesses by local public institutions

D – COMMUNITY SECURITY AND SOCIAL COHESION:
HOW ABLE ARE LOCAL SOCIETIES TO FIGHT AGAINST VIOLENCE IN THEIR MIDST?

**Goal:** To reach a better understanding of the drivers of insecurity in local dynamics, especially for women and other vulnerable groups, and problems with social cohesion in order to identify entry points for strengthening violence and conflict-prevention dynamics.

This section is only conducted through field data collection at the lowest level (municipality, village).

D.1. Community security
- Capacities and modalities for collecting and analyzing criminality data in area
- Crime statistics on area territory (if available) both past and current, covering: homicides (disaggregated by gender), violent assaults, kidnapping, violent theft, domestic violence, rape, extortion, etc.; if no statistics are available, classification of main types of crime by frequency of occurrence
- Mapping of crime and violence on area territory (specific sub-areas concerned or all sub-areas affected)
- Trends in local criminality
- Types of perpetrators of criminal armed violence
- Identification of aggravating factors in community insecurity: ineffective policing, corruption of judicial system, drug and human trafficking, lack of street lighting
and maintenance of public spaces, uncontrolled urbanization, increase in circulation of arms due to conflict, poor social cohesion, arrival of IDPs, etc.

- Existence of local (citizen) security committee(s) and composition
- Production of local (citizen) security and violence prevention plan and components
- Example of measures taken by LG to curb criminal violence, actors involved and results achieved
- Importance of community policing methods
- Recent measures taken to control trafficking and use of small arms
- Level of cooperation between LG and police and/or other armed entity to maintain citizen security
- Involvement of citizens in fighting crime and preventing violence and links with municipal initiatives
- Possible issues with unregulated vigilante groups (armed citizens)

D.2. Social cohesion

- Trust
  - Relation to and perceptions of the local government by citizens
  - Relationship to and perceptions of the police and justice system by citizens

- Social structures and social integration
  - Types and numbers of civil society and community-based organizations (complement to Section B.1)
  - Trends in numbers and activism levels of social and community organizations and relationships among them
  - Level of social, economic and cultural integration between neighbourhoods within LGU – are different neighbourhoods linked closely or rather separated by (in)visible walls?
  - Exclusion of certain areas and/or groups completely from other groups and causes
  - Incidence and type of intra-LGU disputes between groups that tend to generate violence
  - Relationships between IDPs and resident communities
- Civic and political participation
  - General awareness of population of and participation in community-based activities and local governance initiatives
  - Electoral turnout rates

- Cultural identity
  - Strength of local cultural identity and manifestations
  - Homogeneity of cultural practices
  - Tolerance of cultural diversity (levels of discrimination)

- Socio-economic identity
  - Income disparities among residents of municipality and trends
  - Municipal services to support inclusion in the labour market, number of support programmes for those outside the labour market (linked to geographical area or identity)
  - Identification of vulnerable population groups and root causes of vulnerability, such as poverty, poor governance, discrimination, inequality and inadequate access to resources, security and livelihoods
  - Economic links between neighbourhoods and with other municipalities

E – SERVICE DELIVERY: WHAT IS THE LOCAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM PROVIDING TO LOCAL POPULATIONS?

Goal: Strategize which public services delivered by local governments should be supported as a matter of priority by UNDP based on needs, capacity gaps and their contribution to resilience and recovery.

This section is only conducted through field data collection at local government level. Service delivery may be provided by different levels of the local government structure (governorate/province, district, municipality, village).

E.1. Inventory of services

Start by doing a quick inventory of the different public services (administrative, infrastructure, social) currently delivered by local governance systems in the areas surveyed and which stakeholders are involved (local government, de-concentrated services, civil society, the private sector, armed groups, etc.). The table template presented on next page can be used for this inventory exercise. Following is an indicative list of services commonly provided at the local level; it needs to be adapted to the context researched. Following identification of services, a prioritization should be done along with central government partners.
The inventory should lead to the prioritization of the most critical services in need of further analysis.

**Examples of administrative and social services provided by local-level institutions**

- **Security, justice and safety services**: community policing, traffic control, first instance courts, civil registry, mediation, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, disaster risk reduction, disaster response, fire service, civil defense, property and land titling and dispute resolution.
- **Social services**: primary healthcare, disease control, primary education, social assistance, culture and recreation.
- **Infrastructure services**: local roads, sanitation, social housing, social and other public infrastructure.
- **Utility services**: water, electricity, gas, others.
- **Urban planning services**: land zoning, building permits.
- **Urban management services**: waste management, lighting, street and road maintenance, public transportation, cemeteries.
- **Local economic development services**: agriculture extension, food security, markets, employment and skills training, job placement, business development support, income-generating investments, business licensing.
- **Environmental management services**: protection of natural areas, extractive industry licensing, environmental education, pollution control, control of water rights.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF SERVICE</th>
<th>MAIN STAKEHOLDERS INVOLVED</th>
<th>CRITICALITY TO ALLEVIATE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS</th>
<th>CRITICALITY FOR CONFLICT DYNAMICS</th>
<th>CRITICALITY FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY</th>
<th>LEVEL OF IMPACT BY CONFLICT</th>
<th>FEASIBILITY OF QUICK IMPACT SUPPORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Utility services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban planning services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban management services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security, justice and safety services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban planning services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban management services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security, justice and safety services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E.2. In-depth analysis of priority service lines

Together with LG officials, the Diagnostic Team will conduct a more in-depth analysis of up to **three service lines** considered critical to build resilience against violence and conflict and to promote recovery. The analysis covers the following points and applies to the current status of service delivery (i.e. not what was happening before the conflict started):

- distribution of responsibilities between line ministries, state agencies and LG and between state and non-state actors in the planning, financing, delivery and monitoring stages of the service line;
- access to services by sectors of the population based on social situation, income level, identity group and area of residence;
- performance of service line in meeting immediate needs of populations (coverage figures and quality indicators); and
- capacity gaps and other constraints at the LG level for delivering the service (human, equipment, budgetary, technical, innovation, etc.).

A table format should be prepared and shared with LGs to fill in with available quantitative details. A similar exercise can be done with civil society and citizen representatives for qualitative data (perceptions of levels and quality of services). This in-depth analysis should make use of subnational data available from other assessments conducted by specialized agencies and sector ministries.

Finally, LG profiles on service delivery performance should be benchmarked with national data on access to services that might be available from line ministries.
F – LIVELIHOODS AND LOCAL ECONOMIC RECOVERY: HOW IS THE LOCAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM HELPING PEOPLE RECOVER THEIR LIVELIHOODS?

**Goal:** Better understanding of livelihoods and local economic recovery needs of local areas, including the extent and magnitude of the impact of the current conflict on people’s livelihoods and on key organizations that support productive livelihoods and the local economy (public, private and international organizations) and to identify potential entry points for UNDP support.

This section does not replace a proper livelihoods and local economic recovery assessment – if time and resources are available to do it. It focuses on the basic information needed to paint a picture of livelihoods needs and how they are currently answered. Methodologically, it is conducted through desk reviews and interviews, but not household surveys (although these will be useful at some point during programme inception, or may have already been conducted by other agencies). This diagnostic exercise can be conducted for different levels of the local government structure (governorate/province, district, municipality, village).

**Livelihoods coping mechanisms**

- Main sources of local livelihoods (e.g. agro-processing business, remittances, commerce, small industries, wage labour, casual labour, migrant labour) and which ones have been most affected by the conflict situation
- Conflict impact on how people make a living in the area, including income earned, jobs done, purchasing power and productive assets owned by men and women; further details would include items listed below.
  - Impact on livelihoods disaggregation by group (gender, age, ethnicity, specific areas, socio-economic class, disabled, etc.)
  - Demographic changes as a result of the crisis, including numbers of female-headed household de facto and de jure (reasons for, and changes, such as death, migration of male head of household, etc.), numbers of single male-headed households, numbers of child-headed households
- Differences between men and women in terms of making a living since the crisis/conflict started
- Demand for and cost and availability of essential food and non-food items

**Labour market investigation**

- At the current time of the year – when the situation is peaceful – describe the most common jobs available to local unemployed populations (e.g. unskilled agricultural labour (specify), unskilled non-agricultural labour (specify in which sector), petty trading, migrant work, skilled labour (specify), small and medium enterprises
- Roughly what proportion of households in the local government unit would be engaged in these kinds of work? (Proportional piling or a similar method can be used)
- Normal daily wage for jobs listed above
- Differences between men and women, girls and boys as to the types of work done and the payment received
- Are there currently opportunities for job creation?

**Local economy and key actors**

- Key organizations and enterprises that support productive livelihoods and the local economy in the area, i.e. civil society organizations (including women and youth groups), private sector groups including business associations, financial service providers (micro-finance institutions, banks, cooperatives), trade unions, chambers of agriculture or commerce and industry, etc.
- Key productive sectors in the economy of the area and impact of the conflict on these
- Impact on individual retail and wholesale businesses
- Impact on socio-economic infrastructure

**Planning and areas of support by local governments**

- Existence of Local Economic Recovery/Development (LER/LED) Strategy and Plan for the local government unit (on its own or as part of a strategic development plan as mentioned before in C.5.) and method followed to produce it
- Key impediments to effective LER/LED planning and implementation (ask about: lack of capacity, financial resources, understanding of the LER/LED by key local actors, enabling policies or limitations of current policy – if so, what?)
Immediate high-priority livelihoods and local economic recovery needs among different groups in the community

Past and on-going responses to economic needs and economic crisis by the local government (e.g. key commercial and socio-economic infrastructure development, including markets, roads), support to MSMEs, labour market supply (skills and vocational training), subsidies; alignment of such support with LER/LED strategies and plans, when they exist

Past and on-going responses to the economic crisis by other actors: (i) central government; (ii) UN and humanitarian agencies; (iii) the private sector; (iv) armed groups or other non-state actors; etc.; detail categories of recipients, types of support provided, funding sources and possible cases of exclusion from support

Existence of coordination or consultation platforms with key LER/LED actors in the municipal area, especially for planning crisis response; note main difficulties faced

Ways and opportunities to improve responses to economic crisis – diversification of livelihoods base, policy changes, migration, better housing, education, health and water sources, new enterprises, household income-generating activities and type, training in business development, market development, new value chain analysis, etc.
Annex 7.

**RISK MATRIX**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISK CLASSIFICATION</th>
<th>NATURE OF RISK</th>
<th>RISK MITIGATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Political risks**  | • Political instability at the local level is high.  
                    • Local authorities are biased against certain groups. UNDP support to these authorities may create animosity from other actors who would boycott project activities.  
                    • Political instability at central level makes the commitment of central government support falter.  
                    • Political rivalry between the leadership of the different levels of government blocks intergovernmental cooperation.  
                    • Citizens are wary that UNDP works closely with local authorities deemed too involved in the conflict and/or corrupt.  
                    • Difficulty to understand the nature, functions and interests of certain non-state actors leads to bad partnerships, with potential collateral damage with populations and local authorities.  | • Conduct conflict and political economy analysis in areas targeted to make sure to engage actors with a broad enough range of political allegiances.  
                    • Do-no-harm approach: if you can’t work with all main political actors at the local level, including those representing minority groups, do not start engaging on political processes (except electoral assistance).  
                    • Invest time to work in a constructive manner with all members of the local governance system, not just the elite.  
                    • Recruit project staff from the area and representing diverse groups.  
                    • Partner with local organizations.  
                    • Include electoral violence mitigation activities and initiate them early on.  
                    • Emphasize the local level compact at first and work gradually in securing central government support. Do not get held hostage by unstable central ministries.  
                    • Maintain a balance of activities in support of local governments and non-state actors, including civil society organizations and community structures. Try to bring them to work together but not systematically for everything; trust may take time to rebuild between local actors. |
| **Institutional risks** | • Undermining state capacity through engagement with non-state actors for service delivery and other kinds of support.  
                    • Resistance to change and lack of incentives for change in local governments, informal structures and central government.  
                    • Institutional and financial instability of local governments; high staff turn-over and unpredictable fiscal resources limit morale of local leaders and administrations.  | • Work outside of government systems for service delivery as a transient measure only. Keep local governments engaged for needs assessment and leadership. If LG performance does not improve, support negotiated, long-term public-private partnerships for service delivery.  
                    • Certain needs, in particular for peace-building, reconciliation, access to justice, etc., may be better handled by civil society actors if LGs not trusted.  
                    • Identify incentive needs early on. Do not fret over local politicians using project results for electoral campaigning. Other incentives (financial, assets) should be discouraged from the beginning (e.g. no salary top-ups). Maintain strict policy on per diems for training and basic procurement rules to be respected for project funds expanded locally.  
                    • Initiate dialogue with government on better protection of local civil service employment. Build capacities of critical LG staff so that new leaders will be motivated to keep them in their new administration to maintain efficiency. Advocate with government and donors for pooled funding of LGs against a track record of improved service delivery. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISK CLASSIFICATION</th>
<th>NATURE OF RISK</th>
<th>RISK MITIGATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Reputational risks** | • UNDP cannot deliver a coherent local governance programme in a complex political and security context, with a dysfunctional local government architecture and a multitude of non-state and international actors  
• Working through weak local authorities impedes delivering quickly concrete results for populations in need, especially in post-conflict situations.  
• Heavy focus on immediate service delivery needs prevents dealing with other roles of local governance (peacebuilding, justice, citizen security) and resilience against conflict is not built.  
• Programme costs may increase beyond the available funding due to unforeseen factors.  
• Lack of exit strategy, including for dissemination and policy uptake. | • Conduct political economy analysis to evaluate programme feasibility and likely challenges encountered. Use lessons learned of UNDP Country Offices in local governance programming pre-conflict (if applicable).  
• Guarantee increases in leadership and delivery capacity of local authorities prior to starting support to central government (including resources).  
• Create a hybrid mechanism for delivery if necessary at first to ensure urgent recovery assistance is provided while LG capacities are being rebuilt.  
• Train and/or sensitise all stakeholders involved in the implementation and monitoring of the project, particularly project staff.  
• Remain conservative with programme costing and do not over-programme, knowing that unit costs could well rise during implementation (especially if security situation worsens).  
• Factor in a budget for policy uptake and dissemination and engage in dialogue with central authorities early on when upsaling, not just at the time of ending the programme. |
| **Logistical and security risks** | • Difficult and dangerous access to target areas and difficulty to maintain a presence because of logistical and security issues.  
• High costs associated with staff deployment in high risk environment. | • Use UN mission logistical and security means if present. If not, pool resources with other donors for field support.  
• Consider the extra cost involved in such programmes when budgeting.  
• If security risks are significant for UNDP staff, work with local implementing partners (LGs, civil society organizations and international NGOs). |
| **Fiduciary risks** | • Programme funds are diverted by local partners and do not reach intended targeted populations.  
• UNDP operating procedures slow down procurement processes and cash payments to contractors. | • Conduct prior capacity assessment of implementing partners to verify suitability of financial management and accountability practices.  
• Strong monitoring mechanisms and innovative payment modalities can help to buttress transparency and accountability standards.  
• Use fast-track procedures to speed up recruitment and procurement.  
• Factor fiduciary risk in project budget and in negotiations with donors. |
| **Targeting risks** | • Project implementation, from design to evaluation, is not sufficiently gender-sensitive; gender focus is lost in the face of pressure to design and deliver in the shortest time possible.  
• Certain groups continue being discriminated against in certain areas of local governance, even after project interventions. | • Follow UNDP guidance for mainstreaming gender in fragile and conflict-affected settings programming. Focus first on least resisted entry points (e.g. gender-sensitive service delivery).  
• Mobilize Gender Focal Point in Country Office during project design and/or regional and global gender advisors. If high risk of gender bias, request a Gender Advisor with experience in local governance through the SURGE mechanism.  
• Pay extra attention to vulnerability factors during initial assessment so that up-front mitigation measures can be taken. Risks of discrimination need to be addressed from the start with authorities. Certain outputs can be delivered through NGO mechanisms to ensure greater inclusiveness. |
Annex 8.

MODEL TERMS OF REFERENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHIEF TECHNICAL ADVISOR/INTEGRATED LOCAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location:</strong> [To be added]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unit:</strong> Office of the Deputy Country Director - Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of assignment:</strong> PS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reports to:</strong> Deputy Country Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expected duration of assignment:</strong> 1 year renewable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BACKGROUND**

[To be filled by CO, providing details on conflict analysis, drivers of fragility and violence, situation of local governance systems, main peace and recovery issues and UNDP response and partnerships. Present project or programme for which CTA will assume leadership].

The general areas of responsibility include: (a) strategy and programme development, including situation analysis and needs assessment; (b) advocacy for UNDP approach to Local Governance and Local Development (LGLD) in crisis situations and partnership building with national and local governments, United Nations agencies, World Bank and donors; (c) technical and administrative programme implementation; and (d) knowledge management.

**DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

**Under the direct guidance of the DCD, and in collaboration with all cluster teams in the CO and in BPPS, assume the below duties and responsibilities.**

**Strategy and programme development**

- Conduct situation analysis and needs assessment in local governance, including conflict-related and political economy aspects, using UNDP diagnostic tools, and recommend programming priorities based on the CO’s comparative advantages and available resources.
- Lead development of local governance/early recovery strategy and programme, resulting in fully developed project documents.
- Guarantee the involvement and ownership of all relevant CO practice and project teams in all steps of programme development for integrated LGLD, including by training staff on UNDP’s approach and programming tools, as needed.
- Contribute to developing the Country Programme Document and Country Programme Action Plan for all areas relating to LGLD.
- Provide substantive inputs on integrated LGLD into country-level UN planning processes (ISF, UNDAF, etc.).

**Advocacy and partnership building**

- Raise awareness on and ownership of UNDP’s approach and programming tools on local governance in FCS among a wide range of national and international actors, including UN missions, the UNCT, national government and associations of local authorities.
- Strongly advocate and provide solutions for integrated joint strategies and programmes for LGLD.
- Build long-term technical and financial partnerships to support the CO’s goals on LGLD.
- Support an increased role for the CO in country-level LGLD networks.
- Help establish and facilitate UNCT and donor coordination platforms on LGLD and provide into the Early Recovery Cluster, if applicable.

**Technical and administrative programme implementation**

- Perform all regular execution functions assigned to a project manager (in DIM modality) or advise national programme manager on implementation aspects (if NIM modality).
- Provide technical leadership on various areas pertaining to LGLD during implementation and technical advice to country authorities (national, local level) on relevant LGLD policy issues. Organize for additional external expertise to be provided if necessary.
- Maintain a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation framework for all LGLD interventions with specific and measurable indicators.
- Work with the gender, youth and/or conflict advisor to ensure that the LGLD programme is gender-, youth- and conflict-sensitive. In particular, ensure that UNDP’s Eight Point Agenda for Women’s Empowerment and Gender Equality in Crisis Prevention and Recovery and UNDP Youth Strategy are promoted through programme implementation.

**Knowledge management**

- Ensure that a strong evidentiary and analytical base on LGLD is built from UNDP programmes, through periodic reporting, meetings, desk reviews, internal and external evaluations, case studies, lessons learned exercises and other means.
- Oversee the development of appropriate knowledge-sharing and communication tools on UNDP’s achievements in LGLD and active dissemination in and out of country, and ensure uptake at regional and global level of country-level results.
SKILLS AND EXPERIENCE

Education
Advanced university degree in one of the following disciplines: social/political sciences, rural/urban development, public administration.

Experience
• A minimum of seven years of progressively responsible experience in programme design and management in LGLD; field experience in crisis and/or post-conflict settings required.
• Strong experience in area-based development approaches with a focus on the role of local governance for local recovery.
• Experience in partnership building and/or inter-agency coordination in post-crisis, preferably in a UN mission environment.
• Proven ability to interact at the highest governmental and inter-agency levels and to provide high quality policy advice.
• Familiarity with UN common procedures and tools, especially regarding needs assessments, pooled funds and joint programming.

Language requirements
Fluency in English with excellent written and oral communication skills; working knowledge of [language of host country] desirable.
Annex 9.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ACE-The Electoral Knowledge Network. ACE worldwide database on Registration Requirements for Candidates, accessed March 2014.


Bon International Center for Conversion (Training and Education Center for Small Arms), information on the website accessed on March 2014.


Chatterjee, Siddharth. “For Child Soldiers, Every Day is a Living Nightmare”, Forbes Opinion, 9 December 2012


Danish Institute for International Studies. Local Governance in Fragile States, Copenhagen, 2008.


— Global Peace Index 2015.


— “Youth unemployment in the Arab world is a major cause for rebellion”, www.ilo.org, 5 April 2011.


United Nations, Understanding and Integrating Local Perceptions in Multi-dimensional Peacekeeping, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, New York, 2013.


— Conflict-Related Development Analysis, BCPF, draft, 2013.


— “How Much Progress We Made? An Analysis of Women’s Political Participation in Subnational Governments in Latin America and the Caribbean”, Regional Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean, Panamá, 2013.


— Promoting Local Election Management as Part of an Electoral Cycle Approach, Asia-Pacific Regional Centre, Bangkok, 2013.


— The Territorial Experience on Sustainable Development and Peacebuilding: the Department of Nanño, UNDP ART Redes Programme, UNDP Colombia, 2014.


— Risk and Disaster Management, Nairobi, 2010.


United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Study on Homicide 2013, Vienna.


The Guide on Local Governance in Fragile and Conflict-affected Settings: Building a Resilient Foundation for Peace and Development presents UNDP’s renovated approach to supporting local governance and local development actors and systems in countries prone to chronic fragility, recurrent conflict and/or high levels of criminal violence.

The Guide draws upon the extensive experience of UNDP and the United Nations system in working with local governance institutions in fragile and conflict-affected settings. It emphasizes the need to secure a strong social contract at the local level for building state legitimacy, improving livelihoods, and ultimately, strengthening resilience against the recurrence of violence and conflict.

The Guide is meant primarily to support the work of UNDP teams in countries affected by situations of fragility and/or conflict, but can also be useful to policy-makers and practitioners from other development agencies working to address similar challenges.

Copyright © 2016
United Nations Development Programme
One, United Nations Plaza
New York, NY 10017, USA

For further information and feedback, please contact:
José Cruz Osorio, Team Leader
Responsive and Accountable Institutions Unit
Governance and Peacebuilding Cluster
UNDP Bureau for Policy and Programme Support
jose.cruz-osorio@undp.org