OUTCOME EVALUATION
OF SUPPORT TO ELECTORAL CYCLE IN SIERRA LEONE 2011-2014

FINAL REPORT

By
Cheikh FAYE
International Consultant

DECEMBER 2013
# Table of contents

Acronyms ........................................................................................................................................... 3  
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................ 4  
1. Project design .................................................................................................................................. 4  
2. Results so far .................................................................................................................................... 4  
3. Lessons learned ............................................................................................................................... 6  
4. Recommendations .......................................................................................................................... 7  
Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 8  
1. Goal .................................................................................................................................................. 8  
2. Scope ................................................................................................................................................ 8  
3. Objectives ....................................................................................................................................... 8  
4. Focus points .................................................................................................................................... 8  
5. Methodology .................................................................................................................................... 8  
5.1. Documentary Review .................................................................................................................. 9  
5.2. Interviews ..................................................................................................................................... 9  
5.3. Analytical framework ................................................................................................................... 10  
5.4. Limitations and mitigation measures .......................................................................................... 10  
5.5. Schedule of main mission ........................................................................................................... 11  
2. National background ....................................................................................................................... 12  
3. Programme Content ......................................................................................................................... 14  
3.1. Strategic content .......................................................................................................................... 14  
3.2. Implementation settlements ......................................................................................................... 16  
3.3. Budget provisions ......................................................................................................................... 17  
3.4. Major modifications during implementation .............................................................................. 17  
3.5. Performance Assessment ............................................................................................................ 18  
3.1. Relevance ..................................................................................................................................... 18  
3.2. Effectiveness ............................................................................................................................... 19  
3.2.1. Output level Review ............................................................................................................... 19  
3.2.2. Review of Outputs under Outcome 1 ................................................................................... 19  
3.2.3. Review of Outputs under Outcome 2 ................................................................................... 23  
3.2.4. Review of the Outputs under Outcome 3 .............................................................................. 29  
3.2.5. Review of the Outputs under PMU Implementing Agency .................................................... 32  
3.2.6. Outcome level Analysis ......................................................................................................... 34  
3.2.7. Outcome 1 ............................................................................................................................... 34  
3.2.8. Outcome 2 ............................................................................................................................... 37  
3.2.9. Outcome 3 ............................................................................................................................... 39  
3.2.10. Contributions to crosscutting issues ..................................................................................... 40  
3.2.11. Achievements by previous election project (2007-2010) ..................................................... 41  
3.3. Efficiency ..................................................................................................................................... 44  
3.4. Impact .......................................................................................................................................... 48  
3.4.1. Peaceful 2012 elections as a reference point .......................................................................... 48  
3.4.2. Institutional development gains ............................................................................................. 48  
3.4.3. Tangible Assets ....................................................................................................................... 49  
3.5. Sustainability ............................................................................................................................... 50  
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 51  
1. Main findings .................................................................................................................................. 52  
2. Lessons learned ............................................................................................................................... 53  
(i) *It was valuable developing a long cycle electoral support* .................................................... 53  
(ii) Performing well in outputs delivering does not always mean equivalent influence on the related outcomes ......................................................... 53  
(iii) As for many capacity development programmes, the electoral support brought results rather than change .................................................. 53  
(iv) The non-governmental sector is responding well to capacity development ................................ 54  
(v) The proper functioning of the Steering Committee is very supportive to the programme .......... 54  
3. Recommendations ....................................................................................................................... 54  
At strategic level .................................................................................................................................. 54  
1. Better think of chaining logic between outputs and outcome ....................................................... 54  
2. Put more focus on institution change in the capacity development approach ............................. 55  
At Operational level ............................................................................................................................ 55  
3. Enhance integration of the programme .......................................................................................... 57  
4. Assess the current profile of NEC and PPC for more focused CD approach ............................... 56  
5. Handle the issue of sustaining the assets of the programme ........................................................ 56  
6. Continue the support to non-governmental sector ...................................................................... 56  
ANNEXES .......................................................................................................................................... 58  
1. Evaluation Matrix ........................................................................................................................... 59  
2. Bibliography .................................................................................................................................. 72
3. Persons/Institutions visited ................................................................................................................... 73
4. Termes de référence de la mission ........................................................................................................... 73

**Acronyms**

ADR : National Electoral Commission
APPA : All Political Parties Youth Association
APPWA : All Political Parties Women Association
APPYA : All Political Parties Association
AWP : Annual Work Plan
CD : Capacity Development
COF : Country Office
CSO : Civil Society Organization
CTA : Chief Technical Advisor
CTN : Cotton Tree News
DCCMC : District Code of Conduct Monitoring Committees
DBS : Direct Budgetary Support
DFID : Department For International Development
EBF : Electoral Basket Fund
EC : European Community
EMB : Election Management Bodies
EOC : Electoral Offenses Court
EU : European Union
GMS : General Management Service
H : High
HDI : Human Development index
IMC : Independent Media Commission
IRC : Inter Religious Council
IT : Information Technology
L : Low
M : Medium
MDG : Millennium Development Goal
MRU : Mano River Union
NEC : National Electoral Commission
NCD : National Commission for Democracy
NCPC : National Council of Paramount Chiefs
NEW : National Electoral Watch
NGO : Non-Governmental Organization
NRS : National Registration Service
ONS : Office of National Security
PBF : Peace Building Fund
PMU : Programme Management Unit
PPRC : Political Parties Registration Commission
PRODOC : Project Document
SC : Steering Committee
SFCG : Search For Common Ground
SLBC : Sierra Leone Broadcasting Corporation
SLP : Sierra Leone Police
SOWIES : Female Secrete Societies
UN : United Nations
UNDP : United Nations Development Programme
UNIPSIL : United National Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone
USD : Dollar of the Unites States of America
Executive Summary

1. Project design

The Electoral Support 2011-2014 is designed as a long cycled programme bringing sustainable assistance to Sierra Leone with regard to electoral matters. This idea of giving time for sustainable capacity building is essential to the programme’s identity, and is clearly emphasized by its project document. The very first outcome of the programme relates to enabling the country’s Elections Management Bodies to conduct by their own, or with decreased international support, peaceful and fair elections. The programme is also built on achievements by previous electoral assistances and governance projects, and also on remaining challenges driven through lessons learned processes.

Focus areas are: (i) Institutional strengthening, with key expectation being “Electoral institutions have the capacity to administer technically sound, credible and sustainable elections (with progressively less international support”); (ii) Inclusive participation, with key expectation being “Improved public confidence and participation in the electoral process”; (iii) Conflict management and electoral security, with key expectation as “Election-related conflict managed for peaceful polls (before, during and after)”.

Institutions targeted are as follows: National Electoral Commission (NEC), Political Parties Registration Commission (PPRC), Sierra Leone Police (SLP), Office of National Security (ONS), Law Officers Department, Mano River Union (MRU), National Commission for Democracy (NCD), and Non State Actors (Civil Society, Inter-religious Council, Academic institutions, Political parties, Youth and Women groups).

The overall budget, as per Prodoc, stands at USD 42 million, 89% of which is provided by a basket fund with contributors as follows: European Commission, United Kingdom through DFID, Japan, Germany, Ireland through Irish Aid, and UNDP. The remaining 11%, carried out from Peace building Fund, is provided by UNIPSIL.

2. Results so far

While planned resources in the Prodoc reached 45 125 887 USD, consolidation of budgets made available to the programme through its annual work plans shows an amount of 39 78 010 455 USD. Based on this last figure, the execution rate stands 80.8%.

So far, the most prominent achievement by the programme is the successfully holding of the 2012 presidential, parliamentary and local elections. While there was heavy fear about the event, the programme helped making it peaceful and fair, as well as its results accepted. To perform in this regard, as summarized below, the programme issued specific deliveries under its three dedicated outcomes.

2.1. Support to elections managing bodies

The programme heavily supported the EMB, particularly the National Electoral Commission, with deliveries critical to the electoral process. Along with support to NEC in the planning of the whole agenda, it procured equipment supportive to the process, amongst which equipment for a biometric electoral registration which resulted into a voter register of 2,697,291 individuals. For the safe management and preservation of this gain, it settled also a data centre.
and its rescue system, all under responsibility of NEC. Valuable support was also provided through training of various direct or related staffs of NEC and PPRC, developing the IT tools needed at different stages of the process, operationalizing the regional tallying Centres, planning and deploying the heavy logistics towards Election Day.

The framework of the programme, the Steering Committee in particular, offered to stakeholders a sound platform for coordination, information sharing and political dialogue, as well as overall guidance on the electoral agenda. This is also a valuable gain, in a Sierra Leonean model with EMB being not built on a perfectly parity basis.

Unfortunately, while succeeding in standing beside the Elections Managing Bodies to make peaceful and fair elections happen, the Electoral Support failed to really empower them in such a way that they be able to act on their own in upcoming complex election cycles.

2.2. Participation and confidence on the electoral process

The programme supported civil society organizations to run nationwide campaign of sensitization in favor of good participation into peaceful and fair elections. Segments of the population usually not involved in politics, such as disadvantaged groups, have been approached and brought within the process. The youth has been mobilized through artistic or sports events. Women and traditional chiefs’ structures have been solicited. As a result of these efforts by the programme, and also due to other initiatives, the participation to the election has increased to 91.05% in 2012, against 68.61% in 2007 for the presidential contest, 79.28% against 75.80% for the parliamentary elections. In the meantime, the quality of vote improved, with invalid vote dropped from 7.3% in 2007 to 4.7% in 2012. Tension also went down.

With regard to confidence in the process, the programme supported initiatives of monitoring by independent and experienced organizations which scrutinized the entire agenda. Some set up situation rooms to collect critical information and be able to send due alerts to decision makers. Also the media sector was supported to increase its professionalism in covering the electoral process, at the operators’ level, in monitoring the coverage and safeguarding ethics, at the level of the independent regulating institution. Observers reported that the press improved its standing during the 2012 elections.

2.3. Security and justice on the electoral process

The programme helped enhancing the coordination of security involved bodies, as well as it supported the improvement of their assessment of security issues. Precious threat assessment was conducted in this regard. Also, the programme helped bringing the security sector together with the other stakeholders to operationalize a broader concept of security more preventive and participatory. The programme trained 10,500 security staff and logistically supported their effective deployment across the country before, on and after Election Day. As an illustration of success on this, observers interviewed reported that both neutrality and professionalism of security forces improved: scenes of top security officers jubilating at release of electoral results weren’t seen anymore (it was the case in 2007).

With regard to judiciary sector, the programme supported the installation of Electoral Offense Courts, to ease treatment of cases and have the political process not hindered by judiciary bottlenecks. 94 cases are reported to have been brought before these temporary jurisdictions,
related however to common law offenses, rather than being proper election dispute cases. The electoral disputes were still brought before High Court and no notable progress in quickly resolving them is reported: instead, some are even still undecided by now, and do let constituencies unrepresented at Parliament.

2.4. Overall performance

The programme performed well enough in delivering the main outputs designed in its project document, what led as well to having peaceful, inclusive, fair and accepted elections. At the level of the outcomes also, two out of three are met more or less: the improvement of both confidence and participation in the elections, and the well challenging of the security issues. The third outcome relating to making the EMB able to run elections by their own or with less international assistance is obviously not met. The National Electoral Commission, in particular, still shows critical weaknesses amongst which the following:

- Weak strategic and operational thinking and running capacities (it failed to deliver timely and sound planning)
- Weak decision making processes (it is putting at risk both data centre and rescue system against any rationality)
- Weak of culture of dialogue (unilateralism in making critical decisions such as changing key rules of game some weeks before elections)

3. Lessons learned

It was valuable developing a long cycle electoral support

Being a three-year cycle programme makes the 2011-2014 Electoral Support of Sierra Leone have time and resources to develop a holistic approach of capacity building. Public institutions and nongovernmental organizations could therefore be targeted comfortably for relaying the inputs to the electoral system. Though not all the objectives of capacitation are met, surely significant efforts have been done on this, which could not be performed or not as serenely in the tie context of a punctual election focused assistance.

Performing well in outputs delivering does not always mean equivalent influence on the related outcomes

With regard to outcome 1, “Electoral institutions have the capacity to administer technically sound, credible and sustainable elections, with progressively less international support”, the programme performed quite well the totality of this result oriented outputs, but without managing to really influence the overall result. This is possible because the ownership by the concerned institutions, needed for a real qualitative leap wasn’t there enough. This ownership being weak, the efforts went straight to making peaceful, inclusive and fair elections happen, but without any guarantee that the EMB could find their own way next time. Therefore, in designing a programme’s framework of results and resources, it is imperative opening an eye on possible missing links like ownership, so that the programme isn’t loaded with objectives out of management’s control.

As for many capacity development programmes, the electoral support brought results rather than change
As a capacity development strategy, the Electoral Support was meant to bring in changes. With regard to the Elections Managing Bodies, it was about helping them move from a point where they are not self-reliant in terms of electoral management capacities, to another point where they can rely on themselves. This movement hasn’t been performed because there are no sufficient inner provisions to change within the institutions and the programme did not act on this. So for CD programmes, clear strategies should be designed for proper addressing of challenges related to institutional change.

**The non-governmental sector is responding well to capacity development**

With specific regard to mobilization, civil education, election monitoring, the nongovernmental segment appears overall to have been very supportive to the momentum towards peaceful, fair and inclusive elections. The programme should therefore continue helping it strengthen its structuring.

**The proper functioning of the Steering Committee is very supportive to the programme**

The Steering Committee works well so far and, therefore, is very supportive to the programme. Performance expected from each stakeholder is monitored, reminders made in case of delay. With regard to political dialogue also, the SC has been very active, mobilizing even the diplomatic level on the donors’ side to build consensus amongst the political actors. For instance, this approach helped in easing tension and pledging for a solution, when NEC unilaterally increased the nomination fees.

4. **Recommendations**

4.1. **At Strategic level**

1. Better think of the robustness of relations between outputs and outcome
2. Incorporate appropriate strategies and tools for institutional change in the capacity development approaches

4.2. **At Operational level**

3. Urgently secure the appropriate technical conditions for storing of main electoral data center at NEC headquarters, and transfer rescue system to NRS to avoid having main and backup devices in same place.
4. Assess the current profile of NEC and PPRC for more customized CD approach with better chances of success
5. Based on the results of EMB assessment and assuming that its conclusions be conducive in the regard, undertake urgent further Capacity development actions focused on the following issues, as well as on any others emerging out of the assessment:
   - Strategic Planning
   - Assets and risk Management
   - Participative approaches and synergy building, in managing electoral processes
   - Institutional change approaches
6. Continue elaborate and finance work plans with nongovernmental sector
7. 4. Fully integrate resources from the Peacebuilding Fund in the programme
Introduction

1. Goal

The evaluation’s overall goal is to meet the requirements of transparency and accountability towards the stakeholders of the programme: the Government of Sierra Leone and its development partners, namely DFID, European Commission, Japan, Ireland through Irish Aid, Germany, UNDP and UNIPSIL. It is about to provide to these actors, elements to appreciate the results achieved so far, draw lessons learned and relevant recommendations.

2. Scope

The evaluation covers the four main components of the programme, and specifically focuses on making evidence of the extent to which the related outcomes are achieved so far:

(i) National institutions have the capacity to administrate
(ii) Improved confidence and participation in the electoral process
(iii) Election-related conflict managed for peaceful polls (before, during and after)
(iv) Programme well implemented and managed

3. Objectives

The evaluation is dedicated to assessing the Support to electoral cycle, highlighting the results achieved and lessons learned from the implementation, and opening a window on achievements of previous electoral support projects. More specifically, its key expectations are:

(i) Assess the level of achievement of designed outcomes in the Prodoc, and the process and implementation framework supporting such achievements
(ii) Draw lessons learned and make recommendations for better guidance of remaining programming year and other similar programmes

4. Focus points

The evaluative questions are detailed as follows by Terms of reference:

- Evaluate the performance of the programme with reference to its respective strategy, objectives, quantitative and qualitative indicators defined by the programme document and the implementation arrangements, and identify major management and operational issues that impacted on the achievement of programme objectives.
- Evaluate the relevance of the programme in the emerging country context and priorities, taking into consideration other electoral assistance interventions.
- Assess the overall degree of progress made by all supported partners towards development of national capacities aimed at strengthening their management capacities and systems for electoral management in Sierra Leone.
- The evaluation should inform and provide lessons especially in respect of identifying further capacity development needs in national democratic institutions, including suggestions regarding changes to the legal framework around elections.
- The evaluation should pay particular attention to the gender elements of the projects and programmes and provide an assessment of the way in which the programmes addressed gender concerns
The evaluation should inform continued implementation of the programme, by making recommendations regarding further capacity development, how lessons learnt and key issues can be followed up in the post-election period, and suggesting immediate steps to be taken towards further improvement in the future electoral environment.

The evaluation should cover the period from the approval of the Programme Document on February 2011 until the time of the evaluation. The evaluation will examine support programme provided to the multitude of partners and will encompass the entire scope of programme’s capacity building initiatives and their impact. The evaluation should also cover work that falls within the 2008-2012 period with specific emphasis on the 2011-14 programme.

The points above are to be examined within the framework of traditional evaluation criteria standing as below:

- Relevance
- Effectiveness
- Efficiency
- Impact
- Sustainability

5. Methodology

The methodology used for the evaluation involved a literature review and interviews with project stakeholders within the UNDP Country Office in Sierra Leone, the Management Unit of project, beneficiaries and national entities involved in the implementation, representatives of donors contributing to the basket fund.

5.1. Documentary Review

The documentary review covered four sets of documents:

- Contextual documents for Sierra Leone and UNDP, with regard to strategic planning in general, in particular with reference to institutional and political governance
- Planning and programming documents of the Electoral Programme and previous related projects
- Monitoring documents on the implementation of the programme and related projects (confronting what is planned / programmed to what is achieved)
- Any other documents likely to enlighten overall programme or parts of it and other related interventions

The literature review helped to build a first insight on the Electoral Support Programme. Based on this, the methodology has been refined, including the stabilization of an evaluation matrix (see annexes), and where points are picked up to serve in specific interviews of the different targeted groups of stakeholders.

5.2. Interviews

Interviews covered following groups of stakeholders:

- Senior Management of UNDP Country Office
- Other Donors representatives
- Programme Management Unit
• National beneficiary institutions/organizations
• Civil society organizations
• Resource persons involved in implementation or capitalization

As for sampling of interviewees, the consultant held discussions with UNDP and the staff of the Programme Management Unit. Complete list of persons met by the consultant in the purpose of this evaluation is attached in the report’s annexes.

5.3. Analytical framework

The analytical framework, detailed in an evaluation matrix also attached as annex of report, followed the common evaluation criteria, as specified in UNDP and donors evaluation templates, and recalled in the mission’s terms of reference, which states their contents as in table below.

**Tableau 1: Evaluation criteria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation criteria</th>
<th>Corresponding evaluation questions or points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>The extent to which the programme design and delivery of activities was able to respond to and address the organizational and programming priorities of the EMBs, and other participating stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>The extent to which programme activities yielded expected outputs at the sub-component level and contributed to expected outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>The extent to which programme funds, expertise and time were used judiciously to achieve desired programme results? Were programme inputs procured in a timely way and with intended results?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact</td>
<td>The extent to which the legislative and policy innovations, strengthened human capacities, and management systems are likely to benefit the EMBs and other recipient partners into the future with a view to the next scheduled elections in 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>The extent to which the legislative and policy innovations, strengthened human capacities, and management systems are likely to benefit the EMBs and other recipient partners into the future with a view to the next scheduled elections in 2016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The evaluation framework also takes into account crosscutting issues as far as they are relevant given the programme’s content: mainly capacity development, gender equity, HIV/AIDS, human rights, result-based management. Evaluations always should assess to what extent they are integrated into projects and programmes by UN in general, by UNDP in particular, depending of course on their specific relevance in the interventions under review.

Analysis results into performances rating system with values scale showing three levels: « H » for High, « M » for Medium and « L » for Low. For each performance, be it at level of outcome or at that of outputs, the specific underlying factors and deliveries are presented as to explain the rating.

5.4. Limitations and mitigation measures

While per TOR the evaluation was to be run by a team of two consultants, one international team leader, and his national assistant, the national consultant did not finally joint the mission, because he was on another assignment in Zimbabwe (COF informed), and returned to Freetown on the day before the end of mission. The international coped alone with a programme which is still the biggest in the COF’s portfolio. Moreover, the evaluation was also expected to deliver inputs to the ADR exercise on Sierra Leone going on in the meantime. The consultant suggested that a 10-day extension be added to his assignment, so that he could properly and timely cover all evaluation’s scope. The UNDP management did
not agree and this is idea was not implemented. Therefore, to be able to qualitatively and timely deliver, the Consultant then took upon himself.

With regards to data collection process, one donor participating to the basket fund was not interviewed. All its staff being recently appointed in Freetown, it suggested not to meet the Consultant because they did not much about the Electoral Programme. The Independent Media Commission could not be met either, despite submission of a request of appointment and due follow-up: this body, which met already with the ADR team, did not want to make time again with a UNDP consultant. The Consultant built upon literature review and interviews with other stakeholders to mitigate such shortcomings.

5.5. Schedule of main mission

The main mission took place in Freetown, Sierra Leone, between 4th of October and 1st of November 2013. The main sequences of mission were: documentary review and finalization of methodology and tools; primary data collection (interviews), processing of collected information; report drafting. The consultant worked closely with colleagues involved in ADR exercise, and conducted some interviews together with them.
1. National background

1.1. Geographical situation

Sierra Leone is a West African country, of 71,740 sq. km of land area. It is bordered to the North-West, North and North-East by Guinea-Conakry, to the South-East by Liberia, and to the West and South-West by the Atlantic Ocean. Its climate is tropical, with at least 6-month rainfall per year. Erosion, deforestation, floods and environmental degradation remain growing sources of concern.

1.2. Demographics

Population is estimated at 6 million inhabitants in 2011 (World Bank), with a growth rate of 2.227% per year. Net migration rate is negative at -3.86 migrants/1000 inhabitants, but refugees currently in surrounding countries are slowly returning since the end of civil war. Life expectancy at birth stands at 56.55, while infant mortality reaches 76.64 deaths/1,000 live births. The sex ratio (Male/Female) stands at 1.03 at birth but decreases through age pyramid, and stands at 0.9 for overall population, even reaching its deepest position at 0.78 for 65-year and over. The population is young: 61% are under 25-year age.

The breakdown urban against rural area is 38% vs. 72%. The main cities are: Freetown, the capital city (854,000 inhabitants); Bo (234,000 inhabitants), Kenema (182,000 inhabitants), Makeni (109,000 inhabitants) and Koidu (93,000 inhabitants). The ethnic groups structure is as follow (2008 Census figures): Temne 35%, Mende 31%, Limba 8%, Kono 5%, Krio 2% (descendants of freed Jamaican slaves who were settled in the Freetown area in the late-18th century; also known as Krio), Mandingo 2%, Loko 2%, other 15% (includes refugees from Liberia's recent civil war, and small numbers of Europeans, Lebanese, Pakistanis, and Indians).

1.3. Socioeconomic profile

The economy of Sierra Leone is, overall, since the end war, in a quite robust trend of growth. Real GDP grew by more than 17% in 2012. If a slowdown is foreseen in 2013, the growth should still reach 13% in 2013 and 11% in 2014, as mining activities continue to expand. Factors hampering the economy are power shortages, infrastructure gaps and volatile weather conditions.

Mining sector activities, particularly iron ore production, is the main driver of Sierra Leonean economy growth. Expected further investment by mining companies operating the Tonkolili and Marampa iron ore mines, especially in transport facilities, will contribute consolidating this positioning. Noniron ore mining sector, (rutile and diamond production, for instance), as well, is supportive to growth. While oil exploration continues and has already resulted into offshore discoveries announcement, start of production is not expected soon.

Agricultural production growth is linked to new foreign-financed commercial projects, as well as supported by the government's efforts placed on rice production and on improving farmers' access to critical inputs such as credit. Manufacturing appears to be the weakest sector, plagued by supply-side constraints and competition from cheaper imports. Growth of services is healthier, mainly as a result of mining-related services and donor supported efforts to
improve roads, power, water supply and sanitation. Telecommunications in particular continue their upward trend.

This continuous strong growth of the economy is impacting the country’s human development profile. Sierra Leone’s score on the Human Development Index (HDI), which measures development in terms of income, life expectancy and education, has increased from 0.348 in 2011 to 0.359 in 2012. With this, the country rose in the world rankings from 180th out of 187 countries with comparable data to 177th out of 186. The improvement was primarily driven by a large increase in the income index, from 0.297 to 0.321 (with 1 being the highest possible score), but also reflects a smaller improvement in the health index, from 0.438 to 0.444. However, the education index has remained stagnant at 0.326 since 2010. Health index moderate evolution could be a result of the launching in 2010 of a free healthcare initiative for pregnant women, lactating mothers and children under five; international donors gave strong supports to this initiative. The increased income index reflects 18.3% growth in gross national income per head, from US$745 in 2011 to US$881 in 2012. This is the first time in two decades that average income has raised beyond its 1980 level of US$796. The growth was mainly fuelled by an emerging iron ore extraction industry, but has also been underpinned by relatively strong performances in agriculture and services.

Sierra Leone has become the second-fastest-growing country in terms of human development over the past 12 years, after Afghanistan. Nonetheless, country’s index is still significantly below the Sub-Saharan Africa index of 0.475 and the world index of 0.694. The average Sierra Leonean's per capita income is still less than US$2.5 per day, and it lags behind most other income-poor countries in terms of its general level of human development.

About 70.0% of the population lives below the poverty line. Poverty is more prevalent in the rural areas and amongst the youth. Youth unemployment remains dramatically high, at 70%. Food security is a major challenge and increase in agricultural production is constrained by lack of access to markets and poor rural infrastructure. The poor national infrastructure and the small size of the private sector are significant impediments to the achievement of higher and more equitable growth, as required to effectively address poverty and unemployment. The country is heavily dependent on external assistance, with about 50% of public investment programmes financed by foreign resources.

1.4. Institutional and political framework

Sierra Leone is a republic with a constitutional government inspired by English common law. The head of state, president of the Republic, is elected by popular vote for a maximum of two 6-year terms. The now incumbent started his final term out of 17th November 2012 election. The parliament, which legislatures are also of 6-year, encompasses 124 seats, out of which 112 are filled throughout elections and 12 occupied by paramount chiefs. With regard to judiciary sector, the country has a dual system where customary law is neighboring with formal positive jurisdictions. The weakness of the current judiciary system brought the idea of settling electoral courts, dedicated to deciding cases raised along the electoral process.

Sierra Leone has made notable progress in consolidation of peace and democratic governance since the end of its civil war in 2002. This includes the successful running of peaceful elections in 2007 with significantly less international involvement than in 2002, and the successful conduct of the 2008 local council elections and several by-elections through 2010.
However, the gains made are not yet irreversible and the situation remains fragile with a growing political polarization marked by regional and ethnic divisions.

2. Programme Content

2.1. Strategic content

Sierra Leonean 2011-2014 Electoral Support Programme addresses capacity issues in Election managing bodies such as National Electoral Commission (NEC) and Political Parties Registration Commission (PPRC), as well as key institutions involved in the electoral process within sectors of justice, security, media regulation, and civil society. Based on the findings of the Need Assessment Mission, the programme concentrates on three areas:

(i) **Institutional strengthening**: enhancing the institutional and management capacity of the NEC and PPRC, through the improvement of the electoral administration as a whole, including, among other key strategic areas of assistance, legal reform, strategic planning, voter registration, results management system, regional networking, electoral dispute resolution and management of electoral stakeholders.

(ii) **Inclusive participation**: expanding levels of electoral/democratic awareness and participation, particularly for under-represented and disadvantaged segments of society (women, youth and people living with disabilities), and working through political and other stakeholders such as political parties, civil society and the media, reducing the level of political tension and promoting a more conciliatory and consultative political and electoral process.

(iii) **Conflict management and electoral security**: improving the access to justice and administration of electoral disputes; strengthening capacities of ONS and SLP to ensure peaceful elections.

In terms of specific objectives, the three outcomes the programme targets are as follows:

(i) **Outcome 1**: Electoral institutions have the capacity to administer technically sound, credible and sustainable elections (with progressively less international support)

(ii) **Outcome 2**: Improved public confidence and participation in the electoral process, political tension and potentials for violence identified, prevented and resolved

(iii) **Outcome 3**: Election-related conflicts managed for peaceful polls (before, during and after).

The table below gives a synopsis of the chaining of outcomes, their related outputs and contributing activities. While not inserted in the table, these three strategic outcomes are to be completed by an operational one, related to implementation requirements.

Table 2: Framework of results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome 1: Electoral institutions have the capacity to administer technically sound, credible and sustainable elections (with progressively less international support)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output 1.1. The National Electoral Commission’s administration of elections is improved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicative expected deliveries:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Support to the voter registration process, including procurement of equipment, technical expertise, sensitization, contract management, monitoring and oversight Regional/district office strengthening, including to provide decentralized results tally function</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- Capacity development and specialized training (IT, election operations, training and procedures)
- Legal reform to consolidate electoral laws/regulations/procedures including results system
- Support to organization of all planned elections (Presidential, Parliamentary, Local by-elections and possible referendum) as well as follow up (e.g., boundary delimitation post-election)
- Post-election evaluation of lessons learned

**Output 1.2. Political Party Registration Commission is able to maintain dialogue among political parties and promote their constructive, non-violent participation in the electoral process**

Indicative expected deliveries:
- Capacity development and specialized training (with a focus on the new staff)
- Office space in the regions
- PPRC public outreach and research capacity
- Legal reform to consider widening the mandate of the PPRC, granting it authority to sanction violations of the Code of Conduct for Political Parties
- PPRC-sponsored political party training and inter-party dialogue (close linkages with output 2.2)
- District monitoring committees strengthening
- Review of policies and Constitution of Political Parties

**Outcome 2: Improved public confidence and participation in the electoral process; tensions, and potential conflicts identified, prevented and resolved (UNIPSIL led)**

Output 2.1. CSOs are able to monitor the electoral process and promote broad civic and voter education

Indicative expected deliveries:
- Support for national election observation (long-term and short-term observers, with long-term serving as early warning mechanism); capacity building for quick count/parallel vote tabulation
- Civic and voter education initiatives with a particular focus on women and youth – tie in to conflict prevention activities
- Support to civil society led coordination of voter and civic education activities and election observation, including with funding partners outside of the basket fund

Output 2.2. Political parties and their women and youth wings play a constructive and informed role in the electoral process

Indicative expected deliveries:
- Training of party agents (done by NEC/PPRC, directly or via a third-party)
- Promotion of intra or inter party dialogue and commitment from political parties to constructive political discourse and peaceful elections
- Supporting the All Political Parties Youth Association (APPYA) to engage in promoting peaceful elections
- Work with women’s wings of political parties to develop gender strategies, conduct constituency level sensitization and advocacy towards achieving a 30% quota for women and training of women leaders and candidates

Output 2.3. Media monitoring and improved reporting standards

Indicative expected deliveries:
- Support the Independent Media Commission (IMC) to monitor and enforce the Media Code of Practice
- IMC training for journalists on professional reporting on electoral matters
- Support to radio-based news reporting (e.g. SLBC, others)
- Support dialogue with and among editors (Editors Guild) and Sierra Leone Association of Journalists on responsible reporting as well as the establishment of media code of conduct or other mechanisms to enhance the support to the media for a peaceful election

Output 2.4. Promoting national cohesion and unity for peaceful elections

Indicative expected deliveries:
- Support to the inter-religious council to organize a national dialogue on diversity and politics and a peaceful political completion
- Support to artists for peace and musicians to spread the message of non-violence, ethnic tolerance and peaceful elections
- Support to traditional and indigenous groups to exercise neutrality and have positive influence in managing tensions and potential conflicts before, during and after the elections
- Enhancing coordination with learning institutions and academia in promoting national debate and dialogue on non-violence and participatory elections
- Promote non-violent amongst youth through sports
- CSO for violence prevention

**Outcome 3: Election-related conflict managed for peaceful polls (before, during and after)**

Output 3.1. The electoral dispute resolution mechanism is strengthened
Indicative expected deliveries:
- Electoral Offences Court strengthened (temporary body)
- EOC/NEC/PPRC training to judges and magistrates
- Crisis management plan for electoral disputes
- NEC-led public education campaign on the role of the courts

Output 3.2. National Electoral Security Plan implemented and improved capacity of SLP to safeguard elections (UNIPSIL lead)

Indicative expected deliveries:
- Provide support, including international expertise, to the Office of National Security
- Strengthen the institutional capacity, infrastructure, logistics and impartiality of the SLP
- Training SLP and Chiefdom Police, Fire Force, Prison and MACP Personnel on functions during elections, incl. role of electoral courts and sensitization on gender-based violence, as well as police role and responsibilities at polling centers and stations
- Provide UN assistance to the SLP through appropriate and timely deployment, particularly to safeguard voters and polling materials
- Provide crowd control training to SLP personnel to be assigned to election security duties

Source: Prodoc

2.2. Implementation settlements

The Electoral Support is placed under political oversight of a high-level coordination mechanism managed by the UN and set up at the level of Ambassadors or high representatives of donor agencies contributing to the basket fund, or channeling direct support to actors towards the 2012 electoral process. This mechanism “meets periodically to discuss the evolving political environment, shares plans and activities, deliberates issues of common concern, negotiates agreed responses, and analyzes emerging needs and risks. This high-level forum is an important part of donor coordination, with the emphasis on high-level policy development, collaboration and information-sharing.” The mechanism is also open to national institutions and other stakeholders involved in the electoral process.

Under the high level mechanism, exists a still strategic but more operational Electoral Steering Committee, which composition is as follows:
- Government of Sierra Leone
- UNDP
- Donors participating to the basket fund
- Civil society organizations

Working on a consensual basis, the Steering Committee is responsible for making management decisions when guidance is required, including recommendations for UNDP approval of programme revisions. It meets quarterly, or as frequent as necessary. It has also the capacity to constitute sub committees devoted to specific matters: for instance, sub-committees on civil society support, voter registration monitoring.

At technical and day to day management level, the Electoral Support is being operated through direct implementation (DIM), what means that a Programme Management Unit separate and independent from any Sierra Leonean national body is in charge of operating or coordinating activities under the programme. The PMU is placed under supervision of the Steering Committee which provides overall strategic guidance on the programme.

The Programme Management Unit is headed by an international Chief Technical Advisor (CTA), and includes also an operations manager and one finance associate. The CTA is responsible before the Steering Committee for overall implementation of the programme. An integrated approach allows also the programme to access to existing UN staff, including
experts from the other Countries Offices and regional Centres of UNDP. While a small procurement Unit exists within the PMU, heavy acquisitions are referred to Copenhagen central procurement Unit. Quality assurance is assigned to Business Development and Oversight Unit and the Governance Unit of UNDP.

UNIPSIL is the other part of the implementation settlement, with direct responsibility of operating specific activities, namely the following:

(i) Women leaders activities (in collaboration with UN Women and UNDP)
(ii) Police and security component
(iii) Components with Political parties, media and other non-state actors

2.3. **Budget provisions**

Overall resources initially allocated to the programme stands at US$45,125,887, with programmed costs totaling are $42,028,972. Provisions 3% for unforeseen expenses is included in this budget. The following budget lines are also provisioned: 7% as General Management Services (GMS), 2% as Implementation Support Services (ISS) fees, and 5% as fee for support provided by the UNDP Procurement Support Office which is only applicable over the total value of voter registration equipment procured by this office.

The table below gives breakdown of budget by sources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N°</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Currency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>14,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>7,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Irish Aid</td>
<td>441,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>PBF and UNDP</td>
<td>7,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>325,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Prodoc*

2.4. **Major modifications during implementation**

No major changes are reported during the implementation, except the budgetary revisions, which are expected and undertaken on a quarterly basis or more frequently if required.
3. Performance Assessment

3.1. Relevance

A lesson learning process out of the 2007 elections established that election managing bodies, namely National Electoral Commission (NEC) and Political Parties Registration Commission, but also other key actors in the security and judiciary sectors, as well as in the civil society, needed to strengthen their specific abilities towards the 2012 elections. It was all the more imperative to build on at these institutional levels that the political and social context was particularly tricky: political divides along ethnic and regional lines, combined to a winner-takes-all electoral system and a weak economic situation including high levels of unemployment, specifically among the youth, were viewed likely to raise heavy tension during 2012 elections.

This context analysis was confirmed by the conclusions that came out of NAM mission of February-March 2010, which expressed deep concern about seeing the 2012 electoral process be more contentious than that of 2007, and recommended that following challenges be addressed by joint efforts from international donors and authorities of Sierra Leone:

- Reducing the level of political tension and promote a more conciliatory and consultative political and electoral process.
- International technical and financial support to critical institutions that manage political competition through constructive channels such as the NEC, Political Parties Registration Commission (PPRC), the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) and the Judiciary, i.e. the Electoral Courts.
- Training of staff in other important institutions such as the judiciary, and the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Corporation (SLBC).
- Robust international and national observation of the electoral process.
- Active engagement in and support for a robust and highly integrated assistance programme of support that provides a long-term strategic vision and the development of country-appropriate system.
- Continuation of UNIPSIL assistance in the resolution of serious political controversies and strengthening participation of political parties and other actors in the electoral process, throughout peace building fund.

At strategic level, the programme is in line with very first principle of Sierra Leone Poverty Reduction Strategy, PRS II, 2008-2012, which exposes Good Governance requirement as follows: “Rule of law, human rights, and peace and security are essential pre-requisites in Sierra Leone for sustainable growth and economic development. We are committed to ensuring peace building and consolidation, improving national security, reforming the public sector, enforcing the National Anti-Corruption Strategy, improving access to justice and human rights, and promoting positive attitudinal change.” Helping the country hold peaceful election is prerequisite of prerequisites.

With regard to donors ‘programming focus areas in Sierra Leone, the Electoral Support shows overall good relevance. It’s anchored well in component 1 of UN Join Vision: “democratic elections and political dialogue”, and is supportive to component 1 of UNDP Country Programme 2008-2012: “Fostering democratic governance and state capacity”. The programme is also in line with the development targets of other multi and bilateral
contributors to the basket fund. For instance, “Peace, security and good governance” were one of the three pillars of EU/DFID joint cooperation Programme 2007-2012. With regard to Millennium Development Goals, while not targeting specific MDG, it’s clear that, as it works on building sustainable mechanism for renewal of political and institutional legitimacy, the programme promotes basic stability conditions any development goals need to be properly challenged.

Relevance of the programme’s framework of results and resources is, however, questionable about one of its outcomes. Given all efforts provided by the programme in delivering the specific outputs referred to outcome 1, without managing to generate enough result on this outcome, as it will be documented later, it’s legitimate to wonder if the outcome could really be reached by the programme. The question could also be taken in the other side: were the dedicated outputs the right ones to enable true achievement of this outcome by the programme? In any case, poor evolution with regard to Elections Management Bodies ability to run further complex electoral processes on themselves suggests that where they were starting from wasn’t correctly assessed.

3.2. Effectiveness

3.2.1. Output level Review

Review or Outputs under Outcome 1

With regard to Outcome 1 of the programme, target is as follows: “Electoral institutions have the capacity to administer technically sound, credible and sustainable elections (with progressively less international support)”. The programme is expected to deliver two main outputs to achieve this Outcome. They are reviewed below.

(i) Output 1.1. “The National Electoral Commission’s administration of elections is improved.”

National Election Commission is the major target of the programme’s support, which consists of capacity development processes and provision of equipment, as well as facilitation of consensual legal reform. Under the capacity development action, the programme, indirectly and directly, tries to transmit to NEC and its related bodies and personnel, appropriate technical and strategic skills. Indirect channel of capacitiation passes throughout assistance, by programme’s advisors, to NEC in fulfilling the following segments of its regular duties:

- Support to NEC’s planning processes
- Support to NEC in developing of software and other materials related to electoral event
- Support to designing and implementing logistical processes related to the election event

Direct capacitation is undertaken throughout specific trainings to NEC’s staff at Headquarters and at local levels, as well as to non-permanent personnel mobilized towards Election Day.

Equipment provided to NEC by the programme ranges as follows:

- Biometric voter registration equipment
The programme also facilitated the review, renewal and consolidation of the electoral law. Based on the work and proposals by a Legal Technical Committee, the 2011 revised electoral Bill has been passed.

At both levels of capacity development and physical equipment, it appears clearly that the programme, so far, manages to deliver all sub-outputs it is expected to offer, unless for sub-output related to review end reform of electoral law. Therefore, the achievement on overall Output 1 “The National Electoral Commission’s administration of elections is improved” can be regarded as “High”. Evidence of the enhancement of how the NEC administered the 2012 elections lays in the fact that they have been held timely, peacefully, fairly and had their result accepted. Details of programme’s performance on Output 1 are as in table 4 below.

Table 4 Deliveries under Output 1.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Output level</th>
<th>Specific Deliveries Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output 1.1.</td>
<td>Rating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Electoral Commission’s administration of elections is improved</td>
<td>Specific expectations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support to the voter registration process, including procurement of equipment, technical expertise, sensitization, contract management, monitoring and oversight Regional/district office strengthening, including to provide decentralized results tally function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity development and specialized training (IT, election operations, training and procedures)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal reform to consolidate electoral laws/regulations/procedures including results system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support to organization of all planned elections (Presidential, Parliamentary, Local by-elections and possible referendum) as well as follow up (e.g., boundary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>delimitation post-election)</td>
<td>electoral event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Post-election evaluation of lessons learned | - A NEC/UNDP Workshop on Lessons learned held on May 2013  
- Donor issued specific papers on lessons learned, namely EU, DFID, Irish-Aid  
- PMU Reports also draws lessons learned  
- Outcome Evaluation includes lessons learned |

Support provided by the programme has contributed to enhancing administration of elections by National Electoral Commission. As basic evidence of this, key fundamentals of the election have improved in 2012, in comparison with 2007. The election was peaceful, fair, participatory, and its results were well accepted. While not everything is perfect with NEC, its overall preparation and management of the electoral event has improved, thanks to the programme’s contributions. Critical issues of ownership and ability to stand alone in further similar circumstances are discussed later on at outcome level analysis.

(ii) **Output 2**

“Political Party Registration Commission is able to maintain dialogue among political parties and promote their constructive, non-violent participation in the electoral process.”

Political Parties Registration Commission benefited from the programme as direct target, as well as intermediate body for political parties. The programme supported PPRC to develop its own strategic and technical capacities. This has been done throughout:

- **Equipment provision**
  - IT equipment  
  - Office equipment
- **Communication strategy implementation**
  - Designing of website  
  - Publishing of press releases
- **Operationalizing of PPRC**
  - Technical training to PPRC’s staff  
  - Opening of regional offices  
  - District Code of Conduct Monitoring Committees (DCMC),

PPRC served also as a channel to reach political parties. Within this framework the programme has run a capacitating process for these key actors. All the 10 registered political parties have been supported in holding workshops where they discussed issues such as understanding of the revised electoral bill and party internal governance. Representatives of the same 10 were also taken to a study trip in Ghana. Finally, the programme funded inter-party associations capacitating activities, as well as peace building initiatives towards the 2012 elections. All Parties Youth Association, and All Parties Women Association, gained substantive support, while as for All Parties Association, the programme attempted unsuccessfully to reviv it.

Two sub-outputs appear to have been not met. The legal reform of PPRC status has not been performed. After consultations at various levels, proposals are drafted on several key points, but still not passed into law:

- Expanding the mandate of the Commission
* Political Party Financing
* Appointment and removal of Commissioners from office
* Restrictions and the time limit for complaints
* Name of the Commission be amended to reflect the mandate: National Political Parties Commission (NPPC)
* Empower the Commission to have quasi-judicial authority

The second yet not met target under main Output 2 relates to review of political parties’ policies and constitution. While information is not provided on this, the failure could have to do with the sensitiveness of the issue from political parties’ point of view. It came out of interviews held with main of them by the Consultant, that they were jealous of their sovereignty. They even express fear of the controlling power of PPRC.

With regard to overall Output 2, “Political Party Registration Commission is able to maintain dialogue among political parties and promote their constructive, non-violent participation in the electoral process”, the programme’s achievement is strong, as PPRC has been widely assisted to better handle its regular mandate, and specific duties towards the 2012 elections. Thanks to this programme support, it strengthened its internal abilities, and managed to channel to political parties, capacity development processes contributing to good behavior in the electoral context. Details of programme’s performance on Output 2 are in table 5 below.

Table 5 Deliveries under Output 1.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Deliveries level</th>
<th>Specific Deliveries Level</th>
<th>Specific expectations</th>
<th>Performed deliveries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output 1.2.</td>
<td>Rating:</td>
<td>Specific expectations</td>
<td>Performed deliveries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party</td>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity development and specialized training (with a focus on the new staff)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registration Commission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is able to maintain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dialogue among political</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parties and promote their</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constructive, non-violent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participation in the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>electoral process.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Office space in the regions</td>
<td>Four regional offices installed and equipped in in Kenema (East), Makeni (North), Bo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(South) and Freetown (Western Area).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PPRC public outreach and research capacity</td>
<td>Press releases published</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Electronic outreach activities undertaken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PPRC Website also is supportive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal reform to consider</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PPRC still not granted, by law, authority to sanction violation of Code of Conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>widening the mandate of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the PPRC, granting it</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>authority to sanction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violations of the Code of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct for Political</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PPRC-sponsored political party training and inter-party dialogue</td>
<td>The 10 registered political parties held workshops on new electoral bill, party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>governance, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The 10 registered political parties went to Ghana for a study tour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The 2 All Parties Youth and Women Associations also supported in running inter-party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>District monitoring committees strengthening</td>
<td>District Code of Conduct Monitoring Committees (DCMC).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
with party representatives, civil society and other stakeholders have been all 14 districts, DCMCs held regular sessions, helping to defuse tensions and acting as early warning mechanisms

Review of policies and Constitution of Political Parties  Not performed

Political Parties Registration Commission, thanks to the programme multiform contributions, has performed political animation which was helpful towards the election. Question on whether it could be able, on its own or with less external support, to do so in similar complex circumstances is analyzed at the outcome level.

**Review of Outputs under Outcome 2**

With regards to Outcome 2, target is as follow: “Improved public confidence and participation in the electoral process; tensions, and potential conflicts identified, prevented and resolved”. The programme is expected to deliver four (04) main outputs as contributions to this Outcome. They are reviewed below.

**(i) Civil Society Organizations are able to monitor the electoral process and promote broad civic and voter education**

The programme supported the civil society in strengthening its positioning in the 2012 electoral cycle. The resources came mainly from the Peace Building Fund, but also from other donors like DFID (this donor channeled funds to beneficiaries via an implementing agency). National Election Watch (NEW), for instance, could, within this framework, under broad observation of polling stations and regional tallying centres. NEW could also operate a Situation Room to collect, process and report on facts from field. Also UN Women an UNDP supported a second civil society situation room (WSR, for Women Situation Room).

Civic education was carried out nationwide by National Commission for Democracy (NCD). An outreach campaign covered the all 112 Constituencies. 50 messages supported it, referring to national unity and cohesion, tolerance and co-operation, patriotism, non-violence, gender parity, youth participation, why to vote in an Election, who to vote in an election, public property and democratic good governance. They were voiced in five Sierra Leonian languages (Krio, Kono, Limba, Mende and Temne).

The Civil Society Electoral Engagement Process (CSEEP) was responsible of coordinating civil society organizations activities, and reported regularly to Steering Committee, where some NGO were also seating: NEW, and Centre for Coordination of Youth Activities (CCYA).

Overall achievement of the output is high, but reached throughout combined support from the programme (Peace Building Fund) and from other donors’ resources not managed by the programme. It also came out of interviews of some NGO that at operational level, they worked separately (poor integration of activities), while meeting in the coordination mechanism of the programme, and accessing to same information on the electoral process (as released by NEC). Details of performance on Output 2 are in table 6 below.

Table 6 Deliveries under Output 2.1.
Overall Output level | Specific Deliveries Level | Performance Rating
---|---|---
Output 2.1. | Rating | Specific expectations | Performed deliveries | Rating

| H | M | L |
---|---|---|

**CSOs are able to monitor the electoral process and promote broad civic and voter education**

Support for national election observation (long-term and short-term observers, with long-term serving as early warning mechanism); capacity building for quick count/parallel vote tabulation

- NEW observed voting and counting in all polling stations across the country
- NEW observed also tallying processes at regional level
- NEW and WSR operated 2 different situation room to process and report on events and information from field
- NEW was funded by DFID, WRS jointly by UNDP and UN Women

Civic and voter education initiatives with a particular focus on women and youth – tie in to conflict prevention activities

- National Commission for Democracy (NCD) supported in carrying a Civic education outreach campaign to all 112 Constituencies

Support to civil society led coordination of voter and civic education activities and election observation, including with funding partners outside of the basket fund

- The Civil Society Electoral Engagement Process (CSEEP) coordinated activities
- Situations rooms for elections set up by NEW and WSR Ngos, attempted to jointly operate but it failed
- Voter training development by CSEEP

(ii) **Political parties and their women and youth wings play a constructive and informed role in the electoral process**

The programme has already provided significant support to political parties and their trans-partisan associations. Based on an initial training of 150 trainers, by National Democratic Institute and PPRC, 2,000 agents from all political parties have been trained in 40 different locations in the country. Training was also provided to other 2,000 youngsters from the All Parties Youth Association.

The cross-partisan associations were also mobilized to promote inter party dialogue and commit political actors to care of a nonviolent election process. The All Political Parties, Youth and Women, respectively, Associations, have been heavily supported in this regard. They restructured, expanded their membership and settlement: their joint regional offices are equipped by the programme. They campaigned a lot in favor of a peaceful electoral process, as well as for better inclusion of youth and women in the national political leadership.

APPWA convened a meeting with the political parties to present the gender equality bill, and appeal for a minimum 30% quota for women representation in the 2012 elections. It also convened another major event where a Declaration for violence free elections was signed by political and civil society actors. The programme edited this Declaration in 10,000 copies disseminated all around the country.

Overall achievement of this output is high, taking into consideration direct support to political parties capacitation, and accompaniment of their cross-partisan associations in promoting inclusive nomination processes and peaceful behaviors inside the parties. Details of performance on Output 2 are as in table 7 below.

Table 7 Deliveries under Output 2.2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Output level</th>
<th>Specific Deliveries Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 2.2.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rating</td>
<td>Specific expectations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Training of party agents (done by NEC/PPRC, directly or via a third-party)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| M                   | Promotion of intra or inter party dialogue and commitment from political parties to constructive political discourse and peaceful elections | Inclusive interparty dialogue facilitated, attended parties  
| L                   | Supporting the All Political Parties Youth Association (APPYA) to engage in promoting peaceful elections | Attempt to revival the All Political Parties Association (APPA).  
|                      |                          | Support to operationalization APPYA: training in management for 2000 executives + Motorcycles provision  
|                      |                          | Support to operationalization of the All Political Parties Women Association (APPYA):  
|                      |                          | Through APPYA and APPWA sensitization events and tours promote nonviolence, tolerance and peaceful elections, and better representation of women and youth in political leadership  
|                      |                          | Declaration on a violence free elections, signed by stakeholders and 10 000 copies of it edited and distributed around the country |
|                      | Work with women’s wings of political parties to develop gender strategies, conduct constituency level sensitization and advocacy towards achieving a 30% quota for women and training of women leaders and candidates | 2000 executives of the All Political Parties Youth Association (APPYA): trained in management  
|                      |                          | 01 minibus, motorcycles and office equipment provided to the Association. Joint APPWA – APPYA regional offices have been set up and basic infrastructure supplied.  
|                      |                          | APPYA Civic education activities funded |
|                      |                          | 01 minibus and office equipment provided to joint APPWA – APPYA regional offices  
|                      |                          | IT equipment provided APPWA  
|                      |                          | APPWA supported in increasing its membership by integrating representatives of all 10 parties  
|                      |                          | APPWA supported in presenting the gender equality bill to parties and appealing for a minimum 30% quota representation for women in 2012 elections  
|                      |                          | APPWA supported a tour through all 112 Sierra Leonean constituencies, and called for political tolerance. |
(iii) Media monitoring and improved reporting standards

Efforts about media regulation and coverage on the 2012 electoral process reached both the Independent Media Commission (IMC), in charge of sector regulation, and specific broadcasters. The regulator has been provided with dedicated training and equipment, as well as support in sector consultations, media monitoring and sensitization of journalists and editors on their critical role in the electoral process. It could deploy countrywide a team of trained monitors who have been able to listen to radio broadcasts all over the country. IMC also undertook a systematic monitoring of a sample of ten newspapers, and regularly published results in a quarterly IMC media Watch, duly circulated among key stakeholders.

With support from the programme, IMC self-structured and set up a new organogram more conducive to effectiveness in strategic thinking about media development in the country. It brought also the media houses, civil society organizations and development partners into signing a communiqué on the role of media in 2012 elections.

As for media operators, Cotton Tree News (CTN) and a network of local radios, as well as public media Sierra Leone Broadcasting Corporation (SLBC), captured the support. CTN trained 200 journalists, partnered with 26 community radio stations, and managed to build a grassroots network for coverage of electoral process. With support from the programme, SLBC held wide consultations and came up with a memorandum for guidance of its coverage of the electoral process.

Overall, targeted outputs appear to have been met well. Multi targets approach of media issue really impacted the general behavior of the media operators, what resulted into greater professionalism in their coverage of the electoral events, generally speaking. It however should be mentioned that if the sector global performance is praised by interviewees, some politicians from the opposition still deplore insufficient access to public media houses. This opinion is confirmed by EU Observation Mission which reported that “there was an unequal playing field, in particular with regard to the access to the media” (EU Election observation Mission to Sierra Leone, final report, 2012).

Table 8 Deliveries under Output 2.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Output level</th>
<th>Specific Deliveries Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media monitoring</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and improved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reporting standards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
which is circulated among key stakeholders

- IMC restructured and designed a three-year strategic plan.
- Training and deployment of monitors by IMC (this has enhanced IMC capacity to listen to radio broadcasts all over the country, increased its physical presence and ability to identify possible infringements on the Code of Practice)
- Participatory discussions conducted between IMC key stakeholders in the media sector, towards a Memorandum of Understanding making IMC the lead agency on all strategic thinking relating to media development in the country
- IMC has commissioned a study on New Media Monitoring Indicator (for further enhancing of its capacity to coordinate media stakeholders)
- Signing of a communiqué on the role of media in 2012 elections, by different media houses, civil society organizations and development partners

| IMC training for journalists on professional reporting on electoral matters | Not yet performed |
| Support to radio-based news reporting (e.g. SLBC, others) | 200 journalists and radio station managers trainers on electoral coverage, by CTN |
| | District elections reporting teams were established  |
| | 26 community radio stations operating restore and improved their programming in partnership with CTN |

Support dialogue with and among editors (Editors Guild) and Sierra Leone Association of Journalists on responsible reporting as well as the establishment of media code of conduct or other mechanisms to enhance the support to the media for a peaceful election

- SLBC organized a two-day workshop to draft “SLBC Elections Guidelines “, which was attended by representatives of all 10 registered political parties, representatives of national democratic institutions including NEC, PPRC, HRC, IMC as well as representatives from various media houses and civil society organizations.
- The Guideline has been signed by the various representatives and distributed to serve as a guiding rail for the SLBC election coverage and reporting.

(iv) Promoting national cohesion and unity for peaceful elections
The programme attempted to mobilize the traditional structures of the Sierra Leonean society to campaign for a peaceful electoral process. In this regard, it managed to get great involvement of the Inter Religious Council, the National Council of Paramount Chiefs and other indigenous organizations. Both capacitated their membership, first around the idea that IRC/NCPC members should stand equidistant from political parties, to be able to keep playing a regulatory role. Throughout conferences and training sessions in conflicts prevention and mediation, the two organizations also partnered with other civil society organizations and political parties to promote nonviolence. A declaration on tolerance was issued and signed in this regard. Mano River Union Secretariat in Freetown facilitated a series of dialogue sessions with border communities along the Liberian and Guinean borders.

Towards the artists, 300 amongst them have been mobilized on international peace day celebration. They released songs and videos, and played dramas on the thematic of nonviolence and good participation to elections. Sport also was used to voice messages of peace and urge youngsters to participate to the elections. Finally, the campaigning for a peaceful participation to election process entered the campuses, throughout debates by youth and students organizations on issues relating to democratic vitality in general, to peaceful electoral event in particular.

Through mediation by civil society organizations, the programme reached marginalized wings of society with a higher potential of violence, such as ex combatants groups. With get-together events and other football matches, those groups were brought into the social communication towards and for peaceful elections.

The resonance of violence free election and civic participation themes at those various levels of the Sierra Leonean societal structures, as agreed by most of local observers met by the mission, indicates that the overall output achievement is strong enough. The fact that the election took place peacefully and was characterized by an unprecedented turnout can also be regarded as evidence that, somehow, such efforts were successful.
Table 9 Deliveries under Output 2.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Output level</th>
<th>Specific Deliveries Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output 2.4.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific expectations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performed deliveries</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Promoting national cohesion and unity for peaceful elections</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IRC/ NCPC supported in:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- organizing and sensitizing their membership on political neutrality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Undertaking social mobilization against political violence and for peaceful election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Building with other actors (political parties, civil society organization, religious, etc.) a broad consensus for peaceful election, throughout</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Conferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Training sessions on conflicts prevention and mediation (410 members enrolled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Issuance of declarations on tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support to artists for peace and musicians to spread the message of non-violence, ethnic tolerance and peaceful elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Release of songs and videos and drama, by artists, appealing for tolerance, nonviolence and peaceful election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Commemoration of international day for peace in an event attended by 300 artistic groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support to traditional and indigenous groups to exercise neutrality and have positive influence in managing tensions and potential conflicts before, during and after the elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- National Council of Paramount Chiefs and Female Secret Societies supported on appealing for political neutrality in their membership, and promoting tolerance and nonviolence values for peaceful election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Equipment provided to NCPC, and training and sensitization sessions, conferences held by the two organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Six meeting held with border communities to drop tension and promote peace and tolerance towards the elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enhancing coordination with learning institutions and academia in promoting national debate and dialogue on non-violence and participatory elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Academic debates and sensitization, by youth organizations in the main campuses of the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Media communication on peace and tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promote non-violent amongst youth through sports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Football matches used to promote peace and tolerance, as well as, provide education on the electoral process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CSO for violence prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Events such as football matches, meetings, held with local associations to promote peace and non-violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Ex-combatants enrolled in civic activities and voicing messages of peace and tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Films and radio messages produced on peace and tolerance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Review of the Outputs under Outcome 3**

(i) **The electoral dispute resolution mechanism is strengthened**
Within the judiciary sector, the programme supported the implementation, for 12 months, of Electoral Offenses Courts (EOC), to enable prompt decisions in legal cases relating to electoral disputes, this being regarded as a means of decreasing tension along the campaign. Six Electoral Offences/Petitions Courts have been set up and dispatched as three in Freetown and three in the provinces, one in each provincial capital city.

The achievements reported by PMU, as for 29th October 2012, show that the Electoral Offenses Courts received 94 cases, out of which 82 led to convictions and sentences; in 7 cases, the accused were acquitted for lack of evidence; in one case, prosecution failed to provide evidence; 5 cases were still pending.

EOC officers have been trained with support from the programme. Such training reached a wide group of 200 personnel including prosecutors, police investigators, and law officers. Subjects covered were as follows: overview of the Public Elections Act 2012 and in-depth presentations on aspects of the act concerning the judiciary and police officers, for instance:

- Nuances of electoral offences
- IT-related offences
- Evidence for offences,
- Electoral petitions
- How to handle complaints during the campaign period

Two sub-outputs, relating to a “crisis management for electoral disputes” and “NEC-led public education campaign on the role of the courts” are not met, based on indications in PMU reports. However, the instruction, by EOC, of near to 100 cases were valuable contributions to the strengthening the electoral dispute resolution mechanism in the country. It should moreover be mentioned that independence of these nonpermanent jurisdictions is questioned by opposition members, based on observations, by them, that most of EOC’s case decisions were made against them.

Table 10: Deliveries under Output 3.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Output level</th>
<th>Specific Deliveries Level</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output 3.1.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The electoral dispute resolution mechanism is strengthened</td>
<td>Electoral Offences Courts strengthened (temporary body)</td>
<td>H M L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>06 Electoral Offences/Petitions Courts: 03 in Freetown and 03 in the Provinces, one in each Provincial Capital</td>
<td>H M L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>94 cases submitted (29th Oct 2012?)</td>
<td>H M L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>82 cases led to convictions and sentences</td>
<td>H M L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>07 cases with accused acquitted for lack of evidence</td>
<td>H M L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>01 one case prosecution failed to provide evidence</td>
<td>H M L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>05 cases were still pending.</td>
<td>H M L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOC/NEC/PPRC training to judges and magistrates</td>
<td>200 police prosecutors, police investigators, and law officers trained on: overview of the Public Elections Act 2012 and in-depth presentations on aspects of the act salient to the judiciary and police</td>
<td>H M L</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(ii) National Electoral Security Plan implemented and capacity of SLP improved to safeguard elections

Security sector is one of the key entrance points of the programme. It benefitted of important capacity development processes. First, the programme helped enhance the coordination between the involved institutions. This has been done within the National Security Council (NSC) which has been operationalized and could really deal with strategy building on security issue. Assessment of threats towards the electoral event provided greater visibility on fragile segments on the national security map.

At a more operational level, extensive trainings sessions were supported by the programme, through funding as well as deployment of international staff to provide technical assistance. A total of 10,500 security forces members have been enrolled in the training, prior to being deployed all over the country. Security sector was also brought together with political parties and civil society organizations to think of security as a matter of mutual concern towards the elections.

As for equipment and logistical support, provisions were as follows:

- 144 vehicles ONS’s vehicles refurbished to enhance mobility of forces
- 1 Toyota Dyna mini truck was procured for the SLP
- VST communication devices
- Rations and fuel for the deployment of security personnel across the country

As a result of these investments in the security sector, the personnel gained in professionalism and showed more political neutrality. Scenes of security staffs jubilating at release of elections results, as seen in 2007, were not visible anymore. Acceptance of security forces in conflicts prevention and social mediation was also enhanced within the overall population. Achievement of the programme on this output is therefore of high level.

Table 11: Deliveries under Output 3.21.
| SLP to safeguard elections | • 1 Toyota Dyna mini truck was procured for the SLP  
   • Conduct of Threat Assessment by Security sector supported  
   • Development of Nominal Roll supported  
   • Providing rations and fuel for the deployment of security personnel across the country |
| Strengthen the institutional capacity, infrastructure, logistics and impartiality of the SLP | • Conduct of Threat Assessment by Security sector supported  
   • Development of Nominal Roll supported  
   • Providing rations and fuel for the deployment of security personnel across the country  
   • 1 Toyota Dyna mini truck was procured for the SLP |
| Training SLP and Chiefdom Police, Fire Force, Prison and MACP Personnel on functions during elections, incl. role of electoral courts and sensitization on gender-based violence, as well as police role and responsibilities at polling centers and stations | • 10,500 security forces trained by the Programme |
| Provide UN assistance to the SLP through appropriate and timely deployment, particularly to safeguard voters and polling materials | • The United Nations deployed eight (8) UN Police (UNPOL) officers to the Regions and Freetown. |
| Provide crowd control training to SLP personnel to be assigned to election security duties | • Training performed |

**Review of the Outputs under PMU Implementing Agency**

Project document is signed between UNDP and the Government of Sierra Leone. Specific letters of agreement are also signed between UNDP and donors involved in the basket fund. An Electoral Steering Committee in charge of overall guidance and strategic decision making is set up, and functions well enough. The review of its activities shows good flexibility with more meetings held at the critical period of the programme’s lifespan, when decision making is needed. All meetings of this Committee record good participation of stakeholders, including the donors and civil society representatives, and are systematically chaired by Minister of Finance and Economic Development.

Staff of Programme Management Unit has been gradually recruited, and encompasses the following profiles, as in Prodoc:

- 01 Chief Technical Advisor
- 01 Operations Manager
- 01 Finance Associate
- Supporting personnel (Assistant and drivers)
External experts are regularly hired on a short-term assignment basis, to provide needed assistance at different moment of electoral cycle. So far, 20 international and 01 national consultants have been mobilized in this regard. NEC staff with adequate profile is also solicited. The Programme Unit is installed within UNDP main settlement in Freetown, and duly provided with relevant office equipment and rolling stock.

All outputs targeted in the project document have their related activities undertaken, ongoing or in the pipeline. Monitoring on the programme is functioning well. Progress reports are issued timely. Exercises 2011 and 2012 are already audited, and found overall sincere by auditors, who have however deplored weakness in the asset management. Outcome evaluation of the programme is undertaken in 2013. In 2013 also, a joint PMU/NEC workshop addressed the lessons learned on the electoral process.

As a missing piece, a high profile coordination mechanism (at Ambassadors and high Representatives level) is provisioned in the project document, but not set up. However, it came out of interviews that, when required, the programme manages to informally mobilize the top diplomatic level, as it was the case when there was need to sensitize NEC and Government on the consequences of the sudden and unilateral increase of nomination fees, in terms of threats over the whole process.

It’s also observed that no letter of agreement is signed so far between UNDP and UNIPSIL, unlike to what has been done with the other donors. Beyond this shortcoming, resources from the Peace Building Fund appear to have been weakly integrated in the overall programme. Interviewed members of Steering Committee confessed that they had poor oversight on the PBF. Coincidentally, also, it is within these resources, managed by PMU under UNPSIL operational programming and monitoring responsibilities, that cases of misuse by one national implementing body are being investigated.

Table 12: Deliveries under PMU.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Output level</th>
<th>Specific Deliveries Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implementation Output</td>
<td>Rating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMU ensures well managed and well-coordinated implementation of Election Programme as approved by LPAC and amendments approved by the Steering Committee.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular Steering Committee meetings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2.2. Outcome level Analysis

As the evaluation is an outcome oriented one, this section is critical to the programme’s performance assessment. Here is questioned the extent to which, beyond having dedicated allocated resources to generate designed outputs as reviewed above, the programme managed to achieve the very few but strategic and structuring objectives it was meant for, namely as follows:

(i) Electoral institutions have the capacity to administer technically sound, credible and sustainable elections (with progressively less international support)

(ii) Improved public confidence and participation in the electoral process; tensions, and potential conflicts identified, prevented and resolved Election-related conflict managed for peaceful polls

(iii) Election-related conflict managed for peaceful polls (before, during and after)

Outcome 1

The very first outcome, “Electoral institutions have the capacity to administer technically sound, credible and sustainable elections (with progressively less international support)”, was targeted through two outputs the previous section showed that the programme performed well on, delivering all essentials items it was expected to deliver as per project document. Both National Electoral Commission and Political Parties Registration Commission have been duly capacitated and accompanied by the programme in their handling of respective duties put on them by law. This programme support encompassed technical assistance along the whole chain of electoral process (strategic planning, implementing and monitoring), capacity development and equipment provision (biometric registration and voting equipment, as well as heavy IT equipment, including an electoral database and its rescue system, are part of this).

Thanks to this heavy assistance, did the “electoral institutions have the capacity to administer technically sound, credible and sustainable election (with progressively less international support)”, as laid down in Outcome 1? Answering this question has to do with checking to what extent this support did empower beneficiaries, or was more about providing external additional capability so that the electoral process be properly run (for this time!). Said in a different manner, it’s about finding out how well the two main elections managing bodies performed in absorbing this external and punctual assistance, and engaged it into an internal transformational process leading to building their real autonomy in election running.

With regard to the National Electoral Commission, this issue of absorption and ownership raises concerns from key observers interviewed by the consultant. Even NEC staff, when asked, responded that the country will still need important support to properly handle further heavy elections. Critical facts and events, as follows, document the assertion that NEC’s ownership is still too weak to support self-reliance.
**NEC’s abilities in Strategic planning are still weak:** combination of presidential, parliamentary and local elections resulted into a complex event, which needed to be anchored in a robust and timely planning process. Despite repeatedly reminders in all steering committees meetings held in the period, up to end of 2011 NEC failed to issue a comprehensive budget plan for all activities under the electoral process.

This shortcoming resulted into a doctrine of piloting-at-sight which had hampered readiness in some sectors of the process. For instance, important equipment procured internationally by UNDP arrived in Sierra Leone while NEC was not able to make available an adequate venue for their proper storage. Then UNDP came to the rescue, so that damaging incident could be avoided on this. Also, the decentralizing of the tallying process, which was critical to building capacity for timely release of elections results, remained undecided very late, NEC hesitating between implementing the local tallying centres at district or regional level. The decision was made so late that, once again, the programme was forced to commit more than initially planned, to make these centres fully operational in a very short period before Election Day.

The above shortcoming may have to do with the institutional culture of quite a big organization in which decision making processes are not decentralized enough. “While policy decisions can be taken by the Commissioners alone; operational decisions should be taken at the operations level, with oversight provided by the NEC Executive Secretary. This would allow delegation from the Department Heads and Regional Chiefs to the deputies. This would be the best way forward to make best use of the wealth of talent within the NEC.” These indications included in the Narrative report 2012 of PMU, p2, tend to confirm that power concentration in the institution doesn’t allow enough efficiency in decision-making.

Rationale behind critical decisions concerning main legacy of the programme is questionable. NEC has decided to repatriate into its headquarters the electoral data base, without making sure that the required technical conditions are secured in this venue. By now, problems in electric installation are putting this important investment of the programme at risk. Worst, the data base and its rescue system already hosted at headquarters, are put in the same place. Thanks to such decision, the whole electoral data system is now facing substantial threats. Actually the rescue system is meant to be relocated at National Registration Service, as per an agreement NEC signed already with this national body. It’s also discussed between UNDP and World Bank that such transfer should enable NEC to access to resources from this donor to operate or maintain the instrument.

Obviously, these two good reasons are still not enough to make the transfer of the rescue system happen. Somehow, the culture of power concentration expands over assets management and frustrates any synergy approach which could contribute to optimize means throughout mutualizing them, at least within the perimeter of public institutions relating to electoral matter. Corroborating this institutional state of mind, the mission was also informed that NEC requested already the handing over of the programme’s assets, while more than one year is still remaining in the lifespan of the programme. As a conclusion on this point, the ability to share and mutualize with peer institutions is a basic requirement towards NEC’s real capacity building.

Lastly, advanced self-reliance in running complex electoral cycles also requires that NEC be able to constantly build and sustain constructive dialogue with the political actors. Making on its own political decisions jeopardizing the fundamental consensus doesn’t lead to peaceful electoral event. Increasing by 100% the nomination fees to an election planned to take place
few weeks later, was one of these inappropriate decisions, ruining NEC’s image as perceived by the political parties. Whatever technical skills it could have, NEC also needs confidence from the political actors to be able to run quiet and peaceful elections. In Sierra Leone’s model, with this institution being seated on tie relations (organic links?) with the state authorities, it’s already, by principle, a big deal gaining and maintaining confidence from all parts of the political spectrum.

**With regard to the Political Parties Registration Commission**, the main challenge in terms of capacity building has a lot to do with the kind of leadership established in it per law. The constitution of the country stipulates that the chairperson of PPRC is chosen amongst the retired judges. It’s true that such profile no longer hampered by common contingencies, should be appropriate to facilitate dialogue with political parties, which belong to a universe deemed to be passionate and confrontational. But the reverse side of the medal is that, at the age these honorable persons arrive at the top of the institution they have presumably gone throughout any life challenges, what means that their motivation may have decreased a lot. Their overall ability may also have weakened.

This kind of leadership also brings some instability in the institution, which has recently lost at least two of its chairmen. In such context, without strong and continuous leadership, the body cannot really capacitate as well as it should, even if it went through many valuable processes during this electoral cycle. Instead, this overflow of activities even tends to reveal its weaknesses: situations of misuse of resources from the programme are under legal investigation within the institution. Even before this situation be discovered, stakeholders should have noticed that reporting documents issued by PPRC were generally weaker and delayed.

Given the positioning of NEC and PPRC in the management of the electoral process in Sierra Leone, and where they stand by now in terms of internal own strategic and technical abilities, the achievement of Outcome 1 appears to far weaker than corresponding achievements on its specific enabling outputs. In other words, while performing well in delivering these outputs, the programme influenced poorly the related outcome. This discrepancy in results is made possible by the absence of sufficient ownership by EMB on processes at work within outputs delivery. **So, with regard to outcome 1**, as figured out in table below, the electoral institutions, so far, have not the capacity to administer technically sound, credible and sustainable elections, on their own. To have them secure such autonomous ability, further work should be done before upcoming heavy elections cycle.

Table 13: Contributions to Outcome 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of Overall Performance</th>
<th>At Overall Outcome Level</th>
<th>Transition from Outputs to Outcomes</th>
<th>At Enabling Outputs Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rating</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 1</td>
<td>H  M  L</td>
<td></td>
<td>Outputs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have the capacity to administer</td>
<td></td>
<td>Relation between outputs and Outcome</td>
<td>1.1. The National Electoral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>technically sound, credible</td>
<td></td>
<td>isn’t automatic, as conversion of</td>
<td>Commission’s administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and sustainable elections</td>
<td></td>
<td>outputs gains into real influence</td>
<td>of elections is improved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(with progressively less</td>
<td></td>
<td>at outcome level needed mediation:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>international support)</td>
<td></td>
<td>institutional ownership and culture</td>
<td>1.1. Political Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>of change are the mediating factors and</td>
<td>Registration Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>aren’t enough there, both</td>
<td>is able to maintain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>dialogue among political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>parties and promote their</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>constructive, non-violent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36
Outcome 2

The second outcome of the programme relates to “Improved public confidence and participation in the electoral process; tensions, and potential conflicts identified, prevented and resolved”, and is targeted through four main outputs.

(i) CSOs are able to monitor the electoral process and promote broad civic and voter education
(ii) Political parties and their women and youth wings play a constructive and informed role in the electoral process
(iii) Media monitoring and improved reporting standards
(iv) Promoting national cohesion and unity for peaceful elections

Civil society organizations have been supported in monitoring the electoral process, as well as undertaking voter education. With regard to monitoring, organizations such as National Election Watch (NEW) and Search For Common Ground (SFCG), maintained tie follow up on voting and tallying all around the country. NEW, also, set up a situation room collecting live mains facts from the field and alerting the appropriate persons. A Women Situation Room was also installed under guidance of UN Woman with support from UNDP. Actually some of interviewed actors in the civil society sector had already significant regional monitoring experience.

Work done by civil society organizations was clearly witnessed in the report already referred to, by EU observation Mission: “The election process was observed by a high number of domestic observers who made a significant contribution to the transparency of the process. The leading network, National Election Watch (NEW) consisting of approximately 300 NGOs, observed the entire election process using a long term observation methodology, including the biometric voter registration and exhibition process and mobilizing 224 long term observers (two per constituency) to cover the candidate nomination process and the election campaign. On Election Day, NEW deployed more than 9,000 observers covering almost all polling stations in the country. Several other civil society groups also deployed a smaller number of Election Day observers. Also, the hybrid Women Situation Room comprising national and international observers was present with 300 national and 30 international members”.

Trans-partisan associations, namely the All Political Parties Youth Association and the All Political Parties Women Association, have been capacitated by the programme and could involve deeply in the sensitization activities on the electoral process. They held many events to promote peaceful values and appeal for free violence elections. Actually, these types of structures are quite good frameworks for easing tension between political parties. It has been reported to the consultant that politicians from a neighbor country came recently to learn out of this Sierra Leonean very original experience.

One major shortcoming, nevertheless, should be stressed on, as an appeal to focus on it more efforts. It relates to electoral participation of disabled persons, recent history of Sierra increased a lot. For instance, NEC could not provide tactile Braille ballot guides, contrary to
what it managed to do during 2002 and 2007 elections, preventing those with impaired sight from enjoying their right to cast ballot in full secrecy.

Traditional organizations and basic structures of the Sierra Leonean society have been solicited by the programme to pledge in favor of peaceful election. The Inter Religious Council went through a schedule of events in this regard. So did the National Council of Paramount Chiefs, and other indigenous societies. Artistic groups also got involved and released songs, videos and dramas, dedicated to the promotion of peaceful election. Marginalized groups such as ex combatants were brought in the process. Sportive events were opportunities to strengthen the willingness to live together and enjoy peaceful elections. Not all the bodies supporting these social dynamics are institutionally strong enough. But the momentum has been so amplified and did have such a deep resonance in the society that its impacts are tangible.

Support from the programme helped the Independent Media Council in training agents and deploying them across the country for field monitoring of media coverage of the electoral event. At headquarters, the regulation body set up a systematic follow up of press releases, based on sample of 10 newspapers scrutinized. The results of observations were published quarterly. Cotton Tree News was supported in networking with 26 community based radios, which could then resume to activity and improve their standard of coverage of the electoral process. Public operator SLBC came up with a framework for guidance of its own coverage of the campaign, thanks to resources from the programme, even if some actors interviewed still not satisfied with its impartiality.

With regard to Outcome 2, yes “public confidence and participation in the electoral process improved, and conflicts declined”, overall. Evidence of increased participation is also in the voting turnout which evolved as follows: 91.05% in 2012 against 68.61% in 2007, for the presidential contest; 79.28% against 75.80% for the parliamentary elections. Quality of vote also increased, as invalid vote dropped from 7.3% in 2007 to 4.7% in 2012. Tension also is described by all observers to have been quite minor in 2012, compared to what it was in 2007.

Table 14: Contributions to Outcome 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of Overall Performance</th>
<th>At Overall Outcome Level</th>
<th>Transition from Outputs to Outcomes</th>
<th>At Enabling Outputs Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rating</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved public confidence and participation in the electoral process; tensions, and potential conflicts identified, prevented and resolved</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The way from outputs to the outcome is direct, make it possible that same gains at outputs level drive to equivalent influence at outcome level.</td>
<td>2.3. Media monitoring and improved reporting standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.4. Promoting national cohesion and unity for peaceful elections</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Outcome 3**

The third outcome of the programme relates to “*Election-related conflict managed for peaceful polls (before, during and after)*”, and is targeted through two main outputs.

(i) The electoral dispute resolution mechanism is strengthened

(ii) National Electoral Security Plan implemented and improved capacity of SLP to safeguard elections

Electoral Offence Courts are established since July 19th, 2012, as a division of the High Court. They are devoted to expediting trials on the elections related offensives, while electoral disputes are referred to Supreme Court for the presidential contest and to High Court for the other elections. Effectiveness of these special temporary courts is questionable. It has been reported to Steering Committee that by 29th of October 2012, they received 94 cases out of which 89 were sentenced, and 5 still pending. Another source, from European Union Observation Mission, indicates, instead that first case was received in EOC on 5th of December. So were the 94 reported cases really treated by EOC or by their hosting High Court?

Whatever the answer to this question may be, it appears that the electoral dispute resolution mechanism hasn’t been deeply influenced by theses EOCs. The regular judiciary channel kept on being quite congested, including by nomination objections on which, by law, procedures are allowed to continue beyond Election Day, what means that potential aggrieved parties may have not been given the opportunity to stay in the contest. Such unfairness covered by law, is an issue not addressed by the EOC reform. As to illustrate this problem, constituencies 15 (Kenema) and 5 (Kailahun), coincidentally two opposition strongholds, have still not sent representatives to Parliament, because of cases of disputed nominations still pending before High Court almost one year after the elections.

Like NEC and PPRC, the judiciary sector, overall, also does have an image problem, still has a way to go to soften its perception by the public opinion, particularly within opposition sectors and in electoral context. Being deemed not independent enough doesn’t contribute to coming up with consensual elections outcomes. Many judges, already at retirement age, are still operating, of course under special extensions granted by state authorities. Such situations brought members of the opposition met by the consultant invoke a common adage saying that who gives eyes tells where to look. These senior civil servants can nevertheless stand impeccably, but the suspicions going around and alleged acquaintances between judiciary and executive powers do not contribute to confidence on justice.

Security sector has been given strong support by the programme. It could undertake an assessment of threat enabling it to focus strategy on the critical matters and areas of concern. The programme supported also an important training process which reached 10,500 security forces, focusing on points related to professionalism with regard to electoral event. Also, security forces, brought together with other actors such as civil society organizations and political parties, went through extensive sensitizing of all segments of the population on security and peace challenges towards the elections. Last but not least the programme provided important logistical support to enable deployment of security forces across the
country before Election Day. This assistance included communication devices, repairing and provision of vehicles and motorcycles, and provision of fuel and rations.

Observers interviewed as well as reports issued on the elections generally consider that this investment on the security sector contributed to strengthening its professionalism and political neutrality. Scenes of jubilation of members of security forces at release of elections results have no longer been witnessed in 2012, contrary to what happened in 2007 elections. Still, improvement is needed according to the political opposition which continues to ask for complete neutrality of security forces.

With regard to Outcome 3, “Election-related conflict managed for peaceful polls (before, during and after)”, the performance of the programme is ambiguous. On one hand a lot of progress has been made in terms of professionalism of security forces. On the other hand, despite the installation of the special Electoral Offense Courts, some electoral disputes are still pending before High Court, and confidence of part of the political actors in the judiciary system, overall, is still very weak.

Table 15: Contributions to Outcome 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of Overall Performance</th>
<th>At Overall Outcome Level</th>
<th>Transition from Outputs to Outcomes</th>
<th>At Enabling Outputs Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rating</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 3</td>
<td>H M L</td>
<td>3.1. The electoral dispute resolution mechanism is strengthened</td>
<td>H M L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election-related conflict managed for peaceful polls (before, during and after)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.2. National Electoral Security Plan implemented and improved capacity of SLP to safeguard elections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.3. Contributions to crosscutting issues

**Capacity development**: It is the core business of the programme, which all deliveries are meant to build political, strategic and operational competencies in running electoral processes. At the result, yes the country has been accompanied in securing fair and peaceful complex and sensitive elections. But the capabilities appear to have been more event-focused than really anchored in the national institutions so that they are able to act on their own (with less external support) next time.

**Gender issue**: The programme shows real interest for gender issue, and during preparation of the elections, developed strategies to accompany women through their key associations. The All Parties Women Association and other traditional women structures, for instance, got support to strengthen themselves, campaign in favor of peaceful elections and pledge for women inclusion in the parties’ leaderships. The result is mixed so far. 65 women were nominated parliamentary candidates in 2012, with 16 being elected. These figures are exactly in line with the ones of 2007 elections, but well below the statistics of 2002 elections where 156 women were nominated and 18 elected.
**Social inclusion:** Through civil society organizations sensitization campaigns, the programme contributed into bringing the very disadvantaged segments of society within the electoral process. Even marginalized groups, such as ex-combatants, usually standing out of politics, have been reached. The turnout on Election Day could be regarded as the reward of these wide efforts. However, there has been at least one setback with NEC failing to provide people with impaired sight with tactile Braille ballot guides so that they could cast vote secretly.

### 3.2.4. Achievements by previous election projects (2007-2010)

Prior to the 2011-2014 Electoral Support, UNDP developed three specific capacity development projects to assist elections managing bodies as well as civil society organizations:

(i) Award 00049276 – Support to Electoral Process and Capacity Building of EMB (2008-2011)

(ii) Award 00056629 – Support to Electoral Management Bodies-Pase II

(iii) Project 00073954 – Strengthening Electoral MNT CA

The kind of support provided in the above projects was the same as the one being provided now through 2011-2014 Support. The EMB and nongovernmental organizations were also the targets of the capacity development strategies designed around direct trainings, technical assistance through provision of experts, and provision of professional equipment. With regard to year 2007, heavy support was provided to electoral process, which outputs recall so much those of 2012 already reviewed: “1000 observers for the Local elections; Over 36,000 staff recruited and trained in a cascade training programme to work in pooling centers…” (Report, 2007 Elections).

Obviously, the same shortcomings identified in the 2012 supporting strategies were there already in 2007. The issue is still the same: the support manages to help making the election happen peacefully, fairly and inclusively. But the capacity deployed to achieve this result fails to really anchor in the electoral bodies. So, the remaining challenge, out of all these experiences, is to consider how successfully address the issue of enabling change within the EMBs.
### Table 16: Overview of previous projects’ achievements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projects</th>
<th>Main Achievements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Award 00049276 - SUPPORT TO ELECTORAL PROCESSES & CAP BUILDING OF EMBs (2008-2011)** | 1. NEC, Political Party Registration Commission (PPRC) and CSOs’ capacity enhanced considerably.  
2. A nationwide voter and civic education peacefully conducted  
3. A credible voter register established  
4. An acceptable political parties code of conduct developed and signed  
5. An acceptable media code of conduct developed and signed.  
6. Capacity of local security networks enhanced for effective electoral support  
7. Transparent and very credible presidential and parliamentary elections conducted with outcomes widely accepted at both domestic and international levels.  
8. A proposal for support to the 2008 Local Government Elections developed  
9. Two CSOs (Hope Sierra Leone and the Coalition of Civil Society Activists and Human Rights/Sierra Leone) supported to conduct Clean Elections Campaign and Violence free elections respectively.  
10. Supported National Commission for Democracy on sensitization to the run-off elections.  
   • An external consultant in close association with the UN EAT Data Centre Advisor and a team from Statistics Sierra Leone (SSL) conducted the Ward Boundary Delimitation and 394 wards established;  
   • Wards (Boundary Delimitation) Regulations, 2008 drafted and passed by Parliament as Constitutional Instrument No. 2 of 2008;  
   • The voter register was updated to give opportunities certain categories to persons to register and transfer their registration from one polling centre to another based on a change of residence  
   • Peaceful and violent free By-elections conducted in 4 constituencies  
   • Public outreach on elections and voter education were conducted through radio programmes. In some localities town criers were used, also, UNDP supported the National Election Watch (NEW) CSO in enhancing their capacity to, mobilise, train and deploy additional 1000 observers for the Local elections  
   • Over 36,000 staff recruited and trained in a cascade training programme to work in pooling centers  
   • By-elections and training of trainer programme in civic education conducted, and effective management information system and NEC’s infrastructural capacity developed.  
   • People’s awareness raised on the civic duties, rights and responsibilities, gender equality and peaceful politics  
   • NEC conducted in house training for 35 drivers, Administrative assistants, Office Assistants and Senior and middle level staff for leadership and management training. External training was provided for the Chief Electoral Commissioner and the Chief of Finance Unit attended a five-day training workshop in June in Accra (Ghana), on Effective Electoral Assistance. The workshop was organized by the European Union (EU), UNDP and International IDEA.  
   • Developed a draft training Curriculum with three main course areas namely, civic education, governance, and elections administration. A Education Programme hired to support the commission in curriculum elaboration. This consultant also completed a participant’s handbook and a facilitator’s guide  
   • National Electoral Commission access to internet has been improved by changing the provider.  
   • Public sensitization and voter education has been promoted by.  
   • The greater engagement with Civil Society has been fulfilled by signing a Memorandum Of Understanding with National Election Watch to support their activities in civic education. Moreover, a Letter of Agreement has been signed later October with them to support NEW observation of Paramount Chieftancy.  
   • 5 By – elections were conducted in 2009  
   • NEC infrastructural capacity has been mainly developed by the acquisition of the warehouse, the building of the new headquarter perimeter fence  
   • The Programme Management Unit has been established and functional  |
| Award 00056629 - SUPPORT TO ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BODIES - PHASE II |  • Draft manual to strengthen the internal structures and procedures of the Commission was produced.  
   • PPRC monitored the affairs and.  
   • PPRC mediated in an intra-party between two factions of the party by conducting mediation sessions involving aggrieved factions and the top leadership.  
   • DCMCs held monthly meetings followed by radio |
discussions on local radio stations to sensitize the public on tolerance and non violence approaches.

• PPRC organized a 5 days Conflict Mediation Training of Trainers for the South and Eastern region DCMCs
• PPRC held multi party and youth dialogue forums in all the 4 regional towns. The forums were aimed at engaging political parties on the issue of political tolerance and non violence and reaffirm the important role of the parties in the prevention of conflicts
• The Commission completed a restructuring proposal which included the organogram, detailed job descriptions and the remuneration package of the proposed posts,
• PPRC in collaboration with UNDP drew up plans for capacity development for new staff scheduled to be recruited in January 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project 00073954 - STRENGTHENING ELECTORAL MNT CA</th>
<th>Project 00073954 - STRENGTHENING ELECTORAL MNT CA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Electoral stakeholders, such as NEC, PPRC, political parties and Civil Society, gained greater understanding of the legal frameworks governing political parties and elections;</td>
<td>• Electoral stakeholders, such as NEC, PPRC, political parties and Civil Society, gained greater understanding of the legal frameworks governing political parties and elections;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Through the first comprehensive review of the legal framework governing political parties and elections in Sierra Leone, a comprehensive set of recommendations for improving all aspects of the political and electoral legal frameworks was developed;</td>
<td>• Through the first comprehensive review of the legal framework governing political parties and elections in Sierra Leone, a comprehensive set of recommendations for improving all aspects of the political and electoral legal frameworks was developed;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A Geographic Information System (GIS) for electoral information was established within NEC.</td>
<td>• A Geographic Information System (GIS) for electoral information was established within NEC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Internal administrative, financial and accountability procedures for the PPRC were produced, including the Standard Operating Principles (I &amp; II) and Financial Policies and Accounting Procedures Manuals,</td>
<td>• Internal administrative, financial and accountability procedures for the PPRC were produced, including the Standard Operating Principles (I &amp; II) and Financial Policies and Accounting Procedures Manuals,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• With support from the project, sixteen (16) new PPRC staff were recruited and trained in Public Sector Strategic and Financial Management and in Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections (BRIDGE)</td>
<td>• With support from the project, sixteen (16) new PPRC staff were recruited and trained in Public Sector Strategic and Financial Management and in Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections (BRIDGE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Both the NEC 2010 – 2014 and PPRC 2010 -2013 Strategic Plans were develop.</td>
<td>• Both the NEC 2010 – 2014 and PPRC 2010 -2013 Strategic Plans were develop.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3. Efficiency

As a reminder, resources allocated to the programme per Prodoc amounted at USD 45,125,887. This figure doesn’t include resources for Output (2.1.) on civil society activities referred to PBF. The chart below shows how budget divides between the main components of the programme.

Graph 2: Available budget 2011-2012

Outcome 1 relating to empowerment of election managing bodies and accompaniment of them in carrying the heavy components of the electoral cycle appears to have caught the biggest part of the programme’s budget, up to 67%. Then, comes the Outcome devoted to participation of the population and enhancing their confidence in the electoral process which captures 13% of resources. Security and justice forming Outcome 3 take 4.4% of global allocation. The operating resources of the programme (Management Unit expenses) stand at 8.4%. The remaining 7% goes to coverage of indirect costs, mainly UNDP’s GMS (General Management Services).

The resources really engaged in programming through the annual work plans are smaller, standing at 39 629 347 for the two past years of the programme’s cycle. The general profile of structure of resources programmed in AWP doesn’t deviate much from that of global provisioned budget. It’s as above:

- Outcome 1 : 69%
- Outcome 2 : 12%
- Outcome 3 : 5%
- PMU : 5%
- Indirect costs: 9%

Sources: PMU, Financial Reports 2011-2012
Based on total budget provisioned in the annual work plans 2011 and 2012, the execution rate of the programme consolidates at 80.8%. In details, Outcome 2 (Participation and confidence) performs the best with 92% of resources of AWP disbursed, followed by Outcome 1 (Empowerment of EMBs) performing at 87%, while Outcome 3 (Security and justice) has its consumption rate standing at 66% of resources. It’s behind Supporting services (PMU) for which budget in annual work plan is disbursed at 71%, against 19% for budget line “Other” as specified above.

Graph 2: Execution rates 2011-2012

![Graph showing execution rates 2011-2012](image)

Sources: PMU, Financial reports 2011-2012

With regard to efficiency, it’s interesting to see what the balance is between two kinds of resources: on one hand, the resources going to strategic contents as in Outcome 1, 2 and 3, and on the other hand, all the others which are the supporting or intermediation expenses incurred in the way towards the outcomes. Broadly understood, the intermediation costs encompass mainly the operating costs of the Programme Management Unit and the UNDP corporate commission. Based on the provisioning in the AWP, they represent 14% of overall provisions, but drop at 6% when referred to disbursements in the two years. This means that that out of 100 currency units disbursed by the programme in 2011-2012, 94 reached the electoral system as terminal beneficiary while 6 are consumed as “transportation” costs. For the overall accuracy of the analysis, the provisioned cost of 14% should be the one to take into account, as by the end of the programme it should be performed overall.

In terms of efficiency, key question to be raised is whether those indirect costs are worth enough compared to what they help achieve within the strategic outcomes of the programme. UNDP corporate commission of 7% covers the expenses incurred by not only the country office, but the overall organization in supporting the programme. UNDP’s engagement is constant along the programme’s lifespan: at political and strategic level, the Country Direction’s leadership and coordination outputs are critical to the electoral support; at the operations level, the UNDP corporate network is supportive at various levels ranging from international heavy procurements to experts mobilization, and quality assurance.
As for the Programme Management Unit, as a DIM body and with regard to the scope of
programme, it appears to be a light entity, key staff being one Chief Technical Advisor, one
Operations Manager and one Finance Associate. This level of staffing is possible because of
supporting services provided not only by UNDP, but also by the UN network. Within
UNIPSIL, a team of three staffs supported the implementation of the activities on participation
ran with the society organizations, while the Police Unit were handling those relating to
security issues on the electoral process. Other synergy approaches are also developed on the
programme to optimize the indirect costing, such as partnering with World Food Programme
which allowed the use of its storage facilities at lower cost than what the programme should
have paid outside the UN network.

It can be stated that the programme is concerned with lowering its operating costs, so that a
maximum of resources can be devoted to and reach the targets within the three substantive
outcomes. Such a managerial option may even have had a perverse side. The UNIPSIL Unit
in charge of overseeing the numerous CSO implementing agencies is really small compared
to its scope of work in the programme. Also, the Police Unit reported lack of personnel
adequately skilled in the managing aspects the programme put on them, beyond the strict
security issues. Limited personnel dealing sometimes with tasks really out of their profile, is
also a source of risk. Misuse of programme’s resources under legal investigation in one
national implementing body has somehow to do with this restricted staffing.

Despite this shortcoming, the overall functioning of the implementation framework of the
programme is of a good standard, starting with the Steering Committee which seats regularly
and provide due guidance to the programme, and records participation and sound involvement
of its members. At the very top of the organogram a high level coordinating mechanism has
been provisioned by the project document, but has obviously not been set up. However,
informally at least, diplomatic channels are solicited by the programme to handle issues
needing this kind of support. It was the case, for instance, when the increasing of the
nomination fees raised tension between NEC and the political parties and could hamper
inclusiveness of the election.

Interface with the stakeholders is good enough. Donors reported overall satisfaction towards
how the programme is being operated and with the UNDP’s performance in this regard. They
particularly appreciate the coordination and information sharing, unless for the PBF fund on
which they consider that the Steering Committee doesn’t have enough oversight. Interface
with the national partners is characterized by flexibility, so that the programme can fit the
needs as they show up in a complex electoral process. With regard to NEC, subsidiary
principle is put forward, the programme even going beyond its planned positioning to help the
Commission handle properly emergencies or constraints it could not deal with alone. The
logistical challenge with the deployment of all the electoral personal and equipment across the
country before Election Day has been one those situations.

As for the programme’s value for money standing, not only does the Support help Sierra
Leone fill the gap in funding the 2012 elections, by bringing important flow of cash the
government might not be able to timely raise on its own. Though this very visible aspect of
things is important, was it only a question of bringing fresh money, this 14% of
intermediation cost the efficiency is being reviewed here, could be saved and the
corresponding money channel straight to the government as in direct budget support (DBS).
So beyond the money brought in, the true added value gained through the setting up of a whole implementing framework, also and mainly, lays in key or even critical qualitative inputs the programme delivered towards strategic and operational challenges within the electoral process, making therefore a valuable contribution to the country’s achievement of peaceful and fair election. It clearly appeared that the formula of joint presidential, parliamentary and local elections made the event reach a level of complexity that exceeded the internal capacities of the EMB, particularly those of NEC.

(i) From the planning (strategic, operational and budgetary) to the tallying, through the biometric registration, the wide scale training, the IT tools design, the settling of regional tallying centres and the preparation and deployment of a heavy logistical plan to fit all requirements on election day, the contributions by the programme clearly has been decisive (stakeholders reported to the evaluation that, sometimes, they felt that the programme was the only one to really push on).

(ii) The programme also contributed a lot in the prevailing of a minimum level of confidence between the key parties, on one side the EMBs, and on the other the political parties, namely the opposition sectors. This confidence was critical to having peaceful elections. There is a culture or practice of unilateralism in the EMBs, particularly NEC, which is conflict generating rather than conducive to consensus, fairness and peace. The non-agreed sudden increase of nomination fees, which was change of game’s rule during game party, moreover prohibited by ECOWAS regulations, was a perfect illustration in this regard. The programme, its get-together approach, and its backing diplomatic bench, as well, weren’t there, how would have evolved the situation, and what would have happened to mutual confidence in the process?

With regard to value for money, still, besides what the programme delivered, there is also what it did not. Outcome 1 is not only one out of the programme’s three. It’s also the very steering one. The programme is designed as a long cycled electoral support, rather than a punctual and time restricted assistance, to enable the country, through its EMB, to conduct further complex electoral processes on its own or with very few international community involvement. Unfortunately, this section of the commitment isn’t met so far.

The programme may not be held entirely and solely responsible of this critical shortcoming. From where they stood at the start of the support, the EMBs presumably weren’t ready to perform the leap to real autonomy. All what has been provided as support went straight handling emergencies in the process and making the big final result happen, rather than being empowerment inputs to the EMBs. If the EMBs, NEC at frontline, because of institutional weakness, failed to catch as much as they should get from a long cycle support, the programme also may have underestimated the challenges really attached to building autonomous ability in theses bodies.
3.4. Impact

3.4.1. Peaceful 2012 elections as a reference point

Very first and top impact at the credit of the programme is to have contributed to let, in the collective memory, the national heritage of peaceful, fair, transparent and credible elections, which present and upcoming generations of political actors can refer to as a standard not to go below. This reference is a compass leading to self-surpassing as well protecting against any backsliding. It was essential that these elections be held peacefully, fairly and credibly, at this moment of the politico-institutional recovery of the country. If the 2002 and 2007 democratic contests were tests for a country emerging out of such terrible crisis as the Sierra Leonean, the 2012 run really gave the confirmation. As a result, this confirmation is all the more valuable, that the context was complicated. The persisting bad economic situation in the country, with whole sectors of the society, amongst which massive representation of youngsters, feeling left by the wayside, makes the people more and more impatient and skeptical on the willingness and ability of politicians to make life a little bit better in a country with a great potential. The context was also that of a country where the incumbent was seeking for a second term, a situation which used to be quite delicate in African elections, with recurring suspicion of potential unfairness. Despite all this, Electoral Support helped Sierra Leone reached a good standard of institutional political power renewal in 2012. This is undoubtedly one tangible impact by the programme.

3.4.2. Institutional development gains

In participating in building the result above, the programme has also impacted actors it was interacting with, within such a long course process. The electoral cycle approach has, compared to traditional punctual and short-term electoral assistances, this advantage of making the support last so that its targets have bigger chances to be fertilized. In this 2011-2014 Support fertilization happened somehow, at different extents depending on specific profiles of targets, and in any case moderate for institutions at frontline (NEC and PPRC).

Overall, at least, through direct training and/or indirect technical assistance, capacitating processes benefited to the different actors in the electoral system of Sierra Leone. The programme has mobilized so far near to 25 technical advisors and run tens of training sessions, to build and operate capacities that had led to performing the 2012 elections

With regard to Electoral Management Bodies (NEC, PPRC) capacity building gains relate to following:

- Strategic planning
- Biometric registration
- Procuring and managing elections resources
- Election related IT knowledge
- Logistic management
- Management of tallying and results releasing phases and decentralizing such management
- Political and institutional communication
- Social mobilization/inclusion
• Framework for resources mutualizing between peer EMBs in the Mano River sub-region

*Office of national Security and Sierra Leone Police*, mainly, and other security actors got their capacities strengthened with support of the programme in key following matters:

• Building coordinated comprehensive approach of security in electoral context
• Conducting of threat assessment toward electoral event
• Getting together with civil components of society such as political parties and NGOs, to promote a preventive approach of security issues
• Strategic and operational management of security before, on and after election day
• Assets Management

*Judiciary system gained experience* in going through innovation such as the Electoral Offense Courts, which were dedicated to efficient expediting of the elections related disputes so that the electoral process could proceed fair enough to all. The evaluation found no sign that the EOCs unblocked the treatment of the electoral disputes, some of which are still pending almost one year after Election Day. Nevertheless, the experience is there and reflecting on it could bring the judiciary system with a better concept or approach of electoral process accompaniment.

*Media sector* got additional monitoring abilities at the level of the independent regulating authority, as well as enhanced professionalism in coverage of political matters at the level of press houses.

*Civil society organizations* comforted their involvement in domestic electoral process through following gains:

• Institutional restructuring and strengthening
• Top involvement in the running of the electoral process through seating at Electoral Steering Committee (this level of representation was new for them)
• Teaming with security forces and political parties to bring and operationalize broader concepts of peace, security and inclusion
• Wide scale campaigning for inclusion
• Wide scale monitoring of election

3.4.3. **Tangible Assets**

The assets are the most visible impacts generated by the programme. They are of various types and benefited to the overall spectrum of actors within the electoral system. Out of all, the biometric based voter register of 2,697,291 individuals is of specific interest. It will ease a lot the preparation of further elections cycles, as this asset should only need update, instead of undertaking a complete registration process. This register can also go beyond electoral sphere and serve into broader registration of Sierra Leonean population under leadership of the National Registration Service (NRS). The biometric voter Register is hosted in a data centre and its rescue system which constitute the heart of the outputs delivered by the programme. Details of assets at the credit of the programme are as follows:

• Biometric voter Register
• Data centre and rescue system
- Software geniuses
- Logistical equipment: vehicles, motorcycles
- Biometric registration kits
- Learning materials
- IT equipment
- Voting material
- Rolling assets

3.5. Sustainability

The sustainability of achievements by any programme depends on key upstream and downstream factors. From an upstream perspective, one basic requirement for any sustainability is that outputs generating the results be strong enough in term of intrinsic quality. If the deliveries are not technically sound, there’s no sustainability one can attach to benefit resulted out of them. From a downstream perspective, sustainability also presupposes good and strong ownership by the recipient, so that what’s coming out of the programme be held properly and can last beyond the programme’s lifespan.

Generally speaking, as the programme goes through direct implementation modalities, which means full compliance to UNDP’s procedures, the deliveries are of good standard. The equipment procured internationally and the expatriate expertise mobilized by the PMU, are reported having brought sound added-value to the 2012 electoral process. According to interviewees, some local recruitments by NEC may have been of weaker profile, including and mainly at the local level. Nonetheless, overall, deliveries within the programme appear to have been robust enough to support sustainable benefits to the electoral system.

The approach put forward by the programme is also conducive to sustainability. Its different components are meant to be anchored within national institutions and actors. These are the ones who determine the needs to address and initiate their annual work plan. This does ensure well customized activities for relevant solutions to problems in each segment of the electoral process. However, in few cases, this approach did not prevent some actors (political parties, for instance) to report to the evaluation that their implementing agency (PPRC) didn’t involve them in elaborating AWP.

If, upstream, both outputs delivered by the programme and approaches used to deliver them, are, overall, sound and conducive to sustainability, downstream, ownership remains questionable, especially with regard to EMBs. Amongst the two, concerns are particularly heavy about the National Electoral Commission, which is also the main pillar of the electoral system. The following situations alert already on the ability for NEC, not only to maintain, but also vitalize key legacies from the programme.

**Biometric Data Centre at risk**: this main output of the electoral support was operated from a special venue outside of NEC headquarters. The Commission repatriated it recently in its main building, without making sure that facility requirements are fully met for the safety of the equipment. By now, electricity related shortcomings are putting this instrument at risk. While the problem is diagnosed and quite easy to solve, NEC still takes no decision in this regard. This situation is questioning the decision making process in the institution.

**Against any logic, main data centre and rescue system are at same venue**: the decision of repatriation of the data centre at headquarters while its Rescue System was hosted there
already is against any sense of risk management. It’s even ruinous to the principle of having a backup system. What’s quite extraordinary is that a true alternative does exist: relocating the rescue device at NRS venue. NEC has signed an agreement with NRS in this purpose, and knows that such relocation could enable it access to new resources from World Bank. All these good reasons, instead of facilitating the transfer, seem to be hampering factors. Then comes again the same question: what kind of rationality is at work in the institution’s decision making process. Culture and institutional values of the body also are questionable. Openness to peer bodies within the national framework for management of elections and related issues should be basic part of NEC’s mindset, but isn’t obviously.

_Uncertainty on stability and use of skilled staff:_ while during interviews NEC has asserted that its staff turnover is marginal, this statement can legitimately be questioned. In an institution with the culture, values and decision making logics reviewed above, it’s presumable that most skilled personnel could be willing to step out as opportunities show up. In awaiting such opportunities, they may find it difficult to develop their skills to the benefit of the institution.

_Unilateralism on pure political decisions is ruinous to consensus:_ one major prerequisite to sustaining any of the programme’s gain is having the ability to build or consolidate consensuses with the actors of the system, in particular with the political parties. Within a country just emerging out of so deep divides, political consensus is key driver towards peaceful electoral contest. NEC should be building consensus, rather than jeopardizing it, as it did with the decision of increasing by 100% the nomination fees, without due consultation with all stakeholders, especially the political parties. This solely made decision, while mitigated during 2012 main elections course, now fully applies to by-elections, and restricts participation for political parties. This atmosphere of exclusion is not conducive to sustaining of peace built during the electoral process.

_Institutional weakness in PPRC’s leadership isn’t conducive to sustaining gains:_ frequent renewal of the body’s top executive who, by law, is to be a retired judge doesn’t ease capitalizing processes in the institution. The very advanced age of such chairperson, doesn’t help either.

The prognostic of sustainability with regard to the other stakeholders within the electoral system is mixed. The security forces gained capacity development assets through trainings (10,500 of them reached), equipment provision and strategic knowhow (threat assessment, security coordinated approach, assets management), etc. But they are still so indigent that it’s unrealistic to think that they could, on their own, really hold and maintain any significant added-value from the programme. The civil society, more used to self-reliance and optimizing scarce resources, can presumably build on the experiences it went through during the 2012 election process. What’s built with the media sector is subject to specific considerations. Enhanced professionalism at level of private operators, while focused on few of them, could thrive with further push for spreading. Additional monitoring capacity at regulator level is also subject to same favorable prognostic. SLBC public broadcaster has still a way to go to refine its image by dropping allegations that opposition has no fair access to it.

**Conclusion**
1. Main findings

The Support to Sierra Leonean electoral cycle 2011 – 2014 aims at accompanying the country in the preparation and running of the November 17\textsuperscript{th} 2012 Elections as well as helping to challenge post-election related issues. Focus areas are: (i) Institutional strengthening, with key expectation being “Electoral institutions have the capacity to administer technically sound, credible and sustainable elections (with progressively less international support”; (ii) Inclusive participation, with key expectation being “Improved public confidence and participation in the electoral process”; (iii) Conflict management and electoral security, with key expectation as “Election-related conflict managed for peaceful polls (before, during and after)”.

While planned resources in the Prodoc reached 45 125 887 USD, consolidation of budgets made available in annual work plans of years 2011 and 2012 shows a figure of 39 78 010 455 USD. Based on this last figure, the execution rate stands 80.8%.

With regard to evaluation criteria per TOR, the programme so far performs as below:

Relevance: The programme is overall relevant, as it’s in lines with focus development areas of both the government of Sierra Leone and the development partners, and is built on gains from previous efforts on governance sector, as well as on lessons driven from these earlier interventions. Looking at its inner content, this relevance should be relativized on one point at least laying in the following question: were designers of the programme aware of where the EMBs were standing in terms of capacity and did they find the right strategies for outcome 1?

Effectiveness: the programme performed well in delivering outputs which contributed notably to the success of 2012 elections: support to a biometric voter registration, to planning and running the electoral operational agenda, to capacity development processes, to access of actors to professional equipment, to improvement of confidence and participation in the electoral process, as well as to addressing security issues. However, the programme so far, fails to achieve the outcome relating to putting the election managing bodies in capacity of running heavy elections on their own or with less involvement of international community.

Efficiency/value for money: the operating costs understood here as the overall resources consumed in delivering the programme’ services line at 14% of resources, but so far stand at 6% (calculated on data over exercises 2011 and 2012). At this cost, within a sound resources management framework, the programme contributed significantly in securing participatory, peaceful and fair elections, but failed, so far, to make the EMBs able to operate on their own, this shortcoming being a consequence of insufficient awareness of where these bodies were standing in terms of institutional capacities.

Impact: The very top of impacts by the programme is to have meaningfully contributed to let in the collective memory, as a national heritage, peaceful, fair, transparent and credible elections, which present and upcoming generations can refer to as a standard not to go below. This reference is a kind of compass for self-surpassing as well as protecting against any stepping back. In bringing this result, the programme delivered also key assets which are as many valuable impacts: 2,6 million individuals voter register, 10,500 security forces and other hundreds of staffs trained, various types of election relating equipment, including a data centre and its rescue system.
Sustainability: the sustainment of the benefits of the programme is questionable, especially with regard to weak ownership showed so far by the National Electoral Commission. NEC’s institutional values and decision making processes are not taking this body into the culture of change needed for, not only the holding but also the vitalization and upgrading, of the programme’s innovations. Section above documents this opinion.

2. Lessons learned

(i) It was valuable developing a long cycle electoral support

Being a three-year cycle programme makes the 2011-2012 Electoral Support to Sierra Leone have time and resources to develop a holistic approach of capacitation. Public institutions and civil society organizations could therefore be targeted comfortably to channel the designed inputs to the electoral system. Though not all the objectives of capacitation are met, surely significant efforts have been done on this, which could not be performed or not serenely enough, in the tie context of a punctual event-focused assistance. Diversifying the targets and the approaches contributes to reducing the risk of failure on the difficult capacity development field. For instance, if the programme, so far, left the election managing bodies still with heavy CD challenges in line with their role in the process, valuable steps have been made in the media and the security sectors, as well as for the civil society organizations.

(ii) Performing well in outputs delivering does not always mean equivalent influence on the related outcomes

As a capacity development programme, the Electoral Support faced the challenge these kind of programmes faces very often. The outcome 1, “Electoral institutions have the capacity to administer technically sound, credible and sustainable elections, with progressively less international support)” is a perfect illustration of this problem. The programme performed quite well the totality of this result oriented outputs, but without managing to really influence the overall result. This is possible because between the outputs and the outcome there is a missing link the programme doesn’t control: the ownership by the concerned institutions for qualitative leap. This ownership being weak, the efforts went straight to making peaceful and fair election happen but without any guarantee that the EMBs could be able make their own way next time. The lesson to learn here is that in designing a programme’s framework of results and resources, it is imperative to open an eye on such missing links so that the programme isn’t loaded with objectives out of management’s control.

(iii) As for many capacity development programmes, the electoral support brought results rather than change

As a capacity development, the Electoral Support was meant to bring in changes. With regard to the elections managing bodies, it was about helping them move from a point where they are not self-reliant in terms of electoral management capacities, to another point where they can rely on themselves. This movement can’t be performed without good inner provisions to change within the targeted institutions. But the missing of these provisions is also part of the problem; as if they were in, the desired changes should have already happened may be prior the coming in of the programme. The lesson to be drawn here is that in such a programme,
clear strategies should be designed for proper addressing of challenges relating to institutional changes. Many key stakeholders met suggested assessment of NEC to see where its stands in capacity development. While that’s good, if further to this assessment the complementary capacitation approach doesn’t address the issue of culture of chance, it’s to be feared that expected results won’t be there, either.

(iv) **The non-governmental sector is responding well to capacity development**

Civil society organizations’ respond to the programme’s support appears to have been stronger, in terms of population mobilization and sensitization as well as monitoring the electoral process. Traditional and sociocultural associations also cooperated well at grassroots level. The political parties, through their trans-partisan associations, the APPYA and APPWA, a Sierra Leonean refreshing specificity, participated well in the civic education and the pledging for peace and fairness in election cycle. The media actors targeted were also comfortable with delivering valuable inputs in terms of covering and monitoring the electoral process. So, with specific regard to mobilization, civil education, election monitoring, overall, the nongovernmental actors appear to have been very supportive to the momentum towards peaceful, fair and inclusive elections. The programme should therefore continue helping their structuring and strengthening.

(v) **The proper functioning of the Steering Committee is very supportive to the programme**

The Steering Committee functions well and is very supportive to the programme. Tallying of minutes of meeting shows that this institutional framework is providing due oversight and guidance. Performance expected from each stakeholder is monitored; reminders are made in case of delay. With regard to political dialogue also, the SC is very active, mobilizing even the diplomatic level on the donors’ side to build consensus amongst the political actors. For instance this approach helped a lot in easing tension and pledging for a solution, when NEC unilaterally increased the nomination fees.

3. **Recommendations**

**At strategic level** (to enhance formulation of further programmes)

1. **Better think of the robustness of relations between outputs and outcome**

*Justification of the recommendation*

The programme shows shortcomings in some results which may be coming from the framework of results and resources. Outcome 1 on having the elections managing bodies able to run elections on their own illustrates this situation. The outputs designed for this result are smart enough but do no lead mechanically to the outcome. From the project document it should have been seen that, in addition to delivering them, other initiatives should be devoted to enabling the beneficiary bodies to undertake institutional change. Therefore, in further programmes, the causal relationship between outputs and outcomes should be better secured, to enable better level of outcome performance.

*Specific actions for implementation of the recommendation:*  
- Design the outputs accordingly to outcomes they are meant to serve (as usually done)
Identify any prerequisites, conditions or elements of context, likely to influence the effectiveness of the outputs towards their related outcomes: in one hand those conducive to greater influence of outputs on outcomes; in the other hand those playing against such influence.

Taking into account elements in step 2 above, if any, adjust contents of outputs and/or outcomes to make them match more

2. **Incorporate appropriate strategies and tools for institutional change in the capacity development approaches**

*Justification of the recommendation*

On major challenge the capacity development programmes use to be facing fully applies in the Sierra Leonean Electoral Support 2011-2014. It relates to how to get capacities developed really anchored in the beneficiary institutions, duly absorbed and assimilated by them, so that they become autonomous. This has to do not only with bringing in new abilities, but also with thinking of how to make these institutions incorporate the grafts. This is about culture of change, and should be focused on in the remaining time of the programme, as well as in further similar programmes.

*Specific actions for implementation*

- Enclose in any CD activity specific tools to address issue of institutional change
- Provide regular monitoring of ownership of CD results by targeted institutions
- Based on monitoring observations, regularly adjust the CD approach to bring real changes in the targeted institutions

*At operational level* (to inform continued implantation of the programme)

3. **Urgently secure the appropriate technical conditions for storing of main electoral data center at NEC headquarters, and transfer rescue system to NRS to avoid having main and backup devices in same place.**

One emergency about the results of the programme undoubtedly relates to the sustainability of the assets provided. Amongst these, the data center and its rescue system raise serious concerns. The data centre has been relocated to its main building by the National Electoral Commission, without having secured the appropriate technical conditions. This puts at risk this major achievement of the programme, and should be corrected as quickly as possible. The rescue system, which was already at NEC headquarters, needs to be transferred to NRS to comply with security requirements and avoid that any incident damage both main and rescue data systems.

*Specific actions for implementation of the recommendation*

- Send to NEC a memorandum, signed by UNDP, raising the risks incurred by the data centre and its backup device
- Send a memorandum, signed by UNDP, to national authorities on risks incurred by the data center
- Engage SC members into informal or formal sensitization of the national authorities on urgent decisions to make to secure the electoral data system
- Make it clear to national authorities that the security of data system must be preserved prior to any further handover of equipment
4. Assess the current profile of NEC and PPRC for more customized CD approach with better chances of success

Justification of the recommendation
With valuable contributions by the programme, 2012 elections have been run peacefully, inclusively, fairly and timely. This went through sound outputs delivered to the electoral process, many of them channeled through the National Electoral Commission and the Political Parties Registration Commission. Unfortunately such deliveries appear to have not much influenced the inner abilities of these bodies positioned at frontline in preparing and running elections in Sierra Leone. Therefore, it’s urgent to externally and independently assess and determine where NEC and PPRC stand in terms of capacity building, so that for the remaining time of the programme’s cycle, the capacity development contents and approaches can be better customized for better result and impact.

Specific actions for implementation of the recommendation
- Elaborate terms of reference: include as points to address in the assessment specific questions on what are the best entry points for institutional change and subsequent adequate CD approaches and contents; ask for actionable recommendations in this regard
- Circulate TOR among Stirring Committee members (donors showed particular interest in this assessment during interviews)
- Based on recommendations of the assessment, customize both CD contents and approaches CD

5. Based on the results of EMB assessment and assuming that its conclusions be conducive in the regard, undertake urgent further Capacity development actions focused on the following issues, as well as on any others emerging out of the assessment:
  - Strategic Planning
  - Decision making
  - Assets and risk Management
  - Participative approaches and synergy building, in managing electoral processes
  - Institutional change approaches

Justification of the recommendation
EMB, NEC in particular have been found still very weak in strategic planning (illustrated by recurrent delays on delivering planning outputs), in decision making and assets and risk management (illustrated by the ongoing risked storing of electoral data main and rescue systems), in participative management of the electoral process (illustrated by unilateral decisions such as increase of nomination fees), in synergy building (illustrated by the non-implementation of the protocol for mutualizing of data base between NEC and NRS), and in institutional change (illustrated by the fact that valuable outputs conducive to peaceful, fair and accepted elected, while channels through EMB, did not change their inner institutional abilities). Therefore, for the rest of its lifespan, the programme should focus on filling these gaps, under guidance of the assessment of EMB to be conducted to clarify the institutional background and inform on how and where to anchor successful CD activities.
6. Continue elaborate and finance work plans with nongovernmental sector

Justification of the recommendation
The civil society organizations have showed real good potential in joining the elections’ momentum. Traditional structures, political and trans-partisan associations also contributed well in the sensitization and pledged for peaceful and fair elections. The media sector was also supportive to the process. With regard to sustaining results in critical areas of inclusion, participation, peace and fairness, the programme should continue and strengthen support to these nongovernmental actors. This continued cooperation with nongovernmental sector will enable it work over time on electoral matter instead of having ad hoc activities during elections events.

Specific actions for implementation of the recommendation
- Hold an evaluation session with nongovernmental actors to map and prioritize remaining challenges
- Customize new activities based on participatory PTA coordinated by UNPSIL
- Regularly monitor and evaluate activities

7. Fully integrate resources from the Peacebuilding Fund in the programme

Justification of the recommendation
Problems of articulation have been noticed between the programme and one of its funding sources: the Peace building Fund. Members from the Steering Committee report insufficient oversight on this component of programme. Also, implementing agencies report misunderstandings with the Programme Management Unit, with regard to managing the resources and reporting on. To make matters worse, unlike what has been done with all resources providers, no Letter of Agreement is signed between UNDP and UNIPSIL. These shortcomings should be corrected to give to these resources a more efficient and secured framework of implementation.

Specific actions for implementation
- Prepare a Letter of Agreement, and get it formally signed between UNDP and UNIPSIL
- Formalize supervision of PBF resources by the Steering Committee
- Update UNIPSIL staff engaged in the programme on the programme’s management tools and procedures for proper oversight of the national implementing bodies
- Hold updating sessions with the national implementing bodies on the programme’s procedures and en management requirements
### 1. Evaluation Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nº</th>
<th>Evaluation Criteria</th>
<th>Main Questions</th>
<th>Intermediate Questions</th>
<th>Potential Sources</th>
<th>Data collection Methods/Tools</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Analytical Approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Framework of Evaluation the Support’s Achievements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Providing evidence of coherence between the objectives and strategies of the Support and the development and cooperation frameworks of the country and its partners; UN/UNDP/other donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.</td>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>Has the Support a good anchorage level in the context of development of Sierra Leone?</td>
<td>Does the Support help solving a problem (Governance area) in the country?</td>
<td>Reports and diagnosis documentation Resource Persons</td>
<td>Documentary review Interviews of resource persons and beneficiaries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.1.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Is the Support in line with the national development priorities and strategies, particularly with those related to Governance issue?</td>
<td>Reports and diagnosis documentation Resource Persons</td>
<td>Documentary review Interviews of resource persons and beneficiaries</td>
<td></td>
<td>Providing evidence of coherence between the objectives and strategies of the Support and the development and cooperation frameworks of the country and its foreign partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Is the Support in line with UN/UNDP/other donors frameworks for international development cooperation? Does</td>
<td>Reports and diagnosis documentation Resource Persons</td>
<td>Documentary review Interviews of resource persons and beneficiaries</td>
<td></td>
<td>Providing evidence of coherence between the objectives and strategies of the Support and the development and cooperation frameworks of the country and its foreign partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2. Effectiveness</td>
<td>To what extent, quantitatively and qualitatively, the objectives in the Support’s framework are achieved?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Did the Support manage to deliver its expected outputs? Did these outputs generate the expected outcomes? | Intermediate or terminal reports on Support’s interventions or components  
Resource persons or stakeholders involved in Support’s implementation  
Persons and institutions benefiting from Support |
| Were the institutional arrangements functional and helpful to Support’s implementation? | Intermediate or terminal reports on Support’s interventions or components  
Resource persons or stakeholders involved in Support’s implementation  
Persons and institutions benefiting from Support |
| Supports’ Objectives said relevant by resources persons and beneficiaries interviewed | Supports’ Objectives said relevant by resources persons and beneficiaries interviewed |
| Providing evidence of added value by Support’s implementation, at operational level | Focusing analysis on evidences of outputs and their contributions to expected outcomes |

- Reports and diagnosis documentation
- Resource Persons
- Documentaries review
- Interviews of resource persons and beneficiaries
- Outputs directly observed by the mission, or reported by authorized sources, or laid down in validated documents (generally already validated execution reports)
- Institutional arrangements at place and functional
- Analyzing the functioning and effectiveness of the institutional framework of the Support
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Methodologies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective partnerships between donors inside the Support?</td>
<td>Intermediate or terminal reports on Support’s interventions or components, Resource persons or stakeholders involved in Support’s implementation, Persons and institutions benefiting from Support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomson</td>
<td>Documentary review, Individual and collective interviews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective partnerships between donors and national counterparts inside the Support?</td>
<td>Intermediate or terminal reports on Support’s interventions or components, Resource persons or stakeholders involved in Support’s implementation, Persons and institutions benefiting from Support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomson</td>
<td>Documentary review, Individual and collective interviews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the Support promote crosscutting issues and UN?</td>
<td>Intermediate or terminal reports on Support’s interventions or components.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomson</td>
<td>Documentary review, Individual and collective interviews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was the Support gender sensitive?</td>
<td>Thomson.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomson</td>
<td>Existence of tools and approaches to promote gender issue through the Support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomson</td>
<td>Analyzing and bringing evidence of what has been done by the Support with.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the Support systematically have a pro human rights approach?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Intermediate or terminal reports on Support’s interventions or components</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Resource persons or stakeholders involved in Support’s implementation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Persons and institutions benefiting from Support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Did the Support systematically have a pro CD (Capacity development) approach?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Intermediate or terminal reports on Support’s interventions or components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Resource persons or stakeholders involved in Support’s implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Persons and institutions benefiting from Support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Did the Support systematically have a pro RBM (Results based management) approach?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Intermediate or terminal reports on Support’s interventions or components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Resource persons or stakeholders involved in Support’s implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Persons and institutions benefiting from Support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>components</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Resource persons or stakeholders involved in Support’s implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Persons and institutions benefiting from Support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Support level of representation of women in the targets and achievements of the Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Analyzing and bringing evidence of what has been done by the Support with regard to human rights issue</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existence of tools and approaches to promote human rights through the Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Analyzing and bringing evidence of what has been done by the Support with regard to human rights issue</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existence of tools and approaches promoting Capacity development through the Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Analyzing and bringing evidence of what has been done by the Support with regard to capacity development issue</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existence of tools and approaches promoting RBM through the Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Analyzing and bringing evidence of what has been done by the Support with regard to Results based management issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What underlying factors influenced the achievement of the Support’s objectives?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What underlying factors helped delivery of outputs and their contributions to outcomes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate or terminal reports on Support’s interventions or components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource persons or stakeholders involved in Support’s implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons and institutions benefiting from Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documentary review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual and collective interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidences of factors having facilitated the implementation of the Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlightening valuable underlying factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlightening negative underlying factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4. Impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the Support, through its outputs and outcomes, contribute to any substantial changes in its hosting environment?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were the procurement procedures in the Support transparent, fair and rational?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were the procurement procedures in the Support transparent, fair and rational?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were the procurement procedures in the Support transparent, fair and rational?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were the procurement procedures in the Support transparent, fair and rational?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were the procurement procedures in the Support transparent, fair and rational?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were the procurement procedures in the Support transparent, fair and rational?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were the procurement procedures in the Support transparent, fair and rational?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were the procurement procedures in the Support transparent, fair and rational?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were the procurement procedures in the Support transparent, fair and rational?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were the procurement procedures in the Support transparent, fair and rational?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were the procurement procedures in the Support transparent, fair and rational?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 2. Looking beyond the Support

| 2.1. Capitalization | Did it exist any exit strategy progressively enabling the beneficiaries to take charge and be able to replace the Support at closure? | Intermediate or terminal reports on Support’s interventions or components | Resource persons or stakeholders involved in Support’s implementation | Persons and institutions benefiting from Support | Documentary review | Individual and collective interviews | Existence of an exit strategy duly documented through implementation reporting | Existence and progression through Support’s cycle of financial provisions by national counterparts to replace foreign resources at end | Analyze and provide evidence of overall national effort to make achievements survive to Support |
| Are there any major successes in the Support documented? | Intermediate or terminal reports on Support’s interventions or components | Resource persons or stakeholders involved in Support’s implementation | Persons and institutions benefiting from Support | Documentary review | Individual and collective interviews | Major successes in the Supports documented | Conceptualizing and modeling main successes by the Support and their modalities of replication |
| Are there any major failures in the Support documented? | Intermediate or terminal reports on Support’s interventions or components | Resource persons or stakeholders involved in Support’s implementation | Persons and institutions benefiting from Support | Documentary review | Individual and collective interviews | Major failures in the Support documented | Conceptualizing and modeling main failures in the Support and the way to avoid them in the rest of the project and in further similar interventions |
## 2.2. Recommendations

### What to recommend about the formulation of the Support’s results/resources frame?
- Persons and institutions benefiting from Support
- Intermediate or terminal reports on Support’s interventions or components
- Resource persons or stakeholders involved in Support’s implementation
- Persons and institutions benefiting from Support
- Analytical sections (including the underlying factors) in the evaluation report
- Documentary review
- Individual and collective interviews
- Recommendations available on the formulation of the framework of results and resources (impacts, outcomes, outputs, and dedicated resources, and relevant indicators)

### What to recommend with regard to the architecture of the Support?
- Intermediate or terminal reports on Support’s interventions or components
- Resource persons or stakeholders involved in Support’s implementation
- Persons and institutions benefiting from Support
- Analytical sections (including the underlying factors) in the evaluation report
- Documentary review
- Individual and collective interviews
- Recommendation on structuring the Support and its components available

### Based on problems identified by evaluation, elaborate recommendations of adjustments of Support’s logical framework: relevant and realistic: doable at reasonable costs/implementation modalities clearly specified (means, actors, delays)

### Based on problems identified by evaluation, elaborate organizational recommendations: relevant and realistic: doable at reasonable costs/implementation modalities clearly specified (means, actors, delays)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What to recommend with regard to institutional arrangements and implementation framework?</th>
<th>What to recommend with regard to the strategic and operational contents of the Support?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| ▪ Intermediate or terminal reports on Support’s interventions or components  
▪ Resource persons or stakeholders involved in Support’s implementation  
▪ Persons and institutions benefiting from Support  
▪ Analytical sections (including the underlying factors) in the evaluation report | ▪ Intermediate or terminal reports on Support’s interventions or components  
▪ Resource persons or stakeholders involved in Support’s implementation  
▪ Persons and institutions benefiting from Support  
▪ Analytical sections (including the underlying factors) in the evaluation report |
| ▪ Documentary review  
▪ Individual and collective interviews | ▪ Recommendations on the institutional arrangements and the implementation framework, available |
| ▪ Recommendations on the implementation operational strategies available | ▪ Based on problems identified by evaluation, elaborate institutional recommendations: relevant and realistic: doable at reasonable costs/implementation modalities clearly specified (means, actors, delays) |
| ▪ Based on problems identified by evaluation, elaborate strategic and operational recommendations: relevant and realistic: doable at reasonable costs/implementation modalities clearly specified (means, actors, delays) | |
What to recommend about any other aspect touched by the evaluation, and likely to enhance the implementation of the rest of the project and upcoming similar interventions?

- Intermediate or terminal reports on Support’s interventions or components
- Resource persons or stakeholders involved in Support’s implementation
- Persons and institutions benefiting from Support
- Analytical sections (including the underlying factors) in the evaluation report
- Documentary review
- Individual and collective interviews
- Recommendations available on any other enlightened by evaluation and likely to help enhance further similar interventions?

- Based on problems identified by evaluation, elaborate any other recommendations likely to help better implement the rest of the Support, and other upcoming similar interventions: relevant and realistic: doable at reasonable costs/implementation modalities clearly specified (means, actors, delays)
### Table: Overview of financial data per annum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Out/Puts-Comes</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TotBudget</td>
<td>AWP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 1.1</td>
<td>22 475 608,00</td>
<td>8 925 983,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 1.2</td>
<td>2 746 156,00</td>
<td>1 176 348,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 1</strong></td>
<td>24 749 902,00</td>
<td>9 630 469,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 2.1</td>
<td>1 845 000,00</td>
<td>795 000,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 2.2</td>
<td>1 520 000,00</td>
<td>440 000,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 2.3</td>
<td>1 982 337,00</td>
<td>1 075 000,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 2</strong></td>
<td>5 347 337,00</td>
<td>2 310 000,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 3.1</td>
<td>655 000,00</td>
<td>120 000,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 3.2</td>
<td>1 054 140,00</td>
<td>292 967,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 3</strong></td>
<td>1 709 140,00</td>
<td>412 967,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMU</td>
<td>3 196 139,00</td>
<td>502 500,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOT1</strong></td>
<td>35 002 518,00</td>
<td>12 855 936,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5% (in Op 1.1.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP-GMS (7%)</td>
<td>2 702 028,00</td>
<td>851 543,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax ISS (2%)</td>
<td>135 300,00</td>
<td>64 778,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depreciation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OVERALL</strong></td>
<td>38 311 708,00</td>
<td>14 244 119,00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: PMU/Financial Reports, 2011/2012
Table: Overview of financial data per annum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Out/Puts-Comes</th>
<th>Total Budget</th>
<th>AWP</th>
<th>Total Expdtes</th>
<th>Execution Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TotBudget</td>
<td>AWP</td>
<td>/TotBudget</td>
<td>/AWP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 1.1</td>
<td>47,699</td>
<td>2,585,563.00</td>
<td>22,784,370.28</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 1.2</td>
<td>5,242</td>
<td>1,733,274.00</td>
<td>1,058,465.44</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 1</strong></td>
<td><strong>51,697</strong></td>
<td><strong>27,126,975.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>23,564,729.21</strong></td>
<td><strong>45.6%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 2.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 2.2</td>
<td>4,032</td>
<td>1,319,567.00</td>
<td>2,043,760.07</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 2.3</td>
<td>2,770</td>
<td>1,136,609.00</td>
<td>876,695.39</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 2.4</td>
<td>3,101</td>
<td>2,405,300.00</td>
<td>1,558,519.97</td>
<td>50.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 2</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,905</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,861,476.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,478,975.43</strong></td>
<td><strong>45.2%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 3.1</td>
<td>1,309</td>
<td>627,784.00</td>
<td>192,717.00</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 3.2</td>
<td>2,064</td>
<td>1,473,064.00</td>
<td>1,203,135.61</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 3</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,374</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,100,848.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,395,853.61</strong></td>
<td><strong>41.4%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PMU</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,456</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,802,515.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,287,783.92</strong></td>
<td><strong>19.9%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOT1</strong></td>
<td><strong>71,434</strong></td>
<td><strong>35,891,814.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>30,727,342.17</strong></td>
<td><strong>43.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5% (in Op 1.1.)</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNDP-GMS (7%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,016</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,032,624.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>341,669.75</strong></td>
<td><strong>106.1%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tax ISS (2%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>321</strong></td>
<td><strong>245,859.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>174,462.25</strong></td>
<td><strong>54.2%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Depreciation</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OVERALL</strong></td>
<td><strong>78,010</strong></td>
<td><strong>39,629,347.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>32,827,009.68</strong></td>
<td><strong>42.1%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: PMU/Financial Reports, 2011/2012
2. Bibliography

- Electoral support 2011-2014, Project document
- Annual work plans, PPRC 2011-2013
- Annual work Plans, NSA, 2013
- Annual work Plans, NEC, 2011-2013
- Annual work Plans, Judiciary sector, 2012
- Annual work Plans, CTN, 2012
- Annual work Plans, SLP, 2013
- Annual Report, PMU, 2011
- Annual Report, PMU, 2012
- Electoral Support, Consolidated financial report 2012, PMU
- 2013 Quarterly narrative Reports 1 and 2
- PBF Audit, 2012
- DFID’s Evaluation of Electoral Support through UNDP, 2012
- EU observation mission, Sierra Leone 2012 Election, final report
- NEC annual Report 2012
- Support to the electoral reform and the National Electoral Commission 2008-2011, Project document, and reports of progress
- Support to electoral management bodies, Phase II, 2009-2010, and reports of progress
- Strengthening electoral management, 2010-2011, Project document and reports of progress
- UNDP, Country Office of Sierra Leone, ROAR 2011
- UNDP, Country Office of Sierra Leone, ROAR 2012
- UNDP electoral assistance, 10 years review, 2002
- UNDP, CPD/CPAP 2008-20110
- UNDP, CPAP 2012-2012
- UNDP, CPD/CPAP 2013-2014
- UNDP Strategic Plan 2008-2011
- UN-UNDP, Common Country Assessment 2008-2010
- UND-Transitional joint vision, 2013-2014
- UNDAF 2008-2010
- Sierra Leone UN-Joint vision 2009-2012
- Implementation of Sierra Leone UN-Joint vision 2009-2012, 2011
- Mid-term review of Sierra Leone UN-Joint vision 2009-2010, 2011
- UN Support to Sierra Leone Constitutional Review, Project document, 2013
- Interagency technical assistance mission to Sierra Leone, 2013
- Consolidated report on projects implemented under the Sierra Leone Multi- Donors-Trust Fund, 2013
- PSRP II, Agenda for change, 2008-2012, Sierra Leone
- PSRP II, Agenda for prosperity, 2013-2018, Sierra Leone
- PSRP II, Progress report 2012, Sierra Leone
- Sierra Leone Human Development Report, 2011
- Sierra Leone, Millennium Development Goals, Report 2010
### 3. Persons/Institutions visited

| N° | NEC | Chair | 7th October | 11th a.m. | 10th October, 2013 | 11.00 a.m. | 10th October, 2013 | 2.00 p.m. | 11th October, 2013 | 10.00 a.m. | 11th October, 2013 | 2.00 p.m. | 16th October, 2013 | 10.00 a.m. | 16th October, 2013 | 11 : 30 | 16th October, 2013 | 2.00 p.m. | 17th October, 2013 | 11.00 a.m. | Friday 18 October | 4.30PM | Monday 21 October | 10.00am |
|----|-----|-------|-------------|----------|------------------|---------|------------------|--------|------------------|----------|------------------|--------|------------------|---------|------------------|--------|------------------|---------|------------------|--------|------------------|--------|
| 1. | PPRC | Chair | 7th October | 11th a.m. | 13 :30 p.m. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2. | UNIPSIL, Police Unit | Mr. Chris Ade Atere, Planning Officer | 10th October, 2013 | 11.00 a.m. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 3. | Mano River Union | Mrs. Linda Koroma, Deputy Secretary General | 10th October, 2013 | 2.00 p.m. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4. | ONS | | 11th October | 10.00 a.m. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 5. | NSA | Mr. Patrick Buse, Coordinator | 11th October | 11.00 a.m | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 6. | SLP | Mr Kambey | 10th October | 2 :00 p.m. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 7. | National Commission for Democracy | Dr. Abubakar Kargbo | 14th October | 4.00 p.m. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 8. | DFID | | 16th October, 2013 | 10.00 a.m. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 9. | EU | Tom ASHWANDEN Head of Governance and Institutional Support | 16th October | 11 : 30 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 10. | National Election Watch (NEW) | Mr. James Lahai, National Coordinator | 16th October, 2013 | 2.00 p.m. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 11. | Embassy of Ireland | Ms. Paula Molloy, Deputy Head of Mission | 17th October, 2013 | 11.00 a.m. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 12. | Search for Common Grounds (SFCG) | Mr. Ambrose James, Executive Director, 076604298 | Friday 18 October | 4.30PM | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 13. | Centre for Coordination of Youth Activities (CCYA) | Mr. Ngolo Katta, Director 076606419 | Monday 21 October | 10.00am | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

### 4. Termes de référence de la mission

1. **Background and Context**
   Since 2004, UNDP and its partners have supported the Sierra Leonean National Electoral Commission (NEC) to implement a strategic planning and reform process, as well as prepare for and administer the 2007 elections – the country's second national election since the end of the 10-year civil war in 2002, and the first without the supervision and major logistical support of the international community and UN peacekeepers. Building on the earlier success stories Sierra Leone 2012 Election became a
concluding step for Sierra Leone’s peace consolidation process and NEC has greatly contributed to this positive lookout through its important and crucial role in managing the 2012 Elections. The Elections programme is part of the ‘Improved Governance and Risk Management’ Programme Cluster of the Sierra Leone Country Programme Document and Country Programme Action Plan (CPD and CPAP).

In 2012 NEC conducted and managed a technically complex election in a competent, fair and credible manner. With the successful conduct of these elections, and local elections and by-elections held since, Sierra Leone has made important gains in the consolidation of its post-conflict democracy and towards self-sufficient administration of its own elections. The 2012 elections passed peacefully and were deemed credible and transparent by international observers. However, as also noted by various observers groups, there remain significant capacity gaps which, if not addressed in 2013 and 2014, could once again result in reliance on the international community. There remain a fragile political situation featuring political polarization and regional and ethnic divisions which could become exacerbated leading to the 2016 and 2017 electoral processes. This, combined with a weak economy including high levels of unemployment, particularly among the youth, could negatively impact on electoral disputes and conflict management around the electoral process. The potential for conflict related to the electoral process remains a concern to the Government and the international community. Both intend to focus their support on continuing fostering an environment that is conducive to the holding of credible future elections and strengthening mechanisms that administer and oversee the electoral process and party competition in democratic manner.

The programme is being implemented under UNDP Direct Implementation with a dedicated programme management team led by a full Chief Technical Advisor under the leadership and full operational support of the UNDP Country Office with active cooperation with UNIPSIL headed by the Executive Representative of Secretary General (ERSG) who is also the UN RC and UNDP RR. The total programme budget of USD 42 million is funded through a multi-donor basket funding mechanism which currently receives contributions from the European Commission, DFID/UK, Japan, Germany, Irish Aid/Ireland, Peace-building Commission and UNDP. Cost-sharing agreements signed bilaterally between UNDP and individual Development Partners detail the contractual obligations of the parties.

The programme operates under the overall guidance and leadership of a Steering Committee providing specific policy and decision-making mechanism. The Steering Committee meets quarterly or more frequently, if need be, and is responsible for general oversight of programme activities, including financial oversight and approval of funding allocations within the overall budget as recommended by the Programme Management Unit (PMU). The Steering Committee receives regular reports from the PMU and the National Election Commission (NEC) and other stakeholders, approves major activities and expenditures, reach consensus and take decisions in any change in the programme work plan, provide ongoing risk analysis, and consider funding for emerging issues. Further support, as needed, comes from the UNDP Bureau for Development Policy (BDP) and the UNDP Regional Bureau.

Specifically, by the programme’s end, it is expected that the three main intended outcomes will be achieved the following:
1. Electoral institutions have the capacity to administer technically sound, credible and sustainable elections (with progressively less international support);
2. Improved public confidence and participation in the electoral process; and
3. Election-related conflict managed for peaceful polls (before, during and after).

2. **Justification and Timing**
The programme **Support to the Electoral Cycle in Sierra Leone 2011 – 2014** will come to end on 31 December 2014. As per the programme document, UNDP Evaluation Policy, and agreement among the partners, an evaluation is to be conducted to independently assess the relative achievement of intended results. While the programme comes to an end on 31 December 2014, it is suggested to conduct this evaluation after the electoral events, in order to benefit from the availability of programme staff and build on the findings of elections observers, both international and national, and other key stakeholders. The evaluation would also look back at four similar projects and also make recommendations that would guide any needed actions in the remaining time of the programme up to December 2014. The evaluation should provide a qualitative, informative and summative assessment of the programme components in order to inform stakeholders on the appropriateness of the design, organisation, management, implementation, partnerships, and progress towards achievement of the stated programme objectives.

3. **Scope and Objectives**
1. The overall aim of the evaluation is to assess the contributions made by election programmes since 2008 with specific emphasis on the **Support to the Electoral Cycle in Sierra Leone 2011 – 2014** programme. It will also review the extent of the conduct of free, fair and credible elections in Sierra Leone through its support and technical assistance to an array of stakeholders namely National Election Commission (NEC), Political parties Registration Commission (PPRC), Sierra Leone Police (SLP), Office of National Security (ONS), Judiciary, the Law Officers Department, Mano River Union (MRU), National Commission for Democracy (NCD) and Non State Actors (Civil Society, Inter-religious Council, Academics institutions, Political parties, Youth and Women groups). In order to ascertain the impact and sustainability of earlier programmes, the evaluation will also validate the results achieved by the Support to Electoral Cycle, Electoral Reform, Local Government Elections, Violent Free Elections, Strengthening Electoral
Management programmes, their likely impact and their relevance to the overall intended outcome and their overall sustainability. The evaluation covers projects that have delivered in total US$ 76.6 million in total expenditure to December 2012. The evaluation will focus on the following:

- Evaluate the performance of the programme with reference to its respective strategy, objectives, quantitative and qualitative indicators defined by the programme document and the implementation arrangements, and identify major management and operational issues that impacted on the achievement of programme objectives.
- Evaluate the relevance of the programme in the emerging country context and priorities, taking into consideration other electoral assistance interventions.
- Assess the overall degree of progress made by all supported partners towards development of national capacities aimed at strengthening their management capacities and systems for electoral management in Sierra Leone.
- The evaluation should inform and provide lessons especially in respect of identifying further capacity development needs in national democratic institutions, including suggestions regarding changes to the legal framework around elections.
- The evaluation should pay particular attention to the gender elements of the projects and programmes and provide an assessment of the way in which the programmes addressed gender concerns.
- The evaluation should inform continued implementation of the programme, by making recommendations regarding further capacity development, how lessons learnt and key issues can be followed up in the post-election period, and suggesting immediate steps to be taken towards further improvement in the future electoral environment.
- The evaluation should cover the period from the approval of the Programme Document on February 2011 until the time of the evaluation. The evaluation will examine support programme provided to the multitude of partners and will encompass the entire scope of programme’s capacity building initiatives and their impact. The evaluation should also cover work that falls within the 2008-2012 period with specific emphasis on the 2011-14 programme.

The programme evaluation will also examine the:

**Relevance** – the extent to which the programme design and delivery of activities was able to respond to and address the organizational and programming priorities of the EMBs, and other participating stakeholders.

**Effectiveness** – the extent to which programme activities yielded expected outputs at the sub-component level and contributed to expected outcomes, e.g. improved:
- Performance of the EMBs and other recipient partners in planning and managing the elections, including: biometric registration, fingerprint matching, distribution of voters cards, procurement of sensitive materials, Election Day, results management, and the handling of security arrangements.
- Understanding of the elections process among voters;
- Coverage by the media of the elections;
- Knowledge of political party functionaries and activists of their rights and responsibilities;
- Cost-effectiveness: to what extent are the inputs to the programme sustainable, for future elections, particularly large procurements and investments?

**Value for Money/Efficiency** – the extent to which programme funds, expertise and time were used judiciously to achieve desired programme results? Were programme inputs procured in a timely way and with intended results?

**Sustainability** – the extent to which the legislative and policy innovations, strengthened human capacities, and management systems are likely to benefit the EMBs and other recipient partners into the future with a view to the next scheduled elections in 2016. Sustainability should be assessed in particular with regard to the following:
- Improvements to the Voter’s Register because biometric registration.
- Skills and expertise development.
- Capacities for Voter Education.
- Improvements in the Media environment.
- Creation of a peaceful and non violence political environment.
- Future use of other assets procured by the programme.

**Impact** – the evaluation should seek to approximate or estimate the programme’s contribution to free, fair and credible elections in 2012.

The evaluation should further aim to:
- Consider programme design as well as execution, and examine activities across all programme components;
- Assess the design and implementation of the programme in relation to core aid effectiveness principles such as: national ownership;
- Extract the lessons learned and best practices and elaborate specific recommendations to the participating partners and programme stakeholders.
- As much as possible, the evaluation should refer to the start of the programme period, or the start of programme monitoring where applicable, as its baseline for comparative analysis. While many improvements have been recorded in Sierra Leone’s electoral environment since the 2002 elections, many of them are not attributed to this programme.
4. Methodology

The evaluation should use a combination of the following methods for data collection:

**Document Review** – three major categories of documentation will be examined:
- Documents that constitute formal agreement among programme partners and/or record progress; such as the programme document, meeting minutes, the monitoring and evaluation framework, the approved programme Work Plan, periodic reports, as well as reports prepared by contractors to document the progress of their commissioned work.
- Publicly available information such as opinion polls, reports from independent observers that document electoral performance (including some that were funded by the programme), including e.g. reports from Media monitoring and international and domestic observer reports, documentation prepared by political parties, the Electoral Offences Courts (EOCs) and other stakeholders before, during and in the immediate aftermath of the elections.
- Internal working documents or other documents produced during the course of implementation, such as monitoring reports, training materials, mission reports, and consultancy reports.

**Key Informant Interviews** – the evaluation should include interviews with key stakeholders:
- Senior management and other key focal points in NEC, PPRC, SLP, ONS, CSO, Non State Actors, Judiciary and the Law Officers Department.
- Other national stakeholders with a mandate related to the elections e.g. political parties, the Police, etc.
- Representatives of sub-contracted Implementing Partners (IPs) of programme components.
- Members of the Steering committee and representatives of programme donors;
- UNDP staff and management, including key programme personnel;

**Stakeholder Consultations** – Consultations with stakeholders including media, CSOs, Development Partners, Political Parties, National Observers, members of the voting public etc.

In conducting data analysis and presenting the findings, the evaluation should use a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. While the evaluation is expected to estimate programme impact, it is understood that the evidence of impact may not be available for all components.

The evaluation team will undertake field visits to validate findings, to the extent possible.

5. Outputs and Deliverables

**Preliminary findings report** – a presentation of findings to key stakeholders orally and in writing will be made prior to completing the in-country mission. The purpose of this session is to provide opportunity for initial validation and elaboration of the evaluator’s observations and analysis.

**Draft evaluation report** – within two weeks the evaluator will submit a draft evaluation report to UNDP. As the evaluation report will be a key input to the Assessment of Development Results (ADR) in Sierra Leone being conducted by the Evaluation Office during the fourth quarter of 2013, the draft should be shared with the Evaluation Office of UNDP for comments and feedback.

6. Final evaluation report – within two weeks of receiving comments from stakeholders, the Evaluation Team will submit a final document. Evaluation Report Outline

As a minimum, the Evaluation Report (draft or final) shall include the following components:

i. Executive Summary
ii. Introduction / Background
iii. Programme outline and management
iv. Objectives of the projects, as well as the outcome level
v. Methodology
vi. Analysis
vii. Findings
viii. Conclusions
ix. Lessons Learned
x. Recommendations
xi. Relevant Annexes, e.g.
   a. List of people interviewed
   b. List of acronyms
   c. Evaluation work plan and TOR
   d. Key reference documents

7. Evaluation Team Composition and Required Qualifications

A team of two independent experts (1 International and 1 National) will be contracted to undertake the evaluation. The Team Leader will lead, organize, and supervise the work of the evaluation team, ensuring a division of labor that is commensurate with the skills profiles of the individual team members.

He/she will have overall responsibility for the production of deliverables, in particular the evaluation report, and is ultimately accountable for its quality. The Team Leader is also responsible for ensuring adequate consultations with all stakeholders and for
reporting to UNDP on progress. The Team Leader will also making him/herself available to the ADR team during the preparation, conduct and finalization of the evaluation report.

Specifically, the team members will have the following profiles:

**Evaluation Team Leader and Senior Electoral Expert**
- An effective evaluation manager with at least 5 - 6 years’ experience conducting international development evaluations.
- Broad knowledge of technical assistance to elections, with at least 5-10 year’s experience of capacity development in electoral management bodies.
- Demonstrated strong understanding of international electoral standards and principles required.
- Demonstrated strong knowledge of Monitoring and Evaluation methods for development programmes.
- Knowledge of UNDP’s results-based management orientation and practices.
- Prior experience of working in West Africa preferred.

**National Expert, Democratic governance**
- Demonstrated knowledge of capacity development methods.
- Strong knowledge in key areas related to democratic governance such as political parties, the media, civil society, advocacy/education, human rights, women’s empowerment and legal sector.
- Prior experience in conducting development evaluation.
- Demonstrated knowledge of the democratization process in Sierra Leone;
- Knowledge in key areas related to democratic governance including political parties, the media, civil society, advocacy/education, human rights, women’s empowerment, legal sector, judiciary reform, peace and development preferred;
- Good knowledge of monitoring and evaluation methods;

**Qualification Requirements for both experts include:**
- At least a Masters’s Degree in a Social Science or other relevant area;
- Minimum of 10 years of work experience.
- Familiarity with programme implementation in complex multi donor-funded programme s.
- Fluency in the English language and excellent oral and written communication skills.

*Note: The evaluators must not have had any involvement in the design or implementation of this elections support programme and have no present affiliation with UNDP, its funding partners, electoral management bodies in Sierra Leone, or other key programme stakeholder organizations that in any way could jeopardize their objectivity in relation to the assignment. Evaluators will be contracted by UNDP and remunerated according to UNDPs standard rates for consultants and in line with the level of their experience and expertise. The contract will be output-based and payment issued only upon delivery of satisfactory outputs.*

8. **Evaluation Principles and Ethics**

9. **Implementation Arrangements**
The Team Leader will report directly to UNDP Country Director, who will provide guidance and ensure the monitoring of satisfactory completion of evaluation deliverables. UNDP and/or the Elections Programme will provide office space and access to office services such as local transport, internet and printing. Evaluators should provide their own computer and communications equipment.

In consultation with the Evaluation Team Leader and as requested, UNDP and Programme personnel will make available all relevant documentation and provide contact information to key programme partners and stakeholders, and facilitate contact where needed.

An Elections Evaluation Reference Group will be constituted to provide guidance, oversight and quality assurance on key deliverables. The group will include the CD and DCD Programme, Evaluation Manager of the ADR Team, CTA Elections, RBM Specialist and a senior Government Counterpart.

10. **Time Frame for the Evaluation Process**
The Evaluation is expected to start on 15 August 2013 and have an expected total duration of 30 working days. The final work plan will be confirmed by the Evaluation Team and UNDP upon submission of a draft

It is expected that the mission will spend 3 weeks in-country work and that remaining time will be allocated for the production of evaluation deliverables. The final evaluation report should be available for the ADR team which will undertake data collection in October 2

---