THE SYRIAN CRISIS

TRACKING AND TACKLING IMPACTS ON SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

Insights from Lebanon and Jordan

WORKING PAPER - APRIL 2014
This document is a revised version of the paper presented at the United Nations Development Group regional meeting in Amman on 2nd and 3rd of November 2013.
The findings, interpretations and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of UNDP and institutions of the United Nations system that are mentioned herein, nor of the Governments of Jordan and Lebanon.

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The Regional Bureau for Arab States

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Concerned by the scale and protracted nature of the Syrian crisis and its spillover on neighboring countries, the UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States initiated a policy research project in the summer of 2013 to investigate the human development impacts of the crisis and their implications for resilience building efforts in two of the most affected countries: Lebanon and Jordan.

The paper is the outcome of this important, pilot research initiative. It distills and compares available macro and micro-level evidence of the impacts of the crisis in Lebanon and Jordan with a particular focus on the consequences of demographic shock arising from the massive refugee inflows. It shows that, in both countries, the refugee presence has affected the broad spectrum of human development outcomes in communities that were already most deprived and vulnerable prior to the crisis. Absorptive capacities of public health, education, and in particular, water and sanitation systems are rapidly eroding, competition over limited or declining job opportunities and resources is becoming fiercer. The crisis is also altering gender relationships and social cohesion. In this context, Lebanon and Jordan confront the double and daunting challenge of addressing the vulnerabilities of both refugee and host communities while maintaining macroeconomic and social stability.

Highlighting the discrepancies between humanitarian response plans and emerging challenges and priorities for host countries and communities, the paper makes the case for a strategic turnaround, whereby efforts to build resilience shift gears from a purely humanitarian approach towards a longer term, development-oriented one. Central to this approach is a better understanding of the drivers of vulnerabilities and the acknowledgement of the differentiated capacity challenges and priorities that people, communities and national institutions face in dealing with the impacts of the crisis.

The preparation of the paper involved extensive consultations and collaborations with UN agencies and other practitioners concerned by the developmental effects of the crisis in Syria neighboring countries. Following the Regional UN Development Group (UNDG) Meeting held in Amman in November 2013, when initial research findings were presented and discussed, valuable comments were received from dedicated experts through the UNDP Sub-regional Response Facility and the Regional UNDG Resilience Working Group the Arab States/MENA Region, leading to the finalization of the paper in early 2014.

The paper – intended to serve as a resource for researchers and practitioners alike – cross-fertilized with the multi-sector needs assessments conducted by governments and UN country teams in Lebanon and Jordan, and informed prioritization and decision-making in crisis response planning and programming. The insights and recommendations contained in interim versions of the paper also informed the rationale and strategic content of the Resilience-based Development Approach, which now serves as the guiding framework for a more comprehensive and sustainable response to the Syrian crisis.

Sima Bahous
United Nations Assistant Secretary-General
UNDP Assistant Administrator and Director of Regional Bureau for Arab States
Chair of the Regional UNDG for the Arab States, Middle East and North Africa
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The list of UN experts and practitioners who assisted with the production of the paper is extensive and heartfelt thanks are reserved for national experts, Redha Hamdam (Consultation and Research Institute in Lebanon²) and Mukhallad Omari (senior national consultant from Jordan) both of whom contributed insightful background papers that are referenced throughout this report.

A first comprehensive version of this paper was presented to the Regional UN Development Group (UNDG) Meeting held in Amman in November 2013, and in early January 2014 a revised version was shared with members of the UNDP Sub-regional Response Facility and the UNDG Resilience Working Group for the Arab States/MENA Region. The valuable insights and inputs (both formal and informal) received throughout the process were instrumental for improving the scope and depth of the analysis. Invaluable support was received from UNDP Country Offices in accessing relevant resources, facilitating stakeholder consultations and guiding the work at the country level. Also acknowledged are the contributions of the Offices of the Resident Coordinators in Jordan and Lebanon in facilitating the cross-fertilization of research work with other UN supported assessments of the developmental implications of the Syrian crisis.

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¹ Formerly, Poverty Practice leader at UNDP Regional Center in Cairo
² See http://crilebanon.com/cri-team
## ACRONYMS AND ABREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACAPS</td>
<td>The Assessment Capacities Project</td>
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<td>ACF</td>
<td>Action Contre la Faim</td>
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<td>ACTED</td>
<td>Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ART</td>
<td>Articulation de Réseaux Territoriaux</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCPR</td>
<td>Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery</td>
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<td>BSS</td>
<td>Beirut Southern Suburbs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAFOD</td>
<td>Catholic aid agency for England and Wales</td>
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<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere</td>
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<td>CAS</td>
<td>Central Administration for Statistics</td>
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<td>CBJ</td>
<td>Central Bank of Jordan</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organization</td>
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<td>CDR</td>
<td>Center for Development and Reconstruction</td>
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<td>CDS</td>
<td>City Development Strategies</td>
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<td>CERD</td>
<td>Center for Educational Research and Development</td>
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<td>CGE</td>
<td>Computable General Equilibrium</td>
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<td>CIIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CIP</td>
<td>Community Impact Project</td>
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<td>CLMC</td>
<td>Caritas Lebanon Migrant Center</td>
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<td>CPI</td>
<td>Consumer Price Index</td>
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<td>CRC</td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of the Child</td>
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<td>CRI</td>
<td>Consultation and Research Institute</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>CSS</td>
<td>Center for Strategic Studies</td>
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<td>DEF</td>
<td>Development and Employment Fund</td>
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<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of Statistics</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Danish Refugee Council</td>
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<td>EMMA</td>
<td>Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis</td>
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<td>ERC</td>
<td>Electricity Regulatory Commission</td>
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<td>ERF</td>
<td>Economic Research Forum</td>
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<td>ERFKE</td>
<td>Education Reform for Knowledge Economy</td>
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<td>ESFD</td>
<td>Economic and Social Fund for Development</td>
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<td>ESIA</td>
<td>Economic and Social Impact Assessment</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EWS</td>
<td>Early Warning System</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
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<td>FPD</td>
<td>Family Protection Department</td>
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<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender Based Violence</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GII</td>
<td>Gender Inequality Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>GLDUD</td>
<td>Governorate Local Development Unit</td>
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<td>GOJ</td>
<td>Government of Jordan</td>
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<td>GOL</td>
<td>Government of Lebanon</td>
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<td>GTAP</td>
<td>Global Trade Analysis Project</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>HIES</td>
<td>Household Income and Expenditure Survey</td>
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<td>HSES</td>
<td>Household Socioeconomic Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUDC</td>
<td>Housing and Urban Development Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communications Technology</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGSPS</td>
<td>Institute of Health Management and Social Protection</td>
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IHDI  Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index
IMF  International Monetary Fund
ILO  International Labour Organization
IRC  International Rescue Committee
JD  Jordanian Dinar
JESSRP  Jordan Emergency Services and Social Resilience Project
JHAS  Jordan Health Aid Society
JMP  Joint Monitoring Programme
JPFHS  Jordan Population and Family Health Survey
JRHFCHUA  Joint Rapid Health Facility Capacity and Utilization Assessment
MEHE  Ministry of Education & Higher Education
MENA  Middle East and North Africa
MF  Microfinance
MFI  Microfinance Institutions
MMR  Maternal Mortality Ratio
MOE  Ministry of Education
MOF  Ministry of Finance
MOH  Ministry of Health
MOI  Ministry of Interior
MOPH  Ministry of Public Health
MOPIC  Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
MOSA  Ministry of Social Affairs
MOsd  Ministry of Social Development
MOU  Memorandum of Understanding
MSME  Micro, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
MiCS  Multiple Indicator Surveys
MW  Megawatt
NAF  National Aid Fund
NAR  Needs Assessment Review
NFCL  National Framework to Combat Child Labor
NCHRD  National Center for Human Resource Development
NER  Net Enrollment Rate
NES  National Employment Strategy
NFE  Non-Formal Education
NFI  Non Food Items
NGO  Non-government organization
NRC  Norwegian Refugee Council
NPT  National Program for Combating Tuberculosis
NPTP  National Poverty Targeting Program
OCHA  Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PDES  Policy Development and Evaluation Service
PHC  Primary Health Care
PHCC  Primary Health Care Centers
PPP  Public-Private Partnerships
PRS  Poverty Reduction Strategy
QIP  Quick Impact Project
RAS  Regional Analysis of Syria
RRP  Regional Response Plan
SCPRA  Syrian Center for Policy Research
SME  Small and Medium Enterprises
SNAP  Syria Needs Analysis Project
STI  Sexually Transmitted Infections
SWM  Solid Waste Management
SYP  Syrian Pound
TAD  Trans-Boundary Animal Diseases
<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>TB</td>
<td>Tuberculosis</td>
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<tr>
<td>VPA</td>
<td>Violence Prone Area</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCWA</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNHABITAT</td>
<td>United Nations Human Settlements Programme</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Partnerships</td>
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<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN WOMEN</td>
<td>United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>US Dollar</td>
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<tr>
<td>USJ</td>
<td>Research Council of Saint Joseph University of Beirut</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>YMC</td>
<td>Yarmok Water Company</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The conflict in Syria has placed an enormous toll on economic and human development within Syria. The Syrian economy faces widespread de-industrialization and large-scale capital divestment. The unemployment rate skyrocketed to 48.8 percent in 2013, affecting the welfare of over 10 million people. The Syria’s Human Development Index is estimated to have rolled back 35 years because of deteriorating health, education and incomes.

Concerns have also grown regarding the repercussions of the Syrian crisis on neighboring countries. The paper investigates the various channels through which the Syrian crisis is affecting human development prospects in Lebanon and Jordan, with a particular focus on the effects of the unprecedented demographic and vulnerability shock wave resulting from massive refugee inflows. The analysis therefore has a special emphasis on the various challenges faced by host communities, local and national institutions in dealing with this shock.

In addition to analyzing available quantitative data from primary and secondary sources, the paper draws upon the results of recent qualitative participatory assessments. Not only have these assessments been helpful in qualifying results of the quantitative analysis, they also provided important insights on some critical dimensions of the crisis, such as its effect on gender relationships, social cohesion and local governance, all of which are difficult to capture in figures. To shed light on these dimensions and compare emerging priorities for action in both countries, the paper also explores the outcomes of seven regional stakeholder consultations conducted in host communities in Lebanon as well as the results of a recent needs assessment survey conducted by UNDP in 36 municipalities in host governorates across Jordan.

The paper identifies a set of common and country-specific issues that can inform and stimulate further debate and research around the design of effective interventions to build long-term resilience to the crisis and preserve human development gains. It also suggests a series of indicators that can serve as a basis for monitoring the various dimensions of vulnerabilities and human development impacts of the crisis.

Given the scale and protracted nature of the crisis and because the crisis tends mainly to exacerbate the structural vulnerabilities that host countries and communities were already facing prior to the crisis, it is argued that support to resilience building must shift gears from a purely humanitarian approach towards a longer term, development-oriented one.

KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Syrian crisis confronts Jordan and Lebanon with an unprecedented demographic shock. Both countries have allowed Syrians to cross their borders regardless of whether or not they entered the country. Lebanon, a country with a population of 4.5 million, has more than 1 million registered refugees, which represents the highest per-capita density recorded anywhere in the world. In Jordan, Syrian refugees now account for close to 10 percent of the population. In both countries, the refugee crisis spreads out across a large number of communities, exacerbating pre-crisis vulnerabilities while creating new pockets of fragility.

In mapping out the vulnerability challenge arising from the refugee crisis, the paper emphasizes the importance of looking not only at areas that host large number of refugees, but more critically, at areas where high refugee densities combine with high poverty rates and where human development outcomes can be expected to be most severely impacted by the crisis. In both countries, available data shows that the spatial distribution of refugees is highly regressive, with major host areas (e.g. the North and Bekaa in Lebanon, Mafraq and Irbid in Jordan) being also amongst the most deprived prior to the crisis. However, the situation varies sensibly across localities within major host governorates. This underscores the relevance of overlaying poverty and refugee densities at lower
administrative levels (district, municipalities). In Lebanon, where the refugee population is dispersed in about 1600 towns and villages, such a mapping exercise reveals that the crisis has generated pockets of acute vulnerability in over 200 localities throughout the country.

Adopting a slightly different perspective, the paper also suggests paying attention to communities where the refugee caseload is significant compared to the absolute number of poor community members. Specifically, the analysis considers the ratio of refugees to host poor as a useful proxy for the extra-vulnerability burden and potential risks of tension facing host communities. The ratio indeed gives a sense of the degree of competition between refugee and vulnerable host populations over already scarce or rapidly depleting resources, services and livelihoods opportunities. In Lebanon, the ratio was estimated to be close to 2:1 (2 refugees for every poor Lebanese) in some host areas such as the Bekaa region. In Jordan, the ratio exceeds 1:5 in most governorates that host refugees. In the capital city of Amman, where 25 percent of the Jordanian poor reside, the ratio exceeds 1:2 while it reaches 1.5:1 percent in Irbid.

Despite data and other limitations, the paper provides compelling and converging evidence that the refugee crisis has affected the broad spectrum of human development outcomes, most dramatically in communities that were already most deprived prior to the crisis.

In both Jordan and Lebanon, the crisis has aggravated poverty and vulnerability through pushing up food prices and rents, heightening competition over already scarce job opportunities and depressing wages in informal segments of labor markets, on which most of the poor depends for their livelihoods. In rural communities, especially in border areas with Syria, the livelihoods of marginal, small-scale farmers and livestock breeders, have been further impacted by the disruption of agricultural and food trade induced by the conflict. Symptomatic of rising levels of vulnerability, the demand for support from major national safety nets is on the rise in both countries.

The crisis also poses major challenges to health, education and environmental outcomes. As a result of massive arrivals of refugees, the absorptive capacities of public health and education systems have rapidly eroded. In Jordan, overcrowding in public schools, already significant prior to the crisis, has reached alarming levels. The percentage of overcrowded schools rose from 36 percent in 2011 to 40 percent by the end of 2013, reaching 50 percent in Amman and close to 70 percent in the poverty-stricken governorate of Irbid. Although public schools were not initially overcrowded in Lebanon, demographics have been shifting rapidly and the number of Syrian school children could more than double by 2014, accounting for more than 50 percent of children enrolled in country's public schools. To accommodate growing numbers, double shift systems have been introduced. Although cost-effective in the short term and key to averting a 'lost generation', this adds to the strain on local teachers and school infrastructure and also results in education time losses. The educational environment is further undermined by differences in curricula, educational backgrounds and language barriers as well as discriminatory practices against Syrian children, which affects the quality of education for all children. Public health facilities in major host areas have witnessed exponential increases in the number of patients and are now plagued with increased shortages of qualified staff, medicines and financial difficulties. The impact of delayed or provision of quality health care could result in increased levels of morbidity, especially amongst the most vulnerable. In both countries, challenges to health outcomes are compounded by the reemergence of previously eradicated diseases (measles, tuberculosis) and the emergence of new illnesses, such as Leishmaniasis, while the outbreak of Polio in Syria is also a major source of concern. The lack of adequate food and phyto-sanitary control at the border with Syria threatens food health and safety of both host and refugee communities.

The refugee crisis has also placed a tremendous pressure on already strained local water and energy supplies. The drain on water resources is especially severe in Jordan due to its relative lack of water. In northern areas, water shortages have spiked. Hospitals and schools do not have enough water to maintain sanitation standards. In Lebanon, power cuts and shortages, already common prior to the crisis, are on the rise. Risks of power shortages are also a growing concern in Jordan, while the increase in energy consumption is inflating the electricity subsidy bill, further straining the national
budget. Local sanitation and solid waste management systems are overstretched. In Lebanon, there are reports of solid and sewage waste disposal in springs and rivers, which heightens risks of water-borne diseases. The inability of municipalities to deal with rapid waste accumulation has led to illegal dumping and burning of waste, both of which contribute to water, soil and air pollution.

While gender dimensions of the spillover effects of the Syrian crisis have not been systematically and comprehensively documented across sectors, there is evidence that the massive inflow of refugees has altered gender relationships in both refugee and host families, leading to heightened risks of marginalization of women and gender-based violence.

All of these effects turn out to act as significant threats to social cohesion and human security, even in areas where there are strong cultural, identity and historical ties between refugee and host communities. In Lebanon, social cohesion issues are further compounded by the sectarian differences and political allegiances of refugees that tend to aggravate long-standing tensions in host communities.

At the macro-level, it appears that the crisis has undermined economic performance in the areas of trade, tourism and investment, especially so in Lebanon. However, given the number of structural and policy factors that were already at play prior to the crisis, these effects cannot be fully attributed to the Syrian crisis. In both countries, the most tangible macro-effect of the crisis relates to the mounting strain that its management places on already fragile public finances, shrinking fiscal space and administrative capacity to sustain national development efforts.

The paper also investigated the main impacts of the crisis and sectoral priorities for action, as perceived by local stakeholders in Jordan and Lebanon.

Results from recent participatory community assessments reveal that, in both countries, solid waste problems are perceived as the worst impact of the refugee crisis and the top priority for action. In Jordan, this is followed by pressures on water, health and education supply, while competition over jobs and housing were also identified as areas severely affected by the crisis. In Lebanon, anxiety related to competition for jobs and livelihood opportunities ranked second, followed by strains on health services and electricity supply. Failing to address these issues will have repercussions on virtually all other human development outcomes for both refugee and host communities. Assessment results also point to spatial differences in sectoral impacts that deserve attention in shaping the response to the crisis. In Lebanon for instance, pressures on infrastructure (electricity, water, sanitation) were felt heaviest in rural, peripheral communities, outscoring strains on social services. Likewise, perceived risks to social cohesion were found to be highest in areas with high refugee densities and high poverty levels.

Looking at some key features of the mainstay of the current response to the crisis, the paper highlights some discrepancies between the top priorities identified by host communities in Jordan and Lebanon and the sectoral priorities set forth in Regional Response Plans (RRP 5 and RRP6). While the 6th edition of the RRP places a stronger onus on reaching out to the most pressing needs of host communities, these are only partially covered. Support to solid waste management has largely been left out of the response. This is also true for electricity supply in Lebanon. In some priority areas, such as education in Jordan, the degree of reach-out of RRP interventions to host populations appears to be limited considering the acuteness of needs. In both countries, support to livelihoods and social cohesion remain far below needs.

In light of these findings and given the protracted nature of the crisis, the paper argues for a response that seeks to better balance and further integrate humanitarian and development action in a way that can effectively contribute to long-term resilience building.

As a starting point for informed and integrated responses in fast-changing environments, the paper highlights the importance of establishing effective, conflict- and gender-sensitive evidence building and monitoring systems, with a particular focus on the local level. This will entail collecting data (on infrastructure, human and institutional capacity gaps and strengths) that are relevant to the
design and implementation of interventions to address long-term needs. Given spatial variations in issues and challenges related to the crisis, the paper also advocates for the conduct of local participatory and multi-sectoral needs assessments countrywide, as critical for a better prioritization of resilience programming efforts both geographically and sectorally.

Equally critical is the need to effectively bridge and coordinate between immediate, medium term and longer-term development needs, actions and actors. To this end, emphasized in the paper is the importance of linking short-term income generation initiatives to longer-term efforts to address major infrastructure and service deficits (e.g. solid waste collection and disposal, rehabilitation/construction of schools or health facilities, hydro-projects, etc.) that benefit both refugee and host communities, and where women and youth are the prime targets. Though some of the humanitarian interventions currently underway embrace the broader needs of host communities (e.g. providing support for agricultural livelihoods, cash/voucher programs, rehabilitation of schools and health centers, etc.), findings point towards the benefits of scaling-up such interventions and integrating them into longer term resilience building efforts, as enshrined in Lebanon Stabilization Roadmap and Jordan National Resilience Plan.

In terms of emphasizing national ownership and sustainability, it is essential that stakeholders ground their efforts in existing strategies and systems at national and critically at local levels. Being at the forefront of the crisis, local governments and other grassroots actors, including civil society organizations (CSOs), should be a major focus of tailored capacity development and empowerment initiatives. This may involve supporting (short-term) participatory local planning exercises. It may also require cooperative efforts to reevaluate existing local development plans against the effects of the crisis and taking into consideration long-term socio-economic needs and goals. In Lebanon for instance, this would require revisiting the simplified Economic Development Plans elaborated by 27 municipal unions prior to the crisis. Central to resilience-building efforts is the need to strengthen local governance systems by focusing on core functions and key dimensions of decentralization processes.

Inclusive and conflict-sensitive approaches that preserve and promote social cohesion should be at the heart of all resilience-building efforts. Balancing socio-economic support between vulnerable refugee and host populations is particularly critical since humanitarian-refugee targeted assistance has been fueling perceptions (real or not) of unfairness amongst host populations. In addition to tackling the ‘collective’ challenges arising from pressures on solid waste, health, water, and energy services, from a social cohesion lens, the response should place a special onus on sectors (jobs and livelihoods, housing, education) where the effects of the crisis overall tend to be more discriminatory.

Programmatic efforts also need to pay special attention to emerging or entrenched drivers and risks of tensions and conflicts within and/or between refugee and host communities. These efforts should be rooted in-depth assessments of religious, cultural, political and other differences or preconceptions that affect social cohesion. Effective mechanisms need also to be established to foster participation of host and refugee communities in the overall planning, implementation and monitoring of projects. Equally essential are efforts to establish forums for dialogue and strengthen capacities for mediation and diversity management among leaders and key stakeholders in both communities; these mechanisms should also be used to raise awareness on gender-sensitive issues, including gender-based violence.

Though the research work concentrated on the impact of the Syrian crisis and key pathways to resilience-building in neighboring countries through the experiences of Jordan, it is clear that – from a sub-regional perspective – an integrated, cost-effective and sustainable response requires commensurate and continuous resilience-building interventions that support affected communities and vulnerable populations inside Syria.

**Key Words:** Syrian crisis, refugees, vulnerability, resilience building.
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PART I – SETTING THE SCENE: REGIONAL CONTEXT AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

1.1 THE SYRIAN CATASTROPHE

The current Syrian crisis is marred by multiple complexities. The country’s geopolitical importance to Russia and Iran, and, by default, their conflicting interests with the United States, have helped to internationalize the Syrian civil war. In terms of regional unrest, the Arab uprisings deepened social, religious and cultural divisions, including the aggravation of long standing grievances between Sunnis and Shi’as. Today’s Middle East is not a hotbed of state-state rivalries. It has also seen a surge in state-society conflicts characterized by reemerging identity politics; an expanding public sphere (thanks to a revolution in media and communication); a rise in Islamist social and political movements that challenge resilient regimes, and new forms of civic engagement that include the introduction of norms and expectations regarding participation in public life. As regards Syria, the country’s demographic is an intricate patchwork of ethnic and religious groups including Arab Sunnis, Alawites, Christians, Druze, Shia, Sunni Kurds, Circassians and Turks.

Given the national, regional and international complexities of the Syrian crisis, it is safe to say that there is currently no political solution in sight. The conflict will be protracted and it will have long lasting development and stability impacts in Syria, across the region and, even, around the world.

A recent study on the origins of the Syrian crisis attributes the roots of the crisis to what it called ‘institutional bottlenecks’. These bottlenecks are deficiencies in formal institutions and diversions in de facto institutions that led to the marginalization of large segments of society and deprived them from effectively contributing to political, economic and social development. The state of ‘institutional bottlenecks’ in Syria is reflected in the loss of political and economic institutional ability to evolve and respond to the aspirations, interests and expectations of society.

1.1.1 THE ECONOMIC COLLAPSE

The Syrian crisis led to a collapse in economic growth and capital stock, as well as macroeconomic instability and a dramatic increase in unemployment. The Syrian economy faces widespread de-industrialisation and large-scale capital divestment due to destruction, looting and the flight of capital. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is estimated to have declined by 3.7 percent in 2011, by 28.9 percent in 2012 and by a further 6.8 percent in the first quarter of 2013, therefore resulting in a total economic loss of USD 38.4 billion, or 45 percent of total economic losses. The economic impact was also felt disproportionally on the expenditure side (GDP) as during the period, exports fell by 75 percent and imports by 60 percent. Net foreign reserves dropped from USD 23 billion to USD 2 billion.

According to the latest quarterly socio-economic monitoring reports of Syria, total economic losses due to the conflict was estimated at more that USD 100 million by mid-July 2013, with a GDP loss of 37 percent in the second quarter of 2013, compared to the same quarter last year (see Table 1).

---

In addition to impacts on GDP, the crisis has had a notable impact on prices, Syria’s Consumer Price Index (CPI) increased by 51 percent between March 2011 and September 2012. The purchasing power of Syrians plummeted as the consumer price index spiked by 84.4 percent. This was one factor that caused the value of the Syrian to pound depreciate over 300 percent against the US dollar, and the Central Bank to depreciate the official SYP by 67 percent in December 2012.

Since 2011, a large share of public expenditure has been invested in defence with an estimated USD 4.85 billion being redirected for military purposes. Fiscal management of the budget is also in freefall as the tax base has been substantially eroding, with income tax returns declining due to massive job loss and a dramatic reduction in private consumption. While still low by international standards, the budget deficit has reached 65 percent of the country’s GDP. This is likely to spiral further as the government has lost significant revenue streams from oil and state industries that have been impacted by sanctions, looting and takeovers by opposition forces.

As the formal economy has imploded, there has been a growth in informal markets, rent-seeking operations, criminal enterprise and the economics of violence, all of which will plague post-conflict economic regulation, reform, equity and development.

### 1.1.2 THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT TOLL

According to UNDP’s 2010 poverty assessment, roughly 33.6 percent of Syrians were living below the upper poverty line in 2007 with 12 percent living in extreme poverty. In the first quarter of 2013, over half the population (more than 10 million people) were estimated to be living in poverty, with an additional 6.7 million people pushed into poverty as a result of the conflict (3.6 million of these becoming extremely poor). The number of impoverished people was estimated to be as high as 7.9 million in mid-2013, with increases in poverty rates being especially pronounced in the southern, central and northern regions. The labor market in Syria incurred an estimated loss of more than 2.3 million job opportunities, while the unemployment rate skyrocketed to 48.8 percent, affecting the welfare of over 10 million people (see Table 2).
Furthermore, the devaluation of the national currency along with a decrease in cereal and livestock production, disruption of food supply networks, rapid food inflation and mounting unemployment (see below) have increased food insecurity, particularly among poor and vulnerable households whose expenditure is mainly devoted to basic food and beverages.  

**Figure 1: Estimated percentage Loss in Syria Human Development Index**


**Along with negatively impacting labor outcomes, the conflict has dramatically affected national education and health systems.** The SCRP monitoring report (June 2013) indicated the destruction of almost 3,000 schools, while another 1,992 now provide shelter for IDPs. School attendance rates have dropped to 46.2 percent and there is a shortage of teachers as thousands have joined the ranks of refugees and/or IDPs. The impact on the health sector has been equally devastating with the loss of 32 government hospitals and 31 percent of primary health care centers being out of service. The health situation is further compounded by the collapse of the domestic pharmaceutical industry and international sanctions that block the import of lifesaving drugs, specialized modern medical equipment and spare-parts. The system has also been stressed by shortages of health care workers, while the lack of medical care and supply – in terms of equipment tools and medicine – has increased mortality and morbidity, and decreased the capacity to treat chronic diseases.

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**Table 2: Estimated Poverty and Employment Impacts of Conflict in Syria (2012 – 2013)**


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Syria’s Human Development Index is estimated to have rolled back 35 years because of deteriorating health, education and incomes. As seen in Figure 1 above, Syria’s Human Development Index would stand at 20.6 percent of its 2010 value and 23.1 percent below its 2013 potential.

Aside from the loss of livelihoods and basic services, the crisis has led to disruptions in social relations and an increase in the spread of extremism and intolerance. Social norms and values have been negatively affected and the country has seen divisions deepen as various groups have hardened their religious, cultural and social positions and seek retribution for wrongdoings. Not only does this impacts Syrian social and cultural capital, but it also poses serious risks to state unity.

The conflict has killed more than 100,000 people and displaced millions more. Violence, the destruction of essential utilities and the loss of livelihoods, as well as an increase in human rights violations16 and fears about the growing ethnic and sectarian nature of the conflict have forced hundreds of thousands of men, women and children to relocate from their homes, often multiple times and for protracted periods. At the time of writing this report, it was estimated that 6.8 million people inside Syria were in need of assistance; including 4.25 million IDPs, a figure that has doubled since the beginning of 2013. Local Syrian organizations have been struggling to provide a response as the government has blocked many from supporting international humanitarian aid efforts. Only 12 international NGOs have been granted permission to operate inside Syria.17 Millions of people have thus been moving to areas where they were to survive, often first in Syria and then later across a border.

The effects of the Syrian conflict have also reverberated to influence human development outcomes in neighboring countries. This has occurred through various transmission channels, including trade, investment and tourism, however, the human channel is certainly the most prominent with far-reaching consequences. As stressed in a recent policy paper regarding the Syrian refugee crisis, “This is a different kind of refugee crisis which the UN system and the global system have to respond to […] The spillover of the Syrian crisis into Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq carries along the dangers of the rising political tensions and destabilization”.18
1.2 WHY LOOKING AT SPILLOVERS TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES THROUGH A SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT LENS?

1.2.1 ACKNOWLEDGING THE MASSIVENESS AND PROTRACTEDNESS OF THE REFUGEE CRISIS

Beginning in 2011, hundreds of thousands of Syrians crossed the border to seek refuge in neighboring countries. UNHCR reported a tenfold increase in refugee numbers between May and December 2012, and the situation has been fast evolving ever since.

Figure 2: Number of Syrian Refugees in Neighboring Countries (January 2012 – December 2013)

![Graph showing the increase in Syrian refugees in neighboring countries from January 2012 to December 2013.](source)

Source: UNHCR

Between September 2012 and September 2013, almost 1.8 million fled Syria and sought asylum in the Lebanese Republic (Lebanon), the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Jordan), Republic of Turkey (Turkey), the Republic of Iraq (Iraq), and the Arab Republic of Egypt (Egypt). This is equivalent to almost a 9 fold increase in one year (see Figure 2).

By the end of 2013, over 2.3 million Syrian refugees were registered in neighboring countries with an additional 2 million projected to arrive in the sub-region during 2014. Figure 3 shows the distribution of Syrian refugees in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. As of December 2013, Lebanon was the highest recipient of Syrian refugees (35.3 percent), followed by Jordan and Turkey. Within the Arab region, Lebanon and Jordan were together host to 80 percent (close to 1.4 million) of Syrian refugees.

Figure 3: Distribution of Registered Syrian Refugees in Neighboring Countries left (right) as of December 2013

![Pie charts showing the distribution of Syrian refugees in neighboring countries.](source)


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Due to weaknesses in registration systems and other factors these figures are controversial and subject to disagreement. This issue brushed aside, it is evident that Jordan and Lebanon – in spite of their relatively small territory and population size – have absorbed a disproportionate number of Syrian refugees (see Table 3).

**Table 3: Refugee Demographics in Neighboring Countries (December 2013)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>End 2012</th>
<th>2013 (First Quarter)</th>
<th>2013 (Second Quarter)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Poor, million (compared to 2010)</td>
<td>+3.1</td>
<td>+6.7</td>
<td>+7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Extreme Poor (compared to 2010)</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job losses, million (Unemployment rate, percent)</td>
<td>1.96 (43)</td>
<td>2.35 (50.3)</td>
<td>2.33 (48.8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Column 1: For Turkey, Egypt, Iraq, the source is the Population Reference Bureau’s 2013 World Population Data Sheet; Available online: http://www.prb.org/Publications/Datasheets/2013/2013-world-population-data-sheet.aspx; date accessed 28/9/2013; for Jordan, the source is the DOS; Columns 2, 3, and 4, data obtained from UNHCR, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php; Column 5: authors’ calculations.

**The refugee crisis is likely to be long lasting.** Would the conflict in Syria find a peaceful resolution, it is likely that it will take more than a decade to rebuild the infrastructure, services and governance system in the country and possibly just as long to encourage the return of Syrian refugees and displaced citizens. The eventual return of Syrian refugees would not only depend upon the return of acceptable social and economic conditions but it would also be contingent on the promise of a secure environment, which will likely require several years to reinstake.

Protracted refugee situations, whether rooted in conflict or natural disasters are not only humanitarian concerns as they also reflect development failures. Such situations can undermine the pursuit of development goals at local, national and regional levels. There is ample evidence that countries hosting refugees for protracted periods experience long-term economic, social, political, and environmental impacts. Meanwhile, it is well documented that even short-term shocks to households, communities, regions or countries can lead to long-term human development setbacks, some of which may be irreversible. Refugees may wind up competing with equally vulnerable residents for scarce resources such as housing, food, water, sanitation, education, medical services and job and livelihood opportunities. The prolongation of a refugee crisis may not only cause direct security concerns but also have indirect security implications as tensions between refugees and local populations often arise as the latter ten to perceive that refugees receive preferential treatment. This is particularly the case when gaining access to social services, such as health and education, becomes increasingly difficult for local community members.

As evidenced in the remaining of this report through the experiences of Lebanon and Jordan, what is happening in the Syria’s neighboring countries is no exception to this scenario. The refugee crisis has been affecting socio-economic fabrics, access and quality of basic infrastructures and services in territories and communities that were already amongst the most deprived prior to the crisis, with the subsequent risk of deepening vulnerabilities, widening spatial inequalities and fueling tensions. Recent shifts in the political economy of refugee hosting are also reflective of growing concerns and the open-door hospitality displayed so far in Lebanon, Jordan (as well as Iraq) cannot be taken for granted (Box 1).
Box 1: The Political Economy of Hosting Refugees in Neighboring Countries

Arab countries within the sub-region have different stances on the issue of refugees in general, and Syrian refugees in particular. These stances are not always consistent and are subject to ever changing political relations between the refugees’ country of origin and the host countries. These changing relationships have altered the attitudes of host populations as well. Eventually, the official political stance and public opinion about refugees affect living conditions of refugees and add to the fluidity of the situation. It also affects the nature of international response.

Lebanon and Jordan: In spite of adopting and maintaining open door policies, Lebanon and Jordan have had to bear the increased burden of a refugee crisis that is straining national and local capacities, which has prompted central governments to adopt more ‘restrictive regimes’. In Lebanon and Jordan, the response has also been shaped by previous experiences with Palestinian refugees, and while the presence of Syrian refugees is seen a temporary solution, both countries continue to resist interventions that would result in longer periods of exile for Syrian refugees.

Lebanon: Wishing to avoid confrontation with Syria, the Lebanese government has adopted a disassociation policy regarding the conflict. This means Lebanon officially refrains from participating in any international sanctions or condemnations against the Syrian regime and refers to the situation in its neighboring country as an “internal matter.” This places the government in a delicate position because though Lebanon is not a signatory to the Refugee and Statelessness Conventions, it has ratified most other relevant human-rights treaties. Constitutionally speaking, the latter take precedence over domestic law, but this is rarely observed by national courts. Lebanon does not have legislation or administrative procedures in place to address the specific needs of refugees and asylum-seekers, individuals who may be detained and/or deportation for illegal entry or stay. In 2003, UNHCR drafted a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in cooperation with the Lebanese Government where it is stated that Lebanon is not an asylum country, but only a transit country of temporary asylum. The memorandum appoints UNHCR as the entity solely responsible for determining refugee status and the government will allow people of concern to stay in the country for up to one year so UNHCR can proceed with resettlement or repatriation processes. Because of this, refugees and/or asylum seekers in Lebanon are dependent on the Lebanese Higher Relief Commission, UNHCR and other implementing partners for their basic needs. In practice, local committees, charitable societies and municipalities provide most relief services (shelter, food, healthcare, education) for refugees in host areas.

Due to the memory of the 1948 influx of Palestinian refugees, the Lebanese government adopted a policy against the establishment of camps for Syrian refugees. Policies have also been pushed through that forbid structural intervention in informal tent settlements. At the beginning of the crisis, the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) issued a memorandum requiring all schools to admit Syrian students regardless of their legal status and informing that these students would be exempt from paying school fees. More recently however, authorities have become stricter in checking identity documents and some municipalities have gone so far as to impose a curfew on Syrian residents. The Government also announced that could affect Syrian’s refugees possibility to set up microenterprises (UNHCR, September 2013). Refugees are increasingly seen through a sectarian lens, with one side (the “March 14 bloc”) viewing them as unfortunate collateral resulting from a humanitarian crisis and the other (the “March 8 bloc”) seeing them as a threat to Lebanon’s demography and stability; it is the same apprehension and suspicion that had been previously reserved for the Palestinians.

21 Ibid.
22 The National (Abu Dhabi), Lebanon’s PM prefers to dissociate with Syria’, January 29, 2012
Jordan: The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has a long tradition of hospitality towards asylum-seekers and refugees. Since Jordan was a primary destination for Iraqis fleeing violence in their country, the country has ample experience in dealing with refugee inflows. These experiences have shaped Jordanian policies toward Syrian refugees.\(^27\) Thus, Jordan’s open door policy led the Jordanian government to accept numbers of Syrian refugees. However, this favorable environment has come under scrutiny as the country confronts its own socio-economic challenges and growing number of refugees.\(^28\) There are heightened concerns about competition over jobs and resources, and an exacerbation of tensions. Such apprehension has caused delays in approving livelihood support programs and multi-sectoral needs assessments that target refugee populations living outside camps. Concerns over fiscal pressures also led the government to announce a reform of its bread subsidy system (currently accessible to Syrian refugees) through the issuance of smart cards for Jordanian citizens only (see Regional Analysis Syria [RAS], September 2013).

Iraq: In Iraq, the general situation is marked by multiple securities, political and economic challenges. The Iraqi ‘Comprehensive Plan to End Displacement’, developed with UNHCR’s support, incorporates key humanitarian elements tailored to improve access to basic services, livelihoods and employment in areas of return. It also includes shelter programs for areas of displacement.\(^29\) Due to the unrest in Syria, Iraqi refugees in that country are increasingly opting to return home in large numbers, with some 32,000 arriving in July and August 2012 alone. This movement, in addition to the flight of thousands of Syrian nationals, is a major challenge for the Iraqi government. Another challenge facing the Iraqi Government and the international community is to provide humanitarian assistance and sustainable solutions for some 1.2 million Iraqi internally displaced persons (IDPs), in addition to offering protection and emergency support to tens of thousands of refugees in the country.\(^30\)

Egypt: Egypt is both a transit country, as well as one that receives refugees. With regard to Syrians, Egypt adopted at the beginning of the crisis an open stance towards Syrian refugees. For the last two years, Syrians could enter, live legally, and study at university, resulting in over 100,000 finding refuge there. However, the political turmoil following the deposition of President Muhammad Morsi has had serious repercussions on Syrians refugees. While still in power, the President shared a platform at a mass rally with hard-line clerics who called for a holy war in Syria against the Syrian president. In the minds of many Egyptians, the Syrian cause at that point became entwined with Morsi’s subsequent decision to end diplomatic ties with Syria.\(^31\) Syrians have thus been subject to a full-fledged state media campaign against them, violence, destruction of Syrian-owned businesses, and increased arbitrary detentions, including of asylum seekers and legal residents.\(^32\) Concerns about the security implications of continuing to allow large numbers of Syrians to enter the country has led Egypt’s transitional government to adopt a temporary security measure by requiring all Syrians to have a visa and security clearance to enter the country.

\(^{29}\) Ibid.
\(^{30}\) Ibid.
\(^{31}\) Al Masry al Youm, 2013, July.
1.2.2 ACKNOWLEDGING THE VULNERABILITY OF PRE-CRISIS DEVELOPMENT ACHIEVEMENTS

The Syrian crisis has placed additional pressure on the already fragile political, economic and social landscapes of neighboring countries. In all four Arab countries that received Syrian refugees, economic growth was downward trend between 2008 and 2010 and the only country to rebound was Iraq in 2011. Pre-crisis data also reveals a high degree of volatility in all countries (see Table 4).

Table 4: Pre-crisis Real GDP Growth in Neighboring Countries (2008-2011), in percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>9.93</td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>2.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>9.27</td>
<td>8.50</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>9.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>7.16</td>
<td>4.69</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In Egypt, economic growth fell from an average of 6.2 percent 2005 and 2010, to 1.8 percent in the 2010/11. In Lebanon, the average annual growth rate in the post-war period (1993 - 2008) was limited to 4 percent, which is well below the pre-war average growth rate of 6 percent in the 60s and 70s. Reconstruction programs launched in the 90s were expected to have annual growth rates of 8 percent (in constant prices) but because of the civil war, the country incurred significant losses in capital and revenue. In addition, economic changes in the region led to a decreased demand for Lebanese goods and services. It has only been in the last few years that GDP growth has picked up to push past 8 percent between 2007 and 2009. That growth was short lived however, as the fall of the coalition government in January 2011 compounded with regional turmoil, led to an economic downturn where GDP growth fell from 7 percent in 2010 to 3 percent in 2011. The government that was elected in June 2011 held power until March 2013, when the Prime Minister resigned. At the time of writing, a new government had yet to be formed.

Over the past decade, Jordan has also experienced an accelerated pace of economic change brought about by global economic integration and liberalization policies. These changes led to increased GDP growth and some macroeconomic stability. However, in the recent period, the Jordanian economy confronted multiple external shocks. High prices for imported oil and food, interruptions of natural gas flows from Egypt have combined with sluggish tourism, remittances and foreign direct investment in a context of rising regional tensions to produce a profoundly and adversely impact on the economy. While GDP growth recorded an average rate of 6.7 percent between 2000 and 2008, it slowed down to 5.5 percent in 2009 and 2.3 percent in 2010. In 2011, when the Syrian crisis started, GDP growth was only moderately gathering pace (2.6 percent).

None of Syria’s neighboring countries has experienced high enough levels of economic growth in the last ten years to foster significant improvements in people’s living standards. While Lebanon is classified as a high middle-income country with a per capita income estimated at USD 9,862 in 2011, high poverty rates and income inequality continue to prevail. According to UNDP, the poverty rate in 2004-2005 was as high as 28 percent, with extreme poverty reaching 8 percent.

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34 Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR).
35 According to the latest Regional MDG Report (2013), poverty incidence in the Mashreq region (Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and the Syrian Arab Republic) increased from 20.3 percent in 1990 to 23 percent in 2012. The average unemployment rate in the Mashreq region is estimated to have risen from 11.3 per cent to 16.3 per cent. See: http://www.escwa.un.org/sites/arabmdg13/
Table 5: Pre-crisis Rates of Poverty, Youth and Women Unemployment in Neighboring Countries, in percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Poverty rate (National Poverty Line), percent</th>
<th>Total Unemployment rate (15-64 years), percent</th>
<th>Youth Unemployment rate</th>
<th>Male Unemployment rate</th>
<th>Female Unemployment rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


Poverty in Lebanon is strongly associated with unemployment in the agriculture and construction industries and amongst marginalized social groups like the disabled, elderly and the female-run households (e.g. widows). Almost 36 percent of female-headed households face deprivation versus 23 percent of male-headed households.37 According to the results of a survey carried out by the Ministry of Finance in 2011, 37 percent of Lebanese households did not have enough money to pay for essentials such as food, electricity and other basic goods.38 The poverty landscape in Lebanon is also marred by severe regional imbalances where northern Lebanon boasts both the highest poverty (53 percent) and extreme poverty (18 percent) rates.

Poverty still affects 14.4 percent of Jordanians. Poverty incidence is higher in rural areas (16.8 percent) compared to urban areas (13.9 percent), but for the purpose of this analysis, it is noteworthy that over 80 percent of poor households are located in urban areas.39 Although Egypt experienced moderate to high economic growth in the past decade, poverty increased from 16.7 percent in 1999/2000 to 25.2 percent in 2011, while inequality increased.40 Poverty rose sharply between 2005 and 2008 despite an annual GDP growth of 6.2 percent and annual GDP per capita growth averaging 4 percent.41 In Iraq, human capacity and poverty reduction efforts have been severely limited by ongoing violence, and political and economic instability. According to the Central Statistical Office (CSO), 11.3 percent of the population lived on less than USD 2.5 per day in 2012 and the incidence of poverty reached 23 percent for rural communities (6 percent for urban populations). Currently, 13.3 percent of Iraqis are deemed ‘multi-dimensionally poor’.42

36 Youth are those between the ages of 15 to 24 years.
42 Joint Analysis Unit, 2013, UN Iraq. UNDAF 2015-2019, Country Background Synthesis Report. Draft, December. Note: according to the results of the 2012 Iraqi Households Socio Economic Survey (HSES), 18.9 percent of the population continue to live below the national poverty line.
In all four countries, a major source of vulnerability lies in the persistence of high levels of unemployment. In Lebanon, the unemployment rate was estimated at 11 percent in 2010, reaching 34 percent for youth and 18 percent for women. In Jordan, the unemployment rate stood at 12.9 percent in 2009 and 12.5 percent in 2010. Unemployment rates for women are particularly high (above 25 percent) while 85.9 percent of Jordanian women are economically inactive despite the fact that 60 percent are university graduates.

As can be seen in Table 6, the Human Development Index (HDI) has improved over time but this hides important distributional issues. In Jordan, the HDI is second only to Lebanon in the region. Such positive results are attributable to significant levels of spending — more than 25 percent of GDP — on education, health pensions, and social safety nets. However, when discounted for inequality (thereby providing a more accurate picture of the actual state of human development), the HDI falls significantly by about 20 percent in Jordan and Lebanon.

### Table 6: Pre-crisis Human Development Indicators in Neighboring Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighboring countries</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index (HDI)</td>
<td>0.711</td>
<td>0.739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI)</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Inequality Index (GII)</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>0.673</td>
<td>0.698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHDI</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>0.565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GII</td>
<td>0.513</td>
<td>0.456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>0.522</td>
<td>0.573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHDI</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GII</td>
<td>0.529</td>
<td>0.557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>0.611</td>
<td>0.644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHDI</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>0.489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GII</td>
<td>0.599</td>
<td>0.590 (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHDI</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In Jordan and Lebanon, public finances were structurally weak prior to the crisis, meaning that the two countries had already limited fiscal capacities to sustain their development gains. Between 2004 and 2008, Jordan’s primary fiscal deficit (excluding grants) stood at 6.6 percent of GDP, while the overall deficit (excluding grants) averaged 9.3 percent. In 2011, the overall deficit (excluding grants) averaged 9.3 percent.

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43 Unemployment data should be analyzed with caution since many people of working age are not in the labor force. Additionally, there has been a reported mismatch between Jordanians counted as “unemployed” and those available to work (see Jordan Poverty Reduction Strategy, 2013, for more details). Some Jordanian economists claim the overall unemployment rate is considerably higher (25 percent) because they take into account underemployment and jobseekers that are not factored into labor force figures.

44 It should be noted that women’s economic contribution is underestimated and this is just one of the shortcomings from conducting household surveys that collect data from the heads of households. Most are male and they do not see women’s work in the informal/formal sectors as ‘work’. A large number of these men, along with the data collectors, categorize women as housewives.

45 The HDI is a composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development—a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living.

46 The Inequality Adjusted HDI (IHDI) takes into account inequality in all three dimensions of the HDI by ‘discounting’ each dimension’s average value according to its level of inequality. The HDI can be viewed as an index of ‘potential’ human development and the IHDI as an index of actual human development.

47 The Gender Inequality Index (GII) reflects gender-based inequalities in three dimensions – reproductive health, empowerment, and economic activity. Reproductive health is measured by maternal mortality and adolescent fertility rates; empowerment is measured by the share of parliamentary seats held by each gender and attainment at secondary and higher education by each gender; and economic activity is measured by the labor market participation rate for each gender.

grants) peaked at 12.7 percent of GDP\textsuperscript{49}. As a result, public debt, which reduced significantly during 2000-2008, rose sharply, reaching 71 percent of GDP at end 2011. Furthermore, regional tensions adversely affected tourism, remittances and foreign direct investment. In July 2012, the government sought support from the IMF for USD 2.2 billion in credit and a Standby Agreement was signed in August 2012. This agreement included structural reforms and fiscal consolidation measures (including lifting subsidies) that the Government of Jordan started to pursue in November 2012. The removal of petroleum subsidies however led to widespread protests throughout the country as fuel and electricity prices went up significantly.\textsuperscript{50} These protests came against the backdrop of peaceful demonstrations since 2011, whereby Jordanian citizens had been calling for political and social justice reforms including more accountability and transparency from national and local institutions. Thus, the effects of the Syrian crisis unfolded in a context where the Government of Jordan was already torn between preserving macroeconomic stability and maintaining social stability. Following half a decade of robust growth, Lebanon experienced a marked decrease in its debt-to-GDP ratio, from 180 percent in 2006 to 134 percent in 2011. However, improvements in public finances were to a large extent due to cyclical improvement, given that the structural reform agenda presented at the Paris III conference of 2007 has yet to be fully implemented. The shocks delivered by the Syrian conflict have been putting Lebanon's public finances under severe and rapidly escalating strain.\textsuperscript{51}

1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES, DYNAMICS, APPROACH AND LIMITATIONS

Given the scale of the crisis and uncertainties surrounding its end, it has become clear that the immediate and long-term development implications for states and communities hosting Syrian refugees require further scrutiny. This paper is a pilot attempt to put into perspective the human development impacts of the Syrian crisis at the sub-regional level by focusing on two of the most affected neighboring countries: Lebanon and Jordan.

It is argued that because of the magnitude and protracted nature of the Syrian crisis and also because its spillover effects on neighboring countries and communities largely exacerbate pre-crisis fragilities and deficits, the response to the crisis must shift gears from a purely humanitarian approach, which has been prevailing so far, towards a development one. Doing so will help reduce vulnerability and build resilience to the current crisis, as well as future shocks, in a sustainable manner.

Data and recommendations in this paper are intended to establish a baseline for a more comprehensive understanding of the impact the crisis has on human development prospects in Syria neighboring countries, highlighting both common and country-specific challenges. It is hoped this will serve as a foundation for further assessments and improved monitoring of impacts and evidence-based mainstreaming into national and local medium-term development planning for resilience building.

When the research proposal was developed in the summer of 2013, there were no comprehensive assessments of the developmental implications – in terms of both indicators and strategy/responses – of the Syrian crisis neither in Jordan and Lebanon nor in other neighboring countries. Assessments efforts had mainly and understandably focused on gauging immediate needs of refugees to inform the humanitarian response. Based on a preliminary review of literature, the proposal had detailed three major gaps requiring further attention and that served as entry points for research:

\textsuperscript{49} This was due to a sharp rise in expenditures, partly due to the disruption of Egyptian gas supply, and to meet popular demands for additional spending and subsidies

\textsuperscript{50} Jordan Background Report, October 2013, and World Bank Jordan Economic Monitor, Spring 2013. The prices of heating fuel and electricity jumped by 23 percent (year on year) in the last two months of 2012


\textsuperscript{52} The Regional Analysis of the Syria (RAS) conflict produced by the Syria Needs Analysis Project (SNAP) provides to date the most comprehensive virtual source of information on the humanitarian (and to lesser extent development) implications of the Syrian crisis in neighboring countries. The platform consolidates updated information from all sources in the region and provides a synthesis of issues related to the Syrian crisis, focusing on the situation within Syria and the situation of refugees in neighboring countries (Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt). It contains detailed snapshots on recent developments, humanitarian situation and needs of refugees (health, shelter, nutrition, livelihoods and food security, protection, hygiene and sanitation). The platform also compiles information on existing and planned analytical work, while pointing to major data and informational gaps http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/crisis_overview.pdf
• The absence of comprehensive assessments that are based on unified methodologies and that target emerging human development challenges and priorities in host countries and communities;  

• Limited evidence on the macro (especially fiscal) implications and development financing capacities of the Syrian crisis;  

• Limited assessment of the current response to the crisis (national and international) and of stakeholder’s ability to account for the protracted nature of the crisis and address consequent developmental implications.

Country background reports were initially commissioned by UNDP in Lebanon and Jordan to start addressing the above gaps. Because of differences in data availability and accessibility, it was expected that the reports would primarily rely on a review of available literature and other resources as opposed to complex modeling or quantitative exercises. This review would be complemented by consultations with stakeholders at the national and local levels. Thus, no specific methodology was prescribed for documenting the various stages of the analysis.

While country research was still in progress, other substantive analytical undertakings focusing on host countries and communities were initiated in both Jordan and Lebanon. In July 2013, the Government of Lebanon requested the World Bank to undertake an Economic and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) and to analyze the effects of the Syrian crisis on the country and evaluate stabilization needs. The ESIA was conducted in August-September 2013 in collaboration with 14 UN agencies, the EU and the IMF and served as a basis for the development of Lebanon Roadmap for Stabilization. Various assessments focusing on host communities were also in the pipeline in Jordan, including a MoH/WHO/UNHCR joint assessment of health facilities in northern governorates, UNDP-led host community needs municipal assessment and host community needs household survey in the governorates of Ma’arrat and Irbid. In October 2013, the Government of Jordan, in collaboration with the UN initiated a Needs Assessment Review (NAR) of the Impact of the Syrian crisis, which fed into the development of a National Resilience Plan.

The research work both fed into and benefited from the findings of the ESIA and the NAR, as well as of other assessments conducted by UN agencies and other international organizations. In Lebanon, the scope and process of the country study work was adjusted so that it would complement the ESIA exercise. Whereas the ESIA focus was on quantifying aggregate short-term impacts of the Syrian crisis, the background report focused on a more qualitative, downstream assessment of the impacts and probed into the spatial dimensions the crisis. This was done primarily through the facilitation of seven regional working groups organized in host communities across the country.

In Jordan, the elaboration of the background report involved consultations with a number of national and local stakeholders, but time constraints did not allow for an extensive participatory assessment.

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54 In May 2013, the World Bank produced a fiscal and socio-economic impact assessment of Syrian displacement in Jordan using available data and complemented by a rapid appraisal in northern governorates.

55 The background report for Lebanon was produced by a team of experts of the Consultation and Research Institute (CRI) led by Redha Hamdam, see: http://www.lb.undp.org/content/dam/lebanon/docs/Poverty/Publications/THE%20SERIAN%20CRISIS%20report.pdf ; the background report for Jordan was produced by M. Omari, independent consultant.


58 This assessment was carried out in September 2013 in 36 municipalities in Ma’arpat and Irbid in order to provide the information needed to create a framework for development interventions. A questionnaire was sent to the municipalities and designed with the following goals in mind: provide an overview of the current situation of host communities and municipalities; identify sectors in need of immediate support; identify interventions as suggested by host communities and municipalities.

59 The Regional Working Groups sessions were organized with the support of the UNDP regional ART-Gold regional facilitator, in presence of three experts from the Consultation Research Institute (moderator, assistant, questionnaire facilitator). The discussion guide was structured around the following topics: Brief description of the situation before crisis; Demographic profile; Housing; Infrastructure; Economic activities; Social dimensions; Social Cohesion.
of impacts at the local level. In spite of this setback, the analysis benefited from some of the initial findings of UNDP-led participatory municipality needs assessment in Mafraq and Irbid. Findings of the background report also helped inform and guide the broader needs assessment review (NAR) of the impact of the crisis launched by the UN country team in October 2013, while some key findings from Jordan’s NAR were in turn used in finalizing the paper.

Generally, it was difficult to provide a comprehensive and strictly comparable picture of the various development challenges facing both countries. What emerged instead were numerous constraints surrounding process of gathering information and analyzing the development impacts of the Syrian crisis. Some of these constraints include the highly localized impact of the crisis within host countries along with the relative scarcity of local data. Another relates to the fact that the Syrian refugee crisis is highly dynamic, which unavoidably imposes some limits on the tractability of findings.

1.4 PAPER STRUCTURE

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Part II provides an assessment of the demographic and vulnerability challenge arising from the refugee crisis in Lebanon and Jordan. Drawing upon the literature review and research work conducted in Lebanon and Jordan, Part III highlights a number of issues and informational challenges that underpin development impact assessments. It then provides a comparative analysis of the human development impacts of the crisis on host communities in the two countries as well as some insights on macroeconomic and budgetary impacts. A special section is devoted to the results from the local perception surveys conducted as part of the Regional Working Groups in Lebanon and the UNDP-led municipality needs assessment in Jordan. Part IV puts into perspective the findings on crisis impacts with some of the key features of the (humanitarian) response to the crisis so far, highlighting the need for a shift in the scope and focus. Part V concludes on the need for a longer term and nationally-owned approach to building long term ‘systemic resilience’ to the Syrian crisis in neighboring countries. It emphasizes efforts to better link humanitarian and development assistance in the short run in a way that benefit both refugee and host communities, along with complementary larger scale and longer-term capacity development support to national and local institutions.
PART II: SCALING AND PROFILING THE VULNERABILITY CHALLENGE IN LEBANON AND JORDAN

The refugee crisis has not only sent a demographic shock wave across many communities in Jordan and Lebanon, but also an unprecedented vulnerability shock wave. Given the strong spatial dimensions of the refugee crisis in both countries, efforts to map-out and gauge the intensity of the vulnerability challenge arising from the crisis are essential for a better understanding of its human development impacts and for informed, well-targeted responses. Critical in this regard is the need to factor in the levels of vulnerability that host communities were already facing prior to the crisis.

2.1 THE DEMOGRAPHIC SHOCK WAVE

2.1.1 MAGNITUDE AND DYNAMICS

Initially modest, the number of refugees arriving in Lebanon increased steadily during 2012-2013. Although there no official figures on daily arrivals, it is estimated that between 60,000 and 75,000 people were entering from Syria each month in 2013. During that year, the number of refugees registered with UNHCR increased more than fivefold (Figure 4).

In Jordan, arrivals of refugees accelerated dramatically at the end of 2012, with the number of registered refugees more than tripling between November 2012 and May 2013. While initial population movements included family members of Jordanians living in northern governorates or well-to-do Syrians (whose financial resources are now being depleted with the extension of their stay), the vast majority of new arrivals are impoverished and vulnerable families.

In both countries, there is not yet a full consensus on the actual number of refugees. According to UNHCR data, the number of registered refugees in Lebanon exceeded 800,000 in December 2013, a figure approximating 18 percent of the population. This excludes refugees awaiting registration, unregistered Syrians, and adds to the 300 to 400 thousand Syrian workers already in the country and the influx of Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) and Lebanese Returnees since January 2011.

In Jordan, the number of Syrian refugees (registered or awaiting registration) was estimated at 576,354, which is about 9 percent of the population. In both countries, Government estimates however suggest higher refugee densities. According to the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA), the total number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon would exceed 1.2 million, which is more than 25 percent of the country’s population.

60 It should be noted that the number of Syrian refugees returning to their homeland has increased specially in the third quarter of 2013
61 Jordan Background Report, October 2013
62 and a 21 percent increase in Lebanon’s pre-conflict population, the largest proportionate increase experienced by any of the refugee-affected countries in the region, see: UNHCR, 2013, http://www.unhcr.org/525fe3e59.pdf
6310-20% of the registered population is estimated to be unregistered
64 As of December 2013, there were some 51,000 PRS in Lebanon
population while in Jordan, the GoJ (MOI) estimates that the country is currently hosting more than 600,000 refugees.65

**The discrepancy in data is partially due to deficiencies in national registration systems, along with other factors.** In Lebanon, gaps in data reportedly stem from the fact that a number of refugees abstain from registering for political reasons or they return to Syria though their registration is still being processed in Lebanon.66 Moreover, it is not entirely clear whether the number of Syrian nationals present in Lebanon prior to the crisis have been included in refugee estimates as no verification procedures can be applied. From another perspective, the number of refugees can be (and possibly has been) under or over-estimated for political reasons.67 In the case of Jordan, it has been reported that some residents in northern governorates have close ties with Syrian families, which has resulted in an increased number of unregistered Syrians living within host communities.68

At the time of writing, it was projected (UNHCR) that the number of refugees could reach between 1.56 million and 2.28 million by the end of 201469, which would represent close to or more than 40 percent of the population.70 However, these projections may not be read into too deeply, as the deteriorating situation in Lebanon alongside the maintenance of border restrictions, may lower the ‘pull factor’ for people fleeing Syria. In the case of Jordan, Syrian refugee population was projected rise to 800,000 by the end of 2014, which is 12 percent of the Jordanian population.71

2.1.2 Spatial Dispersion, Concentration and Fluidity

The refugee crisis in Lebanon and Jordan is characterized by significant levels of dispersion, concentration and fluidity. In Jordan, more than 90 percent of Syrian refugees are reportedly concentrated in the four governorates of Mafraq, Amman, Irbid and Zarqa, all of which are located to the north of the country72. According to UNHCR data, as of October 2013, the governorate of Mafraq was host to 33 percent of all Syrian refugees (this includes refugees in the Za’atari camp), followed by Amman (24 percent) and Irbid (22 percent).

**From an analytical viewpoint, the spatial distribution of refugees living outside camps however provides a better idea of the vulnerability challenge facing host communities.** As of December 2013, 78 percent of the refugee population (450,000 refugees) were residing outside camps in urban and semi-urban areas in the rest of the country.73 For obvious reasons, the governorate of Amman winds up being the main hosting area, followed by Irbid, Mafraq and Zarqa (Table 7).74

65 MoI database, July 2013. MoI data are based on ID required for Syrian refugees to access public services.
66 More than 90 percent of Syrian refugees identify themselves as Sunni Muslims; meaning very few religious minorities have registered with UNHCR. In Lebanon, refugees from religious minorities, particularly Christians, may choose not to register because they fear negative repercussions from Sunni refugees who identify with the regime. For more information, see: U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), 2013, Factsheet Syrian, www.uscirf.gov/images/Syriapercent20Factsheetpercent20-percent20Julypercent2018.pdf.
67 Lebanon Background Report, October 2013.
70 Included in these estimates are refugees registered or awaiting registration with UNHCR, those un-willing to register, as well as returning Lebanese and Palestinian refugees from the Syria. These figures correspond to two scenarios: in the first, the current level of conflict and its associated effects on displacement in Syria decreases, while in the second, it intensifies.
72 Governorates in the north and north-west of the country are traditional destinations for Syrian migrants workers, notably in the agricultural sector.
73 Note that the majority of Syrian refugees who arrived to Jordan prior to the opening of Za’atri camp at the end of July 2012 through the Ramtha Transit Facilities settled in Irbid (40 percent), Amman (26 percent) and Mafraq (16 percent), see: Urban Refugees, Jordan, November 2012.
74 Amman has a population of 2.3 million and hosts 70% of Jordanian businesses (DOS 2013). Work opportunities in the legal and informal markets are high in this governorate. Irbid is Jordan’s third-largest town after Amman and Zarqa, and the second-largest urban area, with nearly 600,000 inhabitants in 2012.
Available data for Lebanon suggests that the Bekaa governorate posts the highest refugee density (with almost one refugee for every two Lebanese residents), followed by the North and the South (Figure 5). Other assessments revealed that in more than 30 percent of host localities, the number of refugees exceeded the local population.80 Some towns in northern Lebanon and Bekaa have reportedly seen their population size double in the past two years (Table 8).

Table 7: Distribution of Registered Refugee Population Inside and Outside of Camps (Jordan), percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outside Camps</th>
<th>22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Lebanon</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East (Bekaa)</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut and Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Lebanon</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNHCR75: data are for end December 2013

Figures on the spatial distribution of refugees inside and outside camps, however, need to be taken with caution. The actual population in camps is indeed difficult to determine due to incomplete departure information and other factors.76 Also noteworthy are the discrepancies between UNHCR and government data. According to the latest data from the Ministry of Interior (see Appendix II),77 the governorate of Irbid is the main catchment area (39 percent of refugees), followed by Amman (24 percent), and Mafraq (22 percent, this number including the population in camps).78

Table 8: Distribution of Registered Refugees by Governorate (Lebanon), in percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Distribution of Refugees, percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Lebanon</td>
<td>35 (September 2012), 30 (December 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East (Bekaa)</td>
<td>44 (September 2012), 34 (December 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut and Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>9 (September 2012), 23 (December 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Lebanon</td>
<td>12 (September 2012), 13 (December 2013)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNHCR

Unlike Jordan, Lebanon has no formal camps. In 2013, the number of villages and towns hosting refugees in Lebanon reportedly increased from 700 to 1,600 locations. The UNHCR estimated that around 1.2 million Lebanese residents were affected by the arrival of Syrian refugees and this could reach 1.5 million by 2014. Refugees initially settled Sunni-friendly areas in the North, such as Wadi Khaled in Akkar, with subsequent waves heading for the Bekaa Valley.79 A significant number of refugees then registered in Beirut while South Lebanon - which received fewer arrivals at the outset – has witnessed a higher influx compared to earlier periods in the past two years (Table 8).

Figure 5: Estimated Refugee Density Host Governorates (Lebanon)

Source: Authors’ calculations 81

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76 Registration figures provide the official number of residents but thousands are estimated to have left the Za’atari camp, both officially and unofficially for urban areas or return to Syria. See RAS, September 2013; see also http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/settlement. php?id=176&country=107&region=77.
77 The MOI registration of refugees is based on the issuance of IDs required for Syrian refugees to access public services. This data was collected as part of a joint GoJ - UN Needs Assessment Review of the Impact of the Syrian crisis.
As can be seen in Figure 7 below, the refugee density however varies significantly within districts and municipalities. For instance, in Irbid governorate, the municipality of Al Ramtha A Jadida posts a refugee density of 42 percent, whilst in Amman governorate, the municipality of N’aaoor recorded a 26 percent increase in its population.

In both countries, secondary displacements of refugees in search of livelihood opportunities, a more favorable climate and access to services and security is common. In Lebanon, refugees generally tend move inland away from the saturated and increasingly insecure border regions. This distribution pattern is similar to the one highlighted by the Jordan Health Aid Society (JHAS), which keeps a database of registered and non-registered refugees living outside of the camps. As of June 2013, 38 percent of refugees lived in Irbid, with 17.5 percent in Amman and 13.2 percent residing in Mafraq.

These are traditional destinations for Syrian migrant workers, notably in the agricultural sector. Refugees also tend to feel more comfortable seeking shelter among their own sect, see Kira Doarjoseph Krauss, 2013, Return to Fathaland?: Syria’s refugees in Lebanon’s conflict, The Institute for Middle East Studies, The George Washington University, April, http://www.gwu.edu/~imes/assets/docs/Capstonepercent20Paperspercent202013/Capstone_Doarandpercent20rauss.pdf.

In Jordan, the Governorate of Mafraq (including the Za’atari camp) boasts the highest refugee density (UNHCR data) at nearly 59 percent, followed Irbid, Amman, Ajloun and Zarqa (see Figure 6 and Appendix II). It is noteworthy that without changing the ranking of Governorates, MoI data suggests a significantly higher density for Irbid (21 percent against 11 percent for UNHCR).

In both countries, secondary displacements of refugees in search of livelihood opportunities, a more favorable climate and access to services and security is common. In Lebanon, refugees generally tend move inland away from the saturated and increasingly insecure border regions.

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80 Lebanon Background Report, October 2013.
82 Calculations based on (a) the distribution of the Lebanese population by governorates given by National Survey of Household Living Conditions (2004) and an estimated total population of 4.5 million. According to the survey, the governorates of Beirut and Mount Lebanon, comprise 50.4% of Lebanon’s residents, with the rest of the population distributed among the remaining four governorates accordingly: 20.5% in North Lebanon, 12.5% in the Bekaa, 10.7% in South Lebanon;(b) Refugee data on 26 December 2013.
83 Based on 2012 population figures and refugee data for mid-October 2013; see Appendix II for details.
2.1.3 GENDER, AGE AND VULNERABILITY PROFILE

Women, young people and children comprise the bulk of refugee populations in Jordan and Lebanon. Overall, there is little variation in terms of gender structure of refugees between the two countries (Table 7). As of September 2013, female refugees represented around 50% of the refugee population. Syrian males in Jordan now make about 16 percent of all males in Jordan while their female counterpart account for about 18 percent of females in the country. While no comparable figures exist for Lebanon, one can imagine that the smaller population size and greater absorption of refugees has had a major impact on the country’s age and gender structure.

For the purpose of this analysis, it is particularly noteworthy that the number of women in working age group of 18-59 among refugees outweighs that of men in both countries.

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85 Ibid; the map shows the movements of Syrian refugee households between January and mid October 2013 compared to their original place of registration
86 The age classification categories for refugees are not the ones conventionally used by demographers (0 - 14, 15 - 59 and 60+). Therefore, they do not allow direct comparison to determine whether the age structure of the Syrian refugee population is representative of the age structure of the population of Syria. However, according to the US Bureau of Census, 33.9 percent of Syria’s population in 2013 was estimated to be under the age of 14. This suggests that there is considerable over-representation of children refugees in the case of Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon and more or less similarity in the case of Iraq.
87 Note that the proportion of women amongst refugees in Egypt is in the same range (49.4 percent), though it is significantly lower in Iraq (36.5 percent).
The numerous assessments of the situation of refugees in Jordan and Lebanon provide mounting evidence of the highly precarious conditions and multiple vulnerabilities facing Syrian refugees, in particular women, young males, children and the elderly (Box 2).88 Livelihoods of Syrian households are under growing pressures, with the depletion of personal savings and indebtedness accelerating their impoverishment and dependency on assistance.

**Box 2: Vulnerability among Refugee populations**

In both Lebanon and Jordan, women and children refugees are at a greater risk compared to other demographic groups because they have less access to social and economic resources and are therefore unable to meet household and health needs. In Jordan, female refugees who participated in focus group discussions (FGDs) in a recent assessment of cash transfer programs to Syrian refugees89 identified economic pressures as one of the key factors that affect their psychological stability and that of their families. Although there is no comprehensive baseline data, physical violence by intimate partners and other relatives is reported as the main type of violence faced by Syrian women and girls in Jordan. Assessments conducted with Syrian refugees in urban communities indicate that 28 percent of households surveyed left Syria due to specific fears of violence, including (SGBV). Other forms of Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)90 include forced and early marriage, survival sex and sexual violence. Along with escaping violence in the home, shame and the perception of being an economic burden to their families have been identified as reasons that adolescent girls and young women actively seek marriage. Some households even revert to letting their daughters, nieces and sisters engage in “survival sex” to bridge the income-expenditure gap. Added to this is that Syrian women, mothers in particular, have neglected themselves and prioritized other family members while being subjected to violence by their partners.91

Children are a particularly vulnerable group as they are at risk of child labour and lack access to adequate housing and education opportunities.92 Child protection for Syrian refugees is an area of concern since countless children are at risk of abuse and exploitation. A survey conducted by UNWOMEN in Jordan reveals that in 47 percent of households that reported paid employment, a child is contributing to the household’s income, and 15 percent reported child labor as the primary source (85 percent of reported child laborers were boys). Among those girls who were employed, 80 percent work in either domestic work or agriculture, both of which are known to be high-risk sectors for physical abuse and sexual exploitation.93 Other reports indicate that Syrian children are earning as little as JD

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88 See also Appendix III
91 UNFPA, 2012, Assessment of reproductive health and gender-based violence among displaced Syrian women in Lebanon
93 The Government of Jordan formed a subcommittee to address child labor issues among the refugee population, and coordinated efforts to enhance the National Framework to Combat Child Labor (NFCL). However, the law lacks protections against some of the worst forms of child labor

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### Table 9: Age and Gender Structure of the Refugee Population in Jordan and Lebanon, percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>JORDAN Male</th>
<th>JORDAN Female</th>
<th>LEBANON Male</th>
<th>LEBANON Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-11</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-17</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-59</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNHCR: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php; Refugee data are from September 2013.
A majority of participants in the UNWOMEN survey reported that their children were not in school and most participants cited high transportation costs, overcrowding in schools, and bureaucratic barriers as the main impediments. It is also noteworthy that, in both Lebanon and Jordan, children with physical, mental and intellectual disabilities remain excluded from public schools. A recent assessment of 120 refugees in Lebanon—half of whom had disabilities, the others being caregivers—did not find a single child enrolled in school or other educational activities.

In addition, about 11 percent of the households surveyed by UNWOMEN reported the presence of separated children living with them, majority being separated children that have come with their extended family. 1,687 unaccompanied and separated Syrian children were identified in Jordan in the period between January and September 2013. Of these, only 217 were reunited with their families and 135 were placed with spontaneous foster or kinship care.

In terms of violence, children are victims both in the homes and/or at school. Violence at home has reportedly increased since the arrival in Jordan, mothers citing stress and lack of opportunities to leave the home as a contributing factor. In Jordan, the Family Protection Department (FPD) reported 243 cases of violence in Syrian families between 2012 and September 2013. At the same time, protection services for children are overwhelmed.

Of note in Table 7 is the considerable under-representation (less than 2 percent) of the elderly amongst Syrian refugees. Because forced migration selectively discriminates against them, elderly Syrians suffer from negligence and research on the special needs of this age group is very limited, even as of today, a black hole that deserves attention. According to a study carried out by Caritas Lebanon Migrant Center (CLMC), 61 percent of older refugees in Lebanon reported feeling anxious; 10 percent are physically unable to leave their homes; 87 percent are unable to regularly afford the medication that they require, and those with medicine often do not have the means to access prescription refills in Lebanon.

A recent survey conducted in seven areas of Jordan (Mafraq, Irbid) and Lebanon (North Lebanon, Bekaa, Beirut City and Mount Lebanon) governorates in Lebanon and Irbid and Amman governorates and Zaatari Camp in Jordan also reveals that about 30 percent of the refugee population has special needs as a result of impairment, injury or chronic disease. 22.4 percent of the people surveyed reported some functional limitations to physical mobility, vision, hearing or intellectual ability.

Young males are another vulnerable group that has been overlooked. There is no escaping the fact that the majority of people fighting and killed in the crises are young men, and because of this, one would assume that there are more female refugees than there actually are. The fact that the percentage of male and female refugees is almost equal suggests that men are leaving Syria in large numbers in a bid to remove themselves from the possibility of fighting. However, young refugees are the first to be targeted by militia groups for recruitment and therefore, they are the demographic most likely to be given or to pick up arms. That said, they are also seen as a threat to host countries, regardless of whether or not they have committed a criminal act in the past.

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97 UNWOMEN, 2013, Gender-based violence and Child Protection among refugees, with a focus on early marriage http://www.unwomen.org/~/media/Headquarters/Attachments/Sections/Library/Publications/2013/7/Report-webpercent20pdf.pdf.
98 Family Protection Department (FPD), 2013. This number represents the total of all cases of reported domestic violence and sexual abuse of children, women and men.
99 In comparison, data from the US Bureau of Census shows that individuals over the age of 64 account for 3.9 percent of the Syrian population, suggesting a larger proportion probably in the neighborhood of Spercent over the age of 60.
2.2 Locating and Sizing the Vulnerability Challenge in Host Communities

2.2.1 Contrasting Refugee Densities and Poverty Rates

Contrasting local refugee and poverty data provides a workable entry-point for assessing the vulnerability challenge arising from the refugee crisis in Jordan and Lebanon, since poor communities are the ones most likely to face multiple human deprivations and most likely to adopt adverse coping strategies when confronted to stresses and shocks. As evidenced in Table 10, in both Jordan and Lebanon, the spatial distribution of Syrian refugees exhibits a highly regressive pattern, whereby areas with highest refugee densities (ratio of refugees to host population) were also amongst the poorest and most deprived prior to the crisis.103

Table 10: Pre-crisis Poverty Situation and Refugee Densities in Major Host Governorates in Jordan and Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JORDAN</th>
<th>LEBANON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mafraq</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irbid</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajloun</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zarqa</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Authors' calculations; Jordan: see Appendix II; Lebanon: Poverty Data are from UNDP/MOUSA, 2008.

In Lebanon, the poverty rate in the North – currently home to 33 percent of Syria’s refugee population - was as high as 53 percent before the crisis began. While the South and Bekaa post comparatively lower (though very high) poverty rates, it is important to note that the gap between the three governorates narrows significantly when human poverty indicators, such as health and educational welfare, are taken into consideration.104

In Jordan, the governorate of Mafraq, which currently hosts the bulk of Syrian refugees, boasted the country’s highest poverty rate in 2008, followed by Irbid.105 The ranking of governorates in terms of poverty status in 2010 is slightly different compared to 2008, with the poverty rate in Mafraq estimated at 19 percent, lower than the poverty rate in Ajloun (25.6 percent). This is partially due to differences in the methodology used to calculate poverty lines.106 However, it should be noted that Mafraq hosts six of Jordan’s 27 ‘poverty pockets’ (sub-districts with poverty rates exceeding 25 percent). Furthermore, 39 percent of households in this governorate experience experience multiple deprivations in terms of education, housing and economic opportunities.107 In investigating vulnerability challenges, it is also

103 Authors of the Lebanon Background Report noted that, generally, the spatial distribution of refugees according to their socio-economic background tended to follow the disparities among host communities, with refugees of poor socio-economic standing to settle in most deprived, peripheral areas of Lebanon whereas middle to high income categories prefer to reside in urban areas (e.g. Beirut and Mount Lebanon).
105 It is also noteworthy that 67 percent of the poor in affected governorates were under the age of 25 in 2008, compared to 44 percent for the wealthiest quintile. DoS Poverty Report, 2008
106 Calculations for 2008 and previous years took the bottom 20 percent of the population as a reference group. However, to better reflect consumption patterns, the bottom 30 percent of the population was used as a reference group in the 2010 poverty line calculation, which implies that data are not strictly comparable, see Jordan PRS, 2013.
107 See Appendix II for more details on refugee and poverty data for Jordan
noteworthy that the governorate of Mafraq and Irbid have very large proportions of households that are **vulnerable to poverty**\(^{108}\) (31 percent and 27 percent, respectively, compared to 22 percent for whole Kingdom). Given that refugees mainly reside in urban and semi-urban settings, it is also important to remember that 80 percent of the poor households in Jordan are located in densely populated urban areas (mainly in Amman, Irbid and Zarqa), compared to 20 percent in rural areas.\(^{109}\) The absolute number of households that are vulnerable to poverty in urban areas is almost four times greater than in rural areas.\(^{110}\)

Having said that, the **extra-pressure that the refugee crisis places on host communities in smaller, less densely populated but poor and deprived governorates such as Balqa, Ajloun or Jarash should not be underestimated**, because their structural capacities to absorb even small numbers of refugees may be limited.

Table 11: Poverty and Extreme Poverty in Various Regions/Cities (Lebanon, 2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major host governorates</th>
<th>Region/City</th>
<th>Poverty Incidence (percent)</th>
<th>Extreme Poverty Incidence (percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bekaa</td>
<td>West Bekaa Rashayya / Zahla</td>
<td>29.95</td>
<td>9.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hemmel / Baalbek</td>
<td>21.88</td>
<td>6.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jazrine / Saida</td>
<td>45.54</td>
<td>13.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sour</td>
<td>36.41</td>
<td>9.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nabatieh</td>
<td>11.37</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bent Jbeil / Marjaayim / Hasbayy</td>
<td>25.51</td>
<td>3.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>Akkar / Minieh-Dennieh</td>
<td>62.98</td>
<td>20.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tripoli City</td>
<td>56.72</td>
<td>23.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Koura / Zghara / Batroun / Basharre</td>
<td>24.74</td>
<td>4.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>Kesrwan / Jebeil</td>
<td>15.24</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maten</td>
<td>11.18</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Baabda</td>
<td>24.50</td>
<td>4.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shouf / Aley</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>5.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>Beirut City</td>
<td>5.85</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP and MOSA, 2008.

Governorate level refugee and poverty data however provides only a rough picture of local vulnerabilities associated with the refugee crisis, because disparities in poverty situations across locations within governorates are significant. In Lebanon for instance, while poverty and extreme poverty rates exceed 50 percent in Tripoli City and Akkar / Minieh-Dennieh, in the Koura / Zghara / Batroun / Basharre strata, also located in the North, poverty rate are lower than national averages (Table 11).

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\(^{108}\) The ‘vulnerability threshold’ was calculated as being between 1 and 1.5 times the absolute poverty line in 2010, see Jordan Poverty Reduction Strategy, 2013.

\(^{109}\) DOS, 2012

2.2.2 QUANTIFYING THE EXTRA-VULNERABILITY BURDEN ON HOST COMMUNITIES

From a different perspective, the ratio of refugees to poor residents in host communities is also useful for gauging the extent of the extra-vulnerability burden facing host communities in Lebanon and Jordan. This ratio, herein called vulnerability ratio, also gives a good sense of the potential degree of competition between vulnerable refugees and vulnerable community members over local job opportunities, housing, resources and public services; all of which are potential threats to social cohesion.

The vulnerability ratio was estimated for major host areas in Lebanon and Jordan. For the purpose of this analysis, a ratio of 0.2 (1 refugee for every 5 poor residents) was deemed symptomatic of a significant level of risk of impoverishment and heightened competition among vulnerable refugee and host community members.

Source: Authors’ calculations\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{111} The Map is extracted from UNHCR, 2013, ‘Equity in Humanitarian Action: Reaching the Most Vulnerable Localities in Lebanon; the mapping exercise was initiated in July 2013 jointly by Republic of Lebanon Presidency of the Council of Ministers, UNHCR and UNICEF

\textsuperscript{112} Calculations based on (a) the distribution of the Lebanese population by governorates given by National Survey of Household Living Conditions (2004) and an estimated total population of 4.5 million. Refugee data are UNHCR data as of 26 December 2013
In both countries, the vulnerability ratio in Lebanon is incredibly high (above 0.60). The Bekaa governorate in Lebanon clearly stands out with approximately two refugees for every poor Lebanese (Figure 10). In Beirut, the vulnerability ratio is also very high at 0.8. However, this should be interpreted with caution because both the number of poor and the refugee caseload are small relative to the population and absorptive capacities in Beirut are certainly higher as compared to other poverty-stricken host governorates. At the district-caza level, risks of further impoverishment are especially acute in localities of Akhar Ouadi Khaled and Gharta Koura in the North, along with Zahle, West Bekaa, and Balbeek in the Bekaa region, where the ratio exceeded 0.5. Situations in Minieh Danieh (North), Chouf (Mount Lebanon), Hermel (Bekaa) and Tripoli (North) are also alarming (Figure 11).

In Jordan, the vulnerability ratio (UNHCR data) exceeds 0.2 in 9 out of the 12 governorates hosting refugees. With approximately one refugee for every poor Jordanian, communities in the governorate of Mafraq (outside camps) face on average the highest pressure. The situation in Irbid is equally and possibly more dramatic. When estimated with MoI refugee data, the vulnerability ratio for this governorate (1.4) is twice as high as the ratio pulled from UNHCR data. In Amman, there is close to 1 refugee competing with two poor Jordanians.

Figure 12: Estimated Vulnerability Ratio in Host Governorates (Jordan)

Source: Authors’ calculations

113 Ratios are calculated from the database that was used to produce the vulnerable population map (Figure 9). Note that the map was first produced with UNHCR figures at end July 2013.
114 The ratio however falls to 1, when refugees in camps are excluded.
115 There are significant differences in UNHCR and MoI data for Madaba governorate.
116 See Appendix III for more details on data and calculations. The number of poor in each governorate was extrapolated from 2010 poverty
As noted earlier, from a vulnerability cum social cohesion lens, special attention needs also to be given to the incidence of the refugee crisis on smaller and less populated areas that remain deeply impoverished such as Ajloun, Jarash, Karak or even Ma’aan (where the vulnerability ratio reaches 14 percent). As in the case of Lebanon, comparing refugee densities and poverty rates as well as measuring vulnerability ratios at the district/municipal level would contribute to a more accurate assessment of vulnerability and well-targeted responses.

In both countries, more data is also needed to assess the gender and age dimensions of the vulnerability challenge. Indicators such as the ratio of female refugees to poor female community members, the ratio of young refugees to young residents, the ratio of refugees to the unemployed or working poor would also be of particular relevance for the analysis.

### 2.3 WIDENING THE LOOP: VULNERABILITIES OUTSIDE MAJOR HOST AREAS AND MACRO-VULNERABILITIES

There is no doubt that the demographic and vulnerability challenge arising from refugee crisis primarily threatens human development prospects in major host communities, yet it is worth stressing that other communities, though not necessarily hosting a high number of refugees, are nonetheless ‘host’ to significant spillover effects of the Syrian crisis. These include communities located near refugee camps (Jordan) and communities near the Syrian border. Because communities neighboring refugee camps are not identified as ‘host communities’, they do not directly benefit of international assistance. Yet, socio-economic interactions between these communities and refugees are significant, which in many instances lead to tensions that are similar to those observed in major host areas. Communities near the Syrian border suffer because of their proximity to violence and exposure to bombing, movements of armed groups. In Lebanon, livelihoods of populations living these communities have been deteriorating due to the decrease in the cross-border transportation of food and agricultural commodities. No longer receiving Government subsidized seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and animal feed from Syria, farming communities in these areas are also unable to earn an income through trading or smuggling Syrian agricultural inputs through informal trade networks. This has led to a rise in the costs of production. In Jordan, people living in once relatively prosperous border towns are also feeling the impact of the conflict on their sources of income. Fresh fruits and vegetables are no longer arriving from Syria, raising prices for these goods in local markets while gray market trading and smuggling activities have halted due to the conflict. While these communities are not the primary focus of this research, future assessments should give them special attention so that a more comprehensive picture the effects of the crisis can be obtained and a more comprehensive response designed.

As touched upon earlier, assessing the development impacts of the crisis from a long term perspective also requires scrutinizing a number of macro-channels (trade, investments, growth, public finances) through which the Syrian crisis has been impacting Lebanon and Jordan, critically affecting their overall capacity to sustainably manage the spillover effects of the crisis.
PART III – ASSESSING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS

Numerous constraints surrounded the process of gathering information and analyzing the development impacts of the Syrian crisis in Jordan and Lebanon. However, available data and assessments provide compelling and converging evidence that the Syrian crisis has deeply affected livelihoods, access and quality of basic infrastructure and services especially in communities that were already among the poorest and most deprived prior to the crisis. These ramifications also tend to exacerbate social tensions. Compounded by the overall deterioration in the macroeconomic situation, they also undermine the capacities of national and local governments to sustain the delivery of core services to populations. Unless properly managed, these spillovers have thus the potential to cause reversals in human development achievements and widen regional disparities.

The various dimensions of these spillovers are analyzed and discussed in more detail in the following sections. Information and data derived from the analysis are consolidated in Appendix I of the report in the form a ‘Matrix’ which thus provides a tentative set of indicators that could be used to continue tracking the various impacts of the crisis.

3.1 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

3.1.1 UNCERTAINTIES AND FLUIDITY OF THE CRISIS

Uncertainties regarding the duration, magnitude and dynamics of the refugee crisis in neighboring countries – pose significant challenges to needs and impact assessments. As noted earlier, the fluidity of the refugee crisis does not stop once refugees cross the border into a neighboring country, as their spatial mobility within host countries becomes an important factor. However, mechanisms available that allow practitioners and researchers to track displacements of refugees are limited and, as a result, there are large information gaps regarding the exact location of Syrian refugees. Because the situation is so dynamic, it calls for constant monitoring, even in the face of ‘stakeholder fatigue’. It also underscores the need to share information, engage in joint, multi-sectoral assessments and establish of countrywide monitoring systems.

3.1.2 GAPS IN CURRENT RESEARCH

Since the start of the crisis in 2011, UN agencies and NGOs in Lebanon and Jordan have carried out a large number of assessments to gather evidence of the acute and multi-faceted challenges caused by the conflict in Syria. However, for the most part, assessments have remained focused on gauging the immediate needs of refugees.

As an indication, the preparation of the background report for Lebanon involved reviewing 78 documents touching upon the impacts of the crisis. Only 26 percent of the documents focused on local-level/host community challenges. Moreover, the majority of local assessments tended to focus only on specific sectors, making it difficult to compare challenges and priorities across locations. Only 24 percent of documentation adopted a multi-sectoral approach, and those that were broader reaching mainly focused on social sector issues (e.g. health and education) with much less attention being paid to economic, employment, infrastructure, environmental and other key dimensions of the crisis impacts.
Though some assessments addressed gender and protection issues amongst refugee populations, very few have looked at the ways in which the crisis has impacted gender-relationships amongst host populations. In addition, very little hard data exists on other soft dimensions of the crisis including social cohesion and governance issues. Moreover, the bulk of this literature (almost 50 percent) has also been humanitarian or emergency relief in nature.

Likewise, the initial literature review conducted as part of the background country report for Jordan pointed out significant gaps in terms of methodologies and coverage and lacks the comprehensive, multi-sectoral and reliable quantitative data needed so that policy makers and stakeholders can make informed, prioritized planning and programming decisions for host communities. Notwithstanding, the recently completed joint UN Needs Assessment (November 2013), detailing impacts of the Syrian crisis, and the UNDP-led Municipal Needs Assessment in Mafraq and Irbid (October 2013), has been instrumental in filling such gaps.

The above caveats in current research scope and focus are rather symptomatic of the lack of anticipation of the scale and duration of the crisis by the international community and the late recognition that the impact of the Syrian crisis is more than a humanitarian challenge.

### 3.1.3 QUANTITATIVE VS. QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENTS

Although there is a need to move away from relying on perceptions to securing data, the availability and reliability of baseline and monitoring data on refugee and host communities remains a major issue, especially in Lebanon (Table 12).121

**Table 12: Impact assessments of the Syrian crisis in Lebanon and Jordan: Quantitative Data Limitations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of accurate data on the number of refugees in Lebanon and their location.</td>
<td>Lack of consistent data on the number of refugees, including those residing in camps, and their location.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicators related to the impact of the crisis, as well as some of the baseline indicators, are limited. For example, indicators related to income, inflation, poverty, household living conditions and price monitoring are not regularly updated.</td>
<td>Significant discrepancies between UNHCR and GoL data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing data on the ‘pre-crisis situation’ is old and few indicators have significant time series. For example, the last household living condition national survey was conducted between 2004 and 2005.</td>
<td>Scarcity of socio-economic indicators for major host governorates following the onset of the crisis (e.g. there are no new statistics on household expenditure to identify the change in household consumption patterns in host communities).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Even though some indicators are available at the national level, their disaggregation (e.g. at the geographical level) are rarely found.</td>
<td>Methodologies used to cost the budgetary impacts of the crisis vary according to source.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is a discrepancy of indicators, which hampers their usage. For instance, data pertaining to education (gross and net enrolment rates) differ between UNESCO, WB, UNICEF and the Ministry of Education.</td>
<td>Lack of sex-disaggregated data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited accessibility of raw data (e.g. CAS surveys).</td>
<td>Scarcity of environmental data and indicators, and those that are available are not up to date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of sex-disaggregated data.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* As identified in background country reports and others sources

121 Globally, the number of studies that rely on empirical data to assess the impacts of refugees on host communities is limited.
Deficiencies in the availability and quality of data unavoidably affect the tractability of quantitative impact or needs assessments (see Box 3), be it efforts to compare the situation prior to the crisis with the situation during and after, or efforts to assess impacts based on counterfactual analysis and simulations. Not surprisingly, the existing literature in Jordan and Lebanon continues to rely largely on qualitative and participatory approaches such as focus groups and in-depth stakeholder interviews.

Having said that, the case for participatory qualitative analysis (in complement to quantitative approaches) remains strong if ones wants to get a more accurate picture of the impacts and ensuing needs, especially at the local level. Qualitative approaches are also essential in assessing many of the ‘soft’ but critical dimensions of the crisis (e.g. gender, social cohesion, security, and the inner-value of people’s perceptions) that cannot be easily captured through quantitative data.

Box 3: Issues Related to the Quantitative Analysis of Crisis Impacts

In Lebanon, the 2013 World Bank ESIA was the first attempt at quantifying the impacts and stabilization needs across sectors for the period 2013-2014. With reference to the ESIA, the Lebanon background country report warned that limitations in data availability and/or quality render the use of econometric modeling hazardous unless a cross-cutting analysis (using other methodologies) is employed by researchers and analysts, even-though, econometric models provide interesting quantifiable impacts assessments results. Among others, the report points out that the use of simple linear projections for refugee populations may be misleading given the dynamics of the crisis and recent shifts in refugee policies. It also warns against the fact that in assessing macro-impacts, it is difficult to dissociate between the impacts of the crisis and other exogenous or policy factors. Simulation exercises also require making restrictive assumptions, for instance in relation to the stability or changes in economic structures or household consumption patterns. In the context of Lebanon, it may be especially misleading to assume stability of the industry (including construction) share of GDP or the persistence of high investment levels in the short run, given the political uncertainty, decline in foreign direct investment, and institution of new policy measures aimed at restricting real estate transactions.

In Jordan, efforts made by the government to quantify the fiscal costs of the Syrian crisis have relied on different methodologies and assumptions (regarding in particular the number of refugees), which has made it difficult to get a clear picture of needs.

3.1.4 NATIONAL VS. LOCAL ASSESSMENTS

Because the scale of the refugee crisis will reach alarming levels in the near future (~40 percent of the population in Lebanon and ~12 percent in Jordan) national and aggregate impacts require scrutiny. The crisis unavoidably affects national budgets and mounting fiscal pressure, coupled with calls for fiscal consolidation (as is the case of Jordan), reduce the fiscal space available host governments have to mitigate the impacts of the crisis and sustain human development achievements.

The thing is that macro-level assessments face a number of caveats with the foremost being the importance of differentiating between the impacts of the Syrian crisis and all other exogenous or policy factors (Box 3). As highlighted earlier (Part I), in both Jordan and Lebanon, the macroeconomic situation prior to the crisis was already fragile, which means it might be difficult to attribute adverse trends in trade or growth performances solely to spillover effects of the crisis.

Finally, the impacts of the Syrian refugee crisis vary significantly from one region to the other and within regions, between sectors. Such spatial variations clearly highlight the need to fine-tune macro-assessments (‘closing up with a ‘higher resolution) for the sake of developing an informed and people-centered response.

122 The ESIA Report also acknowledges that results are very sensitive to the assumptions made regarding the duration and magnitude of the crisis and that any change in these two parameters could significantly change the impact assessment.
123 Lebanon Background Report, October 2013
3.2 FINDINGS

3.2.1 INCREASED POVERTY AND VULNERABILITY

The assessments conducted by the UN, NGOs and other organizations in Jordan and Lebanon provide mounting evidence of a significant degradation of livelihood conditions for host.124

Rising living costs with a strong bias against the poor and vulnerable

In both Lebanon and Jordan, the substantial increase in demand from refugees has pushed up market prices for food and basic commodities, adding further pressure on the already tight budgets of poor and vulnerable households in host communities. In Jordan, inflation eased from 5 percent in 2010 to 4.4 percent in 2011 as a cap on fuel prices, introduced in January 2011, limited oil prices from rising further. In 2012 however, Jordan’s fiscal crisis forced an increase in fuel and electricity prices. The elimination of fuel subsidies in November 2012 led to a 50 percent increase in the cost of cooking gas, a 33 percent rise in diesel prices and a 14 percent increase for petrol.

Box 4. Comparing Spending Levels and Patterns among Jordanian and Syrian households

A recent household survey conducted by ACTED among Syrian and Jordanian households in six governorates125 shows that, on average, Syrian households spend 38 percent of their budget on food, compared to 40 percent for Jordanians126. Total monthly expenditure of Syrian and Jordanian households varied mostly from JD 400 to 500, whereby surveyed Jordanian households actually show slightly higher expenditure compared to their Syrian counterparts. However, the survey does not distinguish Jordanian households according to their poverty status. Other data shows that expenditures of poor Jordanian households averaged around JD 423.4 per month in 2010 (which is slightly less than current spending by Syrian counterparts), with food accounting for 50 percent of total spending.127 Moreover, registered refugees have access to humanitarian assistance in the form of food vouchers or cash transfers, meaning that their actual purchasing power in local markets may be higher compared to poor or vulnerable residents. Lower health and education expenditure among Syrian households may also be seen as the result of the free education and health care they receive. In contrast, a high proportion of Syrians (90 percent) spent a significantly higher amount on rent (27 percent compared to 16 percent for Jordanians).

Average Monthly Household Expenses (Syrians and Jordanians)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Expenditure</th>
<th>Syrians</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of HHs</td>
<td>Average Household Expense (JD)</td>
<td>% Average Household Expense</td>
<td>% of HHs</td>
<td>Average Household Expense (JD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy (electricity, gas, etc.)</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence (rent, home repairs, etc.)</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>39%</td>
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<td>6%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>66</td>
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<td>64%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>58</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ceremonies</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Communication</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-food</td>
<td>31%</td>
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<td>3%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6%</td>
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<td>6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>488</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: ACTED, 2013

124 For an overview on the status of refugees, see Appendix III. More details on the situation of refugees can be found on the RAS virtual platform: http://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syria-regional-analysis.

125 ACTED, 2013, ‘Food security and livelihoods needs assessment’, http://www.acted.org/en/food-security-situation-and-livelihood-intervention-opportunities-syrians-refugees-and-host-community; The survey was conducted in the governorates of Mafraq, Irbid, Zarqa, Balqa, Ajloun and Jarash with data collected between 19 May and 2 June 2013. A total of 80 households were interviewed in each governorate, out of which 50 percent were Syrian and 50 percent Jordanian.

126 Other data shows that this share is as high as 50 percent for poor Jordanian households. See Jordan DOS; Households Income and Expenditure Survey, 2010.

While the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for food in Jordan stabilized between 130 and 140 points between November 2008 and October 2010, food prices began to rise again in November 2010 and reached 156 points on the CPI by the end of September 2013.\(^{128}\) As shown in Section II.2.3, rental prices also increased, over six times of the original rates in some areas.\(^{129}\) Given household expenditure patterns (Box 4), these changes have been particularly damaging for the poorest and the most vulnerable.

Although it may be misleading to attribute aggregate changes in inflation to the sole effects of the refugee crisis given the number of other factors at play, the results of a simple regression analysis would likely indicate that the refugee influx contributed to exacerbate pressures on food prices.\(^{130}\)

**Figure 13: Inflation in Major Host Governorates, 2010 – 2013 (Jordan), in percent**

Moreover, **governorate-level data show that inflationary pressures heightened in 2013\(^{131}\), concomitantly with the acceleration of the refugee influx, and especially so in major hosting areas.** The inflation rate shot up remarkably in Mafraq from 5.45 percent in 2012 to 8.92 percent in 2013. In Zarqa, it rose above the national level from 5 percent to 6.54 percent in the same period. In Amman, after some easing in 2011, inflation hit 5.5 percent in 2013, however remaining below the national rate (Figure 13).

In Lebanon, the inflation rate was estimated (IMF) at 6.5 percent compared to 5 percent in 2011. The price increases between 2010 and 2012 mainly affected mainly rental, fuel and food prices\(^{132}\). **Though local data on consumer prices is not available, there is evidence that pressures on living costs have been acute in major host areas.** A survey conducted in 2012\(^{133}\) reported an average increase in household expenditure by 15 percent in Bekaa and 6 percent in Northern Lebanon, as a result of price increases. Expenditure on food items rose by 18 percent in Bekaa and 12 percent in the North. In Bekaa, households incurred a 35 percent increase in spending for education and by 40 percent for


\(^{131}\) Data for 2013 are for the first eight months compared with the same period of 2012

\(^{132}\) SNAP: Lebanon baseline information – 10 October 2013

transportation. In the North, household spending on medicines inflated by 34 percent. These effects were mainly attributed to an increase in demand due to the inflow of refugees and the injection of cash vouchers to Syrian refugees (mainly for food and rent). Inflationary pressures were also liable to the fact that, prior to the crisis, residents used to profit from discounted goods and services from Syria (this includes health care services, agricultural products, veterinary services, pesticides, seeds, fertilizers, livestock and forage, medications for beekeeping, diesel for transportation and other consumer goods) that are no longer available. With approximately more than 60 percent of Syrian refugees living in rented accommodation, competition for housing is also on the rise and housing costs have gone up significantly.134

Increased Competition for Jobs and Downward Pressures on Wages

In both Jordan and Lebanon, the refugee crisis has worsened already dire labor market conditions. In both countries, employment generation has remained insufficient to keep pace with the growth in the labor force. In Lebanon, for instance, around 23,000 jobs would need to be created each year over the next ten years in order to absorb the new entries into the labor market, which is six times more than the number of jobs currently being created.135 Most of the jobs created in this country are for unskilled workers and are concentrated in low productivity sectors. Around half the labor force is employed in the informal sector, mainly in services, either as wage employees or low-skilled self-employed, whereas less than a third of workers are gainfully employed. This reflects the bottlenecks that feature labor demand, with more than 98 percent of the total number of establishments in Lebanon employing less than 10 employees. Jobs in high productivity sectors were lost prior to the Syrian crisis, whereby highly skilled workers tend to migrate outside Lebanon.136 In fact, the largest share of the unemployed in 2004 belong to skilled workers (24 percent) followed by the service sector workers (18 percent) and unskilled workers (15 percent).137 In Jordan, 63 percent of the employed in 2010 worked in the public (35 percent) and private service sectors (28 percent). As is the case in Lebanon, virtually all private firms in Jordan are micro- and small enterprises that employ only 1–4 and 5–19 workers, respectively. More than half of the private sector employment is informal.138

As highlighted earlier139, in both countries, employment challenges are particularly acute for youth and women. This situation is of particular concern given that youth and women also comprise the bulk of Syrian refugees. In Lebanon, the unemployment rate was estimated to be as high as 11 percent in 2010, reaching 34 percent for youth and 18 percent for women. In Jordan, 49 percent of unemployed people are below the age of 25 and youth employment stood at 31 percent in 2011.140 Only 16 percent of women are engaged in the workforce in Jordan (compared to about 67 percent of men), which places the country within the bottom five countries in the world for female participation rates. Almost half the economically active women aged 15–24 are unemployed, compared to less than a quarter of male youth.141 In the case of Jordan, another important issue to consider when assessing the impacts of the refugee crisis on labor market outcomes is the importance of migrant workers in the labor force. These workers have come mainly from other Arab countries, particularly Iraq, Palestine and Egypt, and also from South Asia. Most of them are young males with low levels of education who occupy low skilled/low wage jobs in manufacturing, construction, agriculture and personal services.142

134 Refugees are more likely to pay higher rents as they reside with several families in a single apartment, see IRC, 2013, Briefing Note on Syrian refugees in Lebanon, June.
138 This includes self-employed persons; persons working in businesses that are not registered and do not pay taxes and/or; employees who do not pay into the social security fund but work in a registered business. See GoJ-UNDP, 2012, ‘The Panoramic Study of the Informal Economy in Jordan’.
139 See Par. 1.2.2
140 In spite of increasing levels of education, youth experience substantial barriers to employment, see: UNDP and GoJ, 2012, ‘Panoramic Study of the Informal Economy of Jordan’.
142 Non Jordanians are estimated to account for 20 percent of the labor force. For some observers, this would explain part of the Jordanian employment-growth paradox, whereby national unemployment rates remain high despite job creation. See Sahar Taghdisi Rad, 2011, ‘Jordan’s Paradox of Growth without Employment: A Microcosm of the Middle East?’, Development Viewpoint Number 65, Center For Development Policy and Research, SOAS, August, https://www.soas.ac.uk/cdpr/publications/dv/dv65.html
Given the spatial dimension of the refugee crisis, subnational disparities in pre-crisis labor market conditions are also noteworthy. In Lebanon, Beirut and its Southern Suburbs (BSS) suffered from the highest rates of unemployment prior to the crisis and even higher than the national unemployment average of 9 percent. Other areas were witnessing rates hovering around that average or lower as in the case of the North and Bekaa (Figure 14).\footnote{GoJ-UN UNDP, ILO, MOSA, 2008, ‘The National Study of the Living Conditions of Households: 2007’, Beirut.}

**Figure 14: Pre-Crisis Unemployment rates in Regions of Lebanon (2007), in percent**

![Graph showing unemployment rates in different regions of Lebanon](image1)


**Figure 15: Unemployment Rate in Jordan Governorates (average, 2008-2010), in percent**

![Graph showing unemployment rates in different governorates of Jordan](image2)

*Source: DOS Labor Survey Results and authors' calculations.*
Reflective of imbalances in the geographical distribution of the labor force, as well as in the distribution of investment opportunities, spatial disparities in unemployment rates are also significant in Jordan (Figure 15). In the period 2008-2010, the average unemployment rate was close or above 14 percent in the vulnerable governorates of Mafraq, Irbid, Jerash and Ajloun, compared to 11 percent in Amman.

The effects of the refugee crisis on labour market outcomes are not easy to capture and the fact that both countries impose restrictions on refugees’ right to work would rather suggest a limited impact. Pressures on labor markets have however become apparent in areas with high refugee densities and vulnerability ratios and where the competition for, mainly, low-skilled jobs in informal sectors is likely to be fierce.

Figure 16: Total Unemployment Rates in Jordan by Sex & Quarters (2009 to third quarter of 2013), in percent

![Total Unemployment Rates in Jordan by Sex & Quarters](image)


The unemployment rate in Jordan stood at 12.9 percent in 2011 (close to the national average over the last decade), with a marginal decline registered between 2011 and 2012. However, this shot up to 14% in the third quarter of 2013, an increase of 1 percentage point compared the same quarters of 2012 and 2011. The female unemployment rate shows a particularly worrisome trend as it has been on the rise since the last quarter of 2012 (Figure 16).

As with inflation, further analysis would be required to assess whether and the extent to which these changes in national unemployment rates can be attributed the effects of the crisis. However, results of the labor force survey at governorate level provide quite compelling evidence that labor market conditions significantly worsened between 2012 and 2013, especially in areas where refugees form a significant proportion of the local labor force. According to ILO, at least 108,000 refugees (aged 12 and above) in the governorates of Mafraq, Irbid, Zarqa and Amman are either working or

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145 In both countries, refugees, regardless of their residency status, are required to get a work permit. In Jordan, work permits are only issued for jobs “opened to foreigners” as listed by the Ministry of Interior. In order to obtain a permit, a worker must find an employer willing to offer him or her contract. The government also certifies the foreign work permits to ensure these jobs are not in competition with Jordanian workers. Due to this strict and lengthy process, few refugees therefore receive work permits. See Basem & Lozi, 2013, The Effect of Refugees on Host Country Economy, Evidence from Jordan, http://journal-archives34.webs.com/114-126.pdf

146 Note that this period coincides with a sharp increase in refugee arrivals.

147 For the purpose of the analysis, it is important to note that the survey captures employment in informal sectors as participants are asked about their situation regardless of whether the person is part of the social security system or whether the employer for which he/she works is registered or pay taxes.
actively searching for income generating opportunities. The ratio of economically active refugees to economically active Jordanians was estimated to be as high as 23 percent in Mafraq, 12 percent in Irbid and around 6 percent in Zarqa and Amman. Naturally, this has direct implications on the employment prospects and livelihoods of the working poor who represent 75 percent, 62 percent, 54 percent and 31 percent of the working population, respectively, in these four governorates.

Figure 17: Unemployment Rates in Major Host Jordanian Governorates, Disaggregated by Gender (2011-2013)

![Figure 17: Unemployment Rates in Major Host Jordanian Governorates, Disaggregated by Gender (2011-2013)](image)

Source: Jordanian Department of Statistics and author's calculations.

Figure 17 above shows changes in national unemployment rates according to governorate and gender, based on averages from the first three rounds of the labor market survey for 2011, 2012 and 2013. While the unemployment rate increased by 1.1 percentage point at the national level between 2012 and 2013, it shot up by almost 3 percentage points in Mafraq and Irbid, significantly above 2011 ‘pre-refugee crisis’ levels. Increases were less pronounced in Amman and Zarqa, though unemployment rates also exceed 2011 levels.

Most surprising is the female unemployment rate, which shot up by more than 9 percentage points in Irbid to reach 28 percent, and by 3 percentage points in Amman, above already high ‘pre-refugee crisis’ levels. In Mafraq, the female unemployment rate increased significantly from less than 20 percent in 2011 to almost 24 percent in 2012 and 2013.

Local surveys and assessments in affected governorates provide further evidence of the fierce competition for jobs in informal sectors, showing that many Syrian refugees have been successful in securing unskilled, irregular and low paid jobs in agriculture, construction, sales/retail and the food/hospitality services sectors, possibly crowding-out vulnerable Jordanians and other foreign workers from these jobs in the process. Competition between Syrian and poor Jordanian women especially in home-based informal activities also appears to be significant (see Box 5).

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148 ILO in GOJ-UN Needs Assessment Review, November 2013. Activity rates were extrapolated from an assessment of 300 Syrian refugee households (1,485 individuals) conducted by CARE, which found that the economic activity rate amongst refugees aged 12 and above was 48.5 percent in all governorates, against 36.5 percent for Jordanians aged 15 and above, see CARE Jordan, 2013, Syrian Refugees in Urban Jordan: Baseline Assessment of Community-Identified Vulnerabilities among Syrian Refugees Living in Irbid, Madaba, Mafraq, and Zarqa, April.

149 UNDP, Profile of the Working Poor in the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan, 2012, as reported in GOJ/UN Needs Assessment Review.

150 Following the methodology used by ILO in the GOJ/UN Needs Assessment Review to control for the high level of seasonality in quarterly unemployment figures.

151 Quarterly data shows that the unemployment rate witnessed a continuous increase over the first three quarters of 2013 in Amman and Irbid.
A recent assessment of the source of income in Syrian and Jordanian households in affected governorates corroborates shows the existence of fierce competition for unskilled jobs and skilled self-employment (see figures below). Both Syrian refugees and Jordanians face quite similar obstacles in accessing employment. For Syrian refugees, the requirement of holding a work permit appears to act as a significant barrier. For Jordanians, not having opportunities due to high competition but less demand for their skills was found to be the most challenging factor.

Other local assessments indicate that Syrian workers have attracted employers and have taken job opportunities that were previously taken by locals and other foreign workers such as the Egyptians. This may be because Syrian refugees are perceived to be better at unskilled jobs, more service oriented, and “cheaper” than other foreign workers and especially more so than locals. According to a study carried out by CARE in 2013, about 45 percent of adult males in the governorates of Mafraq, Irbid and Zarqa – and 47 percent of those in Amman were working in both regular and irregular jobs.

Interviews conducted by UNDP with local officials and community representatives in Mafraq and Irbid highlighted complaints from Jordanians regarding Syrians that are accepting below-market rates for jobs in the agriculture, construction, sales/retail and food service sectors. The competition also includes

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152. The Ministry of Labour reported that between March and October 2013, 589 businesses (in every part of the country but with high concentrations in the Amman, Zarqa and Mafraq governorates) were closed for hiring unpermitted Syrian workers. These included restaurants, cafes, coffee sellers, supermarkets, butcher shops, filling stations, car washes, clothing shops and bakeries. Shuttered businesses were located about 6,100 Syrians were affected by these closures.


Egyptians and Bangladeshis. First-hand reports were also gathered from skilled Jordanians who lost their jobs to Syrian refugees and in Irbid, reports were received of growing competition for work with Jordanian contractors and in small factories. Syrian refugee competition affects more Jordanian workers than foreign workers, due to the sectors targeted but also to the fact that competition with unskilled foreign workers is apparently not welcomed. The Ministry of Labor implies that about 36.5 percent of documented illegal work hires over the period March-October 2013 involved Syrians. This is compared to only 9.1 percent in 2010.

**Gender dimensions**

Though women are overrepresented amongst the refugee population of working age, the extent to which they have displaced female Jordanian workers has not been much documented thus far. However, studies on labor force participation in Syria indicate that rural women had economic activity rates of 23 percent, about twice that of rural Jordanian women. Female Syrian refugees have de facto engaged in various informal, mostly home-based, activities such as sewing, cooking, baking, cleaning and running informal hair salons, as well as other businesses that provide petty commerce. Unfortunately, these happen to be also traditional spheres of activity for poor Jordanian women. Focused group discussions with local women conducted as part of a recent assessment by UNWOMEN, also point out the prevailing perception that Syrian women are more competitive, are willing to settle for lower wages and work under extreme conditions. The impact of job displacement on Jordanian women in female-headed households is especially significant because of their child-care commitments. Spatial differences in gender profiles of refugees are also noteworthy here. For instance, most Syrian refugees in Ramtha (Irbid) were found to be widowed single mothers.

Echoing the situation in Jordan, the competition between refugees and poor host community members over low-skilled jobs is one of the most, if not the most, urgent challenges facing host communities in Lebanon. A recent field survey of 400 Syrian households conducted by the ILO in four host regions of Lebanon (Akkar, Tripoli, Bekaa, and the South) reveal that 50 percent of the working age refugees are economically active. The highest activity rate among refugees was recorded in South Lebanon, where it is apparently easier for refugees to find jobs (30 days compared with over 90 days in Akkar). Reflective of low educational attainments, most refugees reported working informally whereby 92 per cent have no work contract and over half work on a seasonal, weekly or daily basis. Syrian refugees tend mainly to compete for low-skilled jobs in agriculture or in personal and domestic services, such as driving or housekeeping and, on to a lesser extent, in construction. Engagement of Syrian refugees in agricultural activities was predominant in Akkar and the Bekaa regions. Although Syrian women have an impetus to work given the absence of males in households, only 6 per cent were found to be currently working, mostly (71 percent) in unskilled types of jobs.

Lebanese nationals are under the impression that Syrian refugees work without health coverage and they evade payment of taxes while receiving support in the form of food and shelter from international organizations.

At the macro-level, the unemployment rate increased from 8.1 percent in 2010 to 10.6 percent in 2012 and was estimated at 13% in 2013. According to the World Bank, the refugee crisis could increase the number of unemployed Lebanese (mostly youth and unskilled workers) from 223,000 to 324,000 by 2014, pushing up the unemployment rate to 20 percent.

In both countries, a major impact of the refugee crisis on labor markets has been to depress wage rates, accentuating the reduction in job opportunities especially for local workers.
wages for unskilled work usually ranges between JD 8 and 10, but Syrian workers are ready to accept wages as low as JD 5\textsuperscript{166}. Competition is also significant among skilled workers, with Syrian accepting wages in the range of JD 8 to 10, compared to JD 15 to 20 for their Jordanian counterparts.\textsuperscript{167} In Lebanon, Syrian refugees also tend to work for half, or sometimes one fifth, of what Lebanese earn while also working longer hours. The DMI/UNDP survey conducted in 2012 in North Lebanon and Bekaa reported decreases in wages up to 90 percent and difficulties in finding alternative sources of income.\textsuperscript{168} In the Bekaa governorates, daily wages in agriculture reportedly dropped from LBP 35,000 prior to the crisis to LBP 25,000 per day due to competition from refugees. Wage rates for unskilled labor in the construction sector also decreased.\textsuperscript{169} The more recent field survey conducted by ILO shows that more than half of the surveyed Syrian workers ($7 per cent) earn LBP 450,000 or less a month (i.e less than LBP 15000).

The acuteness of employment pressures among the poorest segments of host communities is further echoed by the results of recent perceptions surveys conducted in Lebanon and Jordan (see Section III.5). These pressures also tend to fuel social tensions between communities. The combined effect of rising costs of living and decreasing wages - notwithstanding impacts on public services - are severely damaging livelihoods of poor and vulnerable households in host communities of Jordan and Lebanon. In Lebanon, it was estimated that pressures on costs and wages could push an additional 170,000 Lebanese below the poverty line by 2014.\textsuperscript{170} Such quantitative evidence is not available in Jordan, but one would also expect a significant increase in poverty headcounts.

Symptomatic of increased levels of vulnerability and poverty, household demand for support from major national safety net programs appears to be on the rise in both countries. Reportedly, in Bekaa and North Lebanon, applications to the National Poverty Targeting Program (NPTP) increased by 30 percent and 24 percent respectively, between December 2012 and March 2013.\textsuperscript{172} As of August 2013, around 74,000 households had applied to the scheme. Out of 18,801 households that were classified as beneficiaries,\textsuperscript{173} 38 percent were from the North Lebanon, 29 percent from the Bekaa, and 12 percent from South Lebanon.\textsuperscript{174} In Jordan in 2010, the number of families receiving cash assistance from the National Aid Funds’ (NAF) increased from 74,300 in 2010 to 89,411 in 2012.\textsuperscript{175}

As detailed in Box 6, the Syrian crisis has had particularly disruptive effects on agricultural livelihoods, also affecting household food and nutritional security outcomes for both refugee and host communities.

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**Box 6: Effects of the Syrian Crisis on Agricultural Livelihoods and Food Security Outcomes**

Though there is a lack of comprehensive information on the spillover effects of the Syrian crisis on the agricultural livelihoods and food security conditions for host communities in Jordan and Lebanon, available evidence suggests that these have been significant. Both Lebanon and Jordan are highly dependent on imports of basic staples, making them very vulnerable to external price and supply shocks. The agricultural sector in Jordan grapples with the challenges of water scarcity, recurrent droughts, urbanization and desertification. Even though Jordan is self-sufficient in some agricultural products (vegetables, fresh fruits, poultry), the country depends mainly on imports for basic foodstuffs.
(cereals, red meat, dairy products). Only 13 percent of country’s food-related needs are met by local producers. Although the contribution of agriculture sector to Jordan’s GDP is less than 4 percent, the sector employs large numbers of the rural population. In 2012, the agriculture sector provided a livelihood for 15 percent of the country’s population and comprised about 6 percent of the national labour force. In Lebanon, cereal production covers only 17 percent of consumption needs and inhabitants of border towns are highly dependent on Syria for imported food products.

**Jordan**

Jordan has been so far able to maintain basic food reserves at a level sufficient to cover population needs and to ensure a stable supply of fortified flour for subsidized bread. Yet overall, by disrupting agriculture and food trade, the Syrian conflict has negatively impacted agricultural livelihoods and the sector as a whole. **The conflict reduced domestic employment opportunities in the agricultural sector, which is the primary source of income for 60 percent of Jordanians residing in small towns and villages.** Jordan experienced a 25 percent decline in agricultural exports to Syria and a 30 percent decline in agricultural imports from Syria in the 2011 – 2012. The supply of locally produced commodities - especially those that are produced at self-sufficiency level, such as chicken, goats, dairy products, eggs, olives, olive oil and a number of fruits and vegetables - have come under stress. The CPI of dairy products and eggs, for example, increased from 146 points in August 2011 to 177 in September 2013. This is after 28 months of price stability and fluctuating between 140 and 150 points on the CPI.

Competition between Syrian refugees and Jordanians in rural areas has also led to a reduction in seasonal farm wages to as low as JD 150 (USD 210) for 30 days of work. The livelihoods of marginal, small-scale farmers and livestock breeders in Irbid and Mafraq (as well as the Jordan Valley) have been affected in many ways. Some had no other options but to abandon farmlands due to insecurity along border areas. Other effects include the loss of informal cross-border trading opportunities; reduced availability of irrigation water; an increase in the price of agricultural inputs; reduced marketing opportunities for traditional export crops, and a net decrease in farm-gate prices. Many farmers and livestock breeders have been selling their breeding animals in order to purchase food and non-food items for their families. The Syrian conflict disrupted cross-border movements of Bedouin herders from winter grazing in Syria to summer grazing in Northern Jordan. The extended stay of Bedouin herders in the ecologically fragile Badia rangelands has reportedly led to overgrazing and land degradation.

The closing of borders also resulted in an increase in smuggled food and other agricultural commodities from Syria. New unofficial trade routes have opened without adequate sanitary and phyto-sanitary control, which puts people at risk of spreading crop and animal diseases that will further reduce local yields and make. Moreover, the disruption of veterinary services in Syria and the illegal trade of animals have the potential to spread Transboundary Animal Diseases (TADs) and threaten the overall state of public health in Jordan.

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176 90 percent of cereal requirements and 80 percent of animal fodder requirements (Jordan PRS, 2013). According to the Jordan Food and Drug Administration, Jordan imported 87 percent of its food requirements in 2012 at an annual cost of JD 2.2 billion (USD 3.1billion). This represents 14 percent of its total import bill.
177 Including crops, livestock, fisheries and forestry sub-sectors.
179 FAO in GoJ-UN Needs Assessment Review (NAR), November 2013. Also see: WFP, Food Insecure and Vulnerable People in Jordan, 2012
180 Ibid.
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid.
184 There are concerns that bore-holes at the Zaatari Syrian Refugee Camp and in other major host communities in border areas will be depleted, if not exhausted entirely in the short term as these bore-holes are also used as local aquifers by rural communities and by large-scale farmers for irrigation. See FAO, 2013, Agricultural Livelihoods and Food Security Impact Assessment and Response Plan for the Syria Crisis in the Neighboring Countries of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, March.
185 Ibid.
The Household and Expenditures and Income Survey of 2010 shows that food consumption is poor or ‘borderline’ for 2.5 percent of the population or 155,000 people. Rates of food insecurity are highest in the rural areas of Mafrak, Zarqa, Aqaba, Amman and Karak.186 Reportedly, female-headed households are more exposed to food insecurity than male-headed households. Even though there is little new data on household food security, the assessment conducted by ACTED187 in Mafrak, Irbid, Zarqa, Balqa, Ajloun and Jarash points to increasing risks. As can be seen in the above figure, 1 percent of surveyed Jordanian and 3 percent of Syrian households were found to be food insecure while another 15 percent Jordanian and 18 percent Syrian households were considered at risk. However, there were some variations across locations. By comparison, 5 percent of Jordanian households in Zarqa were found to be food insecure and 18 percent in Ajloun were found to be at risk. In Ajloun, 6 percent of refugee households are food insecure while over 60 percent are on the threshold and seriously at risk. While essential food items were found to be readily available for purchase in market places, high meat prices however reduced the already low meat intake by most of families. To compensate, at least partially, families added more affordable – but still expensive - eggs and diary to the diet.

**Lebanon**

In Lebanon, as in Jordan, the Syrian conflict has impacted food security, especially in border areas due to the decrease in cross-border transportation of food and agricultural commodities. Farmers in northern Lebanon that benefitted from government-subsidized seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and animal feed from Syria or earned an income through informal trade networks, have thus seen their costs of production rise significantly. Like in Jordan, the collapse of border security has encouraged the transfer of livestock without proper controls, which increases the risk of diseases spreading. The lack of food control at the border also threatens the food health and safety of host communities and Syrian refugees. Vulnerable groups of poor socio-economic conditions tend to buy cheap and unsafe food, which increases the risk for the transmission of animal and plant diseases188.

Food insecurity affects both refugee and host communities. A vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees (VASyr) conducted in May and June 2013189 indicate that 70 percent of Syrian refugees in Lebanon are “food insecure.” Food insecurity seemed to decrease with the length of stay in Lebanon. While most households have acceptable food consumption and diet diversity, refugees are at risk of suffering from a micronutrient deficiency. Nearly 50 percent of interviewed refugees have applied adverse coping strategies, out of which 90 percent reported to rely on less preferred foods, as well as reducing meal frequency and portion sizes. The most common non-food related coping strategies have

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been to dip into one’s savings (45 percent), buy food on credit (39 percent), reducing essential non-food expenditures (30 percent) or sending their children into the workforce (13 percent).

As regards host community households, results of the DMI assessment conducted in 2012 in North and Bekaa show that 61 percent of surveyed households in Bekaa had no food stock compared to 82 percent in the north. Almost 100 percent of all respondents in Bekaa and North Lebanon noted increases in food prices after the start of the crisis. Upwards of 34 percent of people residing in Bekaa noted that they were not able to find the same food items in the local market and this goes up to 73 percent for those living in the North. The survey also highlights adverse coping strategies among Bekaa residents, including purchasing food on credit (59 percent), borrowing food (42 percent), taking out loans (37 percent) and/or spending from their savings (37 percent). Residents in North Lebanon tend to buy food items they can afford (43 percent), reduce the number of daily meals (40 percent) or spend their savings (40 percent).

### 3.2.2 DETERIORATION OF HEALTH AND EDUCATION ACCESS AND QUALITY

Both Jordan and Lebanon have performed well on major health and education indicators. Lebanon has made significant efforts towards reducing infant mortality. Even though there is no regional national study, there seems to be a decreasing trend in infant and under-five mortality rates. The under-five mortality (U5MR) fell to a third of its 1996 level and the maternal mortality ratio stands at 25 for every 100,000 live births. In Jordan, the Maternal Mortality ratio (MMR) stood at 19 per 100,000 live births in 2010.

#### Table 13: Pre-crisis Child and Maternal Health outcome indicators for Jordan and Lebanon

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children under five mortality rate per 1,000 live births</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)</td>
<td>104 (1993)</td>
<td>23 (2009)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


#### Table 14: Pre-crisis Primary Education Performance Indicators for Jordan and Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEBANON</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net attendance ratio in primary education, girls (percent)</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>98.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net attendance ratio in primary education, boys (percent)</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>98.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net primary school completion rate, boys &amp; girls (percent)</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>72.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net primary school completion rate, girls (percent)</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>74.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net primary school completion rate, boys</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net enrollment rate, boys</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>97.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net enrollment rate girls</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>97.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survival rate to grade 5 of basic education, boys</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>98.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survival rate to grade 5 of basic education, girls</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>99.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Jordan: Second MDG Report, 2010; Lebanon: CAS; na : not available

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Lebanon managed to ensure close to 100 percent primary school enrollment for boys and girls, although repetition and dropouts remain a major concern (Table 13 and Table 14). Jordan has also made considerable strides in providing universal basic schooling and ensuring completion of a full course of basic education.

However, national averages hide significant spatial disparities. In Lebanon, the national development strategy generally favored urban centers over peripheral areas. As a result, regional disparities in education and health performance have been able to grow. For the purpose of this analysis, it is worth noting for instance that MMRs are particularly high in communities with high concentration of refugees such as Akkar (57 for every 100,000 live births), Balbaek (60) and Chouf (69). Reportedly, the prevalence of maternal death in the Bekaa and the North are two and 1.5 times higher respectively than the national average (21.3 percent and 16.1 percent against 10.7 percent). With respect to educational outcomes, the repetition rate goes up to almost 11 percent in the Akkar and Minieh-Dinnieh, compared to a mere 2 percent in Beirut. In Jordan also, educational outcomes, though impressive on the aggregate, vary sensibly from governorate to governorate. For example, in Amman and Zarqa, net enrollment rates are close to the national average (97.5 percent), but in Irbid, Mafraq, Jerash, Ma’an and Aqaba, ratios fall – particularly amongst boys – by five to six percentage points.

Available assessments of the impact of the Syrian crisis on education and health care systems in Jordan and Lebanon provide compelling evidence that disparities are likely to worsen. In both countries, absorptive capacities of health and educational systems are rapidly eroding, especially in major host communities, where these systems were already overstretched prior to the crisis. This has far-reaching implications in terms of preserving quality of health and education services, as well as access for both refugees and host populations. Because of higher women and children densities amongst refugee populations, this also means that services for women and children are more affected than others.

Increased Pressure on Health Service Delivery Capacities

In Jordan, the health system for refugee health care is comprehensive, with registered Syrian refugees eligible to receive free primary health services in public health care facilities. Those with secondary and tertiary health needs can receive treatment in public facilities through UNHCR and a network of NGO supported clinics. These facilities provide refugees with free antenatal and postnatal care, along with vaccination services regardless of an individual’s registration status. In Lebanon, primary health care services and goods (immunization, reproductive health, maternal and child health, health education, general medical care, dental care, essential drugs) are provided through a network of 182 primary health centers (PHCs) which are mainly run by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) has also contractual agreements with the private sector through NGOs and with the existing local authorities in districts. Secondary and tertiary care is mostly provided by the private sector.

In both countries, the refugee crisis has led to an exponential increase in visits to public health centers and hospitals. In Jordan, the number of outpatients visits to primary health care centers (PHCCs) increased by 230 percent while the number of Syrians in public hospitals increased by almost 250 percent between January 2012 and March 2013 (10,330 patients) over the same period (Figure 18).

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191 In 2011, 12.7% of the national budget in Jordan (or 3.8% of the GDP) was dedicated to education, with the bulk of this (63.9%) allocated to primary education, see GoJ-UNDP, 2013, Jordan Poverty Reduction Strategy.
194 These are children of secondary school age who are attending primary school.
195 Source MDG Report, draft, September 2013.
197 Syrians who are unregistered or awaiting registration are granted access to primary, secondary and tertiary health services.
198 WB, 2013, ESHA
An assessment of hospitals and health centers under the MoH in northern governorates conducted in May-June 2013 revealed that the total number of Syrians using the MoH facilities averaged 2705 per day which is approximately equivalent to 78,445 Syrian patients per month (44,457 if visits for the measles campaign are excluded). In Irbid and in Ma’arqa, Syrian patients were found to represent 10.45 percent, and 9.59 percent of total patients, respectively, with the percentage as high as 18 percent in some locations. Health services for women and children have been more deeply affected. The percentage of patient visits in Obstetrics and Gynecology and Children’s Hospital groups (17 percent), and at children’s hospitals made by Syrians was more than double the percentage of patient visits by Syrians in general (6.81), possibly reflecting the significant presence of pregnant women and of the large number of children among refugees. 

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In Lebanon, between 2009 and 2012, the number of Primary Health Care (PHC) Network visits soared by 52.2 percent, from 723,891 to 1,102,066 visits. Available data shows that 40 percent to 50 percent of primary health care visits in December 2012 were by Syrian refugees. In some communities, such as Wadi Khaled, the proportion of health care visits by Syrian refugees exceeded 80 percent. As observed for Jordan, the majority of visits were for childcare, reproductive health and medication reasons. Lebanese hospitals also witnessed a dramatic increase in number of Syrian patients, including critical cases, such as wounded fighters (Figure 20). This has exacerbated financial pressures, increasing costs, and generating medication shortages.202

This places a great deal of pressure on the human and institutional ability to absorb to secure outreach services, especially in areas hosting refugees that were already under-served prior to the crisis.

Table 15: Pre-crisis Health System Supply Capacity Indicators in Jordan and Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human capacities</th>
<th>JORDAN</th>
<th>LEBANON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of Physicians per 10,000 population</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of dentists per 1,000 population</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of Nurses per 10,000 population</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of Pharmacists per 10,000 population</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoH total hospital beds/10,000 pop</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In mid-2013, Jordan’s Ministry of Health estimated that between mid-2012 and the end of 2013, the ratio of nurses (for every 10,000 people) would decrease by 6 percentage points to 40 and the ratio of physicians, by 4 percentage points to 23 per 10,000 population. The degradation of supply capacity indicators is likely to be particularly damaging to health access and quality in areas with highest refugee densities. As an indication, prior to the crisis, the number of hospital beds for every 10,000 people was as low as 8 in Mafraq, and 11 in Zarqa, compared to 29 in Amman.203 Other recent assessments in northern areas indicate that health workers are overwhelmed and there is a lack of qualified personnel, which may lead to an overall decrease in the quality of health service delivery. Health facilities have also been facing significant drug shortages, as well as increased financial difficulties in covering their utility costs.205

With the notable exception of nurses (only 18 per 10000 population), the Lebanese health sector, in comparison with that of Jordan, is relatively well endowed. Yet, the consequences of the crisis on public health systems have been pervasive, and this is especially true in peripheral and under-served parts of the country where most of the refugees reside. Overcrowding of primary health facilities has been reported by local stakeholders in BSS, Bekaa, Dennieh, Baalbeck.206

In both countries, there are indications as well that the pressure on public health care services by Syrian refugees has had a ‘crowding out effect’ on some residents who now tend to go to private facilities instead. Reportedly, many insured Jordanian patients are sent to private medical health facilities because of the pressure on public health facilities.207 That said, it should be noted that despite the fact that the cost of healthcare for registered refugees is partially covered by UNHCR, many refugees are still unable to cover their remaining costs. This reality, however, is not always apparent for host populations as many assume Syrian refugees benefit from preferential healthcare services, which divert the care they themselves receive. These perceptions once again fuel tension between host communities and refugees.208

202 Ibid
203 DOS, Health statistics, 2011.
204 UNDP, 2014, Municipal Needs Assessment In Mafraq and ibid
205 This is further evidenced by results of the JRHFCHUA, which indicate that access to oral delivery-related medications is limited in all governorates as is access to cardiac and/or vascular drugs, oral rehydration therapy, and diuretics.
206 Lebanon Background Report -Regional Working Groups
207 JRHFCHUA, 2013
208 ACAPS Regional Analysis on Syria, July 2013, p. 12.
Spread of Communicable Diseases and the Emergence of New Illnesses

In both Lebanon and Jordan, previously eradicated diseases like measles have made a comeback as a result of the refugee crisis. Lebanon is a country that has not seen measles for years, yet the Ministry of Health reported 1,488 cases of measles amongst Syrian refugees in the first three quarters of 2013. This is in comparison with 9 cases in 2011.\textsuperscript{209} The largest numbers of measles cases have been reported in major host areas in Bekaa, the North, and Mount Lebanon. In Jordan also, the number of measles cases, eradicated since 2008, has been on the rise, with 71 occurrences reported by the MoH between January and June 2013, bringing the annual notification rate to 5/million population for Jordanians and 51.2/million for Syrians.\textsuperscript{210}

In Lebanon, the prevalence rate of tuberculosis rose from 12 per 100,000 (501 reported cases) in 2009 to 15 per 100,000 (632 reported cases) in 2012. Although this higher incidence is mainly due to a larger inflow of migrant workers mainly from Africa and East Asia, the Syrian refugee influx has also brought new cases (35 in 2012 and another 24 cases in the first quarter of 2013).\textsuperscript{211} In Jordan, tuberculosis notification cases are threefold greater among Syrians compared to Jordanians.\textsuperscript{212}

With the reemergence of polio in Syria,\textsuperscript{213} both countries are at risk, especially in areas with high refugee densities.

Vaccination campaigns have been organized in Jordan and Lebanon in response to the outbreaks. In Lebanon, by July 2013, more than 300,000 children (Lebanese and non-Lebanese) had been vaccinated against measles and more than 100,000 vaccinated against polio.\textsuperscript{214} Vaccination campaigns have also been conducted in Jordan, yet there are shortages in the vaccine supply. Also noteworthy is the decrease in the percentage of children vaccinated against measles, with recent data indicating (103 percent in 2010 vs. 100 percent in 2012) that the Government of Jordan may be unable to sustain universal vaccination coverage for both Jordanian and refugee children.\textsuperscript{216}

Other communicable diseases previously absent are on the rise in Syrian refugee communities. In Lebanon, instances of cutaneous Leishmaniasis amongst refugees communities totaled 509 in September 2013, which is an almost 100 percent increase in the number of cases reported in 2011 (5). In Jordan, 158.1 cases were detected amongst Syrian refugees and 3.1 for Jordanians.\textsuperscript{217} The fact that many refugees live with limited or deficient water and sanitation facilities exacerbates the spread of disease and affects the health and safety conditions of host communities.

Furthermore, the high number of Syrians suffering chronic illnesses like cancer is placing an additional burden on health systems. In Jordan, the MoH estimated that by end 2013, the system would be catering to 676 Syrian cancer patients, which is 14 percent higher than the number of cancer cases amongst Jordanian nationals.\textsuperscript{218}

Increased need for Reproductive Health Services

Bottlenecks in Lebanon’s and Jordan’s reproductive health services must be addressed given the burden practitioners and institutions are bearing. In Lebanon, the increased demand for reproductive health services and limited awareness of family planning methods, reproductive health issues and Sexually Transmitted Infections (STI) is an important cause for concern.\textsuperscript{219} In Dinnieh (North Lebanon),

\textsuperscript{204}UNHCR. Child protection statistics update, April 2013 – 46 percent of refugees have reported not received the measles vaccine.

\textsuperscript{209}Ministry figures indicate that of the 71 measles cases, 22 were found in Amman, 18 in Ramtha, 16 in the Za'atari Refugee Camp and 11 in Zarqa. http://jordantimes.com/measles-cases-rise-to-71-this-year. Also see Public Health and Nutrition in Jordan weekly report, June 8th, 2013.

\textsuperscript{211}Hiam Yaacoub, 2013, Paper presented in the annual Meeting of the Lebanese Pulmonary Society - Mövenpick Hotel April, 2013 (http://slpsleb.org/2013/06/tuberculosis-in-lebanon-hiam-yaacoub/#&panel1-5); and Lebanon MDG report 2013, draft, September.

\textsuperscript{212}Goi/JUN Needs Assessment Review, November 2013

\textsuperscript{213}19 cases have been documented since May 2013

\textsuperscript{214}UNICEF, 2013, Syria Crisis Bi-weekly Humanitarian Situation Report, July 12-25

\textsuperscript{215}The percentage exceeds 100 percent in 2009 because of the inclusion of non-Jordanians, see Jordan MDG report, 2010.

\textsuperscript{216}Jordan Background Report, October 2013.

\textsuperscript{217}The Syrian refugees and Jordan’s health sector’. Lancet 2013; Accessed online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(13)61506-8

\textsuperscript{218}WHO database: http://www.emro.who.int/media/news/Jordan-health-services-urgent-support.html
the shortage in reproductive health services has been reported a significant issue\textsuperscript{220}. In Jordan, the reproductive health of adolescents and young people and their life styles is also a major concern.\textsuperscript{221}

**In both countries, the impact of delayed, or provision of low quality health care could result in increased levels of morbidity in the medium and longer terms amongst the most vulnerable.** In Lebanon, the costs of restoring the health system to its pre-crisis levels (stabilization needs) were estimated to be USD 177 million in 2013 and to range between USD 216 and USD 306 million in 2014\textsuperscript{222}. In Jordan, where health care services are highly subsidized by the Government, it was estimated that the fiscal cost of providing primary and tertiary health care to refugees could reach USD 168 million in 2013 and this does not include the USD 84 million needed for expanding health facilities and an additional USD 58 million for purchasing medicines and vaccines\textsuperscript{223}.

**Overcrowding of Public Schools**

Public schools systems have also come under growing pressure to accommodate the rapid increase in the number of Syrian children. According to UNHCR, over 50 percent of registered refugees in Lebanon and Jordan are below the age of 18 and require some form of education. At the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) in Lebanon issued a memorandum informing all schools they were expected to admit Syrian students regardless of their legal status exempt them from paying school fees\textsuperscript{224}. The number of Syrian children enrolled in primary and intermediate public schools across the Lebanon increased dramatically from as low as 1,500 during the 2011-2012 academic year to 30,000 for the 2012-2013 academic year. Yet, the enrolment rate of Syrian children was estimated at only 31 percent\textsuperscript{225}. While information on education is scant for the most part, rumor has it that around 5,000 students are registered in private schools in the North; schools that are providing the Syrian curriculum as opposed to the Lebanese one\textsuperscript{226}.

Another issue relates to the mismatch between the distribution of Syrian students and the distribution of public schools across locations. **Public schools in deprived areas of Bekaa, North Lebanon, and Mount Lebanon, have been hosting altogether close to 80 percent of students** (Figure 20).

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\textsuperscript{219}IRC, 2013, Syria: A Regional Crisis, January.
\textsuperscript{220}Lebanon Background Country Report – Regional Working Groups, October 2013, unpublished
\textsuperscript{221}Inter-agency Working Group (IAWG) on Reproductive Health in Crises Reproductive Health Findings from Zaatri Camp and Irbid City, Jordan Participants’ Report 18-21 March 2013; see also UNFPA: http://unfpa-jordan.org/images/stories/PDFPercent20File/%F4ypercent20english-main0.pdf
\textsuperscript{222}World Bank, 2013, ESIA
\textsuperscript{223}It is assumed that that about one-third of Syrian refugees require health services, see See: UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/525fe3e59.pdf.
\textsuperscript{225}Data provided by Lebanon Ministry of Education in October 2013 suggests enrollments of 20 percent or lower.
In Jordan, it was estimated that approximately 25 percent of the total refugee population (70 percent of all school-aged children) require access to schools, while the remainder require alternative informal or formal education services.\textsuperscript{228} The Government has generously waived tuition fees for Syrian refugee students in public schools. At the end of 2012, the number of registered Syrian refugee students exceeded 31,000.\textsuperscript{229} As of September 2013, a total of 67,466 Syrian youth living outside of camps had reportedly enrolled in schools in host communities.\textsuperscript{231} The highest level of school enrolment for Syrian children was in Irbid (over 25,000 students), followed by Amman, Mafraq and Zarqa (Figure 21).

Figure 21: Enrolments and Estimated Numbers of Out-of-School Syrian Children Eligible for Registration in Schools in Jordanian Governorates, (September 2013).

When considering pressures on public school systems in Lebanon and Jordan, it is noteworthy that, in the case of Lebanon, public schools were not initially overcrowded.\textsuperscript{232} Only 20 percent of classrooms in the public and private sectors were reportedly overcrowded with 26 to 35 students per class. Also noteworthy is the low ratio of students to teachers.\textsuperscript{233} According to the Center for Educational Research and Development (CERD) statistics in 2009-2010, the ratio of students to teachers for all levels of education was lowest in the public sector (7.4:1), followed by the private sector (11.6:1) and was highest in free private schools (18.7:1).\textsuperscript{234}

Available evidences do not point to a clear-cut pattern regarding overcrowding of public schools. For instance, a rapid assessment conducted in North Lebanon (excluding Akkar) in 2013, found that only 7 out of the 30 surveyed were overcrowded.\textsuperscript{235} The overcrowding of some schools is exacerbated by the fact that Syrian students cannot afford transport costs to enroll in schools in neighboring areas that may have additional space.\textsuperscript{236} Interestingly enough, in some host communities, the presence of Syrian students has prevented the shutdown of under-populated small schools.\textsuperscript{237} The perception survey conducted in Lebanon between August and September 2013, would indeed substantiate the fact that pressures on education services, though significant, were not seen as the ‘prime concern’ in the seven surveyed locations (see Part 3.2.6).

However, demographics are shifting rapidly. At the time of writing, it was estimated that by 2014, the number of Syrian schoolchildren hosted in Lebanon could more than double and make up more than 50 percent of the total number of children in Lebanon’s public school system.\textsuperscript{238} This means that public

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{226} GoJ/UN Joint Needs Assessment Review, November 2013.
\item \textsuperscript{227} This excludes refugee students in Za’atri camp and all refugees on waiting lists, as well as those pending registration.
\item \textsuperscript{228} UNHCR and UNICEF.
\item \textsuperscript{229} Data provided by the MoE.
\item \textsuperscript{230} Lebanon Background Report, October 2013.
\item \textsuperscript{231} UNICEF, 2012, Education Rapid Needs Assessment for Displaced Syrian Children: In Schools, Community and Safe, Beirut.
\item \textsuperscript{232} However, recent findings from D-RASATI point to significant variations in the student to teacher ratio in public schools, with the latter ranging from a low of 1-5 students per teacher to a high of 20 or more students per teacher.
\item \textsuperscript{233} UNHCR and NRC, 2013, Rapid Assessment of the Education Situation of Syrian Refugee Students Attending Lebanese Public Schools in North Lebanon (Excluding Akkar).
\item \textsuperscript{234} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{235} In Zgharta, for example, 63 percent of students in public schools are Syrian. UNHCR and NRC.
\item \textsuperscript{236} This compares with 25 percent in 2012.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
schools in Lebanon will need assistance to be able to absorb increasing numbers of students. This is especially true for the suburbs of Beirut and villages in North Lebanon and Bekaa, where the student/teacher ratio is generally higher than in other regions. It is important to remember that education is largely private in Lebanon while the public sector (only reaching out to 30% of students) has limited expansion prospects. Most public schools lack equipment, adequate buildings and safe playgrounds. Water and sanitation facilities are deficient as well. Lebanese teachers are not trained to teach children from diverse backgrounds or cater to the needs of Syrian refugees.

The baseline situation of the public education system in Jordan is quite different from that of Lebanon. In 2010, the student to teacher ratio was as high as 19.8 in Amman, and hovered slightly above the average rate of 16 in Irbid and Zarqa in 2010. According to a study conducted by the National Centre for Human Resource Development (NCHRD), 36 percent of schools in 2010 were considered overcrowded, especially in populated urban areas. Approximately 22 percent of schools in Amman, Irbid, Mafraq and Zarqa were operating at more than 100 percent capacity. The same study suggests that overcrowding was often higher in girls’ schools.

In 2013, 41 percent of schools were found to be overcrowded. The proportion of crowded and overcrowded schools was as high as 51 percent and 68 percent in Amman and Irbid, respectively (Figure 22). In some urban centers of the Northern governorates, school crowding has been found to range between 40 to 60 students per classroom. Pressures on education services supply were perceived as being a critical issue and priority area for action by all municipalities surveyed by UNDP in Irbid and Mafraq governorates. School overcrowding was reportedly a major issue in Irbid, but even more so in responding municipalities of Mafraq. With a 40 per cent rise in the number of Syrian schoolchildren expected by the end of 2014, the situation is likely to become intractable.

Deterioration of Learning Environments and Education Quality

The entry of Syrians has also played out in numerous ways on learning environments and the quality of education for all children. To accommodate increased number of students, public schools introduced or re-introduced double shift systems. In Jordan, the number of students in shift schools increased by 29

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242 DOS, 2010
243 NCHRD, 2011, School Rationalisation Baseline Study: The situation of crowded and underutilized schools in Jordan; Go/UN Needs Assessment Review, 2013
244 Ibid.
246 Unfortunately, available data is not disaggregated by gender so it is not possible to determine which schools among girls, boys or mixed gender schools have been most affected by the crisis.
248 Ibid
percent between 2009-2010 and 2012-2013, affecting 13 percent of students. In many schools, the conversion to double-shift timings entailed a loss of education time. In Lebanon, second shifts also started opening, operating in 55 schools out of 89 in December 2013.

In addition, differences in curricula and in educational backgrounds, as well as language barriers hinder the integration of Syrian children and contribute to high dropout rates. In Lebanon, less than 20 percent of Syrian children are estimated to be attending school. In Jordan, these were found to exceed 70 percent in some communities in Irbid and Ajloun. In Lebanon, Syrian students find it hard to cope with the differences between the Syrian and Lebanese curriculum. Moreover, most of Syrian children do not speak English or French, which makes it difficult for them to follow and understand core materials taught in foreign languages. In some of the schools that have shift systems, Syrian students are being taught separately. In Bekaa and BSS, some schools dedicate afternoon shifts to providing educational support for Syrian students who are facing difficulties. However, very few schools adopt inclusion policies and train their staff to cope with the Syrian refugee crisis. According to survey data, only a handful of school principals in North Lebanon have attended orientation sessions regarding inclusion policies relating to Syrian students. In Jordan also, refugee students are having difficulty learning in the new curriculum, specifically because it is in English. In contrast with Lebanon, afternoon classes or second shifts for Syrian students are taught by Jordanian teachers and according to the Jordanian curriculum.

Discrimination by students and teachers against Syrian girls and boys constitute an additional obstacle for the inclusion of Syrian students and create a hostile environment that affects the quality of education for all children. Although levels of violence in Jordanian schools, as measured through national surveys, decreased between 2011 and 2012, assessment reports indicate that Syrian students are frequent victims of bullying, harassment and violence in schools. In Lebanon, clashes among students do not seem to be common and discrimination tends to tame at the end of the academic year with time as well as efforts exercised by members of the community. Sometimes, discrimination is also fuelled by the parents of Lebanese and Jordanian children because they fear that Syrian students are lowering the standard of education or putting their children’s health at risk.

The above findings call for scaling-up of physical, human and organizational capacities in national public education systems to ensure quality education for all children in vulnerable host communities.

While the majority of educational bottlenecks have been well studied and incorporated into the 2010-2015 Education Sector Development Plan by the MEHE in Lebanon, the emerging challenge is therefore to keep the plan on track and ensure the education system can accommodate the needs of Syrian children at the same time. Jordan faces a similar challenge. For instance, the current double shift policy runs against the MOE’s plan to reduce the number of double shift schools, as foreseen under the Education Reform for Knowledge Economy (ERFKE).

250 UNDP Municipality Assessment in Mafrak and Irbid reports a shortening of classes to 35 min from 45 in schools converted to to double shifts.
251 http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/educationRRP52013december-ok.pdf
252 No Lost Generation Strategy, October 2013
254 Lebanon Background Report, October 2013.
255 Ibid.
256 UNHCR and NRC, 2013, Rapid Assessment of the Education Situation of Syrian Refugee Students Attending Lebanese Public Schools in North Lebanon (Excluding Akkar). The survey took place in 30 schools across North Lebanon (Dennieh, Koura, Mennieh, Tripoli and Zgharta) where 11,768 students are registered. The number of Syrian students is constitute 8 percent of the total student population.
257 Temporary teachers are less able to effectively manage classrooms and apply student-teaching methods. NCHRD, 2012 Classroom Observation Baseline Study: Student-Centered Effective Teaching and Learning in Jordanian Schools.
258 Data extracted from MoE database.
259 UN Women, Child protection amongst Syrian refugees in Jordan, with a focus on early marriage, 2013
More efforts and resources are required to expand learning spaces, recruit and train additional teachers, as well as reduce costs of accessing schools. In Lebanon, the MEHE has agreed to, with UNHCR support, open 70 additional schools in an effort to increase current capacity. If successful, this will provide space for an additional 210,000 children in public schools. In Qaa for example, the MEHE already took the initiative to rehabilitate and equip two public schools in order to admit large numbers of Syrian students in the region, schools that are run by Syrian teachers. Yet, what has been achieved so far falls short of what needs to be done. In financial terms, stabilization needs for educational services in Lebanon were estimated at USD 220 million in 2013 and between USD 504 - 734 million in 2014. In Jordan, current expenditures to accommodate the needs of 78,531 Syrian children in the 2013-2014 academic year were estimated at USD 81.4 million, while capital funding requirements to build additional schools were estimated at USD 136 million.

Enrollment rates aside, there is also a need to facilitate and manage the inclusion of Syrian children into public school systems and address high dropout rates amongst the most disadvantaged. This would require strengthening coordination networks between municipalities, Ministries of Education and CSOs, while local teachers should also be exposed to inclusion strategies.

3.2.3 CHALLENGES TO SUSTAINABLE HABITATS

In host communities of Jordan and Lebanon, the refugee crisis is also challenging the quality and sustainability of human habitats. The supply of adequate and affordable shelter is a growing concern. Water, sanitation and solid waste management systems, already deficient prior to the crisis, have become overstretched. Although it is less documented, traffic congestion also emerges as an issue. All of these effects have serious implications for environmental health outcomes.

Increased Demand for Housing and Reduced Accessibility of Poor and Vulnerable Households

In Lebanon, refugees in urban areas often settle in rented accommodation while in rural areas, most live in tents on agricultural land or in buildings that are under construction. A nationwide survey showed that 59 percent reside in housing units, 18 percent in rooms, and 12 percent in tents. According to the survey, one quarter of all refugee households live in less than 25 square meters and 42 percent of households have a density of four or more people per room. More than a quarter have no access to sufficient water and 13 percent do not have access to soap or other hygienic goods. Around 27 percent use a flush latrine while 7 percent use open-air facilities. In addition, 14 percent of households used a latrine that is shared with 15 people or more, while 6 percent have no access to a bathroom at all. In the Qaa region of Bekaa, more than 1,500 refugees live in 120 housing units, hosting more than 10 residents per dwelling. In Hermel (another district of Bekaa), more than 830 households are sheltered in around 500 housing units.

In Jordan, the majority of refugees (upwards of 95 percent) living outside camps stay in rental accommodation. Less than 5 percent reside in informal settlements that are located in rural areas. According to an ACTED survey carried out in 2013, the average Syrian household size is comprised of 6 individuals (vs. 5 in Jordanian). Due to the size of the refugee population, a huge demand has been created for housing in the country, and an additional 86,000 housing units are required. In the municipality of Irbid, construction has increased by almost 20 percent, while in Mafraq the number of building licenses is expected to reach 600 by end 2013 (compared to 332 in 2010). The housing demand backlog in Mafraq could equal to 12600 units, 19 times higher than annual needs of about 660 units. However, despite a severe stress on the housing market, there are not yet evidences

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262 ESFD, Rapid Needs Assessment in the Community of Qaa, 2013
263 World Bank, ESIA , 2013
265 World Food Program, A General Picture Of Living Conditions of Syrian Refugees In Lebanon’ July 2013
266 ESFD, 2013, Rapid Needs Assessment in the Community of Qaa, May.
267 Ibid.
268 ACTED, 2013, ‘Food security and livelihoods needs assessment’
269 GoJ/UN Needs Assessment Review, November 2013
The estimated rate of vacant housing in Mafraq and Irbid governorates is 16 and 20 percent respectively. This reflects the cumulative increase in rent over the previous three years: 


In both countries, particularly in Lebanon, housing markets have traditionally served the needs of the middle- and upper-income groups, while little has been done to promote affordable housing options. The refugee crisis has made access to housing even more difficult for most vulnerable segments in host communities. In Lebanon, the Consumer Price Index monitoring system reported a 44 percent increase in rental prices between June 2012 and 2013. In Beirut, some districts registered an increase in monthly rent up to USD 400, since the onset of the crisis and in BSS, rent for a “lower-middle” dwelling has increased from USD 300 to USD 500. In Jordan, municipalities in Mafraq and Irbid reported increase in rental prices ranging between 150 and 400 percent. As rent goes up, reaching sometimes over 50 percent of incomes, refugees resort to sharing houses with other Syrian families, which results in significant overcrowding, and deteriorating health and sanitary conditions. In both countries, the poorest residents can no longer afford to pay such high rent. There has been a rise in the eviction of tenants who are being replaced by refugees who are able to pay higher rents because several families tend to live in one dwelling.

Increased Demands on Water and Worsening of Sanitation Conditions

Jordan is the fourth most water scarce country in the world and water shortages generally act as a major limitation to the delivery of water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services in host communities. While 97 percent of the Jordanian population has access to clean water, only 55 percent are connected to sewage, a number that drops to 43 percent in Northern governorates. In many areas (such as Mafraq) there was a strain on public water services even before the start of the refugee crisis. In the border cities of Ramtha and Mafraq, water was distributed to households only once every two weeks for a maximum of six hours.

In contrast with Jordan, Lebanon has an adequate water supply due to greater annual rainfall and several large rivers. However, deficiencies in the governance of the sector such as low water storage capacity, poor maintenance of the water distribution network, and lack of an official management mechanism, have led to irregular water supply in some regions. The most recent data shows that 98 percent of households (2009) have access to safe drinking water, yet only a small share of the population receive it through the public network. The proportion of the population using public piped networks as a source of drinking water has declined from 57 percent in 2004 to 35 percent in 2009. Achieving affordable and safe access for poorer households remain major challenges. In 2003, water connection rates were as low as 65 percent and 68 percent in the North and Bekaa, against 93 percent in Beirut.

In both countries, the refugee crisis has therefore placed additional pressure on already strained local water supplies. In Jordan, water resources in northern governorates were already working at full capacity in early 2013, with no seasonal modulation. A recent WASH assessment revealed that...
out 44 percent of all households in rural areas and 33 percent of those in urban areas face water shortages at least twice a month. In the urban areas of Balqa and Zarqa, Syrian and Jordanian households reported having a mere 0.5m³ of water storage facilities, while the average family requires a minimum 3m³ to cater to their weekly needs. These problems are compounded by the fact that there is little understanding of water conservation practices among Syrian communities. Due to limited storage capacity, many households are also increasingly reliant on water bought from private vendors at more expensive rates. In Lebanon, a significant number of dwellings in host communities in the North and Bekaa were found to have no links to water networks and in some, such as Hermel for example, upwards of 60 percent were linked to deteriorating water networks.

Water shortages, which were common in Lebanon prior to the crisis, have increased substantially. In Qaa and Hermel in the Bekaa region, more than 1000 artisan wells are used at a growing depth (between 200 and 400 meters).

The situation with sanitation services is equally bleak. In Jordan, an assessment conducted in October 2013 found that a third of septic tanks (31 percent in rural areas and 34 percent in urban) overflowed at least once in the three months preceding the survey. With the exception of Irbid, Mafraq and Ramtha almost all other smaller municipalities have no sewage systems. Home sewage cisterns are overflowing and disposal cost is becoming prohibitive due to distance of treatment plant. These occurrences increase the risk of wastewater infiltration into underground water and aquifers. An assessment of water and sanitation services in 474 schools in Irbid, Ma'an Mafraq, Zarqa and Amman revealed that most schools do not have enough water storage tanks and 18 percent of water fountains in schools were in need of rehabilitation. The same study revealed that 4.5 percent of schools have latrines that are in bad condition or they have no latrines at all, while 27 percent of the schools have moderate condition of latrine. In addition, the study highlighted that 70 percent of assessed schools were connected to the public sewerage system and that the waste disposal and drainage systems require rehabilitation and/or replacement.

In Lebanon, the rising number of residents exceeds the capacities of already deficient sewage facilities, especially so in peripheral areas. In Qaa and Hermel (Bekaa) for instance, there are no treatment plants and waste disposal is carried out through sewage tanks. A significant number of Syrian refugees in Qaa live in informal tents settlements on agricultural lands where treatment networks are absent thereby causing the pollution of potable and irrigation sources of water. Municipalities are facing difficulties in discharging increased amounts of wastewater.

National and local governments lack the capacity to address increasing water and sanitation needs of both refugee and host populations. The construction of treatment plants, rehabilitation and/or construction of pumping stations, improvement of disposal systems, and better linkages to sources of potable and running water are clearly priorities for action in host communities.

Unsustainable Accumulation of Solid Waste

In both Lebanon and Jordan, the refugee crisis has dramatically increased the need for solid waste management. However, as with other sectors, municipalities are unable to meet the needs of host and refugee communities (see Box 7). If not dealt with accordingly, this will contribute to ground water contamination, pollution of water resources and the spread of water borne diseases.
There is compelling evidence that capacities of municipal solid waste disposal services are overstretched. For instance, the poor municipality of Wadi Kaled in North Lebanon now produces 27 tons of solid waste per month, compared to 9 tons before the crisis. In Jordan, roughly 2.13 million tons of waste was produced in 2012 compared to 1.96 million tons in 2010. The influx of refugees means an increase of ~340 tons of daily waste that needs to be disposed of. In Qasabat Irbid Municipality, daily waste collection increased from 300 tons to 500 tons, after the Syrian influx. In Mafraq Great Municipality, daily waste collection increased from 80-90 tons up to 200-250 tons. Reportedly, the city of Mafraq now spends approximately 18 percent of its budget on waste management excluding salaries. However, resources are not sufficient to cover the costs necessary to extent services to all residents.

In many host communities in Lebanon (e.g. Qaa, Hermel and Zahle), solid waste is collected and disposed at dumps on the outskirts of villages and cities. Solid and sewage waste disposal in springs, rivers or roads has been reported (e.g. in Zahle) and people are at risk of water-borne diseases and the contamination of food sources. In Jordan as well, the inability of municipalities to cope with the accumulation of waste led to an increase in illegal dumping and burning of waste, both of which contribute to water, soil and air pollution.

Box 7: The Refugee Crisis: An Unsustainable Burden on Municipal Budgets

Most municipalities in Lebanon and Jordan have weak financial, administrative and technical capacities. In Lebanon, total municipal expenditures prior to the crisis did not exceed on average 0.7 or 0.8 percent of total GDP, clearly pointing to their scanty capacities. In Jordan, 60 percent of municipal budgets are spent on salaries while debt services are unsustainable for most municipalities. Reportedly, Lebanese municipalities are now strained by supplementary expenditure on operations, higher fuel consumption, maintenance works pertaining to water, sanitation, solid waste, as well as public space management. At the same time, they witness a decline in receipts due to the decreasing numbers of tourists and visitors.

In Jordan, the presence of Syrian refugees has had only a very marginal impact on municipalities’ own resources. For instance, revenues from the solid waste fee were limited due to the high density of Syrian households (often more 10 persons or more per housing unit) and low level of the fee (JD 2/month). In fact, the average income of municipalities in Irbid and Mafraq governorates decreased by 3.4 percent between 2012 and 2013. It is not yet possible to assess the extent to which the refugee crisis has impacted expenditures. Available data point to a modest increase (by 2 percent) in current expenditure plans between 2012 and 2013. Whilst this may reflect a lack of anticipation of the magnitude of refugee inflows - noting that 2013 budgets were prepared before the acceleration of the refugee crisis in end 2012-early 2013 - the fact is that most municipalities in Irbid and Mafraq do not have the fiscal space to increase their budgets. Reportedly, municipalities have shifted resources from investment projects to their recurrent budget to support services.

Increased demand for energy

Jordan has seen rising levels of demand for energy in recent years. According to government statistics, residential consumption rose 9.4 percent from 2011 to 2012, compared to 5.9 percent between 2010 and 2011. However, it is not fully clear what share of this is attributable to the arrival of Syrian refugees, and one should note that according to Government statistics, the average per capita energy use of

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292 The Daily Star, Lebanon, November 2013
293 GoJ/UN Needs Assessment, November 2013.
296 ESFD, 2013, Rapid Needs Assessment in the Community of Zahle – Al Maalaka, May.
298 For more info on the municipality burden see also: http://www.uclg.org/en/media/news/syrian-refugee-crisis-municipalities-frontline
299 GoJ/UN Needs Assessment, November 2013
301 GoJ/UN Needs Assessment, November 2013
Syrians living in cities and towns is 25 percent less than that of the general population. According to available data, electricity service delivery in Jordan has not decreased greatly, but an increased financial burden and power outages have been reported as problems. In Lebanon, power cuts and rationings, which were already common prior to the crisis, particularly in peripheral host communities, have spiked and not only are Lebanese feeling the effects of a population surge, but Palestinian refugee camps are also having to deal with power cuts and shortages.

In both countries, the fiscal burden associated with energy needs has been on the rise in the last two years, further reducing the fiscal space available to deal with other development priorities and manage the fallout of the Syrian crisis. As noted earlier, although Jordan has traditionally relied on natural gas imports from Egypt for 80 percent of its electricity, disruptions in 2011 forced the government to acquire more expensive crude oil imports from the Gulf. This has led to a dramatic increase in the energy import bill (USD 2 million per year), with energy imports reaching 30 percent of total imports at the end of 2013. A study undertaken by Jordan’s Electricity Regulatory Commission (ERC) shows that electricity subsidies to Syrian refugees residing outside camps amounted to JD 44.3 million in 2012 (about USD 66 Million). In 2013, the overall energy subsidy bill was expected to reach USD 1.8 billion.

Traffic Congestion and Deterioration of Road Networks

Because Lebanon suffers from a lack of public transportation networks Lebanese rely on private means of transportation. This explains the difficulty of moving within the country and explains why there is a great deal of traffic, especially at the main entry point of cities like Beirut. It is believed (although not yet measured) that the influx of Syrian refugees exacerbates traffic congestion. The use of motorcycles is increasing as Syrian refugees see bikes as an affordable means of transportation. Similar trends have been seen in Jordan: traffic congestion in host communities has increased and there has been a deterioration of road networks as a result of the rapid population increase. The rise in fuel prices has also increased the accumulated debt of municipalities and because limited financial means have been diverted to more pressing issues, such as solid waste management, even less attention is given to transport issues than ever before.

3.2.4 CHANGES IN GENDER RELATIONSHIPS: MARGINALIZATION AND INSECURITY OF WOMEN AND GIRLS

While the vulnerabilities facing Syrian women, including Gender Based Violence (GVB), are increasingly documented, much less is known about the way the refugee crisis affects the status of Jordanian and Lebanese women and girls. However, though sporadic, evidence is emerging that uncertainties and strains on resources and services also exacerbate frustrations and change gender relationships amongst already impoverished Jordanian and Lebanese families.

In Jordan, qualitative research indicates that income losses tend to exclude women from contributing to household finances, which in turn affects their ability to influence decisions within the family. There is also evidence of growing anxiety among young Jordanian men, as they express an inability to marry and start a family because they cannot secure affordable housing. As a result, Jordanian men have been marrying Syrian women for lesser dowries, particularly in northern governorates. This raises concerns over men exploiting Syrian women’s need for protection. Additionally, Jordanian women and girls

105 Lebanon background report, October 2013.
106 DOS
109 Lebanon background report, October 2013
110 GOJ-UN Needs Assessment Review, November 2013
111 On-going assessment of the economic impact of Syrian conflict on the empowerment of women in Jordan carried out by UN Women.
report feeling a certain level of competition with their Syrian counterparts.\(^{313}\) Also reported by Syrian women is a rise in sexual harassment. Accosted by men in the street, the assumption is that they are available for sex because of widespread stereotypes that are spread throughout the media. As noted in a recent study, this typecasting may also be the reason why Jordanian women have altered their behavior and have expressed a reluctance to leave their homes unaccompanied. It seems that women in general, whether Syrian or Jordanian, are being stigmatized or victimized within their own communities.

In Lebanon as well, there is evidence that Lebanese women are being affected by the refugee crisis because of pressures on basic services, competition for jobs and increased insecurity.\(^ {315}\) Reportedly, the difficulties of men in providing for their families, as a result of increased competition over livelihood opportunities, has contributed to higher levels of domestic and gender based violence. While inter-marriages between nationals and Syrian refugees have been quite common in Lebanon, a rapid participatory assessment\(^ {316}\) showed that in some communities in North Bekaa, young girls are increasingly concerned about Lebanese men taking advantage of the vulnerability of Syrian girls, also because of lower dowries. Lebanese women and men were also concerned about the rise in sexual and gender-based violence. A growing feeling of insecurity amongst Lebanese women and girls has affected their freedom of movement and increased their dependency on men.\(^ {317}\) Several young girls and women reported being afraid to use public transportation as the drivers of taxis and mini-buses may be Syrian and they fear being assaulted or harassed. Some reported being forced to stay home, which dramatically reduces their social, leisure and/or work activities. It has also been pointed out that differences in lifestyles, customs and traditions between the two communities, with respect to women in particular, have caused host populations to fear that their rights and freedoms could be further affected under the influence of a much more conservative Syrian community.\(^ {318}\)

### 3.2.5 Threats to Social Cohesion and Human Security

Overcrowding and ensuing pressures on basic services and resources, competition over scarce or already strained job and other livelihood opportunities are, to varying degrees, exacerbating or creating new tensions between vulnerable refugee and host communities. Within host communities, these are compounded by widespread ‘perceptions’ (whether true or not) that refugees are benefitting disproportionally from the international assistance.

As noted earlier, social interactions between host and refugee communities in Lebanon have been extensive\(^ {319}\). In some cases, inter-marriages have been found to ease social cohesion.\(^ {320}\) In Qaa and Hermel, for instance, there has been a sense of social solidarity, as demonstrated during marriages and funerals.\(^ {321}\) However, this ‘social capital’ is eroding and tensions between Lebanese and Syrian communities are reportedly on the rise. This is especially the case in refugee-dense areas like Akkar and West Bekaa. Members of host communities state that their towns and villages have become dangerously overpopulated and increasingly insecure.\(^ {322}\)

\(^{313}\) Mercy Corps, 2013, Mapping of Host Community-Refugee Tensions in Mafraq and Ramtha, May.  
\(^{314}\) ibid.  
\(^{316}\) UN Women, 2013, Gender Analysis of Host Communities affected by Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon, August. The assessment involved nine focus-group discussions (FGD), reaching 50 women and 21 men in three regions of Lebanon (Bekaa, South Lebanon and South suburbs of Beirut.  
\(^{317}\) ibid  
\(^{318}\) The assessment also notes that word of mouth and media also contributes to create a certain fear and feeling of insecurity related to Syrian men and boys  
\(^{319}\) For more evidence on crisis induced changes in gender relationships in Lebanon, see Roula El Masri, Clare Harvey and Rosa Garwood: Shifting Sands: Changing gender roles amongst refugees in Lebanon: http://www.fmreview.org/detention/anani#sthash.TmRmQcXe.dpuf.  
\(^{320}\) See UNDP/DMI Assessment, 2012, op. cit. The report highlighted the importance of social interactions between refugee and host communities, especially in the form of inter-marriages.  
\(^{321}\) Lebanon background country report. October 2013.  
A poll conducted in May 2013 found that 52 percent of Lebanese respondents believed that Syrian refugees pose a threat to national security and stability while more than 90 percent felt the Syrian conflict had a negative impact on the government’s capacity to protect Lebanese citizens. Two-thirds of those polled were favorable to establishing camps for Syrian refugees. There are growing concerns that the presence of refugees in Lebanon threatens the already fragile sectarian balance. The decision of many Sunni refugees to settle in the Hezbollah-controlled Bekaa valley raises fears of increased sectarian violence as refugees, and even host communities in some parts of Lebanon, are reportedly slipping into patterns of extremism and fanaticism. Added to this is an increase in violence as clashes between refugees and Lebanese citizens have occurred in Tripoli, Sidon, Beirut and outposts near the Lebanese-Syrian border. In Tripoli and the Bekaa Valley, larger outbreaks of fighting between groups supporting opposite sides of the Syrian conflict, have become more frequent. There have also been reports of cross-border attacks in Wadi Khaled that were attributed to Sunni refugees who have possible ties to opposition forces in Syria.

In Jordan, as in Lebanon, the arrival of Syrian refugees has had a direct impact on social cohesion in host communities and has exacerbated tensions while creating new ones. As there are no deep ethnic, religious or cultural rifts between refugee and host communities, competition for opportunity in employment and housing, along with pressures on social services are potential causes for tension.

A rapid assessment conducted by CHF reveals that the majority of Jordanians (59 percent of survey respondents) felt that tensions have been rising in their communities over the past two years because of unemployment, rising costs and corruption. A recent informant assessment conducted in six affected governorates between September and November 2013 reveals that over 20 percent of communities in Irbid are experiencing tensions. The presence of tensions was also reported by a significant number of communities in the governorates of Balqa and Jarash (actually, more frequently than in Mafraq or Zarqa). As suggested earlier in this paper, this underscores paying attention to communities which are not necessarily densely populated or record the highest refugee densities, but where and potential degree of strain between refugees and vulnerable community members (‘vulnerability ratio’) is relatively high. Also noteworthy is that in communities reporting tensions, competition over livelihoods, constraints in accessing affordable housing and the deterioration of education environments were identified as primary (most frequent) drivers of tensions.

In areas with high refugee densities, such as Irbid, there are reports that tensions have sometimes evolved into struggles over identity, territory and security. As noted earlier, integration challenges between Syrian and Jordanian children in public schools have led to verbal and physical bullying and resulted in an unsafe environment for all children. However, aside from rising tensions, there is no evidence to substantiate that the arrival of Syrian refugees has had a direct impact on crime beyond what can be normally expected from an increase in population.

While people are generally dissatisfied with how the government is responding to their needs,
there also are growing feelings of unfairness and exclusion with respect to humanitarian aid provided to Syrian refugees. Reportedly, some local CSOs and CBOs that were providing support to Jordanian vulnerable families in Northern governorates had to cut their support and mobilize resources for Syrian families, which prompted frustration for Jordanians. Quite worrisome, the survey conducted in 2012 by the CSS revealed that 65 percent of Jordanians were against receiving more Syrian refugees while 80 percent advocated for them to be contained in camps and 67 percent believed they pose a security threat.

3.2.6 PRIORITY NEEDS FOR ACTION AMONGST HOST COMMUNITIES: INSIGHTS FROM LOCAL PERCEPTION SURVEYS

As documented in previous sections, the Syrian crisis is affecting the broad spectrum of human development outcomes in host communities. Because available evidence tends to focus on specific locations and/or specific sectors, it is generally difficult to identify sectoral priorities for action within and across hosting areas. However, the results of the perception surveys organized by UNDP in seven regions of Lebanon (Regional Working Groups) and in the 36 municipalities of Ma’arrat and Irbid governorates – have provided particularly interesting insights on most pressing needs.

**Lebanon: Results from Regional Working Groups Surveys**

To allow for a differentiation of perceived impacts, several criteria were taken into account for the selection of survey regions in Lebanon, namely:

- **The presence of Syrian refugees/vulnerability level:** Four out of seven regional working groups/surveys were organized in the governorates with the highest concentration of refugees (North Lebanon: Donnieh and Halba, and Bekaa: Baalbeck and West Bekaa).

- **Rural vs. urban areas:** The urban areas of Tyr, BSS and Halba were selected in order to highlight disparities between rural and urban areas. Variability in terms of economic sectors (agriculture, construction, etc.) was also taken into consideration. For example, agriculture activities are predominant in Bekaa while construction is concentrated in BSS.

Surveyed stakeholders included elected municipality members, local authorities, NGO staff and stakeholders at the local/regional levels. Around 10 percent of all participants were females. Although this percentage seems low, it reflects the reality of female participation in political and electoral process in Lebanon. At the end of each session, participants in Regional Working Groups filled in a quantitative questionnaire that was used to measure the following: presence or absence of an impact; positive or negative impacts; amplitude of the impact, and trend of the impact.

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335 The UNDP Country Office was in charge of preparing working groups. Priority was given to the most accessible regions. An ART-Gold regional facilitator coordinated working group sessions and was assisted by three experts from the Consultation Research Institute.
Table 16: Scope of Perception Survey on the Impacts of the Crisis (Lebanon)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District/City</th>
<th>Vulnerability Ratio</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
<th>Number of Questionnaires</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beirut Southern Suburbs</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Beirut)</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dernieh (North Lebanon)</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deirbek (Beqaa)</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burj Hammoud (Mount Lebanon)</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyre (South Lebanon)</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sour)</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haila (North Lebanon)</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Akkar Halba)</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Kharoub (Chouf, Mount Lebanon)</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chouf)</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lebanon background report, October 2013 (detailed minutes and list of participants); na: not available

As can be seen in Figure 23, the average rating score of the impact is 1.75, which is above the theoretical average of 1.5. After averaging participant’s ratings it appears that solid waste (with a score of 1.97) is the biggest challenge for Lebanese host communities, followed by competition over labor markets (1.95), health impacts (1.93), and dwindling access to electricity (1.91). Although they do not rank among the ‘top four’ perceived impacts, pressures on water and natural resources, sanitation and education services score significantly above average. Noteworthy is that among social sectors, education seemed to be less affected than health.

Figure 23: Perceived Impacts of the Crisis in Host Communities: Average Rating Scores Per Sector (Lebanon)

Source: Adapted from Lebanon background report, October 2013

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336 See Section 2.2.2
337 Where the minimum equals 1.0 and the maximum equals 2.0.
338 The situation however might have changed since the survey was conducted.
The indicator reflects the dispersion/variation of the impact per sector between regions. The lower the percentage is for a sector, the less variation found amongst different regions. Most of the regions in this case face the same impact in specific sectors. The higher the percentage, the more dispersed the impact among the different regions.

Table 17: Sectoral Impact Rating Scores According to Surveyed Communities (Lebanon)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Total average</th>
<th>BSS</th>
<th>Donnieh</th>
<th>Balbeek</th>
<th>West Bekaa</th>
<th>Tyr</th>
<th>Halba</th>
<th>Ekkim kharoush</th>
<th>Coefficients of variation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solid waste</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>labor market composition</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature Resources</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitation</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Markets (demand, consumption)</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominal value</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social cohesion</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of productive services</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Average</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition on market skills</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of products and services</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunication</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of production</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign trade</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lebanon background report, October 2013.

The findings however reveals **disparities in perceived impacts and priorities for action between locations for all sectors and within locations for specific sectors/effects**. Consistent with other findings, the socio-economic impacts of the crisis were more strongly felt in peripheral areas with high ‘vulnerability ratios’ (North, Bekkaa, Chouf) than in BSS or Tyr (South Lebanon). Coefficient of variations (ratio of standard deviations to mean) show that amongst the most impacted sectors, solid waste, competition for jobs, health and education have also the lowest variability amongst regions.

Pressures on natural resources are felt more strongly in the north, where natural ecosystems face significant pressures compared to other regions. **Conversely, electricity, water and sanitation show a higher variability amongst regions.** Not surprisingly, pressures in these sectors are felt more strongly in peripheral areas than BSS. In some (e.g. Donnieh, Tyr), perceived pressures on infrastructures (electricity, water, sanitation) outscores strains on social sectors (health, education) and job markets. Perceived impacts on costs of production also vary significantly between locations. In Halba, the pressure is felt all the more since it has become a central urban zone for Syrian refugees in North Lebanon. Generally, effects on social cohesion are strongly felt in peripheral areas with high refugee concentrations and high poverty incidence (e.g Balbeek, Donnieh). This verifies earlier findings that despite socio-economic ties between Lebanese and Syrian communities, competition over resources, opportunities and services tend to fuel resentment (Table 17).

---

339 The indicator reflects the dispersion/variation of the impact per sector between regions. The lower the percentage is for a sector, the less variation found amongst different regions. Most of the regions in this case face the same impact in specific sectors. The higher the percentage, the more dispersed the impact among the different regions.
Jordan: Results from Surveys in the Municipalities of Mafraq and Irbid

In cooperation with Local Development Committees, qualitative and quantitative data was collected through survey questionnaires and focused group discussions in 36 municipalities in Mafraq and Irbid. The self-administered survey was designed to assess the municipal needs and challenges from a social and technical perspective and identify priorities across the following sectors: Services Solid Waste Management, Water, Sanitation, and Infrastructures (Municipal Services), Education and Healthcare (Government Services), and other issues (employment, housing, environment, and agriculture). Responses to surveys were self-reported by each municipality.340

Figure 24: Perceived Top Priorities in Irbid and Mafraq: Distribution of Municipality Responses by Sector

Echoing Lebanon survey findings, results from the Jordanian survey show that all municipalities in Mafraq and Irbid identified solid waste management (SWM) as a top priority for action. Amongst the eight sectors identified in both governorates as most directly impacted by the refugee crisis342 and priority areas for intervention, solid waste management, followed by education, water and health altogether made up more than 50 percent of responses from municipalities in both Governorates (Figure 24). Results suggest that the pressure on education and health systems was felt more broadly across municipalities in Mafraq governorate compared to Irbid. Surveyed municipalities were also asked to rate priorities identified according to their ‘degree of importance’343 Figure 25 shows average scores for relevant sectors and each Governorate. As can be seen, on average, solid waste management scored highest (close to 5). This is followed by water, health and education. There is overall very little variation in scores between the two Governorates. However, needs for improvements to water and electricity supply would appear to be most pressing in Mafraq compared to Irbid.

340 The questionnaire was sent to the executive councils, headed by the administrative ruler and heads of municipalities within as well as heads of other social services.
341 See UNDP Municipality Needs Assessment – Annex 2 (Top priorities identified by surveyed municipalities); calculations made by the authors are based on the list of priorities and related scores provided in the Annex.
342 Though mentioned as a priority for intervention by a significant number of municipalities, road infrastructure was not considered here, as it was not perceived as directly impacted by the refugee crisis.
343 Scores were ranging between 2 and 5.
However, disparities in scores at municipal level are noteworthy. As can be seen in figure 26, with a few exceptions (sanitation in Mafraq and water in Irbid), needs appear to be relatively more pressing for all sectors in smaller, less populated municipalities compared to more populated ones.

Pointing to the need for a development response, priority interventions commonly suggested by municipalities for SWM and water revolved around correcting structural deficiencies and increasing human resource and infrastructure capacities. For water, the focus was on maintenance and extension of water networks as well as the development of new sources of water. For SWM, respondents emphasized the purchase of new equipment and vehicles and the hiring of more workers. For health, improving medicine supply and hiring of new staff were identified as key interventions.

Although housing and employment were not listed among the top four priorities for action by many municipalities, they were identified as areas severely affected by the refugee crisis and key points of strain between refugee and host community members. This echoes the results of another recent study, which reveals that the lack of affordable housing is perceived as a key driver of tension by 47 percent of surveyed communities reporting tensions, followed by challenges in education (43 percent).

344 Possibly because housing and employment issues fall outside of municipalities’ mandates.
and competition over livelihoods opportunities (23 percent)\textsuperscript{345}.

These findings overall suggest that, while ‘collective community challenges’, such as those related to solid waste, health, water, should receive priority attention in the response to the crisis, from a social cohesion lens, a special emphasis should be placed on sectors (access to housing, jobs) where the effects of the refugee crisis are more discriminatory.

### 3.2.7 CONTRASTING LOCAL AND MACRO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE CRISIS: HIGHLIGHTS

As stressed in earlier chapters, a number of methodological issues underpin the assessment of the macro-economic impacts of the Syrian crisis in Lebanon and Jordan. The foremost is perhaps the difficulty of distinguishing between crisis-specific impact and those caused by the external or policy factors that were already at play prior to the crisis. While price and employment impacts of the crisis were discussed earlier in the report given their immediate connection with the refugee crisis, the present section provides some highlights on other major macro-channels through which the Syrian conflict has affected development prospects in Lebanon and Jordan. A special focus is placed on trade, investment, tourism and resulting effects on economic growth, as well as public finance.

#### Trade and Investment

**Effects of the Syrian crisis on trade performance in Lebanon and Jordan are complex.** The Syrian border has historically served as a critical gateway for Lebanese products especially for merchandise in transit from the port of Beirut toward the markets of the Gulf States.\textsuperscript{347} As a result of the conflict, the share of exports transiting through Syria declined by 0.7 percent of GDP between 2009 and 2012. The first half of 2013 witnessed sharp reductions in trade flows, particularly for food and consumer goods.\textsuperscript{348} As imports come mostly from the rest of the world while exports are mostly directed to other countries in the region, the merchandise trade balance is expected to worsen. The trade deficit increased from USD 9.3 to 14.2 billion between 2009 and 2012. However, as highlighted in Box 8, there have been some ‘positive spillovers’ in the trade sector in the recent period.

Compared to Lebanese economy, the Jordanian economy is less integrated with Syria, which may explain why the aggregate economic impact of the Syrian conflict has been more contained. Whilst between 2010 and 2012, imports from Syria dropped by 37 percent and exports to Syria by 32 percent, the impact on the trade balance was limited because the share of Jordan trade with Syria is small. However, as with Lebanon, the closure of Syrian export transit routes to Turkey, Lebanon and Europe in 2012 and the rise in imports as a result of refugee demands, however led to a significant deterioration of the trade balance.\textsuperscript{349} The country has resorted to alternative routes, which has hurt export price and competitiveness. Export growth declined from 13 percent in 2011 to -1 percent in 2012.\textsuperscript{350} Conversely, imports grew by 22 percent in 2011 and 9 percent in 2012, with increases in food imports by 23 percent and 11 percent respectively.

In Lebanon, the deterioration of the security situation also reduced FDI due to weakened investor confidence. FDI fell 68 percent from USD 3.5 billion in 2011 (8.8 percent of GDP) to USD 1.1 billion in 2012 (2.7 percent of GDP)\textsuperscript{351}. In Jordan, FDI has been witnessing a steady decline since 2008, which started long before the onset of the Arab Spring and Syrian crisis. Available data shows that the decline continued, though at a slower pace, between 2010 and 2012.


\textsuperscript{346} Pre-crisis conditions, along with other internal and external factors need to be factored in.

\textsuperscript{347} 40 percent of all exports transit through it for destinations such as Jordan


\textsuperscript{349} Transit trade is large and accounts for about 11 percent of Jordan’s exports and 30 percent of its imports (IMF).


Tourism

Lebanon is significantly exposed to Syria not only through trade channels but also because of the risk that instability in Syria creates for Lebanon's tourism sector. In the first eleven months of 2013, the number of tourists coming into Lebanon decreased by 7.3% from the same period in 2012 and by 23.7% from the same period in 2011. Tourism losses were estimated at 0.5 percent of GDP in 2012. At the local level, hotels and restaurants in North Lebanon and Bekaa, some of the largest host communities, stated a decrease in business revenue. The occupancy rate of four and five star hotels in these areas was 54 percent in 2012 compared to 68 percent in 2010.

The tourism sector has also been affected in Jordan but to a lesser extent than Lebanon. Because some tourists travel to Amman as part of a trip that may also include Damascus, there are travellers who have been avoiding visiting Jordan. The number of tourists fell by 17 percent in 2011 and further by 7 percent in 2012, mostly as a result of a sharp drop in the number of Syrian tourists. Interestingly enough, though the conflict in Syria has caused problems for those in the tourism industry, the sector shows signs of recovery (Box 8).

Box 8: Are there any economic benefits from the crisis?

Due to falling production in Syria, Syrian demand for Lebanese products has been on the rise, mitigating the negative impact of the crisis which hampers the transit of goods through Syria. Remarkably, Lebanese agricultural exports to Syria increased in 2012, despite disruptions to overland trade due to border and road closures in Syria, and rebel attacks on trucks bound for Syria. While Lebanon has traditionally been a net food importer from Syria, the country posted its first food trade surplus in 2012. In some communities, the decrease of agricultural exports due to insecure trade routes via Syria has been absorbed by an increase in local demand. Revenues at the Beirut Port increased by 26 percent in 2013, and taking into account that regional demand for Syrian goods has been replaced by Lebanese exports, industrial exports increased by 13.5 percent between June 2012 and June 2013. It is worth noting though that some Lebanese employers benefit from hiring low wage employees. This is true of Lebanese employers in agro-industries, where the hiring of Syrian workers has reportedly generated a decrease in production costs across the sector.

In Jordan, the onset of the Syrian crisis, coupled with insecurity in Lebanon, reportedly contributed to reroute regional tourism to the country, supporting the recovery of the sector and growth of related services. Income from tourism went up 15 percent and came close to returning to its pre-crisis level. Along with benefits to the tourism industry, some have also pointed to long-term benefits of Syrian direct investment in the country. In 2012, Syrian investment in Jordanian industrial zones amounted to JD 9.3 billion (more than USD 13 billion) and created almost 700 new industrial jobs.

More research is needed to fully gauge the nature and extent of the potential beneficial spillovers and second round effects of the Syrian crisis in Jordan and Lebanon, including research on the overall impacts of aid flows, incidence of cash assistance on local economies etc. However, these benefits currently seem to be meager vis-à-vis the huge costs and hardships that the crisis has placed on host populations and institutions.
Economic Growth

The spillovers of Syrian crisis have dampened growth in both countries, but particularly so in Lebanon, where the growth rate fell from around 3 percent in 2011 to 2.0 percent in 2012 and further down to 1.5 percent in 2013.364 The World Bank estimated that for the period 2012-2014, the Syrian conflict may lead to a cumulative loss in wages, profits, taxes, private consumption and investment of up to USD 7.5 billion.365 Other studies estimate the cost to be already in excess of USD 6.3 billion, or 20.21 percent of GDP.366

After a sharp decrease in 2010 as a result of the global financial crisis, the GDP growth rate in Jordan posted a very modest recovery reaching 2.6 percent in 2011 and 2.7 percent in 2012.367 At the time of writing, it was projected that GDP would rise only to a modest 3.1 percent in 2013 and to 3.2 percent in 2014. The Central Bank of Jordan estimates this is 2 percentage points lower than the growth rate that could have been achieved without the effects of the Syrian crisis.368

Fiscal Space

In both countries, the fiscal situation, already weak pre-crisis, is further strained due to the additional burden being placed on fiscal spending and the negative impacts of the economic slowdown. In the case of Lebanon, the World Bank369 noted that initial fiscal impacts on Lebanon were limited primarily because most assistance was provided by NGOs and donors.370 However, as anticipated, the situation has been deteriorating rapidly. The fiscal balance registered a deficit of around 9.5 percent in 2012 compared to 6 percent in 2011.371 The WB ESIA estimated that the crisis could depress government revenue collection by USD 1.5 billion while simultaneously increasing expenditures by USD 1.1 billion due to the demand for public services. The widening of the fiscal deficit may also lift the public debt ratio and place Lebanon on an unsustainable path. Public debt was estimated at USD 57.7 billion (58 percent domestic debt and 42 percent external debt), the equivalent of 137 percent of GDP in 2012.372

After peaking at 12.7 percent in 2011, the overall fiscal deficit in Jordan (excluding grants) shrank to 9.75 of GDP in 2012. However, rather than stabilizing, the fiscal situation deteriorated in the first quarter of 2013 (compared to the first quarter of 2012), with the deficit (excluding grants) widening as public spending rose by 14.5 percent and domestic revenues dropped by 2.2 percent. As a result, gross public debt increased by 1.8 percent and reached USD 25.3 billion (81.6 percent of GDP).373

As seen in Figure 27, the recent period is marked by a ‘development adverse’ tradeoff between capital and current expenditures. Reportedly, in 2012 Jordan incurred over USD 251 million to cover additional subsidies (this includes bread, electricity, water and household gas) and current expenditures to provide services and basic needs for Syrian refugees. In 2013, it was estimated that more than USD 152.4 million would be needed to provide subsidized items to Syrian refugees.374

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365 WB ESIA, 2013
366 According to report from the Economic Studies Unit at Credit Libanais, see: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/08/economic-cost-of-syrian-war-on-lebanon.html#ixzz2IT7FbEr
367 Word Bank, Jordan Economic Monitor, 2013
368 G21/UN Needs Assessment Review, November 2013
369 World Bank, Lebanon Economic Monitor, Spring 2013
370 The absence of blanket subsidies (contrary to Jordan) also explains limited strain on public expenditure.
371 SNAP, 2013, Lebanon, baseline information.
372 Ibid.
The WB ESIA estimated that for the period 2012-2014, overall stabilization costs (e.g. the amount needed to revert access and quality of services to pre-conflict levels) could reach USD 1.4 - 1.6 billion or almost 3.5 percent of GDP. In Jordan, 'hosting costs' for 2013 were estimated at USD 449.1 million in January 2013 but were revised upward to USD 851.5 million in April 2013 and further up to 1.68 USD billion in October 2013, including USD 558 million for current expenditures and subsidy costs. The appeal of the Jordanian Government under the new RRP amounts to USD 413.7 million while the cost of the response foreseen under the National Resilience Plan (2014-2016) is estimated at USD 2.41 billion.

Source: Jordan Background Country Report, October 2013, based on MoF data.
PART IV – ASSESSING THE CURRENT RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS: THE NEED FOR A TURNAROUND

In Lebanon and Jordan, hosting high numbers of refugees both in absolute terms and relative to their own population has put a toll on human development prospects in both countries. In this context, an important question that needs to be asked is how do national and international partners address the vulnerabilities and wider/longer term human development spillovers of the crisis on host communities and respond to priority needs?

A number of strategic frameworks have been developed to address the effects of the Syrian crisis/refugee crisis in Jordan and in Lebanon. These include the Regional Response Plan (RRP)\textsuperscript{376} and national response plans (the Stabilization Roadmap in Lebanon and National Resilience Plan in Jordan).

Because the RRP has so far formed the ‘mainstay’ of the current response and served as a core channel for resource mobilization, this part briefly assesses and compares the 5th and 6th editions of the RRP for Lebanon and Jordan against the following:\textsuperscript{377}

(i) Outreach to vulnerable populations and responsiveness to sectoral priorities in host communities;
(ii) Bridges and coordination between humanitarian (short-term) and development (longer-term) action

For the purpose of the analysis, it is important to note that the 6th edition of the RRP maintained protection and assistance to refugees as primary strategic objectives. However, reflecting a greater awareness of the impact of the crisis on host communities and institutions as well as of the protracted nature of the crisis (see Box 9), the new edition places a greater onus on addressing vulnerabilities of populations and recovery needs of host communities. Emergency preparedness has been discarded and instead, longer term planning and engagement in national development processes and plans were included as strategic objectives.

Box 9: UN Statements on the Impacts of the Syrian Crisis

“The political and humanitarian dimensions of the Syria crisis have been recognized from the outset. But, there is now heightened awareness that this is also a development crisis. It will have a deep and long lasting impact on the development and future prospects of Syria. Neighboring countries’ development prospects too have been seriously impacted. The challenge now is to ensure that our collective response to this complex crisis is both humanitarian and developmental in approach”, Helen Clark, UNDP Administrator

“As refugees flee to areas already riven by inequalities, we can only expect disparities between rich and poor, haves and have-nots, to deepen and multiply in Syria’s neighbors. Growing resentment can then threaten national and regional stability. So our response to these dangers must marry immediate needs to future needs - the immediate needs of refugees fleeing the conflict…and also the longer-term needs of the countries hosting them” Anthony Lake, Executive Director for UNICEF

“In Syria and the affected neighboring countries working together we must continue providing food, water, shelter and other immediate lifesaving services. The length, the growing numbers of victims (both inside and outside Syria) and the sheer magnitude of the loss by so many, demands that we knit up our immediate response activities with appropriate efforts to address the longer term livelihood

\textsuperscript{376} Note: Government plans were developed in close coordination with humanitarian actors on the ground to ensure the compatibility and non-duplication of activities.

\textsuperscript{377} The RRP6 was launched at the time of finalizing the present paper.
*challenges.* This work will require supporting affected Syrians as well as affected neighboring country populations whose generosity has regrettably resulted in detrimental economic, social and educational impacts* Ertharin Cousin, Executive Director for WFP

“This crisis has gone far beyond providing only humanitarian assistance to displaced people. Many host communities need longer term development investment, as the challenges they face are likely to grow.”

Antonio Guterres, High Commissioner for UNHCR

“It is clear that neighboring countries will need support for many years. This requires a comprehensive regional approach, including development partners and financial institutions and humanitarian organizations, implementing a multi-year programme of support for Governments and communities. While continuing to support Syrian refugees, we must build resilience in host communities and address concerns about social cohesion, security, stability and access to social services. Valerie Amos, Under-Secretary General for OCHA

Source: Conference on Solidarity and Burden-Sharing with Countries Hosting Syrian Refugees held in Geneva in September 2013

4.1 OUTREACH TO VULNERABLE POPULATIONS AND RESPONSIVENESS TO SECTORAL PRIORITIES IN HOST COMMUNITIES

4.1.1 HOW DOES THE RESPONSE BALANCE THE NEEDS OF REFUGEES AND VULNERABLE HOST POPULATIONS?

The ratio of the number of Syrian refugees to the number of affected residents in host communities targeted for assistance in the various sectors covered by RRP5 provides a good indication of the extent to which the response seeks a balance between the needs of refugees and equally vulnerable populations in host communities.

These were calculated for Lebanon and Jordan based on data contained in RRP5 and related dashboards and RRP6 (Table 19). Note that in the case of Jordan, the RRP5 did not explicitly target vulnerable residents. In the 6th edition also, the outreach to ‘other affected populations’ should be interpreted with caution, as numbers vary sensibly from one sector, and the response does not necessarily involve targeted support for vulnerable residents, but simply assumes that a certain number of residents would benefit in an indirect manner. In the case of Lebanon, the RRP5 explicitly featured outreach to affected Lebanese and related monthly sectoral dashboards/ updates provide numbers on the different vulnerable groups targeted by RRP assistance. These definitional and other issues necessarily limit comparisons between the two countries and call for a ‘more qualitative’ reading of the plans.

378 Ibid
Having said that, Table 19 exhibits a number of interesting patterns. Generally, and understandably, support under the RRPs for Lebanon and Jordan remains prominently directed towards the needs of refugees. However, efforts to balance refugee and host community needs are significant in both countries. On average, RRP6 reaches out to 1 affected resident for every two refugees in Lebanon, against 2 Jordanians for every five refugees in Jordan (when support to camp refugees is included).

In Lebanon, a significant outreach to vulnerable host populations features RRP support in the areas of water and sanitation, food security, education and health, where ratios exceed 0.4 and generally increased between RRP5 and RRP6. This in addition to support to social cohesion and livelihoods, which is by nature earmarked for host communities.

Overall, the RRP6 for Jordan is characterized by a greater outreach to refugees outside camps compared to RRP5. Efforts to balance support to refugees and host communities are also noteworthy in the areas of water/sanitation and health support. Conversely, the relative outreach to host populations in the area of education appears to be quite low given the acuteness of needs. The high ratio featuring support in the protection cluster (1.17) is noteworthy: although the RRP for Jordan does not explicitly identify social cohesion and livelihoods support as a specific area of intervention, the protection cluster foresees support to community-based projects, in the form of QIPs and CIPs, as key to promoting peaceful coexistence between refugee and host communities.

The very high ratio featuring support under the shelter cluster should be interpreted with caution, as all interventions (with the exception of awareness raising on tenure rights) are earmarked for refugees. However, shelter support for refugees is expected to have positive spillover effects to the local construction industry through the engagement of local contractors, and through local market material purchases, while mitigating overall pressures on housing supply and costs.
### 4.1.2 Funding Requirements vs Top Priorities for Host Communities

Table 20 and 21 below provide details of the funding requirements of UN agencies, NGOs, and governments of Jordan and Lebanon within the 5th and 6th editions of the Regional Response Plan to cater to the needs of refugees and host communities.

Table 20: Sectoral Breakdown of UN and Government Requested Funding within RRP5 (January to December 2013) in Lebanon and Jordan (USD million and percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>UN agencies and others</th>
<th>Governments</th>
<th>Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food/Food Security</td>
<td>256.6</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>196.6</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFI/Basic Needs</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>136.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash Assistance</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Cohesion and Livelihoods</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total requested</strong></td>
<td><strong>976.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,216.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Authors’ calculations; For Lebanon: MOsa and RRP5-Lebanon. For Jordan: Syrian Regional Response Plan: January to December 2013.

* Revised RRP (June 2013) Funding status http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php#

Table 21: Sectoral Breakdown of UN and Government Requested Funding within RRP6 (January-June 2014) in Lebanon and Jordan (USD million and percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>UN and other Agencies</th>
<th>Governments</th>
<th>Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>101.5</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>93.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food/Food Security</td>
<td>132.6</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>239.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>91.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>111.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>86.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFI/Basic Needs</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>77.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>102.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASH</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>65.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Cohesion and Livelihoods</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Municipal Support)</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>681.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>817.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Authors’ calculations; based on RRP6 data: http://www.data.unhcr.org/syria-rrp6/download.php?id=100
As can be seen, under the RRP5 (Table 20), there was little difference between the two countries in terms of total requirements with the exception of health, non-food items (NFIs), and WASH. The largest difference between the two countries was for the health sector with Lebanon requiring almost double the relative share required by Jordan. This was followed by WASH where Jordan took the lead with a difference of 7.8 percentage points compared to Lebanon in the relative share of the sector out of the total financial requirements. However, country differences for these two sectors significantly narrowed under the RRP6 (Table 21).

Table 22 puts into perspective the ‘top four’ sectoral priorities enshrined in RRP5 and RRP6 (as proxied by the relative share of financial requirements) with the ‘top four’ sectoral priorities identified by stakeholders on the ground as part of the recent survey exercises (see 3.2.6). Differences in priorities between RRP5 and RRP6, between UN agencies and Governments and among sectors within each country are of particular significance.

As can be seen, there are some disconnects between the sectoral priorities set by UN agencies and governments on the one hand, and the priority needs expressed by the host communities and municipalities on the other hand. These are particularly evident under RRP5, where, with the exception of health in the case of Lebanon, none of the top four priorities expressed by host communities were covered by the combined response. Moreover, the financial burden of the support in the health sector, which stands as a top priority for host communities in both countries, fell overwhelmingly on government shoulders. In Jordan, it is also noteworthy that despite the tremendous needs in this area, only 11 percent of funding requirements were for education.

Table 22: Sectoral Priorities in the Response Plans vs Perceived Top 4 Priorities for Action in Host Communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN and other Agencies</th>
<th>Jordan (RRP5)</th>
<th>Jordan (RRP6)</th>
<th>Lebanon (RRP5)</th>
<th>Lebanon (RRP6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>1. WASH</td>
<td>1. WASH</td>
<td>1. Health</td>
<td>1. Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Education</td>
<td>2. Education</td>
<td>2. Shelter</td>
<td>2. Shelter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Health</td>
<td>(Employment/Housing)</td>
<td>4. Electricity</td>
<td>4. Electricity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although solid waste management ranks as the number one priority in host communities in Lebanon and in Jordan, it was not singled out as a priority issue under RRP5. In Jordan, international support to solid waste removal under the WASH sector was primarily extended for camp refugees. Furthermore, while impacts on jobs and livelihoods rank second in Lebanon, only 2 percent of total funding requirements by the international community were earmarked for immediate assistance to livelihoods and social cohesion.379 Although pointing to the need to support communities hosting

379 See Table 20
Syrians to mitigate the negative socio-economic impact of the increased Syrian population on national infrastructure, and increase direct assistance to vulnerable Jordanians, RRP5 for Jordan did not feature funding in this area.

Overall, the sectoral distribution of financial requirements under the RRP6 in Jordan and Lebanon does not reveal a greater responsiveness to the top priorities expressed by host communities compared to RRP5. Only WASH in the case of Jordan, and health in the case of Lebanon, do feature among the ‘top four’ priorities for funding in the combined response.

In the case of Jordan, priorities expressed by communities are primarily echoed by the appeal of the Government. The weight placed on providing direct support to municipalities is especially noteworthy. It should also be noted that in area of education, the burden falls prominently on the government (56 percent of total sector requirements).

In the case of Lebanon, support to health makes up 13 percent of funding requirements from the international community (against 8 percent under RRP5). Also noteworthy (and in contrast with Jordan) is the engagement of the Government of Lebanon to support efforts in the area of social cohesion and livelihoods. However, despite the criticality of support in this area, it represents less than 6 percent of total requirements. Moreover, energy (electricity) needs continue to be left out of the response.

### 4.2 BALANCE AND BRIDGES BETWEEN SHORT TERM AND LONGER TERM ACTION

While the RRP in Jordan and Lebanon has placed a greater emphasis on reaching out to host populations, the extent to which short-term action under the RRP can effectively address longer-term recovery and resilience capacity needs in host communities is an important issue for consideration, given the protracted nature of the crisis and funding constraints. To shed light on this issue, the distribution of funding requirements according to the nature and expected impacts of interventions is briefly analyzed. This section also sheds light on current response coordination mechanisms.

#### 4.2.1 HOW DOES THE RESPONSE BALANCE SHORT TERM AND LONGER TERM NEEDS?

The RRP6 stressed the need for a greater convergence between humanitarian and development action and adopted a three-track approach that encompasses (i) life-saving support for refugees, (ii) interventions aimed at avoiding a deepening of vulnerabilities of refugee and host populations and preserving social cohesion in most affected areas and (iii) interventions geared towards building longer-term resilience and capacities.

Upon closer review of the projects and initiatives implemented under the RRP for Lebanon and Jordan, it appears that a number of interventions geared towards immediate vulnerability mitigation have also the potential to meet broader and longer-term development needs in host communities. In the food security sector in Lebanon, this involves for instance restoring smallholder production systems in partnership with local institutions in crisis-affected areas, and the development of e-card based food voucher systems, which has the potential to support the revitalization of local economies. In Jordan, the reliance on market-based solutions also gained prominence over in-kind support in the food security response (as featured notably by the opening of a local Jordanian bakery
near Za’atari camp). In the education sector, some interventions (e.g. supply of learning materials to all children, improvements to sanitation facilities) can help improve learning environments.

**In both countries, a stronger emphasis is also placed on the strengthening of national/local institutions and systems.** In the WASH sector in Lebanon, it has been acknowledged that the affected population is scattered all over the country making the response in this sector expensive, time consuming and logistically challenging. Amongst the latest developments was a plan to elaborate a water and sanitation infrastructure project in coordination with the Lebanese Water Authorities and corresponding mapping for stabilization/community-based initiatives that benefit host communities and refugees. In Jordan, the RRP provides for improving water infrastructure in major host communities. In the health sector, efforts to train national health officers on the investigation of outbreak of diseases are also noteworthy.

In Lebanon, other longer term-oriented projects include the strengthening of public education and health systems and surveillance; the rehabilitation of schools; support to the National Poverty Targeting Program and Social Development Centers. The RRP6 also provides for the implementation of community-based projects for strengthening municipal services and livelihoods, under ‘Lebanon Host Community Support Program.’

While differences in the very nature of interventions planned under the last two tracks (vulnerability reduction/mitigation and capacity building for resilience) are not always clear-cut, the way funding requirements are distributed across the various tracks of the RRP for the different sectors, however, is of particular interest.

As can be seen in Figure 28 and Figure 29, in both countries, the bulk (around 60 percent) of funding requirements is for life-saving/emergency purposes. Immediate support to the mitigation of vulnerabilities accounts for 31 percent of requirements in Lebanon, and a slightly higher share in Jordan while support to longer-term resilience capacity needs accounts for less than 6 percent of funding requirements in Jordan and for about 7 percent in Lebanon. In Jordan, support to resilience building gets a higher priority in education (13.6 percent), followed by protection and WASH. In Lebanon, shelter, education, followed by health are the sectors that are mostly targeted by this type of assistance.

**Figure 28: Distribution of RRP6 funding requirements by Type of Intervention and by Sector (Jordan)**

![Diagram showing distribution of RRP6 funding requirements by Type of Intervention and by Sector (Jordan)](source: RRP6 – Jordan)

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183 Inter-Agency Achievements report, September 2013
184 At the time of report writing, an inter-agency WASH assessment was underway to evaluate community capacity needs in the area, as well as for solid waste management.
185 As noted earlier, support in this area also includes community based projects aimed at promoting social cohesion.
Because the time horizon of the RRP is only one year, the extent to which RRP interventions for vulnerability mitigation and resilience can effectively contribute to building resilience of people and institutions in host communities of Jordan and Lebanon on a sustainable basis remains an issue. This generally underscores the need for tightening strategic and programmatic linkages with the medium term/long term priorities set forth in the national resilience/recovery plans recently developed by these two countries, along with commensurate funding of these plans. In light of funding constraints, consolidating initiatives that are scattered and small-scale and addressing multi-sectoral needs, including social cohesion, with a view to maximizing synergies is also an important way forward, highlighting the need for strengthened coordination between the numerous national and international humanitarian and development actors involved in the response. 

4.2.2 INSTITUTIONAL LINKAGES AND COORDINATION BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT ACTORS

Response efforts at the country level have been led by the UNHCR, working in close collaboration with host governments and humanitarian partners. In both countries, thematic working groups have been established to ensure a coordinated response in the sectors of intervention and joint contingency plans have been developed to ensure high levels of preparedness.

In Lebanon, the MOSA is the government entity in charge of coordinating the refugee response. An inter-ministerial committee brings together line ministries and relevant security agencies under one structure. The committee, chaired by the Prime Minister, has several members including the ministries of Social Affairs, Education, Health, Defense and Security. UNHCR, with the support of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), assists the coordination efforts of the Government by co-leading the inter-agency coordination structure. The UNHCR and other UN agencies chair – sometimes with co-chairing of MOSA - the sectoral working groups established for the implementation of the RRP.

In Jordan, the refugee response is under the oversight of Government through the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and MoPIC, line ministries working with each of response sectors, as well as governorates and municipalities in refugee-affected areas. UN

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386 For instance, in Lebanon, the Stabilization and Recovery Programme (SRP) is a joint undertaking of UNDP, UNHABITAT and UNRWA that brings together 4 programs: the Lebanon Host Community Support Programme; the Lebanon ART program; a project on Strengthening Civil Peace in Lebanon Project and Supporting Vulnerable Host Communities in Palestinian Gatherings.
agencies and NGOs chair the various sectors and sub-sectors covered by RRP. Sectoral working groups are coordinated by an Inter-Sector Working Group, which further reports to a higher-level coordination structure chaired by the UNHCR (the Inter Agency Task Force), that brings together most of the agencies working in the field.

Though stakeholders are doing their best to manage the situation, coordination remains a concern amongst UN agencies, NGOs, host governments and donor representatives. This is to be expected given the scale and complexity of the operation and based on the fear that stakeholders may duplicate their efforts, pursue different priorities or work to inconsistent standards. Such concerns have been exacerbated by the widespread perception that UNHCR did not provide effective coordination in the early stages of the emergency. The need for strengthened and inclusive coordination mechanisms has been since then forcefully acknowledged. Particularly noteworthy from the viewpoint of the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of interventions are plans to decentralize/further decentralize coordination mechanisms and foster participation of local stakeholders in response planning and implementation. In Jordan, while a number of multi-sector fora already exist, the RRP6 foresees the strengthening of coordination structures in affected urban areas while the RRP for Lebanon provides for the establishment of field sectoral working groups. In both countries, inter-sector information sharing and vulnerability assessments are also foreseen as important action points for a better coordinated response.

Yet, the more specific challenge of the coordination between humanitarian and development actors (national and international) in the context of vulnerability mitigation/resilience building efforts remains to be addressed. The recent establishment of the Host Community Platform in Jordan and the Host Community Taskforce in Lebanon should however help improving national coordination and integrating international humanitarian and development action, along with a better alignment with national priorities and plans.

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PART V – CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: TOWARDS LONG-TERM RESILIENCE

The paper has highlighted the ways in which the Syrian crisis has decisively affected the already fragile socioeconomic fabrics in two of the most affected neighboring countries. This is meant to emphasize that the Syrian crisis has not created problems from scratch. Well before the onset of the Syrian crisis, the Lebanon and Jordan economies were showing signs of fragility, as featured by sluggish growth, persisting high levels of unemployment, poverty and inequality, as well as weak public finances.

The Syrian crisis has affected Lebanese and Jordanian economies and societies through various channels, and most strikingly through the unprecedented demographic and vulnerability shock wave arising from massive inflows of refugees. Aside from the socio-economic setbacks, uneasy historical relationships between Syria and Lebanon and the concern of an Islamic militant regime in Syria have also added a strong political dimension to the spillover of the crisis.

While some beneficial effects on national and local economies can be traced here and there, they are inconsequential in the face of the tremendous pressure and material, human and institutional fallout that the crisis has caused at both local and national levels. The effects of the crisis are highly regressive, adversely undermining the broad spectrum of human development outcomes (poverty and inequality, food and nutritional security, employment, education, health, water and sanitation, and not least environmental) in areas of Jordan and Lebanon that were already lagging prior to the crisis.

Though the crisis has put a damper on growth in Lebanon, and to some extent in Jordan, the human development impacts of the Syrian crisis remain localized and have notyet tangibly ‘trickled up’ at the national level. However, given the current and projected scale of the crisis, a possible reversal in national development indicators should not be excluded. Moreover, the crisis has exacerbated strains on fragile public finances in both countries, further reducing fiscal spaces and capacities to cope with the effects of the crisis and sustain development efforts.

From a sustainable human development perspective, the Syrian crisis presents Jordan and Lebanon with a double management challenge, which in itself carries a number of policy trade-offs. Stakeholders need to find ways to reduce vulnerabilities and build resilience of refugee and host communities while preserving macroeconomic and political stability. The challenge is compounded by the scale, protracted nature and fluidity of the refugee crisis both across countries of the region, and critically, within host countries.

In both Jordan and Lebanon, the findings underscore the need for informed, nationally owned, well-coordinated and conflict-sensitive responses that do not only cater for the immediate needs and priorities of affected communities, but also address the vulnerabilities and structural bottlenecks that impeded progress on sustainable human development outcomes prior to the crisis. While humanitarian interventions remain an important part of the response, they need to be part of an integrated strategy that is aligned with national development plans and priorities, and that is aimed at building the resilience of households, communities and institutions on a sustainable basis.

5.1 COMPREHENSIVE CONFLICT AND GENDER-SENSITIVE EVIDENCE-BUILDING AND MONITORING SYSTEMS FOR INFORMED RESPONSES

The collective failure to anticipate impacts and needs is perhaps one of the major lessons learned when it comes to the current response to the crisis. Anticipation is indeed a key factor for building resilience, in the sense that it significantly reduces the cost of responding when shock and crises occur, as informational, financial and other capacity constraints tend to increase during shocks and crises.
The dynamic and complex nature of the spillover effects of the Syrian crisis on neighboring countries underscores the importance of establishing effective and comprehensive monitoring and information systems that can build the foundation for informed and effective responses. In light of current data shortages and inconsistencies, a deeper knowledge of the nature, drivers and dynamics of vulnerabilities amongst refugee and host communities is paramount.

5.1.1. ASSESSING AND TRACKING LOCAL VULNERABILITIES AND PRESSURES

As seen throughout the paper, the level and nature of vulnerability facing host populations and communities in Jordan and Lebanon vary from one location to the other. Getting a better understanding of the extent and drivers of local vulnerabilities to the effects of the Syrian crisis is critical for a better design, targeting and prioritization of resilience-based programming.

Strengthening of Data Collection Processes

Given the challenges underpinning data collection and monitoring efforts, including financial constraints, the case for joint multi-sectoral assessments is particularly strong. In addition, effective information sharing channels should be developed and maintained between central governments and municipalities. Understanding the way in which refugee flows affects cities and municipalities is important for informed planning as well as to forestall potential social conflicts. Building internal capacity for data collection, management and sharing data with other government entities will be critical. Statistics from health clinics, schools and offices, and revenue collection can be used to supplement information used for projections and planning. Meanwhile, the potential for communities to document their own situation with localized and quality data in a decentralized manner with the support of local, national and international volunteers could also be worth exploring.

Refugee Crisis Dynamics and Vulnerabilities among Refugee Populations

The fluidity of the refugee crisis in Jordan and Lebanon points to the importance of robust demographic data collection systems that can accurately capture the local and national dynamics of refugee movements. Data collection should therefore take place periodically to account for births, deaths, familial dynamics, not least, secondary displacements of refugees within host countries and returns to Syria. The new registration system piloted in Jordan – where comprehensive information such as biometric data is being gathered – should help address some of the gaps in this area.

Because vulnerabilities among refugees also act as points of strain on host populations and systems, getting a better understanding of the livelihood status of refugees remains not only critical for an informed ‘refugee response’ but also for a comprehensive resilience-based response in host communities.

Vulnerability Localization and Profiling

Contrasting income poverty levels and refugee densities at sub-national levels can be particularly informative for identifying most vulnerable areas and better targeting of interventions. As suggested in this paper, the ratio of refugees to host poor population may also be useful in estimating the extra-vulnerability burden faced by host communities. The ratio also gives an indication of the degree of competition between refugees and equally vulnerable host populations over scarce resources, services and opportunities, and can thus be helpful in gauging potential threats to social cohesion. Given the dynamics of the crisis, local vulnerability mapping exercises would need to be backed-up by commensurate efforts to update refugee and poverty data. The case for updating poverty data is especially compelling in Lebanon.

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390 In the case of Jordan Irbid and Mafraq are singled out as the most vulnerable areas though findings suggest that stakeholders should turn their attention to the impacts of the crisis on poverty, employment and other development outcomes in Amman and other smaller areas.
Getting a more accurate picture of local vulnerabilities will also require probing further into non-income dimensions of poverty. This underscores on-going mapping exercises that overlay basic service and infrastructure availability/access (in addition to poverty incidence) and refugee caseloads. As feasible, the use of the Multidimensional Poverty Index\(^{391}\) would also be worth exploring. The approach would allow ranking hosting areas, according to the various forms of deprivations (income poverty, food insecurity, unemployment, vulnerable employment, limited access to education, health and nutrition, water, sanitation, electricity and other essential services) suffered by local populations and that the crisis tend to exacerbate.

Among vulnerabilities in host communities, those arising from persisting high unemployment rates are especially acute and underscores the need for careful monitoring of national and local labor market conditions, especially in informal sectors, with a special focus on youth, women, and children. This will also allow researchers to better gauge the actual extent of competition between refugees, nationals and other foreign residents.

There is also a need for more comprehensive assessments of food/nutritional security, livelihood conditions and coping strategies among Jordanian and Lebanese host community members. This should go along with efforts to build further evidence on vulnerabilities related to natural resources and the environment.

Because the spillover effects of the Syrian conflict into neighboring countries extend beyond the boundaries of the communities that host high numbers of refugees, assessing and monitoring vulnerabilities in communities at the border with Syria, or those located next to refugee camps will also be important for developing a more comprehensive response to the crisis.

**Local Capacities for Resilience**

Building long-term resilience and sustaining development gains is fundamentally a capacity challenge that also requires careful assessments of the assets and capacities (natural, human, physical, financial, informational, social, political, etc.) that may be available within host families, communities and institutions and that can be harnessed and strengthened as part of the response to the crisis. This points notably to the relevance of Livelihoods and other household capacity-focused assessments, as key complements to vulnerability analysis for informed resilience-based programming.

Generally, special attention needs to be given to the collection of data that are relevant to the design and implementation of longer-term development-focused responses. To this end, research findings indicate that in both countries a special emphasis should be placed on assessing the overall management capacities of municipalities and local governance systems in affected communities.

**Social Tensions and Violence, including GBV**

The arrival of Syrian refugees in large numbers has had a direct impact on social cohesion and security in Jordanian and Lebanese host communities as it exacerbates existing drivers of tension and impacts social ties. These issues require special attention in monitoring efforts.

**Indicators that can capture the risks of tensions between refugee and host communities are of particular relevance.** As noted earlier, the ratio of refugees to host poor/vulnerable populations may provide a good indication of the potential degree of competition over scarce or already strained resources, services and opportunities. Results from perception polls on refugees can also be useful in assessing risks to social cohesion.

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\(^{391}\) The MPI index complements the monetary measures of chronic poverty. It is the outcome of the share of population who is multidimensionally poor (the number of people experiencing overlapping deprivations) and the average proportion of indicators in which the poor are deprived (the overall number of deprivations faced, or intensity of poverty). The index can be broken down into a number of sub-indicators to show how the composition of multidimensional poverty changes for different areas, ethnic groups, or other factors. The MPI approach has been recently used in Iraq assess vulnerability at sub-national levels. See: Alkire, S. and Santos, M.E., Multidimensional Poverty Index, (Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative, Oxford, July 2010)
Findings also indicate that seeking balance between the needs of refugees and vulnerable host populations in the response to the crisis will be critical in mitigating threats to social cohesion. In this regard, the ratio of community members to refugees targeted and effectively reached by international assistance can be viewed as an important variable to consider and monitor in all sectors of intervention. The security aspects of the crisis importance also call for the conduct of regular community safety audits, with a special focus on youth and gender dimensions. The incidence of violence/criminality, as well as occurrences of GBV should be closely monitored. A broader monitoring framework will however require probing deeper into core threats and ways to restore, preserve or strengthen social cohesion and security in affected areas.

**Gender and Youth-Sensitive Monitoring**

While the analysis does point to significant gender impacts and protection concerns, the lack of age and gender-disaggregated data (especially in Lebanon) in the various sectors impacted by the crisis remains an important gap that needs to be filled in a cross-cutting manner.

### 5.1.2 The Case for Participatory Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessments

Beyond documenting the development impacts of the Syrian crisis in Jordan and Lebanon, an important aspect of present research lies in the efforts made to get a better sense of priorities, as perceived by local stakeholders in host communities. Contrasting these with the current response, the analysis uncovered a certain mismatch between the top sectoral priorities identified by host community stakeholders in Jordan and Lebanon and those set forth in humanitarian response plans so far.

Such efforts should seek to include national coverage in both countries to better inform resilience support programming and implementation under the RRP and critically, under the national stabilization and recovery plans recently developed in these countries. This is important because results of sectoral vulnerability/impact assessment and monitoring efforts, along the lines suggested above, may not necessarily help prioritize support between impacted sectors across and within specific locations.

### 5.1.3 Assessing and Monitoring Macro-Vulnerabilities

In addition to monitoring vulnerability at subnational/community levels, it will be important to monitor the macro-variables through which the Syrian crisis is affecting neighboring economies at large. Changes in trade deficits, investment, tourism, growth performance, fiscal deficits and debt levels deserve scrutiny. Assessing neighboring countries’ institutional capacity to secure fiscal space to mitigate the impacts of the crisis and sustain development gains will be especially critical.

### 5.1.4 The Case for Regional Monitoring and Knowledge Sharing Systems

While findings underscore the importance of country and local context-specific monitoring systems, they also suggest other entry points for the development of sub-regional monitoring efforts. Beyond efforts to locate and profile regional Syrian refugee flows, some variables that have strong regional dimensions such as intraregional trade and investment flows, food security and food safety, spread of communicable diseases, political, security and social cohesion, would require consideration.

Though geared towards informing the humanitarian response, it is worth noting that the Syria Needs Assessment of the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS) (a virtual platform that monitors issues and needs in complex emergencies and crises) has been moving towards a more comprehensive and development-oriented approach to monitoring. Since September 2013, its monthly report on the Syrian crisis addresses the situation of the host countries/communities. The production of the Lebanon

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392 This would require setting up confidential and trusted tracking mechanisms.
393 The Lebanon Roadmap for Stabilization and Jordan’s National Resilience Plan
baseline information sheet in October 2013, which covers both humanitarian and development indicators, is particularly noteworthy.

Strengthening national and sub-regional architectures for such monitoring, information management, and early warning systems, will cover a wide range of development challenges facing countries, communities and families in Syria neighboring countries and is well worth considering. This should also contribute to stimulating knowledge exchange and promote scaled-up interventions led by development stakeholders.395

5.2 SEEKING BALANCE AND MAXIMIZING SYNERGIES BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT ACTION FOR SUSTAINABLE OUTCOMES

The scale and protracted nature of the crisis calls for a longer-term approach to resilience building that integrates humanitarian and development responses in a coordinated and synergetic manner. Such an approach should effectively address immediate, medium and longer-term needs of refugee and host populations while strengthening capacities of national and local institutions to preserve and sustain development gains, that is building ‘systemic resilience’. This requires moving away from the standard, sequential, ‘relief to development’ (Continuum) paradigm that places the crisis at one end and ‘normality’ at the other towards a ‘Contiguum’, whereby, short-term, medium term, longer-term impact interventions work together for sustainable outcomes.

Long Term Resilience-Building: From the Continuum to the Contiguum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time frame</th>
<th>Emergency/Short Term</th>
<th>Short Term Medium Term, Long Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiaries</td>
<td>Refugees indirectly Host communities</td>
<td>Host countries and communities indirectly refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Support</td>
<td>Ad-hoc Targeted Temporary</td>
<td>Linkages with National/Local Development Plans More structural Sustainable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectors/Approach</td>
<td>Sectoral approach</td>
<td>Integrated/Multi-Sectoral approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnerships</td>
<td>Government Local authorities UN agencies NGOs</td>
<td>Government Local authorities UN agencies NGOs Private Sector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from the Lebanon Background Report, October 2013

In both Jordan and Lebanon, UN agencies are well positioned to contribute meaningfully to this ‘Contiguum’, having both the ability to work downstream on community-based initiatives and upstream on institutional and policy and capacity level development.

5.2.1 ADDRESSING LOCAL PRIORITIES: LINKING SHORT TERM ACTION WITH LONGER-TERM DEVELOPMENT NEEDS

Heightened pressures on solid waste management, water, education health turn out to be the top impacts and priorities for action perceived by stakeholders in host communities of Jordan. In Lebanon, solid waste management and health also rank among the top four priorities for action, followed by stresses on electricity supply and water systems. A failure to address these pressing issues in a more systematic manner will have a bearing on all other human development outcomes and they should therefore be a priority for resilience programming.

At the same time, pressures on labor markets turn out to rank second amongst the impacts facing affected communities in Lebanon and local assessments suggest they are becoming increasingly significant in Jordan, with important implications for social cohesion. Mitigating such pressures in the short run, in a

395 The establishment of UNDP Sub-regional Response Facility in Amman is an important step in this direction.
way that also paves the way for more sustainable and decent job creation deserves attention in resilience building efforts. Harnessing the commitment of municipalities and other local actors (CSOs, CBOs), as well as the private sector, in local economic development initiatives should be of upmost importance.

To maximize synergies, short-term employment and livelihood support initiatives (e.g. ‘cash for work’ schemes) aimed at mitigating income pressures should be designed so as to address major infrastructure and service delivery deficits in affected communities. This may include emergency employment programs for solid waste collection and disposal, health facility and school rehabilitation/construction, improvements to water and waste water systems, shelter, environmental rehabilitation/green jobs, etc. These initiatives should also seek to strengthen skills, promote savings and support entrepreneurship opportunities.

This underscores the importance of the various Quick Community Impact Projects (QIPs) and Community Impacts Projects (CIPs) that have been implemented in Jordan and Lebanon over the past two years. Though small-scale, these proved to be critical in stabilizing the socio-economic impact of the refugee stream on host communities and preserving social cohesion. These should be evaluated and considered for replication, scaling-up, and institutionalization with national and local development planning processes.

Likewise, short term food security support to both vulnerable refugee and host populations should maximize the use of market-based solutions such as vouchers or unconditional cash transfer modalities, and consider the use of existing retail and agricultural market structures in order to support local economies. Quick-win interventions to restore agricultural livelihoods could be backed-up by immediate upstream capacity and policy development support to Ministries of Agriculture and other food security stakeholders, so as to pave the way for an effective implementation of longer-term interventions (e.g. value chain development, climate-smart agriculture).

5.2.2 MAINSTREAMING AND PROMOTING SOCIAL COHESION

Social cohesion and the potential for conflict in affected communities deserve attention in resilience programming in Jordan and, particularly so in Lebanon. This is not only important for containing the conflict geographically, but also for securing the levels of human security that contribute to the overall effectiveness and sustainability of planned interventions.

Inclusive and Conflict-sensitive Interventions, with a special focus on women and youth

As stressed earlier, an important challenge in managing the impacts of the crisis lies in the need to balance the vulnerabilities and needs of refugees and host populations. Even in cases where conflict prevention and social cohesion are not stated as primary goals of partners’ support, integrated and inclusive interventions that address the needs of refugee and host populations in an equitable manner can help to reduce tension. Participation of refugee and host community representatives in the design, implementation and monitoring of projects is essential. This could also help dispel misperceptions about potential bias in the allocation of support and encourage dialogue across community lines.

QIPs and CIPs as well as other cost-effective, innovative, service-oriented community based...

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196 For instance, the ‘3X6 approach’ currently used for unskilled workers in Jordan under the ‘UNDP Program on Mitigating the Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis’, combines enrolment, rapid income generation, savings, joint-venturing and market expansion.

197 For instance, as noted in the local governance section of the GOJ/UN Needs Assessment Review, “Devising durable solutions for SWM improvement, linked to rapid employment schemes (…) should also have a beneficial impact on social cohesion amongst the host and refugee communities (e.g. among workers involved but also through community-led planning and prioritization of neighborhood sanitation activities and revitalization), support conflict resolution and remove accumulated waste that is hampering development efforts”.

198 The provision of e-food vouchers by the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA), World Bank and WFP can be seen as critical steps in providing benefits that will benefit both Syrian refugees and vulnerable host communities.

199 For a review of international best practices on integrated and balance assistance or targeted development assistance (TDA) in the context of protracted refugee situation, see the Helpdesk Research Report: preventing conflict between refugees and host communities, 2012, Governance and Social Development Resource Center.
projects that stimulate social connections between host and refugee populations, such as the construction of children’s playgrounds, community spaces, or cultural centers, deserve special attention. Scaling-up such programs, alongside efforts to strengthen their linkages with local/national institutions and plans, – as recommended earlier, should be part of programmatic efforts for resilience building. Here again, women and youth should be specifically targeted as they are at risk of incurring bad coping mechanisms.

These initiatives could be particularly effective if they also harness the potential of ‘goodwill’ present at local level. In a context where prospects for remunerative employment opportunities remain scarce, this underscores exploring explore the possibility of voluntary engagement, especially amongst women and youth. This may not only improve living conditions and security in host communities, but also contribute to the future employability participants when new opportunities arise.

Inter-Community Dialogue, Mediation, Gender and Conflict-Sensitive Communication

Conflict prevention approaches, targeted dialogue and mediation can increase the capacity of host communities to prevent and manage conflict. Initiatives aimed at strengthening conflict management, mediation and diversity management capacities should target relevant stakeholders in refugee and host communities (e.g. social workers, teachers, physicians, community and religious leaders, local officials). Findings especially underscore efforts to foster anti-discrimination and social cohesion within school systems (e.g extracurricular activities geared at teamwork in the schools), with a strong involvement of families of both the refugees and the host communities.

Mediation training for Syrian refugee leaders can also pave the way for a peaceful management of returns to Syria by bridging sectarian and political divisions that currently tear communities apart.400

In situations where the media may have contributed to the intensification of tension and social unrest, this also underscores the importance of engaging with media to promote a culture of peace and tolerance. Though small in scale, such social-cohesion initiatives have already been implemented in both countries with support of the UN, though the role of civil society should be expanded based on lessons learned and best practices.401

Addressing GVB and other Gender Issues

As presented earlier, the way in which the Syrian refugee crisis affects gender relationships has heightened risks of gender-based violence within Syrian refugee and host communities, further impacting cohesiveness within and across the two communities. The establishment of safe spaces for dialogue can also serve as an entry-point for raising awareness on the issue of sexual and gender-based violence and help sensitize community members on the causes and consequences of gender-based violence.

5.2.3 TOWARDS SYSTEMIC RESILIENCE

As underlined in the paper, the three-track approach (life-saving, vulnerability mitigation, resilience capacity building) adopted in the RRP6 to manage the spillover-effects of the crisis is an important step towards integrating short term and longer term action. A quick scan of the response plans for Jordan

401 For example, UNDP’s Stabilization and Recovery Program in Lebanon includes a component on local mechanisms for peaceful coexistence and conflict resolution. This initiative supports community leaders in addressing the underlying causes of conflict and creating ‘safe spaces’ for community groups while also engaging with the media to promote a culture of peace and tolerance. In Wadi Khaled, one of the poorest host communities in Lebanon has established a Youth Cultural Centre that offers courses in language and information technology, and also screens films and hosts discussions on social issues for close to 56,000 locals and refugees. Teachers at the center have been trained in peace-building and conflict resolution to help manage tensions between Lebanese and Syrian students. Several NGOs are also working to provide booklets and information for both refugee and community populations on their respective rights and responsibilities (see. Omar S. Dahi, 2013 “Breaking Point: The Crisis of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon”, September 2013). In some northern areas in Jordan, Mercy Corps provides mediation training to Syrian refugee leaders and host communities to help them address raising tensions over employment water and housing with promising results – for more details see Morris, S. Morris, S. “Argument -The Power of Mediation”, 2014.
and Lebanon, reveals that although the primary focus remains on meeting protection and humanitarian needs of refugee populations, the response has placed a greater emphasis on interventions that can also benefit host populations and institutions in the short-term/medium-term. This entails additional community support projects, capacity development support to and collaborations with national/local service providers, as well as a greater use of market-based solutions that can stimulate local economies.

However, given the magnitude and protracted nature of the crisis, the resilience capacity track, which does not exceed 7 percent of total funding requirements in both countries - clearly falls short of needs. Large-scale actions should continue to address the structural challenges underpinning sustainable human development outcomes in Jordan and Lebanon. Efforts to strengthen management capacities of national and especially, local institutions and systems will be critical.

**Building Within and Upon National and Local Medium and Long Term Development Plans**

Therefore, the implementation of the RRP should go ‘hand in hand’ with the implementation of the larger scale developmental interventions foreseen under the Lebanon National Stabilization Roadmap and the Jordan National Resilience Plan. In this process, medium and longer-term development needs could also be reevaluated against pre-crisis development plans at both local and national levels. This would allow for a better prioritization of investments that can adequately cope with the crisis. In Lebanon, this may involve revisiting a number of programs, including the “Horizon Development Program”, various public transportation programs, the irrigation and dams programs and critically, the Simplified Economic Development Plans that were elaborated by 27 out of 52 municipal unions, in addition to other specific power, solid waste, and water projects. While local development planning is still at an early stage in Jordan, there are also plans and investment frameworks in affected areas that could be reviewed and used to accelerate the development of adequate plans in other affected areas.

**Strengthening Local Governance Systems**

In both Lebanon and Jordan, the refugee crisis exposed the vulnerability of municipal institutions and local governance systems. Though the crisis has remained localized in Lebanon and Jordan, the role and effectiveness of municipalities in responding to the crisis has varied greatly. Enhancing national and local ownership and improving municipalities’ leadership capacities for the management of the development impacts of the crisis is important. Working closely with the municipalities can facilitate the identification of cost-effective and sustainable solutions that distribute their benefits among refugees and host communities alike. In the short term, rapid and conflict-sensitive participatory planning exercises should be organized at the municipal/community level, with a view to prioritize service delivery and recovery needs as part of broader and long term efforts to strengthen local governance systems.

Local governments/municipalities should be major players in elaborating a coordinated capacity development response. While there is a need to expand financial/budget support grants to municipalities, efforts to enhance local information management and coordination capacities, as well as other core capacities, including financial management will be critical. This mirrors an initiative recently implemented by UNDP Jordan to support municipalities in the Northern governorates of Irbid and Mafraq under the “Mitigating the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on Jordanian vulnerable host communities” program framework. Also noteworthy also is the agreement signed between the Government of Jordan and the World Bank to support service delivery and municipality capacity to host Syrian refugees.

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402 In both countries, this includes plans to strengthen national health, education, water and sanitation systems, as well as to expand coverage and effectiveness of national safety nets. In Lebanon for instance, the plan is to increase the number of beneficiaries of the National Poverty Targeting Program from 93,900 to 160,700 people over the next five years.  
404 See: http://www.mop.gov.jo/pages.php?menu_id=368&local_type=0&local_id=0&local_details=0&local_details1=0.
Sustaining Engagement and Broadening Partnerships

The relevance of the Millennium Development Goal on the ‘partnership for development’ cannot but be seen through the lens of the Syrian crisis. Managing the change process and coordination of efforts necessary for the successful resolution of the crisis and its effects will require a significant commitment of all partners to cooperate, sustain their engagement (beyond the RRP6) and establish new approaches and instruments for greater effectiveness. Particularly important is the need to increase long-term commitments and establish flexible funding and coordination mechanisms that support sustainable human development objectives that feed into national and local frameworks. The gap between the current level of assistance and what is actually needed makes the case for inclusive and effective multi-actor and multi-sector coordination mechanisms particularly compelling. Finally, diversifying partnerships, drawing up joint initiatives and mobilizing resources from various sources (private sector investments, engagement with non-traditional donors, remittances, fostering public-private partnerships) will be critical in building successful and replicable resilience frameworks.
### APPENDIX I

**VULNERABILITY AND CRISIS IMPACT MONITORING: A TENTATIVE SET OF INDICATORS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>SUGGESTED INDICATORS</th>
<th>LEBANON</th>
<th>JORDAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>POVERTY and VULNERABILITY (incl. unemployment and food insecurity)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Baseline (Pre-crisis)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Change/Impact</strong></td>
<td><strong>Baseline (Pre-crisis)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Poverty</td>
<td>Poverty Headcount (percent)</td>
<td>2004/05: 28</td>
<td>+ 170,000 persons pushed below the poverty line by 2014, (WB/UN ESIA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poverty Headcount (percent)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sub National/Major host areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Syrian refugees to host poor National/Major host areas (Vulnerability ratio(^{406}))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of families receiving support from major national social safety nets</td>
<td>End 2011 - NA</td>
<td>2013 (August): 74,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan: National Aid Fund</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon: National Poverty Targeting Program (NPTP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Costs of Living</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General inflation (percent)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>2012: 5.3 (end of 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inflation rate in host Governorates (percent)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>2012 (North): +6 (UNDP DMI study)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{405}\) The suggested set of indicators and associated values are derived from the analysis and data sources used in the paper. This should be considered as work in progress.

\(^{406}\) Lebanon: estimates based on 2004/05 poverty data and UNCHR refugee data (Oct 213); Jordan: Oct 2013-Est, based on 2010 poverty rates, MOI population and refugee data.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Access to food/Food Insecurity</th>
<th>Change in food prices/CPI (percent)</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>food: +12 in 2012</th>
<th>Food CPI: 143.4</th>
<th>Food CPI (September 2013): 156 (+13%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of national households food insecure or at risk in host communities</td>
<td>2010 (National level): Food Insecure: 0.3% At Risk: 2.1% (WFP)</td>
<td>2013 (Northern governorates): Food Insecure: 1% At risk: 15% , and 15% at risk (ACTED);</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rates in host communities (%) Male (M)/Female (F)</td>
<td>2007: Bekaa: 7.8 North: 7.4 Mount Lebanon: 8.9 BSS: 14.1</td>
<td>NA (but evidences of increased pressures)</td>
<td>2011 (av Q1-Q3): Mafraq: 11.5; M: 9.8;F:19.9 Irbid: 12.8:M:10.8;F:24.1 Amman: 11.5;M:9.4;F:19.9 Zarqa: 12.2; M: 10.7; F: 21.8</td>
<td>2013 (Q1-Q3) : Mafraq: 13.4; M:11.4;F:23.4 Irbid : 13.6 ;M :10.6 ;F : 28.1 Amman: 11.7;M:9.6; F: 20.6 Zarqa: 12.4;M:10.3: F:19.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in Daily Wages (low skilled/skilled) – in host communities</td>
<td>Bekaa: JD 35000 JD/day North: JD 20000 to 30000/day</td>
<td>Bekaa– decrease in daily wages by 10000 JD</td>
<td>(Northern Governorates) 8 to 10 JD/day (low skilled labor) 15 to 20 JD/day (skilled labor)</td>
<td>(Northern Governorates) 5 to 6 JD (low skilled labor); 8 to 10 JD (skilled labor)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HEALTH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LT health outcomes</th>
<th>Baseline (Pre-crisis)</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Baseline (Pre-crisis)</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR) /100000 live births</td>
<td>2010: MMR 25</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>2010: MMR = 19</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[MMR in major host areas] [Ranges between 57 and 69 in North, Bekaa and ]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Emergence of ‘new’ diseases</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of cases of measles</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010: 11 cases reported (source SNAP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013: &gt; 1400 (source SNAP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Pressure on Service Delivery Capacity and Access</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Physicians/10000</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-10: 35</td>
<td>NA (expected negative impacts given pressures)</td>
<td>Mid 2012: 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>End 2013 (estimates): 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of nurses/10000</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;20</td>
<td>NA (expected negative impacts given pressures)</td>
<td>Mid 2012: 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>End 2013 (estimates): 39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of hospital beds/10000</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-crisis: 35</td>
<td>Mid 2012: 18</td>
<td>End 2013 (estimates) 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immunization coverage</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010: 103% (2010)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2012: 100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EDUCATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Baseline (Pre-crisis)</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Baseline (Pre-crisis)</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net enrollment rate, B/G (percent)</strong></td>
<td>Primary school: 2009: B: 98.3; G: 98.4 Secondary school: B: 71; G: 79</td>
<td>NA (expected negative impacts excepted due to overcrowding of schools)</td>
<td>Primary school: B: 97.5; G: 97.5</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net completion rate B/G (percent)</strong></td>
<td>2009: 72.4; B: 70.6; G: 74.7</td>
<td>NA (expected negative impacts excepted due to overcrowding of schools)</td>
<td>(Survival rate) B: 98.8 G: 99.2</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% of public schools holding a second shift</strong></td>
<td>2013: 13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Student to teacher ratio (public sector)</strong></td>
<td>7.4:1 (with variations from 1 to 1:5:1 to 20:1 or more)</td>
<td>NA (anecdotal evidence)</td>
<td>2010: 16:1 Urban areas: 21:1</td>
<td>Actual: 25:1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SUSTAINABLE HABITAT (Housing, Water, Sanitation, Solid Waste, Energy)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Baseline (Pre-crisis)</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Baseline (Pre-crisis)</th>
<th>Impact/Needs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Access to Housing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of housing units needed/year (National/ Subnational)</strong></td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>National: 32000/ year Mafraq: 660/ year</td>
<td>2013: National: 86000 units needed Mafraq: 12,600 units needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of refugees living in informal settlements</strong></td>
<td>12 % of refugees live in tents (July 2013)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rental prices/ % Changes in rental price</strong></td>
<td>Beirut suburbs: USD 300</td>
<td>Beirut suburbs USD 500 for a “lower-middle” dwelling</td>
<td>Mafraq: pre-crisis : JD 40 to JD 50</td>
<td>Mafraq: up to JD 300100 to 300% in some places in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Water & Sanitation-Solid Waste Management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009: 35</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>2010: 97</th>
<th>NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of population linked to drinking water networks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of households running out of water</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>[% of HH reporting running out of water once or twice a month]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Rural/Urban Major host areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of HH having access to sewage systems National Major host areas</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>National: 55 Northern governorates: 43 Mafraq: 35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in solid waste collection (tons per day)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>(Pre-crisis levels)</td>
<td>(2013): Irbid municipality 500 tons/day Mafraq Greater Municipality: 200-250 tons/day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Demand for Energy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010: + 5.6</th>
<th>2011: +5.9</th>
<th>2012: +9.4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change in household electricity consumption (Percent)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## SOCIAL COHESION & SECURITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Baseline (Pre-crisis)</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Baseline (Pre-crisis)</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Competition over resources, services and opportunities</td>
<td></td>
<td>See above</td>
<td></td>
<td>See above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Vulnerability ratio’ (refugees to host poor) See above</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results from opinion surveys: percent of nationals favorable to refugee presence</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>2012: Poll results: Centre for Strategic Studies: 65 percent of the interviewed against receiving more Syrian refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity in Humanitarian Action</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Ratio of targeted affected nationals to targeted refugees in Regional Response Plans (Source)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>RRP5: 0.452 RRP6: 0.495</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRP - dashboards)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of international assistance allocated to social cohesion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security and GVB</td>
<td>Number of reported incidents of violence</td>
<td>To be documented</td>
<td>To be documented</td>
<td>To be documented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security and GVB</td>
<td>Number of reported incidents of Gender Based Violence among Syrian and National Households in Host communities</td>
<td>To be documented</td>
<td>To be documented</td>
<td>To be documented</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### MACROECONOMIC VULNERABILITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Growth</th>
<th>Real GDP growth, percent</th>
<th>Baseline (Pre-crisis)</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Baseline (Pre-crisis)</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>Percentage change in the number of tourists (y.o.y)</td>
<td>2011: -24</td>
<td>2012: -17.5</td>
<td>2013 (Q1): -12.5</td>
<td>2011: -17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Space</td>
<td>Public Debt as percent of GDP</td>
<td>2010:142</td>
<td>2011:137</td>
<td>2011: 74.6</td>
<td>2013 Q3 81.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Space</td>
<td>Share of external assistance allocated to the mitigation of crisis impacts</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX II

### POVERTY, REFUGEE DENSITIES AND VULNERABILITY RATIOS IN JORDAN GOVERNORATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Share of Population, percent</th>
<th>Proportion of Total Poor Pop (2008), percent</th>
<th>Poverty Rate (2008), percent</th>
<th>Proportion of Total Poor (2010), percent</th>
<th>Poverty Rate (2010), percent</th>
<th>Proportion of vulnerable HHs (2010), percent</th>
<th>Number of Refugees 10 Oct, 2013, UNHCR</th>
<th>Distribution of Refugees, percent UNHCR Data Oct.</th>
<th>Nb of refugees, Mol data, October 2013</th>
<th>Distribution of refugees (Mol data), percent</th>
<th>Refugee Density (Mol data)</th>
<th>Vulnerability Ratio (UNHCR Data)</th>
<th>Vulnerability Ratio (MOI data)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mafraq incl.</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>178,213</td>
<td>33.0*</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>134,900</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mafraq outside camps</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>57,426</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>45,656</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>130,796</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>146,000</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibad</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>121,710</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>239,750</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zarqa</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>47,108</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>45,952</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balqa</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>13,947</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>12,602</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jazan</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>ma</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>10,110</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>10,218</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajlun</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>9,641</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>9,066</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karak</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>8,408</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>6,885</td>
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<td>Mafraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>540,656</td>
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<td>613,921</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### APPENDIX III
### STATUS OF SYRIAN REFUGEES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income poverty Employment</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Limited livelihoods and employment opportunities, (agriculture, construction), especially for Syrians without regular status - with possible worsening during winter months.</td>
<td>- High vulnerability – lack of income resources/ irregular income sources especially among female-headed households.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Lower wages and discriminatory working environment – unclear and tightening of labor regulations.</td>
<td>- Restrictions on work permits - lack of job opportunities; vulnerable, low paid employment, mainly in agriculture.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reduced freedom of movement.</td>
<td>- High dependence on external assistance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Increased vulnerability and adverse coping strategies (reduced savings, borrowing, reduced expenditures on schooling and health care, reduced food intake (especially for women).</td>
<td>- Begging (Syrians account for 10 percent of the 2,265 individuals detained for begging over the past 8 months.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food Security</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Increase in food prices.</td>
<td>- Increase in food prices.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Lack of food controls at the Lebanese borders and illegal cross-border trade threatens the food health and safety of host communities and Syrian refugees.</td>
<td>- Food insecurity.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Barriers to enrolment: poverty/ affordability, language, methods &amp; curricula ...etc).</td>
<td>- Only 29 percent of Syrian children registered in schools in and outside camps.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reduced access to education for girls (confined to housework).</td>
<td>- As of June 2013, there were 60,000 children in camps, but less than 25 percent were enrolled in school.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Constraints on access to education for Syrians residing in Palestinian camps.</td>
<td>- Low attendance rates (camps).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- High drop out rates.</td>
<td>- Significant constraints (financial, physical, administrative) on access to school (East of Mafraq, JHAS).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Bullying/racism and discrimination against Syrian students.</td>
<td>- Barriers to enrolment: poverty/ affordability, language, methods &amp; curricula ...etc).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Increased instances of child labor.</td>
<td>- Overcrowded schools.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Health and Disease             | Lebanon       | - Limited financial accessibility to primary and secondary health care services for the most vulnerable (notably the elderly) – limited coverage by partners in certain locations.  
- Limited physical access to health centers, especially for refugees in remote location.  
- Vaccination campaigns organized by MOPH and UNICEF target both nationals and Syrian refugees in host communities.  
- Special needs (sexual and reproductive health, child health care, acute illnesses, non-communicable and chronic diseases, mental health) insufficiently addressed.  
- Increased occurrence of diseases (TB and other communicable diseases).  

Jordan:  
- Low morbidity rates in camps.  
- Increase in demand for health services.  
- High incidence of chronic diseases (including cardiovascular, hyper-tension, back problems).  
- New cases of TB.

| Access to Housing              | Lebanon       | - Overcrowding.  
- Reduced affordability (increase in rental prices).  
  Monthly rents estimated at USD375 in Beirut, against an average monthly income of USD 366.  
- Increase in informal settlements.  

Jordan  
- Higher rents compared to Jordanian.  
- Significant share (20 percent) of the refugee population live in sub-standard shelters incl. tents and informal settlements.  
- Overcrowding.

| Water & Sanitation, Solid Waste Management Environment | Lebanon | - Limited access to safe water and sanitation services (especially for refugees residing in informal settlements and Palestinian refugee camps.  
- Risk of water borne diseases.  

Jordan  
- Available but more costly access to water for poor households.  
- Poor water storage; Limited sewage disposal and treatment facilities.

| Energy                          | Lebanon       | - Increased demand on public electricity and private generators beyond available capacities,  
- Increased pressures related to heating with possible harmful environmental effects (e.g. tree cutting).

<p>| Gender                          | Lebanon       | - Women employed mainly in agriculture. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security and Social cohesion</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Exploitation, harassment and GBV.</td>
<td>- Survival sex and increased early marriage.</td>
<td>- Rising tensions and hostility in some communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Increased GBV.</td>
<td>- Reduced freedom of movement.</td>
<td>- Reduced freedom of movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Negative perceptions.</td>
<td>- Negative perceptions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Potential tension between Bedouins tribes and Syrian refugees.</td>
<td>- Potential tension between Bedouins tribes and Syrian refugees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Negative perceptions of Syrians are brewing and growing.</td>
<td>- Negative perceptions of Syrians are brewing and growing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Increase in criminality in camps.</td>
<td>- Increase in criminality in camps.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>