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A Peace and Development Analysis (PDA) was conducted in 2013 for the Autonomous Region of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea as a collaborative effort of the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG), the UN in Papua New Guinea through the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and its office in Bougainville, Interpeace and 1,100 cross-section of Bougainvilleans through the Autonomous Region of Bougainville.

The PDA team comprised of two members from Interpeace and local Bougainvilleans. A Bougainvillean was appointed as their team leader. The exercise examined the following questions:

A. Where is Bougainville today with regard to the consolidation of peace?
B. How strong today are the capacities to prevent new outbreaks of major violence? and
C. What is being done to ensure that the referendum will be smooth and that its immediate and longer-term aftermath remain non-violent?

The formal purpose of this PDA is to provide a basis for a Peacebuilding Priority Plan, which will direct some new funding from the UN Peacebuilding Fund. But this PDA has other potential uses. (1) The exercise also fits with the intent of the ABG to consult more actively with the people of Bougainville. It can therefore also be used by the ABG to review and enrich its Peace and Security Framework and the Bougainville Peacebuilding Strategy. (2) It also provides an opportunity, for the ABG, the National Government and the development partners to review existing work in Bougainville, and to assess a) whether right things are being done and being done right, b) whether there are things being done that are substantively counterproductive or even harmful, and have to be amended or even stopped, and c) whether there are things that should be done that are not yet being done. (3) Finally, this exercise can provide the basis for a broad-based, inclusive, and region-wide dialogue in Bougainville. Such dialogue can contribute to building a more informed citizenry, strengthen participatory governance, and provide greater clarity about where Bougainvilleans want to go in the next 20-25 years.

The PDA exercise touches on many issues such as reconciliation, weapons, central and local governance, the Panguna mine, district peace and development committees etc. Undoubtedly it may show at times a lack of full and in-depth knowledge about these issues. But where it may be distinctive and add value is in showing an underlying logic or coherence between how Bougainvilleans see the past, the present and the near future, and how these many different issues, often treated as separate, are actually interrelated in the real world and need to be dealt with in a holistic manner.

This report draws on three main sources: extensive interviews and group conversations; a reasonably extensive literature review including academic publications, research-papers, policy documents, review reports, and a few newspaper and website articles; and comparative experience and learning about the consolidation of peace and development in societies that have experienced large scale violence.

It is well recognized that the so-called Bougainville crisis (1988-1997) had two interlocking but also somewhat separate conflict dynamics: the first, between Bougainville and ‘PNG’, and secondly, among Bougainville armed groups fighting each other. It can be argued that today there are three interlocking but also somewhat separate peacebuilding challenges: (1) between Bougainville and ‘PNG’; (2) related to the legacy of infighting during the crisis, and (3) related to the persistence in Bougainville today, of armed groups that do not recognize

1 ‘PNG’ refers to a way of talking among Bougainvilleans and not of course a different political entity. Between 1975 and today Bougainville is and has remained part of the state of Papua New Guinea.
the formal authority of the ABG. Due to time constraints, this exercise could not examine all dimensions in equal depth. Its centre of gravity is the drivers of conflict and capacities for peace among Bougainvilleans. The relationship between the national Papua New Guinea Government and Bougainville has however been extensively examined in the Review of Autonomy Arrangements. Furthermore, the PDA builds on but also complements that Review.

The key thrust of the analysis focuses on how Bougainvilleans today look back on the violent past of the crisis, how they perceive the situation today, and what their views are for the near future, notably in light of the referendum. This has overwhelmingly been a qualitative exercise thus it reveals opinions and perceptions of a population at large which could be inaccurate or largely subjective.

Key findings suggest that Bougainville is not post-conflict, as the historical drivers of conflict remain present today. Bougainvilleans still resist outsiders because of a perceived threat to Bougainville’s resources. Unfortunately culture and identity, unequal distribution of benefits and costs related to resources, internal jalousies and disputes and leadership rivalries are still pervasive. These are even compounded by the slow pace of implementation of the Bougainville Peace Agreement (BPA), reconciliation and weapons disposal. Also across this continuum two significant issues related to dealing with the legacy of the past (a) trauma healing, and (b) creating the conditions to learn from the past seem to have been largely neglected.

The PDA highlights effective governance as an important prerequisite for a strong future of Bougainville. Efforts so far at strengthening governance have been neither visible nor convincing to the Bougainville population at large and will significantly undermine peace building efforts if not expeditiously addressed. Anecdotally economic development must constitute a strong pillar that should support Bougainville’s future however, there has not been convincing evidence for this to the people of Bougainville that this is likely to be achieved. The PDA suggests a stronger demand for investment in the non-mining sector where most Bougainvilleans get their livelihood.

There is significant need for informed and inclusive national debate and dialogue about alternative visions for Bougainville in 20-30 years from now, and about the likely economic, environmental, political, social and cultural consequences of different options such options which could include adoption of a rapid capital intensive model focusing on the Panguna mines the Torokina Oil palm or a substantial investment in Tourism. On the contrary it may want to go down the path of a slower, smaller scale, less capital-intensive option that focuses on non-mining options, smallholder agriculture and agro-business.

Whatever trajectory is chosen, The PDA vividly points out that most Bougainvilleans are of the view that there is stagnation on the issues that matter most, but are not mobilizing into collective action to address them. This is mostly hampered by the lack of collaborative leadership that is widely disconnected with the people. The analysis also opined that the people of Bougainville were not in a position to make informed choices in the 2015 elections and also in the referendum to be held 2015-2020.

Bougainvilleans are yet to come to terms with the realities of a referendum which should determine Bougainville’s future political status and understand its implications fully. The BPA is yet to be properly understood in the light of weapons disposal and good governance as important factors to be considered in deciding the date for the referendum. The PDA clearly identified two strands of opinion regarding the timing of the referendum. There are those Bougainvilleans who feel that the referendum should take place as soon as possible whilst others believe substantial improvements are needed before Bougainville will be ready for either the referendum or independence. It is also quite evident that there is little public awareness about possible risk scenarios related to the referendum and how to prevent and proactively manage them if and when they do arise.

It is not disputed that Peacebuilding is poorly understood and consequently not pursued as effectively as it should be in Bougainville. There is need for deeper understanding of the different contexts in Bougainville which unfortunately cannot
be learned from a training manual. Development efforts in Bougainville are reported to have been largely unconnected to peace and security and there is evidence abound that development resources and investments can be a significant driver of conflict. There is increasing dispute over land in Bougainville as a whole, and the Panguna mine experiences highlights the critical tension point of how benefits and costs are shared, as well as the sensitivities towards outsiders. Development has to be pursued with great sensitivity to conflict to avoid doing no harm.

It is hoped that the Bougainville Peace and Security (and Development!) Council, and its envisaged secretariat, will help deal with the pervasive fragmentation across the ABG and drive a whole-of-ABG-government approach to peacebuilding and conflict prevention.

The PDA strongly recommends that the Peace and Security Committees should be nurtured as the veritable instrument for peace and security in the various districts, and that the strengths of these committees in some districts notably in Bolave and Siwai must be built on and shared. It is imperative that they must remain a local initiative that is inclusive and should not be commercialized, since they have the potential to provide more effective inter-district dialogue and collaboration. These committees will fully support bottom-up governance in Bougainville.

The PDA also lends credence to a multi-stakeholder approach to resolving conflict which involved using an array of partners including the ABG, chiefs, local communities and international partners in resolving the Konnou conflict. In a similar vein the PDA vibrantly points out that controversy around the Panguna mine is alive today with regard to the question of its re-opening. Given that Panguna was and is a core driver of conflict, a peacebuilding approach to it is inevitable and highly relevant. However, if this strategy is not handled well it has the propensity of making the mine a divider that may prove difficult to combine with the connector objective of unity.

Before the crisis, women were active participants in determining how the benefits and costs of the Panguna mine were shared. Today they demand recognition as key stakeholders in the debate about its possible re-opening. Women played very important roles during the crisis, sometimes as supporters of the mobilization and fighting efforts of the men, as victims of the violence and of the blockade, and as is well known, in the peacemaking efforts to reduce local violence and to reach an overarching political agreement.

Marginalization of women in Bougainville is now common and attributable to a myriad of factors ranging from exclusion of women from weapons disposal; gender roles that relegated women to more subsistence programmes; unsupported education; lack of support to war widows; gender based violence and a host of other factors. This marginalization seems to have been engrained in the Bougainvillean society and rather regrettably is not helped by a weakened Bougainville Women’s Federation.

The report outlines the roles played by churches during the crises in violence reduction and peacebuilding efforts in Bougainville albeit many challenges. In some instances there were divisions between denominations and some church leaders invariably took sides in the conflict. However, efforts are now underway to ensure positive relationships and collaboration among the churches.

The interviews conducted across the island and subsequent analysis of the data discloses that a large youth population lost schooling time during the conflict, and are today referred to negatively as the lost generation. This generation epitomizes lack of skills and competencies, poor or unacceptable social behavior, excessive substance abuse including alcohol and drugs and are also most times gun totting rascals or gangsters. Presumably, this legacy was handed over by the adults during the crisis as the youth to this day, still continue to see substance abuse, gender based violence and corruption within traditional communities. The youth need to be given space to participate in the governance process through a thorough understanding of the BPA and the Constitution. Bougainville needs to tap into the energy of the youth for its future development.

Indisputably there is also need for the issue of veterans to be clearly defined. The veterans have 3 reserved seats in

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2 The Konnou conflict arose from a multitude of factors, mostly local and sometimes dating back to pre-crisis years, but eventually pitched different armed militias against the Meekamui in the southern region and the Musingku’s ‘Papaala Kingdom’

3 This federation is meant to be an umbrella organisation in Bougainville to champion the cause of women. It is bridled with leadership rivalries and has not matched the many ills it was created to address
the Bougainville House of Representatives and there are still individuals within the veteran group expecting financial benefit as grounded in the experience of BETA. Sadly there is a strong feeling in Bougainville that too much attention has been given to the ex-combatants compared to the civilians who suffered even more during the crisis.

The PDA shares that International experiences to date have not been adequately shared with Bougainville with respect to the referendum or contemporary thinking in global platforms around sound management of resources, open Budget and participatory budgeting processes which are much needed for effective resource management.

Simply put, the ABG must have the capability to plan strategically and effectively manage its financial resources. In as much as the ABG is desirous of maintaining ownership of processes, budgetary coordination requires capacity and resources, and full coordination may take time to achieve. There is need for strengthening of the Chief Administrators Office to function as the coordinating hub for development partners. It was also shown that the ABG’s Division of Planning didn’t have a comprehensive and detailed overview of what aid-supported activities are being undertaken and where, and what amounts of funds are allocated for what activities. Tracking such aid support and maximizing intervention where it is most needed, will certainly enhance the do no harm policy and contribute to the consolidation of peace. Effective coordination will also obviate the risk of commercialization of peacemaking and peace building.

On the question of the what; the Who and the How, the PDA attempts to outline priority areas that should be given attention for continued peacebuilding initiatives in Bougainville. Firstly the emphasis is on changing strategies that have not worked well and harnessing all available resources within ABG and the national government to ensure that fragmentation of programmatic approaches is addressed and that programmes were relevant, coherent, holistic and integrally linked with gender needs and development priorities. Secondly it is paramount that all stakeholder learn from past experiences and come to the realization that no single individual or government has all the answers to the numerous challenges Bougainville faces. Hence the need for Bougainvilleans to take responsibility for their common destiny by dealing with complex challenges through adopting holistic and multi-dimensional responses.

All of this can only happen in an atmosphere of trust and building relationships across several divides. This warrants effective planning in a collaborative manner geared towards ensuring meaningful and effective actions that will support peacebuilding in Bougainville.

Bougainville Ex-combatant Trust Account set up after the conflict to support ex-combatants in various skills and vocations and in setting up businesses
Conflict is inherent in society. Conflict is not exclusively negative; it also provides creative energy for transformation and innovation. Conflict becomes destructive when it degenerates into significant violence or heavy coercion (the threat of violence). Sustainable peace therefore is not an idealistic picture of a society without conflict, but of a society that has the capacities, at all levels, to manage conflict effectively and constructively. Development in the sense of economic development does not necessarily contribute to greater peace. In many countries economic development has led to increased socio-economic inequalities which, when not constructively addressed, lead to conflict. In the same sense, security does not automatically contribute to greater peace, especially if it is brought about by excessive coercion and structural violence rather than grounded in a state of popular consent.

For some years now, the international community has been shaping its engagement in fragile situations in terms of statebuilding and peacebuilding. Often the emphasis is on strengthening the institutions of government where these are weak, so that the government develops the capacity to govern (raising revenue, providing services and protecting rights, as well as enforcing obligations under the rule of law). The comparative experience however shows two things: Firstly, when many actors in society – including the government - are relatively weak, no single actor alone can overcome the real challenges. Collaborative action is required, thus the most critical capacities exist in the interactions between entities and not within entities. Secondly, viable societies – those that can manage the inevitable challenges and conflicts without resorting to violence or heavy coercion – have both a strong state (or authority) and a strong society (or citizenry/communities).

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The PDA exercise examined the following questions:

D. Where is Bougainville today with regard to the consolidation of peace?

E. How strong today are the capacities to prevent new outbreaks of major violence? and

F. What is being done to ensure that the referendum will be smooth and that its immediate and longer-term aftermath remain non-violent?

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**OPINIONS AND PERCEPTIONS:** The PDA explored how Bougainvilleans today look back on the violent past of the crisis, how they see the situation today, and what their views are for the near future, notably in light of the referendum. It has done this overwhelmingly as a qualitative exercise. As such it reveals opinions and perceptions of a population at large, but also of many influential people. Opinions and perceptions are not necessarily based on accurate information and solid understanding, and may reveal some ignorance. But it is opinions, perceptions and emotions – and ignorance – that to a significant degree drive people’s social, political and economic behaviors. It is possible to explore this in a more rigorous quantitative manner through opinion polls, perception and KAP (Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices) surveys. This has the advantage of producing more methodologically reliable data. But surveys do not engage people in the same personal way as qualitative and interactive approaches, and are not typically used to stimulate debate and dialogue, as the PDA sought to do.

In the conversations, people often made evaluative statements, i.e. they expressed positive or negative views on a variety of issues, and sometimes allocated responsibilities for the perceived state of affairs. The PDA team is conscious that people’s evaluative statements are subjective and sometimes biased. From a socio-political and peacebuilding point of view however, evaluative statements are highly relevant because they are shaped by often implicit expectations. Expectation management is important in politics, in international cooperation and in peacebuilding.

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DRIVERS OF CONFLICT – PAST AND PRESENT.

FINDING 1: Bougainville is not post-conflict. The historical drivers of conflict remain present today. There are probably more contributing factors to conflict today than in the 1970s and 1980s.

Major drivers of conflict in Bougainville:

- **Resistance to outsiders because of a perceived threat to Bougainville’s resources, culture and identity.** This has manifested itself in the past as modest resistance to colonialism, and a political movement for separation of Papua New Guinea since the 1960s. It manifests itself today in ongoing suspicion of the National Government, but also foreign business corporations and traders, and even development partners. Outsiders are however also a convenient target to blame for situations that Bougainvilleans at least have co-responsibility for. There is also explicit demand in Bougainville for trusted outsiders to play neutral, facilitating and enabling roles.

- **Unequal distribution of benefits and costs.** The most visible example of this has been of course the Panguna mine, with resentments created about the distribution of benefits between Bougainvilleans and non-Bougainvilleans, and among Bougainvilleans, and the distribution of spiritual and environmental costs between Bougainvilleans. The question of re-opening the mine remains very controversial among the population and Bougainville’s leading figures. There are at least four different perspectives, each with its own arguments: (1) The mine should be opened as soon as possible; (2) the mine should never be re-opened again; (3) the mine can perhaps be re-opened but not now; (4) the question of whether the mine can be re-opened or not depends on many conditions being fulfilled or not. Other larger scale investment projects, especially those with foreign involvement, have also caused disputes. The Torokina Palm Oil project is one example.

- **Internal jealousies and disputes:** Traditional Bougainville society had many connectors but also a lot of dividers, factors that create social cohesion or antagonism and conflict. Sorcery killings are one expression of this and continue today. The biggest and increasing source of internal dispute however is over land. There is a lack of appreciation of the structural pressures on land, resulting from a big demographic increase, the expansion of cash cropping and climate change. The level of environmental degradation in Bougainville may be underestimated. Disputes in Bougainville risk spiraling out of control because of the use of payback in dispute resolution.

- **Leadership rivalries and divisions:** Leadership rivalries are at the source of splits within the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) and the Meekamui, leading to the persistence of armed groups that do not recognize the authority and legitimacy of the ABG, whom they see as simply another faction. Noah Musingku’s “Paapala Kingdom” is also a separate enclave but emerged from a different trajectory.

Any of these drivers of conflict carries weight. A combination of them makes the situation more volatile.

**Contributing factors.**

Contributing factors are things that by themselves are not drivers of conflict, but that make it easier for a situation to turn more quickly or more seriously confrontational or violent. Some of them are more tangible, others less so, but they are no less important.

Tangible contributing factors include heavy handed actions, which in Bougainville tend to have aggravated rather than resolved the situation; the presence of fire-arms; and the abuse of homebrew and marijuana. Poverty, in terms of income poverty, is not seen as a major factor in Bougainville, however food insecurity may become more important, due to

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6 This is a faction that broke away from the Bougainville Revolution Army headed by Francis Ona. Meekamui did not sign the Bougainville Peace Agreement.

7 Noah Musingku is a self-proclaimed King of the Paapala Kingdom not recognised by the ABG and also creator of the U-Vistract financial scam after the conflict.
the decreasing availability and productivity of land used for subsistence farming.

Intangible contributing factors are:

- **Trauma**: alleged to be so widespread that it is a social problem, and being passed on from parents to the next generation;

- **A general feeling of insecurity**: strong in many though not all locations of Bougainville, that people very much associate with the presence of fire-arms even if they very rarely used. The sense of insecurity for women is probably much higher because of the very high levels of domestic and gender-based violence;

- **Weakened traditions and norms and values and irreversible cultural change**: Bougainvillians tend to highlight the connector rather than the divider factors in their tradition. Traditional culture is then seen and used as a source of resilience, most notably in terms of communal self-help and reconciliation. The weakening of culture and traditional norms and values tends to be attributed to the longer-term influence of Western thinking and the collapse of traditional mechanisms to manage conflict and restore relationships during the crisis. A significant factor however may well be the introduction and extent of the cash-economy, which has major impacts economically and socially, including in gender relations.

- **Lack of relevant and trusted information and a practice of reasoning**: Even educated Bougainvillians have little access to timely, relevant and trusted information that would allow them to develop informed opinions, and make informed decisions and choices. This pertains to important economic information but is also to critical political information such as their understanding of the Bougainville Peace Agreement (BPA), understanding the delineation of responsibilities between the National Government the ABG, and understanding fundamental issues related to the referendum. This creates a situation in which misinformation can flourish and distrust may increase.

- **Skepticism about and distrust of the leadership**: The public standing of the local leadership, notably the Chiefs, varies, but is generally low when it comes to the Bougainville regional leadership.

The presence of fire-arms, the level of alcohol abuse, the prevalence of trauma, the degree to which respect for traditional authority has been lost, and customary values and norms eroded, are new contributing factors that did not exist pre-crisis, or not to the same degree.

**CAPACITIES FOR PEACE – DEALING WITH THE PAST – AND WITH THE FUTURE.**

**FINDING 2:** The predominant approaches to dealing with the legacy of the past in Bougainville are advancing only very slowly at best, or are stagnating. These are the implementation of the Bougainville Peace Agreement (BPA), reconciliation and weapons disposal.

- **The BPA and its implementation**: A detailed review of progress of the Autonomy Arrangements was conducted in 2013, and provides many recommendations for the National Government and the ABG. The general ignorance or misunderstanding of the Autonomy Arrangements among the political and administrative leadership is matched by that among the Bougainville communities and even within government. Many people don’t know the three pillars of the BPA, or that the ultimate decision about Bougainville’s political status remains with the National Parliament. There is no knowledge at the community level of the intent of the BPA (i.e. first give autonomy a chance to work), nor any understanding of the complexities of the transfer of powers and functions and of the financing arrangements between the National Government and the ABG. The people of Bougainville are therefore largely ignorant about the current state of affairs, and of the division of responsibility between the
National Government and the ABG. Until the recent adoption of the Bougainville Public Service act, many Bougainvilleans were unaware that the public service in Bougainville remained part of the national public administration, and that the ABG did not have the mandate to correct it is widely perceived weaknesses. While it is fairly widely believed that ‘PNG’ has not been providing the grants as per the agreement, overall it is difficult for the people of Bougainville to know which authority is responsible for what, and who to hold accountable. Criticism is levied at both the National Government and the ABG, and some Bougainvilleans believe a review of some aspects of the BPA is required.

**Reconciliation:** The loudest and most consistent message is strong protest against the commercialization of reconciliation in Bougainville, driven by so-called big men, and arguably contributed to by the ABG and development partners. Though ordinary Bougainvilleans in several locations are continuing their reconciliation processes entirely with their own means, irresponsible sponsoring of big men reconciliations – often with good intentions - has damaged the strength of customary practices and contributed to attitudes of greed. The result is partial paralysis: outstanding reconciliations for which the wallet has become more important than the heart. There is also a clear message that some leaders have not reconciled with the people. There are however other factors that hamper reconciliation: the concern of some perpetrators to be confronted with demands for compensation and the problem of the ‘missing people’ – with on the one hand graves with bones which have not been identified, and on the other the people missing and believed dead but whose bones have not been recovered. The recovery and proper customary burial of the bones is essential to bring about full closure – both to relatives of the victims and to the perpetrator(s). The strong commercialization of reconciliation (and the distortion of the past – see below) are also leading to a rising number of claims for compensation, for damaged or lost property or loss of relatives, typically directed at the ABG – even if the damage or loss was caused by the BRA.

**FINDING 3:** Two significant issues related to dealing with the legacy of the past are largely neglected. These are (a) trauma healing, and (b) creating the conditions to learn from the past.

- **Trauma healing:** The indications are that personal trauma remains widespread, more than fifteen years after most of the violence subsided, and is to a degree being transmitted to the next generation. The reasons for the persistence of so much trauma need to be better understood. This PDA raises the question to what degree outstanding reconciliations, missing people, proper burials not having been conducted, ongoing gender-based violence, and the general avoidance or distortion of the truth of what happened during the crisis, are contributing factors. The churches and some civil society organizations are trying to address trauma, but there appears to be little recognition and support for this type of work. Anecdotal comments suggest that maintaining confidentiality is a critical element for people to be willing to share what troubles them. Deeper inquiry is needed to understand what can be effective ways of healing for Bougainvilleans.

- **Creating the conditions to learn from the past:** Bougainvilleans so far have chosen to deal with the past through reconciliation, amnesty and pardons. It’s important to know what happened, and to ask the question why the crisis became what it was, however they must chart out a new trajectory for peacebuilding going forward.

- **There are multiple sources of resistance to establishing a more comprehensive and truthful account of what happened:** It revives painful memories, it goes against the cultural practice of not talking about the dead (once properly buried), and it may more publicly establish responsibilities that various individuals want to keep quiet – all of which may lead to further violence. However, this raises the question of what young Bougainvilleans are learning about the crisis: how can Bougainvilleans learn from the past – in a conflict-sensitive manner – to ensure something similar does not happen again?
FINDING 4: Effective governance is an important prerequisite for a strong future of Bougainville. The efforts so far have been neither visible nor convincing to the Bougainville population at large.

- **Confusion at all levels about division of powers and functions between the National Government and the ABG:** The overwhelming majority of Bougainvilleans, but possibly also senior leaders in the National Government and the ABG, still cannot fully discern what is governed by the National Government and what comes under the full authority of the ABG. Experience has shown that Bougainvilleans tend to direct their frustration and criticism at the governance actor that is most identifiable for them, i.e. the ABG.

- **Difficulties in the collaboration between the National Government and ABG:** There is disharmony amongst the various entities of the National Government dealing with Bougainville, while fragmentation within the ABG also hampers the pursuit of a coherent and cohesive approach in Bougainville. Relations between both governments have improved but remain fragile. The geographical distance between the two is an additional challenge that could be somewhat reduced through regular video conferencing.

- **Hybrid political order not yet working:** Bougainville’s Constitution establishes a hybrid political order, which tries to mix modern with traditional institutions of governance. So far neither of them has worked effectively, and their interaction is marred by confusion about roles and responsibilities, and limited capacities (in terms of financial resources, but also competencies and collaboration) at all levels. A clarification of roles and responsibilities, as formally envisaged, will only make sense if the respective entities are able to play their assigned roles. If not, gaps will arise or other entities need to go beyond their boundaries to step in.

- **Toward a whole-of-government approach in the ABG:** The 2012 Capacity Development Strategy sets out a challenging roadmap to address the disconnect at many levels within the ABG (political, administrative and legislative components). The strengthening of the Chief Secretary’s office is an important step in the right direction, but much more will be needed to develop a meaningful whole-of-government approach.

- **There is a major disconnect between the ABG and the citizens of Bougainville.** People acknowledge progress in the rehabilitation of infrastructure and the revitalization of health and educational services, but the ABG has low performance legitimacy with regard to many other issues that matter: political unity, increased public security, strengthening of governance capacities at all levels, improving economic opportunities and development of relevant skills. Various experiences and perceptions contribute to this state of affairs: the limited amounts of money that reach the local level; the lack of transparency and accountability at all levels about budgets, allocation choices and how the money has been spent (Open Budget); corruption (real or perceived); individuals associated with the ABG who have not reconciled with the people; poor performance of the public service including the police (absenteeism, lack of competency, lack of leadership); failure to communicate timely, relevant and trustworthy information about critical issues; lack of the ability to meaningfully participate in critical policy questions for Bougainville; and consultations that are perceived as attempts to make people accept an already decided policy choice (the Mining Forums).

- **Lack of political representation:** For most constituencies, their member in the House of Representatives is not a channel for political representation, nor a source of information or funding. They largely only see them in the lead up to elections, and have heard and become wary of promises that go unfulfilled. There are some notable exceptions where a regional or constituency member actively engages with the people, which contributes to positive local interventions. Many constituencies, however, question what their member does with the 25,000 Kina received per quarter, which is more than what Councils of Elders (CoE) receive, who have more responsibilities and are closer to the people. A recall procedure that in theory allows a constituency to
replace a non-performing member in the House does not work in practice. Coupled with the absence of a formal political opposition and a strong, independent and professional media, this means that Bougainvillians have no effective political voice.

- **The consequences of this disconnect:** The consequences are multiple: a) One is disappointment, loss of belief and possibly distrust in the ABG and the Bougainville leadership. This sometimes results in a demand for neutral outsiders to lead important programs and manage the funds. It also contributes to widespread reluctance to pay taxes; b) In some locations, though not everywhere, people have started mobilizing at village, CoE and to a lesser extent at the district level, to move forward on the challenges they face. The critical ingredients for this are encouragement and local leadership. There are various examples of significant achievements including some (almost) gun-free and alcohol-free zones, progress with reconciliations and burials, and renewed respect for Chiefs. These achievements came about through local responsibility and ownership and without grand plans, strategies or external funding. However, if local initiative is used for the wrong purpose, it may result in mob behavior and law and order issues, including the emergence of private security companies, and individuals or groups seeking to do deals with business entrepreneurs, bypassing the ABG.

- **Demand for bottom-up governance:** People don’t just want a better functioning and better communicating ABG and House of Representatives - they demand less top down and more bottom-up governance.

- **Local level governance is hampered in various locations** because of loss of respect for authorities, lack of resources and competencies, and a lack of collaborative leadership. In some areas Chiefs are respected and have regained some authority, whereas in others their positions are contested or they are sidelined by the introduction of Councils of Elders. In some areas Councils of Elders seems coherent and dynamic, while others are fragmented and inert. Strengthening local level governance will require a flexible approach that adapts to and works with the locally variable circumstances. Energizing local level governance is first and foremost a matter of general encouragement of local ownership, of supporting or enabling good local leadership, and developing critical competencies such as basic work planning and financial management, but also effective communications, and facilitation and mediation skills. Money only builds capacity after these other factors have been strengthened. Money without these other capacities of responsibility, ownership, collaborative leadership and key competencies will go to waste and may even fuel local divisions and conflict.

**FINDING 5: Economic development is another pillar for a strong foundation for Bougainville’s future.** The efforts so far have not been convincing to the Bougainville population at large.

- **Strong demand for investment in the non-mining sector:** The PDA confirms the Autonomy Review observation that the non-mining sector, where most Bougainvillians seek their livelihood, has been neglected. There is a strong demand for the creation of downstream processing facilities to add value, but also for more internal markets, access to credit (Bank South Pacific puts conditions that most cannot meet), agricultural extension services and technical training relevant for an agro-based economy. This demand is sometimes reinforced by reservations about the consequences of re-opening the Panguna mine, and a desire to preserve and protect Bougainville’s environment. People are not generally linking this to the growing pressure on land, the difficult issue of land policy, and the impact of cash cropping on their social relations and traditional norms and values.

- **Recognition of Bougainville’s tourism potential but no (available) analysis of its potential:** There is no reliable research available about what could attract tourism to Bougainville, how Bougainville might fit within other tour options in the region, what sort of tourists might be interested and able to come to Bougainville (nationalities, economic categories, interests). If such research exists, it is not available, even to those who have already established tourism ventures such as guest houses.⁸

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⁸ The PDA did not look into fishing as a livelihood or (additional) source of income, or the potential of fisheries in Bougainville waters.
• **No structured support for small scale and medium enterprise business development:** While it is not too difficult for Bougainvilleans to start up a small business (there are serious challenges for non-Bougainvilleans), there is so far neither policy nor practical support from the government to do so. In addition, business people cannot count on police protection of their business. As a result, business people are reluctant to pay taxes.

• **Popular support for continued alluvial mining:** Continued alluvial mining has broad support: it is relatively open to many willing to make the effort (including armed groups), requires little capital outlay, is believed to have limited environmental impacts, and currently provides good returns.

• **Re-opening the Panguna mine:** As mentioned earlier, there are at least four different, meaningful perspectives on this question. The PDA found no evidence of majority support for any one of them. The far more important finding however is that Bougainvilleans are not in a position to develop an informed opinion and make an informed choice. This is not limited to broad access to and understanding of the Mine Bill drafts. Land ownership remains a critical issue, and has relevance beyond the Panguna mine area, with at least some Bougainvilleans contesting state ownership of the resources underneath the soil. Furthermore, most Bougainvilleans have no access to detailed information from a source they trust, such as how long it would take and how much it would cost for the mine to be re-opened, what the projections are of the revenue it is likely to generate (reportedly such projection are available, but not widely known or easily accessible), what share of that revenue can be realistically expected to stay in Bougainville, and how that would be shared. Nor do they have enough trustworthy information about what the environmental impacts might be with today’s technology and knowledge. A number of women in Bougainville have grouped as Women in Mining to articulate these demands, but also to protest the prevailing exclusion of women in the consultations and negotiations so far – all the more relevant in that land in the Central Region is transferred through the matrilineal line. There is also a significant strand of opinion among Bougainvilleans whose environments are not directly affected by the mining operations and its effluents, who argue that they have to be considered as stakeholders, for two reasons: the Panguna mine affected everyone in Bougainville, through the influx of foreigners and the violence it triggered, and any future revenues from a re-opening of the Panguna mine have to benefit Bougainville as a whole.

**FINDING 6:** There is no informed and inclusive national debate and dialogue about alternative visions for Bougainville in 20-30 years from now, and about the likely economic, environmental, political, social and cultural consequences of different options.

• **Visioning is a strategic thinking exercise:** Visioning is not the writing of a vision statement, but the thoughtful consideration of where one wants to go – and does not want to go- in the medium-term, within a changing real world environment.

• **Copper and/or Coconut:** What society does Bougainville want to become, and what development path does it want to take? The end-of-spectrum visions can be presented on one hand as capital-intensive, larger scale investment projects such as the Panguna mine, the Torokina Palm Oil project and perhaps five star luxury tourism resorts, and on the other hand a slower, smaller scale, less capital-intensive option that focuses on non-mining options, smallholder agriculture and agro-business, and tourism infrastructure predominantly relying on family owned and –run guest houses. The first option is likely to require more foreign presence for capital and expertise, whilst the latter may be successful with largely local resources. Both visions exist, implicitly or explicitly. There is certainly a strong strand of opinion among Bougainvilleans in favor of the ‘small is beautiful’ vision. It is of course possible to try and combine both, as the 2010 Economic Development Policy proposes. But this is easier in a larger space: Bougainville is a geographically and demographically small space: major interventions can have far-reaching impacts.
• **Inability to develop informed opinions about the different options:** The rapid, capital-intensive path may be too easily associated with negative impacts. Many other countries with important natural resources (oil, gas, gold, bauxite, copper etc.) have managed them in ways that increase the potential for conflict: where resources wealth is accumulated by a small political and economic elite, rather than shared widely, social inequalities may increase rapidly. Further, since government can be funded from resource extraction revenue, it doesn’t need to tax the people, and hence has little incentive to govern in participatory, transparent, responsive and accountable ways. Environmental protection laws may exist but are not enforced. However some countries are managing the revenue from national resources for the public good, investing in communities today and in future generations, and have strong and enforceable environmental protection policies in place. The ‘small is beautiful’ non-mining sector based vision will have to take into account the projected futures for copra and cocoa as primary products, and the competitiveness (in terms of price/quality) of more processed products on regional and world markets. Bougainvillians can also make choices that affect their terms of trade: the more they rely on imports, the more they need to export to pay for them (especially if they are independent). The more they consume local produce and use locally created equipment (as they did fairly effectively during the years of blockade) the less they need to import and pay for. There is however the irreversible challenge of pressure on land and resulting environmental degradation, which will force people to rely more and more on (complementary) cash incomes. Very few alternative options seem to have been considered. For example, Rwanda is a densely populated small country that relied almost entirely on agriculture (including some cash cropping), which led to stresses that certainly contributed to the genocide. The current Rwandan government has been investing heavily to turn Rwanda into the high-tech centre of eastern Africa. Given its past educational record, Bougainville could perhaps envisage a new knowledge-based economy, with the support of heavy investment in education.

• **Different options may also have different governance implications** in terms of the degree of centralization or decentralization of government, its overall size, its costs, and sources of revenue to cover those costs. The demand for more bottom-up governance seems to signal discomfort with too much centralization. Figures about how much a good enough government in Bougainville would cost are rarely heard (the Autonomy Review on p. 52 mentions in excess of K300 million). Has the Panguna mine become the only economic or fiscal life-line for Bougainville today, through inattention to the non-mining sectors and a lack of trust built with Bougainville citizens that could convince them to pay taxes?

• **All paths pursued will have impacts on traditional social structures and cultural norms:** Bougainville tradition, custom and culture have been changing for decades, due to the influence of Christianity, the introduction of a cash economy and modern governance institutions before the crisis, authority gained through violence during the crisis, and a rapid demographic increase since. The spread of access to information and communication technologies will also inevitably have impacts on values and behaviors. Bougainvillians will have to think about what is worth preserving, what should be discarded, and how they adapt deeply held values to the realities of today and tomorrow. Retreating into a version of traditional life, as is being done by some cult groups, may be an option for some but not for Bougainville as a whole.

• **All Bougainvillians are stakeholders in this, and today’s youth more than anyone else:** The debate about alternative visions for Bougainville cannot be left to a handful of politicians or senior public servants, and not even to a select group of some 50 or even 200 representatives. This merits broad public involvement from all sectors of society, and especially young people, because theirs is the future that Bougainville has a responsibility to protect.

FINDING 7: Bougainvillians express a sense of stagnation on the issues that matter most, but are not mobilizing into collective action to address them.

The peace-making process in Bougainville was slow and took many years, but is generally portrayed as very successful, because there was broad participation (and internal consultations and debate) and ownership by Bougainvillians.
Outsiders by and large played a supportive and facilitating role. That practice has waned significantly since the creation of the ABG, for a variety of reasons:

- **Grievance and greed:** Not all but too many Bougainvilleans, ordinary citizens and members of the ABG, have adopted an attitude of grievance and greed, expecting someone else — the ABG, the National Government, development partners — to sort out their problems and/or give money. Grievances keep people turned to the past, and greed focuses the attention no further than the very short term horizon. Grievance and greed also put responsibilities on someone else; they do not encourage taking ownership. But lives and societies cannot be rebuilt on this basis, and by only focusing on the past and the pressures of today. The many local examples of Bougainvilleans who have taken up responsibility show that encouragement, self confidence, collaborative leadership and action and pride in achievement are critical to efforts to create positive change. Money is secondary.

- **Problems with the leadership:** The Bougainville leadership is perceived as disconnected from its people, and has not modelled collaborative leadership. Its relationship with its development partners and with its people risks being driven by money, rather than by joint analysis, joint planning and joint periodic review, which are both the source of and the result of trust and genuine partnerships, and without which collective action cannot take place. In doing so the ABG has especially deprived itself of the energy, creativity and commitment of many other Bougainvilleans, who are willing and ready to share the responsibility to overcome complex challenges. They can’t do it alone, but neither can the ABG. The ABG needs a listening and dialogue strategy with its people, not a one-way communication or awareness strategy.

- **Unrecognized contradictions?** There are tensions, dilemmas and perhaps contradictions in their attitudes that Bougainvilleans need to face up to. For example:

  - Can one continue to demand grants from the National Government and simultaneously be strongly pro independence?
  - Can one acknowledge that Bougainville cannot do without some foreign capital and expertise, and simultaneously be defensive about the presence and influence of outsiders?
  - Can one acknowledge that the ABG has very limited financial resources, yet make claims for money, and also avoid paying any taxes?
  - Can one demand economic development and simultaneously say that no land can be touched, or start disputes and conflict purely for personal gain, over the land or other assets that are needed to bring that development?
  - Can one demand economic development yet also hold that tradition and custom cannot be changed?

**FINDING 8.** The people of Bougainville are not in a position, in early 2014, to make informed choices in their elections in 2015.

The 2015 elections in Bougainville will be some of the most important in Bougainville’s recent history. The government and parliamentarians (in the House of Representatives and the National Parliament) who will emerge from these elections will have the responsibility of dealing with the referendum, its outcome and aftermath. All the evidence from the PDA exercise signals that some Bougainvilleans today are not in a position to make well-informed choices about whom they want to lead them through the critical five years after. They don’t (and haven’t been helped to) correctly understand information on the relevant issues, and seem generally disenchanted with the quality of leadership of the ABG and are hence skeptical about the kind of leadership that will emerge during this critical period.

**FINDING 9.** The people of Bougainville are not in a position, in early 2014, to make an informed choice in the referendum about their future political status, which should take place between 2015 and 2020.

Many Bougainvilleans do not know what a referendum is. Many of them are not aware that there is a five-year window period, and many don’t know who decides on the date for the referendum to be held. Many do not know or do not correctly understand the BPA references to weapons disposal and good governance as factors to take into account in deciding the date. More importantly, some are led to believe that that it will be a referendum on independence, rather than independence being one of the options. Many Bougainvilleans are also not
aware that the ultimate decision-making authority resides with the National Parliament. Notwithstanding the experience of twice having found no response to a unilateral declaration of independence, they are not now paying attention to the fact that a sovereign Bougainville would have to be recognized by other states. Many Bougainvillean also have no concrete idea of what the practical differences would be of staying with Papua New Guinea or becoming independent. Those who are pro-independence focus more on the freedom they will gain than on the responsibilities and challenges that will come with it. Little attention is paid to the possible dilemmas for the many Bougainvillean living in other parts of PNG that would result from Bougainville becoming independent. The current ABG leadership has appropriately been drawing attention to the economic viability of an independent Bougainville, but that question is not on the forefront of most people’s minds. The issue was also too quickly linked with a drive to re-open the Panguna mine, presented – and/or perceived – as the only available option. The valid question of the economic and/or fiscal viability of an independent Bougainville has therefore become marred in suspicions about foreign and personal interest agendas related to the mine.

**FINDING 10:** Among those who think a bit more about the referendum, the PDA identified two strands of opinion regarding the timing of the referendum: ‘sooner rather than later’ and ‘we are not ready yet’.

Those who feel that the referendum/independence should take place as soon as possible argue that the current situation is one of stagnation and will not improve with further delay. They argue that Bougainville is not permitted to manage its own affairs, including its relations with aid donors and possible investors and trading partners, as everything has to go through PNG, which is stalling. Further, they argue that no country that opted for independence – including PNG in 1975 – was fully prepared. Many believe substantial improvements are needed before Bougainville will be ready for either the referendum or independence, pointing to outstanding reconciliations, weapons to be recovered, unity to be achieved, more infrastructure to be rebuilt, more economic investment and development especially in the non-mining sector and improved governance and capacities for governance.

**FINDING 11.** There is so far little public awareness and thinking about possible risk scenarios related to the referendum, and how to prevent and proactively manage them.

Potential risk scenarios include: (1) the referendum takes place in a manner that is not free and fair or alleged to have seen too much voter intimidation; (2) the referendum is free and fair but voter turnout is low (admittedly an unlikely scenario); (3) the referendum results in a significantly divided vote The risk of the latter scenario would increase if the split coincides more or less with former BRA-BRF divides or regional divides. When presented with this possible scenario, Bougainvillean felt it would lead to violence. Another possible risk scenario is that of a fair but not overwhelming majority pro-independence, which contributes to hesitation within the National Parliament. That would raise the political temperature and much could then depend on the positions by the influential international actors.

**FINDING 12:** There is little public awareness let alone reflection about possible risk scenarios, irrespective of the political status of Bougainville.

The fact that Timor Leste and South Sudan descended into serious internal violence not too long after gaining independence should underscore that independence doesn’t automatically solve all problems. Some of the possible risk scenarios, irrespective of whether Bougainville remains an autonomous region of PNG or becomes independent, could be: (1) a continued factional standoff that periodically escalates into fighting; (2) large scale capital-intensive but conflict-insensitive investment projects that create new resentments or fuel old ones about the sharing of benefits and cost and the protection of Bougainville resources, identity and culture from outside influence; (3) persistent fiscal weakness of the Bougainville government, maintaining a vicious circle of discontent and disconnect between government and population; or (4) many people losing significant amounts of money if the U-Vistract pyramid system of Musingku’s ‘Papaala Kingdom’ collapses or is forced to close. Precedents from collapsing pyramid schemes in other countries indicate this latter scenario can generate quite some social and political turmoil.
CAPACITIES FOR PEACE – UNDERSTANDING PEACEBUILDING

FINDING 13: Peacebuilding is poorly understood and consequently not pursued as effectively as it could be.

In times of crisis and confrontation, the objective is clear: stop the violence, if possible disarm, and have the parties reconcile. While many Bougainvilleans today have become bystanders, there are still many individuals who mobilize when there is a serious incident or an emerging crisis. These people are insufficiently recognized, encouraged and supported. But crisis intervention and crisis management are only a prelude and aspect of peacebuilding. The goal of peacebuilding is to nurture a viable society that has the capacities at all levels to deal with the inevitable conflicts and disputes that will arise, but that also has strong capacities for collaboration across social, economic, and political divides. Most of that plays out at the level of intangibles: personal wellbeing in the heart and mind, interiorized values and norms that enable positive social life, restoration of broken relationships, a minimum of trust, positive thinking and positive actions. Such nurturing is being done by people and groups that are willing and able to act as connectors – among different individuals and groups at the local level, among different individuals and divisions or organizations at the central level, and between the local and central level. Continued separation (even if there is physical proximity) leads to or confirms distrust, competition, misunderstanding and potentially hostility. Effective peacebuilding requires collaborative leadership rather than coordination. Peacebuilding is done first and foremost with and by real people: it is not a technical exercise of project coordination or integrated planning or strategy development. No plan or strategy will make people work together if their relationships are such that they are not willing or able to. This requires collaborative leadership: getting people to work together by making them see the interconnectedness of their actions, by modelling collaborative approaches and by providing incentives for collaboration and disincentives for fragmented and competitive behaviors. This requires deep understanding of the different contexts in Bougainville, and a level of self-awareness and maturity and skills that cannot be learned from a training manual. There is potential for this at the local level, but this remains unrecognized and unsupported, because until now, peacebuilding in Bougainville has largely been associated with and understood in terms of autonomy, reconciliation and weapons disposal.

CAPACITIES FOR PEACE – PEACEBUILDING ARCHITECTURES & STRATEGIES

FINDING 14: Within the ABG, development has been unduly disconnected from peace and security.

The analysis of the drivers of conflict, which should resonate with the recent experiences of Bougainvilleans, indicates that developmental resources and investments can be a significant driver of conflict. There is increasing dispute over land in Bougainville as a whole, and the Panguna mine experiences highlights the critical tension point of how benefits and costs are shared, as well as the sensitivities towards outsiders. Development has to be pursued with great sensitivity to conflict, to avoid doing harm, and as much as possible in ways that make it peace-relevant, act as a connector rather than a divider.

FINDING 15: The peacebuilding architecture within the ABG has reflected this limited understanding of peacebuilding. That may be changing with the Bougainville Peace and Security Council.

In earlier years peace and reconciliation was anchored squarely at the political level (in the President’s Office), whereas since 2010 they have been anchored within the central administration. Has this change had an impact on the level of political attention – in the Bougainville Executive Council - to peace, security, and conflict sensitive development?

Within the ABG administration, peace and security have been relegated to the Divisions of Peace and Reconciliation and of Veteran Affairs and Weapons Disposal. Even though the ABG’s Medium-Term Development Strategy (2011-2015) also connects peace and security with the Law and Justice Division, in practice this latter division seems to operate at rather a distance from at least the Peace and Reconciliation division. Matters to do with the BPA implementation and the referendum presumably fall under the Autonomy Division,
which again seems to have little active connection with the aforementioned divisions. The Division of Community Development (which also covers youth) has a major role to play, as so much has to rely on communities and local leadership, especially in light of the weak capacities of the administration at the local level. This Division as well seems to be rather disconnected in practice from the ones already mentioned. Finally, as this analysis underscores, the Divisions of Land and Physical Planning and of Mining have a critical role and major responsibility for peacebuilding in Bougainville. The Division of Media and Communications can also make a significant contribution, if it can frame its mission as enabling real two-way communication and informed debate between citizens and government.

If the Bougainville Peace and Security (and Development!) Council, and its envisaged secretariat, are meant to overcome this fragmentation and to drive a whole-of-ABG-government approach to peacebuilding and conflict prevention, then its merits strong support. Putting the right people in place will be essential.

**FINDING 16:** District and lower level Peace and Security Committees can do well, if they are grounded in local commitment and mobilization, nurtured rather than imposed upon, and not undermined with easy money.

Local level initiatives for peace and security originated spontaneously during the crisis. In more recent years, when the ABG sought to establish District Planning Committees, it was realized that very little development could take place if there were significant peace and security problems. Largely local initiatives have led to the creation of local committees, some of which are having a positive impact. Two examples would be the Bolave Peace and Governance Committee in Bana district and the Siwai District Peace and Security Committee. There are other District Peace and Security Committees, such as in Buin, Panguna, and Torokina, with so far varying levels of capacity and effectiveness. The existence of District Peace and Security Committees has the potential to provide more effective inter-district dialogue and collaboration. One key factor for success seems to be inclusiveness of all social forces: women, youth, churches, veterans, business people, administration etc. Presumably another key factor for success is collaborative leadership – people working as connectors, capable of promoting inclusion, convergence if not consensus and collaborative action. District Peace and Security Committees can be an expression of bottom-up governance, where the modern and traditional components of Bougainville’s hybrid governance structure work together. The experiences of other countries show that top-down attempts to replicate a locally created and locally successful initiative tend to fail. It is better to nurture the potential of more District Peace and Security Committees through inter-district exchanges where people can discuss, learn and find inspiration from each other.

Bougainville shows many examples where the sudden access to wealth has led to corruption, effectively undermining peacebuilding or even fueling tensions and conflict. The challenge therefore is to find the right balance between a holistic and integrated approach to the overall improvement of districts, which will require the handling of project and programme funds, and protecting the integrity of mediation and peacebuilding efforts by keeping (the promise of) money (other than some basic running costs) out of them. A separation may be needed between people that develop the role and competencies to be connectors, and those that develop the management skills to handle project and programme funds. The former direct the latter to ensure that money, projects and programmes are managed with great conflict-sensitivity and in ways that make them peace-relevant.

The Bougainville Peace and Security (and Development!) Council, and its secretariat, can also become the institutional connector between central and local level efforts, ensuring their efforts add up to greater cumulative impact, rather than go parallel or even undermine each other.

**FINDING 17.** The eventual handling of the violent Konnou conflict in southern Bougainville (2006-2011) shows the value of collaborative action whereby different actors play the roles for which they are best suited given a specific context (best fit in a given context), rather than through formal coordination.

The Konnou conflict arose from a multitude of factors, mostly local and sometimes dating back to pre-crisis years, but eventually pitched different armed militias against the Meekamui in the southern region and the Musingku’s ‘Papaala Kingdom’. The conflict was initially fueled by the provision
Attempts by the ABG to address it alone were not effective. It took the encouragement and mobilization of the local Chiefs, and of various actor groups such as women, churches and youth, and the creation of spaces by a neutral actor like the UN to develop the collaborative action to bring the violence under control. The Chiefs were able to get the parties to agree to a ceasefire and to put their weapons under the control of their respective commanders. But full weapons disposal and sustained peace also require a political engagement by the ABG of the Meekamui in the south, that, unlike with those in the Central Region, hasn’t happened as yet.

FINDING 18. A Panguna Peacebuilding Strategy is much needed, but also very challenging. Much will depend on how it is pursued and by whom.

As mentioned, past grievances and internal disputes over the Panguna mine were a major catalyst for a decade of violent crisis. Controversy around the Panguna mine is alive today with regard to the question of its re-opening. Given that Panguna was and is a core driver of conflict, a peacebuilding approach to it is inevitable and highly relevant. It is also very challenging as there are today even more overlapping and crisscrossing dimensions to the Panguna conflict: intra-family and possibly inter-clan conflicts; dynamics among owners of mine lease land and others whose environment has been affected by pollution from the mine; gender dynamics with women demanding proper representation; factional rivalries among the Meekamui in Central Region; dynamics between former BRA and Meekamui; long-standing demands for compensation from BCL; and competition over the current spoils from the scrap metal business. Everything therefore will depend on how peacebuilding is pursued here and who drives it.

The Panguna Peacebuilding Strategy document articulates three objectives: 1) promoting unity, referring in the first place to the Meekamui factions in the Central Region; 2) creating a peaceful and democratic environment under which the referendum can be conducted; and 3) as stated in the Strategy, “create an environment that is conducive to conducting a dialogue on the eventual reopening of the Panguna mine which is so central to achieving all of the above Medium-Term Development policy and development priorities in Bougainville.” The Panguna Peacebuilding Strategy built on the rapprochement that had been taking place between the ABG and the Meekamui factions in the Central Region, and that had already found expression in the 2007 Panguna Communiqué and the 2010 Memorandum of Understanding. The origin of this rapprochement is said by the ABG to have been the desire of the people within the No Go Zone to see basic services re-established. For all the reasons highlighted in this PDA (the difficult issue of equitable sharing of benefits and costs; the fueling of internal rivalries and disputes among ordinary people and between leaders by the prospect of significant amounts of money; and the issue of foreigners), the mine tends to be a divider that may prove difficult to combine with the connector objective of unity. The very legitimate concern of the ABG about its fiscal situation seems to have imbued the issue of the re-opening of the mine with a sense of urgency. A sense of urgency however does not combine easily with the patient and painstaking work that may be required to make some sustained progress on so many different but interwoven strands of conflict.

There may also be some confusion about what Panguna refers to: is it the district, its inhabitants, the question of their social and economic development opportunities and what vision they have for their district? Or is it the mine? Who in Bougainville are stakeholders regarding the mine? There are not only those that live in Panguna district, but also others that have been directly affected by the past operations of the mine, but live in other districts. There are of course also those who argue that because the mine was the catalyst for a war that affected everyone in Bougainville, the whole of Bougainville are stakeholders. That argument is further bolstered by those who believe that if BCL would pay compensation, it needs to benefit the whole of Bougainville, and/or that if the mine is re-opened, the revenue it generates should also benefit the population as a whole. There are in any case today also new actors e.g. in the scrap metal trade, whose area of origin was never affected by the mine and who therefore cannot claim stakeholder status based on land. What is their relative influence in the Panguna process, compared to the landowners? These questions are being dealt with under a Panguna negotiating process for compensation separate from the Panguna Peacebuilding Strategy.
This sensitivity and need for inclusiveness in dialogue and negotiations is highlighted by the Women in Mining submission which makes very clear that the women of Panguna do not feel fairly represented, and demand all relevant and reliable information so they can come to an informed opinion. They also challenge the current legal framework that gives ownership of mineral resources to the state. Reportedly their complaint of exclusion is being responded to, but the issues they raised will not be easily resolved.

DIFFERENT ACTOR GROUPS: CAPACITIES FOR PEACE?

FINDING 19: Post-BPA, women have lost the prominence they had before and during the crisis, and in the peacemaking process. They need to reunite in their pursuit of equal representation, and get support also from men.

Before the crisis, women were active participants in determining how the benefits and costs of the Panguna mine were shared. Today they demand recognition as key stakeholders in the debate about its possible re-opening. Women played very important roles during the crisis, sometimes as supporters of the mobilization and fighting efforts of the men, as victims of the violence and of the blockade, and as is well known, in the peacemaking efforts to reduce local violence and to reach an overarching political agreement.

Some of the contributing factors to the current marginalization of women seem to have been (1) the quick shift of attention to the ex-combatants; (2) their exclusion from the first weapons disposal programme, (3) the reassertion of traditional gender roles that orient women more towards subsistence farming (generating only modest cash incomes from sale in local markets) rather than cash-cropping; (4) cultural bias against education for women (especially in south Bougainville); (5) a climate of threat from guns but also other weapons; (6) high levels of domestic and gender-based violence, (7) lack of support for crisis-widows, teenage pregnancies and marriages, and (8) very limited political representation at all levels (in the COEs, the House of Representatives, the Bougainville Executive Council, top jobs in the public service). Though the matrilineal nature of Bougainville society (with the exception of parts of south Bougainville) is often mentioned, actual respect for and influence of women, even in matrilineal areas, seems to be diminishing. Outside actors have sometimes unwittingly contributed to this, by falling into the pattern of men doing business with men. So too has the de facto marginalization of women from critical policy and legal discussions and negotiations, such as those regarding the Panguna mine, the Mine Bill, Land Policy etc. Eight years after the creation of the ABG, there remain three reserved seats in the House of Representatives for veterans and women each, though veterans amount to a few thousand and women make up half of the population. This is a stark reminder of the marginalization of women, and of the continued legacy of the crisis where much voice and power was obtained from holding a gun.

Unfortunately, the Bougainville Women’s Federation is weakened by leadership rivalries. International recognition of and learning and networking opportunities for some women leaders and organizations, to the neglect of others, have not helped in this regard. The lack of information and understanding of the governance framework among many women in Bougainville, and the absence of their voice at all levels where governance decisions are being made, suggests that the Bougainville women’s movement is currently not an effective channel for two-way information and communication. Yet experience shows that, where community mobilization is inclusive or women are given a leading role for community development activities, they quickly demonstrate their potential and competencies to effectively participate in governance.

FINDING 20: The churches of Bougainville have been and are dividers as well as connectors and healers.

During the crisis, several church-leaders or church leaders contributed to the violence-reduction and peacemaking efforts, but the crisis also created internal divisions within the respective denominations. It is uncertain whether the clergy men took sides with their parishioners supporting one side of the conflict or whether the reverse was the case. As a result, sometimes reconciliations also had to take place between church leaders within the same denomination. The churches have a long history of competing for followers, thus many people in Bougainville see them as a dividing factor. There is some movement to create more positive relationships and
collaboration among the churches, such as the Bougainville Christian Churches Association and the recent Bougainville Churches Conference. Post-crisis, church leaders and volunteers have been helping to facilitate local level reconciliations. They also try to provide healing, by engaging individuals as a whole, as a being with various dimensions including a strong spiritual one. Lack of financial resources however means that the churches do not seem to be able to provide much welfare and practical-material assistance, for example to war-widows with children. The churches feel somewhat undermined by being bypassed by other actors, by their lack of financial resources, and by not getting stronger recognition from the ABG and National Government.

**FINDING 21:** Youth make up half of the population, but are not invited or encouraged to contribute to the consolidation of peace, the prevention of future conflict and the development of a viable society in the future.

There are large numbers of young people who grew up during the crisis, who lost out on formal education and whose experiences during that brutal time had lasting effects. They are today referred to in negative terms as a lost generation, which implies poor competencies such as illiteracy and ignorance of custom and tradition, and anti-social behavior: disrespectful, troublemakers, abusers of alcohol and drugs, sometimes holding guns, members of half-criminal gangs of rascals. There are serious problems with this, such as the unfairness of labeling a generation as lost, when many other young people do not exhibit such behavior, and the lack of recognition that these young people are not to blame for their illiteracy and anti-social behavior, but rather the generation of adults at the time they were children and growing up. Even today, children and youth have to observe domestic violence, alcohol-abuse by parents and other relatives, volatile emotions resulting from trauma, tensions and dysfunctions within the community, adults corrupting reconciliation and other customary practices for money etc. Unseen and unsung, women often pay the fines imposed on their children for misbehavior, in order to reduce the pressure on them and to restore the social peace. Again several local, often unrecognized and unsupported initiatives have sprung up to teach literacy and practical skills.

No Bougainvillean under 25 years of age or so has a lived experience of Bougainville before the crisis. Their points of reference then are what they have experienced during and since the end of the crisis. Although they have a tremendous stake in the future of Bougainville, they don’t know about the BPA or the Constitution, they are not given the information that will enable them to develop informed opinions, they have no spaces to explore and develop their own ideas (which they want to do), and are not invited to effectively participate in governance platforms, from the Village Assembly to the House of Representatives. Young people have energy, creativity and optimism that Bougainville needs but is not tapping into.

**FINDING 22:** The current ambiguities around the ex-combatants or veterans need to be resolved.

Three regional Veterans Associations were created at the time of the formation of the ABG, initially as the platform for credible selection of candidates for the three seats reserved for veterans in the Bougainville House of Representatives. Subsequently, attention shifted to the issue of social and economic reintegration of the ex-combatants, hence the framing of the Division as that of Veterans’ Affairs. There remain expectations among a number of veterans of further financial benefits, an expectation also grounded in the experience of the BETA (Bougainville Ex-Combatants’ Trust Account) programme. This provided cash for former combatants to start up a livelihood, and while some succeeded, most simply consumed the money without establishing a livelihood activity⁹. Veterans, through the associations, in many places also provide local authorities with a helping hand in maintaining some law and order. But the veterans’ associations have also been and are likely to remain platforms for political voice, with veterans for example expressing dissatisfaction with the implementation of autonomy, through petitions, street marches and open letters in the press.

Bougainvilleans recognize that there were just causes for people to take up arms, and their own combatants were a source of protection. But there is today also a strong feeling in Bougainville that too much attention has been given to the ex-combatants compared to the civilians who suffered even more during the crisis. There are no victim associations to

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⁹ BETA supported projects that would provide “training to develop skills and knowledge, development of viable businesses or strengthening of existing businesses. It had a structured guideline for accessing funds.
represent them and, compared to other countries that have gone through large scale violence, in Bougainville there seems to be very little practical assistance to help the non-combatants deal with the material and emotional damage suffered during their crisis. Keeping the ex-combatants under the spotlight also perpetuates the situation seen during the crisis, where those who carried guns gained influence and power over those who didn’t.

There is also discomfort with the transformations brought about by the change of name from ex-combatant to veteran. This has been intentional, motivated by a recognition that ex-combatant holds negative connotations of violence and brutality. In that sense, it can help give former fighters a more positive social identity. But use of the label of veteran reframes reality in deeper ways than just for the individuals concerned: it suggests that all fighters fought and risked their lives for the same, noble cause (independence?) which is a distortion of the truth. It buries the fact that Bougainvilleans took up arms for many different reasons, often to protect themselves from attacks by other armed Bougainvilleans. And it diverts attention away from unwarranted acts of brutality that in other countries would raise demands for justice. It also allows the portrayal of all the suffering of the unarmed Bougainvilleans at the hands of their own fighters as “small things”, unavoidable side-effects (collateral damage) of any struggle for freedom. The use of veterans therefore encourages a perceived rewriting of history, which makes it much harder to learn from the past.

Bougainvilleans and ex-combatants need to clear up the ambiguity that persists. Firstly, who do the Veterans Associations really speak for? Not all former combatants are (active) members of Veterans Associations and many do not continue to present themselves in public as ex-combatants or veteran. They have taken on their former or new social identities and in that sense moved on. Although they are ex-combatants, their voice and perspective may not be well expressed through the Veterans Associations. Secondly, how long do Veterans Associations have to persist? The Division of Veterans’ Affairs is supposed to be dissolved by the time of the referendum. Do they constitute a platform for possible re-mobilization, should the referendum not bring a desired outcome? Thirdly, those who continue to see veteran as their primary social identity, need to ask themselves how long they intend to do so? It seems more an obstacle to the desired reintegration in society, than an enabler. Finally, is the question of what society owes the ex-combatants or what ex-combatants can do for society? If people took up arms for a good cause, to protect themselves and their kin from outsiders or from attack by other armed Bougainvilleans, then they can take pride, be a force for peace and for security, and share in the benefits this brings for everyone. If they took up arms to have power, and be able to loot and rape and kill, does society today owe them a major debt?

FINDING 24: The development partners are not making available to the Bougainville authorities and people relevant experiences and approaches from other countries.

This includes for example insights into the experiences of places that chose autonomy (Aceh) or independence (Timor Leste), of the challenges that new countries have faced after independence (Timor Leste, Kosovo, South Sudan), of the different political economies in the management of major natural resources. Many if not most people in Bougainville are also not aware of global platforms such as the International Cocoa Organization, or of global movements and experiences with approaches such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, the Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil Standard and the Palm Oil Buyers Scorecard, or the Open Budget and participatory budgeting movements. There is much learning to be had from these and other experiences, and the development partners are best placed to make it available and understandable.

FINDING 25: The planning and implementation of aid-funded programmes and projects can be better coordinated, and needs to be decided and regularly reviewed against ‘do no harm’ and peace-relevance criteria.

Reportedly some of the aid flows do not show up in the ABGs budgeting process. Such situation obviously does not enhance the ABG’s capacity to most effectively manage its financial resources and plan strategically. The ABG’s Capacity Development Strategy sends a clear message that it wants to retain ownership. However, budget coordination requires capacity and resources, and full coordination may take time to achieve. At the time that this report was written, the office
of the Chief Administrator was being strengthened, so that it can be an effective coordinating axis for the development partners.

It also appears that the ABG’s Division of Planning doesn’t have a comprehensive and detailed overview of what aid-supported activities are being undertaken and where, and what amounts of money are allocated for what activities. Reportedly its Project Management Unit has undertaken a comprehensive mapping of at least the infrastructure-related projects in the Panguna district. Within the context of this PDA exercise, a broader attempt has started to already try and map the geographical and sectoral distribution of all major programmes and projects, from the ABG and development partners, in Bougainville, although many actors were unwilling to share budgetary information. This type of exercise can provide the information to examine, for example, whether programme benefits are equally shared across the districts of Bougainville and match population concentrations, and what the balance is between investment in physical infrastructure and human capital (competencies)?

One of the most striking examples of unequal sharing must surely be the investments in infrastructure, including transport, on the main Bougainville islands, while the Bougainvilleans living on the Nissan Islands and Atolls continue to risk their lives in the absence of safe shipping.

But if the unequal sharing of benefits and costs, and internal disputes and rivalries, can be drivers of conflict in Bougainville, then programmes and projects also need to be designed to ensure that they avoid doing harm and where possible contribute to the consolidation of peace. While over the years, many positive examples have taken place, conflict-sensitivity and peace relevance are not always the case: development partners and the governmental authorities have – despite good intentions and arguably often unknowingly – done harm through their methods of providing funding for reconciliation, paid Bougainvilleans allowances to participate in meetings, provided a possibly inflated number of ex-combatants too easily with money to start livelihood activities as an incentive to dispose of their arms, introduced the language of peace dividends, highlighted the (deserved) merits of some women and women’s organizations to the neglect of others etc. This has sent the implicit message that there can be no peacemaking or peacebuilding without money, has commercialized reconciliation in Bougainville, created inappropriate and unsustainable expectations and demands, and privileged Bougainvilleans with better connections to the international actors. Periodic reviews or real time evaluations need to explicitly examine how programmes and projects impact on the (perhaps very locally variable) dynamics of conflict and peace. Negative impacts need to be stopped and corrected, and good practices learned from.
This Peace and Development Analysis, through a very participatory process, examined the challenges for the consolidation of peace, the prevention of renewed violence, and the development of a well-governed Bougainville whose population has a strong sense of wellbeing.

This section presents PDA team’s assessment of priority areas (the ‘what’), but also its reflections and suggestions about the ‘how’ and the ‘who’. Paying attention to the ‘how’ and the ‘who’ is critical, for two reasons:

1) The prevailing approaches so far aren’t working very well: people by and large express a sense of stagnation on the critical issues that matter for peace and conflict resolution in Bougainville. The various entities in the National Government dealing with Bougainville often working separate from each other, do not speak with one voice, undermining a coherent approach. In Bougainville, the prevailing approaches have been heavily top-down: complex and interconnected challenges are dealt with in a fragmented manner (land, natural resources and community development for example are split over different Divisions, just as youth and education are located in different Divisions) and as stand-alone issues (reconciliation; weapons). Moreover they have tended to single out for attention a few privileged sectors of Bougainville society, notably landowners (at least those somehow affected by the Panguna mine) and veterans – to the comparative neglect of most other Bougainvilleans. The prevailing approach has also been largely driven and controlled by adult men, marginalizing the women and youth of Bougainville, who together make up more than half of the population. Finally, throwing money at a problem when people are not ready to use it responsibly doesn’t solve the problem: at best it temporarily calms the situation down, it may simply be wasted, and in the worst case it encourages greed or fuels the problem.

2) Learning from other experiences: Experience from many other societies that have gone through large-scale violence, and where people are trying to rebuild social cohesion, good enough governance, and the capacities to sustain peace and prevent renewed violence conflict, teaches a few core messages:

- No outsider can do it for you: Inasmuch as the Bougainville crisis relates to its relationship with the rest of PNG, the National Government has a major co-responsibility to make it work. But where it comes to the internal violence among Bougainvilleans, only Bougainvilleans can make sustainable peace with each other. Outsiders can at best support local solutions.
- Complex challenges require holistic and multi-dimensional responses: There are no simple solutions. For example, as we have seen, different people hold weapons for different reasons. Sometimes remaining weapons are connected with political aspirations, sometimes with outstanding reconciliations, or with a general sense of insecurity, or images of masculinity or greed etc. No one-size fits all approach will work to contain and remove all the weapons.
- No one can do this alone: Even a more internally efficient and better resourced ABG cannot by itself resolve all the challenges Bougainville faces today. Nor should it try to: Bougainvilleans of all walks of life should mobilize and take co-responsibility for a more peaceful future. Therefore capacities for constructive collaboration have to be strengthened throughout all sectors and levels of society. Then people may still be critical of their authorities, but will also collaborate with them to make things work.
- Consider the best fit in any given context: There are no practices or solutions that are best everywhere all the time; there are no actors that are best placed to lead the action everywhere and all the time. Government has the formal responsibility, but sometimes it may be wise to be present but let others take the lead.
GING PRIORITIES AND OBSERVATIONS

+ Building basic trust and relationships across divides is often a prerequisite before any meaningful and effective action can take place. That requires time, patient engagement, listening. Progress and results on building fundamental relationships and trust does not happen according to plans and deadlines determined in offices.

+ “No action plan without a prior think piece” - although the clock is ticking, we must think before we act.

+ There are no quick fixes: Certain actions can temporarily calm a situation down, but building sustainable peace, i.e. the local capacities to manage tensions and conflicts constructively, is typically a long-term endeavor.

THE WHAT: KEY AREAS TO CONSOLIDATE PEACE AND PREVENT RENEWED VIOLENCE

PART 1: WORKING TOWARDS A BETTER FUTURE.

1. The ‘What’: More Effective and Constructive Interaction – a priority for the National Government and the ABG?

The ABG in its functioning has suffered from internal fragmentation and, as its 2012 Capacity Development Strategy acknowledges, needs to improve the quality of its public finance management. The various entities in the National Government dealing with Bougainville affairs on the other hand are also not coordinating sufficiently or working towards one coherent approach. Few have grasped the finesse but also the complexity of the arrangements for the implementation of Autonomy, as the Review of Autonomy Arrangements points out. The geographical distance and the time pressure on officials on both sides further complicates communication.

When personal relationships have been established, regular video-conferencing between Port Moresby and Buka could improve the communication for reduced time and cost. The ABG’s Capacity Development Strategy also suggested that the current institutional arrangements for coordination could be improved. One suggestion put forward was for the ABG to establish a coordinating office in Port Moresby, headed by a senior official.

The BPA emphasises the need for the national government and the ABG to work together in the implementation of its provisions. Criticism in that regard can be justified, but too much mutual criticism can lead to an atmosphere in which collaboration becomes difficult, as has happened occasionally.

2. The ‘What’: Stronger Multilateral Political Support – a priority for the international community?

Bougainville is on the radar screen of private sector companies in the extractive industries. It is also on the radar screen of those working on resources-based conflict. The UN Environment Programme should have some expertise that is relevant for Bougainville, but doesn’t appear to be actively engaged so far.

Bougainville for a very long time has been way off the international political radar screen that is absorbed with issues in places such as the Central African Republic, Libya, Syria, Ukraine etc. The issue of Bougainville today merits more political attention and constructive political support, perhaps from regional platforms such as the Pacific Islands Forum, but certainly also from the United Nations. The eligibility of Papua New Guinea – Bougainville to receive some (modest) funds from the UN Peacebuilding Fund is a good entry point step in that direction, if it does not become the first and last step. If the vulnerability to renewed violence is not reason enough by itself, then presumably a referendum that includes the option of independence will be. A smooth referendum and smooth aftermath are in the interest not only of Papua New Guinea and the people of Bougainville. UN agencies such as the Department for Political Affairs have a role to play. The latter is fortunately already engaging, but more will be needed to generate the appropriate level of attention in New York.

There may also be a somewhat bigger role than is currently the case for the development banks (World Bank, Asian Development Bank) who have specific expertise and can provide access to experiences from other countries that Papua New Guinea and Bougainville can learn from.
3. The ‘What’: Informed choices in the referendum.

Strategic Objective: Bougainvilleans are able to develop informed opinions and make informed choices about their future political status, as they will be invited to do in the referendum.

(This supports recommendations from the Autonomy Review, such as 3.2 and 12.2).

What might this entail? For example:

- The people of Bougainville have to understand how the BPA came about, and the compromises that it entailed. They may need to understand the meaning of the sequencing of conditions that had to be fulfilled before the ABG could be set up, as an expression of commitment from both sides. They may need to understand the intent behind holding a referendum 10-15 years after an ABG had been created. They need to know what the meaning is of the conditions of weapons disposal and good governance, and they definitely need to know that the Bougainville leaders at the time accepted that the ultimate decision authority remains with the National Parliament. They will ask questions about why such compromises were accepted and will need credible answers to that;

- The people of Bougainville also need to understand at least the basics of the implementation of the Autonomy Arrangements, and why there is a gradual transfer of powers and functions. They need to know what remains the responsibility of the National Government, and what is legally under the authority of the ABG. They need to have an accurate picture on the financial transfers from the National Government to the ABG. They need to understand what it takes the ABG, even if powers and functions have been formally transferred, to turn that into operational capability. They will ask why the implementation of the Autonomy Arrangements have not gone faster, and will require credible answers to that;

- The people of Bougainville need to have a clearer idea of what the practical political, economic and social implications are likely to be of staying with PNG with Autonomous Region status, and of becoming independent. This relates to the other core issue of the economic and fiscal prospects of Bougainville, but also needs to include, for example, the perspectives of Bougainvilleans residing in other parts of Papua New Guinea, and the question of how much freedom of movement within the national territory people from other parts of PNG would have under continued Autonomy. Giving the people of Bougainville access to experiences from other countries that chose continued autonomy (e.g. Aceh, Irian Jaya is probably not the most trusted example) or for independence (Timor Leste, South Sudan, Kosovo) may also give them a more realistic perspective about the challenges that remain in either case.

- Bougainvilleans living in other parts of PNG are an important stakeholder group and the possible outcomes of the referendum have potentially somewhat different implications for them. They need to be brought into the process, so that their views and concerns can be heard. That has not happened sufficiently until now (including in this PDA exercise).

The credibility of a referendum outcome will be enhanced if it is clear that Bougainvilleans could actually make an informed choice.


Strategic Objective: A majority of Bougainvilleans accept the timing of the referendum and understand the preparations that need to take place. The people of Bougainville and their leaders, and the National Government and Parliament, have anticipated possible outcome scenarios of the referendum, and have been proactive so as to reduce the risk of violence.

What might this entail? For example:

- Various considerations suggest that it is better to organize the referendum towards the end of the window period: quite a number of Bougainvilleans themselves recognize they are not ready yet; the practical interpretation of the BPA conditions of weapons disposal and good governance needs to be clarified; practical preparations for organizing
the referendum are only starting; and there are elections in 2015 (Bougainville) and 2017 (National) which suggests that it is better to wait until on both sides the new governments are in place and settled in. If the date would indeed be put towards the end, the people of Bougainville will need to understand why this is, so that it doesn’t become the object of conspiracy theories. The frustrations of those who want the referendum sooner rather than later will also have to be managed. The scenario must be anticipated that some groups will not give up their weapons until after the referendum, and the enforcement capacity does not exist to make them do so.

- There is a possibility that Bougainvilleans wishing to remain autonomous within PNG feel a certain pressure from those in favor of independence. Bougainvilleans especially need to understand that the credibility of their referendum depends on it being free and fair – and think in advance how that can be ensured in practice;

- There is the possible scenario that a modest majority votes for independence, with a significant minority voting to stay with PNG. Bougainvilleans participating in the PDA conversations suggested that this would lead to internal violence. It may also create hesitation in the National Parliament. Such scenario needs to be worked through in advance at the political level, but also prepared for at the popular level with the people of Bougainville.

- Should the outcome be independence, there may be a transition period of several years between the referendum and the actual formal political declaration of independence, as in Timor Leste. That is not something that the people of Bougainville currently seem to have considered as a possible scenario. Should such scenario come to happen, it is better that it is understood for its potential advantages, rather than distrusted as a delaying tactic.

An assumption in the above reasoning is that the likelihood of violence is increased if people unpleasantly surprised over something that has high stakes and is likely to generate strong emotions.

5. The ‘What’: The Development Path Options for Bougainville.

Strategic Objective: A broad consensus has emerged among the people of Bougainville and their leaders, about how they see Bougainville economically, politically and socially 20-30 years from now.

(This supports the intent of recommendation 3.1 of the Autonomy Review, but advocates that it is not up to a small political and administrative elite alone to articulate the kind of society Bougainville desires to be in the long term. Surely one of the most concerned stakeholders are Bougainville’s youth today).

This PDA has used the image of copper and/or copra to signal that there is at the moment no consensus, and that combining both might be possible but not so easy in practice in a small place like Bougainville. A consensus that emerges has to be more than a hope-line. It has to be based on reliable research and information and learning from other experiences (provided by sources Bougainvilleans trust), a realistic appreciation of what it would take to get there, and how autonomy or independence are likely to affect (positively or negatively) the chances of achieving the preferred future.

What might this entail? For example:

A realistic assessment of Bougainville’s economic resources: Currently many Bougainvilleans simply assert that their island is resource rich and – even without the mine – can be a land of milk and honey. The public thinking about Bougainville’s economic potential needs to be much better informed. Some of the obvious key areas are

- The availability and environmental condition of the land in relation to the rapid demographic increase of the population, and the expansion of cash cropping. That will require statistical information, but also oral history to dispel the belief among the current generation that Bougainville is in pristine condition (the result of shifting baselines where the generation today has no idea of what the environment looked like one or two generations ago, and hence doesn’t appreciate the real change). It may also require household surveys to determine the sources and uses of income (cash, but also food grown at home and goods bartered for), and how the situation of households in that regard may have changed over the past 15 years or so (especially in terms of a changing relationship between self-reliance and subsistence, and the need for money);

- The medium-term prospects for copra and cocoa exported as primary products on regional and global markets, and
the market prospects to add value to these primary products by further processing in Bougainville;

- The economic prospects in domestic and regional markets for other agri-business products such as canned fruits, and for the forestry and fishing sectors (sustainability of fish stocks, used for domestic consumption and/or for export?);

- A better-researched appreciation of Bougainville’s tourism potential, compared to other tourist destinations in the region;

- A better-researched appreciation of the practices and potential of alluvial mining;

- Bougainville’s current trade balance and the options to effect it in Bougainville’s favor (e.g. by increasing production and consumption of Bougainville-made goods and services, so as to decrease the reliance on imports, and/or increasing the value of Bougainville goods and services being exported etc);

- Realistic figures for what the Panguna mine might be able to generate for Bougainville, but also an indication whether there are other areas in Bougainville that lend themselves to similar type of mining. Panguna may not be the only resource.

All of this would have to be accompanied by some realistic appreciations of the capital and human skills that would be required to maximize the economic potential identified, and what would be realistic time frames to do so, if most of the capital and skills would come from Bougainvilleans rather than from outsiders.

The concerns amongst Bougainvilleans about re-opening the Panguna mine relate to the sharing of benefits and costs, but are also inspired by distrust of foreigners and their leaders. In that context it seems very relevant for the people of Bougainville to be exposed to how other resource-rich countries have managed major resources (environmentally but especially politically), where it has gone wrong and how some governments and populations have been able to control the negative impacts of foreign-driven resource extraction and maximize the benefits for the public good. Similar knowledge and learning is available for other capital–driven crops such as palm oil that the ABG needs to tap into.

It is important to remember however that Bougainvilleans can consider all of this in terms of gross national product but also in terms of gross national wellbeing. A population can choose to maintain a materially more modest lifestyle in favor of what they feel is greater wellbeing, and therefore decide not to maximize its economic potential.

6. The ‘What’: The Fiscal Basis for Bougainville’s Governance Institutions.

Strategic Objective: The people of Bougainville have a realistic understanding of the options to fund different modalities of governance institutions, and what their implications are.

(This supports recommendations in the Autonomy Review, such as 9.1., 11.1 and 11.4, but draws attention to the fact that the ability to raise taxes without unduly expensive enforcement also depends on the trust of citizens in their government. Taxation therefore is not to be treated as a technical-financial exercise but as a core aspect of the broader governance relationship. This PDA report also recommends that the issues of informed choice, the development path options and the fiscal basis are so interlinked that they should not be treated separately.)

What might this entail? For example:

- What would be the actual running cost of a good enough Bougainville regional and local administration, which would allow it to attract and maintain a certain number and quality of public servants, have the operational budget to function, and provide a specified level of services? Presumably that budget for good enough governmental functioning would increase if Bougainville would become independent? This would for example incur additional costs such as some diplomatic representations, the costs of printing and managing Bougainville passports etc.

- What is the current running cost of the ABG, and from what sources is that currently being covered? How much comes from internal revenue? If Bougainville became independent, the financial transfers from the National Government would come to an end, though all of Bougainville’s internal revenue would stay in Bougainville (the Autonomy Review provides some insights and figures on this, and draws attention to the two interpretations of fiscal self-reliance, a more technical one in terms of the Autonomy
arrangements, and one taken as Bougainville being able to cover all of its governance costs from internal revenue;

- What are the options for a Bougainville government (irrespective of its political status) to raise more internal revenue – when would such a revenue stream become active and what would it take and cost to make it happen? At the moment the only option seems to be the Panguna mine revenue, though few people know how much the mine may generate and how long it might take before such revenue starts flowing into its coffers. But the importance of Panguna mine income is also heightened by the absence of any meaningful internal revenue from other sources: most Bougainvilleans including business people are reluctant to pay tax, cash croppers and alluvial miners do not pay tax and there is no corporate tax income (the Autonomy Review suggests this may be unlikely even in future). There is little ability to raise VAT, and presumably little or no income from import and export tax (which may negatively affect the terms of trade), and hardly any from licenses and fees. Presumably the ABG does not get income even from the scrap metal trade? But is this situation not also the result of the neglect of the non mining sector, and the failure to build trust with Bougainville’s citizens so that they do pay the personal taxes they owe? Certainly some COEs are considering pressing harder for the local people to pay some local taxes, so they have some budget beyond their own running costs to work with.

- Finally, this situation is not unique to Bougainville. Other countries coming out of large scale violence and with a devastated governance situation have faced it as well (e.g. Liberia, Rwanda, and Burundi). Several of these do not have a major natural resource, so how have they gone about strengthening their internal revenue? What medium term budget deficit might development partners be willing to cover while Bougainville increases its internal revenue?

- Different governance modalities also have different implications for how internal revenue is pursued. There may be different practical implications for raising and spending revenue under a Bougainville administration that is more decentralized than is currently the case.

Clarifying this is relevant for the debate about top-down and bottom-up governance, but would also make it clear to the citizens of Bougainville that they can’t have it both: not pay taxes and oppose the re-opening of the mine. This may have the propensity of putting the government in a very difficult financial situation to govern.

7. The ‘What’: Stronger Governance Capacities at the Local Level.

Strategic objective: Encourage the capacities for collaborative action and key competencies at the district and more local levels.

Given the relative individual weakness of most governance actors at the local level, i.e. district administrations, COEs and Chiefs, the rationale for collaborative action is even stronger. So too the relevance of mobilizing and including other social actors such as the churches, women, youth, veterans, local business people etc. This is already happening in some areas.

**What might this entail? For example:**

- District and constituency based joint analysis, prioritization and planning, collaborative implementation and participatory review, joint learning;

- Open budgets: people know what budgets are available from where, as much as possible participate in decisions how they are to be spend, know how money was actually spent, and participate in the reviews and evaluation of the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the action;

- Strengthening of critical competencies: in analysis, prioritizing and work planning; in basic financial management; in effective listening and communicating, in holding effective meetings, in keeping good enough records; in facilitation and mediation skills. Some of this can be started in classroom settings but is then also further strengthened through periodic coaching;

- Public servants who are dedicated, who stay where they have to be, and who are willing and able to learn, and people reflecting on what members they need in COEs to make the latter effective and accountable;

- Periodic meetings of members of different COEs, Chiefs and district administration personnel, to exchange experiences in dealing with the challenges they face, and what have been key ingredients for success;

- The central administration enabling, acknowledging and...
supporting the positive developments in the local areas, and highlighting successes;

- Development partners giving the key stakeholders at district and COE level the opportunity to join in analysis and planning and in decision-making about where investments are best made and how, based on broader consultation; and

- Restraint in promising and disbursing money until people are ready to handle it responsibly and accountably.

8. The ‘What’: Pro-active, Policy-Driven Efforts to Involve Women and Youth.

Women make up half of the Bougainville population, yet have only three reserved seats in the House of Representatives, and no reserved seats in the Councils of Elders. There is currently only one woman in the Bougainville Executive Council, very few women heading ABG Divisions and not many women who in district level executive manager roles. Many other patriarchal societies have taken affirmative action to ensure greater political representation of women at local and national level (India with its strong male bias is one example; Rwanda where a genocide took place another) even if it takes time for some of the women to take up leadership roles. For a society that is largely matrilineal, this is a dismal situation. This is the time to take action to ensure that more women stand as candidates for the coming elections in Bougainville, and that when they get elected they receive the support needed to assume their roles and responsibilities.

Youth are largely excluded, too. There is some sponsoring of sports, but other youth initiatives and expressions, such as music, also merit support. Young people could be better supported by the Bougainville Business Association and others, to learn how to set up a small business. But young people in Bougainville also want information and platforms to explore and express their ideas: youth debates, more youth forums, a Youth Parliament, young journalists and radio by and for youth are all promising ideas. English is not the language of choice to maximize youth participation. Young people respect tradition, but also observe how, for example, reconciliation has been commercialized where money and store goods are used rather than traditional means of conflict resolution. They want to explore new ideas and opportunities, and the spread of technology will make it impossible to stop that.

PART 2: DEALING WITH THE PAST.

The overall trend so far seems to have been – understandably – one of dealing with the legacy of the past (reconciliation, weapons) with perhaps comparatively less energy and attention left to focus on the future. But this has also opened the way for grievances, opportunistic greed and former combatants to be and remain rather front-of-stage, and to demand solutions from someone else. Perhaps focusing the attention and energies on the new Bougainville that Bougainvilleans want to build together, what it will take to get there and how everybody’s constructive efforts will be needed to achieve the desired future, will unblock some of the seemingly intractable problems.

9. The ‘What’: Overcoming the Legacy of the Past to Ensure a Peaceful Future.

Strategic objective: The people of Bougainville take collective responsibility to overcome the legacies of the past and to ensure that a similar situation of internal violence can never happen again.

What might this entail? How people deal with the past, with painful memories and the question of forgiving, is very individual though also influenced by cultural practices. The PDA team can only identify the questions. This will require more conversation with and among the people of Bougainville, to find the solutions that work for them.

The PDA invites reflection on the possibility to put different issues, so far considered as stand-alone, together. These are reconciliation, which includes missing persons and the importance of proper burial, trauma and learning from the past.

One of the most widespread and loudest criticisms heard by the PDA team had to do with the perceived commercialization of reconciliation. The absence of external funding of reconciliations is proving not to be an obstacle in various local areas. Accordingly, the PDA team recommends that any further external funding for reconciliations be for the moment suspended, while Bougainvilleans at large discuss what they think should be the policy on this. Initial enquiries by the ICRC signal that there may be a significant number of missing people, while there are also graves with as yet unidentified bodies. If this is an obstacle to reconciliation and a contributing factor to trauma, then the issue merits more attention and support.
The apparently high level of trauma, often related to the experience of violence during the crisis (as victim, as perpetrator and for many individuals as both), but perhaps also further sustained and caused by domestic and gender-based violence since, may need significantly more attention and intervention than has been on offer so far. Further inquiry however is recommended, as the PDA team has not been able to do this.

Last but certainly not least, the PDA presents the people of Bougainville with an uncomfortable question. The truth, as many Bougainvilleans acknowledged in the course of the PDA conversations, is that an initial resistance to outsiders turned into an internal fight. Some Bougainvilleans fought for a good cause and fought nobly, but others took arms and used violence for less noble reasons. The question then becomes: What do Bougainvilleans need to do to ensure this does never happen again? What do the next generations need to be told, by parents, teachers, and leaders, so that they will not make the same mistakes as their parents? The stories of individual and local experiences do not add up to an understanding of the wider picture of what happened and why. Not telling the wider truth also allows censored and biased versions of recent history to circulate. How to balance the cultural practice of not talking about the dead and the reluctance to wake up again painful memories, with the need to ensure that the next generation learns from the mistakes of their parents?

**PART 3: BETWEEN THE PAST AND THE FUTURE**

10. **The ‘What’: Weapons and Veterans.**

The prevalence of weapons in Bougainville is in the first place a legacy of the crisis. There was not such demand for weapons before the crisis. The same can be said with regards to the existence of former combatants or veterans. But weapons and veterans also affect life in Bougainville today, and have an impact on its future.

There are no simple solutions for reducing the number of weapons and no single actor can deal with this, certainly not the Veterans’ Affairs Division. Finding 2 of the PDA looks at the main possible approaches, and suggests that it should no longer be treated as a stand-alone issue.

The PDA also suggests that continuing to single out veterans for special attention actually complicates their re-integration in society and in a way prolongs the atmosphere of the crisis when the (male) fighters acquired dominance over other sections of society. The PDA suggests that this be opened to broader discussion, with active involvement of former combatants, but also those who have acquired a new social identity. Some of the starting questions could be:

- What is the responsibility and ability of former combatants to help build a united, secure and peaceful Bougainville nation?
- What can former combatants do to ensure that they are widely felt to be a source of public security and not of threat?
- What do former combatants who have taken on a new social identity have to say to those who are still struggling with it?
- What do former combatants who fought during the crisis have to say to young men today who carry guns but never experienced the brutalizing realities of real war?

**THINKING ABOUT PRIORITIES**

The PDA is expected to feed into a Peacebuilding Priority Plan. Everything mentioned could be considered important and a priority, but it is not possible to do everything at the same time, especially if resources and capacities are limited. Priorities need to be established and in doing so, it might be helpful to reflect why something might become a priority. There are various possible reasons because it:

- is urgent (urgency only has meaning in a context)
- is a necessary prior step in a sequence (i.e. it must be done first before we can tackle the next step)
- affects a large number of people
- affects a smaller group of people, but that smaller group is important in the wider dynamics of a particular context
- is likely to have a calming effect on a tense situation / may slow down a negative trend / may prevent a negative scenario from arising
- is a central/fundamental issue (such issues however tend to be deep-seated, very complex and interconnected with many other issues, which makes them very hard to tackle head on – and if you do, a long-term approach will be required, because there are no quick solutions)
it is manageable and something that we can hope to have a positive influence on in the not too distant future (the low hanging fruit approach: it enable us to have some relative success that generates positive momentum we then can further build on, though by itself it does not resolve the bigger challenge & often we don’t go beyond the low-hanging fruit!)

no one else is working on this (i.e. other issues can be recognized as a priority in a given context, but because other actors are already working on it, this group or programme may decide to focus on something; alternatively this group can still decide to work on something that others are already working on, if it has become clear that the approach by others has some important limitations or short comings).

The following topics can be regarded as combined priorities for consideration and action in Bougainville:

- Informed choices in the referendum
- The timing, preparation for and dealing with the outcome of the referendum - A broad-based debate about economic development options for Bougainville - The fiscal basis for Bougainville governance institutions

They are priorities because they are urgent (even if the referendum date may turn out to still be some years away,); because they affect a large number of people; because it seems nobody is as yet working on them; because they tackle an issue that is fundamental. The solutions to these challenges are not so easy, but working on them is actually quite manageable, and effective work on them may help to prevent a negative scenario.

They are also put together, because the issue of the referendum cannot be dissociated from the vision where Bougainville wants to be in the next 20-30 years, what economic development path can take it there, and what the options are to pay for its governance.

Active promotion of greater participation of women and youth, also might be considered a priority. There is urgency to see more active women and youth engagement in the elections of 2015, and there are a large majority of people who need to have a voice in the Bougainville-wide debates and dialogue about the future for Bougainville. A large proportion of them will also be voters in the referendum, and should be able to make up their own minds.

More effective and constructive interaction between the National Government and the ABG seems an obvious priority now that the referendum window is approaching. The Autonomy Review should contribute to this.

Stronger governance capacities at the local level can be considered a priority, given the currently very weak implementation capacity of the ABG, the demands for more bottom up governance, and the indications that certain intractable challenges (reconciliation, weapons) will have to be partially addressed at the local level. It affects a large number of people, may have a calming effect on the situation, no one else seems to be working on this in a significant manner, and it is relatively manageable (though there is no quick fix). Local governance institutions moreover are important actors and stakeholders with regard to the bundle of issues of the referendum, the desired future for Bougainville and the fiscal underpinning of its governance institutions. Care is required that the approaches to strengthen the capacities at local level do not confirm and deepen the disconnect with the ABG. Strong two-way connections and interactions are required for each level to be able to play to its strengths.

For many, weapons disposal and reconciliation, though not necessarily trauma healing and learning from the past, are and remain decided priorities. Many Bougainvilleans signaled that progress on these issues should happen before the referendum. The PDA team doesn’t disagree with it, but believes that more of the same is not going to give the desired results. A reframing may be required to develop new and innovative approaches.

THE ‘HOW’.

1. The ‘How’: Conflict Sensitive Development, Larger Programmatic and Strategic Thinking, Flexibility in Funding.

- Development needs be approached with high conflict sensitivity: The PDA exercise has identified unequal sharing of benefits and costs, as well as internal disputes including over assets such as land, as drivers of conflict. This means there is a real risk of development-induced conflict. Even the provision of services is not automatically a driver of peace: the destruction of basic services
infrastructure in Bougainville by Bougainvilleans during the crisis invites deeper reflection about the relationship between basic services and conflict. A conflict and peace lens therefore needs to be applied to every development action planned and implemented.

• Development needs to become also organizationally linked with peace and security: Peace and security is not the responsibility of only some Divisions within the ABG, of only some committees at the district level, or only some departments in the development partners’ organizations. These are whole-of-organization or whole-of-government responsibilities. If the Bougainville Peace and Security (and Development?) Council is set up to enable this, it merits strong support.

• Planning and action need to be integrated within larger analytical and programmatic frameworks: Projects cannot be stand-alone activities, but become part of broader geographical programming frameworks, from the constituency to the district to the regional and Bougainville-wide level. Investments in infrastructure are accompanied and balanced by investments in human skill and competencies development. This will require the integrated overview of programming and project information that currently doesn’t exist but that the Project Management Unit within the ABG Division of Planning and the mapping efforts of this PDA exercise have started to address. (This is a step in support of Recommendation 8.4 of the Autonomy Review.) But it also has other implications: a localized peacebuilding strategy, such as the one in Panguna for example, has to become part of a larger Bougainville peacebuilding strategy.

• Participatory governance requires flexible programme funding: Certain actions, such as those related to infrastructure, lend themselves well to project design, with pre-set objectives and timeframes and budget allocations. But peacebuilding in essence is about changing perceptions, relations, mindsets and behaviors: that takes time and requires a sustained process-approach that adapts to the local circumstances. Similarly, participatory governance, without which no trust and effective collaboration between authorities and citizens can emerge, cannot be planned into the last detail and with predetermined deliverables. Bougainville society does not operate at the speed or rhythm that donor administrations want to see, real participation cannot be authoritatively orchestrated, and the nature of the results or solutions that Bougainvilleans will eventually come up with may not be what the development partners might have wished or anticipated. Local ownership necessitates some relinquishing of control. These dilemmas can be overcome by framework funding, as in the case of the Governance Implementation Fund (GIF) supported by the Governments of Australian and New Zealand; i.e. the provision of an only lightly-earmarked envelope, whose budget allocations are not heavily pre-determined in advance, but decided iteratively, as the action unfolds, based on regular review, learning and adaptive management. This can be framed within a project format but the planning will put more emphasis on intermediary and process-results, and implementation will require very adaptive process management.

• The Bougainville Peace and Security (and Development?) Framework: The Peace and Security Strategy Framework offers great potential, if it can be realized. It is too early to say how the new Peace and Security (and Development?) Framework will turn out in practice and reframe how the difficult issues Bougainville is struggling with will be approached. It must emphasize the deep connection of development with peace and security. It has the potential to be a catalyst for more decentralized and bottom-up, conflict- and gender-sensitive programming, that provides the best fit to the variable conditions at local level. It can be a driver of more participatory planning, review and evaluation, which works with existing strengths and commitments rather than emphasizing the evident gaps and weaknesses. It can do so if it does not rely on money as the major incentive. It can open up the spaces for information exchange, and facilitated debate. But its effective implementation will also require the flexible framework planning and budgeting mentioned above. All of which may require some changes in the prevailing ways of working of the ABG and the development partners. Change is painful, but so too is the status quo.

2. The ‘How’: Going out of the ‘Buka Bubble’.

An important contributing factor to the disconnect between the ABG and the people of Bougainville is the ‘Buka Bubble’ effect. Under the Buka Bubble effect, people are very occupied
in Buka, and do not make the time to actually go out to meet the population of Bougainville, not so much to talk to them, but to listen and talk with them. Various foreign advisors, sometimes because of the conditions of their insurance, suffer from the same isolation. But Buka is not Bougainville. Building trust and legitimacy for the ABG, and creating the conditions that can enable other sectors of Bougainville society to work with and support their government, requires crossing the Passage.

3. The ‘How’: Assessing and reviewing proposed and ongoing actions through a conflict-reduction and peacebuilding lens.

This PDA exercise draws attention to the fact that the critical ingredient is not money, but the readiness of people to use money responsibly. When it comes to the ‘how’ then, we look first at intangible assets such as responsibility, ownership, energy, creativity, willingness and ability to collaborate etc.

The ability for people to collaborate constructively emerges from joint analysis, joint planning, concerted action and joint review and learning. All of this requires collaborative leadership, which also implies allowing different actors to lead in the situations for which they are best placed.

The PDA team invites reflection on the following set of possible criteria against which to assess proposed actions and with which to review and evaluate ongoing actions. These are not final but only offered here as food-for-thought.

### ASSESSING AND REVIEWING PROPOSED OR ONGOING ACTIONS

**Some Possible Criteria.**

A) Is this action grounded in solid contextual understanding?
B) Does this action enable and increase people’s understanding?
C) Does the way this action is undertaken stimulate self-esteem and self-confidence?
D) Does this action strengthen the real participation and also leadership of women and youth?
E) Does the way this action is designed and implemented show a high degree of contextual conflict-sensitivity?
F) Does the way this action is designed and implemented encourage local ownership and collaborative action?
G) Is this action designed and implemented as an ongoing learning practice?
H) Does this action contribute to a larger strategic objective for Bougainville?

A) Solid Contextual Understanding: Solid contextual understanding not only of Bougainville overall, but of different histories and current dynamics in different places in Bougainville, is an essential requirement. There are often commonalities in the challenges people face, but also specific characteristics because of the key individuals that influence the local dynamics, and/or certain characteristics of the local environment or local history.

B) Enabling and Increasing People’s Understanding – Awareness raising is not the way: A lot of the ‘what’ identified by the PDA relates to information. But the people of Bougainville need more than information, they need to be able to develop informed opinions and make informed choices. To what degree does the currently dominant paradigm of and practical approach to awareness raising enable and increase the Bougainville people’s understanding of critical issues?
The PDA team has not formally evaluated this, but is concerned that awareness raising indeed does not enable and increase the Bougainville people’s understanding of critical issues. Some years ago for example, many English-language copies of the BPA were printed and distributed, and some were found during the PDA team’s work in the districts, but they evidently did not lead to better knowledge of the basic clauses of the PDA, let alone an understanding. Disseminating information, especially through large documents, to a population which has limited literacy or reading skills, will not work. Web bulletins and Facebook pages probably reach only a small part of the population. Along the same vein, billboards or bulletin boards informing people of what work is undertaken by whom, and how much money is being allocated to it, does not necessarily result in understanding. Many people in Bougainville also do not speak or understand English and some do not even speak or understand pidgin.

Understanding comes from creative ways of explaining, and from the possibility to ask questions (sometimes more than once), and the ability to think issues through and to reason more reflectively. A few participants in the PDA conversations reacted thus: “Thank you, you have opened my mind”. Highly interactive approaches seem advisable. Approaches successfully used in other countries involve, sometimes in combination, interactive group meetings, interactive radio, video, songs and street or community theatre. The PDA exercise for example was not simply a listening exercise, but periodically encouraged interactive engagement, both with the PDA team and among the participants. Well facilitated sustained debates and dialogues can be a format for the dissemination of information but also to encourage reasoning and deeper understanding. This will require however a field team with a very accurate understanding of the relevant facts and arguments, great listening and communication skills, great group facilitating skills, and generally a pedagogical attitude that reflects the principles of adult learning, as well as command of pidgin and one or more local languages.

Songs and street or community theatre can be used to pass on messages and insights but also to stimulate interactive reflection. Bougainvillians certainly can think about other creative methods, and Bougainvillian youth may find a real space for creativity here. Radio is potentially a powerful medium for Bougainville. Radio coverage needs to be extended. But the critical question is what substance radio will disseminate, in what style and in what language(s). If radio is used very interactively and creatively, it can play a vital role not only in disseminating information but also in deepening understanding and developing a practice of public reasoning. That would involve for example hosting well facilitated debates on the radio in which guests promote different views and perspectives but are asked to elaborate their arguments, and where listeners can call in with questions and comments. There is extensive experience of such approach in other countries, including places with low literacy rates but where people have mobile phones. Strong control and censorship of radio would send a message that the authorities don’t trust the people and might lead the people to distrust the authorities.

Video can be used in Bougainville for the promotion of national debate and dialogue. Individual interviews and group conversations can be recorded and the variety of views shown back to people in a video documentary. Video footage and short documentaries can

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help officials understand what really lives among the people, while the challenges and approaches of the authorities can also be shared in a more lively form with the population. Video can be used to promote indirect communication between people in different districts and regions. Again, there is extensive experience from other countries with such use of video to stimulate a constructive national conversation about issues that matter deeply. And this can be taken further towards participatory video, where different groups in society are encouraged to express themselves and communicate through videos they produce themselves.

C) Stimulate Self-Esteem and Self-Confidence: Low self-esteem and low self-confidence make it difficult for people to engage constructively and actively with wider society, and to take ownership and responsibility. It may lead people to remain bystanders or even contribute to negative social behaviors. ‘How’ people are engaged and treated can influence their self-esteem and self-confidence. If they are treated with respect and made to feel that their views are valued and equally listened to, their self-esteem and self-confidence may increase. There were moments in the PDA engagements, when participants expressed pleasant surprise that they were invited to participate and that their views were listened to. Excluding people or talking at rather than talking with people, send a signal that they have lesser value.

D) Strengthen the Active Participation and also Leadership of Women and Youth: Numerically women and youth make up the majority of the Bougainville population. Marginalizing them is not only an expression of disrespect of their rights. It means that Bougainville leaves unused a huge social resource, within which exists commitment, ideas, energy and leadership, that it needs today and tomorrow.

E) Show a High Degree of Contextual Conflict-Sensitivity: ‘Do No Harm’ is a widely accepted obligation in general and even more relevant when working in fragile situations. The PDA signals, as some other sources have done before, that particularly the too easy provision of money, before people were ready to use it responsibly, has done some serious harm. Many societies in the world are struggling to reconcile but there is probably none where people themselves evaluate the impact of outside support for it as so negative. An environment where internal disputes and rivalries are common, and where there is strong sensitivity about the sharing of benefits and costs, requires great care in all other areas of work as well.

F) Promote Broad Local Ownership and Collaborative Action: Local ownership can be held by different groups at different levels. Local people may have taken ownership of an action, and district or Bougainville level actors need to take care not to undermine it. External actors and partners need to find the fine balance between advising and resourcing local actors, and taking over the thinking, the decision-making, the doing. Local ownership also needs to be broad enough: projects and programmes are often at risk of being captured by local elites. They the own them – but a bit too literally. The approach has to be such that it puts and leaves local actors in the front seat, but also encourages them to work together constructively.

G) Unfold as an Ongoing Learning Practice: Hesitating too long and not taking decisions causes problems. But quickly jumping too decisions and actions without enough prior reflection, preferably joint reflection if collaborative actions if to be promoted, also causes problems. That is why the PDA team has refrained for some time to propose priorities and come up quickly with recommendations, and still invites the readers here to treat this document as a think piece. The most effective managers and leaders, and peacebuilders, are often very busy, but still regularly plan time out to think, reflect, review, learn and reframe. Work plans and schedules that do not include time for review, reflection and learning, preferably together, are indicators of problems to come that will not be early detected.

H) Contribute to a Larger Strategic Objective for Bougainville: Comprehensive reviews of the portfolios of peacebuilding projects and programmes from four major donors, some years ago, revealed that most had a strategic deficit. A claim was made that the action would contribute to peacebuilding, but upon closer inspection there rarely was a credible or even identifiable link between the action and that broader goal. Linkages between an action and a broader strategic objective come from a credible theories of change (the intrinsic argument why doing X will
contribute to Y) and from a deep understanding of the particular context (why doing X in this context will contribute to Y in this context).


There is a demand for learning, but training manuals will not be sufficient to learn the most critical skills. There may be a need for training in conflict sensitivity, to at least reduce the instances where harm is done unintentionally or unthinkingly.

But mere intellectual understanding of conflict sensitivity is not enough. The skill is in its application, and any application minimally requires a deep understanding of the context and the dynamics among the key actors (context and dynamics will often vary from local area to local area). Manuals and classroom training typically cannot provide that essential component of insight. A practical way of learning in Bougainville may be to get some insights in a classroom setting, but then get involved in participatory reviews of existing projects and programmes, coached by someone with significant relevant experience. When done constructively, this can provide valuable insights and support for the project/programme management.

Conflict-sensitive ways of working need to be complemented with gender- and age-sensitivity.

Other critical skills for peacebuilding can only be learned through practice and personal development. A first set of critical skills for effective peacebuilding relates to the ability to establish yourself as trustworthy: this includes for example the ability to reach out to and establish a basic relationship with people that one may feel initially uncomfortable with (e.g. members of a cult movement, former combatants, commanders of armed gangs, aggressive uneducated youth etc.) and to approach them with basic respect; to listen attentively and deeply; to ask relevant and powerful questions – questions that take people to the heart of the matter and make them think; to address sensitive issues but in a careful and constructive way. A second set of critical peacebuilding skills relates to the facilitation skills that allow a connector to bring people across divides into conversation with each other. That implies the ability to deal with hostility and suspicion and other strong emotions such as pain, anger and hate, gradually moving the encounter to a less personalized and calmer consideration of the issues and problems, to eventually jointly develop a workable compromise that all can live with, even if is it is not (yet) a solution. The third set of critical skills relates to the personal competencies and maturity required to play such roles: self-awareness about your own spontaneous emotional reflexes and how you are likely to be perceived, strong personal values, a healthy level of self-confidence and self-motivation, self-discipline, great patience and perseverance also in the face of inevitable setbacks etc. These are some of the skills that the PDA team has been practicing. These skills can be developed and strengthened through practice and with the help of mentoring and coaching. Some of this can be exercised in the safe space of a classroom, but it is hard to convey in a training manual.

5. The ‘How’: Collective Learning-Based Participatory Governance.

Purely evidence-based decision-making and governance can lead to an overly technocratic approach, which starts ignoring people’s views and perspectives. That can become a driver of conflict. Purely participatory governance where most participants do not have the information and understanding to develop informed opinions and positions can lead to easy populism that doesn’t resolve anything and can also take a group or society on a path leading to conflict. The ‘how’ proposed here by the PDA team seeks to promote evidence or learning based participatory governance. This is enabled because relevant information and knowledge is shared, the time is taken to explain and to ensure that all stakeholders understand, and ongoing learning done jointly.

THE ‘WHO’

The PDA team did not and was not supposed to assess the potential and actual capacities of different actors. Nor is it up to the PDA team to recommend what different actors should be doing. A couple of observations are offered for reflection however:

1. The ‘Who’: Creative Thinking about Relevant Contributions and Potential Contributors.

- **Formal Responsibility and Financial Resources:** The usual thinking about roles for different actors tends to start with formal mandate or responsibility and financial resources. Governments – and multilateral political organizations – have the mandate and responsibility and therefore also the authority to address many challenges. Those with the
financial resources have the means to do so – at least in as much as money is the essential requirement, and part of the solution rather than part of the problem. That reasoning is valid but in the real world not always enough. For example, following that line of reasoning, the weapons and insecurity problem in Bougainville should be addressed by the Bougainville Police Service. In practice they don’t have the capacity to do so, and the capacity issue is not just one of money. Equally in practice, governments and donor agencies also have variable capacities internally. Perhaps the department or unit that is formally responsible for something isn’t really able to shoulder that responsibility effectively.

- Other Relevant Assets: ideas, knowledge, reflected experience. Some development partners in particular are well placed to provide access to experiences and learning from other countries that have or are struggling with similar challenges as Bougainville. This can be done through the sharing and discussion of reports, but may need to be further enhanced by more direct exposure: film documentaries tend to grab and sustain the attention easier than long reports – but can be biased (as the Coconut Revolution pseudo-documentary about Bougainville illustrates). Exposure visits to other countries are by and large ineffective. Those who went typically do not and cannot share what they learned with those who stayed behind. It is probably more cost effective to bring well selected people from other countries to PNG and to Bougainville, and let them talk with and answer questions from many people here. Some actual or potential partners have particular experience and expertise to offer on public finance and taxation, on resource-based conflict, or on practical approaches to fighting corruption, within government and by citizens. There are also some international organizations that have specific expertise and much experience with radio for peace. Others have a lot of expertise and experience of working with youth or of participatory approaches and multi-stakeholder process design and management. These are just some examples of other forms of value that can be added.

- Beyond Government and Development Partners: There are many other actor-groups in Bougainville (and possibly also in other parts of Papua New Guinea) that could play positive roles. In many places civil society, women, the churches and youth are invited and called upon to play their part. This PDA exercise has drawn attention to the fact that the women’s movement and the churches in Bougainville need to work on their internal divisions that the former combatants need to articulate clearly how they intend to contribute to wider society, and that the potential of youth is largely unrecognized and underused. The business community on the other hand is often overlooked when it comes to peacebuilding, and Bougainville intellectuals and artists are perhaps not as fully called upon as might be possible. Many chiefs that have stayed local and have not stepped onto the wider Bougainville stage feel neglected and, at least by default, somewhat undermined. There are other groups, such as teachers or health personnel that may have roles to play. Active involvement of former fighters, whether members of the Veterans Associations or not, is strongly recommended.
For specific challenges, specific individuals might also be called upon: presumably individuals – political and military leaders but also women – who were closely involved in the process that led to the BPA, and who know why certain compromises were made, are well placed to help explain this to the people of Bougainville. They can do this for example through a recorded conversation that is broadcast on radio and/or shown around the country by a mobile video team. There are also retired Bougainvilleans who gained experience with public administration management during the Mandate period. They should not return to the Bougainville Public Service, but their experience can still be called upon. There may be other elderly people whose oral history of Bougainville (or aspects of Bougainville life) before the crisis could be recorded and widely shared again by radio and/or video.

2. The ‘Who’: Best Fit for Specific Circumstances.

This PDA exercise draws attention to the fact that there is quite a level of distrust in Bougainville. There is a strong demand for information and understanding but also a rejection of it when it comes from a source that people do not trust. There is equally explicit demand for neutral actors, to play third party facilitation and even supervisory roles, in addition to those Bougainvilleans who are already acting as connectors.

Who is trusted (and trust can be gained where it didn't exist before, but also lost) may vary from place to place and may depend upon the circumstances. The key question and attention point therefore is: Who is best placed to play what role in this particular situation? The question can apply to organizations, to teams and/or to individuals.

Having the formal authority or the financial resources doesn't mean an actor is necessarily best placed to play any role for any circumstance. A government official may be the decision-maker but may not be very good at running effective meetings. Then it may be better to have someone else chair the meeting. Similarly, where there is a need for people to create and sustain connections among divided and opposed groups, not everyone is equally well placed to play such role.

Paying attention to who is best placed requires the wisdom and the humility to recognize that sometimes it is better to let someone else take the most visible lead role and to support more from behind.

The ABG at the moment has a credibility problem with significant sections of the Bougainville population. That may mean that it is sometimes better to let someone else take the lead. Yet the ABG should not of course be absent, as then the perception will not change and trust will not be built. Participants in the PDA exercise commented on their appreciation that various ABG staff were part of the PDA team. Australia is very well aware and gallantly acknowledges that some, but not all, Bougainvilleans regard it with suspicion, for a variety of historical and more contemporary reasons. Being also the most important development partner for Bougainville, that is a difficult position to be in. It recognizes that these circumstances imply that it should not be taking or seen to be taking a lead on everything, and leave the space sometimes for others that are better placed.


The challenges in Bougainville, as in other similar circumstances, are too large for any single actor to handle. Weapons are a particular case in point. Reducing the number of weapons in Bougainville, or the threat they pose, will require a multi-pronged approach. One actor can probably not be leading each and every aspect of this. The same holds for the block of priority areas related to the referendum, the vision for the future and the fiscal underpinning of Bougainville's governance institutions. This will require a diverse mix of types of research and interactions, and, among other things, economic and fiscal expertise, but also expertise with participatory approaches, radio, video, creative and culturally effective visual communication etc. No single organization has all of that in-house.

Collaborative action is therefore required, between Bougainvilleans at the local level, between Bougainvilleans and their authorities, within the ABG, between the development partners and the ABG and other sectors of Bougainville society, and between the development partners. Technical-formal coordination is usually little more than a polite exchange of basic information of who is doing what where. This is not enough: moving forward on some of the difficult challenges Bougainville faces requires a deeper and stronger joining-of-forces. That in turn requires collaborative leadership from various individuals.
CONCLUSION AND THE WAY FORWARD

Peacebuilding is not a one off event but a process which takes time and commitment. Comparative experience from many post conflict scenarios have shown that no single actor be it government or international partners alone, can overcome the real peacebuilding challenges presented in post conflict situations. It is thus essential that a collaborative approach is adopted which offers the ideal opportunity for addressing peacebuilding challenges.

The PDA potentially is not a means to an end in solving the numerous peacebuilding challenges in Bougainville, but rather a ‘think piece’ which is expected to feed into a Peace Building Priority Plan for Bougainville. In as much as the findings raised in the report are all considered important for long lasting peace and stability in Bougainville, implementation of all of them will be hamstrung by the realities of resources and available capacities.

Nonetheless, it is prudent for effective prioritisation of the findings to give all stakeholders the opportunity of engaging with the Bougainville realities, so as to come up with tangible peace building interventions that are contextual, coherent, inclusive, participatory, sustainable and affordable.

Key priorities outlined in the PDA for consideration by all stakeholders to inform concrete peacebuilding actions in Bougainville are:

A) Addressing the issue of informed choices for the referendum
B) Focusing on the timing, preparation and subsequently dealing with the outcomes of the referendum
C) A broad based debate about economic development options for Bougainville
D) The fiscal basis for Bougainville’s governance institutions

It will be quite erroneous to assume that these priorities could easily be resolved by espousing a simplistic approach. Early engagement with all of them is likely to ameliorate negative and ‘fire-fighting’ scenarios especially for the referendum. It is quite palpable, that there is an inextricable link between all of these priority areas underscored in the PDA.

However, bearing in mind that paucity of resources coupled with lack of capacities across the ABG are key challenges, it becomes relevant to embark on a route of cross fertilisation of ideas, promoting interaction and constructive exchange of views between the ABG, national government and development partners and adoption of collaborative approaches that ensure that the divide between the ABG and the people is adequately addressed. This line of intervention, will assist the national government and ABG in dealing with the intractable challenges of reconciliation, weapons disposal, strengthening of local government structures and significantly improving on public financial management systems across the ABG.

THE WAY FORWARD

The PDA categorizes the way forward for peacebuilding in Bougainville into silos of WHAT, WHO and HOW.

The WHAT component proposes an effective and constructive interaction between the ABG and national government and stronger multilateral political support, that should be championed by the international community. This must be geared towards creating the appropriate platform for Bougainvilleans to make informed choices in the referendum. The PDA further proposes policy directions that will ensure women and youth contribute to the governance discourse, and indeed in determining the future political status of Bougainville. The issue of weapons and veterans are to be given the attention required by stakeholders, to ensure that the referendum is conducted in a conducive environment.

On the HOW front, Bougainville must endeavor to embark on the path of conflict sensitive development and flexibility in programming, which is not Buka centric. The need for dissemination of knowledge and understanding of contemporary global peacebuilding approaches is a key requirement in Bougainville’s stride for conflict sensitive peacebuilding.

The WHO component of the PDA outlines the need for adoption of a best fit for specific circumstances and the need for creativity at all fronts. The PDA emphasizes the need for networking and collaborative action that will support peacebuilding activities implemented by a range of contributors and stakeholders.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, KEY AREAS AND POSSIBLE PRIORITIES, AND OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE HOW AND THE WHO.

FINDINGS.

DRIVERS OF CONFLICT – PAST AND PRESENT.

FINDING 1: Bougainville is not post-conflict. The historical drivers of conflict remain present today. There are probably more contributing factors to conflict today than in the 1970s and 1980s.

CAPACITIES FOR PEACE – DEALING WITH THE PAST – AND WITH THE FUTURE.

FINDING 2: The predominant approaches to dealing with the legacy of the past in Bougainville are advancing at best only very slowly, or are stagnating. These are: the implementation of the Bougainville Peace Agreement, reconciliation and weapons disposal.

FINDING 3: Two significant issues related to dealing with the legacy of the past, are largely neglected. These are trauma healing and creating the conditions to learn from the past.

FINDING 4: Effective governance is one pillar for a strong foundation for Bougainville’s future. The efforts so far have not been visible nor convincing to the Bougainville population at large.

FINDING 5: Economic development is another pillar for a strong foundation for Bougainville’s future. The efforts so far have not been convincing to the Bougainville population at large.

FINDING 6: There is no informed and inclusive national debate and dialogue about alternative visions for Bougainville in 20-30 years from now, and about the likely economic, environmental, political, social and cultural consequences of different options.

FINDING 7: Bougainvilleans express a sense of stagnation on the issues that matter most, but are not mobilizing into collective action to address them.

FINDING 8: The people of Bougainville are not in a position, in early 2014, to make informed choices in their elections in 2015.

FINDING 9. The people of Bougainville are not in a position, in early 2014, to make an informed choice in the referendum about their future political status, which should take place between 2015 and 2020.

FINDING 10: Among those who think a bit more about the referendum, the PDA identified two strands of opinion regarding the timing of the referendum: ‘sooner rather than later’ and ‘we are not ready yet’.

FINDING 11. There is so far little public awareness and thinking about possible risk scenarios related to the referendum, and how to prevent and proactively manage them.

FINDING 12: There is little public awareness let alone reflection about possible risk scenarios irrespective of the political status of Bougainville.

CAPACITIES FOR PEACE – UNDERSTANDING PEACEBUILDING

FINDING 13: Peacebuilding is poorly understood and consequently not pursued as effectively as it could.

CAPACITIES FOR PEACE – PEACEBUILDING ARCHITECTURES & STRATEGIES.

FINDING 14: Within the ABG, development has been unduly disconnected from peace and security.

FINDING 15: The peacebuilding architecture within the ABG has reflected this limited understanding of peacebuilding. That may be changing with the Bougainville Peace and Security Council.

FINDING 16: District and lower level Peace and Security Committees can do well, if they are grounded in local commitment and mobilisation, nurtured rather than imposed upon, and not undermined with easy money.

FINDING 17. The eventual handling of the violent Konnou conflict in southern Bougainville (2006-2011) shows the value of collaborative action whereby different actors play the roles for which they are best suited given a specific context (best fit in a given context), rather than through formalistic coordination.

FINDING 18. A Panguna Peacebuilding Strategy is much needed, but also very challenging. Much will depend on how it is pursued and by whom.
DIFFERENT ACTOR GROUPS: CAPACITIES FOR PEACE?

FINDING 19: Post-BPA, women have lost the prominence they had during before and during the crisis, and in the peacemaking. They need to reunite in their pursuit of equal representation, and get support also from men.

FINDING 20: The churches of Bougainville have been and are dividers as well as connectors and healers.

FINDING 21: Youth make up half of the population, but are not invited or encouraged to contribute to the consolidation of peace, the prevention of future conflict and the development of viable society in the future, where people enjoy a high degree of gross national happiness.

FINDING 22: The current ambiguities around the ex-combatants or veterans need to be resolved.

FINDING 24: The development partners are not making available to the Bougainville authorities and people, relevant experiences and approaches from other countries.

FINDING 25: The planning and implementation of aid-funded programmes and projects can be better coordinated, and needs to be decided and regularly reviewed against ‘do no harm’ and peace-relevance criteria.

THE ‘WHAT’: KEY AREAS TO CONSOLIDATE PEACE AND PREVENT RENEWED VIOLENCE IN BOUGAINVILLE.

PART 1: WORKING TOWARDS A BETTER FUTURE.

12. The What: Stronger Multilateral Political Support – a priority for the international community?
15. The What: The Development Path Options for Bougainville.
17. The What: Stronger Governance Capacities at the Local Level.
18. The What: Pro-active, Policy-Driven Efforts to Involve Women and Youth.

PART 2: DEALING WITH THE PAST.

19. The What: Overcoming the Legacy of the Past to Ensure a Peaceful Future.

PART 3: BETWEEN THE PAST AND THE FUTURE


DETERMINING PRIORITIES
(see text for possible criteria and priorities)

THE ‘HOW’.

1. The ‘How’: Conflict Sensitive Development, Larger Programmatic and Strategic Thinking, Flexibility in Funding.
2. The ‘How’: Going out of the ‘Buka Bubble’.
3. The ‘How’: Assessing and reviewing proposed and ongoing actions through a conflict-reduction and peacebuilding lens.
4. The ‘How’: Strengthening the Competencies in Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding.
5. The ‘How’: Collective Learning-Based Participatory Governance.

THE ‘WHO’

1. The ‘Who’: Creative Thinking about Relevant Contributions and Potential Contributors.
2. The ‘Who’: Best Fit for Specific Circumstances.
SELECTED SOURCES OF INFORMATION.


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