Evaluation of UNDP's Earthquake Programme

Final Report (Draft)

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<th>Name</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AJK</td>
<td>Azad Jammu and Kashmir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEGIN-ER</td>
<td>Building E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCB</td>
<td>Community Citizen Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Community Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCO</td>
<td>Cluster Community Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBLRP</td>
<td>Community Based Livelihood Recovery Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPRU</td>
<td>Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRU</td>
<td>District Recovery Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERRA</td>
<td>Earthquake Recovery and Reconstruction Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERP</td>
<td>Environmental Recovery Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERF</td>
<td>Early Recovery Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRC</td>
<td>Federal Relief Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoP</td>
<td>Government of Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter Agency Standing Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDMA</td>
<td>National Disaster Management Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>North West Frontier Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVM</td>
<td>National Volunteer Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAMEER</td>
<td>Technical Assistance for Management of Early Earthquake Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>UN Development Assistance Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNV</td>
<td>United Nations Volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section One: Over all Evaluation Summery
1. Background

At 8:50 a.m. on October 8, 2005, an earthquake measuring 7.6 on the Richter Scale struck northern Pakistan causing serious damage in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). The Over 4000 villages were affected, 73,000 people.

Trauma-ridden survivors faced multiple problems such as homelessness, exposure to harsh winter, lack of food security, physical injuries and emotional stress. Additionally, the apparatus of the State was wrecked rendering the provincial and state governments non functional and paralyzed to serve the people in the aftermath of the tragedy. The Earthquake led to an unprecedented response from both within and outside Pakistan. Following swift media coverage of the tragedy, an immediate response on relief took place with unprecedented support from all sections of Pakistani society, Government of Pakistan and international partners. As close partners with the Government and people of Pakistan, some 85 bilateral and multilateral donors made a real difference to the relief efforts in order to overcome the massive destruction the scale of which is evident from the following statistics:

Table 1: Key Impacts of the Earthquake

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>% destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Persons killed</td>
<td>73,338</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injured</td>
<td>128,309</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population affected</td>
<td>3.5 million</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of housing units damaged</td>
<td>600,152</td>
<td>76.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of schools and colleges</td>
<td>7669</td>
<td>66.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>destroyed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care facilities destroyed</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>73.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road – length affected</td>
<td>4,429 (km)</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications exchanges destroyed</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Earthquake 8-10, Learning from Pakistan's experience

The United Nations Agencies, particularly United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), played a crucial role in spearheading the relief efforts mainly through proving effective leadership and close involvement in sectoral cluster groups. UNDP, in close collaboration with the Government of Pakistan, headed the Early Recovery Cluster and implemented a range of relief projects immediately following the catastrophe. These were aimed at meeting the immediate needs of the earthquake affected population. The relief phase transitioned into a recovery phase which continues at present. UNDP has maintained its involvement with the recovery efforts and is currently actively involved in projects that strive to build back the earthquake-stricken areas.

2. Scope and Rationale of the Evaluation

In October-November 2008, UNDP undertook an independent assessment of the effectiveness of its response to the Pakistan Earthquake 2005. This included an evaluation of projects implemented both during relief and recovery phases. The
evaluation aimed to cover the response and relief strategies, their relevance and implementation, progress towards outcomes as well as coordination with key implementing partners and other stakeholders. The evaluation of UNDP’s earthquake programme is part of UNDP’s demonstrated accountability to its development partners/donors, the Government of Pakistan and the people of Pakistan about how effectively and efficiently resources have been utilized for achieving tangible results for the earthquake.

The projects included within the evaluation exercise consisted of the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relief Phase</th>
<th>Recovery Phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emergency and Transitional Shelter</td>
<td>Building Enabling Governance and Institutions for Earthquake Response (BEGIN-ER)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooking and heating</td>
<td>Technical Assistance for Management of Earthquake Early Recovery (TAMEER)-Phase 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubble removal Project</td>
<td>Community Based Livelihoods Recovery Programme (CBLRP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to Recovery</td>
<td>Support to Volunteerism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental Recovery Programme (ERP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These projects are currently managed and implemented under a Direct Execution (DEX) arrangement by UNDP’s Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit (CPRU). Two further projects currently in the portfolio of CPRU will not be part of this evaluation since their scope is broader than the Earthquake 2005 programme. These consist of the following:

- National Capacity Building for Disaster Risk Management; and
- Refugee Affected Rehabilitation.

3. Approach and Methodology of Analysis

The Evaluation exercise has used UNDP’s guidance to set a framework for analysis. The Evaluation divided the relief and recovery phases into two distinct but progressive programs. Interventions during the relief phase were designed to provide immediate help and were short-term and intensive in nature. Interventions during the Relief Phase have been assessed as individual projects according to UNDP’s criteria of:

- Relevance
- Effectiveness
- Efficiency
- Degree of Change

The Evaluation of the Recovery Phase is also primarily at a project level. The performance of each project was gauged according to four criteria mentioned above as well as an additional criterion of sustainability. The rationale for following a
project based evaluation approach rested on the fact that no programme planning document or approach seemed in evidence to justify an outcome level evaluation. Imposing a programme outcome evaluation would have super imposed a programme structure on a set of projects designed with the common goal of providing relief and recovery in the aftermath of a disaster.

The following table highlights the key questions that were considered within the criteria for the evaluation of projects:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Evaluation Questions</th>
<th>Relief and Recovery Phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relevance</strong></td>
<td>Is the project relevant to UNDP's mandate, to national priorities and to beneficiaries needs?</td>
<td>Relief – Is the project relevant to the Flash Appeal and Preliminary Needs Assessments? Does it respond to the most important needs of the relief phase?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Recovery – Is the project relevant to the Early Recovery Framework and Plan. Is it consistent with UNDP’s CPAP? How much of the overall need is it meeting?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness</strong></td>
<td>Have the project objectives been achieved/ or on track to be achieved?</td>
<td>Relief – What part of the target population/ need was served by the project? Were equity and location issues included? How inclusive of stakeholders was the process of implementation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Recovery – What has been the pace and quality of implementation? To what extent are results discernible? Is the process of implementation inclusive of stakeholders and their needs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Efficiency</strong></td>
<td>To what extent do the project inputs derive from efficient use of resources?</td>
<td>To what extent were the targets met with cost and HR efficiency. What were the strategies used to ensure HR efficiency? What trade-offs were made to ensure cost effectiveness versus impact/outreach effectiveness?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Degree of Change</strong></td>
<td>What were the positive or negative changes brought about by the project?</td>
<td>What was the internal and external change affected by the relief and recovery operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sustainability | Will benefits/activities continue beyond the project?
Relief | This is not a consideration during relief.
Recovery | To what extent are project interventions likely to be continued after the project and through what means?

Source: Table 3, Page 10, Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators, UNDP.

To assess the contribution made by UNDP’s projects to the overall earthquake-related interventions, two main policy and planning documents were used listing the UN Agencies contribution – Pakistan 2005 Earthquake: Early Recovery Framework and ERRA-UN Early Recovery Plan. Other studies such as evaluations conducted by various stakeholders and research papers were also used for analysis. The evaluation also discusses the overall issues from the relief and recovery phases and presents recommendations and suggestions for the future.

The Evaluation takes a backward glancing view of UNDP's involvement. It depends on memory based recollections of prime actors which can often be divergent. It can, at best, make a rough estimate of the overall climate of interaction and urgency of decision-making especially during the Earthquake relief phase. These constraints are unavoidable in an evaluation of this nature especially for relief operations that concluded in 2006. However, the Mission attempted to place the strategic choices made by UNDP in a relevant context and discussed salient issues with a range of key informants before reaching a collective view. As part of contextualizing the interventions, the Evaluation also considered the influence of outside factors and how these may have led to the design, scale, scope and pace of interventions.

In evaluating UNDP's projects during relief and recovery, the report also examines other evaluation and uses existing guidance/criteria to verify the findings of this exercise. Recommendations are, however, specific to this exercise, even though they may be verified by other reports and are framed for UNDP's consideration to learn lessons from its interventions during relief and recovery and inform institutional learning.

The evaluation also does not consider impacts on the ground as these would have required a separate focus, approach, methodology and far greater resources. The Evaluation is, therefore, focused at the project outcome level and attempts to draw joint lessons across projects that can inform an overall strategy and approach as well.

4. Tools used for the Evaluation exercise

The Evaluation Mission used a range of published sources, reports and studies for the evaluation. These included Project Documents, Monitoring Reports, independent evaluations (where available) and progress reports. Several documents have also been produced by UNDP and ERRA to assess the overall situation in the earthquake hit areas which also provided valuable information.
The Mission also conducted thirty-seven interviews with a range of key informants from the Government, Civil Society Organizations, UNDP, UN and other donors (see Annex). This led to a balance of views from both “inside” and “outside”. A concerted effort was made to ensure that several people from each organization interviewed were provided an opportunity to contribute their views. The Mission sought the views of various carders of staff as far as possible to balance the inputs. Separate questionnaires were developed for key informants and tailored where necessary for structured and semi-structured interviews. Some interviewees were also asked to fill ranking sheets for assessment of UNDP’s interventions (e.g. CSOs).

A number of field sites in Mansehra, Balakot, Bagh and Muzaffarabad were also visited to gain a first hand view of UNDP’s work on the ground. The Mission had a chance to meet Community Organizations from all current projects. Further, targeted Participatory Rural Appraisal exercises were conducted with communities to obtain the view of project beneficiaries. Such exercises were conducted separately with men and women to acquire gender disaggregated views on project performance.
5. Findings

Relief Phase

UNDP's role in the Relief Phase was generally rated extremely proactive and useful by all stakeholders. Within the UN System, UNDP played a catalytic role in paving the way for the UNDAC Team to arrive and UNOCHA to begin the task of coordination in close partnership with the government. In the early stages, UNDP's role also ensured the provision of timely funds, technical capacity to the RC's Office and adequate administrative support or the Disaster Response Team. In supporting the UN System's response in the initial stages, UNDP exceeded its role and displayed exemplary commitment to humanitarian issues.

UNDP took an early lead in the Early Recovery Cluster and played a strong leadership role in defining the strategic framework of recovery. In doing so, it faced the dual challenge of applying a new approach and trialing the emerging concept of early recovery. UNDP displayed strong leadership skills to enable the Early Recovery Cluster to develop a strategic framework and plan, coordinate closely with ERRA and acquire donor support. UNDP's experience in this area made a major contribution to the development of guidelines and operational frameworks for the functioning of the Early Recovery Cluster and informed its application in other countries.

UNDP's close working relationship with the Government of Pakistan was seen as a tremendous advantage by other donors. Several donors were of the opinion that UNDP's partnership with the GoP allowed the UN System and other donors to play a more coordinated role in meeting the crisis. However, many reputable NGOs questioned the "perception gap" created by UNDP's strong ties with a military led and controlled relief operation and termed it at cross purposes with its support to devolution and citizen engagement.

The Early Recovery cluster also faced some challenges that can now serve to inform UNDP's role in this area. Some challenges were attributable to the novelty of the Cluster Approach and consisted on unclear guidelines, lack of inter cluster and intra-cluster coordination, leadership issues, lack of adequate voice for Civil Society Organizations and lack of integration of issues such as gender and humanitarian approach. Other challenges were specific to the Early Recovery Cluster. Firstly, Early Recovery became an aspect of interventions by other clusters making a separate cluster superfluous. Secondly, UNDP was seen as taking the main role in the cluster rather than facilitating other partners. Nevertheless, valuable lessons were learnt from these challenges for refining the Cluster Approach and Early Recovery.

A range of developments have taken place since 2005 to guide the application of early recovery concept. Guidelines have now been developed, toolkits formed and staff support structure to the RC office has been clarified by UN HQ in New York. These are now in early stages of application. UNDP needs to invest in developing staff and technical capacity to stay abreast with new developments and be technically equipped to support the RC's Office in this area.
A key area where UNDP can leverage a greater role is through participating in Participatory Needs Assessment soon after a disaster on a partnership basis especially with International Financial Institutions (IFIs). UNDP could not leverage a greater long-term role for itself in the recovery area in relation to the IFIs. The IFIs chaired the Core Group of Donors and did not agree to participate in the Early Recovery planning. **Clearer and complementary roles between IFIs and UNDP should be sought to ensure synergy of action.**

UNDP's interventions in the relief phase followed the agreed UN policy of "provider of last resort". This approach ensured that projects/sectors identified in the Flash Appeal that were left unsupported by other UN agencies were implemented by UNDP. However, it also meant that UNDP had to enter areas of work that were not traditionally its areas of intervention e.g. shelter and cooking and heating.

**UNDP was a major financial contributor to the Flash Appeal.** It committed to raise 16% of the total funds and was at par with UNICEF. Only WFP, providing food aid during the emergency, made commitments exceeding UNDP and UNICEF with 33% of overall commitment. IOM, FAO and WHO were the other major contributors although below WHO, UNDP and UNICEF. The Flash Appeal was heavily dominated by the UN Agencies with non-UN partners contributing about 3% of the overall figure required.

However, UNDP was able to meet about 40% of the amount it expected to contribute to the Flash Appeal ($37,138,100 of $90,750,000) which implies impacts on the scale of interventions. This ($37,138,100) amount represents 6% of the total required funding under the Flash Appeal issued on 26th October 2005. The lack of funds did not have a significant impact on UNDP's range of contributions since only two interventions out of 10 proposed ones were not implemented. These include (i) Opening access to remote areas and (ii) Back to School. The human impact of not continuing with these projects is unclear but it seems to be a necessary trade-off at the stage. Nevertheless, UNDP can be seen to have been successful as a conduit for channeling donor money since no less than 12 separate non-UN donors contributed to UNDP implemented projects.

The effect on the scale of individual projects may have been greater in the case of Transitional Shelter and Rubble Removal. Of the committed amount, UNDP was able to contribute 125% for Emergency Shelter, 100% for Cooking and Heating, 50% for Transitional Shelter and only 15% for Rubble Removal. The fully funded projects were urgently necessary ones and UNDP seems to have made the right trade-off, given scarcity of overall funds, to contribute to them. While Rubble Removal was a necessary precursor to recovery, there may be some queries whether it may not have been a better trade off to use the allotted funds for meeting urgent shelter needs. This is particularly applicable since rubble removal was heavily supported by a range of other stakeholders. **UNDP may find it useful to invest in strategic investment and decision-making tools that enable cost-effective and impact-effective trade-offs to be made in post-disaster situations in order to adopt a standardized and evidence-based rationale for choosing which interventions to support.**
While UNDP was able to act as an important partner in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, there are questions regarding its role as an implementing partner given its focus on capacity building and strategic support. The most significant, unique and well appreciated areas of UNDP’s interventions seem to be the ones where local capacity was built. One key example is the involvement of NSET (Nepali NGO) in imparting information, training and demonstrations on earthquake-friendly building techniques.

UNDP seems to have made some gains and missed some opportunities in working with Civil Society Organizations during the relief period. UNDP worked in close collaboration with local NGOs/CBOs to identify disadvantaged for distribution of cooking and heating equipment. In Transitional Shelter Project, UNDP worked with close partnership with NGOs engaging them to implement the interventions for nearly 50% of transitional shelters. This not only aided quick implementation, it also built capacity among local NGOs. However, it is unclear to what extent UNDP was able to include NGOs role and issues in the Early Recovery Cluster. Feedback from NGOs suggests that this was an area requiring stronger engagement.

UNDP achieved a significant impact through shelter and cooking/heating interventions. UNDP’s shelter projects were significant in meeting needs (5% in Emergency Shelter, 10% in Transitional Centre). Achieving a 10% coverage is remarkable since shelter is an expensive area of work. Further, several other agencies e.g. IOM were involved in providing shelter. Cooking and Heating is estimated to have reached out to at least 78,000 households in addition to serving communal facilities such as camps, hospitals etc. At a household level this translates into 13% of the affected households. Since UNDP was the only agency engaged in providing cooking and heating, they served an extremely useful purpose. However, in terms of the overall picture, there are concerns that this was inadequate to the required needs. Similarly, removal seems to have had the lowest overall impact since it removed about 0.35 of the overall rubble.

The level of impact achieved as a result of UNDP’s interventions is not clear given that no systematic field-level and beneficiary-centered impact evaluation has taken place. In the absence of beneficiary centered impact analysis, there is no information available to understand how well the interventions were targeted to local needs and aspirations, how well equity, poverty and gender needs were met and how well remote areas were included. This is an important exercise to learn lessons for the future. **UNDP could consider undertaking a beneficiary-centered impact evaluation exercise to learn lessons on targeting.**
Early Recovery

UNDP was able to create strategic mechanisms in the form of early recovery cluster which gave the program an over all working continuum. The strategic discussions in early recovery cluster earlier helped in institutionalizing a long term perspective even in relief activities. The selection of transitional shelters in place of tents is a case in point. But there still remained some confusion around the concept of early recovery and its programmatic conception. In particular, the distinction between humanitarian interventions and early recovery efforts was not always clear, which affected cluster coordination. 

Still the timely inception of early recovery cluster was already helpful in organizing various actors and developing initial understanding on long term thematic interventions. And although the early recovery cluster could not sustain its effectiveness in later stages, for UNDP alone it facilitated in having a broader hands on knowledge which facilitated it in selecting its own interventions more strategically in areas where it could work best like livelihood and governance.

The overall effectiveness of UNDP’s leadership of the Early Recovery Cluster was affected by the absence of Multilateral Banks in joint recovery response. The Early Recovery Framework and Plan does not include the IFIs despite their obvious role in long-term recovery and reconstruction. While this cleavage was attributed primarily due to the differing and comparative advantages of the multilateral banks (reconstruction) and the UN System (recovery), a concerted approach could have led to further complementarities. By all accounts, the UN’s early advantage in planning the relief and early recovery phase suffered through its absence from the Damage Assessment exercise. Further, the lack of a joint action with the multilateral banks had implication for UN's continued role in long-term engagement on recovery and reconstruction.

UNDP’s knowledge and international experience played a key role in raising and functionalizing specialized state structures for managing recovery and reconstruction. Just few days after the earthquake the government announced creation of Federal Relief Office which means that it was convinced to create a new structure to manage the extraordinary disaster. This was followed by creation of ERRA. UNDP’s soft help during and after that facilitated the government to really develop the organization on professional grounds. The need to establish such an agency has been demonstrated in other disasters as well e.g. in Gujrat and Indonesia. UNDP's support to such structures is also not new. In post tsunami reconstruction, UNDP has provided support to specialized agencies like BAPPENAS and BAPPEDA in Aceh, Indonesia. UNDP’s decision to support ERRA through TAMEER was relevant in the light of global experience and its own mandate as the leader of the Early Recovery cluster. However, given the long term recovery needs of at least 5-7 years, UNDP could not display a phase out approach to make ERRA more sustainable. It also has not worked to change the over centralized nature of ERRA’s working which is not consistent with the constitution of Pakistan. If ERRA’s working is not checked it would eventually undermine the provincial and district

1 Report of the joint DGO/BCPR mission to Pakistan, 18-21 September 2006, UNRC office
civilian capacities and would cause delays and further complexities in reconstruction efforts.

At the time when state institutions especially in AJK were facing the risk of an organizational melt down, UNDP facilitated in resurrecting the state and prevented a potential social chaos. Especially in AJK, the seat of the government was badly hit by the earthquake. Most of the public sector office right from Prime Minister to a Union Council was flattened in an area which has seen major presence of militarized action along the line of control for over a decade and have the presence of various kinds of communities including migrants from Indian held Kashmir. In such circumstances, UNDP interventions facilitated in bringing a sense of normalcy in government offices whose very functioning ensured the presence of government at a very critical time. This facilitated better working and coordination of recovery efforts from government side. The credibility and goodwill UNDP generated with in state authorities can open new programmatic opportunities in the area of agency wide reforms even with in existing programming phase.

The earlier gains in developing a useful strategic early recovery framework could not be translated in developing sectoral plans and adopting a more programmatic approach. The development of early recovery framework was a strategic achievement and more than others it helped UNDP itself gaining a strategic sense for its programmatic options. Its development earlier on with in the three weeks of a disaster helped UNDP claiming its role as a major player and facilitated it as an organization to utilize the framework in organizing various partners and donors at strategic level. Having achieved this broad utility, UNDP later could not draw specific sectoral plans which could have laid the basis for adopting a more programmatic approach. As a result, an otherwise impressive recovery response was reduced to collection of various projects. Lack of program approach deprived undp to ensure program monitoring and a possibility of inter-sectoral collaboration and synergies.

UNDP’s most of the interventions were found efficient although the issues of scale, scope and cost effectiveness reduced the incidence of impact especially in community based programs. Most of the UNDP recovery projects were found efficient but not as effective as they could have been. In CBLRP for instance, interventions in the area of community infrastructure development and their skill building brought in huge benefits but their critical link with asset building services and market mechanisms is non existent or weak by design. The project also suffered due to expensive management and implementation services mainly due to UNDP’s DEX approach. Similarly environmental recovery is having a great head start but just three years availability of funds do not match with projects goal set to achieve in ten years time. In governance Also, the sustainability of UNDP continued support to Tameer seems difficult given that recovery phase is going to take much longer than what earlier anticipated by Tameer.

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2 Major donors with in ERRA’s G-7 acknowledged Undp’s technical leverage.
3 For instance there were some interventions closely linked with disjoined livelihood and environmental recovery projects but due to project approach no such programmatic linkage could be stabled.
The overall early recovery process did not ensure a formal citizen’s oversight mechanism at strategic and operational level. Nor any kind of elected structure at national, provincial or state level was meaningfully involved. This is significant programmatic gap for UNDP in a country where it has been supporting democratic governance for now over a decade. This evaluation did not find any evidence that the overall CPRU program is attempting to seek a transition for more civilian control for the structures it facilitated to create⁴. As a result there is a major perception gap between citizens, bureaucracy and elected representatives over the effectiveness and manner of recovery response⁵. And political regime change in centre, province, state or district will bring in new political challenge for continuing recovery programs. This can be averted now by initiating effective citizens oversight mechanism at every level⁶. On other hand UNDP should actually undertake a detailed quantitative beneficiaries satisfaction evaluation for measuring the reach and impact of their recovery inputs and exactly gauge the response reach and then disseminate it at wider scale to address this.

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⁴ This is not activity level community participation structures like CBOs. This is more of strategic participation for transparency and accountability from citizen bodies, right groups & political representatives at various levels in order to ensure that how citizen’s claims and concerns are informing the program at the systemic level.

⁵ This was already spotted this perception gap already and shared that in post evaluation presentation but National Assembly’s public accounts committee have just summoned ERRA authorities to explain the manner of response.

⁶ National Assembly’s Public Accounts Committee remarks on ERRA’s accounts are a case in point.
Section Two: Project Wise Analysis
Overall Coordination in the Initial Phase

### Relevance
Extremely high

Almost immediately following the devastating earthquake of 8th October 2005, UNDP mounted an effective and well managed coordination operation to respond to the tragedy. In initiating this action, UNDP responded to a humanitarian tragedy that is clearly under the remit of the UN System. However, no UN Agency working in Pakistan in 2005 had the expertise, mandate or experience of working in disaster-related situations. UNDP had been involved in supporting the Government of Pakistan in developing Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) strategies\(^7\). In line with its previous role in the sector, it was highly relevant for UNDP to take a proactive role.

### Effectiveness
Extremely high

By all accounts, UNDP’s coordination role in the initial phase was also extremely effective. UNDP was able to play a facilitative role by alerting and mobilizing the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and assembling key technical support such as the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team which arrived in the country within twenty four hours of the Earthquake. UNDP's early and proactive role paved the way for the UN System\(^8\) (through UNOCHA) to mount an early and coordinated response to the tragedy. Within the first few crucial days, emergency funds (through BCPR) were arranged, details and processes facilitating the arrival of the UNDAC Team were finalized\(^9\), contact was established with the Federal Relief Cell, a Flash Appeal for US $ 549 million was launched and UN Disaster Management Team was convened. It was crucial that UNDP played the catalytic role in arranging the UN Systems early response as effective relief efforts would not have been possible otherwise.

UNDP also beefed up the capacity of the UN System to respond to the crisis by placing a Resource Person on DRR in the Resident Coordinator's Office until a dedicated person (Humanitarian Coordinator) could be available\(^10\). Further, UNDP provided the support services required for UN OCHA and other teams to become operational and processes administrative procedures.

UNDP played an effective role in contributing to the Flash Appeal. It pledged to work on no less than 10 different projects amounting to about about 90,750,000 of the total Revised Flash Appeal of approximately US $ 549 million. This represented

\(^7\) Interview: Haoliang Zhu, Ex Resident Coordinator, UNDP (24\(^{th}\) Nov 2008)
\(^8\) Interview: General Nadeem Ahmed, Ex-Deputy Chairman, ERRA (8\(^{th}\) November 2008)
\(^9\) Interview: Amir Tariq Zaman, Ex-JS, Economic Affairs Division, Government of Pakistan (24\(^{th}\) Nov 2008)
\(^10\) Interview: Jan Vandermortle, Ex-UN Resident Coordinator (27\(^{th}\) Nov 2008)
about 16% of the overall commitment and was roughly at par with UNICEF’s pledged contribution. However, UNDP was able to realize some 40% (US $37,138,100) of the pledged funds securing contributions from some 10 different donors. Since the Flash Appeal was two-thirds funded after six months, this may raise some queries about the level of securing commitments. The level of funds secured had some implications on the number of projects as two projects initially pledged by UNDP were not implemented. The scope of projects selected for implementation was also somewhat reduced. Despite this situation, UNDP was able to select the projects with greatest impact on securing lives (e.g. shelter and cooking and heating) that is the overriding aim during the relief phase. These were selected in line with UNDP's role as ”provider of last resort”. In this role, UNDP played an active job of implementing projects that were not supported by other UN Agencies.

UNDP's effectiveness in the initial phase may also have been somewhat affected by the UN's overall role in managing the crisis. One key issue cited by some participants included the role and advice of technical personnel attached to ERRA – an organization dominated by the military. Close alignment with the military establishment was seen to be at cross purposes with the devolution, poverty reduction and citizen engagement aspects of UNDP's mandate and existing interventions on the ground. UNDP’s effectiveness in reaching out to a range of CSOs may have been affected by this ”perception gap”. Several partners also questioned the sustainability and effectiveness of UNDP's hands-on role during the relief and recovery phase and how it linked with capacity building as the overall strategic thrust of its approach11. However, given Pakistan's political context in 2005, UNDP had little option except to work closely with the current establishment – it was clearly a factor outside UNDP’s control.

**Efficiency**

High

As regards overall efficiency, UNDP played a catalytic role in the early phase with an extremely small team dedicated to DRR issues. This Team played a crucial role in paving the way for the UN System to become operational. The efficiency was evident in the timeliness of the response as well.

**Change Factor**

High

UNDP's role particularly in the early stages showed high initiative and innovation. It responded to the catastrophe in an adaptive and proactive manner. Its full participation in the Cluster Approach contributed to the development of a new tool for dealing with humanitarian crises. UNDP's experience in the Early Recovery Cluster led to the development and refinement of the Early Recovery Approach – a relatively new concept. This approach has since been developed further and several tools and guidance is now available that builds on this crucial first experience. In this area, UNDP has shown clear innovation and ability to apply innovative concepts that provide a model for replication.

It also led to several internal changes – expansion of the scope and type of interventions undertaken by CPRU and recognition of the role of CPRU in taking the

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11 Meeting with NGOs, (21st Nov 2008)
lead on earthquake-related interventions despite project development being undertaken by other Units\textsuperscript{12} in UNDP-Pakistan. Additionally, in practice, the role of UNDP in disaster and relief was redefined beyond its mandated CPAP priorities of "Crisis Prevention and Recovery capacity building" and "capacity development to manage and reduce the risk of disaster"\textsuperscript{13}.

\section*{Recommendations}

Several recommendations emerge from UNDP's role in the coordination of the early phase and as leader of the Early Recovery Cluster. These include the following:

\textbf{UNDP's role in the relief phase:} UNDP has shown clear capacity to play a proactive role in the initial phase of a humanitarian situation. However, it needs to determine its role in relation to the scale of the disaster and needs clear criteria for assessment of its suitability for engagement.

\textbf{Point of entry:} UNDP needs to proactively engage with initial needs assessment (PDNAs\textsuperscript{14}) to assess its role. This needs to be done on a robust partnership basis bringing strong technical knowledge on early recovery rather than as token team members.

\textbf{Strategic role:} Where UNDP chooses to engage itself, its interventions should be organized to provide leverage in subsequent recovery phases. It should ensure that its partnerships extend beyond UN Agencies to other players particularly MFIs that have a stake in long-term engagement in reconstruction and development.

\textbf{Capacity:} Since UNDP is the designated Cluster lead agency in Early Recovery, it is essential that capacity within CPRU is beefed up to ensure continued support in this area. Early Recovery has been defined within UNDP in terms of a Network Approach rather than an exclusive Cluster and is to be spearheaded through advisors attached to the RC's Office\textsuperscript{15}. It is useful that CPRU develops strong technical and coordination capacity to provide technical backstopping for early recovery.

\textbf{Partnerships:} UNDP's capacity to forge effective partnerships with key institutions (e.g. IFIs) requires a sustained and concerted effort. This needs to be strengthened through better coordination, dialogue and early information sharing with IFIs. The development of internal capacity on early recovery can be a useful way to bridge the relief and reconstruction cleavages that became the reason for lack of a joint action in 2005.

\textsuperscript{12} Meeting with ARRs (10\textsuperscript{th} Nov 2008)
\textsuperscript{13} See Page 23; Country Programme Action Plan (2004-2008), UNDP
\textsuperscript{14} Preliminary Disaster Needs Assessment
COOKING AND HEATING PROJECT

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**Relevance**

High

With the fast approaching winter, the need to provide cooking and heating facilities to some 3.3 million16 homeless people after the earthquake was a highly relevant and urgent priority. The need for cooking and heating was identified in the Flash Appeal made by the UN under SAEQ-05/S/NF06. Under the circumstances, UNDP as "the provider of last resort" undertook the responsibility to implement the project given that it did not correspond clearly with the mandate of other UN Agencies.

**Effectiveness**

High

Consultations at the field level, although localized, support the view that this project was effective in providing adequate and timely fuel needs to the affected population. The project reached out at three levels – household, communal and public institutions. At a household level, the project provided heating and/or cooking facilities to a total of 57,896 families in both POK and NWFP. Families that received LPG based equipment were provided LPG cylinders for refueling at pre-calculated intervals depending on type of use. Secondly, camps received heating facilities, communal bathing as well as cooking facilities. Finally, several medical institutions/facilities were supported through supply of LPG and heating units.

The effectiveness of targeting the right households in a geographically diverse scenario was evidently a major concern of this project. Towards this end, the Project devised a range of "packages" to benefit families with varying needs and location. Families in remote areas where LPG supply was extremely difficult received charcoal-based stoves and charcoal supplies (Mansehra, Bagh, Kohistan and Muzaffarabad). Most received LPG based cooking and/or heating facilities. The Project was, therefore, very effective in meeting immediate needs and contributing to "winter race" thrust of operations by increasing the coping conditions of earthquake struck population and enhancing protection from winter-related illnesses. A range of CBOs assisted as Implementing Partners (IPs) and conducted needs assessment within villages to identify beneficiaries. Evidence from interviews with IPs17 and selected field visits showed that people had indeed benefited from project interventions.

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16 Page 2, UNDP and the 2005 Earthquake-One Year On.
17 Interview with local NGOs (Muzaffarabad)
About 17% of LPG cylinders were refilled (100,000). The Project, therefore, provided refueling facilities to a relatively small number of households despite the original goal of 10 refills per LPG kit\(^\text{18}\) - perhaps due to a lack of funds and/or lack of long-term accessibility to target villages. It is also unclear if re-fueling was targeted according to a set of criteria at the household or village level.

It is not clear how much of the overall need for cooking and heating was met by the Project. In the absence of baseline data, it is difficult to estimate outreach. Some estimates state that the earthquake made 600,000 households homeless. If these households were the first priority, the project reached some 9% of the homeless and vulnerable households.

While facilities targeted at the camp level certainly benefited a relatively larger number of people, these, at best, could have reached 275,000\(^\text{19}\) people who were estimated to be in camps (roughly 8% of 3.5 million affected people). However, it is unclear how many of the remote villages were covered by the Project and if these were prioritized in any way.

Women were major beneficiaries of the Project. Trainings imparted on safe use of equipment led to few incidents of fire and enabled women to save time and energy gathering fuel wood.

**Efficiency**

Efficient

The cost-efficiency of the Project is unclear. While each LPG kit is reported to have cost Rs 6000\(^\text{20}\), it is unclear if this includes cost of delivery and staff time. The efficiency in human resource use is evident through the use of IPs for distribution which improved efficiency of targeting the right households.

**Change**

High

The Project presents a high "change" factor. It showed innovation in design and targeting. Market linkages with LPG suppliers were forged and continue to exist. The distribution centers set up by the Project are also in operation through small shops. There is strong evidence that the equipment distributed by the Project continues to be in use. The intervention, therefore, met an immediate and critical need and also paved the way for a sustained change in the living conditions of the local people.

**Evaluations, Guidelines and Gaps**

PROVENTION, ALNAP, IASC Real-time evaluation, Save the Children Evaluation

**Recommendations**

The intervention was made in an exceptional circumstance. UNDP would not be expected to implement a similar project again unless those extraordinary circumstances present themselves again. However, it provides important lessons for

\(^{18}\) Flash Appeal

\(^{19}\) Page 31, Earthquake 8-10: Learning from Past Experience, Iffat Idris, NDMA, 2007

\(^{20}\) Source: see 21.
relief management. It is critical to restoration of essential household capabilities, and need to be included in any relief package where there is a large-scale collapse of houses. There is a need to evolve a strategy for targeting households. Also, the supply of fuel needs to be standardized for the households to be covered. A pre-arranged contract with distributors / suppliers of LPGs would be helpful for their immediate and efficient distribution during the relief phase. However, these are recommendations for relief administration, not really the UNDP.
EMERGENCY AND TRANSTIONAL SHELTER

| Relevance- | High |
| Effectiveness- | High |
| Efficiency- | High |
| Change- | High |

**Relevance**

High

Both Emergency and Transitional shelter projects was indeed a relevant and pressing need after the earthquake. While the Emergency project was UNDP’s first immediate intervention implemented over October-November 2005, Transitional Shelter allowed UNDP to build on the first experience to contribute to introduce improved shelter for the affected population. Both projects were aligned with the Flash Appeal and ERRA-UN Early Recovery Plan and Framework that emphasize shelter as a basic and major need. UNDP is also part of the global cluster working group on shelter and had a clear mandate to contribute to shelter.

**Effectiveness**

High

Both Projects were effective in reaching target population although their contribution to the overall needs was relatively low (approximately 5% and 10% of overall homeless households).

The Emergency Shelter Project provided winterized tents to about 11,654 directly plus 18,801 through partners. The Project, therefore, reached about 5% of the total 600,000 homeless households Given that only a small proportion of the distributed tents were winterized, UNDP seems to have made an early and informed decision about the type of intervention required rather than imposing an unsuitable solution. The Project was efficient in targeting the deserving households through following a one tent per household policy and using CBOs to identify families. However, given the lack of data and coordination in the early emergency stage, it is possible that some duplication and omissions took place.

Transitional Shelter Project covered some 9% of the total affected households (53, 252 at the cost of US S 250 each). Through its involvement of IPs for identification, training and distribution of CGI sheets, the Project was able to reduce duplication and improve targeting. The integration of capacity building and training on improved building techniques made it possible to initiate a change in building practices of local residents.

It is unclear how the Project incorporated land use issues in the transitional shelter project. These are particularly applicable to female headed households and to landless and poor people who did not own the houses they lived in prior to the earthquake.

Since the Project's coverage was low and its main objective was to demonstrate the construction of transitional shelter, it is also unclear if alternative strategies were
considered to ensure maximum effectiveness. One question for consideration would have been whether to cover all households in selected areas (amounting to a total of 10%) or to spread out in all districts. Further, it was unclear how the project strategy related to the overall shelter cluster strategy, if there was one in existence. This would have allowed the Project in particular and the Shelter Cluster in general to enlist the support of other partners in the shelter cluster to cover the population not served in the areas of its operation. This gap may have resulted due to the peculiar dynamics of the shelter cluster.

Efficiency

High

The shelter related interventions used some US $25 million funds (of US $37 million) spent by/through UNDP making this the largest sector of UNDP’s interventions during the relief phase. The proportion of funds used is justifiable in line with the acute need for shelter. However, cost-effectiveness of UNDP’s interventions cannot be determined until a comparison with other partners can be made. The cost efficiency of investing first in tents and then in transitional shelter seems to have diverted resources from being spent on the latter in the first place. However, it can be seen as a logical transition that UNDP seems to have made on the basis of the assessment of prevailing conditions and available choices. It must also be kept in mind that UNDP did not have much experience in this area earlier. It underscores the need to invest in greater technical input in devising shelter strategies especially since shelter is known to be a complex area of intervention.

Human resource efficiency is evident through the use of IPs and UN Volunteers at the field level for outreach and monitoring. The efficiency of the approach is also evident from the use of a Nepali NGO (National Society for Earthquake Technology) for demonstrating earthquake resistant building techniques. These trainings and demonstrations reached out to masons, engineers and self builders. A set of master trainers were trained to ensure sustainability and continuity of the intervention. Two model buildings were constructed for demonstration purposes. A total of 1675 people benefited from this useful training exercise. This component was both cost and impact effective as it reached out to key people, created public awareness and imparted crucial training that would not have been available without such an intervention.

Change

High

The principal change achieved through this intervention was on the lives saved due to harsh winter following the earthquake. An institutional change within UNDP was the learning provided through being involved in emergency and transitional shelter on a relatively large scale. This has led to valuable learning for UNDP and provided lessons for shelter-a complex area of intervention.

Recommendations

UNDP can undertake the responsibility for construction of transitional shelter in a difficult situation as this speaks of its resourcefulness and effectiveness. The provision of transitional shelter was a crying need, which UNDP addressed despite its lack of expertise or sectoral mandate. It established UNDP as a provider of last
resort. Further, it also helped in establishing transitional shelter as an early recovery need which UNDP may be called upon to address, depending upon the needs of the situation. The immediate humanitarian significance of transitional shelter program as well its long-term impact on the UNDP’s role in early recovery network needs to be acknowledged. However, there is need to strengthen UNDP’s technical capacity in the shelter area to ensure that a more cost-effective and people-centered strategy can be adopted in future interventions in shelter.
RUBBLE REMOVAL

| Relevance  | High |
| Effectiveness | Medium |
| Efficiency  | Medium |
| Change      | High |

Relevance

Rubble removal is considered an essential part of recovery and paves the way for reconstruction. It can also be the vehicle for providing cash for work to the local communities who face insecure livelihoods and incomes following a disaster\(^{21}\). UNDP's intervention in the area is aligned with the Flash Appeal and Early Recovery Framework and addresses a key concern raised in the UNEP/OCHA Preliminary Environmental Assessment in early December 2005.

The cash-for-work aspect is aligned with UNDP's mandate under the CPAP to address poverty reduction, community development and asset building for the poor. However, Save the Children had already contributed a project under the Flash Appeal (SAEQ-05/ER/I08) for this purpose and it is unclear how UNDP's intervention supported or aligned with this intervention.

Effectiveness

UNDP was able to implement the project with strong support from UNOPS. Time delays due to bureaucratic clearances were beyond UNDP's control. The extent to which UNDP was able to contribute to livelihood regeneration through this intervention is unclear. Some 178,758 labour days were generated by the Project but the payment rates to workers and the number of workers who benefited from the project are unspecified. It is also not clear what proportion of project funds were actually used for labour. Further, the project made a strategic decision to also clear some private buildings. This was an excellent adaptive measure but could have served the purpose better if some clear criteria for approval of private applications had been introduced.

Efficiency

The Project cleared about 0.3% (554,030 cubic meters) of the 200 million meters\(^{22}\) of rubble generated due to the earthquake. Given the small impact of this intervention, it is unclear how cost efficiency versus scale of output/impact issues was taken into consideration when identifying this intervention for UNDP's support.

Efficiency in timeliness is noteworthy as the project completed its assigned task within 45 days. Further, administrative costs remained low (5% of total project expenditure).

\(^{21}\) Responding to Earthquake 2008, ALNAP, Provention Consortium.
\(^{22}\) See Page 2, Project Completion Report, Rubble Removal Project.
RECOVERY PHASE
Early Recovery Cluster and UNDP's role

Project Details

- Promote and improve effective interagency cooperation between relief, recovery and reconstruction stakeholder on issues including coordination; information management; advocacy and resource mobilisation; and policy development and strategic guidance in a coherent and integrated manner.
- Share information on the progress, achievements and constraints of sectoral activities through situation reports and ERP Quarterly reports.
- Convey policy and strategy frameworks to working group stakeholders, including provision of technical standards and guidelines.

Detailed Evaluation Analysis

Relevance Externally high

The relevance of UNDP's role was also evident in their participation in the Cluster Approach – an approach that was implemented for the first time in the world. "At the outset of the emergency, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) partners decided to apply the general principles of the humanitarian cluster approach to this disaster in view of the particular humanitarian challenges. Consequently, the Humanitarian Coordinator assigned to UNDP the role of lead agency for the Early Recovery Cluster that had been created in Islamabad. For the first time, UNDP was faced with a dual function of having to perform as cluster lead agency and as an operational agency with field-based recovery programmes in affected areas. UNDP's lead role in the Early Recovery Cluster was aligned to its role as the global lead on Early Recovery. As the relief phase progressed, UNDP played a role in the finalization of the Pakistan 2005 Earthquake Early Recovery Framework (November 2005) and ERRA-UN Early Recovery Plan and galvanized the UN Agencies and a range of CSOs to contribute to the early recovery needs.

The cluster approach had been conceived prior to the 2005 Earthquake but was applied for the first time in Pakistan. Its aim was to enable the UN System to respond to the needs of the earthquake in a coordinated manner. "The Cluster Approach successfully provided a single and recognizable framework for coordination, collaboration, decision-making, and practical solutions in a chaotic operational environment. While this innovative approach led to coordinated actions by the UN and other partners, it also revealed several deficiencies that impacted upon the UN System's, including UNDP's, efforts. These included (i) lack of clarity on what constituted a Cluster Approach (ii) lack of involvement of civil

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23 CPR Newsletter- Securing development, peace and justice for all- Early Recovery Cluster: Lessons learned from Pakistan by Angelika Planitz, BCPR, UNDP.

24 UN's March 2005 Humanitarian Response Review

society organizations in decision-making leading to some degree of marginalization (iii) conflicts between the Cluster leading agency’s role in fund raising (iv) lack of ability to discuss and incorporate cross cutting issues such as gender, environment, human rights and participation. These issues apply also, albeit to a varying extent, to the Early Recovery Cluster headed by UNDP. In particular, no guidelines existed at the time for clusters and the distinction between humanitarian interventions and early recovery efforts was not always clear, which affected cluster coordination.

Effectiveness Somewhat effective

As the leader of the Early Recovery Cluster, UNDP faced a challenging task since early recovery was not seen as a particularly relevant area of work given that immediate rescue and relief dominated the agenda. The Cluster was able to undertake a joint needs assessment and produce an Early Recovery Framework outlining priority sectors, areas of intervention and financial requirements. This Framework served as the basis for Government of Pakistan’s call for financial support from donors (in October 2005) for recovery and reconstruction.

The overall effectiveness of UNDP’s leadership of the Early Recovery Cluster was affected by four factors: (i) lack of a joint plan of action with the Multilateral Banks (ii) general limitations in the implementation of the cluster approach that also applied to the Early Recovery Cluster (iii) some perceptions of lack of coordination between UN Agencies and (iv) lack of dedicated fund-raising mechanism to ensure that finances were secured. Some of these challenges were faced by the UN System as a whole in which UNDP’s effectiveness as a participating Agency was also affected.

The World Bank and ADB conducted an assessment of damages and produced a "Preliminary Damage Assessment Report". However, subsequent to this assessment, the multilateral banks and the UN Agencies could not form a joint plan of action for relief and recovery. The Early Recovery Framework and Plan does not include the IFIs despite their obvious role in long-term recovery and reconstruction. While this cleavage was attributed primarily due to the differing and comparative advantages of the multilateral banks (reconstruction) and the UN System (recovery), a concerted approach could have led to further complementarities. By all accounts, the UN lost an early advantage in planning the relief and early recovery phase through its absence from the Damage Assessment exercise. Further, the lack of a joint action with the multilateral banks had implication for the UN’s continued role in long-term engagement on recovery and reconstruction.

In UNDP’s case, long-term effectiveness of the Early Recovery Framework and Plan seemed to be not clearly evident. Key informants supported the view of the IASC Assessment that the Early Recovery Cluster displayed "general lack of clear understanding of what the Early Recovery cluster entails" which "also made it difficult for the other clusters to determine how to relate and contribute to this cluster".

26 For a detailed discussion, please see: Application of the IASC Cluster Approach Report (op-cit)
27 Report of the joint DGO/BCPR mission to Pakistan, 18-21 September 2006
28 Interview: General Nadeem Ahmed, Ex- Deputy Chairman, ERRA (8th November 2008)
One reason was that the Framework and Plan were perceived as too "supply driven". They also could not clarify inter- and intra-cluster coordination especially between the UN Agencies. The lack of latter was also evident from several interviews and the situation may have been one where UN Agencies were perhaps not seen as united behind a common goal\textsuperscript{29}. Further, the transition from relief to recovery was not clear especially with regard to the design of UNDP’s own interventions. One manifestation of this lack of clarity on what constitutes recovery is evident from the relatively unrealistic time frames used for recovery projects given their objectives and outputs.

Another issue in the context of Early Recovery is that the planning process and framework did not lead to a programme approach for UNDP. Instead a projectised approach seems to be prevalent that somewhat excludes common learning, joint action and lesson learning between projects. While some interventions have informed each other (e.g. training undertaken through TAMEER has benefited several government departments linked to other projects), the cross-linkages have been missed. As a result, joint impacts of the projects are not clear and some interventions may be duplicative (e.g. hazard mapping exercises being undertaken by ERP, ERRA etc).

**Recommendations**

- On behalf of common working group on early recovery cease the opportunity to participate in joint need with UNDAC team and ensure to include early recovery analysis in need assessment of the disaster
- Through effective information management, coordination and strategic focus lay the basis for long term early recovery in disaster response programming.
- Strengthen the strategic partnership with OCHA at country level in order to bridge any strategic, operational or programmatic gap between humanitarian and recovery program.

\textsuperscript{29} Several interviews (see footnotes above)
Technical Assistance for Management of Earthquake Early Recovery (TAMEER)

Project Details
Duration: 36 months (December 2005-December 2008)
Budget: US$ 5.14million
Partners: ERRA
Donors: UNDP, Government of Germany, UNISDR, DFID

Objectives

- National Plan of Action for earthquake rehabilitation and reconstruction implemented in a timely, equitable and sustainable fashion through the established government entities.

- The effect of future disasters mitigated through earthquake resistant building techniques as well as capacity building and awareness-raising for institutional preparedness.

The Evaluation Summary

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Detailed Evaluation Analysis

Relevance

High

When the earthquake took place, Pakistan had no central disaster management body to manage the crisis. An Emergency Relief Cell (ERC) existed in the Cabinet Division which was thinly staffed, "had a coordination function and was not equipped for crisis management"\(^{30}\). The Federal Relief Commission was established on 10th October 2008. The mandate assigned to the FRC was to manage and coordinate the relief efforts. Composed of a civilian and a military wing, the FRC was the focal point of the multiple initiatives launched in the earthquake response by various organizations and individuals. As the relief operation progressed, it became clear that a dedicated agency was required to manage and coordinate the recovery phase.

FRC was, therefore, merged with Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority in March 2006. ERRA's focus is on long-term reconstruction in the affected areas and rehabilitation of the population. This includes physical reconstruction of homes and other buildings, restoration of infrastructure, restoring environmental stability and reviving livelihoods. This is a mammoth task for which the establishment

of a dedicated agency is highly relevant and necessary. In Pakistan's case, the need for ERRA was eminent since state and district government had been incapacitated by the earthquake, lacked capacity and human resources\textsuperscript{31} to deal with the massive task of rehabilitation. ERRA was formed at the federal level with a state/provincial (PERRA and SERRA) as well as district level tiers (DRUs). However, ERRA itself, was originally composed of skeletal staff. Given UNDP's focus on institutional capacity building and governance, it was relevant and timely for UNDP to support the development of governance structures that could manage the recovery and reconstruction of earthquake hit areas in the long-term.

The need to establish such an agency has been demonstrated in other disasters as well e.g. in Gujrat and Indonesia. UNDP's support to such structures is also not new. In post tsunami reconstruction, UNDP has provided support to BAPPENAS and BAPPEDA in Aceh, Indonesia. UNDP's decision to support ERRA through TAMEER was relevant in the light of global experience and its own mandate as the leader of the Early Recovery cluster. The Early Recovery Guidelines since produced by UNDP endorse the need to ensure that "recovery is nationally owned and led" and the effort is made to" support governments to lead their own early recovery"\textsuperscript{32}.

**Effectiveness**

TAMEER chose to support ERRA through developing operating procedures, supporting running costs and recruiting staff for ERRA in its first phase (Dec 2005 to XX). Subsequently (XX ongoing), it has supported ERRA through (i) human resource support consisting of staff recruitment (ii) equipment support (iii) trainings and workshops and (iv) strategic support to enable procurement of specialist advice.

An assessment of TAMEER's effectiveness is closely tied to ERRA's performance in implementing recovery initiatives. ERRA's work to date has received favorable verdict from a range of stakeholders and has been highly effective in enabling ERRA to plan and organize the delivery of initiatives to the earthquake affected people. Since TAMEER staff\textsuperscript{33} has been crucial to this outcome, ERRA's delivery of recovery interventions owes considerably to their inputs. TAMEER staff has aided ERRA in implementing recovery projects in three major ways. Firstly, TAMEER staff has spearheaded the production of strategies. A case in point is the Social Protection sector where TAMEER staff has played a key role in producing a Social Protection Strategy. In addition to this Strategy, TAMEER staff has guided the design of ERRA's interventions such as Livelihoods Support Cash Grant Programme, Rural Landless Programme, Legal Aid for Earthquake Affected People and Medical Rehabilitation of People with Disabilities. The design of these programmes owes its technical direction from TAMEER staff. On the impact level, the interventions have benefited people as follows:

\begin{itemize}
  \item In NWFP, for example, 55 provincial office buildings, 9 District and 249 provincial officers' residences were destroyed. Some 75\% of primary and middle schools were destroyed and 574 health facilities were damaged. About 25\% of revenue records and 85\% of municipal records were destroyed.
  \item Page 14, Guidance Note on Early Recovery, Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery, UNDP-BCPR, 2008
  \item To date, TAMEER has placed 74 staff in ERRA. Another 10 applications are in process while 5 posts are pending. Total sanctioned staff is 89. (Annex 1: TAMEER HR Summary as of 30\textsuperscript{th} April 2008, Project Document, TAMEER)
\end{itemize}
Livelihood cash grants have reached 268,000 people; about 100 people have received cash grants under the Rural Landless Programme and some 4,960 claims have been registered; medical support has been provided to the disabled and some 3518 cases have been registered under the Legal Aid Programme and are in various stages of advice.

Other sectors such as housing, livelihoods, infrastructure and health have shown similar progress. Although progress in some crucial sectors such as education has been very slow, this is not attributable to TAMEER staff but to approval procedures for construction in seismic zones with which ERRA needs to comply.

Secondly, TAMEER staff has been embedded down to the district level within District Reconstruction Units (DRUs). DRUs are responsible for coordinating the district level implementation across all sectors and coordinating the work of other stakeholders. At the district level, TAMEER staff has been instrumental in coordinating project formulation, document preparation, project approval and sectoral coordination. This has included the preparation of PC1 documents for projects in each district. Without TAMEER staff, project approval and processing would have been an uphill task given staff shortages and capacity issues. TAMEER staff has also assisted with the preparation of Annual Work Plans for all districts incorporating planned interventions across all sectors. Thirdly, TAMEER has initiated capacity building of government agencies through conducting workshops and trainings. Several training workshops have been conducted on Disaster Risk Reduction and Management, Earthquake Risk Management, Environmental Impact Assessment and Gender. Additionally, TAMEER staff has arranged training sessions for government staff on preparation of PC1s, organized project management training for key government staff.

The need for a strong disaster recovery management authority is a crucial lesson from evaluation of disasters in South Asia. "Lessons from past disasters suggest that, given the multisectoral nature of recovery, new disaster management institutions need to have the authority to coordinate reconstruction efforts by sectoral ministries and agencies." However, in the case of ERRA, this institutional arrangement has not translated into capacity building of relevant line departments at the provincial or district levels to ensure that they are gradually able to lead the reconstruction effort. Consistent "contracting out" of government functions to ERRA precludes capacity building within government agencies and by-passes the long-term mandate and role of line departments. Further, the link between reconstruction and maintenance is crucial for sustainability since providing infrastructure is insufficient if government systems are not coordinated and able to ensure adequate human resources to run the facilities.

While TAMEER has played a crucial role in beefing ERRA's technical capacity, it has done so through externally recruited staff rather than exploring options for addressing capacity needs strategically. This is not unusual in the first phase of

34 In NWFP, TAMEER staff has played a crucial role in the preparation and approval of 1787 PC1s. Another 1779 are under process. In AJK, some 1782 PC1s have been prepared and cleared. (TAMEER Progress Update, April 2008)

35 Page 12, South Asia Earthquake 2005: Learning from Previous Recovery Operations, ALNAP.
TAMEER given the urgency of the situation immediately after the earthquake and the need to form an institution to oversee recovery efforts. However, the second phase of TAMEER could have explored such options more fully. Key issues that emerge due to TAMEER’s exclusive reliance on embedded staff in ERRA consist of (i) the creation of varying incentive structures within the same organization (ii) lack of flexibility in the procurement of technical services as and when required and (iii) lack of long-term capacity within ERRA. Reliance on TAMEER staff means that ERRA itself lacks long term technical capacity to implement its mandate. Given that reconstruction work is unlikely to be completed in three years (ERRA’s current mandate), it is obvious that technical requirements for reconstruction are likely to continue beyond TAMEER (which is set to end in 2009). This calls for a strategic view of UNDP’s support to ERRA and to TAMEER beyond the current phase.

Despite its supply of technical staff under TAMEER and its leadership of the Early Recovery Cluster, UNDP’s support has not been able to facilitate ERRA in ensuring wide scale community participation, citizen involvement and scrutiny in reconstruction process and planning. Community outreach processes have, to date, consisted of grievance redress mechanisms, vulnerability surveys, social impact assessment studies etc. While these have provided valuable information for the technical design of interventions, they have not served to design or implement a wide scale community consultation mechanism or process to inform the reconstruction efforts. The needs, hopes and aspirations of communities are left unexplored and un-accommodated.

**Efficiency and Change**

The efficiency of TAMEER is clear from a perspective of with and without project scenario. The delivery and management of recovery could not have taken place without assistance to ERRA through TAMEER. However, the efficiency of various options of technical support is unclear. Since a range of options and their comparative advantages and costs was not undertaken, it is difficult to measure TAMEER’s cost effectiveness.

TAMEER has contributed to a tangible change in defining the role of a nascent ERRA. The organization grew from skeletal staff into a technically strong entity with clear operating procedures, technical support and structure. A technically strong ERRA played a crucial role in cementing the government’s and donor agencies’ proactive role in the management of recovery. The positive change has been ERRA ability to deliver on recovery initiatives while it has itself been undergoing a process of organizational development and strengthening.

The change has also been evident through the recovery interventions and number of beneficiaries. One key example has been ERRA’s outreach to people on housing payments. All families eligible for house rebuilding have received the first tranche of cash grants, about one-third have received the third grant and about 20% have received the final grant by 2007. This is reflective of a clear change brought about by the timeliness of ERRA’s interventions. Community consultation confirmed that households had

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36 ERRA, 2007
indeed received ERRA’s support both through livelihood cash grants and house construction support.

However, the extent of change on the ground needs to be triangulated through extensive field surveys to consult the beneficiaries on the timeliness and efficacy of intervention measures. Success in meeting numbers identified for support is a key measure of change but one that is “supply” driven. The other side of the picture is to allow beneficiaries to articulate the extent to which support was received, how adequately the needs were met and the process through which this was achieved. There is some evidence to suggest that house construction grants took too long to reach the beneficiaries and that the process was delayed due to slow development of construction standards and their subsequent revision37. A beneficiary centered assessment would play a key role in learning lessons for the design of other interventions.

There are also concerns that the pace of change has been too slow. The construction of educational facilities is one area where this has been evident but other sectors have also lagged. One example is that ERRA estimated damage to some 4,000 water schemes due to the earthquake. However, by June 2006 work had started on only 300 of these schemes. By September 2007, about 20% of the destroyed water schemes had been repaired with work started on another 14% (ERRA, 2007).

There are also concerns that the pace of change has been too slow. The construction of educational facilities is one area where this has been evident but other sectors have also lagged38. One example is that ERRA estimated damage to some 4,000 water schemes due to the earthquake. However, by June 2006 work had started on only 300 of these schemes. By September 2007, about 20% of the destroyed water schemes had been repaired with work started on another 14% (ERRA, 2007).

Sustainability

The sustainability of TAMEER’s interventions is a challenge. Mechanisms for transfer of knowledge and capacity building within government line departments were identified during interviews as an area requiring attention. Further, the existence of ERRA beyond its three year mandate is unclear. Given that a National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) has now come into existence, it is crucial that ERRA begins to develop knowledge transfer mechanisms. At present, such a mechanism is not in existence. A transition road-map (together with ERRA's exit strategy) from recovery to normal situation is also unclear.

37 Interviews with NGOs (21st November 2008)
38 IN AJK, only 12% of the education facilities are currently being built. Of the 36 health facilities to be built by DRU, not a single has been completed although donor sponsored ones (38) have shown considerable progress. Work has started on 6 WATSAN schemes out of 1106 schemes with DRU while 70% of those sponsored by donors have been completed. Some 116 government buildings out of 335 damaged ones have been built. About 51 kilometers (12%) of roads damaged (total 1,456 km) are under repair. Approval has been granted for 24 out of 418 target Community Livelihood Rehabilitation Plans. (Source: DRU, Muzaffarabad, October 2008)
Other Evaluations and Lessons Learnt

Other evaluation exercises such as the lessons learnt from post-tsunami recovery have re-enforced the need for UNDP to support government ownership of the recovery process. In the tsunami case, UNDP's efforts were quickly focused on supporting provincial and district authorities in Indonesia in planning, mapping, shelter and employment. One key lesson learnt was that as recovery effort goes forward, important opportunities for capacity building in the initial post-disaster phase must not be missed. In Pakistan's case, UNDP took a proactive step by supporting ERRA and played a key role in capacity building by supporting ERRA at an early stage.

Evaluation reports have also emphasized the need for an exit strategy for "temporary" structures and termed this a critical issue in post disaster situations. Some recommend that the "transition from ERRA to NWFP and AJK governments and local authorities should have already begun".

The need for more community-based responses and citizen choice in planning recovery from the outset has also been emphasized by several evaluations. This view has been consistently identified by several evaluation exercises and highlights the marginalization of people in "owning" and participating in the decision-making process. A few excerpts discussing facets of marginalization are presented below:

"Evidence from Pakistan already suggests that communities are becoming increasingly frustrated that the aid they have received is not well targeted to their needs and priorities and there is inadequate consultation especially with women". (Page 3, South Asia Earthquake 2005: Learning from Previous Recovery operations, ALNAP)

"Relief agencies made some efforts to consult with beneficiaries to shape their recovery programmes but these consultations were sometimes faced with elite capture. Critically, the affected population was not generally surveyed so that the agencies could be informed about how the community they were setting out to assist viewed the success of their assistance." (Page 30, Perceptions of crisis and response: synthesis of evaluations of the response to the 2005 Pakistan Earthquake, Cosgrave and Herson)

"In the relief and rehabilitation efforts following the Pakistan earthquake, it appears that there was minimal consultation with those who were affected. Most households reported that they had no input in the decision making processes related to the restoration of livelihoods (98%), shelter (98%) and food assistance (97%)". (Page 8: Surviving the Pakistan Earthquake: Perceptions of the Affected One Year Later, Fritz Institute, 2006)

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39 The Post Tsunami Recovery in the Indian Ocean-Lessons Learned, Challenges and Future Action, UNDP, April 2005
40 Response to the Earthquake in Pakistan, Paul Thornton, September 2006
41 See Provention and Fritz Institute evaluations, for example.
Recommendations

UNDP would benefit from an independent assessment of ERRA’s performance at an early stage. Other donors, particularly, DFID may find it useful to fund such an exercise and could be approached to support it. The exercise should be structured to enhance how donors can best support ERRA in a cost effective manner and explore options for continuing with TAMEER. This is particularly relevant since the work of recovery and reconstruction is likely to proceed beyond the three years envisaged earlier.

UNDP should also explore means of intuitional learning between ERRA and NDMA. The valuable work undertaken by ERRA needs to feed into the development of NDMA at an early stage. UNDP can support knowledge transfer mechanisms between the two organizations as a priority.
BEGIN-ER

- Basic Facts:
- Duration: 2.5 years (July 2006 – Dec 2008)
- Executing Agency: UNDP
- Partners: GoAJK, GoNWFP, EAD, ERRA, SERRA, PERRA
- Total Available Budget: US $10.3 million

Project Objectives

- Damaged capacity of local government offices at district, tehsils and union levels restored
- Capacity of local government officials, elected representatives, communities and CBOs developed to play an effective role in coordination, planning and monitoring disaster response.
- Capacity of damaged local government offices at district, tehsils and union levels restored
- Capacity of local government officials, elected representatives, communities and CBOs developed to play an effective role in coordination, planning and monitoring disaster response.

The Evaluation Summery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Highly relevant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Efficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Cannot be applied</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Detailed Evaluation Analysis

Relevance

Begin-er falls well with in UNDP’s core competencies in governance and state capacity development.

Undp is a key donor and implementer in governance programming. UN’s country programmes outline specifically work on participatory governance with an aim to institutionalize devolution, parliamentary development, electoral process and private sector engagement. Therefore Undp was building on its governance units experience and expertise when it ventured in building the state capacities of AJK and NWFP and developed a highly relevant project in varying institutional context of both of the regions.

42 CPAP Review( 2007), Govt of Pakistan-UNDP, Pakistan Page 10, 15
AJK does not function like provincial governments which are highly independent in agency creation and policy formulation. The state of Kashmir is traditionally, as one senior official remarked, micro managed from Islamabad. Even the state budget is activity based with Islamabad giving the salaries of 68000 employees against their monthly projection. Due to centralized nature of operational relationship with the government of Pakistan, the state in itself is not able to create even a single salaried position on its own. It will have to first take approval from Ministry of finance and KANA. It was precisely in this institutional context, that the state was required to reconstruct most of their flattened office structure. Without Undp focus on state reinstatement, it would have taken a lot of time to re-build the seat of government in AJK. Therefore, the phased undp project to provide pre-fabricated buildings to union councils, tehsils & district administration and finally state agencies was highly relevant and it made the state to function again.

**UNDP Begin-er project is manifestation of its strong commitment to align itself with government priorities.**

Undp key working partner has been government in all times. Therefore, making the state functional and efficient falls in its core programmatic priorities. In the times of disaster, undp was able to asses an unmet need on time. Most of the other actors were involved in working at community level and although other organizations, most notably UN-Habitat, their scope was fairly limited. Had undp not done it\textsuperscript{43}, there is no doubt that no one else would have done it at such a massive scale.

From a project conception and design standpoint, it is important to understand that Begin-er prevented at a critical time a very real danger of what can be called as organizational melt down due to prolonged dysfunctionality of the state agencies and brought back the sense of government in the region. In that sense it was able to prevent the fear of weakening the writ of the state on important times making the project highly relevant for the times.

**Effectiveness** Unclear

**Emphasis on local bodies facilitated in making them centre points of coordination at local level.**

AJK traditionally has not seen its local body elections and therefore elected union councils at grass root level since 1990. And yet the office of UC plays important role in maintaining state record of basic citizenship and facilitate citizens in verifications, family affair registration and basic development. In post earthquake, the role of UC became even more central as suddenly many different NGO\s and development agencies started working at UC level and needed them to function as an office of the government in times of coordinating relief and recovery efforts. In that respect, in the context a disaster, showing state presence and enabling it to do its most basic of functions, the project proved effective.

\textsuperscript{43} This evaluation found DFID, the undp donor in Begin-er, very keen and committed to work in facilitating the state becoming functional.
Weak project design could not allow the project to deliver upon its components other than prefabs distribution.

An important part of the project was to ensure the citizen’s access to state services and promote performance accountability within the state structures. The project could not achieve it. There are issues of weak project design with mismatch of project objectives and outputs which later resulted in almost non-existent emphasis on this part. See table in the next page which clearly shows setting up of very ambitious objectives on the basis of sound good governance strategy and existing need but the outputs are insufficient in terms of the scope and size and therefore were not able to fulfill the objectives set.

### Disconnect between ambitious strategy and broad objectives and lean outputs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Rational</th>
<th>UNDP Points</th>
<th>Strategy Summary</th>
<th>Project Objectives</th>
<th>Project Outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordination and clarity of roles</td>
<td>Transparent decision-making, with mechanisms should be created at the local levels for the people to articulate their concerns and be engaged in decision-making; Ensure participatory and consultative processes for recovery and reconstruction planning, implementation and monitoring. Meaningful engagement of all stakeholders in the process, including the affected population particularly women and vulnerable groups Promote community-based approaches Promote partnership and collaboration among public, private, civil society, Effective coordination among the federal, provincial, local governments, donors, Restore and develop institutional capacities of all the partners and at all levels</td>
<td>To enable local government institutions (LGIs) to function again quickly and have technical capacities to plan and implement disaster response activities through a transparent, equitable and participatory process. Engage and mobilize all the partners, including affected citizens and communities, especially the most vulnerable and inaccessible in designing, implementing and monitoring local initiatives for reconstruction and rehabilitation</td>
<td>Temporary (pre-fabricated) offices; Office hardware and software (IT equipment, office furniture and supplies) Short term staff and technical experts for restoration records and other disaster response related temporary skills required Training and capacity building of local elected representatives and LG officials</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the involvement of newly elected representatives Retrieval and rebuilding official records Needs assessment overlaps Special mechanisms for most vulnerable social groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ProDoc Begin-er, Approved on 19 July 2006, Undp.
Clubbing the better governance project with Begin-er was not a good strategy. Begin-er could have restricted itself to prefabs provision which it did wonderfully well.

In fact, in all practical sense, it was not entirely incorrect to keep the project simple and focus more on tangible delivery of pre-fabricated offices. This goal of making the state recover from immediate earthquake shock was already enough for one project. The inclusion of ambitious better governance objectives with fairly weak programming in the similar project made the project too complex for the team. They could have been included through a separate project in order to get greater emphasis and focus from CPRU and could have proved far more effective.

With in the given design, this evaluation found negligible improvement in the working of the state. Majority of the initiative hinged mostly on capacity development of the officials but provided no mechanisms for citizen’s involvement or over sight over the working of the agencies. Begin-er could not contribute in any way in making the agencies more responsive in working for the needs of the vulnerable or poor as it promised in its objectives. In fact, there are no institutional mechanisms for informing the project priorities in favor of poor nor this evaluation could establish any evidence that how the 10 million dollar investment through Begin-er project are creating openings for agency wide good governance reform in reconstruction stage.

Having created high legitimacy and ownership, Undp could actually leverage its influence to at least initiate long term process based governance reforms in order to improve the responsiveness and accountability of the working of the state institutions.

Efficiency

A good level of efficiency was achieved through out the project.

The project showed great efficiency in terms of meeting critical dead lines, ensuring timely financial spending and following a clear project management course. The following box developed directly from the project completion report of the first phase of Begin-er just picks up one key output and explains the process which includes quality criteria and financial management table. All of this explains a well coordinated team able to work through the hazels of extreme winter weather as well as lengthy procurement and installment process in fairly decent times.
The criteria to distribute prefabs were not followed strictly but it did not cause significant harm to the project.

However, there were questions all around that how well the earlier criteria to distribute pre-fabricated houses was followed. The details of sights were left un-selected at the stage of project design\(^4\) Essentially the project was developed for

\(^4\) Proposal Document Building Enabling Governance and Institutions for Earthquake Response (BEGIN ER) Page 6
local government structures at union, tehsils and district level but since the
government agencies were almost non functional they were included too. Once that
done, it is clearly visible that those who were more powerful were able to take the
offices earlier on but sectors like education took a long time having those. In fact
given the size of UNDP’s interventions, it was in a position to leverage its position
and pick and choose agencies as per the agencies role in relief work. This evaluation
could not establish that any serious attempt was exercised by Undp leadership to
balance the equity aspects of prefabs distribution with various organizational
interests of various agencies on ground and were working more assertively for their
share due to nature of post disaster times.

**Change**

**Begin-er has been able to improve the working conditions significantly in
some cases better than before.**

The project was able to bring in significant change in working environment of the
state offices. Some officials acknowledge that the provided offices actually were
better than their normal buildings. Beyond these personal comforts and over all great
atmospheres, it was the timeliness of their provision which contributed most in
making the project very relevant and effective for state agencies and they were able
to function very normally. Many most notably revenue department was able to
restore their record and save and showed an improved performance under a
tremendous workload due to their damages verification role at household level.\(^{45}\).

The second most important contribution the project was able to make is its ability to
create great good will within the government structures. The restoration of public
offices facilitated in creating high organizational relevance of UNDP in bureaucratic
community. This benefited UNDP in improving their coordination with government.
There is also evidence from community consultations during this evaluation that
public offices as whole worked better when they were made functional after prefabs
delivery.

**Recommendations**

- There is an opportunity to develop the second phase of the project on
  improving transparency and accountability with in government structures in
  order to build on projects earlier contribution.

- Build on initial work done with in revenue department by working with new
  revenue school and developing program further for better land record
  maintenance, land rights realization and institutional reforms with in agency.

\(^{45}\) Interview with Khajwa Mohammed Task Manager & Ansar Yaqub Additional DC Muzzafarabad,
Community based Livelihood Recovery Program

Programs Basic Facts:

- Duration: 36 months (April 2006-April 2009)
- Budget: US$ 13.8 million
- Partners: UNDP, ILO, FAO, UNIDO and local communities
- Geographical Area: Tehsil Balakot and Tehsil Muzzafarabad

Program Objectives:

- Revitalize and strengthen community organizations to ensure participation of affected people in planning, execution and monitoring of livelihoods recovery activities
- Restore and strengthen the capacity of line departments and civil society organizations to enable them to be active partners in local development
- Restore income generation activities of affected population especially the vulnerable groups through skills enhancement
- Revive agriculture sector, provide food security and mitigate environmental effects of the earthquake
- Support construction or rehabilitation of community infrastructure related to livelihoods recovery and economic development

The Evaluation Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Extremely high</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Detailed Evaluation Analysis

Relevance  
Extremely high

The program design contained all important elements of livelihood damage assessment and was launched timely.

The livelihood recovery program started from April 2006 was extremely timely as it was launched right after relief phase and aimed to address one of the most important conditions for early recovery. The GoP consented ADB-WB joint damage assessment termed the rapid restoration of building people’s livelihood as first guiding principle for any future recovery and reconstruction plan46. It further

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46 Preliminary Damage Assessment Report (2005), ADB-WB, Islamabad. P.6
estimated that the total loss in employment was about 29 percent of the employed population in the affected Districts. About 38 and 25 percent of the total employment in the affected Districts of AJK and NWFP, respectively, were estimated to be lost. The largest job losses were found in agriculture, small businesses shops, and construction. In total the assessment reported employment losses likely to impact nearly 1.6 million people. The UNDP early recovery framework accounted for the damage assessment report. The project design was further informed by relatively detailed house hold level quantitative livelihood assessment undertaken by Centre for Research on Poverty Reduction and Income Distribution (CRPRID) which accounts for detailed asset and income losses. The program design in community based early recovery program was found consistent with these assessments with focus on agriculture restoration, community based infrastructure development, and skill based training and market restoration activities.

Livelihood Recovery programming generally followed UNDAF strategic directions and was built on undp earlier program experience.

Strategically UNDP earthquake response followed the agreed cooperation areas in UNDAF. Developed in 2004, the UNDAF had included the disaster response elements in its strategic priorities. Specifically at the outcome level, the document talks about rehabilitation of areas and communities and identifies organizations like FAO which are specialized agencies for agriculture rehabilitation. This strategic thinking seems to have informed CPLRP in its program design with emphasis on natural resource rehabilitation involvement of actors like FAO and ILO.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected Outcome</th>
<th>Brief description of cooperation strategies</th>
<th>Major line of Action</th>
<th>Contributing Agencies</th>
<th>Program Modalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 1:</td>
<td>Effective disaster response and mitigation systems for risk reduction and rehabilitation of areas and communities</td>
<td>Support to institutions and community initiatives for rehabilitation of areas affected by emergencies and disasters Facilitation of enhanced preparedness among Government, civil society for emergency response □ Joint advocacy for development of national disaster management plan</td>
<td>Joint programme to strengthen local economy, infrastructure and environment of areas affected by prolonged emergencies, including life-saving rapid interventions Effective national policy on emergency and disaster response and management Joint advocacy, capacity building and awareness raising for disaster risk reduction</td>
<td>UNDP, OCHA, UNICEF, WHO, FAO, WFP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHCR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) P.53

47 ibid
48 The draft damage assessment report was made available to undp staff before 12 November when it was formally released. This allowed undp to benefit from it while developing their own early recovery framework. Interview with Usman Kazi, Program Officer (Livelihood), CPRU, UNDP, Islamabad. 28 Nov 2008.
50 UNDAF takes livelihood intervention as part of a rehabilitation program with in broader community rehabilitation framework.
The livelihood development project has been key area of implementation for UNDP in Pakistan. In AJK alone, UNDP have implemented a long term livelihood development program in 90s. In post earthquake recovery programming, therefore, UNDP developed projects on the basis of its key strengths in governance & livelihood. As other UN agencies picked projects as per their own comparative advantage, UNDP was able to work in areas where other agencies could not. This programmatic flexibility allowed UNDP to fill in the most important programmatic needs and allowed it to develop its livelihood program with other specialist agencies in UN system like FAO and ILO who possessed expertise in delivering agriculture and skill development programs which made the program highly relevant.

**Effectiveness & Efficiency**

The project was able to reach its target beneficiaries ensuring broad based participation.

CBLRP’s project target was 90 percent affected areas of Tehsil Balakot and Muzzafarabad. Muzzafarabad Tehsil had a total population of 565,744 of which 509,219 were affected by the earthquake. Balakot tehsil had a population of 253,340 of which 228,051 were affected. In order to reach to such a challenging target the project was able to revitalize around a 1000 community organizations with fairly broad based in numbers and representation. The following table shows an existence of at least one CO on average after every 500 affected persons which mean that roughly after every 100 houses, there exists at least one CO. That is quite an achievement in the context of post disaster relief environment when social mobilization and organization becomes relatively difficult. Given the number of interventions in the area of agricultural recovery and skills development, this evaluation can safely conclude that project was able to reach to people who were affected in both of the tehsils and delivered as per its plan.

**CBLRP Community Outreach Analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tehsil</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Affected Population</th>
<th>No of COs till April 2008</th>
<th>Outreach measured as one CO per person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balakot</td>
<td>228,051</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>477</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muzzafarabad</td>
<td>509,219</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Calculated from the secondary data available from monitoring reports.

The program was able to deliver on key livelihood recovery issues in areas where it was implemented.

The livelihood program execution and its manner of implementation were found effective at community level. UNDP already had experience of working in livelihood

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51 Early Recovery Plan (May 2006), UN-ERRA, Islamabad.
52 ProDoC CBLRP(2006), CRRU, UNDP, Pakistan P#10.
53 See the detailed community organizations table in annexure
sector at community level in the same region\textsuperscript{54} which greatly helped in establishing important community level alliances for solid program implementation. The interventions also facilitated bringing in important changes in rehabilitating water resources, communal asset building & individual capacity development.

FAO, for instance, was able to develop 60 farmer field schools teaching seed sowing and land preparation to farmers in real life situations. The inclusion of experiential learning elements in training farmers at the grass root level made the exercise far more relevant and effective in delivering necessary knowledge and skills. This could be achieved through outsourcing the component to a specialized NGO called Kisan Welfare Organizations who were already experienced in delivering such training in Punjab. The success of the trainings can be judged from the fact that the local beneficiaries already have made their own associations to promote new knowledge they acquired from trainings. The project as a whole has been able to cover around 60-65 percent of the water and irrigation channel rehabilitation work in 12 UCs impacting 25 hectare per scheme land irrigation and therefore contributing substantially to the local livelihoods.

ILO inclusion in the project facilitated in making the livelihood recovery program more holistic in terms of dealing with the existing market needs. It also brought into focus the employability angle to the programming as oppose to more indirect natural resource development approach. ILO also was able attend to the needs of young people as a target who, otherwise, were relatively neglected as most projects focus families or households as their beneficiary target. The process of selection of final 20 trades for training delivery has been robust, participatory and effective\textsuperscript{55}. A normal immediate post evaluation employment rate of such trainings has been found for displaced and refugee communities around 40-45 percent especially when they are located near mega cities\textsuperscript{56}. This evaluation generally have the impression of higher employment rates for ILO trainees. Following village level description explains this in a bit more detail\textsuperscript{57}.

### Training Usage Chart Imparted by Undp /FAO/ILO at village level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village Name Machi Pura Household 125</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Trainings</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter/Mason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Health Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMST/LMST</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Developed from PRA exercise with community in the area

\textsuperscript{54} Undp implemented Neelam valley-Jehlum valley development program in 90s. The total undo intervention period in AJK spread over a decade.

\textsuperscript{55} First a TNA study was launched which later was discussed in a broad based work shop which identified 56 different trades broadly categorized under construction, tourism, minerals & gemstones, automobile sectors for men and handicrafts and traditional tailoring, gabbasazi, namda making, knitting and other related trades for women. Qualified with the available project resources and compatible with the project design, 20 trades were short-listed for actual implementation.

\textsuperscript{56} Malik, Javed (2007), Evaluation of EU Durable Solution Project for Afghan Refugees, IRC-NRC-ISCOS, Pakistan.

\textsuperscript{57} The chart aim to display just a village level changes and is not meant to provide an over all picture.
The capacity input delivered through this kind of variety of individual and CO level training regime has been found effective and added in communities coping with their rehabilitation challenge and building their livelihoods.

Performance of all CPLRP partners was not uniform.

In all four UN family partners, this evaluation found FAO and ILO more effective in terms of their impact in livelihood recovery although community level consultation places the performance of UNDP higher than others due to their more direct interaction with UNDP social mobilization staff then more technical staff of FAO and ILO. For instance following chart places UNDP as an organization at number two, ILO at number three, FAO at number eight and UNIDO at number sixteen in the total list of eighteen organizations which worked and interacted with the village and cluster community organizations in Balakot.

The Organizational Performance Ranking in Tehsil Balakot

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Name of Organization</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Name of Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Dosti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Sabawoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Oxfam</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Islamic Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>SHA</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>World Vision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>SRSP</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Saiban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Relief International</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>UNIDO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>ACTED</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>WCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Hashoo Foundation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PRA Consultation in UC Garlaat with cluster organizations

But in terms of program effectiveness and interventions appropriateness, this evaluation, however, have rated the roles of FAO and ILO more fundamental in success of the program as both of these specialized agencies were able to innovate the delivery of their designed inputs in ways which made their projects more effective on ground. Following chart explains how, for example, one intervention was able to rehabilitate the livelihood pattern of several villages with in agriculture sector. FAO was seen very effective in designing and delivering these projects on the basis UNDP made organizations that raised the resolution for the project and then worked very closely with the agencies to make this a reality.

The Jabbi Water Channel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Patti</th>
<th>Juttha</th>
<th>Bajwa</th>
<th>Khait</th>
<th>Nakka</th>
<th>Dukhan Branch</th>
<th>Upper Jabri</th>
<th>Lower Jabri</th>
<th>Saidan</th>
<th>Qasim Abad</th>
<th>Bara</th>
<th>Qaziabad</th>
<th>Jabbri</th>
<th>Kundiy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiary in Households</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PRA Exercise conducted in the village.
Undp on other hand had an important task of social mobilization and organization and other agencies could not have worked without Undp's program support at the community level. But how cost effective was Undp in providing management support and delivering its community based organizations network so that ILO, FAO and UNIDO could deliver their specialized livelihood recovery projects? In order to establish that our analysis looked at the actual nature of outputs delivered by undp and its partners before looking at their relative cost effectiveness.

If looked closely at activity based budget sheet, undp is accomplishing following two outputs and all other program delivery is in the hands of other technical partners.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNDP Outputs</th>
<th>FAO/ILO/UNIDO outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output 1: Strengthening and formation of community organizations</td>
<td>Output 3. Training and support to the vulnerable groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 2: Revitalization of the capacity of government at the local level as well as NGOs</td>
<td>Output 4: Revival of agriculture sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Output 5: Forestry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Output 6: Critical micro infrastructure project rehabilitated / established</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to compare the cost patterns, following table is comparing the over all cost patterns of the agencies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table Indicative Technical Support Cost of all Partners</th>
<th>Budget (Euro)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Year 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO Sub-total</td>
<td>800,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO Sub-total</td>
<td>1,169,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO Sub-total</td>
<td>214,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP Sub-total</td>
<td>1,411,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total UNDP and Other Projects</td>
<td>5,278,61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tech. Support</td>
<td>370,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mgmt./Coordination</td>
<td>2,681,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>250,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Cost (7%) of total direct cost</td>
<td>3,829,527</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The table clearly shows that UNDP’s program cost is almost equal to FAO, ILO and UNDIO combined cost although the later three organizations had to deliver key sector specific community projects. The following chart sums up the tabulated value comparisons across partners.
It seems that the DEX approach have increased Undp’s management cost. There are chances that in recovery phase, Undp could have gone for NEX projects involving local organizations that could have decreased the per unit management cost of mobilization and capacity development of the grass root organization. The re-designed project with a different approach could have helped in reaching out to far more geographical locations and beneficiaries.

**Given the resources the project had, it aimed too less to achieve. This resulted in reduced project impact besides making the interventions expensive.**

If seen in the context of an overall livelihood damages in the earthquake zone, the CBLRP as a livelihood recovery response from undp\(^58\) fell well short of coverage and programmatic depth. In terms of coverage alone, the damage assessment report quotes the cost of livelihood restoration as 97 Million dollars\(^59\) in eight most affected districts. It further calculates that:

“.... Around the total loss in employment to be around 324,000 jobs, or about 29 percent of the employed population in the affected Districts. About 38 and 25 percent of the total employment in the affected Districts of AJK and NWFP, respectively, are estimated to be lost. The largest job losses are in agriculture, small businesses/shops, and construction, while no employment loss is assumed for migrant workers and public sector employees. Employment losses will likely impact nearly 1.6 million people....”

In that respect CBLRP’s 13.8 Million US $ could have been planned very strategically to cover either more geographical areas or more number of individual benefits in the affected zone. But as the data shows below, it could not. Following table provides an estimate of per person cost available with the program:

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\(^{58}\) For that matter from the UN system as FAO and ILO was also part of this project.

\(^{59}\) Preliminary Damage Assessment Report (2005), ADB-WB, Islamabad
The table shows that after accounting for UNDP programmatic cost of 7 percent, the project promised around 1044 US$ or 62640 Pak rupees per affected family. This is quite a substantial amount for a family living in affected zone. The question is does the project show the same incidence of benefit from its operations at the community level? The following case attempted to map the livelihood recovery process at village level\(^6^0\).

### Recovery Status at village level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village Name: Upper Machi Pura</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basic Information</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Recovery Issues</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing Compensation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Check Dams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street pavements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sliding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PRA Consultation Session at the village

Further tehsils level consultations reveal that even if CBLRP completes its full targets, the total livelihood rehabilitation of natural water resources and land development would cover about the fifty percent of the total need at Tehsil level. This means that by design the project had coverage issues and was not executed in a cost effective manner. With the total allocation of 13.8 Million dollar, the project could have significantly contributed in improving the livelihood status of the area. This evaluation found FAOs and ILOs relative contribution better than the other two partners UNIDO and UNDP although UNDP budgetary share has been almost the double than FAO and ILO partnerships\(^6^1\). UNDP relative expensiveness in delivering the project has been due to following DEX approach even in the recovery phase when they could have easily passed on the community side to more local level NGOs. That would have given UNDP the flexibility to monitor partners more

\(^6^0\) This case is selected because it covers most of the interventions already been delivered. The intent is to look at the change process in UNDP successful villages.

\(^6^1\) Detailed budget table is given above.
strategically and scale up the program a little more in areas which were left out due to one reason or another\textsuperscript{62}.

**UNIDO’s interventions were not effectively aligned:**

UNIDO’s presence in CBLRP has made the project conceptually holistic as it provides an important linkage with the market system. Most of the other interventions are linked with the revival of productive inputs like natural resource development, skill development for better employability or infrastructural development. And UNIDO’s involvement filled the important market revival component in a country where leveraging markets for recovery and development is still not practiced widely in livelihood programming. And yet the limited scale and scope of UNIDO’s interventions and its mid project phase out by design prevented it to actually have major impacts on promoting investment for recovery.

At least two program reviews\textsuperscript{63} noted that well before the projects end. The midterm review of CBLRP while discussing the future of UNIDO’s interventions after its phasing out recommends this IP should continue until the end of the project. If it is not possible to provide an extension to UNIDO due to budgetary constraints, some of the follow-up activities such as product development, enterprise development and linking communities with micro finance institutions should be taken under the ILO activities\textsuperscript{64}. Earlier CPAP review recommends that by the end of UNIDO’s intervention, the local traders association and chambers of Kashmir and frontier should be worked in order to ensure that somebody will carry on the useful work of UNIDO.

The UNIDO’s program design lacked follow up institutional mechanisms and process facilitation support. The well developed and specific portfolios were attempted to market well in conferences with good attendance rates but the project does not have evidence of their effectiveness in boosting local investments. On the top of it, UNIDO’s components were financially lower than other component and could have been continued given its importance and relevance. In wake of two reviews, the project also could have had some better sustainability mechanisms in place to continue the important task of enacting market mechanism in recovery and rehabilitation something which the project have no evidence to have done successfully.

**Change**

High

**Asset building was promoted as an agenda. As a whole livelihood re-generated and filled a very useful need.**

There are several things which the project was able to contribute from change perspective. The livelihood needs were not taken care of by any one in UN system and the fact that undp have been able to work in that filling in an important

\textsuperscript{62}One such area is Kala Daka where the security situation never allowed any international agency to work on properly due to the conservative nature of society. It was possible that undp funded local NGOs could have broaden the projects scale substantially.

\textsuperscript{63}Country Program Annual Review (2007), Government of Pakistan-UNDP, Pakistan a Mid Term Review CBLRP, Crises Prevention and Recovery Unit, Undp, Pakistan nd

\textsuperscript{64}ibid
programmatic need is a contribution in itself. This has established UNDP ability as an organization to demonstrate a lot of programmatic depth and flexibility which is extremely important in post disaster programming.

The project signifies the evolution of a phased approach starting from relief to recovery and brings in asset building as an agenda in recovery programming. As a concept therefore the project's ability to focus on communitarian infrastructure development, rehabilitation of the agriculture sector and skill development are interventions with opportunities for rehabilitating family's livelihoods and building the social and financial assets. Following chart developed on the basis of participatory process gives out one reflection of livelihood recovery situation in post disaster context in comparison with their situation before the disaster. This data may not be statistically accurate but can still provide a good measure of change at village level. All of these percentages were developed by villagers after discussing and agreeing in a large community meeting.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professions</th>
<th>Before the earthquake</th>
<th>After the earthquake</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction Labor</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raj Mistry (Mason)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarkhan (Wood worker)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor outside the area</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shop Keeper</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Developed with Jabri community.

**Sustainability**

Medium

The Community based cluster organizations are likely to sustain whereas the sustainability of project's core economic recovery outputs is unclear.

There is a mixed picture in ensuring the sustainability of the project outcomes. The community organizations developed were found at a mature stage of institutional development. They were found broad based and representative and have a clear sense of direction. The small COs have forged alliances and elected their own Cluster Community organization (CCO) which has made all the difference. On one level it has facilitated pooling in the talent and developing a stronger leadership which have the backing of grass root organization. Covering a UC level area and a good population, these CCOs now are technically sounder and have begun using rights based language too. Secondly, since the disasters, these CCOs have worked with many other NGOs and donors and do not see themselves as undp CCOs which is great step forward. CCOs also posses their own funds, elected representatives, record and rules of business they developed after getting training in CMST and LMST offered by UNDP. They were found using this newly acquired knowledge.

[^65]: Annexure three outlines the details of this change in individual and collective asset building.
The weakest link of the project is with market and financial institutions which basically help making the entrepreneurial efforts sustainable. The ILO trained skilled youth have displayed a better acceptance rate in the market and as per estimates around half of the total trained persons are already at the job. But the project does not have specific activities which could ensure the transition for many persons who have skills but cannot find job due to one reason or another. Work facilitation in the market is a missing area of work for otherwise successful ILO model. Similarly, farmer schemes and their input provision is also needed to be linked with microfinance institutions working in the area. Rather there should be a formal effort and an agreement between the CCOs and the micro finance institutions with an overlapping oversight of undp staff in order to facilitate the sustainable asset building at the community level.

The micro infrastructure is also needed to be linked with public sector elected department like CCBs, union council and tehsils council record so that their later depreciation could be taken care of not only by community but also from the departmental funds too.

**Recommendation**

**For UNDP leadership at Program level**

The DEX projects are good for relief period with in disaster context but once in recovery phase engage specialized national NGOs to deliver projects at community level. That will allow undp to play more strategic role in ensuring quality. Use cost effectiveness as important criteria for awarding projects and deciding implementation modalities.

Develop a system wide consistent output and outcome monitoring system and create positions with CPRU units to lead that processes while technically linking that to strategic management unit.

**For CPRU Project level Recommendations**

- Develop a projects phase out strategy while accounting of unmet recovery needs in the same area, status of livelihood recovery in other areas, available funding, sustainability of the COs and interventions.
- Develop Teshil wide CO’s coalitions as a future forum to succeed the project, define its leadership, protocols and transition while simultaneously work with cluster organizations for their future capacity development.
- Work with cluster COs for their advanced capacity development needs, networking requirements and coalition building for better rights advocacy. This can be done by developing CPRU specific long term community development approach which could also define cluster organizations vision, role and phase wise maturity indicators.
- Link the program formally with micro finance institutions as well as with market structures in order to ensure sustained livelihood provisions for on and off farm livelihood initiatives.
In the absence of UNIDO, involve chambers, local traders associations and financial institutions for continued work in leveraging market for recovery and rehabilitation needs.
Support to Volunteerism in Pakistan

- Duration: 36 months (Jan 2006-Dec 2008)
- Budget: US$ 5 million
- Partners: UNDP and UNV in partnership with NVM, other government agencies, UN agencies and NGOs
- Donors: UNDP = US$ 200,000 Government of Germany = US$ 994,151

Objective:

- To strengthen human resource capacity for implementation and coordination of relief and recovery initiatives as well as other development activities through mobilization of volunteers
- Support to Volunteerism in Pakistan:
  - Output 1: National Volunteer Movement (NVM) operationalised
  - Output 2: National UN Volunteer (UNV) scheme launched and International and National UNVs deployed for relief and recovery efforts and development activities

The Evaluation Summary

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Detailed Evaluation Analysis

Relevance
High

NVM filled an important institutional void to tap formal volunteerism.

National Volunteer Movement is the first ever specialized agency to deal with formal volunteerism in the country. Before that National Commission for Human Development (NCHD) used volunteerism first as a program and then as approach in their own sector wide program delivery. But creation of a national level volunteer recruitment specialized agency in needed times was in itself a step ahead in institutionalizing volunteerism. Established under Ministry of Youth with active political support from the government, NVM offered a practical and highly relevant scheme for volunteer involvement in the on going rehabilitation works which UNDP was able to support financially and technically. This facilitation was key in making the organization running at the very early stage of its inception.

Efficiency

The key human resources placed at NVM had limited technically capability to fully functionalize a new voluntary agency.

Most of the key human resources placed at NVM were having limited technical capability. The concept of volunteerism in the government structures was extremely new. In order to develop the necessary protocols and implementation strategy to practice volunteerism across various state agencies, NVM needed professionals who have experience in developing voluntary sector with strong understanding of the civil society’s working. Instead NVM was staffed mostly with normal government officers and has been headed by a political figure with limited linkage and understanding of the job. There has been placement of some professional level volunteers in NVM but judging they seemed to have played almost negligible role in developing a meaningful volunteer infrastructure for the agency.

The low level of institutional development impacted volunteer’s utility.

Some organizations, especially district governments, line agencies in government or some small NGOs are less prepared institutionally to host and use volunteers effectively. There were problems of ownership at first place, where some government officials always doubted volunteer’s utility and their role. Then there have been systemic issues also. Governmental projects were run through clearly established rules of business, demarcation in authority, legalities and established office routines. Volunteers and their role did not fit well with in office routines.

NVM needed strong technical facilitation from its donors.

UNDP decision to support the NVM was relevant and was done through a clearly written project proposal. However, the projects implementation was weak on the part of NVM leadership and staff. NVM actually needed a day to day facilitation and a managerial support either directly from UNDP or through some kind of outsourcing arrangements. Most of the activities mentioned in the project proposal could not
facilitate NVM to develop any coherent approach to deal with various levels of volunteerism in the country as it claims in its mission statement. UNDP monitoring of the outputs quality seemed weak.

Effectiveness

Over time the NVM organizational relevance declined specially in recovery phase.

Three years down the line, the experience of NVM shows how an excellent idea and its execution in the shape of timely agency creation in the times of disaster can slowly lose its effectiveness once normal life returns. NVM worked extremely well in the initial phase of its creation mobilizing a very large number of volunteers and deputing them to important tasks like working as camp administrator, Sewerage disposal team, Essential utilities team-water, electricity, First aid team, Trauma alleviation team etc but as the initial pressure to deliver in relief period faded down, the project seemed struggling in maintaining its performance standards across the whole range of areas which its promises in its mission. NVM initial conception places it as a primary agency to coordinate between various different kinds of governmental and non governmental agencies and civil society organizations including bar councils, scouts, medical organizations to “provide a platform for public participation in community building and create a ready pool of individuals that can be mass mobilized to act swiftly and effectively in natural and man-made disasters”. And yet its current working neither have program nor trained human resources to actually undertake this important tasks. The important program positions in the leadership have gone to political personalities resulted in lack of future program strategy and its implementation protocols.

The vertical agency design of NVM was not appropriate for practicing volunteerism which is essentially a cross agency function.

The NVM’s vertical organizational design has been found inappropriate to deal with horizontal cross agency volunteerism functions. Volunteerism is effective because it basically facilitates the integrated and cross agency functions like managing disasters or maintenance of the basic services at the community level. But NVM by organizational design has been kept as traditional bureaucratic organization under one ministry with absolutely no organizational linkage with other ministries. There were no mutual organizational mechanisms defined which could have ensured the working of network form of organizations functioning to practice volunteerism in its true form.

The program did not cater for different expectations of National and International volunteers.

The expectation levels of National and International volunteer were different but the program did not cater for these expectation difference. The tradition of national volunteer placement is a new phenomenon in Pakistan and many who have chosen it have done it as a career move and therefore they were found more concerned regarding their fringe benefits, training opportunities and further placements. International volunteers seemed valuing the cultural and emotional side of
volunteering more and for them living in another culture and country, learning a new language and getting experience while working with different teams are some of the most valuable experiences of their life.

Change

The project displayed complexities and strengths of One UN programming as several agencies were involved to work together through volunteer placements.

This made this program very relevant in the context of One UN Program reforms with in UN system which asks for joint programming and single delivery under a single agency. The project by design therefore possessed potential for looking at operational complexities of different agencies sharing a joint programmatic territory and communities.

Recommendations

There is case for making NVM an independent agency with independent board.

At present NVM is purely government organization and is run under the ministry of youth. However, given the weak technical capacity of governmental ministries, NVM working as a sub-department is not likely to work as effectively as it has been conceived. It is likely to function better as an autonomous governmental authority with independent board so that it could have flexibility in placing and working with several ministries as per their need while tapping at the same time different kind of volunteerism being practiced in the country.

Beside functional level volunteer management initiatives, NVM should work as a focal point to promote and develop volunteerism in society.

In order to accomplish this, NVM will have to come up with very innovative and popular mobilization campaigns while working very closely with media, youth organizations and student bodies while first recognizing there roles. In order to acquire that broader role, NVM should first define and develop its advocacy policy and mobilization strategy with specific details to target various kinds of existing formal and informal volunteerism in society.
ENVIRONMENT RECOVERY PROGRAMME (ERP)

Duration: 36 months:

- Budget: US$ 12.8 million (Seed money of US$ 1 million from UNDP and ERRA subsequently provided $3m so project activities were tuned to available budget)
- Partners: GoAJK, NWFP, ERRA,
- Communities Donors: UNDP and ERRA

Objective:

To provide safe, healthy and viable environment for communities by capacity building of institutions and community to manage, mitigate and rehabilitate the environmental impact of the earthquake

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Summery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevance –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency and Change–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Detailed Evaluation Analysis

Relevance

High

UNDP's support to The Environment Recovery Programme is highly relevant on several counts. It aligns well with the CPAP's programme component on disaster response and mitigation (Indicator 1.1 for Outcome 1) and with Outcome 1 for programme component on environmental management. Environmental aspects were an independent section in the Early Recovery Framework which suggested interventions on disposal of waste, debris and medical and hazardous material, prevention of vegetation removal, slope stabilization and prevention of water contamination and lake outbursts and prevention of impacts on critical habitats and protected areas. These areas for intervention were closely based on an assessment of environmental issues in the wake of the earthquake.66

Effectiveness

High

Due to a delayed start and lack of funds, several of the originally planned interventions have had to be rationalized and readjusted. Since the Project only began implementation in 2007, it is difficult to assess effectiveness at this stage. However, there are early and encouraging signs of an effective approach to watershed conservation (Sub Component B3: Integrated Forest Management and

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66 See Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment-South Asia Earthquake-Pakistan, CARE and USAID
Implementation Through Livelihood Opportunities\textsuperscript{67}). The Programme's effectiveness is evident from a collaborative approach to watershed maintenance and creating links between local communities and Forest Departments. Through a process of social mobilization, the Project has formed community organizations in 44 villages of two watersheds\textsuperscript{68} selected for rehabilitation (Kiri and Kanshian). In Kari, Village Organizations have been created in each of the 27 villages and a cluster organization has been formed (consisting of representatives selected from 27 villages). Based on village level analysis, community consultation and technical support of the Forest Department, an Integrated Watershed Management Plan has been finalized for Kari. This includes a range of measures on forest conservation and landslide stabilization as well as changing patterns of natural resource use among local communities. Measures on providing alternative solutions to NR use have been balanced with overall livelihood and infrastructure improvement through partnerships with ILO, FAO, WFP and other key agencies. The Plan has played a vital role in securing funds from ERRA (Rs 100 million) for the implementation phase\textsuperscript{69}. Field consultations showed high endorsement and willingness from stakeholder communities to support project interventions. The Project is also supported by the Forest Department of AJK and NWFP and has involved their staff in community consultation mechanisms. Tripartite agreements between the Project, communities and Forest Department underpin the implementation, monitoring and maintenance of intervention on watershed conservation and slope stabilization measures.

The Project has taken an effective demonstration approach to watershed conservation and selected two watershed for intervention. Its replication value is high. The same demonstration approach has been taken in slope stabilization (Sub Component B2) by aiming to rehabilitate some 70 slopes (30 slopes have been rehabilitated to date). These sites serve as models for replication. Tied with capacity building of the Forest Department, the demonstration sites can serve as strong catalysts for application of bioengineering solutions to slope stabilization.

However, the effectiveness of the Project needs to be supplemented through a range of market based incentives to ensure change in fuelwood use patterns of local communities. Currently, the communities rely predominantly on fuel wood and have few other options. Interventions on provision of LPG on subsidized rates for one year were part of the original project design (Component B 1) but have been delayed due to shortage of funds. This aspect of the project requires urgent support to ensure market linkages are developed to enable sustainable uptake of LPG and other fuels.

The Project's effectiveness could be further enhanced through supporting some institutional and policy measures that promote long term partnerships between Forest Department and community organizations. In the absence of a strategic framework, guidelines and adequate policies for joint implementation and monitoring endorsing a collaborative approach, the partnerships may not have the base to be long lasting. Additionally, mechanisms for conflict resolution between partners

\textsuperscript{67} This component was later re-designed to encompass management of 2 watersheds only.

\textsuperscript{68} Presentation by CPRU – 6\textsuperscript{th} November 2008

\textsuperscript{69} See page 8: Karli Lake Integrated Watershed Management Plan
require further planning and sustained mechanisms particularly in relation to the maintenance of schemes and enforcement of forest conservation measures.

**Efficiency and Change**

Medium

The ERP has taken a cost efficient approach by prioritizing its interventions in line with available resources. As a follow up to a desk study supported on rubble removal and safe disposal, the Project took an informed decision to not pursue Component A (Waste and Debris Removal) given shortage of funds and a delayed start.

Leverage of further funds from ERRA has been a positive outcome of and efficient and effective demonstration approach.

The DEX approach has been a useful one in the context of this project. Quick implementation of community mobilization, slope stabilization measures and watershed management planning could not have been possible without such an arrangement.

**Sustainability**

Medium

The sustainability of ERP is grounded in a strong collaborative approach with an emphasis on community involvement. Evidence from natural resource management projects from across the globe supports the view that continuation of conservation measures needs to be based on enforceable agreements between local communities and government authorities. However, mechanisms for the continuation of collaborative arrangements beyond the Project's life of three years are unclear. Sustainability of collaborative arrangements requires several ingredients including clear commitment from all parties, institutional policies and frameworks, training, representative and functional community organizations over a longer term horizon to ensure long term conservation. Many of these ingredients are currently being provided through the project. In the event that the Project does not extend beyond three years, it is possible that the early gains in collaborative arrangements my not go through a maturity phase and perhaps not be sustainable.

Awareness raising, especially at the community level, is a key measure underpinning sustainability of the Project. If the Project succeeds in creating awareness on DRM and land stability within local communities, it would create mechanisms for long term acceptability and sustainability of land stabilization measures.

The Project's focus on livelihoods support and creation of alternative options for NR use (forest nurseries, improvement of range and wastelands, establishment of fruit orchards, improved crop varieties) require long term support for fruition beyond the three year project phase. Further, changing NR use patterns in addition to creating alternatives is another step for long term support. Market linkages are necessary for the success of livelihood interventions and require interventions and partnerships beyond traditional donors. An emphasis on such aspects is essential to ensure sustainability.
Recommendations

UNDP should seriously explore options for supporting the project beyond the current three year phase. The Project is structured as a development intervention with measures requiring long term financial and technical support.

The Project should consider leveraging funds for Sub Component B1 at a fast pace. This is the missing equation in an overall well balanced project which can seriously dent the effectiveness of interventions. Changing fuel wood consumption patterns requires a long time horizon and sustained engagement.

The Project should also assess how best it can support the formation of frameworks, policies, guidelines and tools for collaborative watershed management. Without the existence of such frameworks (whether legally binding or not), the sustainability of collaboration between communities and Forest Department may not be possible.
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## Annexes

### Annex 1: List of Organizations and People interviewed by the Evaluation Mission

6th November 2008 to 27th November 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff meeting</td>
<td>Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Nadeem</td>
<td>Ex-Deputy Chairman</td>
<td>ERRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Farhan Sabih</td>
<td>Assistant Resident Representative, Governance Unit</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munazza Naqvi</td>
<td>Programme Officer, Environment Unit</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shakeel Ahmed</td>
<td>Programme Officer, Gender and Poverty Unit</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zubair Murshed</td>
<td>National DRR Advisor, CPRU</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usman Qazi</td>
<td>Programme Officer, (TAMEER), CPRU</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tariq Rafique/ Shaista Hussain</td>
<td>Programme Officer (BEGIN-ER), CPRU</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faiz-ul-Bari</td>
<td>Emergency Coordinator</td>
<td>FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.M. Saleem Chishti</td>
<td>National Project Coordinator, CBLRP</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Saleemullah</td>
<td>Project Coordinator, Environment Recovery Programme</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR (rtd) Naunehal Shah</td>
<td>DRR Advisor</td>
<td>ERRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Iqbal</td>
<td>Watson Coordinator</td>
<td>DRU Mansehra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydatullah</td>
<td>Environmental Coordinator</td>
<td>DRU Mansehra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Visit</td>
<td>CBLRP’s CO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamir Ahmed</td>
<td>Govt Officials (CBLRP)</td>
<td>GoNWFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Tanvir</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahid Aziz</td>
<td>Project Manager Rubble Removal / Begin-er</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rizwana Eshan Warraich</td>
<td>Senior Gender Coordinator Tameer</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Bari</td>
<td>FAO Country Office</td>
<td>FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahibzada Aman Ahmad</td>
<td>Society for Skill Training and Development</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mumahhad Yasir</td>
<td>Project Manager, Society for Skill Training and Development</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junaid Qasim</td>
<td>Nazim, Tehsil Balakot</td>
<td>GoNWFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Visit</td>
<td>Garhi Habibullah; NWFP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sardar Nawaz Khan</td>
<td>Secretary Local Government</td>
<td>GoAJK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farooq Niaz</td>
<td>Senior Member Board of Revenue</td>
<td>GoAJK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Mahmood ul Hassan Raja</td>
<td>Director General, SDMA</td>
<td>GoAJK</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community Visit</td>
<td>CBLRP’s CO</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bashir Mughal</td>
<td>DRU, Muzaffarabad</td>
<td>ERRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position/Role</td>
<td>Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Waheed Khan</td>
<td>President, Rural Development Network</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr M. Nawaz</td>
<td>President, Mahad Help Foundation</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adeel Ahmed</td>
<td>ACO Mansehra</td>
<td>GoNWFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Jahangir</td>
<td>FAO Manehra Office</td>
<td>FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zia Udin &amp; Khalid Rasul</td>
<td>FAO Mansehra</td>
<td>FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Tanvir</td>
<td>District Officer Fisheries Balakot</td>
<td>GONWFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fazil Rabbi</td>
<td>Soil Conservation</td>
<td>GONWFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Saeed</td>
<td>Water Management Assistant Director</td>
<td>GONWFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamir Ahmed</td>
<td>Sub Engineer Water management</td>
<td>GONWFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Gulam Haider Kazmi</td>
<td>Provincial Training Expert</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khajwa Mohammed</td>
<td>Dy. Director Serra</td>
<td>GoAJK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansar Yaqub</td>
<td>Additional DC Muzaffarabad</td>
<td>GoAJK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Mohammed Ashraf</td>
<td>Director Agriculture Extension</td>
<td>GoAJK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Visit</td>
<td>Karl (ERP)</td>
<td>NWFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadaqat</td>
<td>Municipal Office, Bagh</td>
<td>GoNWFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fawad Hussain,</td>
<td>National Humanitarian Affairs Officer</td>
<td>UNRRCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Tariq Bajwa</td>
<td>Senior Member, ERRA</td>
<td>GoP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iftikhar A. Khalid</td>
<td>Deputy Country Head</td>
<td>Oxfam-GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abrar Shakar</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
<td>Oxfam-GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attique-ur-Rehman</td>
<td>Regional Head - AJK</td>
<td>NRSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malik Shahbaz Ahmad</td>
<td>Manager M&amp;E</td>
<td>SPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad Jan</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>SUNGI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hina Tabassum</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
<td>UNV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amir Tariq Zaman</td>
<td>Ex-Joint Secretary, Economic Affairs Division</td>
<td>GoP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew McCoubrey</td>
<td>Infrastructure Advisor</td>
<td>DFID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liam Doherty</td>
<td>Earthquake Program Manager</td>
<td>DFID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sohail Wajid</td>
<td>Programme Associate</td>
<td>DFID</td>
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<tr>
<td>M. Imran Ashraf</td>
<td>Development Advisor</td>
<td>EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haoliang Xu</td>
<td>Former Resident Representative</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mohammad Asif Shiekh</td>
<td>Joint Secretary (UN-China Desk), Economic Affairs Division</td>
<td>GoP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Jan Vandermoortele</td>
<td>Former Resident Coordinator</td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 2 –A: Community Visit and Discussion, Earthquake Evaluation Mission
12th November 2008, Allari Town, AJK

Allari is a mountain village in AJK and is not easily accessible. It consists of 620 households with a population of approximately 3,600. This discussion took place with a group of men from Allari. They were requested to make a list of how their village had been affected by the Earthquake in 2005 and how the current situation had adapted to the devastation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effects on the village due to the 2005 earthquake</th>
<th>Current situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One girls school and two boys schools were functional before the Earthquake and were destroyed during the disaster.</td>
<td>Schools are operational but without a building. Children attend lessons in the open.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A private dispensary provided medicines before the Earthquake struck in 2005.</td>
<td>This has now become operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The earthquake claimed 300 lives</td>
<td>Each household received Rs 100,000 as compensation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All houses were destroyed.</td>
<td>Each household was provided 8 CGI sheets for house construction. These were distributed by the army. Rs 1, 75000 were given to each household for construction purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihoods lost</td>
<td>ILO has provided training – driving, plumbing, mobile repairing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drains destroyed</td>
<td>Not yet repaired and not functional.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A pair-wise ranking of problems/issues faced by the village is presented in the table below. This was undertaken by the participants with only minimal assistance from the moderator.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads not functional</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drinking water supply not operational</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools not functional</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drains destroyed</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No bathrooms</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of electricity supply</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Village was devastated by the 2005 Earthquake and livelihood opportunities were badly affected. The trainings provided by CBLRP in collaboration with ILO were seen as highly beneficial and at least one person who was trained in mobile repair techniques was reported to be earning a regular and satisfactory income. However, in relation to other problems/issues, unemployment received no score.

There can be two explanations for this:

1. it is possible that majority of the people are employed outside the area and income is not a major problem even after the earthquake as remittances support resident families;
2. the participants were unable to assess the overall need for employment in the village.

The second is somewhat unlikely since the participants were duty bearers of Allari’s Community Organization and can be assumed to be well aware of the problems/issues in their village. In this case, the first explanation seems plausible and raises a question about CBLRP’s problem/issue targeting. It is also possible that community needs have changed over time and that they were articulated differently during the earlier stage when interventions were finalized.

Roads, complete restoration of drinking water supply, re-establishment of school buildings and provision of electricity received equal priority in the ranking exercise. Construction of the main road was seen as imperative for stimulating livelihoods and improving income. It is possible that a road did not exist even prior to the 2005 Earthquake but the existing unmetalled path was further destroyed due to debris and rocks. Travel was badly affected immediately after the event and remains difficult in the absence of a metalled road leading to this remotely located mountain village. It is also unclear if the Village had electricity supply before the earthquake. However, drinking water supply pipes and school buildings were clearly destroyed by the Earthquake and fall within the purview of recovery efforts in order for facilities to be function at least at a pre-earthquake level.

Some interventions to restore village infrastructure have taken place in the village over the last three years. These include (i) road clearance by RDP (ii) repair of 25% of destroyed water supply pipes by RDP (iii) construction of 20% of bathrooms in the village. CBLRP has provided training through ILO. In collaboration with FAO, CBLRP has provided fertilizer, apricot saplings and seed to households. Participants reported that ILO/UNDP have plans to construct the road leading to their Village.

Of the agriculture-based interventions implemented through FAO, the provision of seeds was ranked by participants as the most useful and beneficial. Training was rated second in importance and was ranked higher than fertilizer and saplings. Provision of fertilizer was rated as third in term of overall benefits while apricot saplings were seen as least beneficial.

The Village seems to have received adequate compensation from ERRA at the household level. However, their demand for schools is urgent. An application for school construction has been lodged with ERRA with no progress to date.
Annex 2 –B: Community Visit and Discussion, Earthquake Evaluation Mission
12th November 2008
Millat-e- Nisvan, Millat Town (near Mansehra), NWFP

This field visit was undertaken with a female Community Organization (CO) formed by UNDP’s Community Based Livelihood Recovery Project (CBLRP) in Millat Town. Some 20 females were present for the meeting including the President and General Secretary.

The CO held regular monthly meetings and collected contributions (Rs 20 per month) from each household. These were deposited in a Bank account. The Account is operated by the executive committee members on behalf of the CO. The attendance, contributions and major issues discussed in each meeting were noted down and records appeared to be maintained rigorously.

The women discussed their experiences from the Earthquake 2005 and reported loss of property and life. Their houses had been re-built since then. They reported the following problems in their village and ranked them in comparison with each other to establish preferences for interventions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem/Issue</th>
<th>Priority ranking</th>
<th>Priority ranking</th>
<th>Priority ranking</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of health facilities. The closest health facility is at least an hour away. Women face severe problems due to this situation.</td>
<td>X X X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water contamination (unclean water)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girl’s school is located far from the village.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Only girls reported this as a priority.</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of a business/skill enterprise for women. (Embroidery centre)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitation problem (lack of paved streets and drains)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The participants rated water contamination as the highest priority. They were thankful that CBLRP had undertaken interventions to restore the water supply that had been damaged due to the Earthquake in 2005. This resulted in piped water supply to the village as the water storage tanks and pipelines had become functional. However, they reported that the quality of water was highly unsatisfactory rendering
it unsuitable for many household uses. They urged this issue to be solved as quickly as possible.

The problem of health facilities was also discussed at length. Older women in particular found this to be a major problem as they had to travel at least an hour to access the health facilities. No doctors are available in or close to the village. Girls reported the lack of a school close to the village as an issue. This was not seen as a major issue by the group as a whole but young girls reported travelling at least half an hour to and back from school. The lack of sanitation and paved drains was ranked at the lowest priority. Interestingly, this is the project selected by CBLRP and in currently being implemented. Women reported that it was useful but that its utility was lower compared to other problems identified above.

The groups did not have any knowledge of community contributions to the sanitation project. In particular, they were unaware of any responsibility for maintenance of the paved drains and streets.

The group reported regular contact with the Social Scientist and were appreciative of her role.
### Annex 3 –A: CBLRP - Number and membership of COs in Year 1 and Year 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Balakot</th>
<th>COs</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>COs</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Per Tehsil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>10,475</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>5,626</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>14,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2,868</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>2,565</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>4,985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>13,343</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>8,191</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>19,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>6,510</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>2,272</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>8,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>4,431</td>
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Source: CBLRP (2008), Progress Report Year2

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<th>Year 3</th>
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Annex 3-C: CBLRP: Achievements and Current Status

- 1116 community organization (COs) formed / revitalized. Nearly 40 % are female organizations.
- 3452 community activists trained for effectively sustaining COs formed
- 347 training events held for strengthening the COs formed. 4000 COs members trained.
- 11 trainings held for line department staff to facilitate participatory development catering for 230 staff.
- 3420 farmers provided on farm training for improved agricultural practices. Additionally 1100 progressive farmers including 250 females were imparted trainings through Farmer Field schools.
- 6000 HHs got quality wheat seeds, 6600 HHs got quality maize seeds, 6600 HHs got quality vegetable seeds and 6600 got fodder seed.
- 12600 HHs got DAP fertilizer and 16900 got urea fertilizer.
- 27 forest and fruit nurseries developed with community farmers.
- 496500 forest plants were planted through community organization members
- 1300 community members trained in plant management and judicious use of wood.
- 4536 community members trained in different trades.
- 52 % have got suitable employment. 39 female community members trained as TBAs and another.
- 1482 trained in personal hygiene.
- Investment promotion two conferences, four meetings and nine enterprise development trainings were organised.

Following community based micro infrastructure schemes based on prioritized needs of community organizations completed:

- 160 check dams, 24 water storage tanks, 26 animal drinking water ponds, 24 fish farms, 155 Ha field terracing, 85000 c.ft stone protection wall, 31 km water channels, 21 street pavements 61 bridal paths, 6 village drainage schemes, 21 latrines, 3 drinking water systems, 3 suspension bridges and 104 km link roads.

Source: Zafar Iqbal, Presentation to evaluation mission 6 Nov 2008.