Country: Libya
Programme Inception Plan

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<th>Programme for Libya’s Resilience and Recovery – PL2R</th>
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BRIEF DESCRIPTION

The Programme for Libya’s Resilience and Recovery (PL2R) pursues a dual objective: i) to increase the capacity of local actors, in particular municipal governments, to mitigate the increasingly devastating impacts of the conflict on Libya’s civilian populations and therefore contribute to the resilience of Libyan communities; and ii) to help pave the way for full-blown recovery that will put back Libya on a sustainable human development course when sufficient stability prevails. In the current political and institutional context in Libya, where central leadership is highly contested and increasingly ineffective, the PL2R prioritizes the sub-national level as a level of intervention and follows a theory of change whereby positive change can be engineered from below in situations of near state collapse, as currently in Libya, and in particular whereby a new social contract can emerge from improved trust-based relationships between populations and their local governments. While UNDP conceives building resilience and assisting recovery in Libya as necessarily a long-haul effort, this Programme Inception Plan (PIP), drawn for one year, attempts to tackle immediate capacity building needs to support bottom-up stabilization and recovery efforts, and to pave the way for a more strategic national recovery dynamic in the future. The PIP pursues the three following outputs: (1) The path to improved local-level resilience is supported by conflict-sensitive, inclusive and evidence-based integrated planning; (2) Policy dialogue on Libya’s sustainable human development and crisis resilience is activated; (3) UNDP Libya is equipped with an evidence-based strategy and tools for integrated local governance and local development programming. The PIP will be implemented in five pilot locations, under the management of a programme team located in Tripoli and in Tunis and with the support of local implementing agents.


Project ID:
Atlas Award ID:
PAC Meeting:
Management Arrangements:

Project budget:
Total required resources 1,325,000 USD
Total allocated resources
- MENA Dutch Support 285,000 USD
- UNDP:
  - TRAC II: 240,000 USD
  - RBAS: 350,000 USD
  - BPPS: 50,000 USD
  - BCPR*: 400,000 USD

* Reallocation of 2014 CPRTF allocation for Libya’s police project.
I. SITUATION ANALYSIS

A worsening conflict situation

1. Libya is experiencing one of its most tumultuous periods in its history, with serious outbreak of armed conflict in Tripoli, Benghazi, and elsewhere in the country since July 2014. With the fall of Qadhafi’s regime in 2011, Libya had entered a phase of transition from a highly centralised and authoritarian regime with a legacy of systematic human rights violations to a new semi-democratic system but three years after the revolution, Libya’s transition process is seriously challenged. The political fragmentation is manifested in two rival government structures competing for legitimacy and protracted violent confrontations by armed groups allied on each side of the political divide causing internal displacement and loss of life. While the direct consequences of the conflict are clearly observable, the future economic, psychological and social consequences are not yet known.

2. The rapidly deteriorating security situation causes significant displacement and re-displacement, particularly in the western outskirts of Tripoli, in the eastern city of Benghazi and the southern region of Ubari. An estimated 400,000 people have been displaced in the country,1 presenting rapidly increasing humanitarian needs and putting pressure on public services, livelihoods and social cohesion in host communities. Furthermore, the conflict has triggered an acute deterioration in the country’s human rights situation with reported indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas, the abduction of civilians, torture and reports of executions, as well as deliberate destruction of property, among other serious abuses and violations of international law in various parts of the country. In the most affected areas, the delivery of social services is disrupted and the capacity of state institutions to maintain a safety net diminished. The impact of the conflict is more severe on women, children and youth, including for human rights violations. The space for women’s participation in society, including decision-making, is even more reduced than before the resumption of fighting.

3. On the economic side, Libya’s public finances are suffering dearly from the conflict. Oil production has dropped from 1.5 million barrel per day during the first half of 2013 to around 200,000 barrels. This impacts seriously the state budget for budget year 2014.2 According to the Libyan Central Bank, the budget deficit for 2014 has reached 25.1 bn USD.3 Large fiscal and current account deficits could deplete official reserves as the various factions compete to control them and threaten the capacity of the state to honor the public service payroll and commitment to food, fuel and electricity subsidies. The consequences of the historical lack of economic diversification of the Libyan economy and its capture by rent-seeking elites, have been exacerbated by the conflict. The private sector remains embryonic and the risks of doing business in Libya are among the highest in the world.4 Efforts to develop the private sector and to tackle the current unemployment rate of 19.9 percent,5 including different SME Funds and SME incubators, as well as skill and vocational training of youth, have been dampened by the political context and breakout of conflict.

4. Until the recently-launched6 Libyan Dialogue in Geneva, with UN mediation, there was little prospect for a rapid improvement of the political and security situation in Libya. In fact, conflict escalated towards the end of 2014, bringing the risk of total state collapse. Under such scenario, large-scale violence would

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1 Source: UNHCR, December 2014.
2 The oil sector accounts for 80% of Libya’s GDP, 95% of Government revenues and 98% of export receipts.
3 Source: Libyan Central Bank, 15 January 2015
spread to most of the country bringing high civilian casualties, human rights violations and displacement on a much larger scale than currently experienced. With the disappearance of any functional central government institutions, municipalities would be left to their own devices to continue providing for populations’ needs but with a massive cut in the available resources to do so. A war economy would quickly develop and reinforce regional disparities and hardships for vulnerable groups. A middle-ground scenario, which remains the most likely unless ground-breaking process is achieved in Geneva peace dialogue, is that of a dynamic status quo or continuation of the current situation. The military conflict between rival camps would continue at a fairly low level (except around regional capitals) and the two competing national governments would still be able to provide a semblance of leadership and assume minimal core government functions (in particular related to PFM) necessary to enable service delivery and assist local authorities in assuming more of that responsibility. Criminality, especially in Tripoli and Benghazi, would continue rising and the justice and law enforcement agencies unable to curb it. Elsewhere, there might be pockets of stability allowing for timid progress in local development and economic recovery but without a political settlement, sustainability could not be guaranteed. Finally, a third and more optimistic scenario would see Libya embarking on a durable ceasefire giving space for political negotiation and a compromise formula for the immediate future. A reunification of the Eastern and Western government institutions would pave the way for a resumption of major legal and institutional reforms and an earnest social and economic recovery. With the launch of the Libyan dialogue, gathering not only national political actors but also local-level representatives, as mayors and municipal councils have been invited to take part in the latest round of discussions, cautious optimism on such scenario prevailing in the near future can be expressed.

Local governance and local development

5. Since the fall of the Qadhafi’s regime, local councils have been relatively stable and legitimate sources of leadership in the majority of the country’s cities and communities – at least compared to central government institutions. Following in the steps of the Revolution-era Councils established during the upheaval period of 2011, Municipal Councils (MCs) have been elected in 2013/14 in 93 of the country’s 102 municipalities. These councils were not elected on a partisan basis but nevertheless gather individuals representing different political factions and represent currently the only true spaces of political dialogue and consensus-building. They are said to be considered broadly legitimate by the population and receive so far their support.

6. The new Local Administration Law (N°59) adopted in 2012 has already seen a series of amendments but all in all proposes a timid transfer of responsibilities to elected local governments, which should still remain under the purview of state administrations at regional and central levels on matters of public financial management and local development. The law also introduced an intermediate level of local governments, at governorate level, but these structures have not yet been established. In any case, the law remains largely unimplemented so far, due to the absence of a comprehensive regulatory framework to apply it. Constitutional guarantees to protect the principle of local self-government are also missing and reflections on a model for decentralisation, in the context of the works of the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA), are at a very initial stage. A vision and strategy for decentralisation were still missing before the resumption of hostilities in mid-2014 and there is little prospect that progress will be made in this area in the near future – even if support for enhancing the autonomy of local governments is professed in the official circles of the two rival governments.

7. In general, municipalities seem to try and distance themselves from the conflict by maintaining some level of neutrality and focusing on concrete needs for services and protection from citizens. Others seem

to be more inclined to take sides with either of the leading political blocks. While municipal councils do not have direct control over armed militias and vice-versa, relations between them can be tense especially where the prevailing militias originate from another city. Security remains the number one worry for residents of most communities throughout the country and municipalities seem to be taking the matter seriously as several examples of local councils trying to mediate between local armed groups and enforce violence prevention measures on their territory have been reported. Though the ability of municipalities and local councils to serve the needs of the populations are limited due to fiscal constraints and conflict situation, their moral authority stemming from being elected and in close daily contact with the people and community stakeholders endow them with a large potential to play a positive role in strengthening resilience and lending credibility to peace efforts.

8. Human and financial capacity issues in local governments that prevailed before the latest crisis have been exacerbated. At central level, the Ministry of Local Governance is not able to pursue policy formulation nor to provide comprehensive guidance and capacity development support to the newly-elected MCs. At local level, many of the incoming municipal councilors and staff seem inexperienced with the management of local affairs. On the other hand, a large share of the local civil servants (on the central government payroll) have remained but are reluctant to any type of change. This difficult situation in terms of human capacities does limit the possibility for municipalities to assume greater roles, as given by the new law, but also to respond aptly to the crisis impacts. In particular, municipalities struggle to conduct multi-sectorial needs assessment and integrated planning and to involve significantly civil society and wider population in such exercises. Municipalities also suffer from limited experience and means for public outreach and strategic communications.

9. Intergovernmental relations are severely affected by the conflict, adding to unresolved issues of divisions of responsibilities and incomplete legal framework. Public finance management links between the center and periphery are problematic and many municipalities are left without sufficient operating budget and almost no capital investment funding. In a country with a very limited taxation culture, the own-revenue base of municipalities is thin. The result is that funds made available to local governments are overwhelmingly spent on salaries and running costs, and support poorly effective public service delivery systems. Longer-term recovery needs, in particular to strengthen local economies, are not covered.

10. Nevertheless, the newly-elected municipalities seem to be keen on playing a bigger role in nurturing local economic development but knowledge and experience in supporting LED lacks among them. Most are unable to build viable economic strategies, support the development of local SMEs and promote job creation, in particular for youth. Each city usually has its own Chamber of Commerce and they perform vital functions for business, for example issuing certificates of origin and export/import documentation. However, their performance leaves a lot to desire.

11. In spite of the many challenges faced by municipalities to perform, in a time of state collapse, the roles given to them through democratic elections, all interlocutors met by the mission insisted on the fact that Libyans are ready to engage and work closely with municipalities to address their pressing livelihood challenges and increasing expectations of local communities for improved living standards following the revolution and ensuing frustrations which are exacerbated due to the deterioration in the quality of services.

Gender & youth

12. While the country has made some progress in closing the gender gap in education and health outcomes, the female participation in economic and political life still remains limited. For example, the labour force participation rate among young women aged 15-24 is 19%, while the corresponding
percentage for young men is 53% (UNICEF, 2011). Women in Libya continue to face significant restrictions on mobility, suffer serious disparities between men and women in job opportunities, equality before the law, participation in political and public life, and overall inclusion in decision making. In 2012, Libya ranked 36th out of 148 countries on the Gender Inequality Index. With the conflict, violence against women has risen, targeting political and social activists, but not only, as more and more women are subject to very strict social and cultural norms imposed by armed groups.

13. Youth are suffering disproportionately from the conflict as victims of human rights violations but also as forced perpetrators of violence, as many young men are being enrolled by armed groups. Access to the education system, which is anyway in a bad shape, has ceased for some, in particular at university level. Joblessness hits also more the youth (male and female) than any other categories of population and youth labor skills are particularly misfit to the needs of the Libyan private sector.

_The timid response of the international community_

14. The recent crisis has forced all international actors to thoroughly reconsider their engagement in support of Libya’s political transition and development. Development programmes that are still on-going are run by implementing agents, mostly local ones. Overall, donor funding has been curtailed and major donors remain highly attentive to conflict trends before considering resuming their development. Even the latest Libya Humanitarian Appeal faces difficulty in attracting any donor funding at all. 8

14. UNSMIL and the UNCT continue to support Libya in priority areas including political dialogue, democratic governance, security, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, transitional justice, economic development, and basic service delivery. But the future of the UN presence and action in Libya are currently under review and this may lead to a further narrowing of the UN mandate in the country while the conflict rages.

15. In the field of local governance, the EU and USAID remain the two major actors but with limited programmes focusing on a handful of municipalities for core capacity building and support in developing local strategies and plans. None of these programmes seem to have adopted a strong conflict-reduction approach. The EU is considering the next phase of its support in the area given the rapid deterioration of the situation. USAID has adopted an innovative modality for continuing its engagement at the side of municipal councils as it has embedded local technical assistance teams (managed by their contractor Creative Inc.) in each of its target municipalities to provide on-the-job training. This contrasts with the situation of UNDP whereby all Libya-based staff are barred from visiting most beneficiary municipalities and can only interact regularly with Ministry’s staff and Tripoli-area municipalities.

16. On the LED front, DFID, EU and GIZ remain the biggest actors and have been providing capacity-development support for private sector and SME development – although it has been brought to a standstill due to the political context. The main areas of these initiatives concern: i) supporting the newly-created central SME Agency; ii) developing the network and capacities of Business Services Providers (including Chambers of Commerce); iii) modernization of job placement services. The EU has expressed the possibility of resuming some of these works in locations less affected by the conflict.

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8 Out of a total of 35.2 m USD, only m have been raised so far.
II. RATIONALE FOR PROGRAMME INTERVENTION

17. The situation in Libya is reaching a critical level, both in terms of the violence and impact on civilian populations, and in terms of governance and the seeming incapacity of national actors to find a political settlement that could salvage national institutions and protect national interests, especially economic ones. At the same time, the rise of legitimate and relatively capable local governments – or at least moved by a strong will to become more capable – having to bear increasingly the responsibility of preserving whatever remains in terms of social cohesion, basic services and local economy, appears to many as a possible antidote to a total collapse of the state. Following an optimistic theory of change, a stronger sub-national governance system could trigger positive peacebuilding & statebuilding dynamics from below. Also, since the fall of Qadhafi, local governance entities (revolution-era councils and then elected municipal councils), have proven to be more stable, inclusive and effective institutions of governance than national-level entities. Even taking a more modest appreciation on the role of local governments in the current context, or looking at immediate priorities first, it is undeniable that municipalities remain important actors to coordinate crisis response to the civilian population, including IDPs and to mitigate further deterioration of the security, social and economic situation if the armed conflict spreads further. If and when more stable conditions prevail, municipalities will be at the front line of rebuilding and transforming the country, and not just its infrastructure but also its social cohesion, economy and public service. For all of the above reasons, privileging local governments (municipalities) and local governance as entry points for UNDP’s resilience-building and recovery programming in Libya, which by definition should start immediately but will stretch in the long-term, makes full sense. This strategy is also called for in the absence of a national unity government and increasingly difficult positioning for UNDP, and the UN in general, in recognizing legitimacy in one of the national actors only (House of Representatives) but engaging at working level for programme design and implementation mostly with the Tripoli-based government institutions. By doing so, UNDP will also respond to increasingly pressing demands for support from municipalities at working level (by opposition to policy / legal level), relayed by UNDP’s traditional governmental partners for LGLD (Ministry of Planning & Ministry of Local Governance).

Prioritization of issues and needs

18. There is a wide range of issues that limit the capacities of local actors to be more responsive to populations’ needs in times of conflict and to improve the resilience of local communities, as was alluded to in the Section I. Many are structural and will require a profound reform of the political-institutional nature of the Libyan state – something that can only happen when a stable political settlement will happen. In the more immediate future, and given the current context, in order for Libyan local governance stakeholders to be better able to support peacebuilding and recovery dynamics, and for UNDP to be more capable to support them in doing so, the following needs have to be answered:

   i) The drivers and dynamics of conflict, apart from the more obvious and extensively-researched political facets of it, need to be better understood, disaggregated and mapped at the subnational level. This means in particular deepening understanding of the underlying causes and consequences of the conflict and, from a peace-building perspective, identifying potential actors of peace whom should be supported in priority by UNDP.

   ii) Policy and programming choices made by national or sub-national institutions or by development partners must reflect better the actual situation of conflict-affected populations, and in particular of the most vulnerable groups among them (e.g. IDPs, ethnic minorities, women, etc.) as well as the existing capacities of those who will implement them (line ministries, municipalities, CSOs, private sector, etc.). Historically, development planning in Libya has been centralized and based on national statistics rigidly organized by sectors, lacking accuracy and not addressing sufficiently vulnerability issues. Local governance indicators are also unheard of and the same applies broadly to data collection on
local economies. In a context where local governments are now expected de jure and de facto, to organize a large part of the state response to populations’ needs, especially in times of crisis, it is urgent that a sound and reliable basis of local data on a variety of priority needs of the population (security, protection, social cohesion, food security, basic & social services, livelihoods, jobs, etc.) as well as data necessary to analyze the performance of governance processes, be established. This is critical both in terms of the information generated and in institutionalizing the processes that generate it.

iii) The capacities of decision-makers to act effectively and efficiently upon the evidence collected for policy-making, programming, project implementation and monitoring, are weak, especially at municipal level, as so far municipalities had only limited programming responsibilities under the previous local governance system. The new legal framework widens their role in this process and their intention is also to do more to better coordinate services provided by line ministry departments at their level. This would imply adopting a local area-based development planning approach where sector needs are integrated and synergies created. This also implies the capacity to prioritize projects on the basis of their capacity to respond to most urgent needs of the majority and the necessity to reduce inequalities and exclusions.

iv) In the longer-term, and given the expected increasing level of decentralisation of state structures in Libya (whichever political settlement will emerge eventually from the conflict), core managerial capacities of municipalities have to be built in a wide range of areas, in addition to the most urgent aspects of policy-making and programming, as addressed under point iii). This involves, but not limited to, regulatory functions, human / financial / asset management, procurement, revenue generation, public outreach & communications, conflict resolution, e-governance and client service, and so forth. Similarly, management capacities on non-state actors involved in local governance processes also call for attention and support.

v) The rise of participatory, inclusive and accountable governance mechanisms needs to be boosted. This is particularly essential in times of crisis as currently, when the core of the state-society relation is at stake and poor trust between populations and their public institutions, fed by opaque decision-making, exclusive policies and the spread of corruption in the use of public resources, can lead to a total breakdown of the social contract. Libyan municipalities, CSOs, traditional structures and other local institutions that can channel voice and participation, need to work more closely together to respond to people’s needs and guarantee that no one feels outright excluded from decisions that affect their lives.

vi) Inter-governmental relations (between central and local governments) have to be supported, even in a context of duality of central authority and increasing difficulty for central administrations to operate. At the working level, municipalities still need regulatory, technical and financial support from central government. The tasks of delivering basic, social and administrative services can and should be shared with municipalities to ensure better service continuity throughout the crisis period. Vertical integration is also necessary to increase the effectiveness of recovery planning between the different sectors and levels of governance. In a situation of entrenched divisions at central level that cripple the coherence of central state oversight and support to the sub-national level, external assistance to intergovernmental relations should focus on simple and non-controversial aspects such as information exchange, coordination, planning and monitoring, and involve working levels on both sides. When the time is ripe for it, such support can be broadened to tackle more sensitive issues of policy formulation, legal reform and fiscal decentralisation, among others.

vii) Efforts must be made to empower local actors, and in particular municipalities, CSOs, tribal actors/leaders and communities themselves, to strengthen community level conflict prevention, resolution of rising tensions and restore social cohesion at the local level. This could mean supporting local conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives that are already on-going with policy support, training and/or funding. For this, it will be important to understand better what local conflict resolution mechanisms are being used in various parts of Libya and how they can best be strengthened as part of the conflict analysis and development of a longer-term programme for local level development. It is important to keep in mind that efforts in this regard should be risk-conscious in doing no harm or undermining the neutrality and credibility of the organization.
viii) Capacities for the protection and recovery of local economies must be developed, as the national oil and hydrocarbon industry which generates 95% of the country’s GDP, has historically been the state priority in Libya rather than nurturing a vibrant private sector, in particular at SME level. Local authorities never had a big role in supporting local economic actors and economic development policies and programmes originated in the center. Little efforts were made to invest strategically in infrastructure and education to support private sector growth outside of the extractive industries sector. In the current crisis context, what matters most is the ability of local authorities and other partners to preserve first sources of livelihoods for all, especially the most vulnerable, and then to promote viable local value chains that can both generate local growth and jobs. Challenges are enormous given the structural weaknesses of the Libyan private sector and the current conflict context which limits tremendously options for growth and investment capital. A first step, as in for other aspects of local development, requires building local capacities to understand the needs of local economic stakeholders, in particular SMEs, key sectors with potential for growth, the employment situation, the main sources of livelihoods, and to be able to build reasonably sound and sustainable local economic recovery strategies upon such evidence.

ix) As said earlier, much can be done already to build stronger resilience in Libyan communities against the impacts and shocks generated by the developing conflict, and some measure of recovery can also be impulsed from the ground up. However, in the longer run, national recovery-oriented policies and programmes, underpinned by a clear vision, for steering back Libya onto a path of stability and sustainable human development, will be needed. This will require a sound evidentiary base that can be used by academic, state and non-governmental institutions for prospective thinking. In order for a Libyan recovery agenda to be ready when the time is right, support is needed now to generate the information and research results that will help build it. Two critical features, in line with UNDP’s global mission, will be to guarantee that women and youth needs are adequately addressed in the national recovery agenda, and that they are closely involved and consulted during its preparation.

Challenges and opportunities for UNDP’s intervention

19. Some of the main challenges identified for UNDP programming in the local governance / local development (LGLD) area are:

- The difficult, if at all possible, engagement at policy level on local governance issues (outside of the rather “isolated” constitutional debate) given the fragmentation of central power and the UN positioning vis-à-vis legitimacy of the two competing governments. Completely bypassing national state institutions to work directly in support of local governments is neither desirable nor feasible given the nature of UNDP’s presence in Libya.
- Lack of pre-existing detailed and reliable evidence for programming on the conflict impact at the sub-national level, especially on political & governance processes, citizen security, social cohesion, livelihoods, jobs, social services, and other aspects of sustainable human development needs.
- The breadth of capacity gaps in the newly-elected municipalities would require a multi-pronged approach and large resources that are not within UNDP’s reach in the current context, even more under remote operations modality.
- UNDP does not have an established network of trusted implementing partners at sub-national level on LGLD issues as UNDP’s work in this sector, so far, has mostly focused on policy formulation and institution-building for MoLG.
- Donors are not inclined to fund capital investments in Libya, given its NCC status. Leveraging interest among municipalities for cooperation with UNDP on needs assessment and planning without the promise of receiving development funds, especially in a context of national budget cuts (and falling oil prices), may be difficult. Also, UNDP would need to pay extra attention in managing
expectations of municipalities and communities vis-à-vis the breadth of its support that will remain, for the most, in the form of technical assistance and training for capacity development.

- The security context precludes direct implementation by UNDP at the sub-national level. Third-party implementation will prove more feasible but has higher costs and complicates quality assurance for what remains complex and risk-laden interventions.

20. On the other hand, there are several opportunities for increasing UNDP’s role at the sub-national level:

- Libya’s system of local governance will be defined in the upcoming constitution. UNDP is also already supporting the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA) on decentralisation-related policy options and can therefore more easily make the link between ground work and policy issues in the future, and guarantee a more effective uptake of the positive results generated through direct support to municipalities.
- There is broad consensus among international and Libyan institutions that a new and more strategic baseline on Libya’s human development and local governance situation has to be created to establish a sound framework for planning the country’s recovery when the conditions call for it. This means that UNDP should be able to mobilize resources more easily for this programme and to establish partnerships.
- UNDP has already established some trust with MoLG and a number of municipalities over the past two years. With Japanese funding, UNDP currently supports 5 municipalities on core skills for municipal management. It covers information management and linking-up municipalities with central ministries through IT networks. This intervention can be easily capitalized on to strengthen further intergovernmental relations and support remote-controlled project management and capacity development.
- UNDP has long experience in the area of LGLD in similar crisis contexts in the region (Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon, and Somalia) and this experience can be leveraged in different ways, including South-South exchanges.
- UNDP already has a good network of civil society partners at sub-national level (through the SCELT project), which have benefitted from various capacity building activities for outreach, advocacy and organizational development. They can be mobilized in the context of the proposed LGLD programme.
- Working directly with municipalities provides UNDP with the opportunity to support directly, and differently than other donors, the government strategy on economic recovery and development by focusing on the role of local authorities and business service providers to create a more enabling framework for private sector growth and job creation, especially in sectors with growth potential including tourism, service sector, agribusiness/food processing (i.e. dates, fish, etc.), as well as in the oil/gas industry, and to promote entrepreneurship development and skills training for youth (in particular women.

III. PROGRAMME STRATEGY AND DESCRIPTION

Programme Strategy

21. The Programme for Libya’s Resilience and Recovery (PL2R) pursues a dual objective: (i) on one hand, to increase the capacity of local actors, in particular municipal governments, to mitigate the increasingly devastating impacts of the conflict on Libya’s civilian populations and therefore contribute to the resilience of Libyan communities; and (ii) on the other hand, to help pave the way for full-blown recovery that will put back Libya on a sustainable human development course when sufficient stability prevails.
22. The PL2R chooses to work directly at the sub-national level, developing capacities of municipalities, local CSOs and other private and non-state actors, given the duality of power at central level and the difficult UN positioning vis-à-vis their respective legitimacy. Efforts are made though to maintain and strengthen effective, even if modest, intergovernmental relations, as these will be absolutely essential to support future recovery efforts. The PL2R follows a theory of change whereby positive change can be engineered from below in situations of near state collapse, as currently in Libya, and in particular whereby a new social contract can emerge from improved trust-based relationships between populations and their local governments.

23. To nurture a change in state-society relations at that level, the Programme will support new innovative forms of collaboration between state, non-state and community actors in analyzing security, socio-economic, peacebuilding and governance needs and in planning appropriate responses, within the existing system of capacity constraints and absence of strong support from national level, which will help institutionalize the concepts of participatory, inclusive and accountable local governance. The latter is an absolute pre-requisite to create trust and reduce some of the conflict drivers thriving on feelings of exclusion and discrimination, which are pulling the Libyan society apart. Efforts to build a replicable methodology of participatory needs assessment and planning at the local level will be mirrored by and linked to another work stream where UNDP will support non-political national actors to spearhead prospective thinking processes on Libya’s future, once the dust of conflict has settled. All in all, the Programme aims to give greater voice to existing Libyan efforts at solving the conflict from a sustainable human development lens and complementing the national political dialogue supported by UNSMIL.

24. In the longer run, the PL2R goal is of course to accompany Libya on retrieving its path to sustainable human development and this will require specialized area-based support on issues such as citizen security & social cohesion, basic and social service delivery, urban planning and development, local economic development, environmental management and climate change adaptation, etc. areas where UNDP can bring a valuable global experience. Therefore, the strategy behind the launch of the PL2R is definitely to build progressively a viable model of intervention, in the Libyan (changing) context, for integrated local governance & local development.

25. Conflict sensitivity as cross-cutting to all aspects of UNDP’s programmatic response, analytical and scenario-building work should be engaged as soon as possible to guide current and future programming. New approaches are also needed to think about the short to medium term development challenges in Libya and how to address them. The effective use of conflict analysis could also lead UNDP to ‘doing things differently’, including the identification of actors for peace that can be supported through partnership, empowerment and capacity development.

26. UNDP’s programming in the LGLD sector needs to tread cautiously and take an incremental approach. The context is fast-changing, at least in the majority of the country’s regions, and certain actions that are proposed today may not be feasible anymore tomorrow or vice-versa. Based on conflict analysis, UNDPs interventions need to be conflict sensitive, to avoid increased tension or future grievances in communities (as well as between communities and the national government and other actors. Also, UNDP needs to learn by doing as well given the scarcity of experience at the grassroots in Libya, especially over the past 5 years. Therefore, the programme strategy is organized into two timeframes as shown below.

27. For the short Term (12 months), the programme priorities will be to:

- Conduct a multi-pronged conflict analysis with the following objectives: (i) deepened understanding of the country’s context, including underlying causes and consequences of the conflict, dynamics
supporting or undermining peace from a perspective relevant to development actors; (ii) localized analysis of conflict drivers, peace agents and conflict resolution mechanisms at sub-national level (in pilot locations) to inform the development of the UNDP programme on local governance & local development that can contribute to reducing local tensions; (iii) conflict sensitive review of UNDP’s current programming portfolio, along with recommendations for possible changes.

- Strengthen the data collection and analysis capacities of local governance stakeholders (with emphasis on municipalities) as a pre-condition to enhance their responsiveness to immediate security, basic services, livelihoods and economic recovery needs of conflict-affected communities. This includes as well better developing skills and introducing tools for planning and budgeting, coordinating multiple stakeholders, communicating to the population and advocating with national, regional and international players.
- Facilitate and nurture simple forms of participatory governance and citizen engagement, for needs assessment and local recovery planning.
- Strengthening the emergence of positive bottom-up peacebuilding dynamics, building on the conflict resolution role of municipalities, and with increased engagement of women and youth. This would be further developed based on the proposed conflict analysis.
- Producing innovative think pieces about critical areas for Libya’s social, economic and environmental recovery and long-term development, framed in particular around the Post-2015 agenda, and incorporating the views and needs of Libyan youth.
- Raising the profile of local governance and decentralisation issues in the on-going constitutional debate carried by the CDA.

28. For the longer-term (12 – 36 months), the following priorities could be pursued – depending on the evolution of the conflict:

- Continue support to national and local institutions for data collection, monitoring, updates, and analysis on indicators for human development.
- Implementing area-based integrated recovery programmes in urban and rural areas in coordination with key partners and donors including EU, DFID, GIZ, WB and ILO, building upon the simple short-term local recovery plans developed during the first phase of the programme.
- Support community-level conflict resolution and dialogue initiatives (specific interventions and locations to be developed following the conflict analysis and assessments during the first year).
- In terms of local economic recovery, support the implementation of the national SME strategy, focusing on entrepreneurship development (with emphasis on women entrepreneurs), business development services (in particular through Chambers of Commerce), market access, the diversification of the local economy and creating more Libyan employment opportunities.
- In the event of a political settlement at national level and emergence of a unitary legitimate government, support the design and implementation of a national decentralisation strategy, addressing as well intergovernmental relations and the sharing of national resources, and a national capacity development programme for local governments.
- Support innovative social accountability initiatives across the country and the emergence of a national platform of civil society actors working for greater citizen engagement in local governance and citizen scrutiny over government policies.
- Coalesce a number of initiatives to produce nationally-owned evidence and prospective think-pieces on Libya’s recovery into a full-blown national recovery agenda (Libya 2.0) that can form the basis of a national consultation.
- Develop further Libyan human and institutional capacities for conflict analysis, risk assessment and monitoring of trends.
Structure of the Programme Inception Plan (PIP)

29. Given the current unstable conditions in Libya and unchartered evolution path of the conflict for the coming months, UNDP can only embark for the time being on a Programme Inception Plan (PIP) built around the priorities defined for coming 12 months. If successful, the PIP can pave the way for a more ambitious set of activities, and at a larger scale, in the area of conflict-sensitive local governance & local development.

30. In this PIP, conflict analysis work (funded from existing regional resources) will serve primarily the PL2R’s LGLD objectives and has been therefore mainstreamed in the three proposed outputs.

31. Below is a summary narrative version of the detailed Results & Resources Framework presented in Annex 1.

Outcome: Increased resilience of local Libyan institutions and communities and greater preparedness for recovery.

(a) Output 1: The path to increased local-level resilience is supported by conflict sensitive, inclusive and evidence-based integrated planning

**Indicators:** Increased used of conflict-related development analysis tools to support local recovery / development programming; number of municipalities equipped with reliable and updatable baseline on LGLD conditions; number of local (one-year) conflict and gender-sensitive recovery plans produced.

Proposed activities:
- Develop a deeper, multi-dimensional, localized and iterative analysis of the Libyan conflict, supported by a conflict analysis methodology and tools tailored to the Libyan context and trained human and institutional resources.
- Finalize a methodological framework and tools for rapid LGLD baseline assessments to be conducted at the municipal level by coalitions of state and non-state actors and with the backing of an all-Libyan Technical Committee.
- Support Municipal Assessment Committees in 5 locations to conduct LGLD assessments with the technical and process facilitation assistance of trained Assessment Support Teams (ASTs).
- Capitalize on the pilot LGLD assessment to fine tune a national LGLD assessment methodology with ownership from MoP & MoLG.
- Assist partner municipalities to develop, with participation from key local actors and communities, integrated Local Resilience & Recovery Plans (LRRPs) based on localized conflict analysis and data produced by LGLD assessments.

(b) Output 2: Policy dialogue on Libya’s sustainable human development and crisis resilience activated.

**Indicators:** Reliable evidence and innovative think-pieces on social, economic and environmental development themes for Libya are available, with emphasis as well on the role of youth for Libya’s future.

Proposed activities:
- Prepare the “Libya 2.0 Agenda”, a research and policy-setting agenda for Libya’s post-conflict recovery, under the guidance of the Technical Committee and incorporating results from the pilot LGLD assessments (output 1).
- Support the “The Libya We Want” initiative discussing the localization of Post-2015 SDG agenda in Libya, to feed into the Libya 2.0 Agenda.
- Support the “by youth for youth” action research initiative and advocate the results within the youth community and Libyan decision-makers.

(c) Output 3: **UNDP Libya is equipped with an evidence-based strategy and tools to supported integrated post-conflict local governance and local development programming.**

**Indicators:** PIP delivery rate; long-term PL2R programme is launched.

Proposed activities:
- Provision of adequate in-country technical and operational project implementation support through additional national and international staffing.
- Increase positioning of UNDP in conflict-sensitive recovery through programme reviews, staff training and facilitation of donor-wide conflict-related analysis processes.
- Mobilization of continuous BPPS programming support through remote expertise and field missions.
- Strengthen internal communication and resource mobilization capacities to support peacebuilding, statebuilding and recovery programming.

**Methodological Aspects**

32. For the **conflict analysis**, the PIP will develop a tailored methodology, based on UNDP’s Conflict and Development Analysis. The CDA approach provides guidance on assessing linkages between development and conflict with a view to increasing the impact of development interventions on conflict. It is useful in particular to relate conflict analysis at the local level with other levels (national, regional, international). The CDA studies the underlying causes of conflict, the actors involved, the conflict trends and builds plausible conflict scenarios for the future. Given the current context in Libya, and in particular the fact that UNDP needs to operate on a remote basis, the methodology and tools developed will have to be rather straightforward, low-tech and achievable with limited human resources. It will involve secondary research / desk review, consultation workshops, phone interviews and surveys and focus group discussions. The tailoring of Libya’s conflict analysis methodology will be undertaken at the onset of the PIP by the Senior Conflict Advisor recruited for this task and validated immediately with key Libyan & international counterparts.

33. The PIP also proposes to develop and test a comprehensive, yet rapid, **LGLD assessment methodology**, adapting the existing UNDP methodology and experience for conflict sensitive livelihoods and economic recovery assessment9 and previous field work on LGLD assessments in crisis countries.10 The main areas researched through the LGLD assessments will be: (i) citizen security & social cohesion; (ii) local governance including capacities & performance of local governance stakeholders, citizen participation, accountability and inclusiveness in decision-making; (iii) basic and social service delivery (including related infrastructure aspects); (iv) sources of livelihoods, employment and state of local economy; and (v) state-society relations at the local level. The assessment approach will be geared towards identifying types of and causes for vulnerability. It will also be highly conflict and gender-sensitive. The actual methodology and related tools will be developed at the onset of the PIP, under the guidance of the Senior LGLD Advisor and with close participation of Libyan experts of the Technical Committee and of municipal stakeholders in the locations where it will be tested. Annex 2 presents a detailed road map of the LGLD assessment process. The TOR for the Senior LGLD Advisor is included Under Annex 3B.

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9 UNDP Yemen Multi-dimensional Livelihoods Conflict Assessment in Conflict Areas (2013)
10 UNDP Yemen Multi-dimensional Livelihoods Conflict Assessment in Conflict Areas (2013) UNDP/WB Joint Diagnostic on Local Governance in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict (2014);
Programme locations

34. It is proposed to start implementing the PIP in 5 locations distributed among the three main regions of Libya as follows: 2 municipalities in the Western region, 2 in the East and 1 in the South. Given that the PIP serves also the purpose of testing UNDP approach in different contexts and fine tune an approach that can then be replicated across various parts of the country, it is important to privilege diversity in the selection of pilot locations. The following criteria are deemed the most critical in this regard:

- Severity of conflict impact: e.g. destruction of socio-economic infrastructure, high poverty and unemployment, presence of IDPs, levels of criminality, etc.
- Economic development / employment creation potential
- Accessibility for project teams (security, logistics)
- Links to central administration(s)
- Previous experience / contacts with UNDP (including presence at the Tunis workshop in Dec 14)\(^{11}\)

35. The final list of proposed municipalities will be decided at the outset of the PIP, in consultation with UNDP Libya staff and collaborators, and the governmental counterparts. Then will ensure a period of consultations with these proposed municipalities to present the PIP concept and verify their interest in participating in it.

IV. PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION MODALITIES

36. Implementing a project at the sub-national level in Libya, in different parts of the country, is fraught with serious constraints nowadays. The lack of access of UNDP staff in Libya to field locations precludes a direct implementation of all activities and will require working with contracted agents (see below). Furthermore, the technical guidance provided by the Senior Advisors based in Tunis (see below) will have to be organized on a remote basis – unless conditions drastically improve during the course of the project and UNDP Libya office can be repatriated in Tripoli. This will require a greater decentralisation of managerial responsibility to the in-country PIP coordinator and a more technical back-stopping role for the Tunis-based team. Finally, for the sake of cost control, the great majority of training / consultation-related project events will have to be conducted in-country and often without the direct presence of a UNDP personnel. This, of course, will limit the ability of UNDP Libya to perform maximal quality assurance as it would under normal circumstances.

37. The PIP will be implemented using a DIM modality. The overall responsibility for project management will be with the Country Director with delegation for day-to-day operations to the Tunis-based National Manager and the Tripoli-based National Coordinator, who will be assisted on all technical matters by the Senior Advisors. The CD will be responsible in particular to ensure good integration of the two work streams of the PIP.

38. UNDP will establish a Programme Committee to monitor and advise on the implementation of the PIP. Given that the conflict analysis work comes under a regional programme separately funded, the PC will be primarily responsible for the implementation of the LGLD-related activities, while it will be kept informed of progress made on conflict-related work (in particular Activity 1.1). Given the current problems faced with legitimacy of governmental partners in Libya, the PC will have limited responsibilities and meet mostly for information exchange and monitoring /evaluation purposes. All guidance / endorsement on the technical aspects of the LGLD assessment work will come from the

\(^{11}\) Capacity-building in Socioeconomic and Local Needs Assessment, UNDP Libya, Tunis 18 – 22 Dec 2014.
Advisory Board formed of Libyan experts and municipal representatives. The PC will meet at the onset of the PIP, after 6 months of its implementation and another time towards the end of it, when transition to a longer-term programme (and hopefully a stronger in-country management structure) should happen.

39. The PIP will be implemented by experts organized as follows:

(i) Overall management:
- Tunis: Country Director
- Tunis: National PIP Manager

(ii) Conflict Analysis Stream:
- Tunis: 1 Senior Advisor on Conflict Analysis (international consultant) – see TORs in Annex 3A

(iii) LGLD Stream:
- Tunis: 1 Senior Advisor on LGLD (international consultant) – see TORs in Annex 3B
- Tripoli: 1 National LGLD Coordinator, 1 IT specialist, 1 Programme Assistant

40. The conflict analysis staff will only be engaged for 3 to 6 months given the need to complete this part of the PIP by end of April latest. As for the LGLD team, the Senior Advisor’s input is sought for 6 months, mostly to oversee the development and testing of the LGLD assessment methodology. National staff will be contracted for one year. For both workstreams, the National Manager and National Coordinator will represent the PIP towards the Libyan counterparts in consultations, meetings and training events held in Libya.

41. As said earlier, most of Libya-based field work will have to be conducted by contracted implementing agent or partners as otherwise movement restrictions applicable to UNDP personnel for security reasons would impede any work to be conducted outside of the greater Tripoli area. To this end, the following measures will be taken:

- For conflict analysis work, UNDP will most probably enter into an agreement with an NGO. The security risks and lack of access in Libya can hopefully be mitigated by working with partners that have networks of trained people and local staff in several locations within Libya and are allowed to travel. By partnering with an international NGO, the PIP can build on and complement their on-going work in Libya including consultations, community surveys as well as sharing of conflict analysis among international stakeholders.
- For LGLD work, UNDP will contract a local company or NGO that can recruit and manage administratively competent Libyan personnel to be deployed to work with municipalities in the so-called Assessment Support Teams (or ASTs). Each team will be composed of two individuals (including at least one woman) with the following profile: one socioeconomic statistics specialist and one participatory governance / citizen engagement specialist. The teams will be managed technically by the National LGLD Coordinator and report to him/her. Furthermore, the contracted agent will be responsible to organize workshops and other events included in different locations of the country as required in the PIP work plan. Detailed TORs for the LGLD Implementing Agent will be developed by the Senior LGLD Advisor.

42. Below is a Programme Management Structure chart based on the proposed modality as described above. It only relates at this stage to the LGLD part of the PIP.
The preparation of long-term programme will start as soon as the first municipal LGLD assessments have been conducted, so as to build on the information generated and budding country-based partnerships established. This new programming exercise will involve substantial support from BPPS Regional Hub in Amman and the HQ in New York, including through a field mission if necessary. This programming exercise will need more substantial leadership by Libyan counterparts than for the PIP design – and such level of interest and engagement by Libyan partners should come as a result of the PIP implementation. It is foreseen that a full-blown programme document for the PL2R, for 3 years, will be ready by the middle of 2015.
V. PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY

44. In the current Libyan context, UNDP cooperation with other development partners is evident in the on-going support to the national authorities and in the integration with the UNSMIL mission. During the past three years, UNDP has been working to increase its partnerships with Japan, Sweden, Swiss, UK, and Netherlands among many others; and with many counterparts including the parliament and various government ministries, NGOs and CSOs from across the country, enabling these entities to develop and extending good working relationship and trust.

45. UNDP Libya has also established a good working relationship with the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and other UN agencies present in the country-UNICEF, UNFPA, IOM, UNHCR, UNESCO and UNMAS as well as with the IMF and World Bank.

47. Libya is a Net Contributor Country (currently downgraded to upper MIC) – positioning the Government of Libya as the most important donor for the UNDP Country Office until 2013 – and the net official development assistance and official aid received in 2014 is USD 87 mil. (World Bank data). Given the current financial constraints at the country level and the difficult humanitarian conditions, external donor funding is likely to be the main funding sources across sectors and specifically in support of key activities such as elections, constitutional support, civil society and mine action.

48. Guided by national consultations and other discussions, and despite the current challenges faced by the country, UNDP intends to pursue a partnership strategy for the implementation of PIP working closely with other United Nations organizations, bilateral institutions, CSOs, NGOs, and the multilateral institutions. All partners identified at this stage are stated in the Results and Resources Framework (Annex 1). Other partners will be identified during the course of the programming cycle. As much as possible, UNDP will look at opportunities of joint programmes with its partners.

VI. MONITORING & EVALUATION

49. The PIP will be monitored and progress reported in accordance with UNDP standard procedures. Day-to-day monitoring will be the responsibility of the PIP programme team. The PIP Results Framework Matrix provides performance and impact indicators for implementation and verification. The PIP programme team will work under the close supervision and overall co-ordination of the Country Director.

50. Narrative and financial reports will form the basis for assessing and steering performance of the programme. Quarterly Progress Reports (QPRs) and a Final Programme Report will form the basis for assessing performance of the programme, which the two senior advisors will submit to the Programme Committee via the Country Director. Reports will be produced as per UNDP’s results-based management (RBM) project-cycle directives, and on the basis of UNDP’s reporting guidelines. All reports will be circulated among partners and stakeholders as appropriate.

51. The Programme Management represented by the National PIP Manager will submit to the Programme Committee Mid-Year and Annual Progress Reports, in accordance with the Strategic Partnership’s reporting guidelines with the final report assembled on the basis of the Final Review Report template currently adopted by UNDP globally. Delivered within 3 months of the PIP closure, the final report will focus on the extent to which progress has been made towards production of deliverables required to generate output and identification of PIP issues and their solutions. It will also document lessons learned. Any post review or evaluation of the project will be discussed in the report. Appropriate annexes as cited above will be included.
Within the annual cycle the following tools are proposed to be used:

- On a quarterly basis, a quality assessment shall record progress towards the completion of key results, based on quality criteria and methods captured in the Quality Management table.
- An Issue Log shall be activated in Atlas and updated by the Programme Management Team to facilitate tracking and resolution of potential problems or requests for change.
- Based on the initial risk analysis submitted a risk log shall be activated in Atlas and regularly updated by reviewing the external environment that may affect the programme implementation.
- Based on the above information recorded in Atlas, a Quarterly Progress Reports (QPR) shall be submitted by the Programme Management Team through Programme Assurance, using the standard report format available in the Executive Snapshot.
- A programme Lesson-learned log shall be activated and regularly updated to ensure on-going learning and adaptation within the organization, and to facilitate the preparation of the Lessons-learned Report at the end of the programme.
- A Monitoring Schedule Plan shall be activated in Atlas and updated to track key management actions/events.

52. Given the current security context, quality assurance will be provided remotely by the national coordinator and his staff based in Tripoli who will provide regular oversight of programme implementation within Libya. In addition to reviewing monthly reports from the field, the Programme Management Team monitors progress on the ground through periodic field visits (if security allows) and/or a series of telephone interviews with interested local parties. The Programme Management Team shall recommend corrective action where necessary and monitor the implementation. UNDP’s Libya CO will provide additional monitoring and evaluation assistance to the programme team and ensure timely compliance with financial and technical reporting requirements.

VI. SCENARIOS AND RISK ANALYSIS

53. In the context of the political and military dynamics, three scenarios have been identified by UNSMIL as the most likely for the coming 12 to 18 months. However, initial risks and scenarios will be quarterly updated and reviewed based on the results of the conflict analysis component. Corresponding impact on UNDP programming and possible countermeasures are also presented.

A. Towards state collapse:

54. Under this scenario, violence spreads to most of the country, from where it is currently crystallized (Tripoli and Benghazi), bringing high civilian casualties, human rights violations and displacement. Any remnants of a central government disappear leaving the room for regional governance arrangements. The police and army disappear as national institutions and their remnants are incorporated within rival armed groups. Public services cease functioning. Not only does the traditional East / West divide deepen but local ethnic and tribal identities also ascend. With the massive drop in oil revenues, a war economy develops. Finally, the involvement of regional states becomes more overt and significant.

55. This worst-case scenario will severely narrow down entry points for UNDP programming at the local level. It might be possible to continue working more comprehensively on LGLD issues in certain locations sheltered from the raging conflict but the collapse of what remains of the public administration and national PFM (public financial management) systems, including payments of civil servants’ payrolls, would deal a severe blow to any service delivery functions. UNDP support would need to emphasize even more conflict mitigation at the local level, where there is still room for it, and support to needs assessment capacities would have to prioritize humanitarian needs. In locations where IDP influx creates untenable
pressure on host communities, UNDP would need to be able to provide direct support to municipalities to maintain basic services and preserve social cohesion. Work in support of the policy framework on decentralization, within the constitutional debate, would also have to be put on hold given that the CDA would most probably cease functioning under this scenario.

**B. Libya lingering on:**

56. In this scenario, the military conflict between the rival camps continues at a lower level while two competing political frameworks have emerged that vie for recognition and control. Active combat remains mostly centered around the two hot spots that are greater Tripoli and Benghazi areas. Even there, fighting is interspersed with ceasefires. Regional governments on both sides are able to provide some basic services in their areas of control, but national-level service division comes to a halt. Local authorities have difficulty in ensuring accountability and the protection of the population in particular vulnerable groups. Criminality rises, especially in Tripoli and Benghazi, where the justice and law enforcement agencies have been rendered ineffective. Conditions are most stable elsewhere and certain municipalities are able to effectively maintain semblance of law-and-order on the territory, through agreements with local armed groups. The economy remains sluggish as oil revenues fall and the conflict continues limiting options for diversification and private sector growth.

57. This middle-ground scenario represents a quasi-status quo of the current situation, upon which the proposed LGLD programmatic strategy presented in section 5, was built. If prevailing, this scenario will create opportunities greater in certain locations than others to build a comprehensive programme that does not just cater to emergency needs and conflict mitigation imperatives but also engages with more structural municipal development and local economic growth dynamics. Work at the “national” level will remain limited and mostly in support of maintaining a core of intergovernmental relations.

**C. Tenuous stability:**

58. In this scenario, a durable ceasefire which provides for the protection of civilians enables the transitional process to make some headway and find a compromise formula that satisfies the immediate interests of the rival political camps. A political agreement on power-sharing is reached, accompanied by interim security arrangements and a road map for institutional reform. The House of Representatives remains the only legitimate representative body at national level and relocates to Tripoli, playing the role of forum for political consensus-building that can negotiate a long-term political settlement. This conflict resolution scenario is made possible by a durable ceasefire, although some reprisals against specific targeted groups happen. Service delivery for basic social needs but also justice and security, improves. Regional divides soften and are handled within more defined state frameworks; local identity issues are managed also through local political processes (importance of municipal councils). With increasing oil revenues, private sector growth picks up slightly and opens the door to more innovative attempts for diversifying the economy. More Libyan jobs are created.

59. This best-case scenario will require UNDP to resume its former programming at policy and national institution-building levels, in particular in support of MoLG. A country-wide debate on decentralization should be activated, and beyond the limits of the constitutional drafting process. As more municipalities will avail the stability that allow investing in recovery and reconstruction, UNDP will need to find a formula to quickly expand geographically its capacity development support in municipal needs assessment, planning and project development. There will also be probably demands for UNDP to support governorate-level governance and this should be actively pursued as the recovery / development of the country will need to be driven by regional area-based plans and dynamics, and not just narrowly localized strategies and plans. Support to civil society initiatives around local government accountability
can be scaled up and UNDP should look to support the emergence of a local authority association to raise the profile of local governments in the national political transition and institution-building process.

### Risks Associated with the Programme and Mitigation Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Risk Explanation</th>
<th>Risk Mitigation Measure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High level of violence across the country</td>
<td>Spread of violence from Tripoli and Benghazi to other areas; sustained fighting between armed groups; widespread indiscriminate shelling and high civilian casualties; abductions and other reprisals against targeted groups; and displacement.</td>
<td>- No UN movement in the country. - Implementation through third parties (private sector, NGOs, etc.). - Remote quality assurance set up. - Conflict analysis regularly updated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate level of violence in pocket areas</td>
<td>Periods of fighting and indiscriminate shelling in Tripoli and Benghazi interspersed with ceasefires; reprisals against targeted groups and continuing civilian causalities within Tripoli and Benghazi.</td>
<td>- No or limited UN movement in the country according to the UNDSS advisories. - Implementation through third parties (private sector, NGOs, etc.). - Remote quality assurance set up. - Conflict analysis regularly updated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collapse of the central government authorities</td>
<td>Disappearance of central government and emergence of regional governance arrangements; further disintegration of army and police and alignment of their remnants with rival political and armed groups; collapse of public services; breakdown of the rule of law, with a severely hampered judiciary.</td>
<td>- Implementation through third parties (private sector, NGOs, etc.). - Remote quality assurance set up. - Conflict analysis regularly updated. - Programme design adjusted to have activities less vulnerable to interruption, more effective to deliver results and fit the purpose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak central government authorities</td>
<td>Separate institutional frameworks emerging with disputed legitimacy; contest over monopoly on the use of force; continued strong role of armed groups; ongoing weakness of the justice system; low quality of public services.</td>
<td>- Implementation through third parties (private sector, NGOs, etc.). - Remote quality assurance set up. - Conflict analysis regularly updated. - Programme design adjusted to have activities less vulnerable to interruption, more effective to deliver results and fit the purpose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased division of the political elite and among local, tribal and ethnic groups</td>
<td>Competition between and within the two major rival political camps (GNC and HoR) sharpened, ideological polarization increasing; systematic use of violence to achieve political goals divide between West and East increasing; local, ethnic and tribal identities in ascendance</td>
<td>- Conflict analysis regularly updated. - Programme design adjusted to have activities less vulnerable to interruption, more effective to deliver results and fit the purpose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collapse of the national and local economy system</td>
<td>Oil revenue shortfall; undiversified economy; sluggish private sector; low Libyan participation in the labor market; Massive drop in oil revenues; development of a war economy</td>
<td>- Implementation through third parties (private sector, NGOs, etc.). - Remote quality assurance set up. - Conflict analysis regularly updated. - Programme design adjusted to have activities less vulnerable to interruption, more effective to deliver results and fit the purpose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>Risk Explanation</td>
<td>Risk Mitigation Measure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Donors are worried about the risks associated with the programme | Donor funding is already severely downsized compared to what it was right after the Revolution; the focus of the PIP at the subnational level, where UNDP does not have direct presence and in a context of absence of rule of law, would act as an additional deterrent to potential donors. | - Ensure a mix of municipalities with some at lower risk-levels in terms of conflict.  
- Prioritization of contextual low-risk activities  
- Donors are regularly briefed on the status of the programme implementation and related monitoring activities.  
- Selection of reputable and tested implementing agents with good access to and acceptance in PIP locations. |
| Funds are not available to complete the overall programme |                                                                                                                                                                                                             | - Programme committee is regularly briefed on the financial status of the programme funds.  
- Prioritization of the actions which can have a quicker and deeper impact in target population from the development point of view, according to the criteria set in the programme. |
| Mismanagement of funds by implementing partners          | The current security context in Libya complicates programme operations and quality assurance as programme staff will have limited access to programme activities outside of Tripoli. This could provide incentives to implementing agents for fraudulent use of delegated funds or just lowering their cost-effectiveness standards. | - UNDP financial rules and regulations apply to the implementing agent.  
- Close daily monitoring conducted by programme staff (even in remote mode)  
- Extra care applied in selecting implementing agents including checking track record of financial integrity with previous clients.  
- Payments are made on a reimbursement basis only (no advance) upon submission of satisfactory financial reports and documentation. |
| Inability to adhere to planned implementation timeline due to operating context | The preparatory and set-up phase will require building more support and buy-in with Libyan counterparts but in a highly divided political context and tight security conditions. Given the implementation modalities, subcontracting / granting to implementing agents / partners must happen before any concrete activity on the ground can start. | - Fast-track modalities will be applied to hasten the selection of implementing agent / partners.  
- Pre-selection of implementation partner is proposed for the conflict analysis work.  
- Buy-in will be sought primarily from pre-selected municipalities, as contribution and role of central government, in a context of disputed legitimacy and leadership, needs to be kept modest.  
- Advisors will be sought from a pool of vetted consultants in order to cut down on recruitment time.  
- Project activities may start first in locations where access and buy-in is stronger; change in locations may happen down the way if constraints against timely execution of planned activities is deemed too high. |
## ANNEX 1: Integrated Results and Resources Framework

### Outcome: Increased resilience of local Libyan institutions and communities and greater preparedness for recovery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected Outputs with indicators, baseline and annual targets</th>
<th>Indicative activities Activity results and associated actions</th>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Responsible Party</th>
<th>Proposed budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. The path to improved local-level resilience is supported by conflict sensitive, inclusive and evidence-based integrated planning. | **1.1. Develop a deeper, localized and iterative analysis of the Libyan conflict.**  
- Develop conflict analysis methodology and tools tailored to Libyan context  
- Consultations and data collection in Libya; community surveys (in locations selected for LGLD activities) to provide baseline data for future monitoring;  
- Consultation workshop with participants from Libya to build the stakeholder analysis and conflict dynamics (in Tunis)  
- Build complete analysis (including factor, stakeholder, conflict dynamic analysis; identify conflict drivers and peace engines); prepare matrix to present underlying causes and consequences of conflict, dynamics  
- Prepare report, including GIS maps  
- Establish a light monitoring system for updating conflict analysis | Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 | UNDP | 71600 Travel 72100 Contract for services 75700 Trg, WShops & Conf | 20,000 100,000 20,000 140,000 |
| | **1.2. Preparation of a methodological framework and tools for rapid LGLD baseline assessments**  
- Stock-taking of existing data sets, methodologies used in Libya and the region, existing Libyan capacities, regional lessons learnt and preparation of draft methodological note (proposal).  
- Establishment of Technical Committee (10 members) with Libyan experts in economics, social sciences, governance / public administration, gender and statistics. | X | UNDP | MENA Dutch Support | 35,000 10,000 40,000 85,000 |
### Outcome: Increased resilience of local Libyan institutions and communities and greater preparedness for recovery

**Expected Outputs**

**with indicators, baseline and annual targets**

**Targets:**
- Conflict-related development analysis method and tools available and tested in 5 municipalities.
- Very few municipalities have exhaustive LGLD baselines, mostly old and patchy sectorial statistics; governance-related indicators are unheard of.
- 5 one-year Local Resilience & Recovery Plans (LRRPs) developed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicative activities</th>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Responsible Party</th>
<th>Proposed budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activity results and associated actions</strong></td>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>Q3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Workshop (Tunis) with TC and representatives of municipalities to review proposed methodology and finalize scope of LGLD assessment, indicators, data types &amp; sources, collection methods, roles &amp; responsibilities, timeline, etc. as well as training on conflict and gender-sensitivity in needs assessment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1.3. Conduct rapid LGLD assessments in 5 target municipalities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Training of Assessment Support Teams (ASTs, 2 persons per location, incl. 1 woman) in Libya.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Orientation sessions by ASTs in 5 locations on conflict- and gender-sensitive resilience / recovery for key local stakeholders, including municipalities, line ministries, community leaders, CSOs, private sector, youth and women groups, etc.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Establish &amp; train Municipal Assessment Committees (MAC, 10 members) with representatives of key stakeholders</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Support MACs to conduct local baseline assessments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Upgrade IMS(^{12}) capacities of municipalities with links to NSO (National Statistics Office)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Analyse assessment date and write reports.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Local feedback meetings on results and public outreach</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Post-action review workshop (Libya) with 5 MACs to fine-tune LGLD assessment methodological and training package</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

---

12 Information Management System – To be funded under the current LG project
### Outcome: Increased resilience of local Libyan institutions and communities and greater preparedness for recovery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected Outputs with indicators, baseline and annual targets</th>
<th>Indicative activities with indicators, baseline and annual targets</th>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Responsible Party</th>
<th>Proposed budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.4. Develop integrated Local Resilience &amp; Recovery Plans (LRRPs)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Indicative activities</strong></td>
<td><strong>Activity results and associated actions</strong></td>
<td><strong>Timeline</strong></td>
<td><strong>Responsible Party</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Support MoP &amp; MoLG for finalizing guidelines on the preparation of participatory local recovery plans (annual planning).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>Q2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Conduct integrated participatory planning exercises (priorities, strategies, projects, budget) based on rapid LGLD assessment results and localized conflict analysis.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Adoption of one-year recovery plans by Local Councils and public outreach to communities, advocacy to central government and donors.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Support municipal capacities for continuous M&amp;E on LGLD conditions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total Output 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **2. Policy dialogue on Libya’s sustainable human development and crisis resilience is activated** | **Indicative activities** | **Activity results and associated actions** | **Timeline** | **Responsible Party** | **Funding source** | **Budget description** | **Amount (USD)** |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------------|-----------------|
| **2.1. Preparations for “Libya 2.0”, a research and policy-setting agenda for Libya’s post-conflict recovery** | | | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | UNDP | UNDP | 72100 Contract for services | 100,000 |
| - Support Technical Committee to select research themes, including by using results of conflict analysis and rapid local assessments | | | X | X | X | UNDP | UNDP | 72600 Grants | 50,000 |
| - Build capacities of government and academic institutions for policy-oriented research methodologies | | | | | | 75700 Trg, WShops & Conf | 10,000 |
| - Support initial research work (consultants, grants, South-South exchanges) to produce prospective policy notes | | | | | | | | |
| **2.2. Support the localization of SDG agenda in Libya** | | | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | UNDP | UNDP | 72600 Grant | 50,000 |
| - Support setting-up and implementing the “The Libya We Want” initiative discussing the localization of Post-2015 SDG agenda in Libya. | | | X | X | UNDP | UNDP | 75700 Trg, WShops & Conf | 20,000 |

| Sub-Total Output 2 | | | | | | | 50,000 |

**Total Output 1 & 2** | | | | | | | 565,000 |
**Outcome:** Increased resilience of local Libyan institutions and communities and greater preparedness for recovery

**Expected Outputs**  
with indicators, baseline and annual targets

Thinking on Libya’s challenges (beyond instability and conflict) for achieving sustainable human development goals

**Targets:**  
- Seminal research papers and think-pieces striding a large scope of governance, social, economic and environmental issues are produced to guide the work of policy-makers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicative activities</th>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Responsible Party</th>
<th>Proposed budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activity results and associated actions</strong></td>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>Q3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Establish linkages with “The Constitution We Want” Initiative and support the conduct of local aspirations surveys</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.3 Support ‘by youth for youth’ action research</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Engage a core focus group of youth to undertake and contribute to analysis (narrow research question tbc)</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Produce innovative think piece about the views and needs of Libyan youth in the specific area</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Outreach, including production of advocacy tools</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Sub-Total Output 2  
200,000

3. UNDP Libya is equipped with evidence-based strategy and tools to support integrated local governance and local development programming.

**Indicators:**  
- Rate of achievement of PIP’s deliverables  
- Launch of a long-term integrated area-based programme for peacebuilding and recovery in Libya

**Baseline:**  
- UNDP Libya’s 80% (all programme) stood at $13, 526, 199 (2014), highly constrained by its relocation to Tunis and the funding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicative activities</th>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Responsible Party</th>
<th>Proposed budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>3.1. Provision of adequate in-country technical and operational project management support</strong></td>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>Q3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- National PIP Manager (12 m)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Senior conflict advisor (3m fulltime; 2m 1/2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Senior LGLD advisor (6 m)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- National LGLD coordinator (12 m)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Project assistants x 2 (12 m)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Operational costs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2. Develop Programme Document for Support to Libya’s Resilience and Recovery  
- Conduct one integrated programming mission (2 weeks)  
- Additional BPPS technical inputs into programme development, as requested

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicative activities</th>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Responsible Party</th>
<th>Proposed budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>Q3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3. Increase positioning of UNDP in conflict-sensitive recovery  
- Review current UNDP Libya programme from a conflict-sensitive perspective and provision of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicative activities</th>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Responsible Party</th>
<th>Proposed budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>Q3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Outcome: Increased resilience of local Libyan institutions and communities and greater preparedness for recovery**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected Outputs with indicators, baseline and annual targets</th>
<th>Indicative activities Activity results and associated actions</th>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Responsible Party</th>
<th>Proposed budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shortfall for its operational costs.</td>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>Q3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 2013, UNDP Libya produced a programme document on local governance &amp; decentralisation that prioritized policy support for legal reform and institution-building (top-down). It is not appropriate to current Libya’s context.</td>
<td>Training of UNDP staff (and possibly other partners) in conflict sensitivity and conflict analysis</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate shared conflict analysis within the international community through bi-monthly workshops</td>
<td>Resume coordination of LGLD working group (UNDP, EU, USAID, GIZ) in Tunis</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Targets:</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.4. Strengthen communication of results and resource mobilization capacities of UNDP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least 70% of the PIP’s activity results are achieved by end of 2015.</td>
<td>Identify opportunities and strategies for resource mobilization for UNDP Libya</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term Programme on Support to Libya’s Resilience and Recovery is launched during 2015</td>
<td>Mapping of potential donors and innovative partnerships</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Enhance visibility of UNDP work to partners, donors and others stakeholders</td>
<td>Support UNDP’s access to potential contributions and seed resources</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sub-Total Output 3**

560,000

**TOTAL BUDGET**

1,325,000
ANNEX 2: Detailed road map of the LGLD assessment process

This timeline starts after Senior LGLD Advisor has been recruited, Libya-based implementing agent contracted and target municipalities selected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeline Needs Assessment</th>
<th>Deliverables/ Outputs</th>
<th>Estimated Duration to Complete</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preparatory Phase</strong></td>
<td>Literature review &amp; secondary data analysis, stock-taking of lessons learnt in rapid LGLD assessments by UNDP in other contexts</td>
<td>5 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of Technical Committee (10 Libyan experts in socio-economic development &amp; local governance)</td>
<td>5 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drafting of proposal for LGLD assessment methodology (for discussion with Technical Committee and municipal representatives)</td>
<td>5 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct Methodological Workshop (Tunis) with TC, municipality representatives and other key stakeholders, to finalize assessment method and plans</td>
<td>5 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct rapid test of main questionnaires and data collection forms and revise the methodology and data collection tools if necessary (with involvement of Assessment Support Teams)</td>
<td>5 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Train ASTs on methodological package and expected functions</td>
<td>5 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establish Municipal Assessment Committees</td>
<td>5 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Orientation &amp; training sessions of MACs by ASTs</td>
<td>3 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organize in each location all logistical aspects related to the data collection exercise, analysis and report preparation</td>
<td>5 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation of the Rapid LGLD Assessments</strong></td>
<td>MACs collect data from administrative sources, surveys and interviews</td>
<td>10 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enter data in IMS, collate, disaggregate and analyze and produce raw analysis reports.</td>
<td>5 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop conclusions and recommendations based on deeper analysis of data</td>
<td>5 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prepare of presentation materials to disseminate findings to target communities</td>
<td>3 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Production of integrated Local Recovery Plans</strong></td>
<td>MACs prioritize needs, in consultation with community representatives, and identify strategic priorities for recovery as well as quick impact projects for Year 1.</td>
<td>5 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drafting of Local Recovery Plans, including budgets and sources of funding.</td>
<td>5 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rapid capacity assessments of municipalities and selected local NGOs and CBOs for implementing quick impact projects.</td>
<td>5 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop a trends monitoring system</td>
<td>5 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Post-Action Review Workshop with Technical Committee, MACs, MoP and MoLG.</td>
<td>5 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Final Report, including prioritization of the selected projects to be implemented, and elaboration of operational recommendations for UNDP to roll out the LD approach and to accompany the municipalities in the implementation of the projects</td>
<td>5 days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX 3: Terms of Reference for Senior Advisors

A – Conflict Analysis and Conflict Sensitivity, Senior Advisor

Location : Tunis with travel to Libya (security permitting)
Type of Contract : Individual Contract
Post Level : International Consultant
Languages Required : English
Duration of Initial Contract : 1 February to 30 June

1. Project Title

Programme for Libya’s Resilience and Recovery – PL2R

2. Project Description

The current situation in Libya is volatile and rapidly changing. In this context, it’s very important with practical knowledge about the possible consequences, both positive and negative. It is important to understand what implications it may have for UNDP Libya to work (or not) with different partners and what can be done to mitigate negative impact. The effective use of conflict analysis could also lead us to ‘doing things differently’, including the identification of actors for peace that can be supported through partnership, empowerment and capacity development.

Therefore a conflict analysis is proposed to be undertaken by UNDP Libya with the following objectives:

1. Deepened understanding of the country context in Libya, including underlying causes and consequences of the conflict, dynamics supporting or undermining peace from a perspective relevant to development actors with a specific focus on the sub-national context.
2. Conflict sensitive review of UNDP’s current programming portfolio, along with recommendations for possible changes.
3. Analysis for understanding risks, challenges and opportunities at sub-national level to inform the development of a UNDP programme on conflict sensitive local development that can contribute to reducing local tensions.

3. Scope of Work

Under the supervision of the Country Director, the consultant will perform the following duties:

- Develop a practical methodology and approach to analyze the conflict dynamics. The methodology should both cover the conflict analysis and programming review / development as well as include data collection, tools development and design. Undertake a desk review of existing conflict analysis and related materials.
- Support the political dialogue process, led by UNSMIL, as requested.
- Support the development of a methodological framework and tools for rapid Local Governance and Local Development (LGLD) baseline assessments (led by a Senior Advisor on LGLD). UNDP will be assisting partner municipalities to develop, with participation from
key local actors and communities, integrated Local Resilience & Recovery Plans (LRRPs) based on localized conflict analysis and data produced by these LGLD assessments.

- Support the preparations and use of different tools and techniques in order to gather information within Libya under the current situation, for example interviews (including in-depth), perception surveys (by phone or by local partners) and possibly focus groups. Most likely these will be undertaken by partners such as NGOs/CSOs with better access and similar work on-going.

- Support the organization and conduct of a consultation workshop in Tunis, bringing out key actors from Libya to help build the stakeholder analysis and understanding of conflict dynamics. Focus groups or interviews with Libyans living in Tunis should also be organized and supported.

- Development of a country situation profile as well as a causal, stakeholder, conflict dynamic analysis; with conflict drivers and peace engines, accompanied by a set of risks, opportunities, and recommendations for UNDP. Draft an internal as well as external report presenting the findings and recommendations.

- Undertake desk review of existing UNDP Libya projects in collaboration with UNDP Libya office staff to support a conflict-sensitive approach, including opportunities for strengthening confidence-building measures.

- Lead development of a stand-alone programmatic component relating to community-level conflict resolution, dialogue and reconciliation as well as conflict sensitivity advisory support for a new programme that UNDP Libya is about to develop on local development.

- Based on the conflict analysis, conduct and document a scenario building exercise to help UNDP think through strategies, options and contingency planning across its programmes and help position UNDP in the changing situation in Libya.

- Design and conduct conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity training for UNDP staff and key partners to strengthen the capacity to effectively integrate conflict sensitivity into UNDP’s programming and strategic planning processes. A training component in Libya for partners involved in conflict resolution and conflict mapping should also be considered if the security situation allows and can be organized together with partners.

- Review options for, and support the contracting/agreements for how to establish a light monitoring system for up-dating the conflict analysis on-line (e.g. Andala or support to other initiatives), similarly support the production of (possibly by external provider) GIS maps based on the conflict analysis.

- Perform other related tasks as requested by the UNDP Libya Country Director.

### 4. Expected Outputs and Deliverables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliverables/ Outputs</th>
<th>Estimated Duration</th>
<th>Target Due Dates</th>
<th>Review and Approvals Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Methodology prepared, including tools for data gathering and consultations; partners identified; support to the methodological framework and tools for rapid LGLD baseline assessments</td>
<td>1 month</td>
<td>Within 1 month of beginning the consultancy</td>
<td>To be approved by UNDP Libya Country Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft internal and external reports of the</td>
<td>1 month</td>
<td>Within 2 months</td>
<td>To be approved by UNDP Libya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 5. Institutional Arrangement

The consultant will report to the Country Director, UNDP Libya.

### 6. Duration of the Work

The services of the individual consultant are required from 1 February to 30 June on full time basis between February and April and part-time during May-June.

### 7. Duty Station

The consultant will be based in Tunis.

### 8. Qualifications of the Successful Individual Contractor

**Education:**
- Advanced university degree (Master, PhD) relevant to the thematic area

**Experience:**
- At least 10 years of progressively responsible experience in conflict prevention, peacebuilding and transitions, including relevant field experience, especially in crisis or post-conflict settings
- Extensive technical knowledge of conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity, facilitation and managing peacebuilding initiatives;
- Proven policy, advisory and advocacy experience and track record of engagement with senior levels of government, United Nations, and other partners;
- Experience with conflict sensitive project development, in particular in the areas of recovery and local development;
- Proven intellectual and practical capacity to understand and interpret national and local development issues, particularly in recovery situations / post-crisis settings;
- Good knowledge of the socio-economic and political situation of the countries in the Arab region;
- Excellent drafting and formulation skills;

**Languages:**
- Fluency in spoken and written English is a must, knowledge of another UN Language a plus.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Schedule of the consultancy</th>
<th>Approval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Review of existing UNDP Libya programmes and input prepared for new local development programme</td>
<td>1 month</td>
<td>Before the end of the consultancy</td>
<td>To be approved by UNDP Libya Country Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct trainings and support to the local development programme</td>
<td>1 month</td>
<td>Before the end of the consultancy</td>
<td>To be approved by UNDP Libya Country Director</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. Scope of Price Proposal and Schedule of Payments

The consultant will be paid in two installments based on a daily fee after each deliverable is approved.

10. Recommended Presentation of Offer

a) Duly accomplished Letter of Confirmation of Interest and Availability using the template provided by UNDP;

b) CV or P11, indicating all past experience from similar projects, as well as the contact details (email and telephone number) of the Candidate and at least three (3) professional references;

c) Financial Proposal that indicates the all-inclusive fixed total contract price, supported by a breakdown of costs, as per template provided.

11. Criteria for Selection of the Best Offer

The consultant will be selected based on combined Scoring method – where the qualifications and methodology will be weighted a max. of 70%, and combined with the price offer which will be weighted a max of 30%.

12. Approval

This TOR is approved by: Selva Ramachandran

Signature

Name and Designation  Selva Ramachandran, Country Director, UNDP Libya

Date of Signing
ANNEX 3: Terms of Reference for Senior Advisors
[TO BE ADDED]