Assessment of Community Security and Transformation Programmes in Jamaica
Acknowledgements

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

Crime and violence are major barriers to development in Jamaica. The Government of Jamaica (GoJ), supported by international development partners (IDPs), has initiated a range of programmes to increase the safety and security of local communities. However, little research has previously been done to examine which interventions are most effective. The GoJ commissioned this study to establish which methodologies and approaches are influencing progress towards greater community security and transformation. The GoJ is seeking to determine the capacities required to implement the programmes, the gaps in terms of issues being addressed, and the best institutional arrangements to ensure harmonisation and sustainability.

This assessment was conducted as a joint project on behalf of the GoJ and IDPs in Jamaica. The design and implementation of 10 programmes was reviewed:

- Citizen Security and Justice Programme (CSJP)
- Community Empowerment and Transformation Project (COMET)
- Community Security Initiative (CSI)
- Constituency Development Fund (CDF)
- Inner City Basic Services for the Poor Project (ICBSP)
- Peace and Prosperity Project (PPP)
- Jamaica Sustainable Peace and Development Programme (JSPD)
- National Transformation Programme (NTP)
- Peace Management Initiative (PMI)
- Poverty Reduction Programme II (PRPII)

A wide range of GoJ and civil society stakeholders were interviewed as ‘key informants’ at the national and local level. More detailed field research was undertaken into the implementation of the four programmes – CSI, CSJP, ICBSP and PMI – that have had a sustained engagement at the community level. Eleven sample communities were identified and a comprehensive household survey with a sample size of 3,102 interviews was conducted. Focus groups were also held in each community with community leaders, male youth, programme beneficiaries and either women or children.

The report outlines programme objectives, assesses the progress made towards outcomes, highlights any potential gaps in programme design and makes recommendations for their increased effectiveness. The report then assesses the outcomes of programmes on the security of sample communities and reviews the extent to which programmes were anchored in communities. Critical success factors and lessons learnt are then identified. A series of recommendations are then made for the development of a more strategic and harmonised approach to community safety and security.
CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS

Design and objectives

The top social interventions identified by residents as likely to have a ‘big impact’ on crime and violence were: employment and skills training (88%), education programmes (87%), parenting classes (79%), sports (79%) dispute resolution (76%) and music and theatre (71%). Basic service provision scored much lower.

The issues addressed by the programmes are largely congruent with those identified by community residents as issues that should be prioritised. For example, employment and skills training has been identified by all four major community security programmes (CSI, CSJP, ICBSP and PMI) as a major priority. Likewise, three of the four programmes support education interventions which ranked as the second highest priority.

However, only two out of the four programmes have a focus on parenting (and one of those – CSI – does not have a significant focus on this issue). The biggest discrepancy is in the area of sports, music and theatre which approximately three quarters of respondents say would have a big impact on reducing crime and violence but only two of the programmes cover and only to a limited degree.

Means of implementation

Across the 11 communities surveyed, just under one in five people (18%), have accessed services from the programmes. However, the satisfaction ratings across all of the programmes were uniformly high - over 85% satisfaction rates from beneficiaries for all services. It seems clear therefore that programmes have a positive impact on their direct beneficiaries. However, wider community engagement has been more limited. Less than half (45%) of all respondents said that they were aware that there was a Community Development Committee (CDC) working to promote development in their community. Of these, only 14% said that they had ever been asked to participate in any event or activity organised by this committee. This is a clear demonstration of the need to increase and target the public outreach of CDCs.

Outcomes

Crime and violence trends in sample communities

The assessment examined JCF crime statistics and hospital data of violence-related injuries (VRIs) to see if there is any correlation between the implementation of community security programmes and levels of reported crimes and VRIs. Challenges with the police data meant it was impossible to draw direct correlations between programme implementation and crime levels, however, the following key areas of commonality between the police and hospital datasets were identified:

- **Reduction in total number of incidents** - Over the 2006-2008 period, there was a reduction in the total number of reported serious crimes in six out of the 10 sample communities\(^1\) and a reduction in the total number of VRIs in seven out of the 10 sample communities.

\(^1\) The assessment focused on 11 sample communities but police and hospital data were not available for Russia in Savannah-la-Mar.
Reduction in total number of shootings - The number of reported shootings dropped in eight out of the 10 sample communities (it remained the same in the other two) and the number of VRIs from shootings reduced in six out of the 10 sample communities (and remained at the same level in two).

Increase in incidents in 2007 - The overall murder rate across the 10 communities spiked significantly in 2007, the general election year, then dropped in 2008. The total number of VRIs also increased significantly in 2007 in seven out of the 10 sample communities and then dropped again in 2008 in all but one of these communities.

Increase in social capital

There are signs that social capital increased in communities where programmes were implemented:

- 72% of respondents said that people are more willing to work together to make the community safer than two years ago.
- 61% said that they trust other community members.

Improvements in safety and security

There were improved perceptions of safety in sample communities where programmes were implemented:

- 74% of respondents said their community is 'safe' or 'very safe'.
- 38% of respondents said that safety has improved over last two years (14% said it has worsened).

When the police statistics, hospital data and survey results are triangulated it seems clear that the overall safety and security in the sample communities has increased. The key question is why?

The top three reasons given by respondents in the household survey as to why the level of safety in their community had increased were: improved policing (22%), reduced political tensions (14%) and the strengthening or establishment of a Community Development Committee (12%). It is notable that of these three issues, only one – working to strengthen CDCs – is a direct area of current intervention by community security programmes. This reinforces the conclusion of the qualitative assessment that the strengthening and establishment of CDCs and legitimate local governance structures is the most effective current programmatic intervention.

In the communities where improved policing was highlighted as a factor for increased safety, the interviews and focus groups conducted by the assessment team identified that the introduction of a community policing approach was normally the key reason.

Interviews with key stakeholders and focus groups in communities identified the cumulative effect of a combination of different social interventions on reducing criminal activities and political tensions. However, identifying the specific role of individual social interventions will require significant improvements in the monitoring and evaluation systems for all programmes. Improving their impact on crime and violence will also necessitate much better targeting of interventions at male youth.
LESIONS LEARNT

Community policing and local governance are the most effective interventions

The assessment overall has found that the two most vital areas for action to improve community security are strengthening local governance and improving community policing. All four programmes have a central focus on building the capacity of local governance structures. However, a significant gap in programme design is that none of them have a significant focus on engaging the police.

Engaging other MDAs

The community security programmes play an important role in providing some services to volatile and vulnerable communities where the state is not significantly present. However, they are not a long term answer to problems of service delivery. Their role should be to act as a bridge to help reintroduce the state. Engaging other GoJ MDAs is the key to sustainable progress in community safety and security.

Community safety and security strategy

The lack of a community safety and security strategy has had a detrimental effect on the effectiveness and coherence of programmes. They have grown organically and opportunistically, in response to the availability of resources and the immediate needs faced in communities, rather than in line with a clear over-arching vision. There is no clear division of roles and responsibilities between programmes, and there is a lack of a common methodology to standardise their approaches.

Violence prevention and male youth

There is an insufficient focus of programmes on violence prevention, particularly on targeting social interventions to address young men aged 14-24 who are both the main victims and perpetrators of crime and violence.

External factors influencing the impact of programmes

Political tensions

The report finds that politics plays a significant role in the success or failure of programmes. There was a significant increase in VRIs and the murder rate across the 11 communities in 2007, the election year. ‘Politics’ was also cited as the second most common reason why people do not get along in communities. In contexts where politicians are supportive of community security programmes, or at least adopt a laissez-faire attitude, then progress is possible. But in situations where they adopt a tribalist approach then progress can be difficult.

Dons and gangs

Programmes face difficult choices on the ground in terms of how to deal with the Don issue. There are three broad strategies followed in different contexts or at different times: co-existence, co-option and
competition. These strategies are often unspoken, however. It would be beneficial for programmes if the GoJ developed a clear policy of how to address the Don issue. Action is required on three tracks – the community, through strengthening the role of CDCs; the police, through increasing community policing and effective law enforcement; and the political track, including stimulating the will needed to sever ties with dons where they exist and through control over the awarding of state contracts.

**Culture of monitoring and evaluation**

Information is not gathered and used strategically across the programmes. Monitoring and evaluation systems need to be strengthened with a greater focus on assessing the outcomes of interventions rather than just the outputs.

**KEY RECOMMENDATIONS**

**Increasing harmonisation**

- **A new strategic focus is needed by the GoJ to strengthen community security.** In order to facilitate greater harmonisation of community security initiatives, the GoJ should consider a best practice approach that views the process of increasing security in volatile and vulnerable communities as having these four connected phases:
  - Assessing the context, led by SDC with inputs from the JCF;
  - Brokering the peace (in volatile communities only), where PMI has the lead role;
  - Building the peace, where a new integrated community security programme (see below) should take the lead; and
  - Securing development, where responsibility is handed over to MDAs.

- **The GoJ should consider developing a single integrated programme to act as the engine for ‘building the peace’ in volatile and vulnerable communities.** A number of different programmes operate in this phase of the above framework at present, resulting in some overlap and duplication. It is suggested that a new, integrated programme be developed that takes the strongest aspects of the CSI, CSJP and ICBSP (public safety) methodologies. This programme would act as a bridge to reintroduce the state in volatile and vulnerable communities, strengthen local governance structures, develop community policing and then engage other MDAs to ensure it can exit. IDPs could be asked to jointly provide funding for it.

- **The MNS should lead the development of an inter-departmental Community Safety and Security Strategy** that sets out how GoJ MDAs will work together to increase community security.

**Improving the impact of programmes**

- **Community security programmes should prioritise governance and security interventions – strengthening CDCs and improving community policing - in order to have the greatest impact on crime and violence.**

- **Social interventions should be more strategically targeted to prevent violence.** Three criteria could be used to prioritise social interventions:
Assessment: Community Security & Transformation Programmes in Jamaica

- Are activities likely to have benefits at community level in terms of reducing crime and violence as well as at the individual level?
- What impact will interventions have on male youth?
- How sustainable are proposed activities and is there a strategy for scaling up and mainstreaming them into the work of GoJ ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs).

Enhancing sustainability

- **The GoJ should consider developing new legislation that places a statutory obligation on MDAs to prioritise service delivery in volatile and vulnerable communities.** Engaging a broader range of MDAs and ensuring that they target human and budgetary resources to address community security issues is fundamental to ensuring sustainability.

- **The CDF should be used to fund the implementation of community safety plans developed in target communities.** Targeting the considerable resources of the CDF in line with the community safety priorities identified by CDCs and PDCs would help ensure the sustainability of plans.

Establishing a coordinating mechanism

- **A Community Safety and Security Committee should be established to provide a mechanism for effective coordination.** It is suggested that the committee should meet at Permanent Secretary level and should report to either the Public Order Committee or the National Security Council. A small secretariat should be established in the MNS Policy Directorate’s Community Safety and Security Branch to support its operations.

- **Community Safety Plans should be used as the common framework for coordination in volatile and vulnerable communities.** They should be developed based on a participatory assessment of community needs and the local dynamics of crime and violence. The CDCs (supported by SDC) should be the ‘custodians’ of the plans and all programmes. MDAs working in those communities should target their work to address the plans’ priority issues.

Anchoring programmes in communities

- **Increased support should be given to building the capacity of CDCs.** All GoJ programmes should work to strengthen one CDC as a coordinating body in each community, rather than having parallel community committees. Enhancing the representation, outreach and legal status of CDCs are important priorities.

Developing a culture of monitoring and evaluation

- **Develop the Crime Observatory as an information hub and national resource.** There would be significant value in establishing a central repository of information to inform the design, monitoring and evaluation of all interventions. MoUs should be developed between the Institute of Criminal Justice and Security at UWI, MNS, MoH and JCF on the sharing and use of information to ensure GoJ ownership.
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

1. Crime and violence are major barriers to development in Jamaica. The death rate from violence in Jamaica is higher than in many high intensity violent conflicts. The standard international definition of a war or high intensity conflict is “violence characterized by fatality rates of over 1000/year”\(^2\), and in Jamaica 1618 people were murdered in 2008\(^3\). The Government of Jamaica (GoJ), supported by international development partners (IDPs), has embarked on a range of programmes to increase the safety and security of local communities. These initiatives are led by different agencies with different methodologies and are funded by different donors. However, an obvious harmonised strategy is not evident.

2. There is broad consensus among Government, civil society and IDP stakeholders in Jamaica that preventing violence and increasing community security requires a combination of development and security interventions. However, little research has previously been done to examine which interventions are most effective. Therefore, the Government of Jamaica (GoJ) in partnership with the IDPs in Jamaica has commissioned this independent assessment to establish which methodologies and approaches are credited with influencing progress towards greater community security and transformation. The assessment is aimed at determining the capacities required to implement the programmes, the gaps in terms of issues being addressed, and the best institutional arrangements to ensure harmonisation and sustainability. The full terms of reference of this assessment are attached in Annex A.

3. The GoJ and IDPs have agreed to increase the harmonisation of development assistance in order to improve aid effectiveness and reduce the transaction costs to the Government. This joint assessment is an important step towards this goal and is in line with the commitments of donors, international organisations and the GoJ in the Paris Declaration to:

- Eliminate duplication of effort and rationalise donor activities\(^4\).
- Carry out diagnostic reviews that provide reliable assessments of country systems and procedures\(^5\).
- Work together to reduce the number of separate, duplicative missions to the field and diagnostic reviews\(^6\).
- Provide clear views on donors’ comparative advantage and on how to achieve donor complementarity at country or sectoral level\(^7\).

\(^3\) Jamaica Constabulary Force Statistics Department.
\(^4\) Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, p1.
\(^5\) Ibid, p4.
\(^6\) Ibid, p6.
\(^7\) Ibid, p6.
STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

4. This document is divided into seven sections:

I. Section I, sets the context and background for this assessment. It outlines the objectives and scope of the research as well as some of the challenges faced by the research team. The key concept of community safety and security is defined, and indicators of progress - as understood from the ToR are set out.

II. In Section II, the methodology and survey approach, which includes the criteria used for the identification of the 11 sample communities for field research, are presented.

III. Section III assesses the programmes individually to review their design and the progress made in implementation towards their objectives. It also reviews their comparative advantages.

IV. Section IV identifies the critical success factors to increase the effectiveness of community security programmes, based on a comparative analysis of the main different types of interventions undertaken by the four main programmes operating at the local level in the 11 sample communities. A review is conducted of the key factors for the design, means of implementation and outcomes of the programmes on community security.

V. In Section V, the main lessons learnt from the assessment are identified.

VI. Section VI proposes a way forward through the development of a new harmonised framework for community security.

VII. Section VII summarises the key overall recommendations of the report for increasing the impact of interventions and developing a more strategic and harmonised approach.

SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH

Objectives

5. As stated in the ToR, the general objectives of the assessment are “to determine the most effective strategies for promoting community safety and security and identify which approach or combination of approaches indicate the likelihood of achieving intended outcomes and the future implications for future programme development, implementation and hamonisation.” 8 The assessment examines the different objectives and experiences of each programme. Recognising that, apart from the PPP, all of the programmes are still ongoing, the assessment reviews their implementation so far, highlights any potential gaps in programme design and makes recommendations for their increased effectiveness.

**Scope**

6. It is important to emphasise that this assessment is not a detailed evaluation of each programme and nor is an impact assessment. With 10 programmes to examine, this would not have been possible in the time available. Instead, the primary focus has been to look at “the identification of success factors, challenges and lessons learned.” Significant emphasis has also been placed on developing “practical recommendations on how to increase the harmonisation of and collaboration between different programmes.” Based on this analysis, a new best practice framework for community security is proposed.

7. Based on the requirements in the terms of reference (ToR) the following programmes were assessed:

   i. Community Security Initiative (CSI)
   ii. Community Empowerment and Transformation Project (COMET)
   iii. Citizen Security and Justice Programme (CSJP)
   iv. Inner City Basic Services for the Poor Project (ICBSP)
   v. Peace and Prosperity Project (PPP)
   vi. Jamaica Sustainable Peace and Development Programme (JSPD)
   vii. Peace Management Initiative (PMI)

8. It was also requested in the ToR that other programmes aimed at achieving similar objectives should be examined. Following consultations by the consultants with stakeholders, the Project Management Committee agreed that the following programmes should also be reviewed:

   i. Constituency Development Fund (CDF)
   ii. National Transformation Programme (NTP)
   iii. Poverty Reduction Programme II (PRPII)

9. The PRP II and the CDF were included because both provide significant sources of resources for community development and therefore have the potential to have an impact on security. The NTP has a focus on transforming values and attitudes and so has potentially valuable linkages.

**Challenges**

10. In terms of identifying outcomes of the programmes, the research met two major challenges. Firstly, there have been a number of problems with using the police crime statistics as a measure of progress and comparing these with hospital data of violence-related injuries (VRI) (see discussion in Section IV), because the boundaries of the community geographic areas (though having the same name) were defined differently by the police and the programmes. Thus it was difficult to establish correlations between programme implementation and crime trends and to directly compare police and hospital statistics across the same spatial geographic area. Secondly, the assessment has found that the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms of programmes are very limited and in most cases limited to counting the number

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9 P2. ‘Notes of the Technical Committee Inception Meeting’ 31 October 2008.
10 P4, Ibid.
of people trained, i.e. outputs. This has meant that there exists little programme data on which a judgment on the effectiveness and impact of interventions can be based.

**KEY TERMS**

**What is community safety and security?**

11. The 10 programmes reviewed in this assessment all have slightly different goals and objectives (see Section III). However, at the core of most of these is the aim of strengthening the safety and security of local communities. A range of different terms are used in Jamaica and internationally to describe these types of programmes including citizen security, community safety, community security and violence prevention. These approaches are largely similar and there are no clear conceptual boundaries between them. In fact in many contexts different terminologies are used interchangeably or in tandem (e.g. community safety and security).

12. This report uses community safety and security as its main terminology as this is the language that the GoJ uses most widely (e.g. there is a Community Safety and Security Branch of the JCF). Often though the report uses ‘community security’ and in places ‘violence prevention’ is used interchangeably as well.

13. The ToR for this assessment stipulates that its objective is “to determine the most effective strategies for community safety and security”\(^\text{12}\). This requires defining what is meant by community safety and security.

14. Community security is a concept that seeks to operationalise human security, human development and state building paradigms at the local level. Narrowly defined it includes both group and personal security. This approach focuses on ensuring that communities and their members are ‘free from fear’. Yet a broader contemporary definition also includes action on a wider range of social issues to ensure ‘freedom from want’.

15. At the core of community security is the objective of developing effective states that are accountable to citizens for the effective delivery of services. A key focus is on developing inclusive political processes to manage state-society relations.

**Box 1: Definition of community security\(^\text{13}\)**

Community security is a programmatic approach that integrates security and development interventions. It brings together a wide range of state and civil society actors to identify the causes of insecurity and develop a coordinated response to them at the community level, and an enabling environment at the national level. It emphasises participatory assessments, planning and accountability and seeks to improve service delivery, reduce social exclusion, enhance relations between social groups and strengthen democratic governance.

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\(^{12}\) P2, ‘Terms of reference for consultancy assessment of community security and transformation programmes in Jamaica’.

\(^{13}\) This is drawn from ‘Community Security and Social Cohesion: A Concept Paper’, UNDP (forthcoming).
Identifying key success factors

16. In the context of this assessment and the ToR\textsuperscript{14} key success factors are identified in terms of the following:

i. \textit{Programme design}: To what extent did the target interventions have the potential for addressing the needs of the communities?

ii. \textit{Programme objectives}: How effective are the relevant aims and objectives in relation to the roles and responsibilities of the various actors and framework? This is analysed against the implementation and future development and harmonisation of such initiatives.

iii. \textit{Means}: How well does the current nature, volume and mix of programmes address issues of community security? What are the patterns of implementation and the nature and structure of partnerships between different agencies and community based organisations?

iv. \textit{Outcome}: To what extent did the implementation of the programmes influence target communities and beneficiaries and what is the overall progress of the programmes?

SECTION II: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

\textbf{Programme Categories}

17. Although the 10 programmes that were assessed share some common objectives, they are of very different natures and so an assessment methodology was designed in recognition of this. The programmes were divided into three categories: Community implementation - CSI, CSJP, ICBSP, PMI and PPP; multi-level - COMET, JVPPSD and NTP; and funding sources - CDF and PRPII.

\textbf{Community implementation - CSI, CSJP, ICBSP, PMI and PPP}

18. The CSI, CSJP, ICBSP and PMI are all currently engaged in substantial community-level activities. The PPP is a special case amongst the target group as it ended in 2004, whilst all of the other nine programmes are ongoing. A public survey of residents in the PPP focus communities could not be relied upon as people’s memories are often not accurate over such a period of time. The PPP was therefore assessed through a review of project documents, interviews with the implementing agency (the Kingston Restoration Company) and interviews with other key stakeholders\textsuperscript{15}.

\textbf{Multi-level - COMET, JVPPSD and NTP}

19. The COMET project began with a focus on three communities – Central Village, Flanker and Grant’s Pen. However, after a review in 2008 it moved away from a focus on pilot communities to concentrate on

\textsuperscript{14}See page 2 of the TOR, section 2 (Specific Objectives)

\textsuperscript{15}Due to pressure of time, the PPP is the only one of the 10 target programmes that has not yet been fully assessed. This will be addressed before the submission of the final report.
Assessment: Community Security & Transformation Programmes in Jamaica

providing institutional support to the JCF to support the nationwide roll-out of community policing and the implementation of the recommendations of the JCF Strategic Review. The assessment therefore examined the COMET programme more in terms of its focus at the institutional level, rather than at the community level. However, Flanker was among the sample communities selected for the assessment (see below) and so it was possible to also get insights into COMET’s previous community-level engagement.

20. The JVPPSD programme had only been underway for six months at the start of the assessment and had not yet started to work in-depth at the community level. Activities undertaken so far are primarily institutional strengthening and policy development. It was therefore inappropriate to use the same community-level assessment methodology as for longer-running programmes. Instead, the assessment team looked at the UNDP programme to examine its design and its similarities and differences with the other programmes. A key focus was on assessing the organisation’s potential comparative advantage and identifying how to increase synergies with other programmes.

21. The NTP was being launched at the time of writing this report. The programme is situated in the Office of the Prime Minister but is non-governmental. The programme designers have identified 12 National Core Values that each citizen will be encouraged to adopt through a comprehensive communication programme geared at influencing values and attitude of the citizenry. This programme was assessed with the aim of identifying synergies and comparative advantages in the areas of community safety and security.

**Funding sources** - CDF and PRPII

22. Both the CDF and PRPII programmes are at early stage of development and so it is too early to assess their influence at a community level. The assessment therefore looked strategically at these two programmes through the review of project documents and discussion with programme staff and key informants.

**RESEARCH DESIGN**

**All programmes**

23. All 10 programmes were reviewed using a combination of of desk reviews, programme consultations and key informant interviews:

*Desk research*

24. At the start of the assessment the consultants reviewed key documentation from each of the programmes to be assessed, including programme documents, progress reports, mid-term reviews, evaluations, surveys and budgets.

*Programme consultations*

25. The assessment team interviewed the managers and key staff of each target programme to introduce the assessment and question them regarding the scope and impact of their interventions.
National key informant interviews

26. A large number of individual interviews were conducted with key national and international stakeholders including:

- GoJ officials
- Senior JCF officers
- Heads of IDP agencies
- Heads of NGOs
- Academics and opinion formers

Community level programmes

27. In line with the ToR, the assessment team examined experiences of community security interventions at the local level. The CSI, CSJP, ICBSP and PMI were examined in greater detail through the following additional research process.

Local key informant interviews

28. The consultants spent on average two days in each of 11 sample communities (see below) conducting key informant interviews with a range of local stakeholders including:

- Local programme implementing partners.
- Inspectors in charge of local police station, the Divisional Police Commander and Community Policing/Community Relations officers (in cases where the latter have been appointed).
- Local SDC representatives and the head and lead members of the Community Development Committee or equivalent.
- Political representatives.

Focus Groups

29. Focus groups were facilitated in each community with:

- Community leaders including heads of community-based organisations, religious leaders, school teachers and local business owners.
- Young men aged 17-25 (GoJ statistics show that male youth in this age group are the main victims and perpetrators of violent crimes and hence a key target group).
- Beneficiaries of programme services.

30. In order to ensure that the views and experiences of vulnerable groups were heard, a fourth focus group was facilitated in each community with alternately:

- Women
- Children aged 10-16.
31. In selecting focus group participants, a balance was ensured between people who had been involved in the project and those who had no exposure to it. The list of questions used as a basis for the focus groups and key informant interviews is provided in Annex B.

Perception Survey

32. A household survey was carried out in all 11 communities. The survey was designed so as to gain an insight into citizens’ perceptions of security, social capital and project awareness.

33. The survey instrument included a range of questions to gauge whether there have been any changes in the security situation since the projects began, the level of awareness of the programmes, views on the programmes’ effectiveness, and the intervention areas which would have the greatest impact on community security. A pilot survey was carried out in December 2008 in Rose Town - a community where at least one social intervention programme is being implemented but which is not one of the 11 sample communities listed above. The survey questionnaire was reviewed and further revised after this experience.

SAMPLE SELECTION

Sample Communities

34. In consultation with managers of the target programmes and the Project Management Committee, a sample of 13 communities was selected to examine on the basis of agreed criteria. As a result of an administrative delay and ongoing violence in Grant's Pen and Waterhouse, the number of sample communities was subsequently reduced to 11.

35. The selection was done according to the following criteria:

- Communities where the programmes identify that progress has been possible and they have had the biggest impact, enabling the identification of key success factors.
- Communities where the programmes identify that they have faced significant challenges, highlighting the obstacles to progress in some circumstances.
- Communities where just one social intervention programme is working, allowing the examination of the influence of specific interventions.
- Communities where a number of programmes are working to examine the extent to which interventions are coordinated.
- Geographic spread.
- A minimum of two communities per programme but a larger sample for bigger programmes.
- Selection of some communities which are priorities for the implementation of community policing by the JCF to examine the extent to which social and security interventions are coordinated (six were included).
- Selection of at least one community which are on the GoJ’s top 10 hot-spot list (one was included).
36. The table below provides an overview of which programmes are operative in which sample communities. The OPM column refers to the GoJ’s top 10 hot-spot communities. The JCF column refers to communities that are priorities for the implementation of community policing.

Table 1: Programmes working in sample communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communities</th>
<th>CSI</th>
<th>CSJP</th>
<th>JSIF</th>
<th>PMI</th>
<th>Ex-COMET</th>
<th>JCF</th>
<th>OPM</th>
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**Sample size**

37. The sample design was developed in conjunction with STATIN based on household figures provided from the 2001 census (the most recently available). It was designed to provide a +/- 5% confidence interval (margin of error) and a 95% confidence level. Given the nature of the research project, the sample design was developed in order to be able to report on views in individual communities and groups of communities (e.g. those which have experienced a specific type of intervention, or those where a specific programme is operating). This necessitates a much larger sample size than if the same confidence interval and level was required to report back solely on aggregate views across the 11 sample communities. In total, 3,102 household interviews were conducted with the sample size per community ranging from 171 in Hannah Town to 356 in Whitfield Town. The sample size for each community is shown in the table in Annex C. The field research was conducted in January, February and March 2009.

38. The sample aimed at polling a proportionate number of youths under 25 years. A review of similar surveys in Jamaica showed that youth views are often under-represented. Youth are a key target group for this research project and so a quota of 18-20% for the number of youth polled in each community was established, based upon the proportion of youth in each community identified in the national census. In total, 30% of respondents were under 25 years old, so the survey is representative of the views and experiences of this key target group.
39. After discussions with STATIN it was agreed that the sample should be a multi-stage sample with the first stage being a random selection of which enumeration districts (EDs) in each community to survey. For example, if a community has 20 EDs then it would only be necessary to survey five of these EDs for a representative survey.

40. The second stage was a selection of dwellings to be visited in the EDs that are selected in the first stage. This was done by proportionately dividing the total sample size for that community between the selected EDs, based on the number of households that STATIN’s figures show are present in each district. Once the number of dwellings to be visited in each of these EDs was established the sampling interval was calculated (e.g. one in every three households). At least two call backs were conducted for selected households that were non-responding.

41. The third stage was the selection of individuals to be interviewed in the selected dwellings. To ensure that the youth quota was achieved, enumerators asked at each household if there was a person aged 18-25 available for interview. If more than one person in that age group was available then the person with the next birthday was selected.

**Analysis Process**

42. The analysis process was guided by the qualitative findings of the research. Qualitative data were then reinforced by the quantitative findings of the household survey. In order to attempt to identify the outcomes of programmes, the survey findings have been triangulated with police and hospital data. The emphasis was on identifying “success factors, challenges and lessons learnt”\(^{16}\).

**Indicators of progress towards outcomes**

43. The assessment examined different dimensions of community security as indicators of the influence of programmes on the target communities:

   a) Reported crime and injuries due to violence.
   b) Public perceptions of security.
   c) Social capital
   d) Public awareness of the programmes and views on their impact.

   a) *Reported crime and injuries due to violence*

44. The assessment examined JCF statistics of major crimes (murder, shooting, rape, carnal abuse, robbery, breaking, larceny) to see if there is any correlation between the implementation of programmes in target communities and the rates of reported major crimes. The assessment also examined hospital data of treated injuries due to violence to see if there was any correlation between the numbers of injured people treated in hospital and programme implementation. Hospital data often provides a more accurate picture of violent crime than police statistics due to problems of under-reporting of crime. In addition, as community confidence in the police improves, reporting rates may increase. Using police data alone may, therefore, not give an accurate reflection of the crime situation and the influence of programme implementation.

\(^{16}\) Op cit. ‘Notes of the Technical Committee Inception Meeting’.
interventions. The assessment analysed both police and hospital data in order to get a more comprehensive view.

b) Public perceptions of security

45. Security is not just about physical protection but also about how people feel. The assessment team therefore conducted a household survey in the 11 sample communities to assess whether citizens perceive there to have been any changes in the security situation since the programmes began. Questions focused on fear of crime and violence, rates of victimisation and willingness to report crime. The survey instrument was agreed with the Project Management Committee and is attached in Annex D. These issues were also explored in focus groups so as to be able to contrast qualitative and quantitative findings.

c) Social capital

46. The household survey and focus groups also assessed the extent to which social networks exist that connect groups together; the level of participation and active engagement of different social groups; the level of trust between community members and in local institutions; and the responsiveness of the state to citizens. Participation and inclusion are key aspects of community security and these questions provide an indication of programmes performance and impact. The survey and focus groups also assessed the collective efficacy of communities. This is essentially, how willing are community members to help their neighbours, and how likely it is that other community members can be relied upon to take action for the common good. Research has shown that communities where residents feel engaged and share a belief in the community’s capability to act (e.g. to prevent children skipping school and hanging out on the street corner) tend to have lower rates of violence.17

d) Public awareness of the programmes and views on their impact

47. The level of public awareness about programmes in target communities was also assessed. It asked people to highlight whether, in their opinion, programmes have had an impact on reducing crime and preventing violence in their communities.

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SECTION III: REVIEW OF PROGRAMMES

48. This section provides an overall review of the design and implementation of each of the 10 focus programmes. It reviews the progress made towards achieving their objectives, recognising that all of the programmes started at different times and are at different stages of implementation. It should be stressed that this assessment project was not designed as a detailed evaluation of each programme. Where available, a summary of key findings and recommendations of individual evaluations commissioned by the programmes or donors are included in boxes. This assessment does provide an overview though of some of the achievements, strengths and weaknesses of different programmes with a view to how effectiveness can be increased in the future. It also assesses the comparative advantages of the different programmes.

CONSTITUENCY DEVELOPMENT FUND (CDF)

Background

49. The Constituency Development Fund (CDF) is a new initiative that was established in the Government’s 2008-9 annual budget. It had a budget of J$2.45 billion in that financial year and is estimated to receive an allocation of J$2.54 billion in the 09/10 budget. This approximately equates to J$40 million per constituency in the 08/09 year.

50. A Programme Management Unit has been established in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) “to ensure that projects to be implemented are determined by the community” and provide oversight of expenditure and implementation. Regional project managers each cover three parishes and an officer in each parish helps develop draft project documents. Constituency Project Oversight Committees are meant to be set up in each constituency. The project proposals are submitted to an evaluation committee in the OPM for approval. Disbursements are then made to appropriate GoJ ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) (e.g. the Social Development Commission, National Water Commission, National Works Agency) either for them to carry out the work themselves or to tender for private contractors.

Programme design

51. The CDF’s primary objective is “to improve the effectiveness of the peoples’ representative by way of a designated funding mechanism for constituency projects.”

52. The CDF seeks to:

- Promote human and infrastructure development at the community and constituency levels.
- Catalyse economic activities at the constituency level.
- Foster local governance including good environmental stewardship.
- Improve service delivery.
- Bring government and the people closer together.
- Increase the response capacity of the elected representatives.

53. The types of projects it is designed to support include:

18 Taken from a powerpoint presentation, 'CDF March Presentation Rev. New Version', provided by the CDF to the assessment team.
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- Development (social and physical) – disaster mitigation, community centres, hard courts for sports and general infrastructure, educational projects.
- Economic enablement – micro financing for small entrepreneurs.
- Welfare and emergency.
- Social housing.

Progress towards outcomes

54. The scale of resources available - J$40 million (US$450,780)\(^{19}\) per constituency per year - dwarfs the budgets of other community intervention programmes. The programme is encouraging medium-term planning – each MP has been asked for a five year development plan for his/her constituency - however, it is not clear how this is linked to formal PDC and CDC planning processes.

55. The CDF though has a number of weaknesses from a community security perspective. Firstly, reducing crime and violence is not a stated objective. This seems an omission given that it is the main issue undermining development in many constituencies. Secondly, the assessment found that there had been little or no consultation between MPs and CDCs about the use of CDF resources in most of the sample communities. However, in the Kingston Western Constituency, the Fletcher’s Land, Hannah Town and Matthew’s Lane CDCs have been requested to submit project proposals to their Member of Parliament. There was also no awareness in communities of a standard procedure for project identification.\(^{20}\) Thirdly, the assessment has found that political partisanship is a key factor undermining security in many communities (see Section VII\(^{1}\)). Regardless of the checks and balances that are put in place, therefore, linking the allocation of community development resources to MPs could arguably invite suspicion and risks exacerbating tensions.

Recommendations - CDF

- **Increasing community security** should be established as an explicit key objective of the CDF.

- **The allocation of resources by the CDF should be determined by CDCs and PDCs** on the basis of priorities identified by community members in Community Safety Plans. In volatile communities the development of five year plans should be a participatory process led by the SDC and PDC/CDC.

\(^{19}\) Calculated on the basis of J$88.74/$US1 exchange rate on 2.5.09

\(^{20}\) Guidelines on the process that should be followed in the identification of projects have apparently recently been completed but were not made available to the assessment team.
COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT AND TRANSFORMATION PROJECT (COMET)

Background

56. The COMET programme is supported by USAID and was designed to build upon the work done by two previous projects - the PPP (see below) and the Community Policing Initiative in Grant’s Pen. It was conceived of as taking the Grants Pen policing ‘model’ and adapting it to work in other pilot communities – Central Village in St Catherine and Flanker in St James. It has since adapted its approach to operating at a more strategic level and providing institutional support, primarily to the JCF for the roll out of community policing.

Programme design

57. The strategic objective of COMET is “Improved governance through citizen security and participation”. It was designed with two interim results:

- Civil society advocacy of public interests increased
- Public safety in targeted communities improved.

58. As the programme has evolved, the focus of its annual workplans has changed but remains focused within these two broad areas. COMET’s 2009 workplan has four goals:

- More effective policing.
- Supporting GoJ anti-corruption efforts.
- Building capacity for sustainable community transformation.
- Strengthen micro enterprise productivity.

Progress towards outcomes

i) More effective policing

59. The change in approach of the COMET programme was driven by an assessment of community-based policing (CBP) in Jamaica (see box below). This recommended that a new strategy of providing systemic support to the JCF would be more effective than an approach that just targeted three to five limited geographic areas. Changing approach mid-project is not easy and is an achievement for COMET. The benefit of this change of strategy is now being felt as the JCF rolls out CBP in 38 communities (two per police division). It is understood that senior officers in the JCF are now planning to move beyond even this phased approach to an island-wide roll out. This may place increasing demands on COMET in terms of strengthening the police’s capacity to manage this implementation.

Box 2: Jamaica – Community-based Policing Assessment

Jamaica – Community-based Policing Assessment

“The assessment team found that Grants Pen is not a ‘model’ either in terms of success or replicability but that there are valuable lessons to be learned which can assist with the ongoing development of CBP throughout Jamaica.”

“While CBP has been attempted in various forms and at various times in the history of Jamaican policing there has never been a significant sustained implementation programme. A number of factors have been identified to be addressed to make such an implementation of CBP more effective. These include leadership and accountability within the JCF; effective partnership working; clear policy support direction; enhanced corporate communications and increased organizational capacity. Nonetheless, while there are inhibitors to change various circumstances referenced in the report suggest that the time is opportune to progress the implementation of CBP in Jamaica.”

60. COMET is also supporting the MNS in the development of a gang prevention strategy. Given the rise in gang-related crime in Jamaica this is a valuable initiative. There is a need to ensure though that it is closely linked with the forthcoming initiative to develop a community safety policy (see Section VII).

ii) Supporting GoJ anti-corruption efforts

61. None of the other programme assessed have a focus on anti-corruption and so this is a niche for COMET.

iii) Building capacity for sustainable community transformation

62. COMET is providing training and resources to JCF and SDC officers to enable them to support the development of Community Safety and Security Plans. This is an important step that has the potential to help increase the harmonisation of different interventions at the local level.

63. COMET is also sponsoring remedial education and skills training programmes for at-risk youth, focusing on the CBP roll out communities. This is a much more community-level intervention that most of their other activities. COMET’s education programme reaches a large number of children as they sponsored 4000 children to prepare them for their GSAT exams in 2009. This intervention was targeted in the communities that the JCF has selected as priorities for the roll out of community policing. School principals were asked to select their weakest students to receive online tutorials from ‘Go GSAT’. The COMET programme says it has identified a correlation between children failing their GSAT, dropping out of school and joining gangs. In this light, GSAT programmes are important violence prevention interventions. It is not clear though how the COMET education intervention is coordinated with the work of other programmes working on the same issue in some of the same communities.
iv) Strengthening micro enterprise productivity

64. COMET plans to support the development of a policy and regulatory framework for micro enterprise development, develop the capacity of micro finance institutions and provide technical support (e.g. in business development) for local entrepreneurs through grants to micro enterprise service providers. This is an area identified in this assessment as important for community security. COMET has established a partnership with the Development Bank of Jamaica to develop a micro finance policy and establish a lending facility to make funds available to micro finance institutions which, in turn, will provide small loans to entrepreneurs. COMET plans to work with Parish Development Committees to develop Economic Development Plans that identify critical areas in the local economy for employment and the economic life of communities. These are intended to help provide guidance to identify local entrepreneurs and focus investment in communities.

Gaps in programme design

65. COMET's core strength and added value is the institutional support it provides to the JCF (and SDC) for the implementation of CBP. If the JCF does plan to implement an immediate island-wide roll out of CBP then more demands may be placed on COMET in this area. There is a question as to whether the large portfolio of other activities it has planned for this year will enable COMET to play this role to the full. The community-level focus on skills training and education under objective iii also seems to indicate a contrasting approach to the focus on institutional strengthening and strategic level engagement under its other objectives.

Recommendation

- **COMET should consider giving even greater emphasis to the policing aspect of their work.** This is in recognition of the finding of this assessment that strengthening police-community relations is one of the two most important interventions for community security, and the envisaged island-wide roll out of CBP by the JCF.

**COMMUNITY SECURITY INITIATIVE (CSI)**

Background

66. The Community Security Initiative (CSI) was established as a joint initiative between the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of National Security. It was established in 2006 and is supported by a £1 million grant from UK DFID. It was designed to enter communities after the removal of a Don by the police and help to reintroduce the state. CSI currently works in five communities in Kingston, St Andrew and St Catherine: August Town, Brown’s Town (Dunkirk), March Pen, Matthew’s Lane and Highlight View (Mud Town).
Programme design

67. “The Community Security Initiative (CSI) seeks to create more efficient and effective ‘joined-up action’ between existing programmes focused on improving security and safety, reducing poverty and strengthening social development in critical urban communities... It will seek to:

- Aid the social transformation of crime and violence prone, gang dominated communities into safe zones with legitimate social and economic governance processes and structures.

- Enhance the reach of public, social and economic services to poor socially excluded communities and strengthen their capacity to resist penetration and domination by criminals.

- Support the establishment of a network of Community Safety and Security Groups (CSSGs) of citizens to work in partnership with the local police and civic groups to consolidate and preserve community development gains.”

Progress towards outcomes

68. To help achieve the above goals, the CSI programme has the following outputs:

i. To create the necessary conditions, i.e. a secure environment for the regular delivery/provision of essential public services such as policing, solid waste management, public lighting, sewerage disposal.

69. Some progress has been made in increasing the delivery of public services. Regular collection of solid waste was reported in all three sample communities. The sewage system in Matthew’s Lane was upgraded by the National Water Commission (NWC) in 2006 after intervention by CSI. Debris has been cleared from public lots in Matthew’s Lane and community playfields upgraded. CSI organises stakeholder meetings in each community that bring together residents and service providers to try and increase accountability. There is, however, no method of measuring the local service delivery of state providers.

ii) To provide protection for forums to pursue forgiveness, reconciliation, restoration and ultimate healing of relationships within and between communities - primarily post-“Operation Kingfish” communities.

70. Members of the CDCs in CSI’s communities have been trained in restorative justice, conflict resolution and mediation by the Dispute Resolution Foundation. In addition, all community members who receive vocational training must also participate in training in conflict resolution, values and attitudes, healthy lifestyle, life skills and social skills. Much of this training is led by Dr Abel from the Department of Psychiatry at the University of the West Indies.

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22 The wording of the Purpose and Objectives in the CSI Handbook is slightly different from that contained in the programme’s logframe that was agreed between the Ministry of National Security and DFID and which the programme uses to report progress against. It is suggested that consultations take place between MNS, CSI and DFID to confirm which wording is currently operative.

23 P3, ‘Operating Procedures and Regulations of the Community Security Initiative Programme.'
iii) *Increase and facilitate residents’ access to and consumption of productive social and economic services, such as education, health, micro-finance and housing finance.*

Table 2: Beneficiaries of CSI services in sample communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Matthews Lane</th>
<th>August Town</th>
<th>March Pen</th>
<th>Browns Town</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vocational skills training</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life skills/behaviour modification (includes values &amp;</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attitudes, protocol &amp; etiquette, healthy lifestyles)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community animator training</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job placement</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job counseling (including work ethics &amp; attitude,</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>148</td>
<td></td>
<td>436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interviewing techniques and effective communication)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parenting education</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>155</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remedial studies</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training in community leadership/capacity building</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict resolution (incl. mediation training and</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>118</td>
<td></td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>restorative justice)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(incl. 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>officers)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult CXC programme (Maths &amp; English)</td>
<td>102</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurial training</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniformed groups – Girl Guide (incl. six residents</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trained as Leaders)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

71. CSI’s main focus under this objective has been on employment training which it complements with employment readiness and behaviour modification training. An officer with HR experience has been employed to identify job placements for trainees. Even with this range of activities, of 259 residents from the four sample communities who participated in the vocational skills training programme up to June 2009, only 78 (30%) were placed in jobs and only 42 (16% of those are still employed). CSI has found that when people get jobs they find it difficult to retain them, often because they are not adequately prepared for the work environment. CSI are planning to increase their focus on entrepreneurship in response to the changing economic climate.

72. A challenge for the programme is to increase the targeting of interventions at male youth. The programme operates on a principle of “equal opportunities for all community members” rather than

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24 Information supplied by CSI programme, June 2009.
25 Interview with programme staff 17 December 2008.
targeting to key groups. The bulk of skills training and job placements so far have been in issues such as cosmetology, food preparation and housekeeping that are more likely to appeal to women and only 24% of the persons trained to date have been men (see Table 3 below). It is accepted that in volatile communities it can take time to engage male at-risk youth, however more could be done to proactively engage them. The programme is beginning to try and do this. A partnership is being established with Excelsior Community College for 30 males to participate in a computer repairs training programme to commence in June 2009. Other programmes targeting males such as electrical installation and auto mechanics are apparently being planned.

Table 3: Beneficiaries of CSI vocational skills training in sample communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cosmetology</td>
<td>Matthews Lane</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Browns Town</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March Pen</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housekeeping</td>
<td>Matthews Lane</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Browns Town</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Preparation</td>
<td>Matthews Lane</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Browns Town</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March Pen</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Office Administration (GOA)</td>
<td>Matthews Lane</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Browns Town</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurship &amp; Business Plan</td>
<td>Matthews Lane</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Browns Town</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food &amp; Beverage (Waitering)</td>
<td>Matthews Lane</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Browns Town</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March Pen</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior Decoration</td>
<td>Matthews Lane</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbering</td>
<td>March Pen</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Videography</td>
<td>March Pen</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Guard</td>
<td>March Pen</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td></td>
<td>259</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Information supplied by CSI programme, June 2009.
iv) To assign social intervention initiatives to appropriate social agencies under the direction of the Development Division (Cabinet Office) within two months of the launch of security operations.

75. CSI convenes local stakeholder groups to coordinate the activities of social intervention programmes in its target communities. For example, the August Town one brings together the CDC, CSJP, SDC and UWI. These are valuable forums, however, they could be strengthened further by the inclusion of wider GoJ service providers (particularly the JCF). The coordination activities of CSI are limited to the five communities where it operates and do not include other communities where security operations take place.

v) To promote the emergence of legitimate development-oriented leadership and group processes in Jamaica’s socially excluded urban communities.

73. One of CSI’s main comparative advantages is its focus on building the capacity of local governance structures. CSI works in communities that were formerly under the control of Dons and where no formal governance structures existed. Its work on building the capacity of CDCs is done in partnership with SDC and with Dr Henley Morgan’s Caribbean Applied Technology Centre Ltd. CATC has developed a comprehensive 12 week training package for CDCs. The CDC in Brown’s Town is probably the best developed and effective of any of the ones examined in this assessment. The Matthew’s Lane CDC has faced some recent challenges but is generally well capacitated. The August Town CDC is fairly recently established but has significant potential and the March Pen CDC has significant strengths but is undermined by the existence of a parallel community committee supported by JSIF.

vi) To establish a credible inter-ministerial and inter-agency medium-term cooperative framework for delivering actions to achieve strategic safety and security and social development goals.

74. Although CSI has been effective in local coordination, it was originally envisaged as having a much stronger strategic emphasis on coordinating the delivery of services by MDAs. A national Convergence Group of different government agencies (chaired by the Director of JSIF) has ceased to meet regularly. As the programme has faced the challenges of coordination, it has shifted its focus towards implementation. This at times presents an increasing risk of overlap with other programmes. No inter-ministerial and inter-agency framework currently exists. The absence of this strategic partnership with other MDAs has limited the level of improvement of service delivery.
Box 3: CSI - Output to Purpose Review

CSI ‘Output to Purpose Review’

“The low level of male participation in training opportunities needs to be addressed through further training needs assessment and the provision of opportunities that are considered to be more male-oriented such as carpentry and auto-mechanics.”

“It has been difficult for the CSI programme to establish strategic relationships with state agencies and other actors in the community because agencies have been isolated from these communities for so long that there is a hesitancy to get involved until stability proves itself. However, what the programme has done is to build productive relationships at the community level in order to advance the programme. While this has worked to the benefit of residents, there is a risk that the absence of institutional relationships could mitigate the effectiveness of the programme in other communities, where ground-level relationships might be harder to establish.”

“One of the main outputs of this programme is to facilitate the creation of legitimate leadership structures in the target communities, and provide some capacity building support to the fledgling councils. The councils are then encouraged to develop action plans for their communities, and the CSI programme team has already been encouraged to start thinking about ‘weaning’ those communities that have grown with the programme.” [original emphasis]

Taken from ‘DFID CSI Output to Purpose Review’, 2008.

Gaps in programme design

75. CSI was conceived as a co-ordinating mechanism for reintroducing state service into volatile communities after security operations. However, whilst some of its objectives focus firmly on this coordination role, the wording of others has led it more into implementation. This has created an internal tension as to what its appropriate role is.

76. There is also a lack of clarity in the programme design as to whether the Convergence Group was just designed to coordinate interventions in the small number of CSI communities or had a wider coordinating role in other communities.

77. In hindsight, there is a question as to whether a special programme like CSI is actually the right vehicle to facilitate strategic national level coordination between government MDAs. From the point of view of strengthening governance it might be more appropriate for a core GoJ MDA to play that role.
Citizen Security and Justice Programme (CSJP)

Background

78. The Citizen Security and Justice Programme (CSJP) was established in 2001 and full implementation activities started in 2002. It is financed with a US$20.6 million loan from the Inter-American Development Bank and has a programme execution unit under the Ministry of National Security. The first phase of the programme has now ended and a second phase and IDB loan are planned. In the interim period, the programme's operations are being sustained by the GoJ.

79. CSJP is the biggest of all the community security programmes – both in terms of number of communities and range of social interventions. The programme currently works in 26 communities across the island. Its first 15 communities were all in Kingston and St Andrew: Allman Town/Woodford Park, Ambrook Lane/Cassia Park, August Town, Denham Town, Drewland, Fletchers Land, Grants Pen, Hannah Town, Kencot, Mountain View, Rockfort, Southside/Tel Aviv, Tower Hill, Trench Town and Waterhouse. In 2007, the MNS decided to expand the programme to West Jamaica and added 10 communities in St James and one in Westmoreland. These additional communities are: Canterbury, Farm Heights, Flanker, Glendevon, Granville, Mount Salem, North Gully, Norwood, Rose Heights, Russia and Salt Spring.

Programme design

80. The programme’s purpose is to “implement a comprehensive set of activities aimed at controlling and reducing, on a sustained basis, criminal activity in Jamaica.” It has three objectives:

- Prevent and reduce violence.
- Strengthen crime management capabilities.
- Improve the delivery of justice services.

Recommendations - CSI

- CSI should place more focus on targeting male youth in its employment and training programmes.
- CSI should review its experience of providing job placements, employment readiness training and entrepreneurship support with the view to establishing a ‘best practice’ methodology for alternative livelihoods.
- CSI should develop an exit strategy for its interventions in communities and strengthen partnerships with other MDAs for sustainability.
81. In order to achieve these objectives a number of priority activities were identified for support in Phase I. These were organised into four basic inter-related components:

- National strategy development.
- Capacity building of the Ministry of National Security and Ministry of Justice.
- Strengthening of the justice system.
- Community action.

82. It is currently envisaged that Phase II will focus on:

- Establishing a youth transformation centre for the Department of Correctional Services.
- Completion and implementation of an Integrated Management Information System.
- Community interventions.

**Progress towards outcomes**

83. This assessment focuses solely on the community action component of CSJP’s programme. The main focus areas of support under this component are designed to be:

i) *Delivery of violence prevention services by NGOs (including dispute resolution training, life skills education, remedial education and parenting).*

84. Partnerships have been developed with a range of NGOs including Dispute Resolution Foundation, Kingston Restoration Company, Peace and Love in Schools (PALS), Sistren Theatre Collective and Youth Opportunities Unlimited (YOU). A significant number of residents have been trained and the table below indicates numbers for five of the six CSJP sample communities examined in this assessment. However, there is no evident mechanism for assessing the outcome of this training either in terms of the effect on the individuals or the community.

ii) *Improvement of community facilities*

85. Community centres have been built in a number of communities and rapid impact projects (such as multi-purpose courts) delivered.

iii) *Improvement of police/community relations*

86. This was not a significant feature of CSJP’s current work in the sample communities examined by this assessment. However, some support had been provided in August Town to the development of a Crime Prevention Committee. Given the finding of this assessment that improving police-community relations is one of the keys to community security, this area of the CSJP programme could be substantially enhanced.
Table 4: Beneficiaries of CSJP interventions in sample communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>August Town</th>
<th>Mountain View</th>
<th>Fletcher’s Land</th>
<th>Hannah Town</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homework Assistance, Remedial Education for Primary School Students</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Continuing Education (Instruction in CXC Math and English)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adolescent Life Skills Education, including Counselling and Mentoring</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>Delivered under Performing Arts training</td>
<td>233</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parenting Education</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performing Arts Training (including Life Skills Education)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational Skills Training (including Life Skills Education and Remedial Education)</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

iv) Strengthening of community-based organisations

87. CSJP does not appear to have as strong a focus on building the capacity of local governance structures as CSI or JSIF and has the impression of a more ‘top down’ approach. The situation differs across the sample communities examined. The CDC in Fletcher’s Land has received substantial support from CSJP and demonstrates capacity. In Flanker, the Peace and Justice Centre is already well capacitated and CSJP has provided additional support. In Hannah Town and Russia, the CDCs are very weak. In August Town and Mountain View, CSJP has taken the decision not to invest in the CDCs because they lack capacity, viewing this as a role for SDC. In both communities, members of the leaders’ focus groups commented that they felt that CSJP “did its own thing” and did not work through the CDC to coordinate its interventions.

v) Sourcing employment, training and other forms of support for residents

88. This is CSJP’s main current area of focus. Of all the programmes, CSJP has the most significant focus on skills training with the largest number of beneficiaries. Table 4 above shows that 342 people have been trained in the CSJP sample communities studied in this assessment, 194 of these were men and 148 women.

89. CSJP has significantly increased its focus on skills training in the last year. Prior to 2008, CSJP focused on assisting persons to access regular HEART programmes. However, no monitoring mechanism was established to find out what happened to the beneficiaries post-training. In February 2008, CSJP began designing and managing its own training programmes. As of March 2009, 342 people had received

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27 Information supplied by CSJP programme, figures correct as of March 2009.
training in the sample communities studied in this assessment and 901 residents (565 males and 336 females) had received training across all of the CSJP communities. Of these 901 people only 50 have completed their training, and the others are all in progress. It is still therefore too early to judge the outcome of this intervention. Of the 50 people who have completed training so far, only seven (14%) have found permanent jobs, others have done occasional jobs.

90. CSJP has found that it takes most trainees more than six months to complete their training course because they require preparation first. The programme has also concluded that it needs to provide training up to HEART Level 2 standard in order to increase the chances of people finding jobs. Level 1 is a fairly basic introductory course and in the current economic climate employers are looking for workers with more developed skills.

Gaps in programme design

91. CSJP does not have a focus on enhancing the delivery of services by state agencies in its target communities. It operates as a special programme that procures and delivers its own services. This can have short term benefits in ensuring rapid response to community needs, but it does not necessarily address long term governance and service delivery issues. There is therefore a question mark about what happens when CSJP pulls out of a community and the sustainability of some interventions. This has yet to be tested as, six years after it went into its first group of communities, CSJP is still operating in all of them.

Recommendations - CSJP

- CSJP should increase its focus on developing the capacity of local governance structures.
- CSJP should place a stronger emphasis on community policing.
- CSJP should develop an exit strategy for its interventions in communities and develop partnerships with other MDAs for sustainability.

28 ‘CSJP – Community Intervention data as at March 2009.’
INNER CITY BASIC SERVICES FOR THE POOR (ICBSP)

Background

92. The Inner City Basic Services for the Poor (ICBSP) project is financed with a loan from the World Bank and is implemented by the Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF). It is a five year programme (May 2006 – June 2011) and has a budget of US$32.8 million.

Programme design

93. The programme’s objective is to “improve quality of life in 12 Jamaican inner-city areas and poor urban informal settlements” through:

- Increasing access and improving the quality of water, sanitation, solid waste collection systems, electricity, roads, drainage and related community infrastructure for over 60,000 residents of poor urban informal settlements through capital investments and innovative arrangements for operations and maintenance. Infrastructure work is intended to reflect principles of the Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) approach. (US$21.85M).
- Facilitate access to microfinance for enterprise development and incremental home improvement for entrepreneurs and residents in project areas (US$1.25M).
- Increase security of tenure for eligible households in project areas (US$0.6M).
- Enhanced public safety through mediation services, community capacity building, skills training and related social services (US$3.9M).

94. The final objective on public safety is divided into five core social prevention areas:

- Mediation and conflict resolution.
- Alternative livelihoods and skills development.
- Family support programmes.
- Youth education and recreation.
- CBO capacity building.

95. The ICBSP project has Community Liaison Officers in each of its target communities. These are generally of high quality and have established good relationships with the communities in which they work.

Progress towards outcomes

i. Increasing access to basic services

96. Infrastructure investment to improve basic services was designed as the core of the ICBSP. It is the programme’s main strength on paper and intended to demonstrate tangible results to residents and help increase their trust and participation. No other community security programme is investing significantly in

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29 ‘Project Appraisal Document for a Proposed Loan in the Amount of USD 29.3 Million to Jamaica for an Inner City Basic Services for the Poor Project’, February 2006.
this area and so it is an important niche. However, the programme has faced serious delays in its infrastructure work which have led to significant frustration at the community level and undermined progress. Of the five ICBSP communities examined in this assessment, significant progress on major infrastructure work had only happened by May 2009 in Whitfield Town with the removal of zinc fences. Due to the fact that none of the projects have yet been completed it is too early to assess their impact on community security.

97. Of the infrastructure interventions seen by the assessment team, the one that had the most visible potential impact on crime and violence was the removal of zinc fences in Whitfield Town. Many interviewees talked of how the zinc fence removal has reduced barriers between community members and increased security. For example, one child said “gunmen used to hide behind the fences but now they can’t.” One of the community leaders commented that removing the fences “has given the community a moral lift”. The contrast in the look and feel of the streets where zinc fences have been removed and those which have not was stark to the survey team members.

98. In Bucknor, the ICBSP programme has selected 60 households to formalise their electricity supply. Community members have to pay J$5,000 towards the cost of a legal connection and JSIF pay the balance. The initiative has been very popular in the community and is significantly over-subscribed. The level of community interest in this aspect of the programme is interesting and demonstrates that many people are willing to regularise their utility services if given the opportunity.

99. JSIF do not support large scale training programmes but do seek to certify local labourers as part of their infrastructure development work. The infrastructure work provides employment (normally for young men) and in Whitfield Town interviewees commented that crime and violence had reduced since the zinc fence removal project had started. They feared however that violence would increase as soon as the work dried up.

ii) Facilitate access to microfinance for enterprise development

100. This is a potentially valuable area of investment and an issue where only COMET out of the other programmes is working. However, three years into the programme and this component has not yet been launched in target communities.

iii) Increase security of tenure for eligible households

101. Tenure is a significant issue for community security. The Minister of Housing recently estimated that approximately one million people – a third of Jamaica’s population – live in informal settlements. Lack of tenure provides a barrier to development for residents in a number of ways, for example, they are often unable to access credit or regularise their delivery of services (e.g. electricity). The assessment team saw no evidence of progress on this objective in the sample communities.
iv) Enhanced public safety

102. The delays experienced in the above areas have meant that the programme’s focus has gravitated towards social interventions. These were only initially envisaged as playing a supporting role to the physical work but have ended up being the core of the programme so far. This takes ICBSP away from its main area of added value and often results in overlap with other community security programmes.

103. The homework and GSAT classes supported by ICBSP were generally viewed by the communities examined as being the most effective of JSIF’s interventions. However, there is no clear strategy for scaling up to engage a wider group of beneficiaries.

104. The ICBSP programme has the most structured education intervention. It supports homework and GSAT classes for 50 young children (25 in each class) in each of its communities. The age range of children attending is from six to 12 years old. Attendance levels vary but were generally reported to be good. The children are selected by the Community Committee in conjunction with the local school based on their reports. The aim is to target children who have no other source of help with school work and who are under-achieving in school (working at below Grade C level).

105. The GSAT class works to a set syllabus provided by the Ministry of Education which is then narrowed down to focus on priority topics. The homework classes mix students in different grades so there is no overall syllabus.

106. A valuable monitoring and evaluation system for the education interventions was introduced at the start of this academic year. Children sit a diagnostic test at the start of the year and then again at the end of the year to track their progress. Only two or three students apparently passed this test in one of the Whitfield Town zones, illustrating the substantial gap that most of the children need to make up. Most children have a problem with reading and as a result JSIF is reassessing in some communities whether GSAT courses are the main priority. They plan to start remedial literacy classes soon.

107. The education interventions were greatly valued by many of the beneficiaries interviewed. “Since I started coming to the class my maths has improved” and “It’s easier now for us to do our school work” were two typical comments. It is clear that the programme benefits those who attend classes, but this is only a small minority of the children in each community. There is no apparent strategy to engage the Ministry of Education (MoE) and scale up these interventions to reach out to a larger number of children.

108. The summer camps organised by JSIF were highlighted by many interviewees as being a valuable initiative. These combined education in issues such as dispute resolution with sports and entertainment for a large number of young children.

109. The programme’s focus on strengthening local governance structure is a strength, but the way in which this is implemented is a weakness in some of the communities examined. For example in Flanker and March Pen, JSIF has supported the establishment of parallel community committees to the existing CDCs (see discussion in Section VI). There are questions about the sustainability of these community

30 Figures on the number of beneficiaries of JSIF’s public safety interventions have been requested but were not received in time to include in this draft of the report.
committees as well as the four established in different zones in Whitfield Town. These four zonal committees are not linked together in a CDC and are due to wind up at the end of the programme.

110. The lack of positive male role models was cited by many interviewees as a factor fuelling young men becoming involved in gangs. “The frequent absence of fathers from homes worsens the problem of self worth and identity among youth”, as one focus group member expressed it. JSIF has recently established a mentoring programme managed by Youth Opportunities Unlimited in six of its 15 ICBSP communities. By May 2009 180 young people, 70% of whom are male, have signed up. This is an interesting initiative but it is at too early a stage in its implementation to assess its influence on community security.

**Gaps in programme design**

111. Violence prevention does not appear to be a strong enough central focus of the public safety activities. This is illustrated by the lack of activities aimed at male youth aged 14-24. A recent World Bank review of the public safety component of the programme made a number of recommendations to increase the violence prevention focus of the project (see box below).

**Box 4: ICBSP – Public Safety Component Review**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jamaica Inner City Basic Services Project – Public Safety Component Review</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Far greater attention to the social planning outcomes of all these initiatives is needed…[to] bring the various current (and proposed) projects into a more cohesive whole, with an articulated theory of change and enable a more critical assessment of what should be refined, added and abandoned.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Insufficient attention to higher risk community youth and young adults who are unattached, at the margins of the community and already involved in crime and violence.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“A reduction of specific types of crime and violence prevention…should be explicitly stated as an aim of the social interventions”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Recommendations - ICBSP**

- **JSIF should strengthen the violence prevention lens of the ICBSP** and implement the recommendations of the recent World Bank Public Safety Component Review.

- **JSIF should review its management of infrastructure projects in inner city communities.** Attention should be given to whether procedures can be streamlined to help speed up the tendering process for infrastructure projects.
Background

112. The JVPPSD programme was launched in June 2008 and is supported by UNDP. Its focus is mainly at the strategic level in terms of institutional strengthening and facilitating coordination. However, it is supporting some community level activities in Jones Town, Trench Town and Granville.

Programme design

113. The programme has five main objectives:

- Design of armed violence prevention policies and programmes.
- Capacity building of institutions to prevent armed violence and increase community safety.
- Building effectiveness and coherence of international support to armed violence prevention policies and programmes.
- Increasing safety in target communities.
- Development of a UN Country Team programme on armed violence prevention.

Progress towards outcomes

i) Design of armed violence prevention policies and programmes

114. Support has been provided to the Ministry of National Security to help establish its Policy Unit and further assistance is anticipated to support the development of the forthcoming Community Safety policy. The JVPPSD programme has also supported the Ministry of Justice in the development of its policy on restorative justice.

ii) Capacity building

115. As part of a strategy to increase sustainability, National Technical Advisers are being provided to key partner government institutions to help build their capacity, transfer skills, mainstream gender issues and provide focal points for programme coordination.

JSIF should explore whether there are opportunities to further increase the use of community-based contracting. JSIF has already begun to break up large contracts to enable the use of community-based contracting. Consideration should be given to whether this practice can be expanded and whether there are additional responsibilities that can be devolved to CDCs where they demonstrate integrity and capacity. A strict monitoring mechanism would need to be developed to ensure accountability and guard against abuses.
iii) Co-ordinating international support

116. The UNDP programme’s main strength lies in its focus on coordination. This takes advantage of UNDP’s neutrality and recognised convening role. It places emphasis on increasing the coordination of international development partners (IDPs) as well as building the capacity of Government agencies to develop a more joined-up approach.

117. Knowledge management is another strength of UNDP and an area where all other programmes studied in this assessment are weak. UNDP is supporting the development of an online Community of Practice on security and justice to help connect government, NGO and community practitioners. It is providing support to the Crime Observatory and also funded this assessment project.

iv) Increasing safety in target communities

118. This is the area of the programme with the greatest potential risk of overlap with other programmes. Under this objective, UNDP is working with SDC to strengthen the CDCs and develop community safety plans in Jones Town, Trench Town and Granville. Resources are being provided to a number of NGO partners to support the development and implementation of the plans. However, CSJP is also working in Trench Town and Granville.

v) Development of a UN Country Team programme on armed violence prevention

119. UNDP has developed a sub-project under the JVPPSD focusing on building the capacity of local government and civil society partners to conduct women’s safety audits as part of the development of community safety plans. Other UN agencies will partner in this initiative.

Gaps in programme design

120. The JVPPSD programme covers a wide range of issues from coordination of international partners, to national policy development and capacity building and supporting local implementation. This, combined with the fact that it has a smaller budget than the CSI, CSJP and ICBSP programmes, poses the potential risk of the programme spreading itself too thinly.

**Recommendation - JVPPSD**

- UNDP should focus primarily on its coordination, capacity development and knowledge management roles. There is more added value in this than in becoming another parallel programme working in local communities.
**NATIONAL TRANSFORMATION PROGRAMME (NTP)**

**Background**

121. The National Transformation Programme (‘A Fresh Start for Jamaica’) is a new initiative based in the Office of the Prime Minister. It is a civil society-led initiative that seeks to create a partnership between Government, NGOs, Churches and the private sector for socio-economic transformation.

**Programme design**

122. The NTP has identified 12 National Core Values that each citizen will be encouraged to adopt through a comprehensive communication programme: dignity of work, honesty, justice, love, peace, personal development, respect and reverence for life, responsibility, savings and investment, trust, truth, and unity.

123. The NTP has three main levels of focus: transforming the person, the family and community, and negative aspects of Jamaica’s national image. In order to do this, three change strategies have been identified:

- “The NTP will engage a comprehensive Communication Programme, to bombard the nation with covert and overt ‘value based messages’ to give hope and transform the way our people think and act as ‘First Class Citizens’.
- The NTP will develop a technology based Coordination Programme and Platform to facilitate networking among the social agencies and players informed in the national transformation process. The intent is to ensure minimum duplication of efforts, maximum use of resources, ‘fast tracking’ of interventions to critical ‘targets/target areas’ and the development of new intervention initiatives where gaps exist for maximum impact.
- The NTP will engage a formative and summative Evaluation Programme of our Communication and Coordination Programmes to ensure that we ‘do it right’. (Facilitated by quarterly consultations and e-reporting from partnering agencies."

124. In addition to this, the National Transformation Programme has identified three Thematic Areas:

- “What We Live: The values and attitudes, religious and cultural beliefs that ‘raise’ us, shape our lives and determine our destiny. Our sense of self and others.
- How We Live: Relationships and the way we treat each other. Our community and national governance structures. Leadership development, with a focus on personal, community and national actors related to our national economy.
- Where We Live: The physical and built environment. Informal and under-resourced communities. Urban and rural communities.”

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32. Ibid.
Progress towards outcomes

125. NTP has a mandate from the Prime Minister to coordinate social intervention programmes. However, the programme has faced a number of challenges in this regard. As a civil society led initiative, a number of stakeholders interviewed questioned the NTP’s capacity to coordinate the technical work of government agencies. And the NTP’s reporting and coordination structure is unclear. It is based in the Office of the Prime Minister but is non-governmental, it appears to report directly to the Prime Minister rather than through the civil service, and a planned Advisory Council has yet to be established.

126. One area where some progress has been made is on using communications as a tool to help transform behaviour. This is a niche that no other programme currently has and a series of media advertisements were launched at the start of 2009. “Focusing on using communications and advertisements to encourage mind change could help to underpin the work of other programmes”, said one key national stakeholder interviewed.

Gaps in programme design

127. It is not clear what mechanism would be used by the NTP to coordinate the work of social intervention programmes, and how decisions made would be followed up and implemented at the national and local levels.

Recommendation – NTP

- The NTP should focus on its communications role. This is a niche that provides real added value to the work of other social intervention programmes.

33 See Section 10 ‘Developing a Harmonised Approach to Community Security’ for a full discussion and recommendations on the issue of national coordination of community security and social intervention programmes.
**PEACE MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE (PMI)**

**Background**

128. PMI was established by the Ministry of National Security in 2002. It is a small organisation having a large impact but facing significant resource constraints. The assessment team repeatedly heard from different stakeholders that the organisation is over-stretched. PMI has only four field staff and three office staff (plus the voluntary inputs of a committed board) and they are in constant demand in their fire-fighting role.

**Programme design**

129. PMI’s mandate is to mitigate and defuse community violence. PMI draws a distinction between this and criminal violence but acknowledges that “there is a growing thinness of the line”. PMI is involved in three main areas of activity:

- Mediation (e.g. brokering peace treaties).
- Counselling (e.g. therapeutic and psychological assistance).
- Social development (e.g. small scale livelihood grants to ex-combatants).

**Progress towards outcomes**

i) Mediation

130. PMI’s main comparative advantage is that it directly targets the youth involved in violence. It has the deepest understanding of the dynamics of conflict of any of the programmes assessed, and also has the advantage as a small organisation of being able to act more rapidly and more flexible. PMI is widely credited by interviewees with stopping the wars in August Town, Browns Town and Mountain View - a very significant achievement. They are viewed by the different sections of the communities as having a neutral face and thus trusted to initiate dialogue which strengthens trust. Mediation work is PMI’s core strength.

131. PMI also has a keener focus than most of the programmes on measuring the outcomes of its work through collecting data locally on the murder rates in the communities where they operate. The graph below is based on their own research conducted though discussions with local police officers and gang members. It shows the drop in the murder rate in six communities where PMI operates.

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34 Taken from a powerpoint presentation, ‘The Peace Management Initiative: Going Forward From 2008’.
ii) **Counselling and therapy**

132. Another strength is PMI’s focus on counseling and therapy. It has a trained social worker on its staff who leads a team of 30 volunteers (including retired doctors, teachers and mediators) that conduct healing and reconciliation work with ex-combatants and victims of violence. PMI organises retreats and field trips for gang members that take them out of the inner city and expose them to a range of different issues including conflict resolution, problem solving and leadership training. None of the other programmes studied performs this role.

iii) **Social development**

133. PMI provides some small grants to gang members to help try and encourage them to develop an alternative livelihood to the gun. For example, in August Town PMI has sponsored four poultry farms and one block-making factory to provide over 50 at-risk youth with a legitimate source of income. However, outbreaks of war have disrupted the projects and killed some participants. As a result only two poultry farms remain. In Browns Town, PMI has had more success with livelihood projects as four of the five poultry farms established in the different sections of the community in the wake of the large scale violence in 2005 are still operative. The fifth project is currently being revived. The lack of ready markets though means that turnover is slow, but the projects provide purpose and some hope to young men who have guns buried in their back yard and otherwise might slip back into violence. The murder rate in Browns Town has remained low since 2005.
Gaps in programme design

134. PMI is in many ways the victim of its own success. Because it has established a unique niche it is in high demand from the Government to ‘go broader’ and intervene in emerging conflicts in a wide range of communities. Because of the relationships with warring factions it develops in communities it comes under pressure locally to ‘go deeper’, remain engaged and provide development interventions to sustain the peace. The lack of clarity in its relationships with other programmes compounds its challenge as it is unclear who and when it can ‘handover’ interventions to.

Box 5: PMI Evaluation 2006

PMI Evaluation 2006

This evaluation likened the challenge of PMI defining its role to that of a runner who ends up having to run all the legs of a relay.

“There are far too many gaps in this process and too many roles for PMI.

a) It is asked to talk to criminals where others cannot but it is condemned by some of its members and partners for playing a policing and illegal role;
b) It is distracted from its mediation role by its sudden call to run the first leg of the race; and
c) At the end of its mediation process it finds itself without the human and financial resources and without any formal agreement for who will take up the next stage.

The PMI urgently needs to define its starting point and its exit point in the peace process and initiate the development of agreements – MOUs with other agencies re.their roles and responsibilities.” [original emphasis]

Taken from ‘PMI Evaluation’, Trevor Spence, Georgia Sinclair and Alicia Hayman, January 2006.

135. Another challenge that PMI faces is a lack of understanding on the part of many stakeholders of the importance of engaging warring factions and addressing their needs and concerns. It is accepted good practice in conflict resolution and peacebuilding internationally that engaging combatants and disarming, demobilising and reintegrating them back into society is central to sustainable peace35. Jamaica may not be ‘at war’ but the homicide rate is actually higher than in many high intensity violent conflicts36. However, a number of interviewees nationally and locally questioned the ethical basis for “giving resources to gunmen” and the police are at times nervous about PMI’s relationships with ‘shottas’.

35 The concept of disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegartion (DDR), may not be applicable to Jamaica in its entirety, however there are key components of this process that may be adapted to the Jamaican context. The United Nations has recorded valuable lessons learned from these processes that may be a good point of reference for the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) as it develops its strategy to address gangs [see ‘Towards a Framework for Peace and Security in Jamaica’, S. Blake-Lobban, forthcoming].

36 The standard international definition of a war or high intensity conflict is violence characterised by fatality rates of over 1000/year, and in Jamaica 1611 people were murdered in 2008.
136. Though PMI seems to have a strategy for demobilising warring factions, and in limited cases reintegrating, a strategy for the third critical component – disarming, and thus fully reintegrating – is missing. This is not necessarily a role for PMI but the lack of a focus on small arms control is a gap in the work of all agencies at the moment.

137. An additional challenge faced is PMI’s institutional structure. It has a Kingston arm and a West Jamaica arm and the relationship between them is unclear. It is under-staffed and its internal management structure is heavily reliant on the leadership of a committed board. For sustainability it would benefit from a paid Director (possibly an existing Board member). If the organisation is to expand, these issues would need to be examined.

**Recommendations - PMI**

- PMI should be given a larger, predictable budget to enable it to expand its mediation activities and strengthen its organisation.
- PMI should focus primarily on its mediation role and counseling services. It should have a small fund for developmental activities within a three month window of the signing of a peace agreement whilst the larger organisations mobilise to take over.
- MoUs should be brokered by the GoJ between PMI and its longer term partners – CSI, CSJP and ICBSP – outlining its role as a short term service provider and determining a clear procedure for the call-in and hand over of services.
- PMI should work with CSI, CSJP and ICBSP to advise on the targeting of interventions to ex-combatants and youth at-risk.

**Peace and Prosperity Project (PPP)**

**Background**

138. The PPP was designed to improve social and economic conditions in two volatile inner city communities – Grants Pen and Standpipe. It was funded by a US$2.6M grant from USAID and implemented by the Kingston Restoration Company (KRC). Operations started in March 2001 and finished in November 2004, except for a Limited Scope Grant agreement extended to September 2005 to facilitate the sustainability of various activities.

**Programme design**

139. The purpose of the project was to “Improve social and economic conditions as well as the community’s capacity for conflict resolution in Grants Pen and Standpipe.”
140. The project had two main outputs:

- Increased employment and entrepreneurship opportunities.
- Improved community capacity for conflict resolution.

141. The specific initiatives geared to achieving the outputs and purpose included:

- Establishment of a Peace Centre.
- Provision of skills training.
- Placement of residents in jobs.
- Provision of technical assistance to micro and small business firms.
- Provision of training in conflict resolution.
- Provision of training in mediation.
- Establishment of homework centers.
- Upgrading of Basic School facilities.
- Establishment of Computer Laboratories in two primary schools.
- Establishment of uniformed groups.
- Staging of Peace Day Concerts.
- Staging of sports festivals and competitions.
- Upgrading of playfields.

142. The comprehensive project design with a broad range of complementary interventions was recognised by all stakeholders interviewed as one of the project’s main strengths.

Outcomes

143. “All activities were implemented successfully in varying degrees”\(^{37}\) according to the USAID evaluation. The table below from Kingston Restoration Committee illustrates how some of the main targets were met.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5: Evaluation of progress against targets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increased employment &amp; entrepreneurship opportunities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Targets</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A minimum of 360 new jobs to be created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 businesses to be assisted &amp; 10 new businesses to be created.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Increased improved community capacity for conflict resolution** |  |
| **Targets** | **Achievements** |
| 12 community conflict resolution programmes implemented and sustained | 16 community conflict resolution programmes implemented and sustained |
| 2500 residents participating in conflict resolution programmes. | 5933 residents participating in conflict resolution programmes. |

\(^{37}\) P1, ‘Evaluation and lessons learned: Peace and Prosperity Project, Democracy International Inc, June 2005
144. The police statistics from Grants Pen during the period of the project implementation show how there was a reduction in reported major crimes.

Table 6: Major crimes committed in the community of Grants Pen – 2001-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offence</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>Jan 2001-Sep 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shooting</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

145. Lessons from the project include:

- The important role of a community centre in providing a space for mobilisation and training (in Grant’s Pen this has continued after the project as a public library).
- The need for a comprehensive approach to employment that complements vocational skills training with literacy, numeracy, social skills and behavioural problems.
- The positive role of sports in engaging male youth.
- The need for a sustainability plan to be built into the project from its inception (see box below).

Box 6: PPP Evaluation

**Peace and Prosperity Project Evaluation**

“With all its successful programs, PPP cannot be considered a success today, because it does not have built-in sustainability. Most programs have ended without continuity plans. The ultimate success of a pilot project should be measured by its sustainability. Successful activities which are not sustainable serve to raise expectations and then disappoint those who had hoped to improve their community and the quality of their lives.”

“The common denominator for those activities that have been most successful is the level of community involvement in decision making, and when programs responded to their perceived needs.”

*Taken from ‘Evaluation and Lessons Learned: PPP’, Democracy International Inc, 2005*

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38 Police Department statistics provided by KRC
39 P2, Ibid.
40 P22, Ibid.
BACKGROUND

146. The first PRP was a nationwide project focused on alleviating poverty through providing quality basic infrastructure and services in the fields of health, sanitation and water. PRP II also focuses on basic infrastructure and services but working in volatile and vulnerable communities. Both projects are implemented by JSIF. The PRP II has a budget of EURO 11 million and is financed by a EURO 10.1 million grant from the European Commission and a EURO 900,000 contribution by the Ministry of National Security.

PROGRAMME DESIGN

147. The purpose of the programme is “improvement of socio-economic conditions and quality of life in communities with an emphasis on the promotion of community safety and the reduction of criminal behaviour in volatile and vulnerable communities”.41

148. It is anticipated that the programme will have the following results:

   i. Reduction in the level and incidence of poverty in communities across Jamaica.
   ii. Improved capacity of poor communities to participate in their own development.
   iii. Increased access to basic infrastructure and services.
   iv. Improved capacity of NGOs to support and facilitate communities and community-based organisations as well as to effectively develop the capacity to liaise with JSIF, the SDC, local government and other organisations relevant to community development.
   v. Improved capacity of the Social Development Commission to assist and support communities.
   vi. Prevention and reduction in crime and violence through interventions in volatile and vulnerable communities.
   vii. Increased access to the justice system through courthouse built according to international standards, incorporating human rights principles and children’s safety.

PROGRESS TOWARDS OUTCOMES

149. The programme has been beset by serious delays. The original agreement between the EC and GoJ was signed in April 2007 and then amended in August 2007. A financing agreement was signed in December 2007. Implementation has yet to start.

150. The main cause of the delay appears to be the ‘pre-selection’ of target communities. A list of volatile and vulnerable communities to select from was developed by the MNS in 2008. SDC is now developing profiles of these communities and four criteria have been agreed to rank the communities:

   - JSIF/SDC poverty assessment score.
   - Crime profile.
   - Absorptive capacity.

151. JSIF has a target of implementing 45 infrastructure interventions in these communities with a preference for bundling interventions in a few communities to try and increase the cumulative impact.

152. A second part of the programme is focused on social interventions and will be implemented by CSJP. The focus of this work is not yet tightly defined but is envisaged to involve interventions with youth and parents in three target communities.

153. A third part of the programme includes support for the construction of a family court in Lucea.

Gaps in programme design

154. Given the poor state of infrastructure and basic services in many communities where CSI and CSJP are working, it is unclear why priority is to be given to physical interventions in other communities\(^\text{42}\). The infrastructure interventions conducted by CSI or CSJP are small scale rapid impact projects and of a different nature to the service enhancement projects envisaged under PRPII. It is understood that consideration is being given to focusing some interventions in CSI communities. This would have a definite benefit in terms of increasing harmonisation. It would also reduce the need for JSIF to spend time and resources on building the capacity of local CBOs as CDCs should already be in place as a result of CSI and CSJP partnership work with SDC.

155. It is not clear yet if or how the youth and parenting programme to be implemented by CSJP will be coordinated with the PRPII infrastructure interventions or with CSJP’s existing community-level work.

**Recommendations - PRPII**

- **The GoJ considers targeting PRPII infrastructure work in volatile and vulnerable communities where CSI or CSJP operate**, in line with priorities agreed in community safety plans.

- **The new parenting and youth programme** be developed as a best practice methodology that can then be implemented by different agencies across a wide range of volatile and vulnerable communities. If a standardised approach is developed based on the experiences and lessons of different programmes then the impact would go beyond being another pilot project.

\(^{42}\) P1, ‘PRPII Selection Criteria for Targeted Communities’
**COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES OF PROGRAMMES**

156. Based on the above assessment, the following table outlines the main comparative advantages of the 10 programmes. A detailed assessment of the appropriateness of the objectives of the programmes and a comparative analysis of their different interventions can be found in Section IV below.

Table 7: Areas of Comparative Advantage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Competitive Advantage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CDF</strong></td>
<td>US$450,780 million budget, which is far more than the budget of all the other programmes combined.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMET</strong></td>
<td>Builds capacity of key institutions - JCF and SDC- to enable them to implement community policing and support the development of Community Safety and Security Plans.* Only programme that has a focus on anti-corruption. Targets at-risk youths specifically in communities selected for the roll out of the JCF’s, CBP programme Focus on building entrepreneurship – supports a national microfinance policy, Economic Development Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CSI</strong></td>
<td>Focus on building the capacity of local governance structures.* Introduced a more comprehensive approach to skills training with employment readiness and behavior modification training and job placements. Convenes local stakeholder groups to coordinate the activities of government agencies in target communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CSJP</strong></td>
<td>Established effective relationships with a wide network of NGOs and CBOs.* Most significant focus on skills training with the largest number of beneficiaries. Unique approach to parenting programme in Flanker. This approach yielded better results than the parallel ICBSP parenting programme in Flanker.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ICBSP</strong></td>
<td>Only programme that has a significant focus on infrastructure work to improve basic services in communities.* The most structured education intervention for GSAT students with robust monitoring and evaluation system. Focus on children through summer camps and mentoring</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Programme | Competitive Advantage
--- | ---
**JVPPSD** | Coordinates IDP Working Group on Security and Justice and its neutral status has potential to act as a bridge between GoJ and IDPs.*
 | Supports building of GoJ capacity and policy development.
 | Knowledge management – online Community of Practice can be an important tool for networking and lessons learnt.*

**NTP** | Unique communications role can add value to the work of other programmes.*

**PMI** | Only programme that directly targets and engages youths involved in violence*
 | Keener focus than most of the programmes on measuring the outcomes of its work through collecting data locally on the murder rates in the communities where they operate.
 | Focus on counseling and therapy

**PPP** | The comprehensive project design with a broad range of complementary interventions was recognised by all stakeholders interviewed as one of the project's main strengths.*

**PRPII** | Not yet fully underway

*Indicates core comparative advantage.

157. One important general conclusion of this assessment is that there are too many different programmes and no clear coordinated national approach to community safety and security. This makes the objective of harmonisation much more difficult to achieve. The objectives of many of the programmes are broadly similar and there is no clear logic as to why in some sample communities there are a number of programmes operating whereas in others there is only one programme. A rationalisation of the number of programmes, a clearer focus of others on their areas of comparative advantage, and the development of a strategy to guide an integrated approach are important priorities. More detailed recommendations to guide this process of harmonisation can be found in Section VI and VII.
SECTION IV: CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS

158. This section identifies the critical success factors to increase the effectiveness of community security programmes, based on a comparative analysis of the main different types of interventions undertaken by the CSI, CSJP, ICBSP and PMI in the 11 sample communities. It reviews the design, means of implementation and outcomes of the programmes on community security. The section also assesses the extent to which the issues targeted address the priorities of local residents and identifies which issues have the greatest potential to reduce crime and violence.

159. It is difficult to discern whether specific social interventions have helped contribute to increased safety and security in target communities. Causal relationships are always hard to establish in communities with a multiplicity of activities. But the lack of effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for all programmes for their interventions makes any attempt to do so impossible.

160. However, interviews with key stakeholders and focus groups in communities identified the cumulative effect of a broad range of interventions. For example, the layering of a variety of social interventions in Flanker over a number of years and the development of the Peace and Justice Centre can be seen as providing a conducive environment for the improvement in security that was precipitated by the community policing approach of the Mobile Reserve. Similarly, a number of residents in Fletcher’s Land highlighted the broad range of interventions over a number of years as being the building blocks for the improvement in security. A lesson learned internationally is that preventing violence and strengthening community security requires a comprehensive approach. Identifying the specific role of individual social interventions will require significant improvements in the monitoring and evaluation systems of programmes. Improving their impact on crime and violence will also necessitate much better targeting of interventions at male youth (see Section VII).

DESIGN AND OBJECTIVES

Extent to which target issues address citizens’ priorities

161. The table below provides an overview of the main interventions conducted by each of the four programmes in target communities. The overall emphasis is mainly on social interventions. It is important to recognise that each of the four programmes covered in this section has a slightly different mandate (these are outlined in Section III).

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Table 8: Overview of programme interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>CSI</th>
<th>CSJP</th>
<th>JSIF</th>
<th>PMI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace brokering</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counselling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening community councils</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment and skills training</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihood grants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homework and GSAT classes</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parenting classes</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute resolution</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music and theatre</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community centres</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinc fence removal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved sanitation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved access to water</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved waste management</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved public spaces</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved roads</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
164. In all 11 sample communities, respondents were asked “What kind of impact do you think the following interventions might have on crime and violence in your community?”

Table 9: ‘What kind of impact do you think the following interventions might have on crime and violence in your community?’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The intervention rated as having the biggest independent impact on crime and violence in the community</th>
<th>The impact that interventions might have on crime and violence in your community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Big impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment and skills training</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education programme (e.g. homework and GSAT classes)</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parenting classes</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute resolution</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music and theatre</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved sanitation</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved access to water</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved solid waste management</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved roads</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved street lighting</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved public spaces</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community centres</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinc fence removal</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Colour key indicates top five under each category

162. Based on the responses tabulated above, there is a fairly good congruence between the priority issues identified by the community residents and those addressed by the programmes in some areas, but not in others. This is discussed below.
Social interventions

163. The top priority identified by respondents – employment and skills training – has been identified by all four programmes as a top priority. Likewise, three of the four programmes (CSI, CSJP and JSIF) support education interventions which are the second highest ranked priority. However, only CSI and CSJP have a focus on parenting (and CSI does not have a significant focus on this issue), which is the third joint popular priority issue identified by communities. The biggest contrast is in sports, music and theatre which approximately three quarters of respondents say would have a big impact on reducing crime and violence but only two of the programmes cover and not to a significant degree.

Employment and skills training

Unemployment was the top priority issue raised by focus group members in each of the communities visited. This view is reinforced by the results of the household survey – as illustrated in the above table, 88% of respondents said that employment and skills training would have a big impact on crime and violence in their community. It was also rated as the intervention having the ‘biggest overall impact’ with over half of respondents choosing this option.

The research indicated that there are many barriers to community members accessing jobs including the lack of jobs in the labour market, inadequate technical skills, illiteracy, cost of training, lack of employment readiness and the stigma attached to coming from a disadvantaged inner city community. A key lesson learnt from the programmes is the need to continue to develop more creative and comprehensive approaches to employment. Skills training alone is not enough.

164. Both the number of people trained, and the number who have found jobs so far after completing CSI and CSJP training courses, are very low compared to the figures from the PPP project in Grant’s Pen and Standpipe. This project successfully placed 414 residents in new jobs, exceeding the targeted number of 360. This means that, considering that the estimated unemployment population in the PPP area was about 1,900, 22% of the unemployed were placed in new jobs, which is a significant result.

165. A large number of the residents who have so far been accepted on skills training programmes with CSI (76%) and CSJP (37%) have been women. Men are often more reluctant to sign up, often due to fear of leaving the community and the need to ‘hustle’ to get money to meet immediate needs. Given that male youth are the key target group for violence prevention, this presents a significant challenge to the programmes. Training women is clearly important for community development (and research shows that if their income increases they are likely to spend it more productively than men) but it is not likely to have as immediate or direct an impact on community security.

44 Strengthening local governance structures and improving policing were not included as options in this survey question.
166. **Illiteracy** is a significant barrier to people taking up skills training opportunities. HEART Trust/NTA require students to pass an entrance exam in basic Mathematics and English and many community members are unable to meet this basic requirement. For example, according to one of the JSIF officers in Whitfield Town, only two of the 25 workers involved in zinc fence removal in Zone B passed their Grade Nine test to receive HEART training. This highlights a significant barrier to progress in the current approach to skills training. Without basic literacy and numeracy, people cannot access training and get certified.

167. **Training courses would be better attended if they were held in inner city communities, rather than requiring residents to travel.** Many male youth who were interviewed as part of this assessment feel unsafe to leave their communities. The cost of transport and lunch money is a further barrier to many. When the CSJP programme in Russia failed to provide a promised stipend for residents who signed up for skills training, many community members dropped out of the classes.

168. In the current worsening economic climate, the number of available jobs is likely to drop dramatically even for those with qualifications. Encouraging **entrepreneurship** and building the capacity for small business development will therefore be increasingly important. There is an insufficient focus on these issues at present in the programmes, although CSI has recently started an entrepreneurship programme in Matthew’s Lane.

169. **Micro finance** is another important issue that is not yet widely available in target communities. It is intended to be a part of the ICBSP programme but this aspect has yet to be implemented. The COMET programme has made micro finance a key part of its new workplan.

**Education**

170. Education was the intervention that received the second highest number of positive responses in the household survey. 87% of respondents said that education programmes would have a big impact on crime and violence in their community.

171. CSI, CSJP, COMET and JSIF all support different education interventions. Most of these though are small scale and mainly involve homework and GSAT classes, or funding for further education for individuals.

172. Education is an important intervention for violence prevention but activities that target under 11 year olds - such as homework and GSAT classes - are unlikely to have an immediate impact on reducing crime rates. The main age group involved in violent and criminal acts is older youth aged 14-25. So, if successful, interventions could begin to have some impact after three years when those beneficiaries hopefully do not become involved in gangs. This time lag poses a challenge though for monitoring the impact of interventions as well as the timeframe for expecting results.

173. There is also a question about the scale of interventions. For example, the ICBSP homework and GSAT classes involve on average 50 children in communities with populations that range in size from
Bucknor with 3,605 residents to Whitfield Town with 20,864. In order to have an impact on crime and violence in larger communities, education interventions either need be on a larger scale or be very well targeted at ‘at risk’ youth.

**Sports**

174. Sport is an under-utilised tool in community security programmes. 79% of respondents in the survey said that sports programmes would have a big impact on crime and violence in their community. Sport can play a valuable role in building bridges between different groups and engaging male youth. Each programme has supported some sports activities at different stages. For example, JSIF organised a football and netball tournament between teams from its 15 target communities in 2008. In Russia, CSJP has supported a community football league and helped organise matches between the community and the police. These were widely seen as being effective in bringing different parts of the community together and strengthening police-community relations. In Mountain View, corner football leagues organised by PMI have been instrumental in stabilising the community after extreme periods of violence. However, there is no sustained sports programme in any of the 11 sample communities. This is a gap in the programmes. Local sports clubs and CDCs could be supported to help organise community events on a regular and sustainable basis. The challenge is to use sports strategically as a means of mobilising young men to participate in other programmes.

175. When residents were asked ‘what is the standard of social services and facilities like in your community?’, recreational spaces received the second lowest overall score – 47%. Only 36% of respondents said that the standard of recreational spaces in their communities was good or very good. This illustrates a gap for investment in infrastructure development.

**Dispute resolution**

176. The inability of community members to resolve disputes peacefully was identified by many interviewees and focus group members as a key issue. The police officers interviewed highlighted the escalation of minor disputes and reprisals as being factors responsible for a significant number of murders and violence-related injuries. 76% of respondents in the survey said that improving dispute resolution would have a big impact on crime and violence in their community.

177. Most of the programmes have some focus on dispute resolution. JSIF and CSJP have contracted the Dispute Resolution Foundation to run conflict resolution workshops in many of their communities. And dispute resolution is at the heart of PMI’s peace brokering work.

178. However, speaking to community leaders and members in a number of communities, it appears that insufficient investment is being made in dispute resolution by the CSI, CSJP and ICBSP programmes. For example, in August Town, Bucknor and Whitfield Town community leaders called for a more sustained programme of dispute resolution training. It was commonly felt that the initial workshops had been valuable but not sufficient to fully capacitate community members to mediate in a dispute.

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46 Figures provided in a note to the research team by SDC: ‘Community boundary description and population estimate for selected communities’.
179. It is unclear at present what impact the dispute resolution interventions have had in communities. There appears to be no clear follow-up mechanism to ensure that people who are trained put their new skills to use in the community.

180. The focus of current dispute resolution training was also questioned by some interviewees. One view was that there needs to be a greater emphasis on practically resolving disputes ‘on the corner’ in inner city communities, rather than on formal mediation processes in meeting rooms.

181. The issue of dispute resolution is linked to access to justice. This is where the Peace and Justice Centre in Flanker plays a valuable role. As well as helping to mediate in community and individual disputes, the centre provides advice to residents on accessing justice. The development of capacitated community centres that can help play this role in communities (see below) is a priority for investment.

Music

182. Music is a unifying force in Jamaican communities. 71% of respondents said that music and theatre would have a big impact on reducing crime and violence in their community. Yet the only example that the assessment found of programmes using music was CSJP in Russia. A stage show was held in the main square to launch the programme where the group One Third performed. This event was the first time in memory that a major artist had performed a concert in the community and it clearly made a big impact on many focus group members. Many male youth focus group members spoke positively about the event. They argued that it succeeded in helping to reduce feelings of marginalisation and brought all the sections of the community together in a single space. It is not necessarily that the programmes themselves need to get involved in organising music events but rather a case of partnering with the relevant agencies (e.g. the Jamaica Cultural Development Commission or the Ministry of Sports, Youth and Culture).

183. With the enforcement of the Noise Abatement Act, the number of street dances in communities has been reduced. The development of recreational facilities and community centres where licensed cultural events could be held would help address the gaps identified in the survey and provide a neutral space for young people to meet.

Parenting

184. Improving parenting and reducing the high rate of teen pregnancies were identified by community members as priorities in almost every focus group. This was backed up by the survey in which 79% of respondents (the third highest score) said that improving parenting would have a big impact on crime and violence. As one interviewee in Flanker noted, “poor parenting is at the basis of so many problems”. A common view amongst focus group members in August Town and March Pen was the need to foster a more community-oriented approach to raising children.

185. The CSI, CSJP and ICBSP programmes all have interventions aimed at parents. CSJP has the most extensive programme with 366 parents having received training across five of the communities focused on in this assessment. CSI have run parenting workshops in March Pen and Matthew’s Lane and JSIF in some communities run parenting groups for the parents of the children attending their homework or GSAT classes. **There is no common approach though taken across these three programmes.** Some are classroom based whilst others follow up with home visits. No evaluation mechanism exists, beyond the
numbers of parents trained, to measure the effectiveness of the interventions. However, in Flanker it has been noted that the CSJP funded parenting programme is more effective than the one under the ICBSP. The Flanker Peace and Justice Centre is responsible for the CSJP funded parenting programme. Their approach includes home visits and pairing a parent mentor to families.

Community centres

186. The assessment found that having a physical space for the CDC to be based and where training and activities can take place is very important. The best example of this is the Peace and Justice Centre in Flanker (established eight years ago with support from the CIDA/GOJ Social Conflict and Legal Reform Programme and now supported by CSJP) that acts as the heart of the community. It has trained staff and volunteers and hosts a wide range of activities including homework/GSAT classes, CDC meetings, marching band practice, mediations, and a suspension facility where children who are temporarily excluded from schools are taken for counselling and tuition. It provides a ‘one-stop shop’ for advice and support on any social issue, including enabling residents to access justice. The community centres in Fletcher’s Land (supported by CSJP) and Matthew’s Lane (supported by CSI) are also good examples.

187. The establishment and resourcing of community centres is a key area for investment. Respondents in the household survey gave the standard of community centres the lowest overall score out of all social services and facilities in the sample communities – 40%. Only 32% of overall respondents said that the standard of community centres in their community was good or very good. Given the vital role they can play in increasing social capital and increasing access to services, this is a significant problem. By contrast, in Flanker 71% of respondents said that the standard of community centres was good or very good and 68% did in Fletcher’s Land.

188. In divided communities the location of a community centre could have a significant impact on cohesion or conflict. Providing such a resource to one section of the community could inadvertently increase tensions with another section. However, building a community centre on the boundary of two sections could potentially provide a place for members of different groups to meet and undertake shared activities which could help bridge previous divisions.
**Recommendations - Social interventions**

**Employment and skills training**

- **The GoJ should review the experiences of skills training, employment readiness and job placement programmes.** A tracer study could be developed to follow what happens to the large CSJP cohort that is currently in training. The numbers trained and finding work so far from both CSI and CSJP programmes are insufficient to have a significant impact on community security.

- **Develop a strategy with the Jamaica Foundation for Lifelong Learning to address illiteracy.** Remedial classes should be integrated with vocational training to increase their attractiveness.

- **Increase the targeting of employment programmes at male youth.** This is critical if community security programmes are to more strategically address violence.

- **Increase the focus on developing entrepreneurship.** Programmes could partner with the GoJ’s new Young Entrepreneurs’ Programme and the Jamaica Business Development Centre (JBDC) to support the development of small businesses and help them access micro finance.

**Education**

- **Develop a strategy with the MoE for the scaling up and handover of homework and GSAT classes.**

- **CSI, CSJP, COMET and JSIF should meet with MoE to share lessons learnt on education interventions and develop a best practice methodology that could be used by all programmes.**

**Sports**

- **Increase the focus on sports in community security programmes.** Community sports tournaments are a low cost way of building social capital and engaging young men. A strategy should be developed to use sports as a gateway to engaging male youth in longer term peace building activities.

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- **Increase the focus on investment in recreational facilities in infrastructure programmes**
Music

- **Develop an ongoing, innovative dispute resolution programme in target communities.** Existing approaches should be reviewed to ensure that they are applicable to ‘corner’ situations and are more proactive than reactive. A train-the-trainers approach could be used and a cascade training programme developed as a means of ensuring that conflict resolution skills are spread more widely throughout communities.

Parenting

- **Develop a standardised parenting programme.** This should draw on the experiences of the various initiatives supported by different social intervention programmes so far. The CSJP approach in Flanker presents a useful best practice. In addition to parents being trained, they are paired with parent mentors who conduct home visits and interact with the parents and children on a regular basis for an extended period. This approach is distinct from the usual approach of training parents with the assumption that they will implement what they have learnt at home. Indicators should be established for assessing its impact. The delivery of this programme should then be put out to tender.

Community centres

- **Each focus community for social interventions should have a functioning community centre.** This should be a priority for infrastructure development.

Physical services

189. The findings of the survey show that there are diverse views among respondents as to whether physical service interventions would have a likely impact on crime and violence. For example, the number of respondents who thought that improving sanitation, access to water, solid waste management and roads would have a big impact on crime and violence ranged between 42 and 51%, but quite high figures of 25-34% of people said that these interventions would have no impact. The figures are slightly higher for interventions that have a stronger focus on environmental design with 55-59% of respondents saying that improving public spaces, street lights and zinc fence removal would have a big impact on crime and violence.

190. The state of physical services and infrastructure is very poor across all of the 11 communities that were examined. It is perhaps not surprising though that interventions to improve these physical services scored lower in the survey given that their impact on crime and violence is often more indirect. However, a number of focus group members in different communities pointed to the negative effect that the poor state of physical services and the built environment has on the psyche of residents. “The lack of proper infrastructure has a damaging impact on how people feel and their sense of self”, said a community leader in March Pen.
191. One challenge of infrastructure interventions is limiting them to specific areas within a community. The choice of location for works projects can be the source of division and rivalry within communities, and can exacerbate tensions. Establishing clear, equitable and transparent criteria for decision-making is important. Community workers must also have a sound knowledge of the potential or actual conflicts or tensions within the community.

192. A clear lesson from the infrastructure interventions so far is to set realistic timeframes and not raise community expectations. Community members in all five of the ICBSP communities visited had a catalogue of complaints about delays in the infrastructure projects. “RIP should stand for rest in peace not rapid impact project” said one community leader in Browns Town where none of the three planned rapid impact projects had been fully completed by May 2009. These delays undermine the credibility of the programme.

193. There are few examples of programmes successfully improving the delivery of physical services from other government agencies. This perhaps partly reflects the challenges of working with government service providers and the lack of leverage that community security programmes currently have over them. One exception is in Matthew’s Lane where CSI succeeded in getting the National Solid Waste Management Agency (NSWMA) to improve refuse collection. Faced with a similar challenge in Fletcher’s Land though, CSJP had to pay the NSWMA to remove a significant amount of garbage that was littering the community, rather than the NSWMA doing it as a service.

194. CSI has developed a model of organising local stakeholder groups in each of its communities that bring together service providers and residents. There is often a challenge in ensuring the attendance of key government agencies, indicating that stronger strategic institutional partnerships could be valuable. However, these stakeholder groups have significant potential to help strengthen service delivery.

**Recommendations - Physical services**

- **Community security programmes should focus on infrastructure work with clear crime prevention benefits.** Zinc fence removal, improving informal roads, street lighting and refurbishing public spaces can all have a direct impact on crime levels through improving environmental design.

- **The Prime Minister should instruct all government service providers to prioritise service delivery in GoJ priority communities.** The responsibility for service delivery in these communities should be borne by government ministries and agencies, rather than community security programmes. This is in line with the Prime Minister’s call for a ‘new deal’ with disadvantaged communities.

- **Community security programmes should prioritise working with service providers to improve their delivery.** Local stakeholders meetings that bring together service providers and residents are an excellent model. Building the capacity of CDCs to coordinate these and to increase voice and accountability is critical here.
Local governance structures

195. All four programmes operating at the community level focus, to some degree, on the development of effective and accountable local governance structures. Lessons learnt from community security programmes in other parts of the world suggest that strong local governance is critical in coordinating and sustaining violence prevention activities.47 This is particularly important in Jamaica, given the partisan nature of politics, the weakness of local government and the strength of illegitimate governance in many communities in the form of Dons. In volatile and vulnerable communities, where the state has often been absent for many years, effective CDCs can have the following advantages:

- They can be a vital means of re-connecting communities with government services.
- They have the potential to be an important means of increasing the voice of marginalised residents.
- They can help to increase the accountability of service providers.
- In a partisan political system, they also have the potential to be important sources of non-partisan governance.

196. Despite the common focus of all four programmes on strengthening local governance structures, little attempt has been made to standardise approaches to it. However, the Social Development Commission invariably serves as a key partner in these efforts.

197. The assessment identified a qualitative correlation between the existence of a strong CDC and progress in community security. Where CDCs appear to be strongest – for example in Flanker and Fletcher’s Land – significant progress has been made. However, where they lack capacity – for example in March Pen and Russia – programmes face greater challenges.

198. In August Town and Mountain View, the local governance structures have emerged out of Peace Councils. These Councils have been formed with the support of PMI to bring the warring sections of the communities together. They act as valuable early warning mechanisms of potential flare ups of violence and members often act as mediators in local disputes. Over time, the membership of the Council in Mountain View has transitioned from gang leaders to more legitimate community leaders.

199. Many of the communities examined receive support from multiple social interventions. In such contexts, the role of CDCs is critical in ensuring coordination. However, in two of the 11 communities the assessment examined, different government social intervention programmes support different community governance structures. In Flanker and March Pen, CSJP and CSI respectively support the local CDC whilst in both communities JSIF has supported the establishment of a parallel Community Committee (CC) to manage the implementation of its ICBSP programme. In March Pen, this was done because the ICBSP project is only operating in one section of the community – Africa. However, the decision to implement the project in just one section of the community and the existence of two parallel local governance mechanisms has reinforced divisions in March Pen, duplicated efforts and undermined the coordination of interventions. “The two committees are feuding as to who controls the community”, said one local leader.

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200. **Representation is a central challenge for CDCs.** There is a risk that their membership comprises local elites and is not representative of the communities they serve. CDC membership is often comprised of the heads of local community-based organisations (CBOs). The gender balance of most of the committees the assessment observed was fairly good but very few had youth representatives. Given the fact that youth are the critical target group for violence prevention this is a definite gap in programme implementation.

201. In addition, the level of **community outreach** of most CDCs is quite poor. Less than half (45%) of the population of the 11 communities knew that there was a CDC. And only 14% say that they have ever been invited to take part in any activity organised by the CDC. An innovative approach to improving community outreach has been tried in Brown’s Town, where CDC membership includes ‘street representatives’ from each section of the community in addition to heads of CBOs. These street representatives have a responsibility to mobilise the residents in their areas and be a channel for communication.

202. **In circumstances where the CDCs’ capacity has been built their role in programme management should be expanded.** “The CDC members have been trained”, said one interviewee in Bucknor, “but what have they been empowered to do?” The CDC in Bucknor appeared capable but yet had little role in managing the activities underway in its community. For example, the CDC could have identified a contractor to fence the newly-built playing field and sow the grass but even small contracts require approval from JSIF head office. This apparently takes two or three months, which delays the programme, often frustrating community members.

203. **The legal status of CDCs needs to be addressed.** CDCs have an ambiguous status in the governance structure of Jamaica. They are designed to link upwards to Parish Development Committees and through them to Paris Councils (local government). However, they are themselves just community-based organisations with no automatic legal status. Some committees, for example in Bucknor and Fletcher’s Land, have become registered as Benevolent Societies and so have a more formal status. CDCs have great potential to be vital governance structures. This potential would be more likely to be fulfilled if their status is reviewed and strengthened.

### Recommendations - Local governance

- **All GoJ programmes and MDAs should work to strengthen and support one CDC in each community.** Channeling support through one body is important for coordination and governance. Supporting parallel community committees risks overlap and duplication.

- **Invest more in strengthening CDCs.** Sustained capacity building is required in the following areas: leadership, proposal writing, communications, developing community safety plans, community mobilisation and improving service delivery. A standard training package should be developed, building upon and augmenting the different tools currently used by each programme. The capacity of SDC to support and strengthen CDCs – “providing an incubator service” as one interviewee put it - should be significantly increased.
Devolve more responsibility for programme management to CDCs. Once CDCs have demonstrated their capacity, programmes should provide a budget for them to manage. This would further help to enhance capacity and enable the role of programme staff to transition from implementation to monitoring. This would require the programmes to strengthen their own monitoring capacity to avoid fiduciary risk.

Focus on improving the representation and outreach of CDCs – Establishing a quota for youth members and including street representatives are two means of enhancing representation. A much stronger focus (and budget) on awareness raising is needed to publicise CDCs within communities and engage residents in their activities.

Policing

204. Of the 38% of respondents who thought that their community had become safer in the last two years, the most popular reason given for this change (22%) was better policing. When children in a focus group in Whitfield Town were asked “what can be done to improve your community”, 11 of the 12 answered “more police”. The JCF’s roll out of community policing only began in mid 2008 and so it is too early to see from the available police and hospital data if this has had an impact on crime and violence in the sample communities. However, the survey results and the qualitative findings of the assessment do indicate that improving the partnership between police and community members is central to enhancing community security.

205. Levels of trust in the police are very low across all 11 sample communities. However, where the police have been able to demonstrate a new approach – for example through the work of the Mobile Reserve in Flanker – communities have responded very positively. The Flanker case provides an interesting example. The Mobile Reserve was sent into Flanker in November 2007 following a wave of killings. The community had previously had a bad relationship with the St James police, accusing them of disrespect and a heavy-handed approach. The Mobile Reserve made a deliberate attempt to unite the divided community. A series of football matches were held between the police and teams of local youth. Community meetings were held to discuss the priority issues to address to increase security. Regular foot and vehicle patrols were conducted 24 hours a day. And, most importantly, the officers treated residents with respect. This combination of respect, reassuring presence and working with the community to solve problems paid dividends. The murder rate dropped from nine in 2007 to two in 2008.

206. However, none of the four programmes has support for community policing as a key focus. CSI and CSJP both engage the police to a varying extent in their different communities, but neither has a structured approach across all of their communities. The ICBSP programme does not have any activities that engage the police as this apparently is against World Bank guidelines. PMI understandably do not outwardly engage with the police – working with them but not getting too close - because of their work with gangs and not wanting to be seen as ‘informers’. None of the programmes have a strong focus on engaging the community in policing. This is a clear gap. The onus at the moment is largely on the JCF to take the initiative.

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48 CSJP have a good practice here that can be developed whereby they give a J$20,000 per month grant to CDCs who demonstrate capacity and good governance.
207. A good example of effective collaboration with the police was noted in August Town. A Crime Prevention Committee (CPC) has been established (with the support of CSJP) as part of the CDC that brings together community leaders and the police. The CPC has developed a community policing implementation plan that includes a proposal to develop a community safety plan. The CPC is currently looking for funding to implement this.

208. The assessment found that JCF station commanders and Community Safety and Security Branch (CSSB) officers are often unclear what being a ‘priority community’ for community policing involves. Implementation is therefore uneven across the communities. The level of success is often partly determined by the leadership of the Divisional Commander. COMET has worked with the JCF to develop a useful Community Policing Manual. However, additional training and guidance on key issues such as organising community policing forums, developing community safety plans, deploying resources, engaging the community, mainstreaming community policing throughout local stations and developing partnerships with social intervention programmes would be valuable. For example, it would be valuable to establish as practice that community policing should be viewed as part of a broader community safety approach and planning framework.

209. In many communities residents draw a clear distinction between different types of police. For example, the positive work of the JCF’s CSSB officers in March Pen and the Mobile Reserve in Flanker was frequently contrasted by interviewees with that of “the regular police”. In Russia, community members spoke of how community policing was beginning to spread more widely amongst the local police, however, there was still some way to go. The assessment found that the roll out of community policing is having an impact in all three of these communities. CSSB officers have a good relationship with the community, patrol regularly and seem to have developed trust with local residents. However, many interviewees and focus group members said that this impact is often undermined by other police officers. There were frequent criticisms of the paramilitary style adopted by the police when they conduct special operations in the communities. These operations appear to destroy the confidence that the CSSB officers have developed. It is recognised that effective law enforcement is critical to tackling crime in Jamaica and that a range of strategies must be employed. However, treating community members with respect and acting in line with human rights standards must be principles that are observed at all times.

**Recommendations - Policing**

- Bring together JCF station commanders, CSSB officers, CDCs and social intervention programmes to discuss what community policing involves in practice. Organise a workshop to raise awareness among key stakeholders from the JCF priority communities. Training the police, social intervention programmes and CDCs together will help foster partnerships. The COMET and JVPPSD programmes would be well placed to support the CSSB on this issue.

- Mainstream community policing throughout the JCF. There are clear benefits in having specialised CSSB officers but there is a risk that they become marginalized and out of step with ‘regular policing’. Community policing should be practiced by all officers throughout the force. This is the stated policy of the Commissioner and the CSSB, but needs wider buy in and support.
Target the roll-out of community policing in the same communities as social intervention programmes. Experience shows that security and development interventions need to go hand in hand.

Engage communities in policing. Each programme should make policing a top priority and have a strong focus on working with communities to engage them in working with the police. Policing is too important just to be left to the police.

MEANS OF IMPLEMENTATION

216. The four programmes (CSI, CSJP, PMI and ICBSP) have both similar and varied methods and structures by which they implement their selected targeted interventions. This is referred to as the means of implementation. This section analyses the means employed by these programmes in the delivery of their interventions.

Community liaison officers

224. The CSI, CSJP and ICBSP programmes all employ community liaison officers (CLOs) to coordinate activities in their respective communities. This model seems to be an effective one with residents normally speaking highly of the staff. However, when more than one programme operates in a community, each with their own CLO, there is a risk of duplication, especially when SDC also has its own field officer responsible for that community. One of the potential benefits of moving towards a more harmonised approach (see Section VII below) could be to avoid this overlap.

Partnerships and collaborations

NGOs

225. The CSI, CSJP and ICBSP programmes all contract out the provision of key services, particularly training programmes, to NGOs. In many cases, different programmes contract the same NGOs to deliver services but in others a wide range of different partners are employed. For example, all of the programmes use DRF to provide conflict resolution and mediation training. However, CSI, CSJP and JSIF have all used different NGO partners to deliver parenting training. There would be considerable benefit in moving to a more standardised approach to training on critical issues. Another challenge is that in the current ad hoc system, the contracts which the NGOs receive from the programmes are often short term and do not provide sufficient security to enable long-term planning.

SDC

All the programmes successfully partner with SDC to implement their projects. SDC acts as a community mobiliser and is currently developing community profiles that will be used by the various programmes. SDC also serves as a key partner in CSI, CSJP and ICBSP’s efforts to strengthen local governance structures. SDC’s capacity appears to vary from community to community and gives the impression of
being stretched. There is a case for programmes to provide financial support to SDC to help support key aspects of their implementation.

**Inter-programme collaboration**

Collaboration between the CSI, CSJP, ICBSP and PMI programmes in sample communities is fairly limited and the programmes appear more often than not to be individualistic. As explained in the above discussion on *Local Governance Structures*, in two instances programmes supported different community governance structures in the same community. This has resulted in a duplication of efforts and undermined the coordination of interventions. CSI supports coordination in its target communities through its stakeholder meetings. However, the absence of integrated community safety plans inhibits sustained collaboration and a clearer division of roles and responsibilities.

**Awareness of programmes**

210. Social marketing is one established way of ensuring targeted beneficiaries are aware of interventions, and thus increase the possibility of them participating. Residents in each community were asked if they had heard of the various social intervention programmes that were working in their community to reduce crime and violence. The level of awareness of the programmes is shown in the table below:

**Table 10: Level of awareness of social intervention programmes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Sample size</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>CSJP</th>
<th>CSI</th>
<th>COMET</th>
<th>ICBSP</th>
<th>PMI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whitfield Town</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain View</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fletcher’s Land</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August Town</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucknor</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March Pen</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hannah Town</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthew’s Lane</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunkirk</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flankers</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>3,102</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total sample size for each social intervention programme | 1,697 | 1,157 | 319 | 1,450 | 940 |

| % of residents aware | 44% | 34% | 35% | 72% | 71% |
211. The survey results outlined above shows that 72% and 71% of the respondents are aware of ICBSP and PMI respectively. By comparison, 44% were aware of CSJP and 34% were aware of CSI. It is striking that the level of awareness of the ICBSP and PMI programmes was a lot higher than for the other programmes. This can possibly be explained by the significantly higher media profile that both organisations have. The nature of ICBSP work in a community – infrastructure development – also makes it more readily visible. In addition, JSIF puts signs up at every project site to inform residents that the ICBSP programme is responsible for the physical work. Although the mediation work carried out by PMI is largely done out of the public eye, when it comes to fruition, for example, with the signing of the August Town peace treaty it becomes high profile.

212. It is not necessarily important that community members know the name of the organisation that is providing services. Many residents are aware of the services, rather than the organisation behind them, or they know them by the person in the community who organises them.

**Access to programmes**

213. Much more important is how many community members have accessed programme services. On average across the 11 communities, just fewer than one in five people (18%) have accessed services. This figure was much lower at only 3% in Russia. This can be partly explained by the fact that the CSJP programme has only been in the community for a year but it is still a low figure. However, in August Town where CSJP, CSI and PMI operate only 5% of respondents said that they had accessed services. August Town is a large community but given the number of interventions that have taken place over a lengthy period this is a low number.

**Figure 2: Have you ever accessed any of the services provided by any of the above named programmes?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Yes</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) No</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Don’t know</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-response</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

214. The respondents who had accessed programme services were then asked to rate their level of satisfaction. The satisfaction ratings across all of the programmes were uniformly high - over 85% satisfaction from beneficiaries for all services. It seems clear therefore that programmes have a positive impact on their direct beneficiaries.
Awareness of CBOs

215. Whilst it is not necessarily important that residents know the names of community security programmes, it is vital that they know about the CBOs that they support to lead activities in that community. As indicated in figure 8 below, only 45% of all respondents across the 11 communities said that they were aware that there was a CDC working to promote development in their community. Of these, only 14% said that they had ever been asked to participate in any event or activity organised by this committee. This is a clear demonstration of the need to significantly target increasing the public outreach of CDCs.

216. By contrast, in Flanker, where the Peace and Justice Centre provides a hub for the community, 61% of respondents were aware of the CDC and 19% said that they had been invited to participate in an event or activity.

Figure 3: Is there a community based organisation (e.g. CDC) working to promote development in your community?

Box 7: Key findings from perception survey

**Key findings**

- All programmes have a positive impact on their direct beneficiaries with very uniform satisfaction ratings across programmes and services.

- Wider community engagement is limited. Only one in five people surveyed had accessed programme services and less than half were aware that there was a CDC.
OUTCOMES

217. Challenges with police and hospital statistics make the impact of programmes on community security difficult to accurately measure. Nevertheless, by triangulating different data sources it seems clear that the overall level of safety and security in the sample communities has increased. The direct influence of the implementation of the programmes on this was very challenging to ascertain, because most programmes do not have an effective monitoring and evaluation system in place. Monitoring is normally focused heavily on outputs, for example the number of persons trained, instead of the outcome the training may have on the life of the beneficiaries and the impact this in turn has on community security. Equally important is the fact that many variables are at play in any given community, as such, in most cases it is difficult to definitively attribute a particular change to a single programme.

Crime and violence trends

218. In an attempt to assess the possible impact of the programmes, the assessment team looked at the JCF statistics for major crimes (murder, shooting, rape, carnal abuse, breaking, robbery and larceny), and data on the number and type of violence-related injuries (VRIs) admitted to the main public hospitals that serve the sample communities. The objective was to see if there is any correlation between the implementation of community security programmes and levels of reported crimes and VRIs.

Police statistics

219. The police crime statistics for 2006, 2007 and 2008 can be found in Annex E. There are three important general caveats to assessing crime statistics. Firstly, many crimes (especially rape) may be severely under-reported due to lack of trust in the police and fear of reprisals or intimidation. Secondly, if confidence in the police increases, levels of reported crime may actually increase, even if the number of actual crimes remains the same. Thirdly, even if crime figures are accurate then an increase or reduction in crime cannot be automatically attributed to the work of the programmes in those communities.

220. There are two additional caveats in the Jamaican context. Firstly, it has not been possible in the research to determine the JCF’s definition of the boundaries of these communities. The JCF collects information routinely by police division and there is no match between police division boundaries and those used by the community security programmes. In some cases, the JCF statistics for communities differ markedly from those supplied by programme staff or CDC members. For example, in Matthew’s Lane in 2005, CSI report that there were 38 murders yet the JCF statistics made available for this research indicate that there was only one. A potential explanation for this could be if the JCF boundaries are limited

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49 This data has been obtained from the Jamaica Injury Surveillance System (JISS) that is intended to collect information on each patient admitted to a public hospital with a VRI. Questions are asked about the location of the incident, the address of the patient, the method of injury and the circumstance of injury.

For all types of VRIs except gunshots, the JISS is more accurate than the Hospital Monthly Statistical Report (HMSR) that provides total aggregate information by hospital. However, for gunshots the JISS is less likely to record every case due to the serious nature of the injury and the need for emergency medical management. The level of under-reporting varies from hospital to hospital. The Ministry of Health estimates that in Kingston Public Hospital 93% of gunshots are recorded on the JISS, 90% at Bustamante Children’s Hospital, 63% at Spanish Town Hospital, 98% at May Pen Hospital, 58% at Cornwall Regional Hospital and 31% at Savannah-la-Mar Hospital. Because of the low proportion of VRIs captured at Savannah-la-Mar Hospital, the assessment has decided not to analyse the VRIs for the community of Russia as the figures would not be representative.

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to the road called Matthew’s Lane whereas the programme boundaries span the whole community which crosses two police divisions. There is a similar problem with the statistics for Browns Town. Interviews with local stakeholders highlighted that there was a large number of murders in the community in 2005. CSI, JSIF and PMI have all independently quoted very high figures (65, 54-60 and 51 respectively) based on their own research and contacts. However, the JCF statistics provided to the assessment team say that there were 10 murders in the community in that year.

221. Secondly in the Jamaican context, there is the problem that in garrison communities a lot of the crime and violence is outwardly directed. Communities may be safe internally but members of the community may commit significant crimes elsewhere. A reduction in crime and violence within the community could be a reflection of the increased disciplinary power of the Don.

222. Nevertheless, police statistics are one of the main sources of information available and so it is worthwhile to examine them. But because of the limitations mentioned above, the assessment does not attempt to draw direct correlations or causality between programme implementation and crime levels.

Table 11: Changes in crime levels in the sample communities and nationally

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% change 2006-08 10 communities</th>
<th>% change 2006-08 Nationally</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>+6%</td>
<td>+20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shooting</td>
<td>-27%</td>
<td>+14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>-13%</td>
<td>+9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carnal abuse</td>
<td>+50%</td>
<td>+6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>+32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breaking</td>
<td>+140%</td>
<td>+87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>+188%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All major crimes</td>
<td>+1%</td>
<td>+35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Violence-related injuries

223. The VRI tables for each community can be found in Annex F, ‘Community Reports’ along with hotspot maps that show the locations of the incidents within the communities. The VRI data does not include homicides but it provides a more accurate picture than the police statistics of the violence patterns in sample communities because it directly corresponds to the community boundaries of the programmes.

Table 12: Change in level of total VRIs and shootings in sample communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Level of total VRIs 2006-08</th>
<th>Level of shootings 2006-08</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August Town</td>
<td>+15%</td>
<td>+250%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown’s Town</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucknor</td>
<td>+15%</td>
<td>+300%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flanker</td>
<td>-28%</td>
<td>-73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fletcher’s Land</td>
<td>-83%</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hannah Town</td>
<td>-85%</td>
<td>-100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March Pen</td>
<td>+163%</td>
<td>-84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthew’s Lane</td>
<td>-61%</td>
<td>-50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain View</td>
<td>-31%</td>
<td>-75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whitfield Town</td>
<td>- 80%</td>
<td>-25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Comparative analysis of police and hospital data

224. It had been hoped to be able to directly compare the police and hospital data to reach firm conclusions about the impact of the programmes. However, the differences in the community boundaries used for both datasets mean that this is not possible. The area of greatest potential comparison is shootings as both datasets have a distinct category for this. However, it is not possible to directly compare the numbers of shootings in the police and hospital data because (in addition to the boundary issue), not all shootings are captured in the latter (see footnote 43). It is possible though to compare trends in the data over time. Despite these challenges, there are a number of noteworthy areas of commonality between the two sets of statistics. These are highlighted below:

Box 8: Key areas of commonality between police and hospital data

**Key areas of commonality between police and hospital data**

- **Reduction in total number of incidents** - Over the 2006-2008 period, there was a reduction in the total number of reported serious crimes in six out of the 10 sample communities and a reduction in the total number of VRIs in seven out of the 10 sample communities.

- **Reduction in total number of shootings** - The number of reported shootings dropped in eight out of the 10 sample communities (it remained the same in the other two) and the number of VRIs from shootings reduced in six out of the 10 sample communities (and remained at the same level in two).

- **Increase in incidents in 2007** - The overall murder rate across the 10 communities spiked significantly in 2007, the general election year, then dropped in 2008. The total number of VRIs also increased significantly in 2007 in seven out of the 10 sample communities and then dropped again in 2008 in all but one of these communities.

- **Significant reductions in Flanker and Whitfield Town** - The year on year reductions in VRIs in Flanker and Whitfield Town correlate with the year on year reductions in reported serious crimes in these communities in the police data.
Public perceptions of safety and security

Changes in safety and security

225. A number of questions were asked in the household survey to assess how security has changed during the period in which the programmes have been implemented. 74% of residents said that their community is ‘safe’ or ‘very safe’.

Figure 4: How safe is your community?

Figure 5: How has the safety of your community changed over the last two years?
226. More people thought safety had improved than thought it had worsened in each of the 11 communities. Overall, 38% of respondents across the 11 communities believe that the safety of their community has improved over the last two years (as opposed to 14% who say it has worsened). By comparison, 59% of residents in Flanker think safety has improved there. This correlates with the reduction in the police crime statistics and hospital VRIs from 2006 to 2008 (see above) and with the qualitative finding that significant achievements have been made to improve community security in Flanker. 56% of the respondents in August Town said that the level of safety has improved in their community. When correlated with the fall in reported crimes since June 2008, it can be deduced that this is due to the signing of the peace treaty signed in August Town.

**Reasons for improvements in safety and security**

227. Policing and local governance were identified by citizens in the perception survey as the key reasons for improvements in security in sample communities. This was backed up by the findings of the focus groups and key informant interviews. Respondents who said that safety in their community had improved over the last two years were then asked what they thought the reason for that was. The largest number of people - 22% - said improved policing, followed by 14% who thought it was due to reduced political tensions and 12% who said it was due to the strengthening or establishment of a Community Development Committee (CDC). In Flanker, where community policing has been successfully implemented, a significantly higher proportion of respondents – 52% - said improved policing was the reason for the improved safety in the community. The table below shows the top three reasons given by residents in each sample community for the improvement in security.

228. The similarity in reasons given by the residents in each community is notable. Of a long menu of options, only five issues were identified by residents as being in the top three reasons in each community – improved policing, reduced political tensions, stronger CDCs, reduced criminal activity and establishment of a peace treaty.

229. It is also notable that of these five issues, only two – stronger CDCs and the establishment of a peace treaty – are direct areas of current intervention by community security programmes. The four main community security programmes all have a focus on strengthening CDCs. This reinforces the conclusion of the qualitative assessment that the strengthening and establishment of CDCs and legitimate local governance structures is the most effective current programmatic intervention.

230. PMI are the only agency to work directly to establish peace treaties and a formal agreement has only been reached in one of the sample communities – August Town. Police statistics back up the finding of the household survey and the qualitative assessment that the peace treaty was a pivotal achievement in August Town that has significant potential for wider application. Crime levels dropped markedly in August Town after the signing of the peace agreement in June 2008. According to local police statistics, there were 12 murders and 13 shootings in the first six months of the year and five murders and three shootings in the latter.

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50 These statistics were obtained by PMI from August Town police station and are more reliable than those compiled nationally because the boundaries are known. The full table can be found in Annex X.
In the communities where improved policing was highlighted as a factor for increased safety, the interviews and focus groups conducted by the assessment identified that the introduction of a community policing approach was normally the key reason. As discussed above, this is not a current major area of focus of the programmes (with the exception of COMET). With increased attention by the programmes in future to help engage local communities to work with the police, this area has significant potential for further increasing community security.

Table 13: Top three reasons why safety has increased in each community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>August Town</th>
<th>Bucknor</th>
<th>Flanker</th>
<th>Fletchers Land</th>
<th>Brown's Town</th>
<th>Hannah Town</th>
<th>March Pen</th>
<th>Mathews Lane</th>
<th>Mountain View</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Whitfield Town</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responses-safety has improved last 2 yrs.</td>
<td>160 / 56%</td>
<td>53 / 30%</td>
<td>190 / 60%</td>
<td>79 / 29%</td>
<td>142 / 45%</td>
<td>65 / 38%</td>
<td>100 / 35%</td>
<td>58 / 21%</td>
<td>134 / 39%</td>
<td>64 / 21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 3 reasons for improved safety</td>
<td>Stronger CDC 25%</td>
<td>Stronger CDC 19%</td>
<td>Improved policing 54%</td>
<td>Improved policing 100%</td>
<td>Reduced Criminal Activity 22%</td>
<td>Reduced Criminal Activity 20%</td>
<td>Stronger CDC 21%</td>
<td>Reduced Criminal Activity 41%</td>
<td>Reduced political tension 37%</td>
<td>Reduced Criminal Activity 34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace treaty 20%</td>
<td>Reduced Criminal Activity 17%</td>
<td>Reduced Criminal Activity 26%</td>
<td>Stronger CDC 32%</td>
<td>Improved policing 12%</td>
<td>Reduced Political Tension 18%</td>
<td>Reduced Criminal Activity 21%</td>
<td>Reduced political tension 14%</td>
<td>Stronger CDC 14%</td>
<td>Reduced political tension 11%</td>
<td>Reduced Criminal activity 20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced political tension 16%</td>
<td>Improved policing 13%</td>
<td>Stronger CDC/Peace and Justice Centre 14%</td>
<td>Reduced political tension 18%</td>
<td>Reduced Criminal Activity 8%</td>
<td>Improved policing 12%</td>
<td>Reduced Criminal Activity 12%</td>
<td>Improved policing 6%</td>
<td>Improved policing 13%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total /11 communities
9 communities - Reduced criminal activity
9 communities - Reduced political tension
8 communities - Improved policing
6 communities – Stronger CDC
1 community – Peace treaty

Impact of programmes on safety and security

For all four programmes, the large majority of respondents who expressed an opinion (i.e. did not respond “don't know”) said that the programmes had had a “significant impact”. The survey indicates that most persons believe PMI and the JSIF ICBSP have had the highest relative degrees of impact on improving safety and security. This is in keeping with the survey findings that these are the two programmes that most respondents are aware of. The impact of PMI and JSIF may have been foremost in people’s minds because they address more high profile and tangible issues – PMI: gangs and violence; and JSIF infrastructure. As indicated in the table below, 60% of the respondents believed the ICBSP had highest impact, whilst 56% believed PMI had highest impact.

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51 This figure is an anomaly and it is assumed an error was made in the data capturing process.
Table 14: How much overall impact, to your knowledge, have the following listed programmes had on improving safety and security in your community?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of impact</th>
<th>Significant impact</th>
<th>Small impact</th>
<th>Not much impact</th>
<th>No impact at all</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>Non-Response</th>
<th>Degree of impact*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSJP</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>1,769</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSI</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>2,377</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMET</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>2,864</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBSP</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>1,689</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMI</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>2,207</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Relative degree of impact – calculated based on total sample size in the communities where the respective programmes are operating (significant to not much impact).

Social capital

Figure 6: Are people more or less willing to work together to make the community safer than they were two years ago?

233. Encouragingly, 72% of respondents across the 11 communities said that people are more willing to work together to make the community safer than they were two years ago. And 61% of respondents said that they trust other people in their community.
Box 9: Key findings from perception survey

**Key findings from perception survey**

- Public feelings of safety increased in the sample communities where programmes were implemented.

- The top three reasons given by respondents for the increase in safety are improved policing, reduced political tensions and stronger CDCs.

- Social capital increased in the sample communities where programmes were implemented.
SECTION V: LESSONS Learnt

HOW TO ENHANCE SUSTAINABILITY

Community policing and local governance are the most effective interventions

234. The assessment overall has found that the two most vital areas for action to improve community security are strengthening local governance and improving community policing. All four programmes have a central focus on building the capacity of local governance structures. However, none of them has a significant focus on developing a partnership between the community and the police. These issues are of a fundamentally different nature than the other types of social interventions as they address issues of power, accountability and participation in communities. Because of their focus on increasing the capacity to manage problems peacefully, community policing and local governance interventions have a direct influence on community security. Combined action in these two areas is vital in the process of replacing illegitimate with legitimate authority. This combination of security and governance interventions can then act as a platform for social activities in all other areas. These two issues were repeatedly identified by focus group members and key informants as playing the pivotal role in improving community safety and security. Action in these areas is vital for the sustainability of interventions. Without improved policing and legitimate governance structures, progress made through other social interventions risks being reversed.

Focusing on community policing and local governance is also important because both issues focus on increasing the capacity to manage problems peacefully. The large scale of social needs, and the worsening economic climate, mean that it is unrealistic to expect programmes to find jobs are unable to adequately address in Jamaica means that programmes will not be able in the short term to adequately address them.

Engaging other MDAs

235. The community security programmes play an important role in providing some services to volatile and vulnerable communities where the state is not significantly present. However, they are not a long term answer to problems of service delivery. Their role should be to act as a bridge to help reintroduce the state. Engaging other GoJ MDAs is the key to sustainable progress in community safety and security. A community security programme should be judged as much on the partnerships they develop and the MDAs they engage as on the services they deliver directly. The effective engagement of other MDAs is a prerequisite to a community security programme bring able to handover its role and exit a community. Otherwise there is a risk that these special programmes begin to substitute for the regular service delivery of MDAs rather than facilitating it.
**Recommendations - Sustainability**

- **Prioritise security and governance interventions.** Programmes should give more emphasis to supporting action in these areas as central to reducing crime and violence. This can then provide a sustainable foundation for social interventions.

- **Focus on engaging MDAs.** Improving the service delivery of other government agencies is the key to sustainability. This requires a top down approach through establishing strategic partnerships as well as bottom up approach through strengthening the capacity of CDCs to hold local service providers accountable.

**EXTERNAL FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE PROGRAMME IMPACT**

**Political tensions**

236. Tribal politics looms large in volatile and vulnerable communities. As highlighted in Section IV: the recorded cases of VRIs increased significantly in seven out of the 11 sample communities in 2007, the general election year, and then dropped again in 2008 in all but one of these communities. This spike was also seen markedly in the police murder statistics for Mountain View (one of the most politically divided communities studied) where homicides jumped from 0 in 2007 to 12 in 2007.

237. In the household survey, “politics” (12%) was the second most common reason given by respondents for people not getting along in their community. The third most popular reason was “gang war” (12%) and many gang wars often have a political dimension. Politics was also viewed by respondents as a significant factor in the safety of communities. Of those 38% of people who thought that their community had got safer over the last two years, reduced political tensions was the explanation given by 14%. Of the 14% who thought that their community had become more unsafe, 19% ascribed this to increased political tensions.

238. A number of interviewees painted a concerning picture of the links between politicians and Dons in many of the communities studied. “They have double standards”, said one, “in public they distance themselves from Dons but in private they regularly meet with them.” Some stakeholders also alleged that some MPs have a vested interest in keeping CDCs weak because they do not want any ‘rival’ structure in the community taking power way from them.

239. In contexts where politicians are supportive of programmes, or at least adopt a *laissez-faire* attitude, then progress is possible. But in situations where they adopt a tribalist approach then progress can be difficult.
Dons and gangs

240. Many of the volatile and vulnerable communities where programmes operate have illegitimate governance structures in the form of Dons. A distinction can be drawn between ‘big Dons’ who control entire communities and are more closely linked to organised crime and ‘corner Dons’ who are local gang leaders from a section of the community.

241. Twenty six per cent of respondents in the household survey said that there was a Don in their community. This is likely to be a significant under reporting as 35% of people surveyed said that they do not know or did not respond. This figure is far higher than the average level of do not know and non responses suggesting that people were afraid to answer the question. Of the 26% of respondents who said that there was a Don in their community, 66% said that this Don does “good or positive things” for that community. Eighteen per cent said that this Don does “bad or negative things” (with a significant 44% of people saying they “don’t know”).

242. When asked to describe what good or positive things the Don does, the responses mainly fell into two categories. The most popular response was to provide social welfare – 54% of respondents said he “supports children”, “back to school”, “distributes jobs”, “supports the community”, “organises treats and dances”.

243. The other significant response was to provide security and order - 43% of respondents said he either “provides security”, “fights crime”, “enforces peace”, “resolves conflict” or “keeps order”. This shows that in contexts where the police are ineffective, the Don steps into the security vacuum and provides a basic service to communities.

244. When asked to describe what bad or negative things the Don does, the responses were overwhelmingly focused on crime and violence. Sixty seven per cent of these respondents raised issues including “instigates war”, “jungle justice”, “commits murder”, “commits crimes”, “beatings and violent acts”, and “commits rape”.

245. Interviews with the JCF and programme staff highlighted that violence is often higher in divided communities with a splintered gang structure. If communities have one central Don, as opposed to a number of corner Dons, then they are often more peaceful.

246. Programmes face difficult choices on the ground in terms of how to deal with the Don issue. There are three broad strategies followed in different contexts:

- Co-existence – to ensure the smooth running of programme activities, programmes or their local partners, may inform the Don about their plans and try and get him to informally support the programme.
- Co-option – PMI works to engage corner leaders in Peace Councils, broaden their horizons and show how they can play a positive role in community development.
- Competition – through strengthening CDCs, programmes support an alternative legitimate governance structure in the community. This combined with the increased provision of services seeks to gradually undermine the Don’s role.
247. These strategies are often unspoken, however. It would be beneficial for programmes, and the GoJ as a whole, to have a more conscious and articulated strategy of how to address the Don issue. In developing a strategy to address Donmankship, it may be helpful to think of an approach over time. At the outset, programmes may find it pragmatically necessary to engage a Don in order to secure access to a community but then over time the strategy should change to co-option and competition. Policing of course has a vital role to play in law enforcement and arresting those leaders who are involved in criminal activities. Many stakeholders interviewed called for a much clearer policy from the GoJ on the Don issue to underpin the approach of the JCF and programmes.

**Recommendations – External factors**

- **The GoJ should develop a policy on how to deal with the Don issue.** Action is required on three tracks – the community, through strengthening the role of CDCs; the police, through increasing community policing and effective law enforcement; and the political track, including stimulating the will needed to sever dubious ties where they exist and control the awarding of state contracts.

**Community Safety and Security Strategy**

248. Crime and violence are top priority issues for the Government of Jamaica and receive the largest share of international development assistance. Social intervention programmes which address these issues have multiplied in recent years. However, this has happened in the absence of a clear strategy for community safety and security. A strategy has been anticipated in this area for over two years but none has yet been published.  

249. This absence of strategy has had a detrimental effect on the effectiveness and coherence of programmes. They have grown organically and opportunistically, in response to the availability of resources and the immediate needs faced in communities, rather than in line with a clear over-arching vision. Programmes and interventions have therefore sometimes developed haphazardly.

250. There is no clear division of roles and responsibilities between programmes, and there is a lack of a common methodology to standardise their approaches. This assessment provides an opportunity to address these pressing issues and set a clearer direction for community security programmes.

251. The increasing threat posed by gangs in Jamaica has led to the development of a gang prevention strategy that is currently being worked on by the Ministry of National Security. It is important that this strategy is developed in close collaboration with the development of the community safety strategy. The two issues are clearly inter-linked with gang prevention and disruption being a key element of increasing the safety and security of communities. However, as previously discussed, gangs and dons continue to exert high influence on programme outcomes.

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52 It is understood that the Ministry of National Security has recently developed terms of reference for this policy.
Recommendations – Community safety and security strategy

Use relevant aspects of this assessment alongside existing data to inform the development of a community security strategy. The strategy should formally establish the roles and responsibilities of different programmes and set out the linkages between them. Given the range of interventions that are required to increase community safety, this strategy should be developed cross-departmentally. It should set out how GoJ MDAs will work together to increase community safety in partnership with specialised programmes.

Establish a common methodology for interventions. There would be a considerable benefit to standardising approaches to key issues (e.g. skills training packages, CDC strengthening, parenting and dispute resolution training) across different programmes. Thematic working groups could be established that bring together key stakeholders from relevant government agencies, NGOs and CDCs to distil the lessons learned from experiences to date and develop common guidelines from the work of different actors.

CULTURE OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION

252. This assessment has found that information is not gathered and used strategically at present across the programmes. Almost all of the interventions in communities lack monitoring mechanisms beyond counting the number of people trained. And decisions on targeting interventions are often made without a sufficient knowledge base. Lessons learnt from violence prevention interventions around the world demonstrate that, in order to maximise impact, it is essential to:

- Identify the problem.
- Investigate its causes.
- Develop and test interventions.
- Implement the most effective.
- Evaluate them to build the evidence-base for what works.

253. By identifying the risk factors that can make a community vulnerable to violence, community safety interventions can be preventive as well as responsive.

254. There are a number of ways in which evidence-based programming could be improved at different stages of the programme cycle. In the design stage it is vital that programmes have a better understanding of the local context and the dynamics of violence in a community. SDC are developing community profiles for many communities but whilst these contain a lot of valuable information they often lack sufficient focus on security issues, crime patterns, hot spots and asset mapping. These profiles would also benefit from integrating elements of conflict sensitivity to enable programmes to better understand the interaction between their intervention and the context in which they are operating. SDC should work with the police to develop an assessment tool of community security related issues to assess the threats that communities face and help to determine the sequencing of development and security interventions. This tool could be used to assess the context in communities (see Section VII: The Way Forward – Developing a Harmonised Approach to Community Security) and identify which stage in the new proposed framework should be the appropriate entry point.
255. COMET is providing support to the Violence Prevention Alliance (VPA) to add additional layers of information (the nature of which is to be determined by the JCF and MNS) to the SDC profiles for the community policing roll out communities. These should draw on standard conflict assessment methodologies, which have been developed and tested by DFID, the EC, CIDA, UNDP, USAID and the World Bank all over the world. Standardising assessment tools such as surveys and integrating some further questions into the GoJ’s Crime Victimisation Survey (CVS) would also help to provide a common baseline from which progress can be measured. The questions in the survey instrument for this community security assessment, which was also informed by the CVS, could help to inform this (see Annex E).

256. During the implementation phase, information should be used on an ongoing basis to inform programme decision-making. For example, the use of GIS data of crime locations could be used to inform the targeting of a zinc fence removal programme.

257. Significant action is also needed to strengthen the **monitoring and evaluation** of community safety programmes. The absence of data gathering at the moment means that it is difficult to assess the impact that different interventions have on community security. This has been a key challenge encountered by this assessment. Most of the programmes are output focused at the moment and the only information it was possible to obtain from them were figures of the number of people trained. Apart from information about the number of people placed in jobs following the skills training programmes, no follow up information is collected by the programmes about the effect interventions have on the lives and circumstances of beneficiaries (the outcome), and in turn the impact that this has had on crime and violence in the community. A more rigorous and scientific approach is needed. There would be significant benefit in moving to a harmonised approach to monitoring and evaluation across programmes based on common indicators for success.

258. A significant obstacle to the effective evaluation of programmes is the lack of a common unit of analysis for data gathering. The police, SDC, STATIN and the community security programmes all have different definitions of what is a ‘community’. A process of standardising community boundaries across the GoJ is urgently needed.

259. Given the challenges encountered with the police statistics the hospital VRI data appears to have the most potential for monitoring programme impact. The JISS is a valuable tool but the capacity of the MoH and hospital staff must be increased to help ensure that data is reliably captured and made accessible.

260. There would be significant benefit in establishing a national central repository of information on community security and a clearing house for data gathering and analysis. Experience in Latin America and the UK has shown the value of national Crime Observatories. The Jamaican Crime Observatory model developed in conjunction with the JCF for West Kingston by the Institute for Criminal Justice and Security (ICJS) at the University of the West Indies (UWI) and the VPA should be reviewed with a view to enhancing it and scaling it up to provide an evidence base for wider programming. At present, the Observatory uses crime statistics and hospital data on violence-related injuries to inform the targeting of

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police operations. There is significant potential to expand the role of the Observatory but the level of GoJ ownership would need to increase and its geographic reach would need to be extended.

**Recommendations – Culture of monitoring and evaluation**

- **Integrate crime and violence analysis, drawing on conflict assessment methodology, systematically into SDC community profiles.** A training programme should be developed for SDC officers to build their capacity to do this, with technical assistance coming where necessary from VPA. The COMET or UNDP programmes could be well placed to support this.

- **Develop a common set of indicators to measure the impact of community security programmes.** The MNS is working with Harvard University (supported by DFID) to develop indicators on security and justice. It is important that this includes indicators to measure progress in community safety and security. This initiative should also be connected with the initiative of the JCF, MNS and SDC (supported by COMET) to develop indicators for community policing. Once agreed, a common set of indicators should be used as a basis for monitoring and evaluation by all programmes and donor agencies.

- **Develop the Crime Observatory as an information hub and national resource.** Memoranda of understanding should be developed between the ICJS, the JCF, the MNS, the MoH for the sharing and utilisation of information. Community security programmes and CDCs could be brought into the Observatory as additional partners so that they can use the information to inform their activities.

- **Standardise the boundaries for communities across all GoJ MDAs.**

- **Train MoH and hospital staff to accurately record VRIs (especially shootings) and link the hospital databases to help make information centrally accessible.**

- **Use the forthcoming online Community of Practice as a forum for sharing experiences and lessons learnt.** This has the potential to be a valuable knowledge management tool if all stakeholders become active participants.
VIOLENCE PREVENTION AND MALE YOUTH

261. An overall conclusion from the assessment of the programmes is that they would benefit from a stronger focus on violence prevention. This should include a more rigorous assessment at the programme design phase of which interventions have the greatest potential to contribute to increasing the safety of local communities.

262. One significant finding of the assessment is that unattached male youth aged 14-24 are currently not being sufficiently reached by most community safety programmes. Yet this is the priority group for violence prevention and the key to programmes making the leap from individual to community benefits. There is no doubt that young men are a challenging group to engage but a much more proactive approach is needed for this.

Recommendations – Violence prevention and male youth

- **Prioritise social interventions to more strategically address violence prevention.** Three criteria should be used by community security programmes for prioritising social interventions:
  i. Are activities likely to have benefits at the community level in reducing crime and violence in addition to their benefit to targeted individuals?
  ii. What impact will interventions have on male youth who are the main perpetrators and victims of crime?
  iii. How sustainable are proposed activities and is there a strategy for them to be taken on by CDCs or scaled up and mainstreamed into the work of government MDAs?

- **Establish male youth involvement as a key indicator of programme success.** One of the measures used to assess programme performance should be the extent to which they have managed to engage male youth.

- **Use sports, music and entrepreneurship as means to engage male youth.** These are the issues that the assessment has found are most appealing to young men and should be used to a much greater extent by programmes.
**SOCIAL COHESION**

263. The existence of a broad range of social networks is a good indicator of social capital. Research by the World Bank shows that the more networks exist between diverse communal groups, and the more responsive a state is to its citizenry, the more likely a society will be cohesive and possess the inclusive mechanisms necessary for mediating and managing conflict before it turns violent\(^{54}\). This aspect is not encouraging in Jamaica – 48% of respondents in the community security assessment are a member of no social networks. The Church is by far the most powerful social network with 34% saying they are members of a Church.

264. Experience internationally shows the value of integrating social cohesion with community security initiatives.\(^{55}\) Social cohesion is about tolerance and respect. There are two principal dimensions to it:

- **Tackling social exclusion**: the reduction of disparities, inequalities and marginalisation.
- **Developing social capital**: strengthening social relations, interactions and ties.\(^{56}\)

265. The assessment identified that social exclusion among members of disadvantaged communities, and the rivalry between different communities or sections of communities (often divided along political lines), are key issues fuelling crime and violence in Jamaica. This suggests that an increased emphasis on increasing social cohesion is required. Many of the programmes do this already – for example, the provision of basic infrastructure by ICBSP addresses social exclusion and PMI’s Peace Councils bring together leaders from different warring factions. However, tackling social exclusion and developing social capital could be integrated more effectively and systematically across community security programmes.

266. Tackling social exclusion requires developing strategies for engaging excluded groups. Exclusion in Jamaica can take different forms – political, economic, social and cultural. The assessment team heard repeatedly from community members about the stigma they felt because they live in the inner city. “If you give a Hannah Town address when you go for a job then you are automatically not going to get picked”, said one focus group member. Promoting social inclusion involves tackling power relations and confronting the social groups or institutions responsible for the exclusion. Its objective is to ensure that people from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities.

267. Social capital comes in two main forms – bonding and bridging. Many Jamaican communities display strong bonding forms of social capital that can often be exclusionary and conflictual, for example, small, tightly-knit communities which may threaten neighbouring communities “of another political colour”. This can clearly be seen in the rivalry between the JLP and PNP supporting sections of Mountain View.

268. A social cohesion approach in this situation would involve developing activities that link the communities together (e.g. sports or music), addressing underlying inequalities (e.g. employment or housing), and building contact and trust (e.g. community resource centre) to break down negative images of the other community. The aim here would be to transform bonding forms of social capital, into bridging social capital that links different groups together in a more inclusive approach.

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269. One challenge for social cohesion in Jamaica is the micro level at which communities define themselves. Programmes naturally tend to follow these boundaries, however, there is a risk that this may inadvertently reinforce divisions between communities. Rigid adherence to pre-agreed community boundaries also makes it difficult to address conflict issues as violence often crosses boundaries. The assessment found that, with the exception of PMI, no programme has any structured activities to bring neighbouring communities together. This is a gap, particularly in contexts where one programme is working in parallel in neighbouring communities (e.g. CSJP in Fletcher’s Land and Hannah Town). Programmes have an opportunity to help build peace across borders and expand residents’ sense of community.

270. Social capital is often referred to as the invisible glue that keeps society together even in difficult, stressful times. Trust is a key component of it and one encouraging finding of the assessment is that levels of trust in the 11 sample communities are quite high – 61% of respondents said that they trusted other people in their community. In retrospect the survey should have asked whether respondents trusted people from neighbouring communities to provide a comparison.

### Recommendations – Social cohesion

- **Design programmes to maximise community interactions.** Social intervention programmes should be designed to promote positive relationships between different social groups within an area (particularly across political divides), bringing people into contact and encouraging them to work together for the benefit of the whole community.

- **Develop activities to bridge community boundaries.** Programmes should be more creative in supporting activities that link neighbouring communities together. In cases where one programme is working in adjoining communities this should be straightforward. This could involve working in partnership with another programme (e.g. CSJP in Denham Town and CSI in Matthew’s Lane). Important links could be made here between CDCs and PDCs to help link up initiatives in different communities.

- **Launch a media campaign promoting famous Jamaicans from inner city communities.** The assessment team heard from focus group members in Whitfield Town about the impact that local athlete Melanie Walker winning the 400m hurdles gold medal in the Beijing Olympics had on the self esteem of residents the area. Many famous sportspeople, musicians and businessmen have come from disadvantaged communities in Jamaica and an advertising campaign that highlighted this could help to reduce the stigmatisation of communities and increase the self esteem of residents. The National Transformation Programme could be well placed to develop this idea.

- **Consider positive discrimination.** The level of social exclusion faced by residents of inner city communities is so marked that there is a case for a policy of positive discrimination in employment. The Government should lead a discussion with the private sector about how to increase the employment opportunities of members of disadvantaged communities. Issues to consider would be the possibility of positive discrimination or incentivising employers to recruit more from the inner city. 
SECTION VI: THE WAY FORWARD – DEVELOPING A HARMONISED APPROACH TO COMMUNITY SECURITY

271. The current programmatic arrangements have developed incrementally rather than by design. Pressure for a more harmonised approach is coming from three main sources:

- Local communities who are often confused by the myriad of different programmes.
- The Government who in the current economic climate is keen to reduce duplication and transaction costs.
- The IDPs who have committed in the Paris Declaration to rationalise donor activities based on comparative advantage and complementarity.

272. Based on the findings of this assessment, there would be significant benefits in developing a more structured and harmonised approach. The aim should be to provide volatile and vulnerable communities with a continuum of support to prevent violence, increase security and provide an enabling environment for development. The roles and responsibilities of the various agencies should be made clear. Capacity to coordinate and monitor performance and impact will need to be built.

273. It is suggested that the basic principle that underpins this new approach is that a new strategic focus by the whole GoJ is needed to strengthen community security. Experience in Jamaica and internationally shows that preventing violence and increasing the security of local communities requires a multi-dimensional, multi-stakeholder response. This task cannot be left solely to specialist community security programmes, but should be a central focus of the work of all MDAs.

A PROPOSED HARMONISED FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY SECURITY

274. A new best practice framework for community security in vulnerable and volatile communities in Jamaica is put forward here for consideration. It views the process of increasing community security in volatile communities as having four connected phases – assessing the context, brokering the peace, building the peace and securing development. The emphasis here is on helping volatile communities recover from violence and move towards peace.

275. The framework is equally applicable to vulnerable communities that are at risk of sliding into conflict but where violence has not reached the stage that requires a negotiated peace agreement. In these cases, the emphasis would be on preventive actions that can stop violence from worsening. Experience globally has shown the similarity of approaches needed in conflict prevention and conflict resolution. After an assessment of the context, the starting point for action in these vulnerable communities therefore would be phase three, building the peace.

276. The benefit of the GoJ adopting a framework such as this for community security is that it would help to define the roles and responsibilities of different actors within a bigger picture. Viewing interventions as part of a continuum can also help to emphasise the importance of sustainability. It is important to emphasise though that adopting an overall framework for community security does not imply a
prescriptive, 'one-size fits all' approach. The strategy proposed is a need-based approach that is flexible to respond to the specific challenges of different communities.

277. Different actors will play specific roles at different stages but it is important to recognise that the boundaries between these stages are not hard and fast, and the handover between agencies will often be gradual. Fundamental to the handover is getting key community stakeholders to build trust with new partners. The length of time this takes will vary from context to context. As the role of one programme or agency gradually reduces, the role of another will gradually increase.

278. The diagram below illustrates the proposed phased approach. It highlights the main components of each phase, the lead GoJ partners (recognising that there will also be important civil society partners throughout the process) and some examples of indicators of progress. Once these indicators have been achieved then there would be a transition into the next phase of the framework.
Figure 7: The Community Safety and Security Framework

ASSESSING THE CONTEXT
(SDC/JCF)
Indicator of progress – Assessment of community as volatile or vulnerable

BROKERING THE PEACE
(PMI)
Indicator – peace agreement or negotiated ceasefire.

POLICE INTERVENTION
(Kingfish/community policing)
Indicators – arrest of criminal leaders, regular patrols, introduction of community policing

BUILDING THE PEACE
(New integrated community security programme coordinates interventions)

Components
1. Detailed local needs assessment (with SDC)
2. Community governance structures (with SDC)
3. Community safety plans (with SDC, JCF and key service providers)
4. Youth development - particular focus on young men (with HEART/NTA, JBDC, MYSC (NCDC, NCYD, NYS))
   a. Livelihood opportunities (incl. employment and skills training, entrepreneurial support and life skills training)
   b. Sports
   c. Music
   d. Dispute/conflict resolution
5. Parenting education (with National Parenting Commission)
6. Community policing (with JCF)
7. Community peace and justice centres (with MoJ and JSIF)
8. Improving service delivery of MDAs (with Local Authority/Parish Council, MoE, MoH, MoWH, NWC, NSWMA, RGD etc)

Indicators - development of capacitated CDC, increased public trust in police, creation of community safety plan, increased economic and social opportunities for male youth, partnerships developed with other government MDAs for ongoing service delivery etc.

SECURING DEVELOPMENT
(ongoing responsibility of the MDAs)

Components
1. Social interventions
   a. Education
   b. Health
   c. Welfare
   d. Employment and skills training
2. Security - community policing
3. Justice
4. Physical services
   a. Water
   b. Electricity
   c. Roads
   d. Solid waste disposal
5. Housing/Amenities
Assessing the context

279. The starting point in every community must be an assessment of the local context. This could be done jointly by the JCF and SDC and a number of recommendations have been made above to further strengthen SDC’s community profiles with community security-related data. On the basis of this assessment, communities will be judged as volatile or vulnerable. If a community is viewed as ‘volatile’ with a high level of crime and violence then the first necessary interventions will be ‘brokering the peace’ (phase 2). If a community is judged to be ‘vulnerable’ then the starting point would be ‘building the peace’ (phase 3).

Brokering the peace

280. The first necessary step in volatile communities is often securing a ceasefire between warring factions. Of all the programmes examined, PMI has the primary role here and has demonstrated its ability to facilitate peace agreements between gangs in August Town, Browns Town and Mountain View. Psychological support and counseling to protagonists and victims will often be required. PMI could have a small fund for specific developmental activities within a limited time period such as retreats for gang members, and small livelihood grants to ex-combatants.

281. A MoU would then need to be in place between PMI and other key programmes and agencies (e.g. CSI, CSJP or the proposed new programme – see below) to hand over services after an agreed period. It is suggested that this initial phase would normally last approximately three months after the signing of a peace agreement but may take longer depending on the local context (and recognising that it will be a gradual transition). Ensuring an effective handover though is vital to help reduce the risk of PMI getting over-stretched through longer engagements. It would be important for PMI to help introduce the key figures from other programmes into the community during the peace brokering phase, and make it clear to community members that they will be responsible for supporting the community to move forward into the next phase. This will help to ensure continuity. PMI can also play a useful role in advising longer-term programmes on how to engage ex-combatants and male youth so that they can leave the continued developmental work with this key target group to them.

282. Policing interventions will be needed in parallel in many communities stabilise the situation. In some cases this could be through Operation Kingfish or another police taskforce to target known criminal leaders who could be a barrier to peace, in other cases it might be a community policing intervention to provide a visible reassuring presence and increase trust between the police and residents.

Building the peace

283. This is the critical threshold phase for communities. Progress, or the lack of it, at this stage will often determine whether communities slide into further conflict or begin to stabilise. A number of different programmes – particularly CSI, CSJP and the ICBSP – currently operate in parallel in this area, conducting social intervention activities which contribute to building the peace. However, as documented above, this assessment has found a number of examples of overlap and lack of co-ordination. This is often due to the lack of a common planning framework and a lack of clarity about their distinct roles and responsibilities.
284. This proposed new model for community security is designed to increase the harmonisation of different interventions and ensure that their sum is more than the total of their parts. **It is proposed that the GoJ considers mandating one programme as its core platform for community safety and security.** CSI and CSJP both have different strengths and weaknesses. They operate mainly in different communities (with CSJP active in a far greater number) but they currently offer a broadly comparable range of interventions. It is suggested that a new programme be developed which takes the best aspects of each programme’s methodology and the public safety methodology of ICBSP. For example, CSI has a comparative advantage in its work to strengthen local governance, both CSI and CSJP have significant experience in skills training and job placements that should be consolidated, CSJP has a best practice parenting programme, and CSI’s methodology of local stakeholder groups to bring together service providers and local communities is a good model for wider application. This newly consolidated programme would be the GoJ’s lead agency for the ‘building the peace’ phase in volatile and vulnerable communities.

285. Developing one programme as a central platform for community security has a number of advantages. It will help standardise the different approaches currently used by different programmes. It will help eliminate competition between agencies and share valuable resources. For example, CSI’s job placement officer recently moved to work at CSJP. In this proposed new programme, her skills would be available for work in all volatile and vulnerable communities. Community liaison officers can be pooled rather than different programmes having their own for the same communities. Establishing one central programme will also reduce transaction costs such as one NGO being contracted by three different agencies to deliver the same services.

286. If one core programme is mandated as the main engine for building the peace, then the role of other programmes should be designed to provide complementary specialist services. Community safety plans would be used as a common planning framework to guide the interventions of different actors. For example, it is suggested that JSIF’s ICBSP and PRP II programmes concentrate on infrastructure interventions that address needs that are identified by communities in these plans.

287. The specific interventions required in each community in this phase will vary on a case-by-case basis and be demand-driven. However, they should all be focused on the objective of reducing violence and increasing community safety and security. It is suggested that activities are prioritised that either strengthen social capital (e.g. developing peace and justice centres) or that target male youth (e.g. livelihoods, sports and music). NGOs will have a key role to play in delivering training and services. It is envisaged that the new programme will develop standardised approaches to key thematic issues with contracts for their implementation put out to tender. The box below identifies priority issues for a new integrated community security programme to address during this ‘Building the Peace’ phase. It is important to stress though that the exact choice of approaches has to be context-specific and based on the needs identified during the assessment.

288. It will be important for the GoJ to consider the appropriate length of time for a specialist community security programme, such as the one proposed, to remain in a community. The assessment team considered alternative methods of service delivery for this critical peacebuilding stage, for example by relying directly on other government MDAs. However, their current lack of presence and poor level of service delivery in these communities means that this is not a viable short term option. It is vital though that the proposed new community security programme develops an exit strategy from the time of its entry.
into each community. Otherwise, there is a danger that communities become dependent on it to deliver services and solve problems rather than looking to the regular organs of state.

289. It will be necessary to develop a set of indicators as to what the desired end state is for consolidating the peace. Important criteria could include a reduction in homicides and violence-related injuries, improved perceptions of safety by local residents, the development of a capacitated CDC, the introduction of community-based policing, the creation of a community safety plan based on a participatory assessment of local needs, and partnerships developed with other government MDAs for ongoing service delivery in the community. The length of time it takes to reach this stage will vary from community to community but as a benchmark it is suggested that a two-three year engagement should be sufficient.

**Box 10: Priority issues for new community security programme**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority issues for a new integrated community security programme to address in the ‘building the peace’ phase:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conducting local needs assessments</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building on the initial assessment of the local context by the JCF and SDC, a more detailed assessment of local needs should be carried out. This should be done in a participatory way, involving the CDC in a lead role and engaging as many stakeholders as possible, so that the conclusions are ‘owned’ by the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Developing community safety plans</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The assessments should then inform the development of local community safety plans. These should be designed as common planning frameworks for the work of all MDAs and civil society organisations in volatile and vulnerable communities to help ensure an effective division of labour based on the comparative advantages of different agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strengthening local governance structures</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing the capacity of CDCs is identified in this report as one of the two foundations of community security and should be a core focus of a new integrated programme. This will involve working in close partnership with SDC. The training package developed by CATC Ltd for the CSI should be reviewed and could help provide a common basis for a capacity building programme. A key focus of training should be on increasing the representation and outreach of CDCs.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Supporting community policing</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>The second key foundation of community security identified in this assessment is improving policing through providing support to community policing. The new programme should seek to act as a bridge between local communities and the police, engaging residents to work with the police in a partnership. For example, the programme could facilitate regular meetings between the police and the CDC as well as ‘corner’ consultations with residents in different sections of the community. The COMET programme will be a good source of technical advice to help develop this component.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Improving the service delivery of MDAs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving the service delivery of MDAs should be a central objective of a new community security programme. CSI has developed a model of local stakeholder meetings that bring together service</td>
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</table>
providers with the CDC and local residents to try and increase accountability and performance. The endorsement of this model by the heads of MDAs would be valuable to help ensure that local officers prioritise participation in these forums. The objective should be to engage MDAs as partners in the implementation of local community safety plans.

**Providing livelihood opportunities**
Unemployment was the top priority issue identified by residents in most communities. The new programme should take a comprehensive approach to livelihoods that combines areas of good practice developed by CSI and CSJP. This includes: working with HEART to identify gaps in the labour market; offering skills training in areas that are in-demand in the economy and that are likely to attract young men; providing a stipend to help ensure they attend classes; integrating remedial classes with vocational training; providing training in employment readiness, life skills and behavior modification; engaging the private sector to identify job placements; offering training in entrepreneurship and small business development; and helping access micro credit.

**Supporting sports and music**
Sports and music should be used by a new programme as strategic entry points to engage young men. Supporting community sporting competitions, cultural events and dances are an excellent means of reaching out to youth who otherwise are often reluctant to become engaged. The challenge is to then build on this to encourage young men to participate in other aspects of the programme such as skills training and dispute resolution.

**Investing in dispute resolution**
A sustained programme of dispute resolution is needed in communities. It is suggested that a cascade training programme be developed as a means of ensuring that conflict resolution skills are spread widely throughout communities. DRF’s ‘Level Da Vibes’ approach that was used by the ICBSP is a good means of reaching out to youth and this could be built upon.

**Developing community peace and justice centres**
Multi-purpose community centres are critical to provide a neutral space for convening the community, providing training and helping residents to access services. The Peace and Justice Centre in Flanker is the best example of this and provides a ‘one stop’ shop for mediation, access to justice and advice and support on any social issue. Supporting the development of such centres, or engaging other programmes to provide this capital investment, should be a key priority for the new community security programme.

**Enhancing parenting**
Poor parenting was identified by many stakeholders as being at the root of many aspects of community insecurity. The CSJP parenting programme in Flanker was the most successful reviewed in this assessment. This combines training for parents with the identification of a ‘mentor’ who conducts home visits and works with the parents and children over a period of time to help ensure that skills learned are put into practice.
Securing development

290. This third phase marks the transition from a security-led to a development-led approach. It is envisaged that there is a transition at this stage from a process primarily supported by a specialist community security programme to one that is supported through the sustained provision of services by regular GoJ line ministries and service providers. The assessment team heard first hand from a number of stakeholders about the challenges currently faced in terms of encouraging some MDAs to work in volatile and vulnerable communities. Significant work is required to build the capacity and willingness of many MDAs to deliver services in these environments.

291. Many interviewees felt that Prime Ministerial leadership and legislation are required to get government agencies to prioritise work to enhance community security. In light of the extreme levels of crime and violence, all MDAs could be instructed to prioritise service delivery and budgetary allocation in these communities. It is therefore recommended that a statutory requirement on MDAs to work together in partnership to deliver services to increase community safety in volatile and vulnerable communities should be established. This has proven to be an effective approach in the UK where the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act requires the establishment of Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (aka Community Safety Partnerships) for each local authority. The Act requires all departments (including the police), "without prejudice to any other obligation imposed upon it - exercise its function with due regard to the need to do all it reasonably can to prevent crime and disorder in its area". It is suggested that legislation in Jamaica could mandate the establishment of community safety partnerships between MDAs at the national and local levels. In addition to legislation, the development of capacitated CDCs at the local level will be vital to holding all service providers accountable.

292. The Prime Minister talked about the concept of a New Deal for communities at the IDB Citizen Security conference in early 2009. In order to help incentivise communities to manage their affairs peacefully, an approach could be piloted whereby improved services and infrastructure development are delivered based on the achievement of certain criteria. The Violence Prevention Alliance has developed the concept of a ‘Safer Community Ladder’ with a sliding scale of indicators in areas such as violence, dispute resolution, community governance, education and health, police relations and development. This could be reviewed and strengthened by the GoJ and piloted in a number of communities to test this new approach.

CO-ORDINATING THIS NEW APPROACH

293. The vast majority of government officials, programme managers and NGO workers interviewed for this assessment highlighted the lack of coordination between different programmes and agencies, as being an urgent priority. Coordination is needed at the national and local levels. “There are a lot of different interventions in communities but their impact would be significantly increased if there was better coordination”, as one programme manager put it. This is fundamentally an issue of strengthening governance.
Establishing a Community Safety and Security Committee

294. Based on the findings of this assessment, it is suggested that the objectives of national level coordination should be to:

   i. Coordinate the activities of community security programmes to ensure a clear division of labour, which takes account of respective comparative advantages and effective linkages.
   ii. Monitor and review the implementation of the proposed inter-departmental community safety and security policy.
   iii. Engage a broad range of government MDAs to increase their responsiveness and service delivery to volatile and vulnerable communities.
   iv. Monitor the progress of communities through the three phases of community security and ensure timely engagement and hand-over of services between programmes and MDAs. This would require monitoring and updating a watch list of volatile and vulnerable communities.

295. The first objective above has recently begun to be filled by the Ministry of National Security who has convened a series of co-ordination meetings between the three agencies it oversees – CSI, CSJP and PMI. These meetings have been welcomed by participants and consideration could be given to expanding its membership to include representatives from the JCF, JSIF and SDC. Even if the recommendation of this report to consolidate the functions of CSI, CSJP and the social intervention aspects of the ICBSP into one consolidated community security programme is implemented then this first level of co-ordination would still be valuable to ensure effective linkages with the JCF and SDC. It is proposed that this inner group should then report to a higher level committee. This higher level committee – the Community Safety and Security Committee (CSSC) - would fulfil the second, third and fourth objectives of national coordination outlined above. It is proposed that this group should include all the relevant MDAs (e.g. MNS, MoE, MoH, NSWMA, NWA, NWC, OPM) and meet at Permanent Secretary level on a quarterly basis. Ensuring senior representation will be crucial to its effectiveness as a decision-making body. Past attempts at coordination have failed when MDAs sent increasingly lower ranking staff who were not authorised to take decisions.

296. Establishing such a Committee would help demonstrate that the GoJ is taking decisive action to reduce violence and increase the safety of local communities. It would also help to elevate community security into an organising principle for the work of a wide range of different MDAs. Crime and violence are at a crisis point in Jamaica and, as such, must be prioritised by relevant MDAs for widespread, sustainable change to occur.

297. It would be important for the Committee to report to a Ministerial committee in order to ensure high level attention to its work. It is suggested that it could either report to the Public Order Committee (POC) or to the National Security Council (NSC). It is also suggested that cross-party support be sought for its establishment in order to ensure its sustainability in future governments of both political parties.
Establishing a secretariat

298. For such a committee to be effective, it would require a small secretariat. The role of the secretariat would be to:

i. Convene meetings.
ii. Record the decisions taken.
iii. Follow-up with members to monitor the implementation of decisions.
iv. Provide a mechanism through which decisions taken nationally can be acted upon locally, and the concerns of citizens can be passed up through CDCs to the national level.

299. A critical question is: who should facilitate this coordination and act as a secretariat for these proposed new committees? The required body needs to have:

- The authority to convene a wide range of GoJ stakeholders.
- Legitimacy, drawn from technical expertise in violence prevention and community development.
- A mechanism to ensure that decisions made are followed up and acted upon nationally and locally.

300. The NTP currently has the mandate to play this role but many key stakeholders interviewed in this assessment have questioned its ability as a civil society-led programme to coordinate the technical work of government agencies. The report therefore proposes that the NTP focuses on its communications role where it can provide clear added value and on providing a broader social intervention vision for government agencies, the church, private sector and civil society.

301. A number of stakeholders have made suggestions as to who they think would be the entity best placed to play the co-ordination role for community safety and security. Many stakeholders consulted suggested that SDC is the appropriate organisation to play this co-ordinating role. However, questions have been raised about its institutional fit in the Ministry of Information, Culture, Youth and Sports. In the medium term there is an argument for re-locating SDC into the Office of the Prime Minister where it could work closely with the Department for Local Government and play a central co-ordinating role for action in vulnerable and volatile communities. Another option would be to establish a Ministry of Social Development that could coordinate action on social interventions and community safety. In the current economic climate, though, establishing a new government ministry may not be viable.

302. The best current option given existing capacity and the important links to the POC or the NSC, is for a unit in the Ministry of National Security to take on the co-ordinating role of CSSC secretariat. The POC is chaired by the Minister of National Security. If the CSSC is to report to the POC, then the MNS Crime Prevention and Community Safety Unit in the Policy Directorate would be the most appropriate body to be secretariat. If the Committee is to report to the NSC, then the National Security Policy Co-ordinating Unit (NSPCU) could act as its secretariat. This body is being revitalised and is already envisaged to act as the secretariat to the NSC. It is being relocated into the MNS’ Policy Directorate and will have a dual reporting line to the MNS and the Cabinet Office. Whichever option is chosen, it is suggested that the Permanent Secretary in the MNS is the Chair of the CSSC. An additional factor in favour of this is that the CSI, CSJP, JSPD and PMI programmes all sit within the MNS and the ministry also has oversight of the JCF who are a vital partner. It is suggested that an arrangement be put in place to ensure that SDC
feeds security-related issues that are passed up from CDCs and PDCs to the MNS for consideration by the Community Safety and Security Committee.

303. A key advantage that the MNS has for this coordination role, is that it is a core GoJ MDA rather than a specialised programme or unit with an uncertain lifespan. In terms of strengthening governance therefore it is arguably a more sustainable approach. Potential concerns about the MNS favouring a more ‘security-led’ approach to community safety should be allayed if the overarching Community Safety and Security Strategy is developed inter-departmentally and the implementation of the strategy is overseen by the inter-departmental Community Safety and Security Committee. If the GoJ in the medium term decides to relocate the Social Development Commission in the OPM or establish a Ministry of Social Development then the coordination function could be transferred.

**Strengthening community-level coordination**

304. Improved coordination is also required at the community level to avoid overlap and duplication. For example, there are separate community committees in Flanker and March Pen and parallel skills training programmes in August Town. CSI has taken the lead in local coordination, in the communities where it currently operates, by convening regular stakeholder meetings. For example, the August Town group brings together the CDC, CSI, CSJP, SDC and UWI. This is an important initiative that is welcomed by all members and should be replicated in other communities with some minor adjustments. The JCF should be invited as a key stakeholder given the critical role that policing plays in community security. In addition, more could be done to support the communities themselves to take the lead role. The aim should be to capacitate the CDCs to coordinate the different actors working in their communities.

305. Common planning frameworks are a vital means of ensuring coordination at the local level. This highlights the important potential role of Community Safety Plans. Few of the communities studied in the assessment reported that they had a community plan of any sort that was being used by the CDC and external actors to prioritise and target interventions. SDC is currently in the process of facilitating Community Development Plans in some communities but these often lack sufficient focus on safety and security issues. If crime and violence are top government priorities then it follows that these should be key issues that frame local planning processes in volatile and vulnerable communities.

**Resourcing this new approach**

306. Three proposals are put forward in this report to maximise the pool of resources available for community safety and security in the current difficult global and national economic environment. Firstly, systematically engaging MDAs in the development and implementation of community safety plans so that the delivery of services in volatile and vulnerable communities comes as much as possible from main departmental budgets. Secondly, re-orientating the CDF so that its considerable resources are targeted to support the implementation of community safety plans in line with priorities identified by PDCs and CDCs. Thirdly, increasing donor harmonisation so that Jamaica’s IDPs provide their support to community security interventions in a more coordinated manner, reducing duplication and lowering transaction costs. During this assessment, a number of national stakeholders were sceptical as to whether IDPs are committed to harmonisation or prefer to have their own individual projects. On the other hand, a number of international stakeholders said that they were willing to harmonise but expect the GoJ to provide a clearer lead on this. It is suggested that UNDP helps to act as a bridge between the GoJ and IDPs to
facilitate the development of a more harmonised approach. It is the responsibility of the GoJ to set out a clear road map, but then up to international partners to follow it.

SECTION VII: KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

307. This section highlights the key overall recommendations of the report for increasing the impact of interventions and developing a more strategic and harmonised GoJ approach to community safety and security.

I. Increasing harmonisation

- The GoJ should establish a new framework for community security to facilitate greater harmonisation with clear roles and responsibilities for different actors. This could view the process of increasing security in volatile and vulnerable communities as having four connected phases:
  - Assessing the context which could be done by the SDC with input from the JCF;
  - Brokering the peace (in volatile communities only), where PMI has the lead role;
  - Building the peace, where a new integrated community security programme (see below) should take the lead; and
  - Securing development, where responsibility is handed over to MDAs.

- The GoJ should consider developing a single integrated programme to act as the engine for the ‘building the peace’ phase in volatile and vulnerable communities. A number of different programmes operate in this area at present resulting in some overlap and duplication. It is suggested that a new, integrated programme be developed that takes the strongest aspects of the CSI, CSJP and ICBSP (public safety) methodologies. This programme would act as a bridge to reintroduce the state in volatile and vulnerable communities, strengthen local governance structures, develop community policing and then engage other MDAs to ensure that it can exit. IDPs could be asked to jointly provide funding for it.

- The MNS should lead the development of an inter-departmental Community Safety and Security Strategy that sets out how GoJ MDAs and programmes will work together to increase community security (incorporating the framework proposed above). A common methodology for interventions in this area to guide all actors should also be developed.

II. Improving the impact of programmes

- Community security programmes should prioritise governance and security interventions – strengthening CDCs and improving community policing - in order to have the greatest impact on crime and violence.

- Social interventions should be more strategically targeted to prevent violence. Three criteria could be used to prioritise social interventions in volatile and vulnerable communities:
  - Are activities likely to have benefits at community level in terms of reducing crime and violence as well as at the individual level?
What impact will interventions have on male youth?
How sustainable are proposed activities and is there a strategy for scaling up and mainstreaming them into the work of GoJ ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs).

III. Enhancing sustainability

- The GoJ should consider developing new legislation that places a statutory obligation on MDAs to prioritise service delivery in volatile and vulnerable communities. Engaging a broader range of MDAs and ensuring that they target human and budgetary resources to address community security issues is fundamental to ensuring sustainability.

- The CDF should be used to fund the implementation of community safety plans in target communities. Targeting the considerable resources of the CDF in line with the community safety priorities identified by CDCs and PDCs would help ensure the sustainable implementation of plans.

IV. Establishing a coordinating mechanism

- An inter-departmental Community Safety and Security Committee should be established to provide a mechanism for effective coordination. It is suggested that the committee should meet at Permanent Secretary level and should report to either the Public Order Committee or the National Security Council. A small secretariat should be established in the MNS Policy Directorate’s Community Safety and Security Branch to support its operations.

- Community Safety Plans should be used as the common framework for coordination in volatile and vulnerable communities. They should be developed based on a participatory assessment of community needs and the local dynamics of crime and violence. The CDCs (supported by SDC) should be the ‘custodians’ of the plans and all programmes and MDAs working in those communities should target their work to address the plans’ priority issues.

V. Anchoring programmes in communities

- Increased support should be given to building the capacity of CDCs. All GoJ programmes should work to strengthen one CDC as a coordinating body in each community, rather than having parallel community committees. The legal status of CDCs should be strengthened as part of the local government reforms and enhancing their representation and outreach are important priorities.

VI. Developing a culture of monitoring and evaluation

- Develop the Crime Observatory as an information hub and national resource. There would be significant value in establishing a central repository of information to inform the design, monitoring and evaluation of all interventions. MoUs should be developed between the Institute of Criminal Justice and Security at UWI, the MNS, MoH and JCF on the sharing and use of information to ensure GoJ ownership.