SMALL ARMS SURVEY
Acknowledgments

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWG</td>
<td>Alarm West Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>BD BiH</td>
<td>Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>BICC</td>
<td>Bonn International Centre for Conversion</td>
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<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBC SALW</td>
<td>Coordination Board for the Control of SALW</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJB</td>
<td>Centar javne bezbjednosti</td>
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<td>CSS</td>
<td>Centre for Security Studies</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUPM</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Federation of BiH</td>
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<td>FPD</td>
<td>Federal Police Department</td>
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<td>BP</td>
<td>Border Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>IANSA</td>
<td>International Action Network on Small Arms</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>MoS</td>
<td>Ministry of Security</td>
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<td>MIA RS</td>
<td>Ministry of Internal Affairs of Republika Srpska</td>
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<td>MIA</td>
<td>Ministry of Internal Affairs</td>
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<td>MoFTER</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations</td>
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<td>Office of the High Representative</td>
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<td>Intelligence-Security Agency of BiH</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td>PIP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Private Security Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTSD</td>
<td>Post-war Traumatic Stress Disorder</td>
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<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Republika Srpska</td>
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<td>Small Arms Control and Reduction Project in BiH</td>
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<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<td>SALWS</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons Survey</td>
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<td>SEESAC</td>
<td>South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIPA</td>
<td>State Investigation and Protection Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITA</td>
<td>Indirect Taxation Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded Ordinance</td>
</tr>
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</table>
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SALW Distribution

It is estimated that altogether there are 1,224,142 individual weapons in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 1,098,762 pieces are in civilian possession, while 144,378 pieces (or 11.61%) are categorised as government (state, entity or Brcko District) stock holdings and 1,002 pieces are classified as the property of private security agencies (0.08%).

Survey results indicate that 34%, or every third citizen, in Bosnia and Herzegovina owns a firearm stored in their household. The most common type of firearm found in households, according to respondents views, are pistols (62.6%) or hunting rifles (23.1%). Approximately 7.6% of respondents believe that citizens own explosive devices, while 6.3% believe that some own automatic weapons.

The estimates on civilian possession, 1,098,762 firearms, envelops both legal and illegal possession. In terms of civilian possession, according to the number of issued licences, there are 349,366 firearms. The distribution of issued licenses indicates that there are 146,542 pieces (42%) in the Federation of BiH, 196,854 (56%) in Republika Srpska and 6,000 (2%) in Brcko District.

The more significant amount of 749,366 firearms, according to the results, remains under illegal civilian possession, which indicates that every fifth citizen (19.5%) owns an illegal firearm. This high distribution of illegal or unregistered firearms represents a significant threat to public safety, which is also indicated by statistical data on the number of criminal offenses committed using these weapons and by an increase in activities related to serious and organised crime.

The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina own 124,025 individual weapons, which represents (9.97%) of the overall amount of SALW in BiH; police forces own 20,353 firearms (1.69%), while private security companies own 1,002 (0.08%). These weapons, the property of security institutions, will be subject to considerable reduction over the forthcoming period as a result of the implementation of adopted policies for the elimination of surpluses weapons and ammunition.

The estimated surplus within the armed forces has been assessed at 99,882 weapons and 22,500 tons of ammunition.
SALW Impact

> Statistical data from the law enforcement agencies indicates that the overall rate of criminal activity has remained at the same level over the last few years, while the number of SALW incidents has drastically increased. The number of criminal offenses committed using firearms increased by 50% during the period 2007 and 2009. The majority of these criminal offenses were committed with illegal weapons. The best example of the negative impact that SALW have on human security is the increase in robberies and theft as well as public order violations committed using illegal firearms. Suicide attempts involving SALW most often have fatal consequences: one fifth of suicides are committed using SALW.

> The presence of SALW in households also has harsh consequences for women and children in relation to instances of family violence. Almost a quarter of households in BiH have been confronted with some form of violence and one fifth of violent acts were committed using SALW. The consequences of these traumatic incidents have a negative affect on the functionality of the family, most notably as the primary social cell.

> The impact of SALW has also been manifested in relation to gender and consequently 71% of SALW victims were male, while only 29% were female. Also, 25% of men are inclined towards weapons and considered them as desirable, compared to only 5% of women.

> Small arms and armed violence, directly or indirectly, have an immense impact upon children. The negative effects of SALW abuse on children are manifested not only through murder and injury, but also through negative consequences such as psychological trauma, low quality of life and reduced productivity. A major concern is the fact that SALW abuse has become accepted and justified, since SALW possession is easily affordable and they can easily be acquired on the black market.

SALW Perceptions

> Survey results indicate that Bosnia and Herzegovina is perceived as quite a secure country. In this regard, amongst the survey respondents, 44.1% felt secure in their communities, while 14.5% felt extremely secure. On the other hand, a small percentage felt insecure, while only 4.1% felt extremely insecure.

> In relation to the problems connected to SALW the overall attitudes expressed indicate a consequential relationship between people with psychological problems and the immense amount of weapons under civilian possession. The majority of respondents considered the police force as the ultimate bearer of responsibility to ensure the security of citizens, followed by the family and international organisations.

> Amongst the reasons for possession of SALW personal security was most frequently quoted, which in turn highlights the low level of trust in the police. Other reasons included weapons that are a consequence of the conflict, the fear of a new conflict and the traditional gun culture.

> The majority of citizens perceived SALW as a great threat to human security, emphasising their negative perception of both legal and illegal weapons. The main reasons under which they would opt to acquire a SALW were to protect family and property, as a hobby or sport and self-protection, while a very small percentage cited the unstable political situation as a reason for possessing a SALW. The threat posed to family and in particular children were the main counter arguments to possession, special emphasis was placed on improper storage and unskilled handling of weapons.

> Weapons collection activities were perceived as insufficient and without adequate results. Nonetheless, the majority of respondents were in favour of local authorities pursuing such programmes. Attitudes confirming that an immense number of citizens would voluntarily and actively participate in such programmes and that these programmes would be successful are encouraging.
The predominant attitudes concerning approaches to motivate the voluntary surrender of illegal weapons were centred on harsher punishments for illegal possession and financial compensation in exchange for weapons.

SALW Capacity

There are no binding international legal norms within the domain of SALW control that would encourage each state to enact policy to combat their proliferation and to implement control of SALW on its own. As such, Bosnia and Herzegovina has adopted for a state strategy consisting of legal regulations, the establishment of organisational capacities within the structures of authority competent for matters pertaining to SALW, international cooperation and civil society activities. The Coordination Board on SALW was established by the Council of Ministers of BiH and is in charge of the implementation and harmonisation of legislature with international acts.

Legislative pertaining to the export and import of weapons and military equipment, the movement of weapons and the issuance of licenses to private security companies is, on the whole, quite well regulated and for the most part harmonised with European standards. However, control and licensing of civilian possession of weapons needs to be further aligned and regulated with the decision of the Council of Ministers on the harmonisation of this domain with international acts.

Government institutions in BiH are responsible for implementation of overall control over SALW in accordance with international acts. Adoption of the Law on Foreign Trade in Goods and Services of Strategic Importance to the Security of the State has ensured a uniform approach to the issuance of licenses for the export, import, brokering and transit of weapons and military equipment.

Police agencies, which the respondents saw as being most responsible for the security of citizens, have marked steady progress in combating SALW in recent years. By actively participating in the implementation of the strategy and Action Plan for SALW Control in BiH police forces have collected a considerable amount of illegal weapons and ammunition, despite the fact that 82% of the overall amount was voluntarily surrendered by citizens. Furthermore, the collection of 818,025 pieces of ammunition, 16,535 mines and other explosive devices, 9,361 hand-grenades, 4,321 long-barrelled weapons, 2,118 pistols, 1,772 rifle-grenades and 587 hand-held rocket launchers represent a significant effort.

Those weapons proclaimed as inoperative or as surplus within the framework of the armed forces of BiH represent a security and institutional challenge for government institutions. A surplus of nearly 100,000 weapons and 22,500 tons of ammunition and explosive devices is subject to the policy on destruction. Enhancement of the industrial capacity for the destruction of ammunition together with a common political will are preconditions for the formation of a mid-term solution to this issue.

The leading international organisation providing assistance and support to BiH institutions on matters related to SALW control is the UNDP BiH, which provides technical and financial aid for building institutional capacities within this domain. Other international organisations and governments have also actively endorsed BiH efforts aimed at SALW control.

Civil society programmes, although noticeable, are still insufficient to mobilise the wider public and are implemented within the framework of international community support.

The majority of respondents perceived SALW as a major threat to human security and dislike weapons, whether legal or illegal.
Introduction

The considerable amount of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a legacy and a relic of the war that marked the early 1990s. The uncontrolled presence of SALW in a post-war society, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, represents a major obstacle to the establishment of the rule of law, sustainable economic growth and human security. An environment in which weapons are easily acquired and attainable represents a threat to human security and the overall security of the state, whether these weapons are used by serious criminals or organised groups, groups connected to terrorist activity or people suffering from post-war traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

Estimates on the impact of armed violence, obtained by the UNDP through media monitoring, indicate a significant increase in armed incidents committed with use of illegal weapons. An increase in the number of registered civilian weapons has also been observed as well as a significant amount of surplus weapons and ammunition owned by the defence structures in BiH. The Small Arms Survey BiH that was conducted in 2004 indicated that 19% of civilians in BiH legally owned weapons, while 16% possessed weapons illegally.

The new Strategy and Action Plan for SALW Control, adopted by the Council of Ministers of BiH for the period 2008-2012, is focused on strengthening the capacities of BiH concerning the destruction of surplus weapons and munitions, the enhancement of the legislative framework on SALW, such as the registration, storage, trade and reduction of weapons and ammunition. The Small Arms Survey 2010 offers up-to-date information on the overall situation in this field and can be used as a source of information on the challenges that face decision-makers, the international community and the public in a post-conflict society with a significant presence of SALW.

As such, the aim of this survey is to offer empirically-based facts on the overall presence and impact of SALW in BiH and the corresponding potential for their presence to a destabilising affect on the peaceful and secure environment in the country. At the same time, the results can be used as an indicator for future activities and actions on SALW control and as a comprehensive source of data on issues related to SALW.

The survey is comprised of quantitative and qualitative analyses of estimates issues in relation to SALW in Bosnia and Herzegovina encompassing four areas:

- SALW and Ammunition Distribution Survey;
- SALW Impact Survey;
- SALW Perception Survey;
- SALW Capacity Survey.

Prior to delving into the methodological structure, it is important to first establish a definition of SALW in regard to the terminologically used in the survey. As there is a lack of international consensus on the definition of SALW the term SALW used here refers to the definitions given in the Strategy and Action Plan for Small Arms and Light Weapons Control in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008-2012 as well as the definition of SALW Standards drafted by SEESAC.

According to the former, the term “small arms and light weapons” envelops two terms: “small arms”, which covers revolvers, pistols and automatic guns, rifles and carbines, machineguns, rifles, assault rifles and light machineguns together with their associated ammunition. Whereas, “Light weapons” covers heavy machineguns, hand-held rocket launchers, portable and anti-aircraft cannons, recoilless cannons, bazookas calibrated to a maximum of 81mm, portable rocket systems and portable anti-aircraft systems and their associated ammunition. The latter, SEESAC definition of SALW, includes all lethal conventional munitions that can be carried by an individual combatant or a light vehicle that do not require a substantial logistics and maintenance capability.
Methodology

Several different methods were used for the collection of information for this survey, including a questionnaire method based on a sample of 1,500 respondents from across the entire country, discussions led in focus groups, interviews held with key actors, desk analyses, content analyses and the triangulation method. The survey was conducted from June to September 2010.

During the preparatory phase key information providers were designated, such as state and entity officials, police authorities, international officials, experts as well as other actors dealing with matters pertaining to SALW. During this stage, relevant material and publications on SALW and related issues were collected.

The first stage of the research encompassed the preparation of material for the conduct of quantitative field-research: a questionnaire for the survey and a set of questions designed for focus groups and interviews as well as establishing the research pattern and sample. Taking into consideration the sensitivity of the topic, additional educational steps were taken to ensure that the questionnaire staff maintained a consistent approach throughout the field research.

The quantitative field-research was conducted in the second stage of the study, using a representative sample of 1,500 respondents. The sample was based on the 1991 census, encompassing the section of the population in age groups 18 and above; the sample was divided according to the regions of BiH. A “random-walk” method was also used, coupled with the approach to locate the main respondents older than 18 years of age at each address, household and street. The respondents were also sampled according to their gender, age, nationality, education and employment status as well as by the type of settlement in which they resided. The results and analyses of the questionnaire were supported by discussions led in five focus groups. The margin of error for the questionnaire was 2.5%.

During the third stage, five focus group discussions were held in Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Tuzla, Mostar and Sarajevo. Each focus group was comprised of 10 to 12 people that were representative in regard to age, gender, education and their type of settlement. The focus groups lasted approximately two hours and the findings were used for comparison with the questionnaire results. In order to obtain a more representative view of the attitude of the focus groups an additional tool was utilised: a scale of attitudes. This scale was similar to the one used in the questionnaire and was distributed to participants prior to the discussion. This procedure enabled a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the focus group discussions. Within the frame of this stage in the research, the researchers interviewed over 40 key actors as part of the fieldwork, for the most part representatives from state and entity institutions, including the police, employees of international organisations, professors, SALW victims, experts in security issues and similar.

The Study on Small Arms and Light Weapons was commissioned by the UNDP BiH and developed by the Centre for Security Studies (CSS) BiH over the period June to September 2010. The study is based on the public-opinion poll (questionnaire), discussions within the focus groups, interviews conducted with government officials (state and entity level), police officials, academics, experts, civil society representatives and international organisations as well as on data obtained from official sources and data published by the Government and the entities, the media and other sources. The study is based on SEESAC protocols and is in accordance with regional standards/guidelines on disarmament at the micro level (SEESAC RMDS/G 05.80).
1. SALW AND AMMUNITION DISTRIBUTION SURVEY

The first part of this survey provides an insight into the quantity and distribution of SALW in BiH; special focus is given to estimates on the legal and illegal civilian possession of weapons. For the purposes of the analyses on the distribution of legally owned weapons two sources were used: official statistics issued by the police authorities and the attitudes of citizens on the legal possession of weapons. In the context of estimates on illegal possession, the survey relied solely on citizens’ attitudes provided through the public-opinion poll.

In order to provide an insight into the complexity of this field it was necessary to highlight the existing administrative competences in BiH. The competency of state authorities, as prescribed under the existing Constitution and legislation, are not endowed with the responsibility for data collection on SALW, as this falls under the competences of the entity ministries of internal affairs and Brcko District police. In the Federation of BiH this competence is further devolved to the cantonal level. The fact of the matter remains that the diffused police structure makes data collection within the domain of security more difficult and thereby represent an obstacle to the creation and implementation of public policy in this area.

1.1 Overall Distribution of SALW

The following indicators are based on data obtained from the relevant authorities and the survey findings. Namely, the survey findings indicate that there are 1,244,142 firearms in BiH of which 1,098,762 (88.31%) are in civilian possession, while 144,378 pieces (11.61%) fall under the jurisdiction of the State, the entities and Brcko District institutional holdings. Private security companies (PSC) account for 1,002 (0.08%) firearms. The conclusion can be drawn that the number of weapons in civilian possession exceeds the national holdings to a ratio of 8:1, which is less favourable when compared globally.
When comparing the high percentage of weapons in civilian possession to the percentage found in national holdings it becomes apparent that a more intense and comprehensive approach to this issue needs to be raised. A high level of distribution of weapons amongst civilians can contribute to and or incite violence and crime, thus decreasing opportunities for prosperity and development. Armed violence kills, both directly and indirectly, hundreds of thousands of people each year and injures countless more, often with lifelong consequences.

Such a high concentration of civilian possession can serve as an indication of the ingrained tradition of a gun-ownership culture. Nonetheless, other causes have also contributed to this phenomenon, yet the causes and motives for gun ownership is a topic which is discussed further in other chapters.

Table 1: Assessment of the total quantity of firearms in BiH

<table>
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<tr>
<th>WEAPON OWNERS</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
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<td>Legal civilian possession</td>
<td>349,396</td>
<td>Entity and cantonal MIA and BD Police</td>
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<td>Estimates of illegal civilian possession</td>
<td>794,366</td>
<td>Questionnaire results</td>
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<td>RS Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private security companies (PSC)</td>
<td>1,002</td>
<td>MIAs and BD Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimates on the total quantity of weapons in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>1,244,142</td>
<td></td>
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WEAPON DISTRIBUTION IN BIH

- **88.31%** - Civilians
- **9.97%** - AF BiH
- **1.64%** - Police
- **0.08%** - PSC
1.2 Distribution of Legal Civilian Possession

No central database exists for recording either the number of licenses that are granted to civilians or the number of firearms held by police agencies in BiH; however, some progress has been noted in this domain, pertaining mostly to legal regulation. In response to the inability to achieve a political consensus on the enactment of a state law on weapons, the Council of Ministers of BiH rendered a decision to harmonise the existing legislative framework, at all levels of government, with international legislation within this domain. To reiterate, this area is regulated under the competency of the entity in RS, cantonal competency in the Federation and the competency of Brcko District of BiH. Although the deadline for implementing this decision was not met by the authorities, certain progress was made. Some levels of government, such as Sarajevo Canton, the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton (HNK), Zenica-Dobo Canton (ZDK), Tuzla Canton (TK) and Brcko District, have enacted new legal regulations that are largely harmonised with the Council Directive 91/477/EEZ, along with the amendments to the Directive 2008/51/EC and the UN Protocol on Weapons. In other cantons the area of civilian possession is not adequately regulated. In some cases the Law on Acquisition, Possession and the Carrying of Firearms and Ammunition of the Socialist Republic of BiH is still in used and certain provisions of this Law are impossible to implement. The efforts of the MIA of the FBIH to regulate the area of procurement, possession and the bearing of firearms and ammunition is of note, in particular its efforts to ensure a single harmonised law on the level of the FBIH.

However, these efforts are dependant upon the willingness of cantonal governments to agree to transfer competence in this area to the entity, which is somewhat of an unrealistic expectation. The field of civilian possession in RS is regulated by the 2007 Law on Arms and Ammunition (Amended in 2009). This Law is not sufficiently harmonised with European standards and further amendments are needed in order to proceed with the Council of Ministers Decision that all legal solutions in this area must be harmonised with international law and in full respect of all European norms.

Aside from the above mentioned structural problems and legislative differences, data on the number of civilian registered weapons has been collected based solely on the cordiality and understanding of law enforcement agencies at the state, entity, cantonal and district levels. The data collected relates to the numbers of short and long-barrelled firearms owned by civilians. The latter refers to two types of weapons (pistols and revolvers), while the former generally relates to hunting weapons (hunting rifles and carbines). The collected information has produced realistic indicators on the number of legal firearms and the total number of hunting firearms (see Table 2); this issue has given rise to public discussion and speculation over the last few years.

According to an analysis of the results collected from the police agencies in BiH, the total quantity of legally registered firearms amounts to 349,396 pieces. Taking into account the overall population in BiH, which is placed at 3,842,566, a conclusion can be drawn which implies that every ninth citizen in BiH legally owns a firearm. However, when compared to 2004 the total quantity of registered firearms has decreased by 5,604 pieces. This reduction is, most probably, a consequence of new regulations introduced in the field of weapons and ammunition ownership. The new legislative solutions, which are only implemented in certain parts of BiH, stipulate the mandatory renewal of registration. Simultaneously, stricter legal regulations were introduced on how to obtain a licence, which require a certain financial contribution. However, this is only a tentative conclusion based on the premise that the reduction in registered firearms is related to the more stringent licensing regulation. This type of approach is not necessarily objective and leaves room for other factors that could have had an impact on the number of licensed firearms. Considering that the overall aim was not to investigate the causes of the reduction in demand for licences, this survey did not dwell too much in this segment.

While observing the aforementioned number of legal civilian firearms (349,396) it can be stated that the number is in balance with the surrounding states: civilians in the neighbouring Republic of Croatia (population statistic approximately 4.5 million) issued licenses for 371,702 firearms, while in Serbia (with approximately 7.4 million people) the number was a bit higher, amounting to 1.1 million legally registered weapons.

For the purposes of this research, a classification of civilian firearms can serve as a contributing analysis on the different types of weapons within the territory of BiH. Out of the total number of legal firearms in BiH 60% are short-barrelled firearms (208,458 pistols and revolvers), while 40% fall under the category of long-barrelled firearms or hunting weapons. In reference to the territorial distribution of legal civilian firearms, 56% (196,854 pieces) are located in RS, while in the Federation of BiH that percentage amounts to 42% (146,542 pieces). A similar ratio occurs in terms of the topographic distribution: RS has 62% of registered hunting weapons (86,772 pieces) and 53% of short-barrelled firearms (110,02 pieces). The table below provides further detail on the topographic and territorial distribution of firearms.
1.2.1 Civilian Possession of Registered Weapons in the Federation of BiH

The Federation of BiH does not have a single law on weapons at the entity level. Instead, the legal regulations governing this issue were adopted at the cantonal level. In order to provide a better insight into the procedures for the acquisition of a firearm certain paragraphs included in the Law on Acquiring, Possession and the Bearing of Firearms and Ammunition of Sarajevo Canton were analysed. Unlike the other cantonal laws, this Law is, for most part, harmonised with international acts.

In order to obtain a license to acquire a firearm and ammunition a citizen has to meet certain preconditions: he/she must be 18 or above, cannot be psychologically or mentally impaired and must not have been convicted of a criminal or minor offence during the previous five years.

After meeting these and other conditions, as stipulated under the Law, the citizen then submits a request for approval to the Police Department of the MIA of Sarajevo Canton. The Chief of Police, adhering to the procedure, then forms a three-member commission in order to evaluate the request.

Hunting or long-barrelled weapons are issued only to those persons who have passed a hunting examination and are members of a hunting association. However, in terms of hunting weapons, the Law does not contain a clause that permits a licence to be granted to a citizen for the purpose of the protection of private property.

Since 2004, the MIA of the FBiH has made a number of attempts to transfer these regulations to the entity level; however, these attempts have been unsuccessful due to the failure of representatives in the Parliament of the FBiH to support such a legal solution. The same approach as the MIA of the FBiH can be observed currently through the process of implementation of the Council of Ministers of BiH Decision concerning the harmonisation of the existing laws on weapons with international standards. There are no indications that cantonal officials will perform the transfer of competency within this domain to the Federation of BiH. The attitude of the representatives of the MIA of the FBiH is that a unified entity law would establish a more stringent and quality orientated level of control over the civilian possession of weapons.

On the basis of data collected from the ten cantonal ministries of internal affairs, the FBiH has 146,542 firearms registered under civilian possession. When compared with the results from the last survey conducted in 2004 there has been a slight increase in the number of legal civilian firearms amounting to 2,073 pieces.

The table below shows the topographic and territorial distribution of registered weapons in the 10 cantons of the FBiH.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAPONS</th>
<th>FBiH</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>RS</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>BD</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GUNS AND REVOLVERS</td>
<td>94,876</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>110,082</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>208,458</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNTING WEAPONS</td>
<td>51,666</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>86,772</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>140,938</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>146,542</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>196,854</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>349,396</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.2.2 Civilian Possession of Registered Weapons in RS

An individual in RS can obtain a firearm and or air-pistol based solely on the authorisation of the competent organisational unit of the MIA of RS. The individual must provide valid proof of address. Hunting weapons can be obtained by members of hunting associations after having passed a hunting examination.

At the end of May 2010 the MIA of RS reported having issued 110,082 weapons licenses for short-barrelled (pistols and revolvers) and 86,772 licenses for long-barrelled weapons (hunting rifles and carbines). The overall number of civilian possession of registered weapons amounts to 196,854 pieces.

When comparing the number of legal civilian weapons (196,854) with the number derived from the SALW study conducted in 2004 (200,896) a drop in the number of licences can be observed. Namely, the number of issued licenses has dropped over the past seven years by exactly 4,042 weapons. As already stated, the reasons for this trend could be due to the new stricter regulations for obtaining a license and also the lack of re-registration of existing licences.

Table 3: Weapons registered in RS
The authorisation for the provision, possession and carrying of firearms is issued by the police of Brcko District. This authorisation is issued based on an individual written request, whereupon a certificate for the registered weapon is issued. This certificate is issued for a five-year period with the possibility of renewal based upon a request by the certificate owner. Weapons, weapons’ components and ammunition can be obtained only by the person whose name appears on the certificate.

Upon the adoption of the Law on Weapons and Ammunition, Brcko District Police initiated the replacement of licences for all citizens in possession of legally owned weapons. Throughout the process, which was initiated in 2003, BD Police issued 6,000 licenses, out of which 3,500 were licences for short-barrel (pistols and revolvers) and 2,500 for long-barrelled firearms (hunting rifles and carbines)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPES OF WEAPONS</th>
<th>SHORT-BARRELLED (pistols and revolvers)</th>
<th>LONG-BARRELLED (Hunting weapons and carbines)</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER OF REGISTERED WEAPONS</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Weapons registered in BD

Throughout the research Brcko District police officials pointed to the problem of the large quantity of registered civilian firearms (approximately 3,500) without a renewed certificate status. These weapons remain registered in the outdated records maintained for the period from 1968 to 2003.

According to the opinion of Brcko District police officials, there are numerous reasons for this failure to renew weapons certificate. One of the primary reasons for this is that a large number of citizens have changed their place of residence, or, in other words, they have migrated from Brcko District to neighbouring countries without first deregistering their weapons. Secondly, could be the fact that during the war many weapons went missing or were seized, without the owners reporting it to the relevant authorities. The third and crucial reason is the death of the owners of weapons. An immense number of citizens have either died or were killed and the authorities have no record of what happened to the firearms registered to these individuals, given that they are included in the records dating from 1968.

>
1.3 Distribution of Illegal Civilian Possession

In terms of the distribution of illegal firearms, it should be stressed that in BiH, as well as other countries in the region, official statistical data concerning the number of illegal firearms does not exist. In addition, representatives of the ministries of internal affairs and other participants failed to provide estimates. However, a large number of the population was armed during the conflict in the nineties and later demobilised after the ratification of the Dayton Peace Agreement. None of the participants could, with any certainty, state that during the process of demobilisation these individuals handed over their firearms. The presence of illegal firearms and their diversity in BiH does however indicate that these weapons, as remnants of the conflict, account for the most significant number of illegal firearms.

For the purposes of collecting indicators on the scope of the problem and the distribution and quantity of illegal firearms the survey relied on statistical data obtained from police agencies on the number of firearms collected as a result of committed criminal acts, firearms seized from civilians and on the results obtained through the questionnaire from the Survey on Public Opinion on the weapons situation and citizens’ safety.

The results provide more information on these issues and the threat posed by firearms, indicating the number of illegal firearms in civilian possession. This sort of information was taken into account with a certain level of reservation, as the research methodology was based on the last population census conducted in 1991, on statistical estimates of the population and on estimates of the number of households by the statistical institutes in BiH. However, the results do provide an assessment and an estimate of the scope of illegal firearms.

In order to obtain the most exact data possible on the distribution of illegal civilian firearms, using the Lickter Scale of Attitudes, three statements connected to this issue were created. Bearing in mind the sensitivity of the topic the Scale of Attitudes was chosen as a method for obtaining the most honest answers from the four statements shown below, providing the participants with five options (answers) to choose from.

1. Q: In my opinion, people in their households own several pieces/types of firearms?
   A: one; two; three to five; not one household or I do not know.

2. Q: In my local community I am aware of households that have a weapon?
   A: one; two; three to five; not one or I do not know.

3. Q: My household owns a firearm, accordingly stored and out of reach of children?
   A: I completely agree; I agree; I cannot make up my mind; I do not agree or I do not agree at all.

4. Q: How many people do you know that own a weapon?
   A: One person; up to five people; I do not know anyone; up to ten people; Fifteen or more persons.

The first question served as an attempt to identify the respondents’ attitude in relation to the estimates on the number of weapons distributed in households: 38.1% of respondents opted for the answer that households own one firearm, 12.9% stated that a household owns two firearms and 3.3% opted for the answer “from three to five” weapons. Only 0.6% of respondents opted for the option of “more than five”, while the remaining respondents selected “I do not know”.
The obtained results give the indication that the average household in BiH own a total of 1.46 firearms per household. For the purposes of statistical processing, it is necessary to create an insight into the overall population in BiH as well as the number of households. Official data from the Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina shows that in 2009 BiH had 3,842,566 citizens with an average of 3.27 members per household and 1,175,097 households. Taking this data into account, the first estimate illustrates that in BiH altogether there are 1,715,633 firearms.

With the aim of reaching as correct data as possible on the amount of firearms in civilian possession the final estimate included a combination of answers from the remaining three questions. These answers focused on the respondents’ assessment of the number of households with firearms within their community, the attitudes in their households concerning the possession of weapons and the number of people in possession of firearms (in their opinion). The answers to these questions were used as a determinant to estimate the overall number of firearms in BiH.

The answers to the second question, which incorporated use of the Lickert’s Scale, were used to produce the following indicators: according to 14.6% of respondents every household owns a weapon, 12.6% were of the opinion that every second household owns a weapon and 20.9% opted for “three to five” households. The remainder of the respondents stated that they “do not know of any household in possession of a weapon” or that they simply “do not know” the answer to this question.
The indicators that were developed from this question combined with the number of households according to official estimates (1,175,097) point towards the figure 584,625 households being in possession of a firearm.

The opinions extracted from the second question, where the respondents were asked to make statements in relation to their own household, indicates that 12.4% of respondents agreed absolutely with this statement, while 23.7% agreed. On the other hand, 25.9% of respondents completely disagreed, 26.9% disagreed and 11% could not decide.

By comparing these answers to the overall number of households with a firearm in BiH the following estimate, based on respondent opinion, is that 424,210 households own a firearm.

Within the frame of the third question, efforts were also made to reach indicators concerning the number of households with a firearm. The question was directed towards the respondents’ estimates on the number of people in possession of a firearm in their community. 16.1% of respondents were of the opinion that each person owns a weapon, 32.6% indicated that they believe that every fifth person owns a gun, while 5.5% of respondents believed that every tenth persons owns a firearm. Furthermore, 2.1% opted for the answer that each fifteenth person or more owns a firearm, while 43.7% stated that they “do not know” of anyone in possession of a firearm in their community.
Bearing in mind that this question relates to individuals that are believed to own a firearm, the following methodology was applied when calculating the estimates in terms of households: by using the estimate that each household averages 3.27 members, the indicators show that 436,838 households possess a weapon.

The indicators from the three previous answers imply different estimates on the number of households with a firearm (see table below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH A FIREARM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In my local community I am aware of households that have a firearm</td>
<td>584,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My household owns a firearm, accordingly stored and out of reach of children</td>
<td>424,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many people do you know that own a firearm?</td>
<td>436,838</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using the median value, in order to obtain accurate data, the figure of 481,891 households that own a firearm was reached, according to respondents. As stated above, data on the estimates of the number of households and the number of firearms per household reached through the first question indicates that there are 1,715,633 firearms in BiH. Using the mean method in relation to statistical indicators the estimate reached illustrates that there are 1,098,762 firearms in civilian possession.

The indicators presented in the table below reflect the median value of answers.
The analysis of answers in terms of gender on the level of BiH indicates that one third of women admitted to living in a household with a firearm, while in terms of geographic spacing there were no significant differences. One third of the urban, rural and suburban populations admitted to owning weapons, which indicates an equal distribution of weapons in households across BiH.

On the Scale of Attitudes the number of respondents that answered affirmatively to the question on possession of firearms in households, as well as to the question concerning their awareness of households in possession of a weapon, was higher when compared to the survey conducted in March 2004. The 2010 survey indicates an increase in the number of persons stating that they possess firearms in their households of 34% (or 510 respondents).

In order to obtain statistical indicators on the number of illegal civilian firearms it was necessary to subtract the 349,396 registered firearms from the developed median. The result illustrates that there are 749,366 (19.5%) illegal firearms.

Using this median, further conclusions were developed: each third citizen in BiH owns a firearm or 1,098,762 people, whereby each fifth citizen owns an illegal firearm, or 749,366 people, while each ninth citizen owns a legal firearm in their household (349,396).

The overall quantity of firearms distributed in civilian possession, using the median value, amounts to 1,098,762, of which 749,366 pieces are illegal and 349,396 pieces are legal firearms.

The overall quantity of illegal firearms, amounting to 749,366 pieces, indicates that 19.5% of the population of BiH owns an illegal firearm, which is nearly 6.5% higher in relation to the overall quantity of illegal firearms found in Croatia where research on SALW has indicated that 12.9% of Croatians own illegal firearms. The percentage of illegal firearms in other countries in the region indicates a similar lower trend. The surveys in Serbia and Albania indicated that both countries have half the number of illegal firearms in civilian possession. Such trends in illegal civilian possession can be explained within the prism of the recent conflict. As the conflict zones were situated on the territory of BiH and Croatia the majority of the population most probably kept weapons bought or given during the war. Moreover, one should also take into account that a certain number of demobilised soldiers failed to return their weapons as well as the mentality of local populations that justify household possession for the purpose of protecting property.

The vast majority of participants from the survey were of the opinion that citizens, on average, primarily own pistols, followed by hunting rifles and 8% of participants believed that citizens also own explosive devices, while 6% believed that citizens own automatic firearms. A small number of participants (0.5%) thought that citizens own heavy-machine guns.
The armed forces of BiH were established under the provisions of the Law on Defence. The AF BiH are a professional uniform military institution controlled by BiH.

The decision of the Presidency of BiH on the size, structure and location of the armed forces of BiH regulates the number, which amounts to 16,000 members comprised of 10,000 military personnel (officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers), 1,000 civil personnel and 5,000 reservists.

The quantity of functional weaponry and military equipment of the AF of BiH meets the recommended structural requirements, but in terms of its tactical and technical characteristics it is to some extent obsolete. The basic criteria used for the selection of weapons to equip the AF of BiH were based on the current condition of the equipment and its technical validity. During the process of defence reform it was unrealistic to enter simultaneously into the modernisation process, which would have required the allocation of considerable financial assets.

Some of the core weapons selected by the Ministry of Defence of BiH (MoD) are listed below.

- M16A1 rifle
- M60 machinegun
- M76sniper rifle
- anti-tank bazooka OSA M79
- mine thrower M57 60 mm
- howitzer D-30J 122 mm – multiple rocket launcher system
- self-propelled APRA 40 122 mm
- M60 A3 tank
- armoured personnel carrier M113 A1
- combat helicopters UH-1H and Mi8/Mi17MTV

The armed forces of BiH selected standard NATO equipment, thus additionally increasing the already large amount of surplus ammunition, landmines and explosive devices. The Presidency of BiH rendered the Decision on the Principles of Equipment and Weapons Surpluses Disposal on the 10 June 2009, specifying under amendment, as of 8 October 2009, that surpluses shall be disposed of through sale, donation and destruction.

In terms of the sale of weapons and ammunition belonging to the AF of BiH, “starting from 1 January 2006, with the establishment of the Ministry of Defence of BiH, to date, no tender rendering weapons and or ammunition sales has been published”. This indicates that the MoD of BiH has not sold any weapons or ammunition. The is regardless of the fact that the MoD of BiH is in charge of realising five existing contracts for the sales of weapons and ammunition, signed by the previous entity ministries of defence, as prescribed by the decision of the Presidency, should be a point of focus. In accordance with the aforementioned entity contracts, the MoD delivered the below quantities of ammunition to the Republic of Yemen.

- Bullets 12.7 x 99: 1,922,368 rounds
- Bullets 14.5 x 114: 1,659,348 rounds
- Bullets 12.7 x 108: 494,000 rounds

Apart from the weapons donated to the MIA of the FBiH and the MIA of RS, the MoD did in 2007, in accordance with a Presidential Decision, donate weapons to the security forces of Afghanistan. namely 60 120mm D30S D30J howitzers, 19,500 AK-47 assault rifles, 1,000 short-barrelled ERO 9mm automatic rifles and with 400 M27 machineguns.

The destruction processes, initiated within the framework of cooperation between the UNDP and the MoD of BiH, have been continued, rendering the Decision of the Presidency of BiH that commits the MoD to finalise preparations for the destruction of all quantities of surplus light weapons, high risk ammunition, mines and other explosive devices in accordance with donor approval. Such an approach indicates the common determination of the Government of BiH to proceed with the systematic phased destruction of
weapons and ammunition, in spite of the fact that the MoD continues with preparations for the publication of tenders for the sale of surplus weapons.

In the following section presents data on the storage of ammunition, mines and other explosive devices within the present framework of the capacities of the armed forces of BiH. The table below illustrates how the AF of BiH opted to utilise five perspective storage facilities: Capljina, Hadzici, Bihac, two in Mrkonjic Grad and one in Tuzla. Other possible storage facilities are not suitable and require additional human and financial resources from the AF of BiH.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATUS</th>
<th>STORAGE FACILITIES</th>
<th>AMMUNITION, MINES AND OTHER EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (In tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL AF BIH</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUITABLE FACILITIES</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSUITABLE FACILITIES</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 (empty)</td>
<td>(inspection completed)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUITABILITY FOR AMMUNITION, MINES AND OTHER EXPLOSIVE DEVICES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSPECTIVE 6 (SIX) COMBAT KITS FOR THE AF OF BIH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SURPLUS FOR THE AF OF BIH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: AF of BiH Ammunition, mines and other explosive devices

Along with a significant amount of ammunition, mines and other explosive devices the AF of BiH also has a considerable amount of weapons, ranging from small and light to large calibre weapons. According to the MoD of BiH, the AF of BiH has 124,025 individual weapons of which 24,143 are considered as useable and 99,882 as surplus.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>TOTAL AMOUNT</th>
<th>PERSPECTIVE</th>
<th>SURPLUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WEAPONS</td>
<td>124,025 pieces</td>
<td>24,143 pieces</td>
<td>99,882 pieces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The overall amount of SALW of the MoD of BiH indicates that the Ministry encountered serious obstacles in the process of dealing with the surpluses. The total number of weapons currently amounts to 125,025 pieces and 30,000 tons of ammunition, mines and other explosive devices, of which 24,143 pieces and 7,500 tons of ammunition are considered as perspective. The surplus of 99,882 weapons and 22,500 tons of ammunition represents a challenge for the administrative and destruction capability of the MoD of BiH.
1.5 Border Police of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Law on the Amendment to the Law on the State Border Service, which came into force on 18 May 2007, named this institution as the Border Police of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In June 2009 the Border Police was staffed by 2,224 employees, comprised of 2,039 police officials, 40 state officials and 145 other employees. A decade after its establishment the Border Police has developed into a contemporary police agency organised in accordance with the norms of other European border police. Together with its headquarters, which is located in Sarajevo, the Border Police has other six regional offices.

The Border Police of BiH owns 1,555 short-barrel (mostly “Glock 17” pistols) and 199 long-barrelled weapons (mostly Yugoslav M70 assault rifles). In terms of the foreseen number of employees, the Border Police does not have a surplus of weapons.

1.6 State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA)

The State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) numbers 1,318 employees or 67.58% of filled vacancies, while a further 632 vacancies remain to be occupied. SIPA employees are armed with 17 official Glock pistols and 26 Magnum 357 revolvers, chemical-type pistols (pencil-pistols), sniper rifles, shotguns and machineguns. In order to perform its complex tasks SIPA has at its disposal 1,513 firearms.

1.7 Distribution of Firearms: Police Forces of BiH

In terms of presenting the distribution of weapons among the police forces in BiH the research failed to obtain all necessary data on the exact number of firearms. The reason for this was that on the basis of the Law on the Protection of Classified Information some of the ministries of internal affairs did not provide the requested data. However, a rough estimate was still possible based on information and data obtained from the other ministries of internal affairs and the number of police employees. Based on this estimate, within the framework of police forces in BiH, the MIA of the Federation of BiH, the MIA of RS, Brcko District, SIPA, the Border Police and the ten cantonal ministries of internal affairs are estimated to possess around 20,000 firearms.
1.7.1 Police in the Federation of BiH

In accordance with the number of police officers within the framework of the ten cantonal ministries of internal affairs and the MIA of the Federation of BiH, it has been estimated that the police in the Federation of BiH own approximately 9,800 firearms.

Given below are the quantities of firearms possessed by the cantonal ministries of internal affairs.

Una-Sana Canton (Kanton Unsko-Sanski - USK) police forces own 1,113 official firearms. Out of these weapons, 1,015 pieces are short and 98 are long-barrelled firearms. The official weapons are stored in organisational units in accordance with security procedures. The MIA of the USK does not have a surplus of official weapons, but it owns a mandatory reserve of short-barrelled weapons in case of malfunction, destruction or loss of firearms.

Posavina Canton (Posavski kanton) police forces have at their disposal 322 pieces of short-barrelled and 55 long-barrelled firearms (rifles, automatic rifles, carbines, hunting rifles and other). Altogether the police have 377 firearms, which are properly stored.

Canton 10 (Livno) (Kanton 10 - Livanjski kanton) reported 46 long-barrelled and 506 short-barrelled firearms and three “Cougar” CS grenade launchers. According to MIA data, one semi-automatic machinegun has been categorised as surplus and is proposed for destruction.

Zenica Doboj Canton (Zeničko-dobojski kanton) police are in possession of around 1,900 firearms. This includes all police units, traffic units and support units. The police do not have any formational surplus of weapons, yet over the period of conducting this survey a tender for the sale of 330 pistols was published.

West Herzegovina Canton (Zapadnohercegovački kanton) police have no formational surplus of weapons. The MIA has at its disposal 332 short-barrelled and 19 long-barrelled firearms (17 AP-7, 62 and 2 CZ M-72 machineguns).

Bosnian Podrinje Canton (Bosansko-podrinjski kanton) police have 23 long-barrelled and 237 short-barrelled firearms (“GLOCK” and “LUGER” 9mm calibre pistols), amounting altogether to 260 firearms. Police officers are trained and qualified to handle these weapons in accordance with security procedures.

Tuzla Canton (Tuzlanski kanton) police reported 149 automatic and 262 semi-automatic pistols. Police officers in Tuzla Canton utilise the aforementioned weapons which are registered with the MIA. Police officers are trained and qualified to handle these weapons, which are stored together with weapons confiscated from citizens. These weapons are prohibited except to those officials empowered by the chief of the organisational unit.

Central Bosnia Canton (Srednjobosanski kanton) police possess 858 firearms, including 850 short-barrelled firearms and 8 long-barrelled weapons. Formational weapons surpluses do not exist. Herzegovina-Neretva Canton (Hercegovačko-neretvanski kanton) police reported 76 pistols, 14 automatic rifles and 11 rifles altogether as its official weapons.

Sarajevo Canton (Kanton Sarajevo) police forces own 1,007 firearms, including 946 short-barrelled and 61 long-barrelled firearms. The MIA of Sarajevo Canton does not have any formational weapons surplus.
1.7.2 Police in RS

There were 6,927 employees within the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Republika Srpska in April 2010. According to data from the Small Arms and Light Weapons Study in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004 the police in RS owned 6,311 short-barrelled and 851 long-barrelled firearms within its public security centres (CJB), police stations, academy and special unit. Considering the fact that there has been no significant change in the number of employees compared to the aforementioned period, it is expected that the number of weapons remains similar. Aside from the above mentioned amount of weapons, the Ministry of Defence of BiH has donated a certain quantity of ammunition, mines, explosive devices and other weapons to the MIA of RS: 100,000 bullets (7.62 x 39mm) and 10,000 sniper bullets (7.9 x 57mm), 184 M70 automatic rifles, 21 M84 machineguns, 30 Scorpion pistols, a M53 machinegun, a M56 sub-machinegun and a M59 semi-automatic rifle, an M48 rifle and a M61 automatic pistol. With this, the MIA of RS increased its number of weapons by 276 pieces. However, there is no data on whether these new weapons acted as replacements or were just added to the existing ones.

1.7.3 Police in Brcko District

The police in the Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina has 297 employees. Within the framework of its operational, legal, administrative and other tasks the Police of Brcko District is assigned the tasks of protecting the lives and security of the citizens of Brcko District, the protection of property, prevention of crime and similar. Police officials are armed with 303 official “Glock” 9mm calibre pistols and 95 long-barrelled firearms for the purposes of its support unit. The police also own 95 old official pistols, which were returned to and stored at the police warehouse. The police of Brcko District also own 443 short-barrelled and long-barrelled firearms.

1.8 Private Security Companies and other Entities

There are 169 private security companies that are active in BiH. Private Security Companies (PSC), as well as internal services for protection, register their weapons within the competent ministries of internal affairs. Each PSC or internal service employee must be permitted to use his/her weapon if required during the course of the performance of his/her duties within the object that he/she secures. The ministries of internal affairs in BiH have issued 1,002 licences to private security companies covering 979 short-barrelled and 23 long-barrelled firearms altogether. For internal protection services within the territory of BiH a total of 115 licenses were issued for short-barrelled firearms and 11 authorisations for long-barrelled firearms.

The biggest private security company in BiH, “Alarm West” or the “Alarm West Group”, has approximately 1,700 employees. The majority of these employees are certified security guards trained to provide support to any client in accordance with his or her needs. Having in mind the number of employees, the Alarm West Group along with Sector Security own the greatest amount of registered firearms in BiH.
This chapter examines the direct and indirect impact of SALW on society in BiH. The consequences of the misuse of SALW in criminal activities, SALW misuse in armed violence and its impact on various societal groups are dealt with separately, as are the observations on security, politics and economic issues in general. This chapter further analyses the general oversight of the impact of SALW, since limitations on data have hampered the creation of an in-depth analysis. Various factors, such as inefficiencies of record-keeping, the lack of a harmonised classification of public statistics and the overall passivity within the population related to reporting SALW incidents, have contributed to this. Official data sources were used in instances where specific data was unavailable.

### 2.1 SALW and Crime

Murders, theft and armed robbery, the trafficking of weapons and military equipment and other forms of violence related to SALW are becoming increasingly present in contemporary societies, such as BiH, having an impact on human security. Violent murders in coffee bars and the detonation of bombs and explosive devices in public places have become a reality.

However, according to data from the entity ministries of interior, the total crime rate has hovered at the same level over the past few years, whereas levels of domestic related violence and SALW related incidents have increased drastically. According to data provided by the MIA of the FBiH, in 2009 the number of robberies and thefts increased by 304 incidents (58%) in relation to 2008. This trend continued during the first quarter of 2010. Also, the MIA of the FBiH filed three charges for the trafficking of weapons and military equipment in 2009.

During the first six months of 2010 the MIA of RS filed reports against 241 persons charged with the unauthorised use, possession and or resale of weapons and explosive material, which is an increase of 10.6% compared to the same period in 2009.

A more detailed analysis of information contained in a report on the crime rate by the MIA of the FBiH and the MIA of RS indicates that, the number of criminal offenses committed using weapons has increased by nearly 50% during the period 2007 to 2009 and has remained at the same level during the first six months of 2010. This data is in accordance with information on the increase in the rate of violent criminal offences pertaining to robbery and theft and to the frequent homicides and perturbations. The results from the focus group discussions named homicide, frequent gunfire and theft as the leading threat to the security of communities and society at large. Furthermore, these kinds of incidents of armed violence are most often linked to criminal gangs and are the main cause of fear amongst citizens.

Criminal groups are most often spearheaded by older individuals who recruit younger members. This attitude was mainly expressed by the focus group participants from Tuzla, Sarajevo and Banja Luka. Bank robberies where the perpetrators use assault rifles and long-barrelled rifles were also of particular concern. This trend is on the increase and therefore was presented as an object of concern.

It should be emphasised that most criminal offenses are committed by perpetrators using pistols, hand-grenades or other explosive devices, which is not very surprising bearing in mind the amount of illegal firearms in civilian possession. However, both police and media reports claim that most criminal offenses are committed using illegal firearms. As such, the MIA of Sarajevo Canton points to the fact that not a single criminal offence has been committed using a registered firearm.
According to the public-opinion survey, two-thirds of respondents had occasionally heard gunfire and explosions in their immediate surroundings, a tenth of respondents had heard it more often (once a week), while almost 6% had heard gunfire several times per week.

The results of the survey have enabled more detailed information on crime and SALW. One quarter of respondents confirmed the notion that, “In my family there were victims of assaults, threats or intimidation”; out this number 18.7% stated that the assaults were minor, whereas 7% claimed that the assaults had been intense. The majority of respondents were from Brcko and Tuzla (15.2%), followed by 12.4% from Banja Luka, 11.4% from Mostar, and 8.6% from Sarajevo and Doboj.

An alarming fact is that one fifth of respondents had been subjected to threats involving the use of firearms, while 14.3% had suffered threats involving cold weapons. Along with information on criminal offenses, data on violent deaths showing the trend of suicides and homicides was gathered. Suicide attempts involving firearms have a higher probability of a lethal outcome compared to other methods.

According to data collected from the Statistics Agency/Institute of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for the period 2003-2007, 5,824 violent deaths classified as accidents, suicides or homicides occurred. From this number, 2,312 were suicides (40%), while 342 deaths were homicide (6%).

42% of murders and 23% of suicides in Republika Srpska are committed using firearms.

More than half of the overall number of incidents occurred in RS, namely 2,996 violent deaths (51%), out of which 1,352 (45%) were classed as suicides and 160 (5%) as homicides. The suicide rate in the FBiH was 11% lower, while the homicide rate was 1% higher in relation to RS. For the same period, Brcko District recorded low rates of violent death, namely only 0.05%.

**Black market pricing**

In BiH a rifle can be purchased for around 300 to 400 BAM on the black market, the same rifle in Slovenia is priced at around 2,000 BAM, while the same weapon can cost 4,300 BAM in Austria or Germany.

A pistol, most often type TT produced by the Red Flag factory in Kragujevac, costs around 150 BAM. The price of a bullets varies from 0.40 to 1 BAM, depending on the caliber.

On average globally 3,000 people a day are severely injured by firearms: the ratio is 3 injuries to one murder.

IANSA
Out of the 1,352 suicides committed in RS (for the period 2003-2007) 23% were committed in accordance with classification X72-X75, meaning that 323 persons committed suicide using firearms.

A higher rate of firearms abuse was recorded in relation to homicides with fatal outcomes. For the same time period, out of the 160 homicides 67 incidents (42%) were committed using firearms or explosive devices.

In addition, the statistical data indicates that men are more likely to suffer a violent death than women. For instance, in 2007 out of the total number of registered deaths, amounting to 1,226, male victims accounted for 75% of the total number. This higher trend of male victims is constant across incidents of suicide, homicide and accidents (the table below includes more detailed information).
In the aftermath of the war SALW are still present in society and the risk of violence and domestic violence remains quite high. In households containing a firearm the risk factor that domestic violence will result in a tragic outcome remains high. This is particularly applicable in the case of women, where the risk of being murdered by their partner increases by 100% in the event that there is a firearm in the house. As far back as 1996 researchers discovered had a relationship between the return of soldiers and an increase in domestic violence, both in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. This connection is not surprising having in mind that certain soldiers, during the course of demobilisation, brought weapons and other explosive devices home with them. Thus, according to the statistical indicators, incidents of domestic violence as well as violence in general that jeopardises human security often involves the use of firearms.

In the majority of violent incidents the victims experience minor or severe injuries, which are regularly accompanied by verbal assaults and serious threats, such as psychological and physical harassment. Some criminal offenses occur frequently in the same families usually with lethal outcomes, such as homicide.

Homicides are the most extreme case of domestic violence and such conflicts often result in multiple victims, mostly women and children. Ten women and one child were killed in the FBiH and seven women and one child killed in RS in 2007. In three instances, the perpetrators, from the FBiH and in RS, committed suicide after committing these crimes. However, aside from incidents of domestic violence, firearms are also connected to other criminal offences that have a direct or indirect impact on human security. As such, in RS in 2009 there were 901 criminal offenses against life and body registered, including 28 homicides, which indicates an annual increase of 3.6%. Out of the overall number of homicides, 11 took place in Banja Luka, 9 in Doboj, 4 in Bijeljina, 3 in East Sarajevo and 1 in Trebinje. Moreover, 18 attempted homicides, 626 bodily injuries, 159 severe bodily injuries, 13 physical and others disturbances were reported. For the same period in the FBiH, 1,264 criminal offenses against life and body were registered with 37 criminal acts of homicide. Almost 60% of homicides in the FBiH were committed using firearms.

The following table illustrates the comparative statistical data on the number of criminal offenses related to domestic violence committed in BiH for the period 2006 to 2009.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENDER</th>
<th>ACCIDENTS</th>
<th>SUICIDES</th>
<th>MURDERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>681</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Violent deaths in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2007 classified according to gender and type of death
The data on the number of incidents of domestic violence committed in BiH indicates a high rate. The presence of violence in general in BiH was confirmed by the attitudes collected through the Public Opinion Survey. More than a quarter of respondents confirmed that within their families there had been cases of violence. Furthermore, according to the survey, one fifth of violence was committed using firearms.

Data such as this should be taken into account with a certain amount of reserve, particularly in view of the fact that a large number of incidents of domestic violence remain unreported, mostly those involving the use of firearms. There is a high probability that a victim will not report firearm abuse or threats in fear that the competent authorities could fail to seize the firearm.

Despite the high rate of domestic violence state, entity and other relevant institutions in BiH, for the most part, display a tendency to neglect this issue. There is no record kept on the use of firearms in these instances and social workers are not obliged to ask if the perpetrator used a firearm or some other weapon in the course of an incident.

Globally, violence involving firearms presents a huge threat to the security and development of society. This type of violence occurs frequently on a daily basis and not only in war affected countries, but also in developed countries that have not endured a conflict. According to estimates by IANSA, the total number of firearm victims in Rio de Janeiro for the period 1997-2000 exceeded the number of victims in war zones such as Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and Uganda over the same period. On average 3,000 people are injured by firearms each day.

Data such as this is for the most part extremely daunting, but it should be noted that SALW still construe an issue that is preventable. New approaches, such as the so-called “Human Security” approach, should be developed, whereby special significance would be given to fully comprehending this field, namely the complexity of preventing negative consequences resulting from the presence of SALW. Simultaneously, it should be noted that authorities need to employ a multidimensional approach towards solving this issue, by acting at different levels (local, entity, regional and global): placing the purchase of firearms under strict control, reducing the demand for firearms, removing the illegal firearms currently in circulation, diminishing legislative shortcomings and others measures. Under the domain of preventive action, high quality solutions must be introduced to uncover early warning signs and adequate legal proceedings put in place for the punishment of perpetrators.
2.3 SALW and Gender

Through analysis of the statistical data collected for the purposes of this survey it became apparent that almost all SALW related areas and issues in BiH showed gender differences. These differences were mostly visible in areas of SALW distribution, perception and impact.

Considering that the largest amount of statistical data on SALW is not classed according to gender, the analysis was limited solely to a comparison of violent deaths (suicides and homicides) for the period 2003-2007.

Data from the Statistics Agency/Institute of BiH, as presented in the table above, demonstrates the difference in relation to the number of fatalities (both homicide and suicide) between the two genders. Male victims comprised 71% in comparison to 29% of female victims of SALW.

The notion that men greatly outnumber the women as perpetrators of SALW related criminal acts is further confirmed through the attitudes collected via the focus groups. Focus group participants in Mostar considered that all SALW related criminal offenses in their town were committed by male persons, failing to nominate a single case where a female person committed a criminal offence using a SALW. The majority of focus group participants, especially younger female persons, perceived the connection between possession of SALW and “manhood” in general as a solid one. Namely that by failing to achieve the values associated with being a “real man” (to be strong, brave, self-confident, communicative, the bread winner and family defender) the majority of young and a large number of middle-aged men tend to compensate through authority symbolised by weapons. According to the attitudes of the focus group participants, one of the ways to overcome this issue is to initiate an awareness raising campaign on this issue in schools, with special attention and programmes aimed at young boys. Unfortunately it appears that the pedagogic services, that are responsible for youths and children, tend to ignore the issue of the existence of SALW in schools and classrooms and fails to take measures within their competence.

The results from the Public Opinion Survey in terms of the distribution of firearms and security of citizens with regard to gender also indicate certain differences between male and female attitudes on SALW. Almost 25% of men offered their support for gun-ownership, while only 5% of women did so. Also, 40% of women were of the opinion that possession of a firearm is a menace to family, while also agreeing that to some extent it can serve as a form of protection. This attitude was confirmed by 20% of the male participants.

An interesting fact that surfaced during the course of discussions within the focus groups is that women do not advocate for firearms, but stand firm on the need to legalise and safeguard firearms and to create harsher punishments for the misuse of weapons together with the collection of illegal weapons.
2.4 SALW Children and Youth

In contrast to conventional warfare of the past, contemporary warfare has been marked by an increase in the use of small arms and light weapons. The consequences are manifested through greater population losses, particularly among civilians (in 80% of cases), with women and children as the most vulnerable groups. According to the estimates of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), over the period 1990-2000 two million children were murdered using small arms, around five million were injured and more than twenty million were compelled to leave their homes.

In cooperation with UNICEF BiH, in 2009 the Centre for Security Studies conducted a survey on the direct and indirect impact of small arms and light weapons on the population of BiH; particular focus was given to children as one of the most vulnerable social groups. The results indicated the presence of SALW in BiH society and that they represent a threat to human security, particularly to children. The high level of distribution of SALW and the ease of access to such weapons have a direct impact on the safety of children, which is manifested through examples of the intentional abuse of SALW with the purpose of committing a crime and for the manipulation of and domination over weaker victims. In this way, children perceive the possession of firearms, namely possession of firearms in their households, as a leading threat to their security, second to traffic accidents. This attitude was also confirmed by the focus group participants who, in addition, perceived the lack of safekeeping of firearms as a threat to children in their homes.

Moreover, the research from 2009, in relation to the situation concerning weapons and the safety of citizens, confirmed the main counterargument against possession of weapons in households as being the threat that they poses to family and in particular to children.

Main reasons against weapons possession in the opinion of citizens

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unprofessional handling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of unsafe storage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to family/particularly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The BiH public was astounded by the death of five-year-old Dejan Tomic from Bijeljina. The tragedy took place when Dejan and his friend D.D., a year older than him, were playing in the garden. They entered the garage and recovered a machinegun, with a bullet still in the barrel. The machinegun belonged to Dejan’s father.

Magazine Start issue 122, 2 October 2007

Start 122 hronika, 02.10.2007.
Small arms and armed violence, particularly the proliferation and abuse of SALW, has an immense direct or indirect impact on
children. The negative effects of the use of SALW on children are not only manifested through death and injury, but also through
psychological trauma, a low quality of life and an overall decrease in productivity.

SALW related conflicts frequently weaken traditional family structures and undermine
the infrastructure in place for the protection of children by causing death or injury to
one parent or by compelling a child’s separation from the rest of his or her family. The
consequences of early exposure to armed violence can have a crucial influence over
a child’s decision to become a soldier early on and the reason why a child perceives
weapons as a legitimate form of resolving a conflict of any kind. The proliferation and
abuse of SALW also disrupts the primary services on which children depend.

An increase in violent behaviour and criminal acts amongst the younger generation
represents a serious threat to community, family and children. The inadequate socio-
economic situation in BiH combined with the lack of institutional capacity to implement
laws governing children and youths together with the issue of juvenile delinquency has resulted in an enormous increase in the rate
of latter over the past few years.

In the evolution of the causes that create wrong perceptions of moral and societal values and the motivation to possess SALW
amongst children the following have been identified as the main causes: electronic media and violent content, video games based
on different forms of virtual weaponry, print media reports on criminal activities and the occasional glorification of persons associated
with criminal activities.

Yet what is most worrying is the fact that the use of SALW has become acceptable and even justified, since SALW are so easily
attainable on the black market. Through television, film and video games children gain the misconception that SALW are glamor-
ous; often the heroes in these media are gun-users who obtain and use weapons in unrealistic dramatic and unsafe ways. Among
children old enough to have been exposed to such material and therefore able to recognise basic weapon types the result can be a
perception of gun-use as thrilling. Recently Switzerland adopted a Violent Games Act, which led to a ban on any type of violent game.
The outcome, as already stated, will probably be an interdiction on the production, distribution and sale of any games considered to
be inappropriate, with the obligation of a 16+/18+ certificate warning that “cruel and violent acts against people or beings similar to
people are present only for the purpose of the game’s success.”

In terms of the direct impact of small arms and light weapons, the majority of children that took part in the survey stated that they had
had direct contact with small arms and light weapons or unexploded explosive devices. Only a small percentage of these children
from all focus groups voluntarily provided detailed information on how they came into contact with such weapons, most frequently
with hunting rifles that belonged to their parents or grandfathers. Yet most of them acknowledged that they were aware that some of
their friends or peers had had contact with small arms and light weapons, occasionally even bringing them to school. One boy who
participated in a focus group stated:

“Obviously lots of weapons are present here…it is evident in the huge number of media reports in newspapers concerning various
incidents caused by small and light weapons… almost every day somebody kills someone with a pistol or a rifle”.

In October 2006 seven-year-old Amar Horozović from the village of Napreli near Sanski Most was severely injured after a
hand-grenade exploded. Amar found the
grenade in his father’s suitcase. Doctors
were compelled to amputate both of
Amar’s hands.

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“A boy from my school brought a hand-grenade to school and showed it to the
other children”.

Through the discussions with children a number of trends were observed through-
out BiH, namely in terms of the perception of SALW, and almost all interviewed
children proclaimed weapons to be dangerous. During the evaluation of their
awareness concerning the quantity of SALW present in their communities the
majority of children said that they thought that there was a relatively large number
of these weapons, but not visible or available to them. One of the female partici-
pants stated:
The majority of children from across BiH also stated that there is a lot of violence amongst their peers, expressed through many fights and harassment of children. There were no examples of children witnessing the abuse of SALW in school, but it is possible that the children might not have been willing to report such examples to the research team. However, there were examples of children bringing SALW to school to show it to their friends.

2.5 Political and Economic Impact

State governments, led by valid policies, can contribute to the prevention of SALW related violence. This means that they should be able to recognise this as an issue, along with the fact that SALW can end up in the wrong hands and inflict immensely detrimental consequences on the security of the state and its economic growth trend.

Globally, armed violence harms the business environment, impacts negatively on the possibility to evade poverty and brings about the inability of health and education systems to function in accordance with the demand. International companies withdraw in such situations and trade subsides are created due to the inability to function normally. Furthermore, foreign investors withdraw and tourism ceases to grow and consequently stagnates. These are some of the global factors suspected of affecting the economic development of BiH amidst bad political leadership.

In order to evaluate the overall orientation and attitudes of politicians in BiH towards weapons and whether they support the same, the BiH magazine “Start” attempted to collect answers from the leading political elite.

“Start” complained that it had obtained only a small number of answers in response to its questionnaire that was forwarded to the Parliament of BiH. For instance, Šemsudim Mehmedović claimed to own a hunting weapon used exclusively for the purpose of hunting. His colleague, Mirko Okolić, claimed to have owned his pistol since 1980 for reasons of his own protection. Beriz Belkić pointed out that he has no need for firearms as he belongs to the group of people that believe that state institutions should guarantee the security of each citizen. Slavko Jovičić stated that he had had enough of weapons as a member of the former State Security Service, adding that he disliked them even back then and finds them disgusting; therefore, he does not own one, even as a trophy or souvenir. Lazar Prodanović does not own any kind of firearm and nor does he consider it necessary. Husein Nanić and Adem Huskić were of the same opinion. Answers to the magazine “Start” were not communicated by Zlatko Lagumdžija, Bakir Izetbegović, Momčilo Novaković, Rifat Dolić, Sadik Bahtić and others.
This part of the survey analyses the types of perceptions amongst the population of BiH in regard to security, their attitude on human security, the tradition of firearm possession and usage as well as attitudes on the legal and illegal possession of firearms. The final section of this chapter provides certain recommendations concerning future action and programmes for the collection of illegal firearms under civilian possession. These recommendations are created based on the opinions given by citizens.

3.1 Perception of General Security

According to the results of the survey conducted in this domain BiH is perceived as a secure country. Therefore, 44.1% of respondents felt secure in their community and 14.5% felt extremely secure. On the other hand, a somewhat lower percentage of 24.1% of respondents rated their sense of personal security within their place of residence as insecure, while only 4.1% of respondents rated it as extremely insecure.

In RS 48.8% of respondents felt safe in their place of residence, while 41.7% in the FBiH felt the same. The degree of insecurity was slightly higher in the FBiH: 25.4% in relation to 22.2% in Republika Srpska. Statistically significant differences were perceived when analysing data in terms of the respondents’ age. The safety factor increased with age with 46.3% in the age group 25 to 29, whereas it deteriorated for the age group 55 to 59 at 40.3%, only to rise again in the age group 60+. In terms of ethnicity, Croats reflected the highest sense of safety amounting to 25.9%, while 50.4% of Serbs felt safe within their communities. 27.9% of Bosniaks felt insecure and 6.8% of the category “Others” felt extremely insecure within their place of residence. In rural areas 48.6% of respondents felt secure within their place of residence, while 44% in urban and 40.7% in suburban areas felt the same. The degree of insecurity felt in rural areas amounted to 25.7%, 23.8% in suburban and 23.7% in urban areas.
In many previously war-affected countries and countries with a high crime rate human security is often undermined and the lives of citizens are directly or indirectly placed at risk. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in other countries, the main threat to human security, for the most part, is reflected in the emerging form of domestic violence. In many cases cold weapons or firearms are commonly used. In the FBiH during the first quarter of 2010 the largest number of criminal acts was committed under the category offenses against marriage, family and youth or the category of “domestic violence”; the latter numbering 188 cases, which is 23% more when compared to the same period during the previous year. In RS, during the first quarter of 2010 a total of 67 criminal offenses of domestic violence were recorded, which represents an increase of 9.8% compared to the same period in 2009. Media reports also recorded an increase in reporting on domestic violence. In one article in the newspaper Dnevni List, on the troublesome level of domestic violence, it stated that every fifth woman is subject to domestic violence. The Chairman of the Commission for Equal Opportunities of the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH, Mr. Vinko Zorić, considers that society is still in denial in relation to violence against women, stating, as an example, that the notion that “she asked for it” is still very common. In addition, he said that the “processing of criminals is a long process and women are confronted with fear and financial instability, having been dependant upon the abuser”.

The growing trend of domestic violence was also recorded by the survey conducted for the purposes of this study; data concerning the occurrence of pronounced violent assaults, threats and intimidation in households in BiH was highlighted as a major concern. An extra burden is the fact that the victim is also frequently exposed to physical violence in the course of almost all recorded assaults. More than half of the respondents stated that they had (either directly or indirectly) experience violent attacks where the victims were most often exposed to physical violence. An almost identical attitude was observed within the focus groups where, in addition, the participants were of the opinion that certain criminal acts committed using firearms, for instance murder and robbery, induce a correspondingly higher sense of insecurity. Incidents of domestic violence involving the use of firearms were very much frowned upon.

As previously stated, domestic violence as an occurrence is more present than official data claims. Victims very rarely report violence after the first assault, usually reporting it only after years of harassment.

Data from the Federal Police Department of the FBiH for the first quarter of 2010 indicates a significant increase, over 50%, in criminal offenses (fights, theft and robberies) committed mostly by armed perpetrators. Furthermore, the perpetrators were mainly organised criminal groups; the most frequent targets were betting shops, banks, post offices and the larger shopping centres, jeopardising human life as a consequence.

The police in RS filed reports against 123 perpetrators for the unauthorised use and possession of firearms and or explosive material as well as for the trafficking of weapons and explosive material in the first quarter of 2010, which shows an increase of 8.9% when compared to the same period during the previous year. This data indicates that there has been a marked increase in SALW related criminal offenses in RS. An extremely worrying fact is that in this period 18 assaults against police officers were recorded, whereby 14 police officers were injured.

Bearing in mind that the level of violence, namely armed violence, has increased over the recent period, it comes as no surprise that this was reflected in the survey. As such, only 2.8% of respondents considered their security to have improved since the start of the economic crises, while 31.5% of them considered it to have deteriorated. The majority considered that it had remained the same. The majority of respondents (42.8%) in urban areas thought that the situation has remained the same, while in suburban areas most respondents thought that it had deteriorated (34.4%). It is interesting that the majority of citizens within the age group 34 to 44 thought that the security situation in their local community had improved, whilst most of those who thought the opposite fell under the age group 55 to 59.
Discussions in the focus groups did not indicate any major digression concerning the perception of security in rural areas. Instead, differences were observed between war affected areas and those that were left unaffected by the war. Thus, the attitudes of participants in the focus groups in Banja Luka and Bijeljina differed completely from the attitudes of participants in the focus groups in war-affected cities like Sarajevo and Tuzla. However, what was common to all focus groups was a high level of insecurity and the attitude that security in their local community has deteriorated since the beginning of the economy crisis: 47% of participants.

The results further indicate that the citizens of Brcko District have suffered the most intense level of violent assaults, threats and intimidation, namely 15.2%. In the FBiH 20.8% of respondents indicated some milder forms of threats or intimidation, 18.2% of respondents from Brcko District had similar experiences and 15.5% in RS. From the total number of respondents, 15.2% from Tuzla, 12.4% from Banja Luka, 11.4% from Mostar and 8.6% from both Sarajevo and Doboj answered that there had been an intense form of assault, threats or intimidation in their family. In response to the question “Have there been victims of violent threats and intimidation assaults in your family?” 16.7% of respondents from Sarajevo, 15.7% from Tuzla, 13.5% from Banja Luka, 9.6% from Doboj and 8.9% from Zenica answered affirmatively. The respondents also estimated that 20% of these assaults, threats and intimidation were committed using firearms and 13.6% were committed using cold weaponry.

The majority of participants in the focus groups believed that most issues connected to the use of firearms derived from the cause and effect relation that exists between people with psychological problems and the immense number of firearms in the possession of citizens. One-third of participants believed that alcohol, drugs and unemployment are the leading factors that bring about violence committed using firearms and physical force. In Bijeljina and Mostar the focus group participants attributed the high rate of unemployment and the sense of an undetermined future for citizens as the main risk factors, while they rated the situation in their towns as disastrous and were concerned for their survival, pointing to economic issues rather than weapon related issues as the leading problem.

In terms of psychological issues, focus group participants in Tuzla voiced their objections to the medical examination requirement for the issuance of a firearm license, stating that the validity period is too long. At the same time, they added that the process of licensing is complicated and expensive and that this can have a negative effect, as manifested in the increase in the possession of illegal weapons.

**In May 2008, Tomislav Petrović (41) from Lipovica, at around six in the morning, shot dead six people.**

Petrović first shot three neighbours in their houses and later got on the bus line Gornja Lipovica - Tuzla where he killed three passengers. Petrović first came to the house of his neighbours Mija and Kaja Petrović and killed them. He then killed his neighbour Ivo Markanović and afterwards set off towards a bus, where he found three passengers aboard. He got on the bus and used his pistol to kill Niko and Mara Petrović and Dragica Markanović, while inflicting severe injuries on the driver, Mursel Ćolić.

After having committed six murders Petrović took his car and drove to Srednja Lipovica, where once again he opened fire on one of the parked cars. At that moment, police came by and arrested him. The motive for the crimes remains unknown to this date, while locals assert that Petrović was acting weird and suffered from depression.
Focus group participants in Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Tuzla asserted that the rising number of armed robberies and murders is the leading issue that endangers human security. The results from the survey also support this attitude: 32.2% of respondents considered criminal offences against property/theft to be the most frequent offences, followed by drug-related offences (24.1%) and general criminal offences (22.1%), public order disturbances (15.8%) and criminal offences against body and life (5.7%).

The majority of citizens (78.6%) considered the state/police authorities as bearing the greatest level of responsibility for the safety of citizens. Only a small percentage of citizens, namely 8.5%, considered family as the most responsible unit for the safety of citizens, while 8.2% placed this function under the umbrella of responsibilities attached to international organisations present in BiH, namely NATO, the EUPM and EUFOR. A similar attitude was expressed by focus groups participants, with the difference that amongst women the attitude that family is the unit most responsible for the safety of citizens was more dominant.

Chart: Who is responsible for the safety of citizens?

When analysing the data in terms of entity separation no statistically significant differences were perceived, having in mind that most examinees considered the state/police to bear the ultimate responsibility for the security of citizens. It is interesting that a considerable percentage of citizens believed private security companies to have the greatest level of responsibility for the security of citizens. In this respect, 28.1% of citizens from Bihac, 21.9% from Cazin and Tuzla and 12.5% from Pale thought that this responsibility falls under the responsibility of private security companies. When the data was analysed in relation to other socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents no statistically significant differences were perceived related to gender, age, ethnicity or place of residence of the respondents.
3.3 Perceptions on the Tradition of Gun Ownership and Usage

Whilst researching the tradition of possession of firearms attempts were made to provide answers to the views or attitudes of citizens towards the possession and usage of firearms. Conducting the household survey enabled the outlining of certain patterns and views of citizens towards the possession and usage of firearms. Nearly half of the respondents believed that people most often own a firearm for the sake of their private safety, while more than a quarter believed that ownership of a firearm was the result of a low level of confidence in the police; this attitude was shared by all three of the constituent peoples of BiH. In terms of gender, there were no differences with 51% of men and women considering that people most often own firearm for their own safety. Such an attitude was most supported by respondents in the age group 25 to 29.

The second reason given for the possession of firearms was as a direct consequence of 1992-1995 war. A quarter of respondents considered “left-over” weapons as the main reason for owning a firearm. Weapons as remnants of the war is still the key issue for the security of BiH and also for the personal security of citizens due to the fact that the vast majority of citizens were directly affected by the war and have owned a weapon at some point of time. In terms of the categorisation of the section of the population that is still in possession of these remnants of war, the category of demobilised soldier cannot be overlooked: 40% of respondents from the survey were of the opinion that the majority of demobilised soldiers still own firearms. A fifth of respondents failed to agree with this statement. In terms of entity separation there were no great differences observed: 36% of respondents in RS and 32% of respondents in the FBiH agreed that the majority of demobilised soldiers still own firearms.

The third reason for possession, according to the opinion of the respondents, is fear of a new conflict. A fifth of respondents agreed with this attitude. The fear of a new conflict, as a reason for possession of weapons, was most pronounced in Brcko District where 64% of respondents shared this opinion. This result is extremely indicative of the traditional view when it comes to the gun culture, probably as a result of deeply rooted images and experience related to the war.

In terms of ethnicity, the survey indicates that Croats perceive the fear of new conflict as the greatest reason, while Bosniaks and Serbs perceive the low level of confidence in the police forces as the reason for possessing firearms. “Other” citizens were equally represented through the attitude that the low level of confidence in the police forces and the great quantity of weapons remaining from the war can prompt citizens to (continued) possession of firearms.

During the focus group discussions many of the participants pointed out that they possess weapons because they fear a new conflict, whilst the majority held the attitude that they need weapons for their personal protection due to their low level of confidence in the police forces. Furthermore, the majority of participants from suburban areas stressed that they possess firearms for the purpose of hunting and protection of property. What was emphasised by the participants from all of the focus groups is the great presence of the “macho” culture, particularly amongst youths in BiH, which results from the fact that many men own weapons and, more importantly, are lacking any perspective in life.
Only 12.5% of respondents chose tradition as the most frequent reason for the presence of firearms in households. In Bosnia and Herzegovina it has become usual for a man to own a firearm. Just slightly over half of respondents thought that mostly younger men own weapons, whereas 16% of them considered teenagers to be most susceptible to owning a weapon. It is interesting that only 0.2% of men believed that women own weapons.

### 3.4 Perceptions on Legal and Illegal Possession

According to the survey and focus group results, the majority of the population dislike SALW and perceive them as a great threat to human security. On the other hand, a fifth of respondents held the opposite attitude and proclaimed to like firearms. Almost 90% of participants in the focus groups perceived firearms, both legal and illegal, as a leading threat to their security. Participants of the focus group in Tuzla eagerly discussed weapons as a threat, without assigning any difference between legal and illegal weapons. The number of women who do not like firearms (50%) was considerably higher than the one-fifth of men who do not like firearms. Furthermore, 25% of men like firearms compared to only 5.6% of women. A detailed analysis indicated that in regard to ethnicity, there were no significant variations perceived in regard to “sympathies” for firearms.

Further detailed analysis has indicated the interesting result that there are no differences between the attitudes of respondents coming from rural, urban or suburban areas in terms of their like or dislike for firearms. However, this was not the case when classifying respondents according to their education. Those with only primary education and skills and those without any education were more inclined towards firearms in comparison to respondents with secondary school education and university graduates.

The response to the statement that ownership of a weapon should be legal was that 23.7% of respondents agreed absolutely, while 34.7% of them agreed. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the majority of respondents and focus group participants agreed that it is necessary to acquire firearms legally.

The attitude that the acquisition of a firearm should be done in a legal manner was most supported by respondents from RS (42.6%), while 29.6% of respondents in the FBiH supported the same attitude. In terms of ethnic divides, Serbs agreed with this the most (42.6%), while the lowest rate of support for this attitude was expressed by Croats (29.7%). Further analysis indicated that respondents in rural areas were more inclined to advocate for the legal possession of firearms, although this attitude was also supported by a huge percentage of respondents from both urban and suburban areas (one-third).

When identifying the reasons that would contribute towards possession of a firearm the majority of respondents opted for “property and family protection”. As a second reason the respondents opted for “hobbies”, meaning for sport or hunting. The third reason was self-defence. The results indicate that only a small number of respondents (2%) believed that each household needs to own a legal firearm for political reasons.

In terms of illegal weapons, almost half of all respondents considered it justifiable to acquire a firearm for the protection of property or family. One-third of respondents said that they would acquire an illegal firearm for a hobby, while a quarter of respondents said they would do the same due to the complicated and expensive procedure for licensing a legal firearm. Of significance were the results that indicate that 32% would acquire an illegal firearm because they lacked confidence in the police and that 13.2% doubted the stability of the political situation. In RS and the FBiH the majority of respondents said that they would acquire an illegal firearm in order to protect their family and property. In Brcko District the respondents considered a lack of confidence in the police forces as the leading factor. Aside from the previously stated reasons, the focus group participants also stated gunfire celebrations as a reason for the possession of both legal and illegal weapons. This was particularly emphasised amongst participants from suburban areas in Banja Luka, who complained that they either hear gunshots or see gunfire during each wedding celebration.

83% of respondents considered firearms as a threat to family and especially to children, giving this as the main reason against the possession of firearms in homes. Unprofessional handling, as a main reason against owning a firearm, was given by 39.3% of respondents and 35.3% saw the main counterargument to possession within the categorisation of firearms as the menace to society. Only 8.9% answered that the main reason against possession of a firearm within a household is the complicated/expensive proce-
-dure for obtaining a license. Such an attitude was somewhat opposite to the attitudes collected through the focus groups, whereby more than one-third of participants considered it difficult and expensive to obtain a license. As expected, a higher percentage of women (86.7%) do not recommend possession of a firearm because it presents a threat to family and children, whereas 40% of both men and women cited the unprofessional handling of firearms as the main reason.

3.5 Recommendations for Control Measures and Future Programmes on SALW Reduction

The questionnaire and focus group results, aside from offering an insight into perceptions on security and attitudes towards SALW, also provided opinions and recommendations on future control measures and programmes for SALW collection activities. Concerning weapons collection programmes, the participants and respondents offered their opinions on how successful the previous collection programmes were and, most importantly, their opinions on possible motives that might prompt people to handover their weapons in the future.

More than half of the respondents believed that weapons collection activities have not been successful and that weapons still pose an immense threat to the security of citizens. These results are unsurprising as a SFOR survey conducted in November 2003 indicated that only 30% of respondents had a positive attitude towards the up-to-date efforts aimed at the collection of illegal weapons.

Nonetheless, the respondents had a positive attitude in the sense that weapons collection actions have had a positive influence on security in their communities, but at the same time they were of the opinion that much more needs to be done. The majority of focus group participants were familiar with the previous weapons collection programmes (i.e., Harvest and Weapons for Money/Tools), but thought that more needs to be done in terms of preventive action, such as harsher legal punishments for illegal weapon possession and or usage. A prevalent feeling was that the legal system has failed to apprehend the perpetrators and has even allowed some convicts time outside of prison, allowing them the freedom to walk in their communities and induce fear. Although some of the requested legal regulations have already been introduced, the reaction in the focus groups indicates that either the participants did not know about them or that the police and penal systems do not implement these measures in an adequate manner.

In terms of assessing previous collection activities, a significant percentage (22.5%) of respondents were quite indecisive, of which 32% were Croats. A fifth of respondents, mostly Croats (27%), nevertheless believed that to date the collection activities have achieved adequate results. Furthermore, with regard to ethnicity, the highest rate of Bosniaks (22%) agreed absolutely with the attitude that weapons collection actions to date have not provided adequate results, while the highest rate of agreement with this attitude was amongst Serbs (46%).

The respondents from Zenica, Bijeljina and Doboj agreed most with the attitude that “previous weapons collection activities have not provided adequate results”, whereas the highest rate of disagreement was displayed amongst respondents from Livno and Brcko District.
The collected data indicates that half of the respondents agreed that it is necessary to continue with these programmes and that 37.3% “agreed absolutely” is very important for any future collection programmes. Furthermore, data indicating that one-third of respondents agreed absolutely that they would return weapons and that they would do it in person (40.4%) is also encouraging. The positive attitude concerning the return of weapons was also recorded through the focus groups. Such a positive research result represents an important fact for the domestic authorities and a recommendation to find the best approach and programme to remove the huge number of illegal weapons from citizens. When developing these programmes the fact that half of the respondents and almost all of the participants of the focus groups stated that they would take part in future weapons collection programmes for the sake of their own personal security should certainly be taken into account.

The respondents held the strong belief that weapons collection programmes (voluntary or compulsory) should be continued in the future; more than 86% expressed this attitude, which represents an increase of 13% when compared to 2004. In terms of who should develop and proceed with these programmes, the majority (559 out of 1,000 respondents) of respondents, as they did six years ago, opted for the “financial aid in exchange for voluntary surrenders of weapons”. This sentiment was also shared by all the focus groups, where participants advocated for financial compensation to more easily convince individuals to surrender their weapons during the course of a collection programme.

Many of the respondents estimated that programmes were most successful when cash was offered in exchange for weapons, while 24.5% of respondents thought it necessary to set deadlines for the surrender of weapons. In Brcko District and the FBiH this proved to be the least favourable option, with only 9% from Brcko District and 14% from the FBiH opting for it. The percentage of respondents that considered that weapons collection should be conducted through armed forces or police searches should not be neglected: 21.4% or 321 respondents. In RS, the view on searches and seizures remained the same as it had been six years ago, the least favourable option: only 12.8% of respondents. The fourth option “exchange for development projects” was chosen by 13.5% of respondents in BiH, while 4.3% thought that weapons collection programmes should not be conducted at all.

As for the bearers of future weapons collection programmes, 49% of respondents thought that the police forces should be in charge of such programmes, while local authorities/civil protection were chosen by 19.5%. Comparing these results to the results obtained in 2004, a change in attitude amongst citizens can be perceived; in 2004 the majority of citizens considered the local authority as the primary bearer of responsibility for organising weapons collection programmes, followed by the police. If you consider the current weak level of responsibility shown by local and other levels of government towards this issue this change of attitude amongst citizens is not surprising. The level of confidence in the armed forces of BiH as those in charge of future programmes was also present, whereby 16% expressed their belief that the armed forces of BiH should be the bearers of this responsibility, while 11% believed that international armed forces were the best candidate for this function.

In terms of the potential success factor for future collection programmes, the results indicate that more than half of citizens in BiH believe that future programmes would be successful. This result differs greatly from the results of 2004, whereby the majority was divided on this matter. This attitude was shared by the participants of the focus groups who, in addition, stressed that future programmes should be long-term and continuous. Furthermore, the focus group participants were of the opinion that people are in a dilemma as to how to get rid of their weapons. This is reflected through instances where people have thrown them into rivers, containers or rubbish bins, which further endangers human and especially child safety. In their opinion, people mostly tend to throw away explosive devices, ammunition and malfunctioning firearms.

Useful data on how to incite the population to surrender their firearms was collected during the survey; the respondents gave their suggestions on the best approach to motivate people in their communities to surrender illegal weapons. The respondents had five options to choose from, as shown in the chart below.
A nearly identical question was posed through the BICC survey conducted in July 2004, when citizens were asked what the best approach to motivate people to voluntarily surrender their weapons would be.

In difference to the SFOR research conducted in 2000, where the prevalent attitude was that a stable and secure state is the guarantee that all people will surrender their weapons, projecting this as a motive, the BICC research in 2004 indicated that the best motives were a decrease in crime and the offer of financial compensation in exchange for weapons. A surprising fact discovered through the present study is that the respondents nominated harsher sanctions for illegal possession or financial/reward stimulus as the best forms of motivation to surrender weapons. This attitude was also confirmed through the focus groups, with the difference that the focus group participants in Banja Luka preferred the organisation of prizes and other forms of compensation as the leading means to motivate the surrender of weapons.

Finally, any future weapons collection programmes should take into account the aforementioned results and should be based on an intensive awareness campaign focused on the dangers of firearms. Many participants of the focus groups pointed to the overall lack of programmes focusing on the dangers of SALW possession and thought that programmes such as these could contribute greatly to the fight against such weapons. The focus group participants from Sarajevo also pointed to the lack of transparency during previous collection programmes conducted by international armed forces and to the lack of a long-term amnesty for the surrender of weapons.
The overall attitude that it would be efficient to continue implementation of programmes that target the risks related to the possession of weapons was supported by over 82% of respondents in BiH. The survey suggests that one of the activities that would contribute towards estimating the remaining numbers of illegal civilian firearms would be an amnesty for handing in the existing legally owned weapons (pistols and firearms used for hunting). More than half of respondents opted for this option.

4. SALW CAPACITY SURVEY

In many countries, including BiH, the issue of arms control, namely the fight against SALW, is a part of a wider security sector reform process. Issues related to the purchase, trade, possession, distribution or misuse of SALW represent a significant element of national defence. The importance of such a perspective should not be diminished and from the perspective of government institutions it is important to emphasise the broader dimensions of the impact that SALW have on society on the whole. Therefore, activities initiated by the government should not overlook other public policies that could and should be integrated into the issue of SALW through related problems such as education policy, youth policy and social or development policy.

Although this wider approach is the primary focus of this study it is necessary to consider it in terms of human security, which over the recent period has gained increased significance within public and scientific debate. As such, the government is required to employ a multi-dimensional approach to this issue and strive to include all levels of governmental organisation, legislative, executive and judicial power in order to solve this issue and have a positive impact on creating public opinion in support of government policy.

In the absence of international legal standards that would explicitly regulate the area of weapons control, as was the case with the interdiction on antipersonnel mines, it has been recognised that each state should create policies and develop capacities in order to deal with SALW on its own. In this way Bosnia and Herzegovina has created a strategy within this domain, complete with legal regulations, the establishment of organisational capacities within the structures competent to deal with matters pertaining to SALW, international cooperation and civil society activities.

The following chapter focuses its attention on the legislative framework adopted by BiH institutions for the purpose of weapons control, analyses of the established organisational capacities at all levels of government and activities implemented by the authorities, international organisations and civil society within the field of combating SALW. In addition, this section indicates the international obligations carried out and fulfilled by BiH at the regional and multilateral level.
4.1 Legislation and the Regulatory Framework

This section analyses and provides an overview of the regulative and other legislative regulations governing the production, export and import, movement and trafficking of weapons, issuance of civilian licenses for private use and weapons licenses issued to private security companies. Furthermore, this section tackles the issue of adequate records keeping and the central database of weapons as well as the harmonisation of BiH legislation with international standards.

Legislative and Normative Capacities

Legal regulations related to SALW are well regulated and are harmonised with European standards. The adoption of the Law on the Export and Import of Weapons, Arms and Military Equipment in 2003 has been of immense importance; the need for such legislation was highlighted when BiH violated the UN embargo on the export of weapons to Iran. After this important step, further action was taken to harmonise the legislative framework with international standards in the area of the movement of arms. Since December 2009, a new law governing the control of foreign trade in goods and services, bearing strategic importance for BiH, has been enacted. Through the enactment of this law the previously mentioned Law on the Export and Import of Weapons, Arms and Military Equipment was amended on several occasions prior to it being derogated. In addition to the aforementioned law, other laws have been enacted with the aim of regulating this domain.

1. Law on the Policy on Direct Foreign Investment in BiH
2. The Law on the Production of Arms and Military Equipment in BiH
3. Law on Examining, Marking and Tracing Small Arms and Ammunition in BiH
4. Law on the Import and Export of Arms and Military Equipment and Control of the Import and Export of Dual-Use items of BiH
5. Criminal Code of BiH
6. Law on the Transportation of Dangerous Goods of BiH
7. The Law on the Control of Movement of Weapons and Military Equipment of BiH
8. Law on Border Control of BiH
9. Customs Policy Law of BiH

Aside from the above stated legislation, there are many other legal and sub-legal regulations that have been adopted at the level of BiH and lower levels that have additionally aided in the creation of a legal solution for the more efficient control of SALW. Also, apart from the aforementioned legal solutions, there are other areas that need to be better regulated in order to increase the capacity for SALW control. This refers to the regulation of civilian acquisition, possession and storage of SALW as well as record keeping and more adequate regulation over the work of private security companies. At present, there is a lack of political will to adequately resolve these questions and these issues are subject to political negotiation on the question of through which level of authority they will be regulated.
4.1.1 Licensing Export and Import

As stated above, the Law on the Import and Export of Arms and Military Equipment and Control of the Import and Export of Dual-Use Items was the first law enacted to regulate this domain and is perhaps the most significant from the perspective of weapons control. The enactment and implementation of this Law has ensured a unified state principle in terms of the issuance of licenses for the export, import, intermediation and transit of weapons and military equipment. The recently adopted Foreign Trade in Goods and Services Bearing Strategic Importance for BiH Control Act has further enhanced the existing legal regulations.

Along with the enactment of legal and sub-legal acts the authorities in BiH have also completed the harmonisation of regulations governing the export and import of weapons and military equipment and control of dual-use goods with that of EU legislation. The publication of the “Common List of Military Equipment Covered by the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports”, implementation of the “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction” and “The List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies” has also been completed. The latter will contribute to the enhancement of control over dual-use products and decrease the chances of their abuse for unauthorised military or terrorist purposes, which is in accordance with EU regulations 1334/2000 and 149/2003. Through these developments BiH has completely harmonised its control over the export/import of all goods with international and in particular with EU standards and has achieved considerable progress within the domain of export control at the state level.

The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations of BiH (MoFTER) is the administrative institution in charge of issuing licenses for the export, import, intermediation and transit of goods. This institution issues licenses only to those legal and civil entities registered with the Ministry. However, in order to issue a licence the Ministry first needs to obtain an approval provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of BiH, the Ministry of Security of BiH and the Ministry of Defence of BiH and, in accordance with new legal regulations, also the approval of the Ministry of Civil Affairs of BiH and the State Regulatory Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Security.

This is of extreme importance in terms of international and global security, since the approval of the Ministry of Security of BiH confirms that the license is in accordance with BiH security policy, the approval issued by the Ministry of Defence of BiH guarantees that the license is in accordance with the defence policy of BiH; the Ministry of Civil Affairs of BiH approves that the license will not jeopardise the lives and or health of people the environment and material assets, while the State Regulatory Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Security confirms that the provision of new sources of radiation shall not violate regulations governing irradiation and nuclear safety. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of BiH, in this field of work, deals with the interdictions and penalties of the UN Security Council, the OSCE and the EU, undertaken international obligations of BiH, foreign policy interests and special interests in relation to strategic foreign policy partners of BiH, EU Rules of Conduct concerning the export of weapons and the principle of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In addition to the above mentioned institutions, the Border Police and the Indirect Taxation Authority also actively participate, in accordance with their respective competences and responsibilities, in the control process related to the export and import of weapons and military equipment and dual-use products.

A licence issued for the export and import of weapons is valid for a period of one year. The MoFTER of BiH maintains a database on all issued licenses and provides the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH with reports. This procedure ensures transparency during these proceedings.

However there are still some ambiguities within the legal regulations. As stated above, the MoFTER is in charge of issuing licences for the export and import of weapons, yet during the approval process approval is also requested from the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Security, Civil Affairs at the state level and the State Regulatory Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Security. Considering the insufficient number of people charged with this responsibility it might be more convenient to formulate a joint commission made up of representatives of the competent ministries, which could then make a collective decision on each case as opposed to working individually.

The representatives should be enabled to consult with their colleagues whilst rendering a decision of this importance, which is currently rendered independently. Moreover, attention should also be given to the regulations referring to the end-user. According to the positive legal provisions, the broker has the obligation to provide the Ministry with confirmation that the goods included in the export document have reached their final destination. What remains obscure is how the Ministry can verify this obligation with the existing
capacity, having in mind that BiH has only 56 diplomatic consular representative bodies. This deficiency has an impact on the fulfilment of the surveillance and control commitment and therefore effectively it is essential to amend this legal regulation. In this way it would be possible to avoid speculation concerning irregular transfers of weapons, such as those that were made public based on reports by international non-governmental organisations that followed and specified the unauthorised weapons transfers made by BiH around the world.

### 4.1.2 Legislation on the Control and Movement of SALW

The basic legislation for the domain of control over the movement of weapons is included in the BiH Law on the Control of the Movement of Weapons and Military Equipment. This Law regulates the methods and conditions under which the movement of weapons is performed within BiH, as well as the movement of weapons aboard. A request for the movement of weapons within BiH is submitted to the competent authority, whereas in the case of the export/import or transit of weapons it is submitted to the Ministry of Security of BiH. Furthermore, this Law also regulates the submission of a request for approval of surveillance and control measures taken for the movement of weapons and purposes of record keeping.

Apart from the above mentioned Law, it is also important to mention that on the 19 November 2009 EUFOR transferred this competence to domestic institutions. On this day, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between EUFOR, the Ministry of Security of BiH, the State Regulatory Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Security, the RS Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FBiH Ministry of Internal Affairs, the cantonal ministries of internal affairs and Brcko District Police in relation to the transference of control over the movement of weapons and military equipment.

There are general and special conditions for licensing:

**GENERAL CONDITIONS**
- 18/21 years of age, depending on the place of residence.
- No criminal record, meaning no committed criminal offences, with the exception of traffic offences.
- No minor charges incurred during the previous two years.

**SPECIAL CONDITIONS**
- Possession of a psychological and physical health certificate.
- Possession of a certificate on technical skill of handling weapons and knowledge of the regulations.
- Weapons cannot be visible, or brought to public rallies, schools, health or other public facilities, or catering facilities.
- Procedure lasts from 1 to 12 months.
- Weapons have to be registered within the period of eight days of purchase.

The Law has certain exceptions, manifested in the fact that it is not applicable to the movement of weapons by the armed forces of BiH and police authorities. In addition, the Law does not apply to civilians that hold a valid weapons licence.

The Ministry of Security of BiH and the competent entity ministries of internal affairs and Brcko District police are in charge of the implementation of this Law. In 2009 there were 55 requests for the movement of weapon, while in 2010 this number increased to 95.
The efforts made by the Ministry of Security of BiH in 2008 to regulate legislation at the state level were in vain due to insufficient political support. The Council of Ministers of BiH adopted the draft Law on Arms, which governs the provision, storage, collection, repair, production, marking and trafficking of weapons and ammunition as well as the maintenance of civilian shooting ranges and the formulation of sanctions at the state level; however, the proposal was denied. The aforementioned draft law would, for the first time, have regulated, in a uniform and efficient manner, this significant domain at the national level and at the same time would have harmonised legislation with European Union standards. Since this was not accomplished this domain remained within the competency of the entities and Brcko District, with many legal variations.

**SPECIAL CONDITIONS**
- Possession of a psychological and physical health certificate.
- Possession of a certificate on technical skill of handling weapons and knowledge of the regulations.
- Weapons cannot be visible, or brought to public rallies, schools, health or other public facilities, or catering facilities.
- Procedure lasts from 1 to 12 months.
- Weapons have to be registered within the period of eight days of purchase.

In RS the Law on Weapons and Ammunition regulates the procedure for the acquisition, storage and bearing of weapons and ammunition as well as the issuance of weapons licences and authorisations for the storage of weapons. This Law has introduced harsher criteria for the licensing of weapons, whereby proof that the individual is trained in the handling of firearms is required to be provided by an authorised professional organisation. The training consists of both theoretical and practical aspects aimed at verification for the bearing and usage of a weapon, including skills, safe handling and target practice with firearms.

Other conditions must also be satisfied in order to obtain a licence to carry a firearm: 18 years or older, a justified reason (hunting, sports, personal protection, profession), the requirement to meet the psycho-physical criteria by providing a health certificate issued by a doctor, to have completed the required training and the obligation to provide certification that no criminal or minor charges have been filed or are pending against the individual applying for the license. Under the provisions of Article 14 of the Law on Weapons and Ammunition, the MIA of RS is authorised to reject a licence for any weapon where its origin cannot be traced or that lacks a production serial number. This Law has, for the first time in RS, separated the issue of storage from possession of a firearm, ensuring that a separate licence is now required for the storage of a firearm and for possession.

Sanctions for the illegal possession of a firearm in RS range from 400 to 1,200 BAM. It was the opinion of the respondents and the participants of the focus groups in Banja Luka, Mostar, Bijeljina, Sarajevo and Tuzla that these sanctions are not high enough to have a preventative influence or incite citizens to either return illegal weapons or to legalise them. The last amendment to the Law on Weapons and Ammunition, dating from December 2009, brought only technically improved to this Law while no further steps were taken to harmonise it with international acts; it is expected for this to take place during 2010.

As previously mentioned, this domain is regulated by cantonal laws in the FBiH; therefore, in order to gain a better insight into legislative regulation the Law on the Acquisition, Possession and Bearing of Weapons and Ammunition of Sarajevo Canton was analysed, because, for the most part, this Law is better harmonised with the Directive 91/477/EEZ than the other corresponding cantonal laws.
In order to obtain a licence for the acquisition of a firearm and ammunition certain conditions must be met: 18 years or above, not psychologically impaired or underdeveloped and no prosecutions for criminal or minor offences. After meeting the stated conditions a request for approval of acquisition of a firearm and ammunition is then submitted to the Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Sarajevo Canton. The chief of the relevant police force then establishes a three member commission that is assigned the task to assess the degree to which the request is justified.

Hunting weapons and long-barrelled weapons are only issued to those persons that have passed a hunting examination and who are members of a hunting organisation. However, the Law has certain provisions and an exception in relation to hunting weapons. This exception is manifested by the fact that citizens who need to carry and store hunting weapons in order to protect private property can obtain the same through this procedure.

Furthermore, the Law stipulates that a licence is issued to citizens for the possession and bearing of weapons. The validity of the licence is restricted to five years; this is the most significant amendment to the previous Act. Sanctions for violations range from 300 BAM to 10,000 BAM, while penal sanctions range from 30 to 60 days, which is also a novelty.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina there is no state level law that regulates civilian acquisition, storage and bearing of SALW. Instead, this domain is regulated by laws that are not harmonised in Republika Srpska and Brcko District, while in the Federation of BiH this domain is regulated by cantonal laws (weapon laws and criminal codes). As such, there is the immediate need to regulate this domain in a more adequate manner, either by enacting a state law or through the absolute harmonisation of the existing laws with international acts. Despite consensus being reached at the highest political level, the Decision of the Council of Ministers of BiH is late as in its implementation it has suffered from unpredicted delays. Moreover, the existing legal regulation fails, firstly, to address the issues of the establishment of a central database of registered SALW under civilian possession and secondly the establishment of a functional database within all institutions assigned with the implementation of the law, which would enable faster access for interested competent authorities.

Therefore, during the process of harmonisation of the existing legislative regulations it is extremely important to envelop international standards as a strict guideline for this domain, primarily EC Directive 91/477/EEZ and its amendments 2008/51/EC as well as the UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacture and Trafficking of Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition and also the UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime.
4.1.4 Licensing of Private Security Companies (PSC)

The private security sector in BiH has experienced an expansion since 2002, at which time it became officially legally regulated. Statistical data collected by the Centre for Security Studies (CSS) from the cantonal ministries of internal affairs, the RS Public Security Centres (CJB) and Brcko District Police indicates that currently there are 169 private security companies in BiH with an overall staff turnover of 4,207 personnel. PSC have at their disposal 1,075 firearms for the purpose of allowing their employees to perform their duties.

The three existing legal regulations define the competent authorities that are responsible for the licensing of weapons for PSC. Namely, in the FBiH a PSC can only own weapons for half of its employees, while in Brcko District only a third of PSC employees. According to the provisions of the existing entity acts, short-barrelled weapons are considered firearms where the length of the barrel does not exceed 20cm, the overall length of the weapon does not exceed 30cm, is automatically reloaded each time a bullet is discharged but is only able to discharge one bullet at a time. The calibre of the firearm can be a maximum of 9mm and the firearm cannot have a silencer attached.

Brcko District regulations allow for the provision of a semi-automatic short-barrelled firearm for the needs of PSC employees, reloaded each time a bullet is discharged and able to discharge only one bullet at a time, with the barrel not exceeding 60cm.

There are obvious differences between the entities and Brcko District concerning the provision of weapons for PSC; however, such differences also exist at the entity level. In the FBiH a PSC can only acquire weapons for a fifth of its employees. This regulation makes the work of PSC within the FBiH much more difficult and limits their capability to react in instances of armed robbery during the transport of money.

The MIA of the FBiH recognised this problem and enacted an amended to the Law in 2008. Under Article 24, concerning agencies and internal services for the protection of people and property, PSC in the FBiH are placed in the same position as PSC in RS in terms of the provision of weapons for their needs. Moreover, this legislation has allowed PSC in the FBiH to obtain one semi-automatic long-barrelled weapon (shotgun or rifle) for each armoured vehicle used for the transportation of money.

What also need to be emphasised is that the acquisition of arms and ammunition by PSC is performed in accordance with the existing laws and through the approval of the cantonal ministries of internal affairs and the CJBs. These laws are on the cantonal levels (10 different laws) and on the level of RS and Brcko District. In theory, there is the possibility for a PSC from Bihac to acquire a weapons licence with documentation originating from a PSC that is based in Mostar or Zenica. This is of concern to PSC and therefore PSC owners have expressed their belief that it is vital to harmonise the legal regulations to achieve a constant definition for the acquisition, storage and bearing of weapons and ammunition.

Taking into consideration the very modest training given by PSC in the handling of firearms, the legislative branch has, under Article 25, stipulated the obligation for PSC to perform periodic tests on the skill of their employees in handling firearms and tests on their psycho-physical skills done in the manner stipulated in the internal rulebook written by the ministry of internal affairs.

The existing limitations imposed on PSC concerning the acquisition of firearms, which is limited to 50% of employees assigned the task of physical protection, is a standard established in accordance with relevant international documents and the obligations undertaken by BiH. In this sense, the UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime and the subsequent UN Plan of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW are established as both a recommendation and a commitment on the part of the State to under national laws, regulations and procedures influence the prevention, combating and eradication of small arms and light weapons trafficking in all of its emerging forms. In this sense, the Micro-Disarmament Standards/Guidelines for Southeast Europe (RMDS/G) also establishes that small arms, light weapons and ammunition can represent a huge threat to governments as well as to regional and international efforts to establish peace, whereby the most effective manner of tracking SALW is through interventions and programmes concerning micro-disarmament and SALW control; ultimately this will lead to laws on firearms that prohibit the bearing of weapons in public places.

The majority of legal regulations on private security in BiH are harmonised with the standards of comparative legislation in developed countries, while research on judicial practice has shown that it is compatible with the provisions contained in the below documents.
Analysis of the existing laws in BiH within the domain of private security has shown a similarity in concept and content to those existing in the USA, France, Belgium and Greece and in the neighbouring countries of Slovenia and Croatia.

The provisions concerning private security companies are well regulated legally as is the domain of weapons acquisition by PSC, as perceived by many respondents during the course of this survey.

4.1.5 Foreign Trade Distribution and Production of Weapons in BiH

In regard to the issue of the foreign trade distribution of weapons and military equipment and dual-use goods under export/import control, BiH has finalised the harmonisation of regulations governing this domain with that of EU legislature. The implementation of the Law on the Import and Export of Arms and Military Equipment and Control of the Import and Export of Dual-Use Items, which was recently adopted to govern control over the foreign trade distribution of goods and utilities (services) bearing strategic relevance for BiH security, has provided a uniform state principle concerning the issuance of licenses for the export/import, brokering and transit of weapons and military equipment.

According to data obtained from the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations of BiH (MoFTER) related to foreign trade in arms and military equipment, 43 legal and civilian entities were registered for the period up to the 25 June 2010. The registration is administered as permanent or temporary. In this way the MoFTER issued 48 authorisations to legal and civilian entities for weapons and military equipment foreign trade transactions in 2008; 13 were registered as permanent and 35 as temporary.

Over the period 2006 to 2009 the MoFTER issued 674 export and 602 import licenses altogether for weapons and military equipment. By comparing the “Review of Licenses Issued for Weapons and Military Equipment and Dual-use Goods” for 2006 with results from 2008 a mild increase in the number of licenses issued in 2008 is evident. There was an increase of 32 licenses issued in 2008, totalling 382 licences. Results on the number on licenses issued in 2009 had not yet been adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH at the time of writing this report and consequently the relevant report was not officially available.

The table below presents a comparative overview of licenses issued in 2006 and 2008 classified by the type of license.
Information on licences is quite dynamic and is subject to constant change as a license is valid for a twelve months period, which makes it impossible to conduct a thorough analysis on the number of import and export licenses issued for last year (2009). As the MoFTER was not able to provide this information, the Indirect Taxation Authority was contacted for information on the export and import of weapons and military equipment. This information was then compared with export and import values contained in the data on licenses issued by the MoFTER during 2006 and 2008.

The export licenses issued by the MoFTER indicate that the export of weapons and military equipment compared to imports of the same goods in BiH was four times greater in 2006 and six times greater in 2008. Namely, the overall export value, according to licenses issued, in 2006 amounted to 50,288,873 Euros, while the import value amounted to 12,666,237 Euros. In 2008 the value of export licenses increased to 57,782,455 Euros, while the value of import licenses decreased to 8,744,586 Euros. The ratio of export to import provides a positive impression that the export value is five times greater than the import value for of same type of goods.

Yet data related to the number of licenses issued does imply a difference in the data presented by the MoFTER; according to information from the Indirect Taxation Authority, the value of exports in 2006 amounted to 1,668,097 Euros or just 3% of issued licenses, while the value of import licenses decreased to 8,744,586 Euros. The ratio of export to import provides a positive impression that the export value is five times greater than the import value for of same type of goods.

The table below illustrates the MoFTER and ITA data for 2006 and 2008, indicating that only 6% of export licenses and 23% of import licenses were carried out.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Export licenses for weapons and military equipment</th>
<th>Import licenses for weapons and military equipment</th>
<th>Temporary export licenses for weapons and military equipment</th>
<th>Temporary import licenses for weapons and military equipment</th>
<th>Export licenses for dual-use goods</th>
<th>Import licenses for dual-use goods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the ITA, for the period 2006-2009 the value of exports was higher by 21% in comparison to the value of imports. As implied, there was a positive trend in this industrial domain, although this is different to the indications contained in the MoFTER reports on the number of licences issued in 2006 and 2008.
Through the information presented a huge disproportion is evident in the official reports of the institutions in charge of SALW control. Certain media in BiH have pointed to these deviations, but no concrete steps have been taken on improvement in this area. Local government representatives have pointed to the inherit problems resulting from the different methodological approaches exercised in data collection.

The annual report of the MoFTER fails in the sense of being used as an objective indicator with the purpose of enhancing public awareness and a basis for the creation of public policies within this domain. This report is based solely on the numerical representation of licences, without paying attention to whether or not they were executed in the given period. In addition, the licenses are issued for a twelve month period and not as a calendar year. Overall, there exists an objective need for a change in the system of reporting.

Another factor that highlights the need for a revision of the approaches for data collection and reporting becomes evident when taking into account that these reports are submitted annually to the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH. As such, members of the highest legislative body are placed in a position where they can adopt documents that reflect a false image of weapons control in BiH. With this in mind, the MoFTER should create an annual report based on executed licences for the period 2008-2010, as only in such a manner can a true picture of the state of weapons control in BiH be attained and presented. The ITA should also re-examine the methods for recording weapons and military equipment and dual-use goods and further harmonise it with the records from the MoFTER. The ITA would also be able to establish itself as a “control” factor in terms of cross referencing reports on the number of executed licenses delivered by the MoFTER.

Certainly, the methods used for reporting to the Parliamentary Assembly should be more objective and this requires certain legislative amendments and the harmonisation of the records and competences of the MoFTER and ITA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>EXPORT VALUE IN BAM</th>
<th>IMPORT VALUE IN BAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3,262,515.48</td>
<td>4,132,267.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2,743,906.64</td>
<td>5,559,750.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>9,953,398.66</td>
<td>5,732,212.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>8,633,039.21</td>
<td>4,052,633.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>24,592,859.99</td>
<td>19,476,864.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.2 Organisational Capacity

4.2.1 Coordination Board of BiH on SALW

Having in mind the significant amount of weapons and ammunition that are remnants of the 1992-1995 war and the challenges and threats that these weapons represent, the Council of Ministers of BiH adopted, during its 117th session held on 11 May 2006, the Strategy and Action Plan on Small Arms and Light Weapons Control in BiH. The SALW Coordination Board was established to perform the functions of coordination, advice and monitoring throughout the implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan. The Board has been assigned multiple and complex tasks, such as the identification and assessment of the influence that SALW have on society and the security of people as well as on economic and social development. Furthermore, the Board has been assigned to support the mobilising of the resources necessary to proceed with activities planned within the strategy, coordination of all activities during the implementation of the strategy, its updating and reporting on the progress of implementation of the strategy and monitoring its compliance with the UN Plan of Action and the EU Code of Conduct for the Council of Ministers of BiH and international organisations.

The Board is characterised by its versatile composition; aside from the seven representatives from domestic institutions that comprise the Board there are also observers from international organisations, representatives of nongovernmental organisations and civil society organisations and UNDP representatives that serve as the main support mechanism for technical and financial matters. The versatile composition of the Board appears to be very efficient and convenient, which is manifested in its achieved results.

In 2009, with technical assistance from the UNDP BiH, the Board revised the existing Strategy and the Action Plan on Small Arms and Light Weapons Control in BiH for the period 2008-2012. This revision represents an extension of efforts of the State oriented towards enhancing the capacity in BiH for the destruction of surplus weapons and ammunition, the legal regulation of SALW, raising the awareness of citizens concerning the threat posed by SALW and the possible influence of SALW destruction on the health of citizens and the ecology. The Board has continued to develop cooperation with both governmental and nongovernmental organisations active in the domain of SALW by holding roundtables (together with the entity agencies for civil protection) in order to give individual actors the opportunity to express their aptitudes and to explain their roles within the implementation of the strategy. Within the scope of cooperation between the UNDP and the Joint Parliamentary Commission for the Defence and Security of BiH, two workshops were held (Medjugorje and Bijeljina) in relation to the implementation of the strategy. Furthermore, in 2009 the Board addressed its activities at the international level, where the representatives participated in the work of the Regional Steering Group, at the International Seminar on Export Control UGA/CITS-USA and at the Regional Seminar on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. The representatives of the Board were also active in all other forms of cooperation between the countries of Southeast Europe on integral approaches to the issue of SALW. This, above all, pertains to cooperation within the SEESAC (South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms in Southeast Europe), RACVIAC (Centre for Security Cooperation) and SECI (Southeast European Cooperation Initiative - Working Group for Combating SALW Trafficking and other Regional Initiatives).

The Coordination Board has also supported the working group assigned with the task to develop the Law on Arms. Moreover, the Board has monitored and analysed the procedure for weapons and ammunition destruction. According to Momir Brajic, State Coordinator for SALW matters, the Board shall, in accordance with its mandate, continue to coordinate activities for the implementation of the strategy and the action plan over the coming period.

As part of fulfilling its commitments to the international community, which also falls under the responsibility of the Board, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bosnia and Herzegovina has, as a responsible member of the international community, expressed its commitment to participate in activities related to the control of weapons transfers. During the past few years BiH has signed several conventions and agreements concerning the control of the transfer of weapons (see table below). BiH strives and expects to be recognised as a reliable international and European actor, being aware that these processes increase the possibility of its membership of NATO and the EU.

To demonstrate its commitment towards observing best international practice, both formally and rhetorically, BiH supported the EU Declaration on Weapons Transfer Control during the preparatory
Committee session on the UN Plan of Action in January 2006 and has also demonstrated support for efforts to enact the Agreement on International Transfers of All Types of Conventional Weapons by the end of 2008. Although the competent institutions have signed and ratified the agreements listed below, the dilemma exists as to whether the decisive clear political and operative will exists to actively pursue implementation of these agreements and adhere to the solutions found for the causes and issues connected to SALW. The implementation part appears to only have been placed under the competence of those persons involved in these issues and not under official policy and the competent authorities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS</th>
<th>ACCEPTANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional Implementation Plan to Combat the Proliferation of SALW</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all of its Aspects</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE Document on SALW</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE Document MANPADS</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE Document for Commercial Intermediation</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE Documents for End User</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Firearms Protocol</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Coordination Board reports to the Council of Ministers of BiH on its work and provides recommendations for the improvement of the institutional fight against SALW on a regular basis.
4.2.2 Police Agencies

The public opinion survey indicated that citizens consider the police to be most responsible for their security (see chart below); however, the attitudes of the respondents in relation to the level of trust in the police and in its efficiency differed. The focus group participants agreed absolutely that the police are most responsible for their security, but they did not have a high level of trust in the police and nor did they consider the present police structure capable of dealing with the security challenges, especially the issue of SALW.

**Chart 3: Who is responsible for the security of citizens?**

What is worrying is that almost all focus group participants shared the attitude that they would not report a criminal offense to the police due to their lack of trust in the police and also because they believed that by reporting an offense they would place themselves in danger. This means that they believe that if they report an offense to the police then the offender would be made aware of the source of the report. Participants of the focus group in Banja Luka stated:

“And why do you think I should report a murder even if I was to see one? So that some police officer could snitch on me for the price of a coffee and so that I have to fear for my life after the offender is released. And believe me when I say that soon enough he would walk free, because murderers do walk freely in our town still today. In the end, whose job is it? What do the police receive its salary for?”

Focus group participant, Tuzla:

“Four main reasons why we distrust the police are (1) insufficient professionalism and physical condition of police officers, (2) very corrupt and immoral management, (3) corruption and (4) connections to the mafia”.

Focus group participant, Sarajevo:

“Police need young, moral, physically prepared and professional police officers and, with time, police work will regain the trust of people”.

Analysis of the police service in BiH, its work and results, based on annual statistical reports, indicates that the work of the police over the few past years has shown marked and constant progress. Therefore, it is surprising that the focus group participants held such a negative attitude and low level of trust in the work of the police. However, what remains a fact is that the police need to improve in order for local communities to show more trust in their work. This relates in particular to combating organised crime and the prevention of juvenile delinquency.

Prevention of the aforementioned criminal offenses as well as the illegal trade in firearms is possible only if the competent MIA operates in accordance with international standards and possesses the necessary equipment. The latter represents a problem for police services in BiH, since the majority do not even own adequate storages facilities for keeping illegal weapons collected or seized from civilians. Another problem that arises is the destruction of these weapons, meaning that a police capacity for the destruction of SALW does not exist.

In terms of SALW, police forces, through their representatives, have actively participated in the drafting and implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan on SALW Control in BiH. Furthermore, the majority of the ministries of internal affairs have experience
related to the initiation and implementation of weapons collection campaigns and this experience should be taken into consideration during the implementation of future campaigns.

As part of its regular activities, through campaigns and consequent amnesties, BiH police have seized and collected a significant amount of weapons, arms and ammunition and the list of weapons, arms and ammunition seized by the police is long. The greatest amount is collected and or seized ammunition (818,025 pieces of different calibre) followed by mines and other explosive devices (16,535 pieces), hand-grenades (9,361), long-barrelled firearms (4,321), pistols (2,188), grenades (1,772) and grenade launchers (587). Also collected and or seized were mine throwers, recoilless guns, 683.4 kg of explosive, two aerial bombs and other types of arms and equipment (see table below). It is worth mentioning that 82% of these were voluntarily surrendered by citizens.

The cantonal ministries of internal affairs, entity ministries of internal affairs and Brcko District disclosed the information contained in the table below concerning illegal weapons seized or collected through police actions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF WEAPON</th>
<th>CANTONAL MIAs</th>
<th>MIA of FBiH</th>
<th>RS MIA</th>
<th>BD POLICE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automatic rifles</td>
<td>1,705</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy machineguns</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-48 Rifles</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-automatic rifles</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunting rifles</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-barrelled weapons (not specified)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>2,141</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistols</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>1,420</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>800,825</td>
<td>17,200</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>818,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand-grenades</td>
<td>9,321</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>9,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines and explosive devices</td>
<td>3,989</td>
<td>12,546</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>16,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades (anti-tank and antipersonnel)</td>
<td>1,772</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>1,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket launchers: WASP, OSA, RPG and other</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recoilless guns BST</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine throwers 82mm and 60mm</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockets for bazookas</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosive (kg)</td>
<td>664.10</td>
<td>19.70</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>683.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial bombs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12: Armaments collected and seized by cantonal and entity police forces and BD Police
4.2.3 Border Police and the Indirect Taxation Authority of BiH

The Border Police of BiH (formerly the State Border Police of BiH) was established under the Law on Border Police enacted by the High Representative in accordance with his authorisation of the 13 January 2000. The operational function of the Border Police began on 6 June 2000 in the aftermath of the formation of the first Unit/Command: J/PGP Sarajevo Airport. The transition process of surveillance and control over borders from the entity and cantonal ministries of internal affairs was conducted in stages and was completed on 30 September 2002 with the inauguration of the police “Strmica” Unit/Command of the Boarder Police.

Under the provisions of the new Law, enacted in October 2004, the Border Police was defined as an administrative unit with operational autonomy within the framework of the Ministry of Security of BiH. The Border Police was established to perform police work related to surveillance and control of the country’s borders and other tasks prescribed under this Law. The amendment to the Law, which entered into force on 4 May 2007, changed the name of the State Border Service to that of the Border Police.

The control and administration of the borders of BiH has been a problem for a number of years, as BiH still has unresolved issues with the neighbouring countries. Moreover, the long river border with Serbia and Croatia represents one of the obstacles to the prevention of trafficking in weapons and other goods. Altogether BiH has 89 stipulated border crossings of which 55 are international, including 4 international airports and 34 border crossings for trade. The entire border of BiH is 1,551 kilometres in length.

The traffic of weapons and military equipment, dangerous and radioactive substances and dual-use products is administered through road, railroad and air transport. To this end, international border crossings have been established for the export and import of such goods. In terms of international border crossings, six have been established for road transport at Doljani, Orašje, Rača, Izačić, Klobuk and Vardište, while there are three international railroad border crossings at Dobrilj, Čapljina and Brcko and four international airports for air transport in Sarajevo, Mostar, Banja Luka and Tuzla.

The Boarder Police employs 2,224 operatives comprised of 2,039 police officials, 40 state officials and 145 other employees.

According to information provided by the Border Police, it seized and or collected 1,089 weapons during the period 2004 to 2009: 112 pistols, 108 semi-automatic rifles, 16 submachine guns, 449 side arms and other. An analysis of the amount of seized and collected weapons over this period indicates that 2004 excelled in terms of the greatest number of collected or seized semi-automatic firearms (37 pieces), while 2006 excelled in the greatest number of collected or seized pistols (56 pieces). As the table below indicates, there was a decrease in the number of collected and or seized weapons during the period 2005 to the present.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of weapons</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automatic weapons</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-automatic rifles</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistols</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold weaponry</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sprays</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13: Temporarily seized weapons by the Border Police over the period 2004 to 2009

The Border Police has unlimited quantities and types of weapons for the purpose of performing its operations related to the surveillance and control of the state border crossings and the provision of airport security. In accordance with the foreseen number of police officials, the Border Police has no surplus weapons.

During the last few years the Border Police has implemented several activities aimed at improving the administration of the border and the prevention of weapons trafficking. Amongst numerous activities conducted within domestic and international projects it is important to mention the Project for Placing Barriers at sites deemed convenient for illegal transactions. This project was conducted in cooperation with Croatia, whereby 118 sites deemed convenient for illegal transactions on the BiH side were identified and 68 of
these locations obstructed within the scope of the project. Likewise, the implementation of such projects has also been initiated in cooperation with Montenegro resulting in the obstruction of 44 identified sites. Negotiations with Serbia concerning the demarcation of the border are still ongoing.

Today, the Border Police is a modern inventive capable target-oriented and professional police agency competent to perform the task of border control and which actively and appreciably contributes to the security of the citizens of BiH, the region and beyond. The Border Police is charged with cooperation and the fulfilment of the needs of citizens and the fulfilment of the commitments of BiH with regard to EU accession.

The Second institution with significant powers is the Indirect Taxation Authority (ITA) of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or the customs service. The ITA was under the competence of the entities up until the formation of the state institution; however, these structures appeared inefficient and the cause of significant loss in state revenue. This brought about the unification of the existing customs services into a uniform system under state control. The Parliamentary Assembly of BiH adopted the Law on the Indirect Taxation Authority during a mutual conference held in December 2003.

With the establishment of the ITA a completely new customs system was established in BiH, which soon proved its worth and economic justification through the greatly increased collection of state revenue. The ITA is an autonomous administrative organisation responsible to the Council of Ministers of BiH, via its board of directors.

Field activities take place at 40 land border crossings, 4 air crossings, 8 railroad crossings and 3 postal border crossings.

As previously mentioned, an ITA representative is a member of the Coordination Board on SALW, and the table with legal regulations under which the ITA acts on the matters of BiH weapons and military equipment are given.

It is also important to mention another recently established institution with the aim to achieve an integrated administration of the borders, better cooperation between agencies and enhancement of the capacity to combat the trafficking of weapons and all others forms of border crime: the Centre for Risk Analysis. On 22 December 2008 an agreement was signed on the establishment of the Centre for Risk Analysis, which relates to the control of state borders. As yet, the centre has not reached its full capacity, with only ten employees with different vocations taken from six different institutions: the Ministry of Security of BiH, the Border Police, the Indirect Taxation Authority, the Veterinarian Office of BiH, the Department for the Protection of Crops of BiH and the Department for Services to Foreigners. All of whom are expected to fully contribute on the protection and integration of the border administration.

REGULATIONS GOVERNING CONTROL
- Law on Customs BiH (Official Gazette of BiH, number: 57/04)
- Decision on the Implementation of Regulations (Official Gazette of BiH, number: 63A/04)
- Instruction on Commitment to the Provision of EUFOR Approval for Weapons and Military Equipment Export, Import, Transit and Intermediation (Official Gazette of BiH, number: 56/05)
- Rulebook on the Manner of Performing Control over Weapons and Ammunition Transfer over the State Border (Official Gazette of BiH, number: 32/10)

Indirect Taxation Authority BiH
4.2.4 The State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA)

Members of the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) recognised the fact that weapons can often end up in the wrong hands and result in immense consequences for the security of the society as a whole. Therefore, through its representative on the Coordination Board for SALW, SIPA actively participates in SALW control. Within its capacities and framework, namely within the regular operations and tasks performed by the Crime Research Department of SIPA, it has contributed to the fight against illegal SALW. During 2009 and the first six months of 2010 SIPA seized the following types of weapons: 10 rifles, 1 machinegun, 26 pistols, 27 bombs, 4 grenade rifles and 7 hand-grenade throwers. SIPA is also very active within the domain of combating the illegal trade or trafficking in weapons and therefore it has undertaken several actions, in cooperation with regional services for the implementation of the law and to the prevention of criminal activities.

4.2.5 Armed Forces of BiH

Through their capacities the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina contribute immensely towards the control of SALW and, through their civil representatives from within the Ministry of Defence, actively participate in the work of the Coordination Board on SALW. The entity governments reached an Agreement on the Final Disposition of all Rights and Commitments for Movables which shall be Deployed for Defence, thus enabling continuation of the defence reform, including, amongst other things, the domain encompassing small arms and light weapons. As for the quantity of SALW in the possession of the armed forces of BiH, as a consequence of the defence reform a surplus amounting to 99,882 pieces of SALW was established. A surplus amounting to 22,500 tons of ammunition, mines and other explosive devices represents an additional issue for the armed forces of BiH.

What is of major concern is that the majority of this surplus ammunition is placed in unsafe stockpile storage areas (14 to 20 storages). Due to this fact, it is necessary to decrease the number of locations of armed forces of BiH weapons and ammunition storages as soon as possible. According to information from the Ministry of Defence, it is planned to decrease the number of stockpile storages for surplus SALW to two locations and the number of locations for ammunition storage to five. Once the problem of ammunition surpluses has been resolved it is envisaged that these former storage sites will be transferred to the civil authorities in order to further utilise them. These actions would encompass a reduction in the number of SALW and it would contribute to meeting NATO standards.

Of immense significance is the fact that all processes are transparent and that the armed forces of BiH have the capacity in terms of personnel to safeguard this great amount of surplus weapons and ammunition; the armed forces of BiH also has the capability to enhance the capacity for the destruction of ammunition, mines and other explosive devices. The destruction process itself is very expensive and demanding, requiring great financial assistance for capacity building with increased security measures. The process is slow and more importantly represents an immense security issue. The destruction of ammunition, mines and other explosive devices is administered through dismantling, detonation, incineration or if necessary by other means.

Within the framework of the UNDP project “Small Arms Control and Reduction in BiH”, which was implemented over the period 2005-2007, 90,000 pieces of SALW from the entity military storages were destroyed and as of January 2006 also weapons from the armed forces of BiH. Weapons were destroyed in the BiH iron foundries of Jelšingrad in Banja Luka and Mittal Steel in Zenica. The methods used were cutting and incineration.

Out of the 35,000 tons of surplus ammunition, mines and other explosive devices registered in 2006, up until June 2010, a total of 6,953 tons had been destroyed. This quantity was destroyed in six locations: “Trom” in Doboj, “Unis-Pretis” in Vogosca, “Binas” in Bugojno, “Igman” in Konjic, “Manjaca” in Banja Luka and “Gladna Brda” in Glamoc. The table below provides the quantities of destroyed ammunition, mines and other explosive devices, classified according to location and proprietor origin.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistics Concerning Annual Destruction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006: 1,855 tons destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007: 2,022 tons destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008: 1,814 tons destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009: 1,124 tons destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010: 102 tons destroyed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the table above it is obvious that the facility TROM in Doboj destroyed the greatest amount of ammunition, mines and other explosive devices during the course of the destruction process. TROM is a military unit licensed by the Ministry of Defence to implement these activities. The unit is disposed with 22/24 members for the destruction of ammunition, mines and other explosive devices, which is administered by members of the first and second section. The current annual capacity of this unit is 800 tons of small arms ammunition and 1,200 tons of other ammunition. Altogether, its capacity is 2,400 tons annually, wherein 800 tons of SALW ammunition is destroyed by an explosive weapons incinerator (EWI).

Furthermore, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Headquarters of the armed forces of BiH are also assigned the task of the monitoring and verification of ammunition, mines and other explosive devices through civilian capacities. In addition, the MoD strives to enhance its present capacity and to establish the preconditions for the continuation and acceleration of the process of resolving the issue of surplus weapons.

The issue of the destruction of surplus weapons and ammunition is a common problem for the region as a whole, thus other armed forces from surrounding countries encounter the same or similar problems. In Montenegro, due to the low level of industrial capacity, destruction is administered mainly by open detonation, which causes ecological consequences. Albania has an ammunition surplus amounting to as much as to 100,000 tons and considers that it is capable of destroying this amount over a three year period, given that it receives support from the international community. At present, some regional initiatives related to this matter are barely out of the conceptual phase, yet the commitment of all countries and officials from their armed forces to eliminate surplus ammunition and weapons is not in question. Consideration is currently being given to the possibility of establishing a regional centre for the destruction of ammunition, mines and other explosive devices; however, for now it remains at the analysis stage in order to estimate the financial justification and how realistic it would prove to transport unstable ammunition from one location to another. Thus, for now, each country tries to address the issue of weapons and ammunition surpluses on its own.
4.2.6 Parliamentary Oversight

The Parliamentary Assembly of BiH is responsible for leading defence issues and monitoring the security forces, including the armed forces of BiH. Democratic parliamentary oversight of the defence and security sector is administered by the Joint Commission on Defence and Security of the Parliamentary Assembly. The Joint Commission was established in December 2003 under the provisions of the Law on Defence and is comprised of twelve members: six form each House. The President and two Vice-Presidents, representatives of the three constituent peoples of BiH, administer the work of the Commission.

The Joint Commission scrutinises and monitors the implementation of security and defence policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, monitors the work and scrutinises the reports of the Standing Committee on Military Matters, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Security and other executive authorities that deal with matters pertaining to security and defence. The Commission is responsible to the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH, with special focus on reporting, short-term and long-term plans in relation to the armed forces, policy and recruitment, salaries and compensation, education and training of members of the armed forces, professional behaviour and ethics standards for civil and military personnel, equipping the military, the work of the arms industry, provision of aid and the export and import of weapons and military equipment, material aid and contracts with foreign companies that provide commercial services to defence institutions, task aptitude, military exercises and operations including the realisation of international commitments and international peace operations; furthermore, it scrutinises and develops opinions, recommendations and modifications and amendments to acts within its competence, scrutinises and develops opinions and recommendations, modifications and amendments on the defence budget proposals, scrutinises reports on the execution of the defence budgets as well as reporting on the revision of institutions active within the domain of defence and security policy in BiH as well as other issues that fall within the domain of security in BiH.

The establishment and function of parliamentary oversight, through the Joint Commission, is a positive step in terms of the democratic monitoring of the security sector. Over the course of recent years Commission members have proven to be interested in the issue of weapons control and have made adequate progress in this domain through legislative activity. Also, the Commission has supported and contributed to implementation of the state Strategy and Action Plan on SALW Control and has taken action to improve regional cooperation in this domain. Their engagement in relation to the manner of resolving the problem of surplus weapons and ammunition in the possession of the armed forces of BiH is also worth mentioning.

However, members of the Parliamentary Commission have encountered certain limitations. It appears that BiH has resolved the issue of parliamentary oversight, mirroring the more developed European countries, yet the reality is quite different. A very small number of parliamentarians are engaged and devote limited time to the Joint Commission since they are at the same time members of other parliamentary commissions. If you add to this the limited human and financial resources it points to the fact that they are not capable of implementing their assigned tasks. Cooperation between civil or scientific institutions and the Commission has not been used to its full potential and therefore the Commission members are limited to their personal attitudes or the attitude of their political option when residing over an issue.

The lack of experts on defence and security matters in the Joint Commission and other security institutions has an immense affect on the parliamentary members’ ability to implement the tasks assigned within the domain of weapons control.
4.2.7 International Engagement and Capacities

Numerous international organisations contribute to the enhancement of SALW control and support the activities of government institutions in BiH. The greatest contribution to the SALW issue in BiH has been received from the UNDP, the UNDP BiH and other international organisations and embassies including the OSCE, NATO, OHR, EUSR, EUFOR, EU, US Embassy, British Embassy, Netherlands Embassy and others active within the field.

4.2.7.1 UNDP

The UNDP BiH is the leading agency concerning SALW matters in BiH. Through its activities it coordinates international support and provides information and training for the institutions of the Council of Ministers of BiH. Aside from contributing to building state capacities for SALW control and assisting in the establishment of the State Coordination Board for SALW, the UNDP continues to assists in the work of the Board through the provision of expert analysis, support for implementation and other means of support.

With the aim of providing assistance to local authorities to deal with SALW and ammunition remnants and distribution, in 2004 the UNDP initiated the project Small Arms Control and Reduction in BiH (SACBiH). The objective of the project was to upgrade the results achieved within the scope of the previous UNDP project named Small Arms Control Project (SAP), which was initiated in 2003. The SACBiH Project works in partnership with the authorities of BiH to decrease the threat posed to human security by the large and uncontrolled presence of SALW and ammunition in the country. The project is based on three distinct components, each geared towards securing particular objectives.

- Enhanced Institutional Capacity for SALW Control
- SALW and Associated Systems Destruction
- Ammunition Disposal

Within the scope of this project assistance was provided to the Ministry of Defence during the process of weapons and ammunition destruction. In addition, the UNDP actively supports the enhancement of the capacity of the Coordination Board to deal with the issue of SALW by providing technical aid and support for the implementation of the state Strategy and the Action Plan for SALW Control in BiH. The project cooperates with the Joint Commission, the Ministry of Security, the entity ministries of internal affairs and Brcko District Police.

Results achieved through the period 2005 to 2010 include:

- destruction of over 95,000 pieces of SALW from entity military stockpiles, within the scope of Operation Harvest;
- destruction of over 4,800 tons of unstable surplus ammunition;
- increase in the capacity to destroy ammunition from 3,200 to 6,400 tons per year, which was enabled through the provision and setting up of machines allocated for the destruction of ammunition;
- establishment of an operational Coordination Board for SALW;
- adoption and ongoing implementation of the revised national Strategy and Action Plan for SALW Control;
- establishment of state community-based policing;
- support to the Community-based Policing Strategy;
- development of the Safer Communities Project, which is ongoing in five municipalities in BiH;
- draft version of the State Law on Arms outlined in full respect of EC directives on the possession of weapons (91/477/EC);
- Law on the Transport of Hazardous Substances outlined in accordance with the UN raw-model;
• development of an outline and support for implementation of the state Law on the Movement of Weapons and Military Equipment;
• harmonisation of the Draft Law on Arms of the Federation of BiH and the Draft Law on Arms of Brcko District with EU directives.

Together with the aforementioned results and achievements it is important to assert that the UNDP has, within the scope of the SACBIH Project, initiated and implemented programmes through local NGOs and civil society aimed at reducing the threat posed by weapons in absolute accordance with the national strategy for awareness raising on the matter of SALW. In 2005 the campaign “No to Celebratory Fire” was initiated and during the course of 2006 the campaign “Surrender your Weapon in Exchange for Tools” was instigated, while in 2008 the information campaign “Let’s take Victory over Weapons” was run.

4.2.7.2 OSCE

The OSCE mission exists in BiH in order to fulfil the commitments within the framework of security and the military-political dimensions. The weapons control subdivision of the Security Cooperation Department (SCD) supports all relevant institutions in BiH and assists them in meeting international commitments related to defence and security.

The OSCE mission has undertaken the role of coordinator in leading international actors active in the domain of SALW and by assisting the authorities in BiH to deal with the issues of armed forces surplus ammunition, legal and illegal SALW in civilian possession and weapons issued to private security companies. Under its function, the OSCE tries to ensure that all international stakeholders implement their activities in the domain of weapons control without overlapping. The OSCE also ensures that all stakeholders share information on weapons and ammunition and that they all act as “one voice” in the event of political blockades.

The OSCE mission has for a number of years been focused on the implementation of awareness raising at the political level, initiating the reform process and promotion of OSCE principles agreed by 56 member countries: the OSCE Code of Conduct on military-political security concerns, OSCE Principles for the Administration of Conventional Weapons Transfer, the OSCE Document on SALW and the OSCE Document on Conventional Ammunition Storage. In addition, the OSCE initiates and finances the training of key personnel within local institutions and offers technical support to local authorities when requested.

Through the support of the OSCE mission BiH has significantly improved its implementation results over recent years, through the exchange of information, after inclusion in the OSCE communication net, enhanced democratic control over the armed forces of BiH, raising awareness and training personnel in state and entity institutions for defence and security. All of this has helped to improve implementation of policies that have contributed towards an improvement of global activities to combat terrorism; more precisely, many anti-terrorist initiatives were enabled through preventative security measures.

The OSCE mission together with its international partners in BiH, including NATO, EUFOR, OHR, UNDP and more recently the US Embassy, has cooperated closely on efforts to address the issue of the huge amount of weapons and ammunition still present in this country. The OSCE actively participates in monitoring the destruction of weapons and takes care that this process is transparent.
In order to reduce the number of both legal and illegal firearms in BiH several weapons collection actions have been implemented. In this context, the SFOR and EUFOR “Operation Harvest” (initiated in 1998) and BiH internal initiatives on weapons collection deserve special attention. During the period August 2003 to August 2006 SFOR and EUFOR units seized 15,151 pieces of small arms that were subsequently destroyed through smelting at the Zenica steel mill. Starting from the first Operation Harvest in 1998 some 60,000 weapons have been seized from the local population and later destroyed. Since its inception Operation Harvest, led by SFOR and EUFOR, has been considered as one of the most successful campaigns for the destruction of SALW in the Balkans. The total number of SALW destroyed in all three destruction actions over the period August 2003 to 2006 amounts to 107,049 pieces. EUFOR weapons collection activities ceased in 2006 after responsibility was transferred to the competency of the local authorities.

In regard to dealing with surpluses weapons and ammunition, this survey creates an insight into the approach advocated by EUFOR and which options are most acceptable for dealing with the issue. “EUFOR fully supports the attitude of BiH that weapons and ammunition surpluses should be dealt with as soon as possible, as does the part of the international community that actively supports the offloading of surplus weapons and ammunition. Yet, in regard to the option to offload, EUFOR advocates for destruction and dismantling rather than sale or donation”.

The fact that EUFOR can use its influence in relation to political decisions and apply pressure on political circles during its endeavours to create a more secure and safe environment and to build the capacities of local authorities for ammunition storage is important. At present, EUFOR actions are focused on the control of SALW, their dismantling/demilitarisation as well as on monitoring SALW and the surrender of ammunition and its subsequent destruction.

In the future the role of EUFOR will be focused more on monitoring the fundamental military tasks within the domain of SALW control that previously were transferred to local authorities. Furthermore, increased focus will be given to the spheres of capacity building and the training of the armed forces of BiH. Altogether, EUFOR shall continue to maintain bilateral relations with international community organisations active in the domain of SALW control in BiH.

The United States of America supports BiH in its determination to secure the decommissioning of weapons, which is considered to be one step towards the enhancement of regional security. As a result, the USA shall assist BiH in its efforts and plans for the destruction of surpluses amounting to 67,000 pieces of small arms and 20,000 tons of conventional ammunition and explosive devices.

In May 2010 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for political and military matters, Thomas J. Masillo, signed a statement reflecting the mutual commitment of both countries to decrease the threat posed by surplus stockpiles. The USA is also committed to support the efforts of the BiH administration on maintaining the process of demilitarisation, which represents a key component in the promotion of its aspirations towards EU membership.

BiH has actively supported the Regional Approach to Stockpile Reduction (RASR), which was initiated in order to build partnerships amongst military officials in Southeast Europe and to establish the conditions to undertake common efforts aimed at dealing with the issue of weapons surpluses and inadequately secured stockpiles of conventional ammunition. This initiative has been supported by the USA.

The political commitments undertaken by the Presidency of BiH upon rendering the Decision on the policy to offload surplus small arms and light weapons meant that the US Embassy could continue to support the destruction process of unstable ammunition and SALW in BiH. In September 2010 the US Embassy, in cooperation with the UNDP BiH, incited an initiative to continue the process to destroy surplus weapons in the possession of the armed forces of BiH as well as cassette ammunition and white-phosphor ammunition by donating 1.3 million USD.
In 2004 the UNDP BiH established, through the Study on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Ammunition Demilitarisation Feasibility Study, that the physical state of ammunition was generally visually acceptable, but that poor storage conditions contribute to an accelerated deterioration. In a study conducted in 2007 by the UNDP the team for drafting the study reached the unanimous conclusion that the Unis Pretis factory in Vogošća (Sarajevo) represents the most convenient location for the further development of an ammunition disassembly plant. Furthermore, the aforementioned study contributed immensely to initiating the process of the disassembly and destruction of surplus SALW and ammunition in the possession of the armed forces of BiH in cooperation with BiH authorities.

As for SALW and ammunition destruction, BiH has over the course of the last five years immensely enhanced this capacity. Today, the capacity to destroy ammunition, mines and explosives exists in two forms, supplemented by a third option: incineration.

The first procedure relates to the method of dismantling, which is being implemented in four locations: the military unit TROM in Doboj, the Unis Pretis factory in Vogošća, Binas in Bugojno and Vitezit in Vitez. Following the installation of new equipment donated by the UNDP in 2010 a capacity amounting to 6,400 tons per year was reached.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>ANNUAL CAPACITY IN TONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TROM DOBOJ</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIS PRETIS VOGOŠĆA</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BINAS BUGOJNO</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITEZIT VITEZ</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14: Annual capacities of subjects assigned with the destruction of ammunition, mines and other explosive devices by the method of dismantlement.

The second procedure of destruction is that of open-air detonation. The capacity of this procedure amounts to 500 tons per year and is implemented in two locations: Gladna Brda in Glamoću and Manjača Banja Luka.
Table 15: Annual capacities of subjects assigned with the destruction of ammunition, mines and other explosive devices using the method of open-air detonation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>ANNUAL CAPACITY IN TONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GLADNA BRDA, GLAMOĆ</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANJAČA, BANJA LUKA</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The capacity for the destruction of firearms exists within the frame of two BiH steel mills: Mittal Steel in Zenica and Jelšingrad in Banja Luka. The method of open cutting and incineration is used for this procedure. Weapons are smelted into steel and later recycled into other products.

As previously mentioned, the industrial capacity has been significantly improved through the acquisition, by the UNDP, of secure equipment for the military workshop in Doboj, Vogošća, and Vitez. Within the framework of the SAC Project, the UNDP endorsed an improvement in the industrial capacity through the acquisition and installation of three different devices for the destruction of ammunition in accordance with EU security rules and NATO standards for destruction and storage procedures. During the course of this research the necessary equipment had already arrived at the designated companies and installation is ongoing. Through this donation to supply new equipment BiH increased its capacity for the destruction of ammunition, mines and other explosive devices from 3,200 tons to around 6,400 tons per year.

However, looking at the results collectively it is obvious that in past years BiH has failed to destroy more than 2,000 tons of ammunition, mines and other explosive devices as in 2007, while in 2009 and 2010 it was far from achieving that average.

Therefore the attitude of certain officials that BiH can destroy the surpluses of ammunition, mines and other explosive devices over the next 3 to 4 years seems a bit too optimistic. Of course, efforts in this direction should be made and all relevant factors should be fully engaged in this process in order to achieve the maximum level of enhancement of security for the citizens of BiH, which is the legal obligation of all institutions of power.
Numerous action programmes for combating SALW have been implemented in the past with the aim of reducing the number of illegal SALW and increasing the security of people throughout the country. Such programmes involved amnesties, collections and the destruction of SALW as well as the organisation of award games and awareness raising campaigns.

**Operation Harvest**

Operation Harvest appears to be a very successful programme of action implemented by international military forces in BiH. This programme was initiated by SFOR at the beginning of 1998 and was continued by EUFOR with the objective to collect and or confiscate illegal weapons found during searches. Through this programme, over the period August 2003 to August 2006, SFOR and EUFOR collected 15,151 SALW possessed illegally by civilians. Besides SFOR and EUFOR, Operation Harvest was actively implemented by the police forces of BiH. According to available information, the following amounts of SALW were collected: 818,035 rounds of ammunition of various calibre, 16,535 mines and other explosive devices, 9,361 hand-grenades, 4,321 long-barrelled weapons, 2,118 pistols, 1,772 grenades and 587 hand held rocket launchers. Also on this list were mine throwers, recoilless cannons, two aerial bombs and other types of weapons and ammunition. During the amnesty 82% of these weapons were voluntarily surrendered by the population.

**SALW and Ammunition Destruction**

SALW and ammunition destruction programmes have been implemented by various actors, but, for the most part, SFOR and EUFOR destroyed the most SALW collected during Operation Harvest. Counting from when the first Operation Harvest, which took place in 1998, up until the present some 60,000 individual weapons were collected from the local population and later destroyed. At their training grounds, civil protection services in Bosnia and Herzegovina destroyed a huge amount of unexploded ordnance (UXO) confiscated from the civilian population. The most popular and successful SALW destruction programme was the UNDP programme implemented within the frame of the SACBiH Project. This programme resulted in the destruction of more than 95,000 individual SALW and 4,800 tons of unstable ammunition removed from the entities military stockpiles.

**Campaign Against Celebratory Gunfire**

The Campaign Against Celebratory Gunfire, implemented under the umbrella of the United Nations Development Programme in BiH (UNDP BiH) was conducted by the Centre for Security Studies (CSS) over the period 23 December 2005 to 14 January 2006. The campaign was based on an awareness raising package focused on the dangers linked to the possession and abuse of small arms and light weapons and alternative modes of protection. The aim was to enhance the awareness of citizens about the menace of celebratory gunfire. In the course of the campaign citizens were asked, through the campaign video, not to use pyrotechnic devices or small arms and light weapons during celebrations.

**Give away Weapons and Win Tools**

This programme was a weapons and ammunition collection action conducted within the territory of the Municipalities of Novo (New) Sarajevo and Istočna (East) Ilidža. The action lasted for one month, beginning on the 5 November and ending on the 5 December 2006; the programme obtained excellent results. This action was a pilot project aimed at enhanced security for citizens and the development of their awareness on the menace of illegally possessed SALW in BiH.

The small arms collection action and award game Give away Weapons and Win Tools was organised by the UNDP in collaboration with its partners: the Centre for Security Studies, Europlakat, the department stores Robot Commerce and Tomašević, the entity ministries of police and local communities.

The action and award game lasted for one month and during this period citizens in the two municipalities surrendered a large number of small arms, ammunition mines and other explosive devices. As indicated, within the framework of this action citizens surrendered 332 individual weapons, including pistols, rifles, hand-grenades and wasps as well as 4,975 rounds of ammunition. As part of the action citizens received various rewards: scooters, DVD players, refrigerators, electrical ovens, televisions and other valuable kitchen equipment.
“We wish to acknowledge the efforts of those people that recognised the importance of actions for the collection of small arms as well as the efforts of those who voluntarily surrendered their weapons to the desks designated for this action. In this way they directly affected the enhancement of the security situation within local communities and more importantly they potentially saved many lives”, asserted Christine McNab, Resident Representative of the UNDP on the occasion of the presentation of the awards.

Teachers Guide for Mine Risk Education

Bosnia and Herzegovina suffers from the highest level of landmine mine contamination in the region of Southeast Europe. It is estimated that within its territory there are around 220,000 landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) located in more than 13,000 locations throughout the country.

Areas contaminated by landmines have a direct or indirect impact on the community, which is reflected in the huge number of civil victims and in particular children. Since 2002 UNICEF has collaborated with ministries, governmental institutions and nongovernmental partners on the development of outline policies for the regulation and strengthening of capacities at all levels to reduce the risk posed by landmines and UXO.

In 2006 the ministries of education in BiH concluded that the legacy of landmines, UXO and other explosive devices and weapons represent a menace to the lives and development of children. With the aim to protect the lives and development of children, the ministries of education together with their partners developed a Teachers’ Guide for Mine Risk Education with accompanying educational material (audio-visual teaching aids). The Guide, together with the syllabus aimed at increased awareness of the risks, was a reflection of experience acquired through educational work with children and as such should have been included as part of the obligatory curriculum. However, analysis of the implementation of this Guide in the curriculum indicates quite the opposite: the Handbook is not included as a part of the curriculum in schools in BiH.

The project was implemented by Handicap International BiH in collaboration with the BiH Mine Action Centre (BHMAC), UNICEF, the ICRC, Red Cross BiH, SFOR, EUFOR, Civil Protection, the Centre for Security Studies and the cantonal ministries of education, the pedagogic institutes and teachers.

The FIGHT AGAINST WEAPONS: Informative Campaign on the Threat and Risks Posed by Illegal Weapon

Over the period January 2008 to January 2009 the Centre for Security Studies conducted an informative campaign on the threat and risks posed by illegal weapons. Within the framework of the informative campaign, which was realised through entity television and radio programmes, efforts were made to endorse programmes targeting the surrender of illegally possessed weapons. The methodology of the informative campaign FIGHT AGAINST WEAPONS was based on the document SASP II and contained fully endorsed informative campaign aims.

The methodology was conceived in six stages aimed at informing the public about issues related to SALW. Sports day competitions were organised whereby children were given the opportunity to express their attitude towards SALW in their own unique way.

Aside from the daily broadcast of videos at the state and entity level, the campaign also presented videos at the local level in three cities: Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Bijeljina. The awareness raising programme was oriented towards school children and sports clubs in these three cities, which have the greatest number of recorded SALW related incidents. Consequently, sport games were organised in Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Bijeljina whereby children pointed to the
problems created by the presence of SALW. Altogether, 400 children participated in these games, which attracted considerable media attention.

Working Seminar with Journalists

The media plays a major role in weapons control issues as well as in holding the authorities liable for their actions and decisions within this process. However, reporting on weapons tends to be conducted either in a sensationalist manner or the issue is viewed as irrelevant in some regions.

The UNDP and the CSS have recognised the importance of the role played by the media when addressing the issue of SALW and therefore, within the scope of the project “Fight Against Weapons”, organised the working seminar “Media Fights Against SALW”, which was held on 1 April 2008. This working seminar was organised in order to present to journalists both the theme and the Manual for Media Reporting on SALW, which consists of practical guidelines for professionals to report on this issue which jeopardises human security.

FIREARMS (VATRE NO ORUŽJE)

The goal of this public campaign was to increase awareness on the menace posed by firearms, especially for the youth of BiH. It was initiated by the UNDP and UNICEF and implemented by “Via Media”, which created the solutions for the public campaign. A televised campaign including TV spots (3 x 15 seconds and videos 30 seconds in length) and large billboards containing messages like “Firearms are present in every fourth household in BiH” and “Who will be the next victim?” was conducted during the summer of 2010.
Civil society organisations should support state institutions by playing a constructive role in strengthening security and consolidating democracy. Currently in BiH only a very small number of NGOs realise projects within the domain of SALW. Due to the sensitivity and nature of the problem as well as the attitudes of citizens concerning disarmament and confidentiality civil society in general does not take an interest or play an active role in solving this problem.

Opportunities for the inclusion of the civil sector are multiple, especially if you keep in mind the power of contemporary media and its influence over the political elite and affect on public opinion. Decisions rendered during the course of creating public policies are increasingly influenced by public attitudes. The promotion of a culture of peace, organisation and implementation of campaigns aimed at controlling the presence of weapons in society and raising the awareness of citizens as to the menace posed by SALW and the organisation of public forums as well as theme shows on the issue of SALW are just some of the ways in which civil society can contribute towards combating the threat posed by SALW.

The media reports on the consequences of the presence of SALW in society on a daily basis by presenting the public with tragic cases that involve the use of weapons and armed violence. Occasionally the media addresses the issues of surplus weapons and ammunition under the possession of the armed forces and the illegal possession of weapons by civilians in BiH. Yet in the majority of cases an insufficient level of knowledge amongst journalists and a weak analytical approach is reflected. Therefore, it is necessary to dedicate more attention to the training of journalists and record keeping on this subject.

Inclusion of the nongovernmental sector within the issue of SALW in BiH has been limited to a small number of civil society organisations active in this domain. The Red Cross of BiH has conducted education amongst school children on the menace and risks related to the possession of weapons and unexploded explosive devices, but these activities have ceased due to a lack of funds. In 2009 the nongovernmental organisation “The Genesis Project” conducted education projects on the risks posed by landmines, UXO and SALW focused on primary school children.

The most active organisation within the civil sector that deals with the issue of SALW in BiH is the Centre for Security Studies (CSS), which acts as a “think tank” organisation within the security domain. In regard to the matters of SALW and weapons control the CSS is a part of the IANSA global network of nongovernmental organisations, being at the same time an active partner to nongovernmental organisations that contribute to the fight Against SALW in the region, such as Saferworld from London, the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC), the Centre for SALW Control in South-eastern Europe (SEESAC) and other organisations. At the local level the CSS has been included in a significant number of activities undertaken with the aim to enhance human security in BiH. Amongst other things, the CSS has conducted a number of surveys on SALW, organised a number of public campaigns to raise awareness on the menace posed by SALW, implemented projects related to risk education, lobbied and advocated for the fulfilment of the international commitments of BiH in connection with arms control issues and supported the institutions of power during implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan for Small Arms and Light Weapons Control in BiH.

When considering the future role of NGOs within SALW programmes in BiH it is clear that civil society organisations must play a larger role in activities aimed at raising awareness and education on the menace posed by SALW. In addition, NGOs are perceived as vital actors in regard to lobbying state institutions to approach the issues of SALW control and collection in a more comprehensive and uniform manner.
### Annex 1: Survey Sample

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Annex 3: Attitudes Scale

<table>
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<tr>
<th>CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES</th>
<th>SURVEY OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON WEAPONS AND THE SECURITY OF CITIZENS</th>
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1. INTRODUCTORY REMARK

In our society people ever more frequently (almost daily) handle weapons, which can result in injury as well as homicide, robbery and other criminal activities. Based on this fact, it can be stated that the security of citizens is, to some extent, placed in jeopardy. By participating in this poll, or stating your attitudes, you can contribute to the solution of this problem. This survey is conducted anonymously by the Centre for Security Studies and therefore we expect honest answers from you.

2. GENERAL DATA

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identification number of examinee (number and or initials)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Gender | 1. Male  
2. Female |
|--------|-----------|

| Age | 1. from 18 to 24  
2. from 25 to 29  
3. from 30 to 34  
4. from 35 to 44  
5. from 45 to 54  
6. from 55 to 59  
7. from 60 and above |
|-----|------------------|

| Nationality | 1. BOSNIJAK  
2. CROAT  
3. SERB  
4. OTHER |
|-------------|-------------|

| Education | 1. None  
2. Primary  
3. Skills/Craft  
4. Secondary  
5. University |
|-----------|-------------|

| Working Status | 1. Employed  
2. Unemployed  
3. Student/Pupil  
4. Retired |
|---------------|-------------|

| Type of Residence | 1. Urban  
2. Rural  
3. Suburban |
|-------------------|-------------|

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTIONS / STATEMENTS</th>
<th>ANSWERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. In my family I am:  | 1. Husband  
2. Wife  
3. Son/daughter  
4. Grandmother  
5. Grandfather |
| 2. How would you rate your personal security in your place of residence? | 1. Very secure  
2. Secure  
3. I do not know  
4. Insecure  
5. Very insecure |
<p>| | | |</p>
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<tr>
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</table>
| 3. | **In my family there have been victims of assault, threats or intimidation:** | 1. Yes, intense assaults  
2. Yes, milder assaults  
3. No  
4. I do not know  
5. I do not want to answer |
| 4. | **In my experience, knowledge or opinion the victim is most often attacked:** | 1. Physically  
2. Using a bat  
3. Using Cold weaponry/knife  
4. Using Firearms  
5. Something else |
| 5. | **The greatest responsibility for the security of citizens should be performed by:** | 1. State/police  
2. Private security companies  
3. Family  
4. International organisations (NATO, EUPM, EUFOR)  
5. I do not know |
| 6. | **Possession of a weapon within the family represents:** | 1. Protection of family  
2. Poses a threat to family  
3. 1 and 2 (no difference)  
4. Increases family security  
5. I do not know |
| 7. | **Since the start of the economic crises security in my community has:** | 1. Enhanced  
2. Remained the same  
3. Deteriorated  
4. Is changeable/varies  
5. I do not know |
| 8. | **In my opinion, today the most common offenses are:** | 1. Property criminal offenses/robbery  
2. Drug trafficking  
3. General crime offenses  
4. Acts against body and life  
5. Public order violations |
| 9. | **In my opinion, in my community, --------- most often possess weapons:** | 1. Older men  
2. Younger men  
3. Teenagers  
4. Younger women  
5. Older women |
| 10. | **I hear gunfire and explosions in my immediate surroundings:** | 1. Every day  
2. Once a week  
3. Several times a week  
4. Rarely  
5. Never |
| 11. | **In my opinion, people most often own weapons because:** | 1. Personal protection  
2. Property protection  
3. Community protection  
4. Job they perform  
5. For hunting |
| 12. | **Weapons are present in families most often because of:** | 1. Tradition  
2. Low level of trust in the police  
3. Preservation of private possessions |
<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td><strong>In my local community I am aware of households that own a weapon:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|   |   | 1. One  
|   |   | 2. Two  
|   |   | 3. Three to five  
|   |   | 4. None  
|   |   | 5. I do not know  |
| 14. | **In my opinion, people in their households own several pieces - types of weapons, on average:** |   |
|   |   | 1. One  
|   |   | 2. Two  
|   |   | 3. Three to five  
|   |   | 4. More than five  
|   |   | 5. I do not know  |
| 15. | **The majority of demobilised soldiers possess illegal weapons in hidden places:** |   |
|   |   | 1. Strongly agree  
|   |   | 2. Agree  
|   |   | 3. Neither agree nor disagree  
|   |   | 4. Disagree  
|   |   | 5. Strongly disagree  |
| 16. | **Weapons should be owned legally:** |   |
|   |   | 1. Strongly agree  
|   |   | 2. Agree  
|   |   | 3. Neither agree nor disagree  
|   |   | 4. Disagree  
|   |   | 5. Strongly disagree  |
| 17. | **Each household should acquire weapons illegally because:**  
|   |   | (IT IS POSSIBLE TO CHOOSE MULTIPLE ANSWERS) |   |
|   |   | 1. Hobby (hunting or sport)  
|   |   | 2. Expensive and complicated procedures for obtaining a license  
|   |   | 3. Family and property protection  
|   |   | 4. Lack of trust in the police  
|   |   | 5. For political reasons  |
| 18. | **Each household should acquire a legal weapons because:** |   |
|   |   | 1. Hobby (hunting or sport)  
|   |   | 2. Self-defence  
|   |   | 3. Family and property protection  
|   |   | 4. Weak security protection of citizens  
|   |   | 5. Political reasons  |
| 19. | **Personally, I dislike weapons:** |   |
|   |   | 1. Strongly agree  
|   |   | 2. Agree  
|   |   | 3. Neither agree nor disagree  
|   |   | 4. Disagree  
|   |   | 5. Strongly disagree  |
| 20. | **The main reason why I would not recommend possession of weapons in households is:**  
|   |   | (IT IS POSSIBLE TO CHOOSE MULTIPLE ANSWERS) |   |
|   |   | 1. Because of the threat it poses to family, and especially children  
|   |   | 2. Because of the threat it poses to society  
|   |   | 3. Because of unsafe storage  
|   |   | 4. Because of unprofessional handling  
|   |   | 5. It is hard/expensive to acquire a license  |
| 21. | **How many civilians who are gun-owners** |   |
|   |   | 1. One  
|   |   | 2. Up to five  
<p>|   |   | 3. Not one  |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 22| Which type of weapon, in your opinion, on average, do BiH citizens most frequently own?        | 1. Pistol/revolver  
2. Automatic weapon (i.e., AK-47)  
3. Hunting rifle  
4. Machinegun  
5. Explosive device/bomb |
| 23| I live in a household with a firearm that is properly stored and out of the reach of children:| 1. Strongly agree  
2. Agree  
3. Neither agree nor disagree  
4. Disagree  
5. Strongly disagree |
| 24| Which, in your opinion, is the best approach to motivate people in your local community to surrender their illegal weapons and ammunition? | 1. To promulgate amnesties  
2. Decrease in criminal activities/enhancement of the police  
3. Harsher punishments for the illegal possession of a weapon  
4. Organised compensation or awards (weapons in exchange for furniture, technical aids etc.)  
5. Social campaigns |
| 25| Will future organised voluntary weapons and ammunition collection actions be successful?       | 1. Strongly agree  
2. Agree  
3. Neither agree nor disagree  
4. Disagree  
5. Strongly disagree |
| 26| I would return an illegal weapon personally:                                                   | 1. Strongly agree  
2. Agree  
3. Neither agree nor disagree  
4. Disagree  
5. Strongly disagree |
| 27| Current weapons collection actions failed to give adequate results:                            | 1. Strongly agree  
2. Agree  
3. Neither agree nor disagree  
4. Disagree  
5. Strongly disagree |
| 28| Weapons collection programmes should be continued:                                             | 1. Strongly agree  
2. Agree  
3. Neither agree nor disagree  
4. Disagree  
5. Strongly disagree |
| 29| In my opinion, weapons collection should be implemented through:                               | 1. Searches and force  
2. Exchange for development programmes  
3. Organising financial awards  
4. Setting deadlines to surrender weapons  
5. Should not be conducted |
| 30| Who should conduct weapons collections?                                                        | 1. Local authorities/civil protection  
2. Police  
3. Armed forces  
4. International military forces  
5. Nongovernmental organisations |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Options</th>
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|31.| It would be efficient to continue with implementation of programmes (informative campaigns, social games and others) on the threats posed by possession of weapons: | 1. Strongly agree  
2. Agree  
3. Neither agree nor disagree  
4. Disagree  
5. Strongly disagree |
|32.| I would take part in weapons collection programme for my personal security and the security of citizens: | 1. Strongly agree  
2. Agree  
3. Neither agree nor disagree  
4. Disagree  
5. Strongly disagree |
|33.| The best thing would be to proclaim the legalisation (amnesty) of existing weapons that can be legally owned (pistols and hunting rifles): | 1. Strongly agree  
2. Agree  
3. Neither agree nor disagree  
4. Disagree  
5. Strongly disagree |


BICC. July 2004. Study on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SAS) Bosnia and Herzegovina. Commissioned by the UNDP.

UNDP. 2006. Survey on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in Croatia.


IANSA. Armed Violence: Global Crisis 1,000 Victims on a Daily Basis, Campaign for the Decrease in the Use of Weapons and a more Secure Society.

Legislation:

Official Gazette of Brčko District BiH 17/12
Official Gazette of BiH Number: 75/05
Official Gazette of BiH Number: 05/03, 33/03 and 14/05
Official Gazette of BiH Number: 05/03; 09/03; 33/03; 14/05; 56/05 and 75/05
Official Gazette of BiH Number: 103/09
Official Gazette of BiH Number: 75/05
Official Gazette of BiH Number: 15/06
Official Gazette of BiH Number: 53/09
Official Gazette of RS Number: 01-1277/07
Official Gazette 118/09
Official Gazette of Brčko District BiH Number: 17/02; 23/03 and 35/05
Official Gazette 118/09
Official Gazette of Sarajevo Canton Number: 29/01
Official Gazette of the FBiH Number: 50/2002
Official Gazette of RS Number: 50/2002
Official Gazette of the FBiH Number: 78/08
Official Gazette of RS Number: 01-1277/07 and 24/09