Identification of Lessons Learnt from the Response to Hurricanes Irma and Maria: Recommendations to improve UNDP multi-country operational response in Small Islands Developing States (SIDS) contexts.

BARBADOS AND THE OECS SUB-REGIONAL OFFICE
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

During the period September 6-19, 2017, the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) of the northern and eastern Caribbean were battered by two powerful Category 5 Hurricanes - Irma and Maria. In Dominica, the British Virgin Islands (BVI) and Barbuda these hurricanes decimated critical infrastructure, housing and livelihoods. These islands fall under the responsibility of the UNDP Sub-regional Office for Barbados and the OECS. Other islands such as Sint Maarten and Turks and Caicos were also part of the initial response in the Caribbean. The 2017 response highlighted the logistical and operational complexities of launching a multi-country response and recovery operation in small island contexts where UNDP may not have a substantive presence.

Few days after the first hurricane and articulated by the strong commitment of the Regional Senior Management, the Government of China donated US$ 5m to UNDP for a re-roofing reconstruction programme. This intervention, the first of its nature in the region and one that triggered a lot of corporate attention, demanded the quick procurement of some US$ 4m of construction materials, equipment and tools to be distributed in Dominica and Barbuda. The operation was extremely complicated given the geographical challenges associated with the Caribbean, the multi-country nature of the programme, the lack of UNDP presence in those islands and the weak capacities and limited infrastructure of the countries devastated by the natural disaster among other reasons. The project was not “business as usual” and pushed the comfort zones of UNDP teams.

One year after the disaster, presents an optimum opportunity to take stock of things that have worked and to learn from those that need improvement. To this end, a review study was launched on 27 November 2018 with the main objective of identifying lessons learnt and making practical recommendations for optimal operational response arrangements in a post-disaster context in SIDS. The review focuses on the procurement experience of UNDP Barbados and the OECS Sub-regional Office and the interactions with RBLAC, the Regional Hub and Project Offices in Antigua and Barbuda and Dominica. Data for the study was collected from key documents and semi-structured interviews with 25 participants from 28 November to 20 December 2018.

In the first place, it is important to highlight that UNDP teams in different locations successfully managed to find creative solutions to address a wide array of challenges and that project results exceeded the expectations of national governments and partners. This was possible thanks to the strong leadership at different levels, creative teamwork, plentiful calls and meetings and the commitment and professionalism of colleagues in New York, Panama, Barbados, Dominica and Antigua and Barbuda.

This said, since the main purpose of this review is to identify key operational areas that would demand attention should a similar UNDP response be required, the document will focus on challenges and practical recommendations for improvement. Main findings from the interviews highlight the need to improve communication and information sharing among the teams involved in the operational response working in five different countries. The lack of clarity regarding roles and responsibilities, and the need to strengthen the Country Office and impacted countries capacities have been also underscored.

With the information gathered during the interviews, the team facilitating this study has put forward a few key practical recommendations aiming to tackle most of the main challenges experienced. Understanding that substantial operational changes need to start somewhere, implementing just a few of these recommendations would have an extraordinarily positive impact in future UNDP responses in similar contexts.
SUMMARY OF BUSINESS FLOW AND KEY FINDINGS

1. IDENTIFICATION OF NEEDS
   • Information not available at the time of project formulation
   • Requirements from Governments frequently changed
   • Very restrictive donor demands (roofs and 9 months implementation period)

2. DEFINITION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
   • UNDP lacked technical expertise - reliance on third parties and UNDP's role as the middleman
   • The limited capacity of national partners

3. INITIATION OF PROCUREMENT
   • Standard UNDP procurement rules are difficult to meet in post-disaster contexts
   • Multiplicity of personnel involved led to unclear roles and responsibilities
   • Communication flows did not meet all the needs despite the multiple efforts

4. EVALUATION OF OFFERS
   • Lack of market knowledge – no previous UNDP presence
   • No previous agreements with suppliers
   • Intermittent participation of teams on the ground in all phases of the process

5. CONTRACT AWARDING
   • Teams on the ground were unaware of the details of the process
   • UNDP non-procurement staff heavily involved in procurement tasks
   • Unavailability of local suppliers

6. SHIPPING
   • Challenges in verifying materials at the port of origin
   • Transportation delays

7. ARRIVAL OF GOODS
   • Need to verify items received (inconsistencies were too frequent)
   • No information on arrivals
   • Logistical challenges in the ports
   • Need for specialists to manage the logistics

8. RECEPTION AND DISTRIBUTION
   • Customs clearance posed several challenges
   • Logistics required (warehousing and machinery)
   • Difficult transportation to final destination
SUMMARY OF MAIN PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

PROJECT DESIGN

1. PROJECT MANAGER IMMEDIATELY APPOINTED
   A Project Manager for the initiative/project needs to be formally tasked. ToRs with roles and responsibilities shared with all relevant colleagues in different locations.

2. SURGE PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST DEPLOYED IN IMPACTED COUNTRIES
   With the support of the Regional Procurement Advisor, procurement specialists must be prioritized as part of the SURGE deployments as soon as projects with large procurement activities are envisaged.

3. LOCAL LOGISTICIANS AS PART OF NATIONAL TEAMS
   Local teams must hire national experts on logistics, ideally familiar with ports and transportation arrangements.

4. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AS PART OF THE UNDP PROJECT MANAGEMENT PROCESS
   UNDP staff must be involved in the process of defining technical specifications to avoid challenges associated with gaps in dealing with third parties and consultants.

5. PROCUREMENT PLANNING - PREPAREDNESS
   Specialized rosters with solid experts and databases with information on local markets would have a critical impact in similar responses. Exploring the flexibility of procurement rules for disaster and recovery should be pursued internally; Long Term Agreements (LTAs) and others are options that should be considered.

COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION

6. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
   Clear definition of roles and responsibilities of all UNDP teams involved in the operations should be determined and disseminated as soon as possible. This also relates to national institutions and other stakeholders. Country Office and teams on the ground must participate in decision-making processes and the chain of command must be respected.

7. INFORMATION CHECKLIST
   Creating an online platform (Google doc or similar) where all relevant colleagues have access to key documents at all times.

8. PRE-EXISTING AGREEMENTS
   Discussions and agreements with governments on technical specifications and possible quantities to be procured in case of disaster would make a difference so only validation would be required in the aftermath. Same for developing LTAs with suppliers.

9. CLEAR COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES
   Communication mechanisms, channels and periodicity including expected participants and audience must be elaborated, circulated and revised periodically.

10. BOOST CAPACITY ON PROCUREMENT
    Basic UNDP procurement workshops/training on crisis should be promoted.
BUSINESS FLOW AND KEY FINDINGS

Despite the complexity of the recovery operation after the hurricanes Irma and Maria, the projects achieved tangible results exceeding expectations from donors and partners. Notwithstanding these good outcomes, it is important to acknowledge that the business flow faced a multitude of challenges. This section displays some key findings that affected the business flow in all its different stages; from initial Identification of Needs to the final distribution of materials.

"Dealing with 10 different countries and governments especially with no previous relationship or ongoing programme, was difficult" [Interviewee]

"Changing the types of buildings for restoration midways resulted in a mismatch of materials and huge monetary implications"

In response to Irma and Maria, the government of China funded a re-roofing programme to purchase US$ 4m worth of roofing materials (total programme budget was US$ 5m, including technical assistance, capacity building and management costs). Despite time constrictions and lack of capacity, UNDP had no choice but to adapt to the Chinese government requests to develop a Project Document only a few days after Hurricane Maria, in an extremely complex context.
2. DEFINITION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Once needs were agreed with national institutions and the minimal recovery parameters were defined (often using the principle of Building Back Better), the technical specifications of required items needed to be determined. Although Crisis Response Packages and other elements had some level of general technical specifications, adaptation to national context and national approval was required. After Irma and Maria, UNDP didn’t have the technical capacity and the personnel required to carry this engineering task. Consequently, these technical specifications were made by third parties such as Engineers Without Borders (EWB) and external consultants. UNDP was the link between the consultants, government and the suppliers, which was not a linear process. According to the interviewees, communication between UNDP and third parties and within UNDP offices (including RBLAC, Panama Hub, Barbados MCO and project offices) did not flow as good as it was required.

“The engineers are not UNDP, they were not able to get in touch directly with our vendors, with our suppliers. We [UNDP] were the middleman”

“We cannot depend on a third party to verify and to agree on a change of specifications and quantities, these things must come directly from us [UNDP]”
3. INITIATION OF PROCUREMENT

Once the Definition of Needs and Technical Specifications were established, the procurement itself started. Procurement methods included Micro-purchasing, Request for Quotation (RFQ), Invitation to Bid (ITB), Request for Proposal (RFP) and direct contracting.

UNDP procurement is subject to the following general principles: best value for money; fairness, integrity and transparency; effective international competition; and best interest of UNDP. However, in a post-disaster situation, adhering to these principles becomes more challenging than in regular operations. This difficult procurement task in the response to the hurricanes was led by the Regional Hub in Panama.

Since UNDP had no procurement experts in the impacted countries, non-specialized UNDP staff had to be actively involved in procurement tasks which proved to be inefficient.

This experience shows the importance of full and active engagement of all the teams involved. Once a decision is taken by the Senior Management, different units must align to find ways to operate together in what often is a stressful and imperfect working environment. The absence of this alignment may lead to questioning the management structure, key project elements and assigned roles and responsibilities.

“What would have fixed everything is more clarity at the senior management level, what needed to be done and who needed to do it”

“Communication and coordination mechanisms from Panama, NY and Barbados did not work well; the three legs of the same stool were not working together; the coordination was completely lost, which resulted in monetary costs”

4. EVALUATION OF OFFERS

Once the procurement methods were established, the competition opened to find suppliers from whom acquire materials. UNDP Financial Regulations and Rules (Rule 121.03) emphasizes that the procurement process should be practical and suited to the market. Due to the geographical complexity of a multiple response in different islands, understanding the realities of local markets posed a challenge. Exploring the market in places where UNDP had no presence and did not have previous procurement arrangements made problematic to find suppliers.

Local supply in small islands is limited and, in a post-disaster scenario, even more scarce. UNDP procurement rules seemed to be over-cumbersome for most of the local suppliers. Many of them did not meet all the criteria required to make offers or did not have the capacity to apply to RFQs or ITBs.

“What were already small markets are now heavily impacted, so any procurement process needs to be considered in a different context”

“Some Caribbean suppliers may have been able to supply faster but were not invited on the bids because ‘we did not know them’”

“We didn’t understand the Caribbean and how they work”
5. CONTRACT AWARDING

Contract awarding was done in Panama and communication with other teams in NY, Barbados and the impacted islands was suboptimal. This resulted in contracts not being shared with “final users”, which difficulted the validation of goods received, signing of reports or processing payments.

“We are a small team and we do not have any procurement capacity [...] we are not procurement experts or civil engineers and we are being asked to make substantive technical procurement inputs to actually make up the documents from the beginning”

“There is a fear that we will end up with no qualified bids. [...] there are not too many mature providers in the market who can submit a bid for some of the works that we have”
6. SHIPPING

Once contracts were finalized and the materials were procured, the logistics aspect took a prominent weight in the operation. This starts with the shipping of materials in the port of origin. During the response, the main challenge on this stage was ensuring the correct quantity and quality of the material at the port of origin. An external company was hired for this purpose, but its efficiency was limited; reports did not have all the information required, were delayed on some occasions, were confusing. Moreover, this option was very costly.

“They were issuing authorization of payments without checking the goods were in the containers”

“We tried to certify that whatever was going into a container was according to the contract, the ITB and the technical specifications”

7. ARRIVAL OF GOODS

Due to the lack of specialized personnel and the time constraints, the verification of materials was at times not properly carried out. There were several occasions when materials received in the port of arrival did not correspond with technical specifications transmitted from the impacted countries or were not in conformity with regards to quantities. In several occasions, the UNDP team on the ground was not aware of the arrival of containers and the estimated timelines. Other occasions, the information transmitted from the Regional Hub was not processed or was difficult to understand for colleagues responding to the crisis. These issues had a particularly negative impact on projects with hard deadlines. Additionally, shipments were delayed with almost no exception. Equally, ports were not ready for such a high demand for operations required in a post-disaster context.

“Another issue was that ports of arrival were receiving different stuff from the initially agreed, for example, x number of roofs, or screws that were not galvanized as agreed, etc.”

“Due to lack of infrastructure, many ports of arrival were not prepared for such a heavy demand. It was impossible for them to manage the logistics”
8. RECEPTION AND DISTRIBUTION

Once goods arrived in port, reception and distribution of materials were not a straight forward process due to customs clearance. UNDP did not have the adequate personnel to follow up this procedure and significant amounts of time and resources were lost with items stuck in customs for several weeks in some cases.

A consultancy company (SGS) was hired to verify the items received but their reports were not timely nor conclusive despite the costs and workload created with this arrangement.

Final distribution was also difficult due to lack of expertise and human resources required for this sort of operations.

“There were a lot of delays in customs and there were a lot of delays from the verification of the items along with the surveyor on site, which led to the delaying of the payment of the suppliers since we did not have the final inspection reports”
MAIN PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Most interviewees agreed upon two main different areas for improvement; (a) project design, and (b) communication and Information. An important group of colleagues also emphasized the need that the Country Office and teams in impacted countries should be more actively engaged in decision-making processes and critical steps of the response. This “lessons learnt” exercise has tried to focus on providing suggestions that, if implemented, could have a quick positive impact in UNDP recovery programming.

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**PROJECT DESIGN**

1. **PROJECT MANAGER IMMEDIATELY APPOINTED**

Assigning a Project Manager since the very beginning of the operation is identified as the main and most important recommendation of this study. ToRs with roles and responsibilities must be shared with all relevant colleagues in different locations.

“We didn’t have an operation manager to manage all of this. This is an area that we didn’t cover properly”

“The major issue is that we did not have a project manager, someone that could manage all these different funds, all the procurement, etc.”

2. **SURGE PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST DEPLOYED IN IMPACTED COUNTRIES**

Since 2018, the leadership and active engagement of the deploying UNDP procurement expertise to the field during the early stages of the programme is described by the interviewees as a key element.

Procurement capacity on the ground must be enhanced to avoid non-experienced staff handling complex processes. Procurement specialists should be responsible and accountable for contracts administration.

Additionally, in collaboration with the Crisis Bureau, Country Support Management Team and roster manager; the regional procurement advisor can be deployed as the first responder.

“Strengthening the procurement capacity of the offices receiving goods is key; maybe by one SURGE or a semi-permanent staff”
3. LOCAL LOGISTICIANS AS PART OF NATIONAL TEAMS

One of the problems encountered during the response was the lack of local logistics experts. Sometimes verifications on the ground did not take place, materials were stuck at customs, final reports were not available, or suppliers were not paid on time. Specialists who understand the realities on the ground need to be involved in helping with the rosters, tracking vessels and materials, shipments, timings, verifications, reception of goods, follow-up with customs, drafting of reports, etc.

Equally, once the operation is over, this personnel should be strongly encouraged to take stock of the experiences on logistics; including timings, moving of goods, limitations of the ports, and others so this information is incorporated in future procurement plans.

“The logistician we procured for Antigua and Barbuda didn’t meet the expectations at all; it was an international logistician and what we needed were local logisticians that know people, rules, authorities, etc. in the country”

“Experience is not only needed but you need a person with experience IN the region”

4. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AS PART OF THE UNDP PROJECT MANAGEMENT PROCESS

UNDP staff must be part of the definition of technical specifications. According to the interviewees, many issues would have been prevented from the onset should technical specifications would have been made by staff directly employed by UNDP, such as civil engineers. This would have allowed the team to verify technical specifications and apply changes when needed.

Having said that, other interviewees emphasized the need to engage with specialists that not only belong to UNDP teams.

“We need to hire technical people that can help us out with the specs”

“We didn’t plan well and didn’t bring the adequate people [...] if you want to build roofs you need an engineer to tell you what materials you need”

5. PROCUREMENT PLANNING - PREPAREDNESS

Preparedness is the key to a proper response. In this sense, procurement forecasting and planning should focus on:

- A better understanding of market reality. Assess what are the capacities and resources of the local markets and set realistic expectations.
- Building local capacity to promote reactivation of local economies. However, this approach must take into consideration the application of UNDP rules, project and delivery timelines and market realities; a high number of tenders were disqualified because they didn’t meet the minimum requirements.
- Country/Project offices assisting the hub in building specific rosters or databases (including local vendors) for all the things that may be needed in each country in case of emergency, and LTAs with suppliers.

“We need to think about a stronger procurement planning process because, obviously, there were some gaps. With the global capacity that UNDP has, we could have managed it better if we would have paid more attention to this”

“UNDP should have a clear strategy of how to proceed if another crisis hits in this kind of countries”
COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION

6. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

A clear definition of roles and responsibilities within UNDP including different teams involved in the response is required from the beginning of the operation. HQ and Regional Hub proved to be essential, but the Country Office and affected island must be at the center of the decision-making process. For that purpose, Country Office capacities must be strengthened in the early days with skilled and experienced staff that, ideally, could provide at least medium-term support (beyond a couple of weeks).

The Caribbean experience highlighted some of the shortcomings that the rosters, agreements with UNV, SURGE arrangements and other UNDP recruitment mechanisms for quick and sustainable deployments have in practice.

These roles and responsibilities of all colleagues involved from different locations must be properly communicated to relevant partners to avoid confusion and ensure adequate communication flows.

“A document stating people’s roles would have helped and made everything clearer”

“We thought it was clear [roles and responsibilities] but then it got confusing when things started to get more complicated”

7. INFORMATION CHECKLIST

Making key documents available to everyone. Creating an online platform (Google doc or similar) where everyone has access to key information at all time. Essential documents include but are not limited to technical specifications, ToRs, procurement documents such as ITB, logistics reports and technical inspections.

“New personnel did not have guidance or clear understanding of the UNDP POPP procedures and business flows”

“The documents have to be shared but many were hard to find. People did not know all of the processes and information got lost”

8. PRE-EXISTING AGREEMENTS

Pre-existing discussions and agreements with governments on technical specifications and possible quantities to be procured would make a difference so only validation would be required in the aftermath of a disaster. As mentioned above, the same would apply for developing LTAs with suppliers.

“Trying to have relationships with governments and focal points could help [...] as well as putting in place long-term arrangement”

9. CLEAR COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES

Communication business process that includes channels, periodicity, expected participants and audience must be elaborated, circulated and revised periodically. This can be achieved with regular meetings, coordination calls within UNDP, including the RBLAC in NY, the Regional hub, Barbados MCO and project offices if relevant.
The response actually invested a lot of effort and time in improving information flows and communications. For instance, procurement meetings were organized weekly and monthly updates shared with donors and partners. However, identified gaps indicate that there is room for improvements, some of them probably linked to engagement to the project, alignment with decision making processes or knowledge and experience in disaster response and recovery.

“The communication between the requisitioning unit [the hub] and the procurement servicing unit [the multi-country office] did not go very well either. There were a lot of communication gaps and misunderstandings”

“One of the findings that we made is the lack of communication between our team and the rest of the teams on the ground”

“We kind of neglected the communication, both internal and external. More capacity at all levels [NY, Panama and Barbados] would have helped”

10. BOOST CAPACITY ON PROCUREMENT

Basic procurement workshops/training for crisis would be beneficial. Any UNDP staff involved in activities with large procurement components must understand how UNDP does procurement, methodologies and key challenges.

“It is important that any colleague contributing to or making procurement decisions in these situations has a minimum understanding of how best practices apply […], how UNDP set up applies”
The response to the hurricanes Irma and Maria was the first time for the Regional Bureau to address a crisis situation of these characteristics. Although final outcomes were genuinely positive in terms of results thanks to the generous commitment and hard work of many colleagues, a big part of the procurement operation was a “learning by doing” exercise. This report presented the key findings and main practical recommendations to improve a UNDP multi-country/territory disaster response operation in SIDS contexts.

Acknowledging that some of these challenges were previously captured in the After-Action Review, this “lessons learnt” exercise aimed at providing key practical recommendations with an operational focus. Many of them are not very costly and can be rapidly implemented if managers and related colleagues are well aware of them and committed to improving UNDP practices.

This report highlighted two main areas of improvement. On the one side, the need for a stronger Project Design that includes a project manager, SURGE procurement specialists, local logisticians, UNDP direct involvement in the definition of technical specifications and preparation of rosters and databases with information on local markets. On the other side, better communication and availability of information is equally key; including clear roles and responsibilities, availability of information checklist, pre-existing agreements with governments and suppliers (LTAs), clear communication procedures and basic procurement training on crisis contexts.

Several participants have indicated that adjustments are already taking place as they move forward with the implementation of new projects or in the context of the preparedness planning exercise leading by the Regional Bureau and Crisis Bureau. For example, there are now very close interactions between procurement experts and engineers. Equally, procurement fairs and training of new personnel in procurement have also been conducted prior to launching complex procurement processes.

This multimillion operation has been a massive learning experience from which regional capacities have been naturally strengthened. The project was a success and UNDP managed to deliver on time in all the expected results thanks to the forward thinking and commitment of all UNDP teams involved in the response.

It is hoped that the findings of the study can be validated and consolidated in view of international best practices to come up with procurement models that can improve the work UNDP does in the crisis response and recovery.

“We have huge lessons learnt and now everything is being done better; after you’ve done mistakes you can see them more clearly”

“What UNDP achieved was remarkable. We are still there, there is still money, donors, etc. I don’t think any other agency that was in these SIDS is still there”
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study has been led by the UNDP consultants Dr. Nicole Greenidge and Mr. Miguel Guirao and has been possible thanks to the generous collaboration of UNDP colleagues in New York, Panama, Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, British Virgin Islands, Guatemala and other locations.

UNDP Barbados and the OECS Sub-regional Office.
ANNEX 1 - TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE STUDY

Identification of Lessons Learnt from the Response to Hurricanes Irma and Maria: recommendations to improve UNDP multicounty operational response in SIDS contexts.
Barbados and the OECS Sub-Regional Office

1. BACKGROUND
During the period September 6-19, 2017 the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) of the northern and eastern Caribbean were battered by two powerful Category 5 Hurricanes- Irma and Maria. In Dominica, the British Virgin Islands (BVI) and Barbuda these hurricanes disseminated critical infrastructure, housing and livelihoods. These islands fall under the responsibility of the UNDP Sub Regional Office for Barbados and the OECS. Other islands such as Sint Maarten and Turks and Caicos were also part of the initial response in the Caribbean. The situation was complex as five countries in the Caribbean were impacted and UNDP had no substantive presence in any of the islands which was a formidable logistical and operational challenge.

2. OBJECTIVE OF THIS EXERCISE
The objective of the review is to identify specific lessons learnt after UNDP response to hurricanes Irma and Maria with the purpose of making recommendations for optimal arrangements in multi-country/territory disaster SIDS contexts. Recommendations will also focus on how UNDP could operate in contexts where there may not be a country office presence. The review will focus on procurement and financial business processes. It will examine governance elements of procurement related to capacity, systems, roles and responsibilities, communication flows and coordination.

3. SCOPE
The review will focus on the experience of UNDP Barbados and the OECS Sub-regional Office and the interactions with RBLAC, the Regional Hub and Project Offices in Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica and the Virgin Islands. The period of interest is from September 2017 – June 2018.

4. METHODOLOGY
UNDP Barbados and the OECS will facilitate the collection of data, analysis and dissemination of key findings and recommendations.

Data Collection
Data for the review will be gathered from documents, and semi-structured interviews (See section 9 for the draft interview protocol/questions). Background documents will provide a basic understanding of how procurement should be undertaken, and already identified or documented best practices on emergency procurement. Interviews will provide data on what took place and recommendations from the Irma and Maria experience. Documents for review include:

1. UN Procurement guidelines
2. After Action Review of UNDP response to hurricanes Irma and Maria
4. Standard Roles and Responsibilities for Contract Management

Semi-structured interviews will be conducted with key staff at HQ, the Regional Hub, Barbados and the OECS Sub Regional Office and Project Offices in affected islands. Proposed interviewees are listed in section 10.

Data Analysis
The data will be analyzed using thematic analysis. A summary of each interview will be written up and analyzed for key themes that emerge across all interviews and with respect to alignment with ‘best practices’ in emergency procurement.

Validation of the Findings
An initial draft report with key findings and recommendations will be circulated for comments amongst all relevant UNDP colleagues. The possibility of organizing a validation event (virtual or face-to-face) will be discussed at a later stage should the wide UNDP team feel that it is pertinent.
### 5. EXPECTED OUTPUTS
There will be two expected outputs of the review. These follow:

1. A report summarizing lessons learnt and providing recommendations for improved procurement and communication in multi-country SIDS.
2. Validation and sharing of the findings and recommendations with participants.

### 6. OUTCOME
The overarching outcome would be the provision of recommendations by Barbados and the OECS Sub Regional office to improve current the modus operandi to ensure timely, efficient and cost-effective procurement response.

### 7. TIMELINE
- 28 Nov-mid Dec: interviews
- Dec: data analysis
- Dec: dissemination of key highlights
- Jan: first draft report circulated
- Jan: revised report circulated
- By March 2019: validation of the report

### 8. PROPOSED OUTLINE OF THE REPORT
1. Introduction
2. Procurement Best Practice
3. Procurement Findings- Experience during the response to Irma and Maria: implications of a SIDS context. Challenges and Opportunities
4. Lessons Learnt
5. Recommendations
6. Conclusion

### BACKGROUND
In response to requests from affected States, UNDP followed the guidance provided by the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for crisis response. Almost immediately, first responders were deployed to five affected locations, and crisis coordination mechanisms, the Crisis Board and Crisis Management Support Teams, were activated in Headquarters. In anticipation of potential airport closure, for the first time, a first responder was dispatched to the area ahead of the hurricane. Subsequently, a SURGE planning team was deployed. This also coincided with the conclusion of initial short-term deployments by first responders and the deployment of the second wave of Early Recovery Advisors. By this time, and at the end of the first month, two Post Disaster Needs Assessments (PDNAs) were triggered for the major affected countries of Antigua and Barbuda, and Dominica and preparations began for a Donor Conference. The Donor Conference was held in November 2018 and resulted in $1.6 billion in grant pledges to this largely non-official development assistance (ODA)-eligible region. Thereafter the second planning process was initiated, known as the “Business Case”, with the main objective of determining an appropriate role for UNDP in sustaining recovery efforts. The Business case was approved by the Crisis Board (Dec 18) and endorsed the establishment of Project Offices in Antigua and Barbuda, the BVI and Dominica (UNDP, 2018).

There were clear strengths of the UNDP response. At the request of the Secretary-General, UNDP mounted a clear and confident decision-making response procedure and developed key units such as the Dominica Crisis Management Unit (CMU). Additionally, UNDP formed strategic relationships with partners such as the People’s Republic of China and CARICOM. Notwithstanding, characteristics of the context in which the response was launched by UNDP flagged several questions about UNDP response in SIDS or ‘small’ contexts. Some of these questions centre on issues like procurement, communication, coordination and capacity arrangements in multi-country responses in SIDS. The After-Action Review (AAR) conducted nine months after the disaster from June-September 2018 highlights seven key nuances of the case. These relate to the small comparative size of the disaster to other developing country contexts, limited capacity, and complex operational arrangement. Additionally, there was uncertainty around aid eligibility, and issues around the multi-country impacts, the lack of UNDP country presence and the territorial status of some of the affected islands. The review concluded with several recommendations for improvement. One year after the disaster, with response completed and recovery work now fully underway, there is an optimum opportunity to identify more specific recommendations for the enhancement of procedures and systems for working in future SIDS contexts. This internal exercise examines and documents key elements of the response in the Caribbean after hurricanes Irma and Maria and proposes some recommendations for consideration.
### THE SITUATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE SITUATION</th>
<th>QUESTIONS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Few deaths and a small affected population compared to other developing contexts.</td>
<td>What would be a proportionate UNDP response for large scale disasters in small contexts with few deaths?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper middle and high-income countries.</td>
<td>What is the role of UNDP in middle and high-income SIDS contexts?</td>
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<tr>
<td>High per capita costs for infrastructure and services which is further exacerbated by severe institutional and human resource constraints with spillover limitations on the absorptive capacity to undertake recovery work. There are also logistic challenges related to operating in small islands, with weak local markets that very early in the process are depleted. Also, there is a heavy reliance on imports and supply chains that also result in bottlenecks in logistics, and import, warehousing.</td>
<td>How can UNDP response assist SIDS to be better prepared and rapidly scale-up the capacity arrangements for times of disaster?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small islands, nearby to each other, one event has the capacity to impact multiple countries/territories simultaneously or in close succession.</td>
<td>What are the coordination arrangements required to manage the complexities of multi-country responses in SIDS? How can communication, and capacity arrangements at RBLAC HQs, Barbados MCO, and Panama Offices be augmented for a fast and effective coordinated response in SIDS?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small islands with no UNDP presence.</td>
<td>How can UNDP support a crisis affected country/territory where UNDP has no presence?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Highly taxed UNDP Barbados MCO prior to the crisis.</td>
<td>What capacity requirements are needed for the Barbados and the OECS Sub-regional office to support response in affected States?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some SIDS territories are not sovereign</td>
<td>• What is the role and responsibility of the UNDP for response in territories that are not sovereign?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How can procurement and financing arrangements and systems be augmented to manage response in multi-country crisis contexts?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How can deployment arrangements facilitate operational efficiency?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Planning for emergency procurement saves time, cost and lives, also when it is effectively undertaken it can play a pivotal role in the recovery phase. It also requires investments. The review will examine governance elements of procurement related to capacity, systems, roles and responsibilities, communication flows and coordination. It will provide recommendations for improvement in the SIDS multi-country response context (Figure 3).

COMMUNICATION FLOWS
The UNDP (SOP) for Immediate Crisis Response outlines the institutional and operational framework for making rapid critical decisions and actions in crisis situations. The SOP focuses on the period between the onset or identification of an imminent crisis and the point when a Country Office has in place the resources to implement recovery and resilience initiatives. It also outlines the relationships, responsibilities and communication flow between Country Office, Regional Hub (Regional Bureau, Central Bureaus and CRU) and Headquarters, during the crisis response. The review will apply the SOP as a basis for assessing how the communication flows functioned for the response to Irma and Maria. It will examine the particular opportunities and challenges that emerged from the multi-country context in the Caribbean. Additionally, it will provide recommendations for communication in contexts where UNDP may have to permanent presence and countries are not sovereign. Communication flows with the national government will also be examined.

SETTING THE CONTEXT
In accordance with UN regulations and guidelines, all phases and types of procurement are guided by the following four principles:
1. Best value for money
2. Fairness, integrity and transparency
3. Effective competition
4. In the interest of the UNDP

The disaster context creates additional complexities and gives rise to unique procurement issues and challenges that would not be normally encountered in day-to-day routine UNDP national and local operations. According to the UN Procurement Practitioner’s Handbook, ‘emergencies’ can serve as a basis for skipping some aspects of the process- for example, competitive bidding interalia. This helps to speed up the process of procurement. Notwithstanding, definite measures to address disaster procurement preparedness can add great value to the process and address some of the most substantial problems within emergency procurement namely speed, capacity, ownership, transparency and accountability (UNOPS, 2014). The Aid and International Development Forum (AIDF) Guide on Best Practices and Lessons Learnt in Emergency Procurement (2015), highlights some of the underlying issues to these problems under ten top areas of concern:
1. Emergency procurement planning is not yet standard central policy within departments/units.
2. The budget does not sufficiently account for emergency procurement coordination and this results in delays to releasing funds.
3. Disaster procurement preparedness and emergency logistics are not linked such that certain goods and services may not be fit for purpose.
4. Communication between procurement agencies and NGOs is lacking.
5. Misunderstandings of the political, social and cultural context in emergencies that can impact receptiveness, access and workability of procured goods and services.
6. Local procurement of goods and services is not fully integrated into procurement policy and planning.
7. There is a lag in the incorporation of the latest technology and innovation into emergency procurement
8. The role of the private sector is not optimized, and they are not fully incorporated into emergency planning and response.
9. Training of staff for emergency response requires greater recognition across departments involved in all stages of the procurement process.
10. Mid-review of risk reduction, preparedness and disaster responses rarely take place hence assessment of progress, impact, needs and appropriateness of procurement during emergency responses goes unmeasured. Mid- and full reviews are essential to assess whether disaster response and procurement processes support or undermine resilience within communities.

In response to these challenges, several best practices have been identified. These include the use of procurement forecasting and planning, forming early vendor partnerships, plugging funding gaps with the help of the private sector. Other options include decentralization of emergency procurement, building local procurement capacity and generating business opportunities. The 2017 hurricane season, underscored the importance that governments give to the promotion of national economies and, therefore, local procurement. There is also a role for innovative and technological savvy investments in setting up multiple platforms for engagement, as well as streamlining communications and coordination. Finally, standby rosters of humanitarian and operational expertise, building networks of goods and services help to address issues of speed; and inclusive participation in framing procurement and can help build ownership.

This review will investigate the extent to which typical challenges in emergency procurement were also experienced in the SIDS case. Furthermore, in view of UNDP and overall best practices, it will recommend the arrangements and systems needed to facilitate effective UNDP response in multi-country SIDS crisis contexts (Figure 3). Here effective emergency procurement could be understood to be that which addresses the four UN procurement principles, and is speedy, builds capacity, ownership, transparency and accountability. The SIDS context may also identify additional principles for effective procurement.

**FOCUSING ON COMMUNICATION FLOWS**

The review will examine communication and coordination in the context of how information flowed between the CO/Project Offices, Headquarters, the Hub, and national partners. It will not examine communication in the context of supporting resource mobilization, managing reputational risks and increasing UNDP’s visibility and the understanding of its work by all stakeholders, including the national population, partners, and donors. Flows will document what was communicated, to whom, for what and the roles and responsibilities and how effective the process was in the multi-country/territory context.
ANNEX 2 - INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

A. INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR NON-PROCUREMENT SPECIALISTS (45- 60 MIN)

Identification of Lessons Learnt from the Response to Hurricanes Irma and Maria: recommendations to improve UNDP multicounty operational response in SIDS contexts

These questions are guides only and will serve as general guidelines for the interview.

INTRODUCTION

The researcher will establish rapport, give a background to the researcher, explain the purpose of the study, explain what will happen with the information. During this time, assurance of confidentiality and anonymity will be given. The participant will be informed of the duration of the interview, and permission will be sought to record the interview. The researcher will provide the opportunity to ask questions, listen and respond to any concerns before asking to obtain informed consent.

PROCUREMENT AND COMMUNICATION FLOWS

1. What was your role as part of the response? How was this role related to procurement?
2. The procurement business flow during the 2017 response to Irma and Maria may have included:
   • Budgeting,
   • Definition of technical specifications and responsibilities for doing them,
   • Contract management,
   • Payment management and disbursement,
   • Transportation to country,
   • Quality assurance of materials,
   • Customs and arrival to final project destination.

   Taking each one of these elements in turn:
   • What do you think worked best? Why?
   • What did not work well? Why?
   • What improvements are needed for future responses?

3. How did working in multiple small islands affect the procurement process?
4. How clear were roles and responsibilities? How could this be improved?
5. What were the bottlenecks/ challenges to communication flow for procurement between your operational unit and others (HQ, Regional Hub, Barbados MCO, project offices, national partners)? Please be specific about your mandate for action; the operational support provided- what? Who?
6. How should communication flows operate for future experiences based on the lessons from Irma and Maria?
7. What further improvements are needed for procurement for future responses?
8. If you could change one thing from the 2017 experience, what would it be?

ENDING

The researcher will thank the participant and ask whether there was anything further they wanted to add. The researcher will indicate that the highlights of the interviews will be shared in December and a more detailed report when it is ready will be sent via email. Subsequently, there are plans for a validation meeting on the findings of the exercise/ study early in the new year.
B. INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR PROCUREMENT SPECIALISTS (45-60 MIN)

Identification of Lessons Learnt from the Response to Hurricanes Irma and Maria: recommendations to improve UNDP multicounty operational response in SIDS contexts

These questions are guides only and will serve as general guidelines for the interview.

INTRODUCTION

The researcher will establish rapport, give a background to the researcher, explain the purpose of the study, explain what will happen with the information. During this time, assurance of confidentiality and anonymity will be given. The participant will be informed of the duration of the interview, and permission will be sought to record the interview. The researcher will provide the opportunity to ask questions, listen and respond to any concerns before asking to obtain informed consent.

Technical questions on procurement

1. What was your role in procurement as part of the response to Irma and Maria?
2. The procurement business flow during the 2017 response to Irma and Maria may have included:
   • Budgeting,
   • Definition of technical specifications and responsibilities for doing them,
   • Contract management,
   • Payment management and disbursement,
   • Transportation to country,
   • Logistics management
   • Quality assurance of materials,
   • Customs and arrival to final project destination.

   Taking each one of these elements in turn:
   • What do you think worked best? Why?
   • What did not work well? Why?
   • What improvements are needed for future responses?

[The following questions should be asked if these areas are not addressed in responses to question 2.]

3. What are the procurement preparedness arrangements needed at the Country Office/ regional hub/ HQ level to help improve the response? For example, related to:
   • procurement forecasting and planning- such as forming early vendor relationships.
   • legal arrangements with national authorities operate to expedite procurement and delivery of goods/services.
   • fast track procurement procedures such as pre-qualification processes function as part of the response.
   • additional funding to plug the funding gap. What kinds of partnerships are needed to support this? What would be the role of supply chain mapping, if any at all?
   • capacity and technical expertise at the national level for procurement.
   • local level procurement arrangements.
   • Working with the private sector and local businesses to increase capacity and scale up efforts for emergency procurement preparedness.

4. How did working in multiple affected small islands affect the procurement process?
5. What are the innovative procurement related products and arrangements that emerged from the Irma and Maria experience?
6. If you could change one thing from the 2017 experience, what would it be?

ENDING

The researcher will thank the participant and ask whether there was anything further they wanted to add. The researcher will indicate that the highlights of the interviews will be shared in December and a more detailed report when it is ready will be sent via email. Subsequently, there are plans for a validation meeting on the findings of the exercise/study early in the new year.
### ANNEX 3 - LIST OF PARTICIPANTS, INFORMATION NOTE AND CONSENT FORM

#### LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTICIPANT</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Barbados MCO</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Marlon Clarke</td>
<td>Technical Coordinator for the Disaster Risk Resilience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Nato Gzobava</td>
<td>Operations Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Dwayne Nurse</td>
<td>Procurement Associate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Selena Gooding</td>
<td>Programme Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Perry Parris</td>
<td>Finance/Budget Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Chisa Mikami</td>
<td>Resident Representative a.i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Ugo Blanco</td>
<td>Senior Recovery Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Danielle Evanson</td>
<td>Program Manager for Climate Change and Disaster Resilience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RBLAC New York</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Luca Renda</td>
<td>Senior Strategic Advisor, LAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Alfonso Buxens</td>
<td>Regional Procurement Advisor (RBLAC)---in Panama or NY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Kenroy Roach</td>
<td>Regional Advisor, LAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Ana Maria Diaz</td>
<td>Former Strategic Planning Advisor during the event Current Resident Representative, Guatemala</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Antigua and Barbuda</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Maureen Lance-Onyeiwu</td>
<td>Former Head of Project Office, Antigua and Barbuda</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Paola Solda</td>
<td>Project Manager - Antigua and Barbuda Recovery Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Hub- Panama</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Maribel Landau</td>
<td>Regional Programme Advisor, Regional Center in Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Richard Barathe</td>
<td>Director, Regional Center in Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Maria Valeria Cabrera</td>
<td>Regional Programme Associate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Carlos Avila</td>
<td>Procurement Technician, Regional Center in Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Jacinda Fairholm</td>
<td>Programme Specialist, Disaster Risk Caribbean, Regional Center in Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Itziar Gonzalez</td>
<td>Programme Specialist, Integration and Coordination Support, Regional Center in Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dominica</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Ian King</td>
<td>Head of Project Office, Dominica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Avis Talbot</td>
<td>Operations Officer - Dominica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>British Virgin Islands (BVI)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>23. Shadi Hussein</td>
<td>Procurement Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crisis Response Unit/Crisis Bureau</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Xavier Hernandez Ferre</td>
<td>Programme Specialist, CRU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Fabrizio Andreuzzi</td>
<td>Programme Specialist, CRU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Barbados and the OECS recovery team would like to invite you to take part in the lessons learnt exercise that the Sub Regional Office is facilitating. Its main objective is to identify key specific lessons learnt after UNDP response to hurricanes Irma and Maria with the purpose of making recommendations for improved arrangements in multi-country/territory disaster SIDS contexts. The review will focus on procurement and financial business processes. It will examine governance elements of procurement related to capacity, systems, roles and responsibilities, communication flows and coordination. This is a learning exercise. This brief document explains why the study is being done and how you will be involved should you agree to participate.

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY?
The 2017 response to hurricanes Irma and Maria has highlighted logistical and operational complexities of launching response in multi-country, small island contexts where UNDP may not have a substantive presence. The response to hurricanes Irma and Maria is a great opportunity to take stock of things that have worked and learn from those that need improvement. Thanks to your support, the team trusts this exercise can identify key elements that, with some adjustments, would make UNDP response more effective, efficient and timely next time a crisis hits the region.

WHY HAVE I BEEN INVITED TO TAKE PART?
Given your important role in the operations of the 2017 response in the Caribbean to Irma and Maria, we would like to have your views on the procurement aspects of the response and how future response in multi-country, small island contexts could be improved. This interview will talk about your role in the response, your role in procurement, what worked well and opportunities for improvement. We will also talk about ways to improve the process with a specific focus on innovation, capacity, systems, roles and responsibilities, communication flows and coordination. The review will focus on the experience of UNDP Barbados and the OECS Subregional Office and the interactions with RBLAC, the Regional Hub and Project Offices in Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica and the Virgin Islands. The period of interest is from September 2017 – June 2018.

DO I HAVE TO TAKE PART?
No, participation in this exercise is voluntary.

WHAT IS REQUIRED OF ME IF I DO TAKE PART?
Subject to your consent the team will expect you take part in one interview. As you may wish interviews may also be done as a group. Interviews will be between 45 -60 minutes. For participants located in Barbados, the interview will be done in a private space in your office environment at a time that is suitable for you. For participants located outside of Barbados, the interview will be conducted by way of Skype for Business. Interviewers would like to audio record the interview for transcription afterwards.

WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF TAKING PART?
The findings that will emerge from the study will be utilized to make recommendations to improve the current modus operandi to ensure timely, efficient and cost-effective procurement response. The outcome would be practical recommendations that when implemented would ultimately help to improve UNDP crisis response mechanism. The focus on emergency procurement in the context of multi-country impacts in SIDS where UNDP may not have a presence is an area of research which is relatively new to UNDP and we will be adding to the knowledge base for good practice in the UNDP and for other SIDS contexts where the recommendations may be transferrable.
**WILL MY TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL?**

Yes, all information gathered in this study will be kept confidential. The team will ensure that interview transcripts have identifiable information removed and are carefully stored.

**WHAT INFORMATION WILL BE COLLECTED?**

The discussion/interview will be digitally recorded for transcription and analysis by the researcher, but your name and details will not be used. The notes will only be used by the researchers, and we aim to prepare a report around the results of these interviews. Direct quotations from your interviews may be used in the write-up of the study and where used, these will be anonymous. No individuals will be able to be identified and your privacy will be protected. The audio files and transcripts will be stored on an encrypted device.

**HOW AND WHERE WILL DATA BE STORED?**

Data will be stored on a secure laptop; any data on portable devices will be password protected.

**WHO IS ORGANIZING AND SPONSORING THIS RESEARCH?**

The study is being organized by the Barbados and the OECS Sub Regional Office in collaboration with RBLAC, Crisis Bureau and colleagues in Regional Hub and Project Offices in the Eastern Caribbean. Highlights of the study will be shared with all participants.

This exercise is being facilitated by Ugo Blanco, Senior Recovery Advisor, UNDP Subregional Office for Barbados and the OECS, Dr. Nicole Greenidge, Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery Consultant and Miguel Guirao, Junior Recovery Analyst.

**WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO THE RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH STUDY?**

A short report on the highlights from the interviews will be available in December. The report will be written in English. A draft copy of the initial findings will be shared with all participants. Anonymized quotations may be used in publications.

**WHAT IF THERE IS ANY ISSUE OR CONCERN REGARDING THIS EXERCISE?**

If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, please contact Ugo Blanco by email to ugo.blanco@undp.org and Dr. Nicole Greenidge at Nicole_Greenidge@undp.org

**WHAT DO I DO NEXT?**

Please let the team know if you would like to take part in the study.

**FURTHER QUESTIONS?**

If you have further questions. Please contact Dr. Nicole Greenidge

Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery Consultant

United Nations Development Programme

Sub-regional Office for Barbados and the OECS

UN House, Marine Gardens, Hastings

Christ Church, Barbados

Email: Nicole_Greenidge@undp.org

Tel 1 (246) 467-6039

Mobile 1 (246) 256-1015
CONSENT FORM

Identification of Lessons Learnt from the Response to Hurricanes Irma and Maria: recommendations to improve UNDP multicounty operational response in SIDS contexts

1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily. I agree to take part in the above study and to inform the researcher if I am no longer comfortable with participating in the study.

2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason, and that I will not be penalized for withdrawing nor will I be questioned on why I have withdrawn.

3. I give permission for interviews to be transcribed.

4. I give permission for anonymised quotes to be used in any publications. These quotes will remove all my personal details.

5. I understand that other researchers will have access to this data only if they agree to preserve the confidentiality of the data and if they agree to the terms I have specified in this form.

6. The procedures regarding confidentiality have been clearly explained (e.g. use of names, pseudonyms, anonymization of data, etc.) to me. All data will be kept confidential.