


SADC REGIONAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000



**CHALLENGES
AND OPPORTUNITIES**

SADC REGIONAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000

Challenges & Opportunities for Regional Integration



United Nations Development Programme



Southern African Development Community



Southern African Political Economy Series Trust

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Foreword

The first *SADC Regional Human Development Report* published in 1998, focused on the interface between governance and human development in the SADC region. The report, under the theme 'Governance and Human Development in Southern Africa', highlighted the need for SADC to put in place a regional integration strategy in order to ensure sustainable human resource development for all countries and peoples of the region.

Experience has shown that political, economic and social developments have had a significant impact in the region. The peoples of the region through SADC are working for closer collaboration and co-ordination of various policies related to socio-economic, political and social spheres and this has increased the need for greater collaboration and commitment by the leadership in the region as a whole. These pressures have resulted in SADC states prioritising and co-ordinating critical sectors like defence and security, trade and investment, agriculture and environment, water and land management, education and human resource development, at the highest political level.

Historically, the Southern African region has experimented with political solidarity in the form of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). With the political liberation of Namibia and South Africa, member states began to steer regional co-operation towards deeper economic integration and political unity manifesting in the transformation of SADCC into the Southern African Development Community.

As the current Chairperson of SADC, I find it gratifying that the varied lessons drawn from past experience have assisted in mobilising leaders and stakeholders to embark on regional co-operation strategies as a platform for effective development. In spite of the current socio-economic and political hurdles confronting the region, prospects for deeper and more sustainable regional co-operation are bright.

The reality is that regional economic integration is becoming a global movement with the industrialised and developing countries organising themselves into powerful regional blocs. Although there is an ongoing debate on lessons to be learnt from experiences of successful regional blocs, the existence of SADC itself is already a statement of intent to overcome historical limitations, as well as acknowledgement of the benefits of regional economic integration. The challenge for SADC member countries is to generate the political will and commitment to the regional project.

We are already as a region committed by the Windhoek Treaty to implement economic integration through, among other things, harmonisation of political and socio-economic policies of member states; creation of appropriate institutions for implementation of regional programmes; removing obstacles to free movement of capital and labour, goods and services; development of technology and human resources.

The report, the second in the series, being published under the theme 'Challenges and Opportunities for Regional Integration', explains the interface between regional integration and human development. While examining the challenges of HIV/AIDS, armed conflicts, poor economic performance and so on, the report highlights opportunities for regional integration emanating from larger regional markets and joint development and operation of infrastructural facilities and services.


With the integration challenges and opportunities spelt out, this report, like its predecessor, will be a vital advocacy tool for use by policy actors, civil society and the private sector.



List of SADC countries showing those that have produced national human development reports and the years they produced them

Country/region	Years of national human development reports
Angola	1997, 1998 and 1999
Botswana	1993, 1997
DR Congo	None
Lesotho	1998
Malawi	1997, 1998
Mauritius	1998
Mozambique	1998, 1999, 2000 (in preparation)
Namibia	1996, 1997, 1998
Seychelles	None
South Africa	1998
Swaziland	1997, 1998
Tanzania	1997
Zambia	1997, 1998
Zimbabwe	1998, 1999, 2000 (in preparation)
SADC	1998 and 2000

Map of the SADC region, showing the Human Development Index categories



Compared to the early 1990s, the late 1990s saw most SADC member states reduce public expenditure on the military as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and increase public expenditure on education and health as a percentage of their GDP. However, across SADC member countries, improvement in the level of human development has not been sustained. Between 1985 and 1990, the value of the Human Development Index (HDI) increased in most member countries but it decreased between 1990 and 1994. The improvement in real per capita GDP has not been sustained either. While the adult literacy rate increased in the region between 1990 and 1997, life expectancy at birth fell in all except four of the fourteen member countries.

Backlogs in human development are among the major obstacles to economic growth in the region. These include the need to increase human resource skills and confront major threats like HIV/AIDS and cross-border crime. The report shows regression in much of the region on these fronts between 1995 and 1998. Seven of the fourteen SADC member countries are among the 38 least developed countries of the world and six are in the low human development category. There are unevennesses in regional trade and other relations. In addition, many major barriers to equitable and mutually beneficial regional integration arise from infrastructure deficiencies and capacity constraints.

Does integration within the region need to be more profound and far reaching than processes taking place at the global level or in relations with key extra-regional trading partners like the European Union?

The argument advanced is that the SADC region needs a programme that combines sectoral co-operation, policy co-ordination and trade integration in a way that addresses real infrastructural and capacity constraints. The programme must also be sensitive to the need to counter polarisation.


SADC has taken some steps towards implementing this vision. Intra-SADC trade has grown from 27.8 per cent of the GDP of the region in 1991 to 39.5 per cent in 1996. In spite of inherent institutional constraints SADC has been successful in building the inter-state solidarity needed to support liberation struggles and create a Southern African identity. SADC has also made progress towards political integration by establishing consultative structures like the SADC Parliamentary Forum, the SADC Electoral Commissions Forum, and the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.

The *SADC Regional Human Development Report 2000* (RHDR) explains the interface between regional integration and human development. It reviews the concept of human development and considers the meaning of and rationale for deep integration in SADC, and its relationship to Pan-Africanism, worldwide regionalism and globalisation.

The report also interrogates recent achievements and setbacks in human development and examines progress towards economic, political and social integration in the SADC region.

Like its 1998 predecessor, this report is an advocacy tool and underscores policy issues that need attention in order to deepen integration and improve human development in the region. It is imperative to identify ways in which regional co-operation can help confront these critical challenges and make human development a reality for the people of our region.

On behalf of the SADC Regional Human Development Report Project Steering Committee, I would like to thank the SARIPS of the SAPES Trust and particularly the Team Leader and his staff for their major contribution to this endeavour.



This report, the second in the series, commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and executed by the Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies (SARIPS) of the Southern African Political Economy Series (SAPES) Trust, would not have been possible without the support and contributions of a large number of individuals and organisations.

Several regional and international institutions were generous in sharing their experience, research materials and data with the drafting team. The report drew from the databases and material of organisations such as national statistical offices, police headquarters, parliaments and central banks in countries of the SADC region, the drug commission in Zambia, World Bank and United Nations AIDS office, and other UN agencies.

The project team wishes to acknowledge their great debt of gratitude to Carlos Lopes, former UN Resident Co-ordinator and UNDP Resident Representative in Harare. His vision, deep commitment to and support of a uniquely independent and truly regional report has been a source of inspiration. Also, the opportunity to initiate and undertake this exercise has provided SARIPS/SAPES Trust with an invaluable basis upon which to extend its network of scholars and experts in both the sub-region and beyond. It has helped develop a valuable and even indispensable data-bank on Southern Africa, and contributed significantly to the growth of expertise in handling such elaborate and demanding exercises. We are grateful to both the UNDP and SADC for affording SARIPS/SAPES Trust such an invaluable opportunity through which the latter has been able to further its work as part of its mandate as an organisation devoted to developing social science, policy research and policy training.

Sincere appreciation is owed to the members of the Steering Committee who rose to the occasion and invested considerable time and effort in the report process. The mandate of the Steering Committee, under the able chairpersonship of Professor Oscar Monteiro, was to define the subject matter of the report. Its membership, broad-based and balanced by representation from governments in the SADC region, the UNDP and regional academia, consists of the following eminent people:

Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi (Minister of Public Service and Administration, South Africa); Olivia Muchena (Minister of State in the Vice President's Office, Zimbabwe); Anil Gayan (Minister of Foreign Affairs and Regional Co-operation, Mauritius); Angelo Mondlane (Chief Economist representing the SADC Secretariat, Botswana); John Ohiorhenuan (Resident Representative, UNDP South Africa); Emmanuel Dierckx de Casterle (Resident Representative, UNDP Mozambique); Macharia Kamau (Resident Representative, UNDP Botswana); Ramoshebi Ishmael Maboe Moletsane (former Vice Chancellor, National University of Lesotho); Dominic Mulaisho (Private Consultant, Zambia); Ibbo Mandaza (Team Leader of the project and chairperson of the SAPES Trust, — an ex-officio member of the Steering Committee).

The Regional Human Development Report team is indebted to the UNDP offices in South Africa and Mauritius for the logistical support in organising Steering Committee meetings. Grateful thanks is extended to Dan Temu, UNDP Deputy Resident Representative in South Africa and his team, and Rose Gakuba, the UN Co-ordinator and UNDP Resident Representative in Mauritius and her team, especially Christiane Lan Kung Wa, the Programme Assistant, Roland Alcindor, the economist and Dominique Moorghen the secretary.

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The core writing team comprised the following team members: Ibbo Mandaza, the project leader, Chinyamata Chipeta, a senior economist who drafted the major concept paper and was the full-time core writer in the drafting process, Khabele Matlosa (SARIPS Assistant Director — Research) and Allast Mwanza (SARIPS Social Policy Programme Co-ordinator). Athaliah Molokomme (Co-ordinator of the Gender Unit at the SADC Secretariat) also contributed as a member of the core drafting team. Mwesiga Baregu (SARIPS Peace and Security Programme Co-ordinator), Dan Tevera (SARIPS Environment Programme Co-ordinator) and Prosper Matondi (SARIPS Land Programme assistant research fellow) also contributed to the

drafting process. The project relied heavily on Joyce Malaba, the project Data Analyst who was responsible for putting together the statistical annexes and statistical analyses in the report, assisted by Solomon Chiwara. Contributions in the form of boxes were made by the President of Zimbabwe, His Excellency Robert Gabriel Mugabe (Land reform), the President of South Africa, His Excellency Thabo Mbeki (HIV/AIDS), the Prime Minister of Mozambique, His Excellency Pascoal Manuel Mocumbi (Information technology), the OAU Secretary General, Salim Ahmed Salim (Conflict, peace and security), Sam Moyo, Associate Professor of Rural Development and Environmental Management, and Director of SARIPS (Land issues), Micere Mugo, Professor of African-American Studies at Syracuse University (Gender), Amartya Sen, Nobel Peace Prize winner in Economics (Poverty), Claude Ake, late Director of the Centre for Advanced Social Science, Nigeria (Globalisation) and Paul Tiya, WHO-AFRO — Health, Environment and Sustainable Development, on behalf of the Director of the World Health Organisation, Gro-Harlem Brundtland (Environmental security).

The report also drew from background papers presented and discussed at a regional workshop held in Swaziland in March 1998, attended by about 45 participants. These included experts, academics and practitioners from Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The report was further strengthened by various contributions of the SARIPS 2000 Annual Colloquium, whose theme was Regional Integration in Southern Africa. This facilitated the consultative process through the participation of representatives from civil society organisations, academics and policy makers from the SADC region as well as the African continent in general.

The project is indebted to a tireless and hardworking supporting team led by Joyce Kazembe, responsible for overseeing management and administration of the project, anchored by Jennifer Chiriga, the SARIPS Research Programmes Administrator. The project was also given support by Allan Mushonga and Richard Kamidza who compiled the bibliography. The project secretariat was made up of a committed team of which the following deserve special mention: Maud Butawu, the Regional Human Development Report Project Secretary and Vista Mbewe, Grace Maumbe and Perpetual Makokove, all secretaries at SARIPS/SAPES Trust.

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The authors, grateful for all the assistance they received during the study, assume full responsibility for the opinions expressed in the report.

Ibbo Mandaza
Team Leader

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Abbreviations

AAC	Anglo American Corporation
ACTSA	Campaign for Access to HIV/AIDS treatment in Southern Africa
ADB	African Development Bank
ADR	African Development Report
AEC	African Economic Community
AIDS	Acquired immuno-deficiency syndrome
AM	Arithmetic Mean
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
ASCCI	Association of SADC Chambers of Commerce and Industry
AZT	Zidovudine (drug used for treatment of AIDS)
BHP	Broken Hill Proprietary Company
CBI	Cross-Border Initiative
CEAO	West African Economic Community
CEMAC	Central African Monetary and Economic Community
CEPGL	Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries
CMA	Common monetary area
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COSAFA	Confederation of Southern Africa Football Association
COSANA	Confederation of Southern Africa Football Association
CSIR	Centre for the Study of International Relations
CSO	Central Statistical Office
Dev.	Development
DR Congo	Democratic Republic of Congo
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa)
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDEP	Equally distributed equivalent percentage
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign direct trade
FANR	Food, agriculture and natural resources
Fem Pop.	Female population
FII	Foreign Investment Index
FISCU	Finance and Investment Coordinating Unit
FITI	Foreign Investment and Trade Index
FLS	Frontline States
FPL	Food Poverty Line
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDI	Gender-related Development Index
GDI-A	Gender-related Development Index adjusted for income inequality
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GPZ	Zambezi Planning Authority
HDI	Human Development Index
HDR	Human Development Report
HIPC	Highly indebted poor countries
HIV	Human immuno-deficiency virus
HPI	Human Poverty Index
HRD	Human resource development
ICT	Information and communication technology
Im	Imports
IMF	International Monetary Fund
Inc	Including
Interpol	International criminal investigation organisation
IOC	Indian Ocean Council
IPA	International Press Association
IPU	Inter-Parliamentary Union
ISCO	International standard classification of occupations
ISDSC	Inter-state Defence and Systems Committee
ISPS	Internet service providers

kg	kilogramme
km	kilometre
LII	Labour immigration index
LMI	Labour migration index
LPAD	Livestock production and animal disease control
m	million
MCP	Malawi Congress Party
min	minute
MISA	Media Institute of Southern Africa
MP	Member of Parliament
MRU	Mano River Union
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ODA	Official/Overseas Development Assistance (can be either)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Pop.	Population
PPP	Purchasing power parity
PRI	Protocol ratification index
PTA	Preferential Trade Area
RETOSA	Regional Tourism Organisation of Southern Africa
RHDR	Regional human development report
RPTC	Regional Peace-keeping Training Centre
SA	South Africa
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
SAPES	Southern African Political Economy Series
SARIPS	Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies
SARPCCO	Southern African Regional Police of Crimes Co-operation Organisation
SII	SADC Integration Index
SIIP	SADC Integration Index (Including protocol ratification)
SITCD	SADC Industry and Trade Co-ordination Unit
Sq km	Square kilometre
SSDB	SARIPS/SAPES databank
STD	sexually transmitted disease
STP	SADC Trade Protocol
TAZARA	Tanzania-Zambia Railway
TCPL	Total Consumption
TI	Trade index
TII	Trade and investment index
Tot. Pop	Total population
TT	Terms of Trade /Total trade
UDEAC	Central African Customs and Economic Union
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	United Nations AIDS office
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational and Scientific Organisation
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Education Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNITA	National Union for Total Independence of Angola
USA	United States of America
WAEMU	West African Monetary Union
WAM	Weighted arithmetic mean
WCO	World Customs Union
WDI	World development indicators
WDR	World Development Report
WTO	World Trade Organisation
ZCCM	Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines

Executive summary

A Can regional integration promote human development?

An attempt to put people at the centre of all aspects of development is a key innovation of the concept of human development.



- 1 Human development is the process of enlarging people's choices so that they can live a long and healthy life, be educated, have access to resources for a decent standard of living, enjoy political, economic, social and cultural freedoms, and have human rights, self-esteem and opportunities for being creative and productive. The success of this process depends on the creation of human capabilities, the absence of barriers to economic and political opportunities and the full participation of the people in the decisions and processes that affect their lives. The attempt to put people at the centre of all aspects of development is a key innovation of the concept of human development. A related development is the introduction of a comprehensive measure of development called the Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI is a composite of three components, namely, longevity (measured by life expectancy at birth), education (measured by the combined gross enrolment ratio at primary, secondary and tertiary levels, and adult literacy rate) and standard of living (measured by real per capita income).
- 2 Across SADC member countries, improvement in the level of human development has not been sustained. Between 1985 and 1990, for example, the value of the HDI increased in most of the member countries. However between 1990 and 1994, it decreased in most of the countries in the low human development category and in four of the countries in the medium human development group. Improvement in real per capita Gross Domestic Product has not been sustained either, with a larger number of countries experiencing a decline during 1994-97 than during 1990-94. While the adult literacy rate improved in most SADC member countries between 1990 and 1997, life expectancy at birth fell in all except four of the fourteen member countries.
- 3 The purpose of transforming the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) through the 1992 Windhoek Treaty was to promote deeper integration to help address many of the factors that make it difficult to sustain improvement in human development. These factors include:
 - Armed conflicts which make it imperative to create a regional mechanism to prevent and resolve conflicts.
 - The pressures of contemporary globalisation and the concomitant trend towards regional trading blocs which mean that SADC member countries need to urgently transform and restructure their economies to become more competitive.
 - Historic dependence on exporting primary commodities and lack of industrialisation.
 - The limited market size of the economies of most SADC member countries which makes them individually unattractive to investors. Regional integration would increase market size and make it easier to attract and sustain the necessary investment for development, growth and restructuring at higher levels of efficiency and productivity.
 - The small size of most SADC member countries in terms of population implying that the per capita cost of providing infrastructure is high. This cost could be reduced if these countries co-operated in the development of infrastructure.

- The spread of HIV/AIDS, TB, malaria and other infectious diseases across SADC member countries which they need to combat through co-operation.
- 4 SADC has adopted an approach which combines trade integration with sectoral co-operation and co-ordination. The Windhoek Treaty envisages an approach which is more profound than that between countries of the region and the world economy in general or with extra-regional trading partners.

Referred to as deep integration, this approach entails the removal of external barriers, like tariffs, as well as internal barriers,

Box 1 The 1993 African Development Bank study on integration

This study of Economic Integration in Southern Africa examines the arguments for greater co-operation and progression towards economic integration. It endeavours to do so in a way which informs various constituencies in Southern Africa of the choices that the region faces in the post-apartheid era.

Efforts to achieve regional economic integration are justified by the prospect that collective regional endeavour will produce a greater pay-off in developmental benefits for individual countries than unilateral use of economic policies and instruments. The study makes a convincing case that in Southern Africa the pay-off would be considerable. The evidence suggests that all Southern African countries have much to gain from various forms of regional co-operation. This might be from more effective co-ordination of their investments in specific sectors, from harmonisation of particular laws, rules and regulations, or from more advanced approaches involving

the convergence of trade, fiscal and monetary policies as a prelude to integration.

The gains will come from three principal sources:

- 1 From substantial cost savings resulting from co-ordinated investments in physical, social and institutional infrastructure, for example, a regional power grid or a coherent regional airline system.
- 2 From the benefits of trade liberalisation which will increase output and trade, stimulate larger investment flows and produce greater economies of scale.
- 3 From 'externalities' which increased competition generates such as greater product range and diversity; improved production techniques leading to lower costs; and more attractive opportunities for foreign investment in the region.

The study shows that the opportunities for moving ahead are numerous. They range from initiatives to economise on power generation, reduce transport costs while improving

service, share agriculture technology and research and manage scarce water resources to plans to promote cross-border investment and regional exchange rate stability.

Action can proceed in one area as fast as circumstances allow without the pace of progress necessarily depending on what happens in other areas. A 'multi-speed' approach to co-ordination across different sectors is entirely possible and desirable.

Regional co-operation which will yield significant developmental benefits to its participants must be based on an appropriate choice of partners. That choice must be rooted not merely in political aspirations but in objective opportunities based on realistically attainable economic structures. To encourage adopting a framework for co-operation that is out of alignment with economic realities is a recipe for failure.

Source: African Development Bank. Economic Integration in Southern Africa, 1993



The Windhoek Treaty envisages an approach which is more profound than that between countries of the region and the world economy in general or with extra-regional trading partners.

However, there is nothing in the theory of regional integration which says that the gains will be equitably distributed. Moreover, these gains ... may be offset by the welfare losses of unemployment and deterioration in the terms of trade.

such as monopolies and cartels, investment licensing and regulations. In contrast, shallow integration is concerned with removing only the external barriers. The choice of deep integration is premised on the argument that many of the critical barriers to intra-regional trade are capacity related. In other words, they arise from underdeveloped production structures and inadequate infrastructure, rather than tariff or regulatory barriers. The potential for polarisation in a region with economies of different sizes and levels of development is another key consideration.

- 5 There is not much literature on the impact of deep integration on human development. The conventional theory of regional integration focuses narrowly on what happens to intra-regional trade, regional output, employment and the terms of trade once barriers have been dismantled. In the simple case where only internal barriers are dismantled, intra-regional trade expands, leading to an increase in regional output and regional employment; and furthermore, cheaper regional products replace more expensive regional products.

Where removing internal barriers is accompanied by putting up a common external tariff, the impact on the regional economy will be similar except that more expensive regional products may replace cheaper external products, hence consumers may end up paying more. In the long run, extending the market should enable regional integration to positively impact on human development through:

- increased competition which affects prices and costs, and the growth of output and employment;
- decreased unit costs of production which drive down prices from which consumers benefit; and
- increased regional and international investment which will create employment and income.

However, there is nothing in the theory of regional integration which says that the gains will be equitably distributed. Moreover, these gains from trade, based on specialisation, may be offset by the welfare losses of unemployment and deterioration in the terms of trade.

- 6 The conventional theory of integration ignores a number of other ways that regional co-operation and integration impact on human development. These include:
- the contribution of regional export growth to the supply of output, especially by providing the foreign exchange to pay for imports of consumption, investment and government expenditure;
 - the contribution of functional co-operation in infrastructure, utility and other sectors to increasing output, reducing costs and improving reliability of supply;
 - the contribution of peace and security to reductions in military expenditure and consequent increases in expenditure on social and economic services; and
 - the indirect contribution of regional integration to longevity and education through the expenditure of increased income and revenue on social services.

Skilled labour is relatively scarce throughout the SADC sub-region.

Semi-skilled and unskilled labour is relatively abundant

7 Skilled labour is relatively scarce throughout the SADC sub-region. Employing this labour in receiving countries helps them to improve their human development through:

- increased provision of social and economic services, and
- increases in national income.

In sending countries, the emigration of skilled labour undermines their human development through:

- a reduction in the provision of social and economic services, and
- a reduction in national income which may not be fully offset by migrants' remittances.

Semi-skilled and unskilled labour is relatively abundant in the SADC sub-region. In receiving countries, semi-skilled and unskilled labour undermines human development by :

- competing with local labour for scarce jobs and hence exacerbating an already serious unemployment problem;
- putting downward pressure on wages and labour income; and
- exerting pressure on limited social services and amenities and so adversely affecting their quality and quantity in per capita terms.

In sending countries, emigration of semi-skilled and unskilled labour undermines their development by reducing the amount of labour there.



Box 2 Towards deep integration

The concept of deep integration conveys a message: that integration within the region needs to be more profound and far reaching than processes taking place at the global level or in relations with key extra-regional trading partners like the European Union. However, deep integration does not merely mean travelling further - in a quantitative sense - along the path of conventional trade integration. Seven of the fourteen SADC member countries are among the 38 least developed countries of the world; and as the present report indicates, six are in the low human development category. There are also great unevennesses in regional trade and other relations. In such a context, we need to recognise that many of the major barriers to promoting equitable and mutually beneficial regional integration do not arise from tariffs and regulatory regimes but from infrastructure deficiencies and capacity constraints. We also need to recognise the potential for polarisation in a region with economies of very different sizes and levels of development. Thus, as a


number of studies including that of the African Development Bank (1993) have argued, what the SADC region needs is a programme that combines sectoral co-operation, policy co-ordination and trade integration in a way that addresses real infrastructure and capacity constraints and is sensitive to the need to counter polarisation.

SADC has taken some steps towards implementing such a vision. The Protocol on Trade provides for an asymmetrical process of tariff reduction leading to the establishment of a Free Trade Area by 2008. Sectoral co-operation programmes are underway in key areas and some steps have to be taken to promote more effective political co-operation. These need to be recognised as initial, and as yet rather shallow, steps along the path towards regional integration. We need to do much more in a context where, as many have argued, regionalism is not an 'optional extra' but a necessity if Southern Africa is to achieve development oriented growth. In particular, major challenges to bring about institutional reform within SADC and make its Programme of Action more

effective will have to be confronted as a matter of urgency.

A critical question that we urgently need to answer is: What kind of regional integration will promote human development? Many of the existing programmes seek to address issues of trade and related economic infrastructure. These are important in their own right and could contribute to raising human development by raising incomes. Backlogs in human development have, however, long been identified as among the major obstacles to promoting economic growth. They include the need to raise the skills of our people and confront major threats like HIV/AIDS and cross-border crime. The present report shows that the period 1995 to 1998 did not see great progress and much of the region regressed on important fronts. We need to give priority to identifying ways in which regional co-operation can contribute to confronting these critical challenges and assist in making human development a reality for the people of our region.

Col Davies
Member of Parliament
South Africa



- 1 Compared to the early 1990s, during the late 1990s most SADC member states reduced public expenditure on the military as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product and increased public expenditure on education and health as a percentage of their Gross Domestic Product. The average infant mortality rate decreased further. But despite the apparent increase in the share of public expenditure allocated to social services, there was a decline in the average combined gross enrolment ratio from 51.8 per cent in 1995 to 51.1 per cent in 1998, a decline in the average adult literacy rate from 71 percent to 67.3 per cent and a more marked fall in average life expectancy from 52 years to 47 years. These developments may mean either that the increase in public expenditure on social services was not enough or that there were other factors which offset the increases. In the case of health, the spread of infectious diseases such as malaria, TB and more seriously, HIV/AIDS, was an important factor. Mismanagement of social services in the public sector may have been another contributory factor.
- 2 The value of the average (SADC) Human Development Index (HDI) decreased from 0.568 in 1995 to 0.538 in 1998. Among individual SADC member states, the HDI decreased in eight countries representing 57 per cent of the total. These countries are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. There was a sharp fall in life expectancy, per capita real income and combined gross enrolment in some of these countries. In six other countries, representing 43 per cent of the total, the HDI increased. These countries are Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Swaziland and Tanzania.
- 3 In 1995, only nine SADC member countries (or 64 per cent) had a Human Development Index (HDI) above 0.500. These were Seychelles, Mauritius, South Africa, Swaziland, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In 1997 and 1998, the number of countries which had a Human Development Index (HDI) above 0.500 had decreased to eight, representing 57 per cent of SADC member states. This number included all the countries listed above, except for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The decline in the HDI of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was due to a fall in all the components of the HDI index, namely: longevity, literacy, combined gross enrolment ratio and real per capita income.
Levels of human development also differ within countries on the basis of literacy, gender, age and racial differences. The groups with high levels of human development are urban dwellers, males, those who are literate in their vernacular language, the historically favoured racial groups of whites and Asians, and the politically influential middle class in government and the private sector.

Summary table of main indicators, 1998

HDI RANK	Country	Human Dev. Index (HDI)	Gender Related Dev. Index (GDI) (GEM)	Gender Empowerment Measure*	Human Poverty Index (HPI)	SADC Integration Index SII	GDP per capita (PPP, US\$)	Population (millions)	Land Area (000s) square kilometres
1	Seychelles	0.808	10 600	0.1	0.5
2	Mauritius	0.782	0.765	0.359	11.5	0.038	8 312	1.1	2
3	South Africa	0.718	0.706	0.540	20.2	0.080	8 488	39.4	1221
4	Swaziland	0.672	0.659	0.329	27.3	0.556	3 816	1.0	17
5	Namibia	0.651	0.638	..	28.6	0.285	5 176	1.7	824
6	Botswana	0.613	0.598	0.403	28.3	0.198	6 103	1.6	582
7	Lesotho	0.583	0.558	0.389	23.3	0.362	1 626	2.1	30
8	Zimbabwe	0.570	0.562	0.359	30.0	0.322	2 669	11.4	391
9	DR Congo	0.440	0.416	822	49.1	2345
10	Zambia	0.429	0.415	0.238	37.8	0.075	719	8.8	753
11	Tanzania	0.422	0.411	..	29.2	..	480	32.1	945
12	Angola	0.419	54.7	..	1 821	12.1	1247
13	Malawi	0.393	0.370	0.238	41.9	0.077	523	10.3	118
14	Mozambique	0.350	0.320	0.331	50.7	..	782	18.9	802
	SADC	0.538	0.536	..	31.5	..	2 663	189.7	9 277.5

*GEM is for 1997

Source: SARIPS/SAPES databank

C

Regional
integration

The main flow of intra-SADC investment is from South Africa to the rest of the sub-region to exploit natural resources, follow local markets or to seek least cost locations.

In spite of institutional constraints, SADC has successfully built inter-state solidarity which was needed to support liberation struggles and to create a Southern African identity.

- 1 During the 1990s, intra-SADC trade grew faster than the total SADC trade. For example, between 1991 and 1996, intra-SADC exports, imports and total trade grew at average annual rates of 23.1 per cent, 17.7 per cent and 13.8 per cent, respectively; whereas between 1992 and 1998, total SADC exports, imports and total trade grew at average annual rates of only 2.4 per cent, 5.7 per cent and 3.8 per cent, respectively. Reflecting this trend, intra-SADC trade grew from 27.8 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product of the sub-region in 1991 to 39.5 per cent in 1996 (including informal cross-border trade, the actual intra-SADC trade ratios may be higher). This development reflected two factors: first, the upward trend in intra-SADC trade which began in the late 1980s; second, the entry into SADC of the five new SADC members, namely: Namibia, South Africa, Mauritius, Seychelles and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
- 2 Intra-SADC investment takes the form of foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment and loans. This type of investment is relatively insignificant but on the increase in the sub-region. The main flow of intra-SADC investment is from South Africa to the rest of the sub-region to exploit natural resources, follow local markets or to seek least cost locations. But there have also been flows of intra-SADC investment from other countries, for example from Zimbabwe into the financial sectors of Malawi and Tanzania and from Malawi into retail trade and the insurance industry in Zambia. For lack of data, it has not been possible to quantify total intra-SADC investment.
- 3 Data on intra-SADC labour migration in the sub-region are scarce so the report does not present a comprehensive account. From what we know about current labour markets, skilled workers are moving from poorer member states into South Africa, Botswana and Namibia in search of higher real earnings. Exact numbers of migrant workers in this category are not known. South Africa is the main magnet for unskilled workers from the rest of SADC. But the number of foreign unskilled workers South Africa is able to offer jobs to is falling. Other categories of migrant workers in South Africa include those with temporary residence permits, estimated at 52 704 in 1996, visa over-stayers, estimated at 769 000 and unauthorised or illegal immigrants, officially estimated at between 2.5 and 5 million. In addition to work-seekers, there is a huge legal cross-border movement within SADC, mostly of temporary visitors to South Africa.
- 4 SADC has made some progress towards political integration. A SADC Parliamentary Forum has been established outside the formal structures. This forum is a consultative body and lacks legislative powers to have real impact on SADC. A SADC Electoral Commissions Forum has also been established outside the formal structures of SADC. This is also a consultative body, lacking executive authority to have any real impact on the electoral process in the SADC. There is also the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security but SADC has yet to clarify its role, status and mandate. In spite of these institutional constraints, SADC has successfully built inter-state solidarity which was needed to support liberation struggles and to create a Southern African identity.

D What are the challenges?

Other factors that are compounding the problem are the mismatch between the skills acquired through formal education and the skills required in the labour market and the inability of SADC member states to restructure their economies in the face of globalisation.

Abject poverty afflicts about one-third of the SADC population.

- 1 In most of the SADC member states, growth rates of output (Gross Domestic Product) are not high enough to increase per capita income and improve the standard of living. They are not high enough to reduce poverty. Economic growth rates are constrained by low growth rates of total exports, low investment rates (themselves the result of low rates of domestic savings), adverse terms of trade and HIV/AIDS, among others.
- 2 Rates of growth of the labour force exceed rates of growth of formal sector wage employment in most SADC member states. As a result, rates of unemployment and underemployment are high. Current economic growth rates are not high enough to appreciably increase employment levels. But even if output increases, employment growth is unlikely to be at rates comparable to labour force growth rates unless less capital-intensive techniques and sectors can be emphasised. Other factors that are compounding the problem are the mismatch between the skills acquired through formal education and the skills required in the labour market and the inability of SADC member states to restructure their economies in the face of globalisation.
- 3 Apart from low rates of economic growth and high unemployment, several SADC states also suffer from macroeconomic instability which undermines human development and regional integration. This is characterised by the following:
 - high budget deficits — financing these deficits crowds out the private sector from the domestic financial market;
 - high rates of inflation and high interest rates which discourage investment;
 - high balance of payments deficits — financing of these deficits requires foreign borrowing;
 - high levels of external public debt — servicing this debt has a major impact on the capacity of governments to invest in human development; and
 - exchange rate instability which discourages trade and investment.Some of the countries in the region have gone a long way towards reducing budget deficits and have a certain measure of macroeconomic stability but have not necessarily experienced a higher rate of economic growth and development.
- 4 Abject poverty afflicts about one-third of the SADC population. Poverty reflects failure of past policies to create formal sector wage employment, among other things. Between 30 and 40 per cent of the labour force is either completely unemployed or underemployed in the informal sector or in drought-prone subsistence agriculture. Poverty is a major constraint to human development and deep integration because it retards improvement in human capabilities like improved health, skills and physical capital formation. Income inequalities in the SADC sub-region are among the highest in the world. Ten out of fourteen countries have Gini coefficients in excess of 0.50. Inequalities in income distribution reflect inequalities in ownership distribution of land and other assets, as well as in access to resources in general. These inequalities undermine human development and deep integration by denying the majority of the people economic opportunities.

- 5 The SADC region continues to experience armed conflicts. In the past, armed conflicts were largely internal and had to do with struggles for political liberation and the fight against apartheid and racism. The long period of liberation wars and military destabilisation encouraged the growth of the arms trade and the formation of armed groups which further undermined regional security. Current armed conflicts reflect the aftermath of past conflicts and the failure of the nation-state-in-the-making to promote good governance. Basically, these conflicts are internal but they are spreading across borders and threatening to engulf the sub-region. Military expenditure, the mining of land and the destruction of life and property in armed conflicts impose enormous opportunity costs in terms of foregone economic and social activities, leading to a reduction in output of goods and services, civilian employment, income, exports and so on. So ultimately armed conflicts undermine human development as well as deep integration.
- 6 Transnational crime, which includes car-jacking, fraud associated with money laundering, transfer pricing, small arms and drug trafficking, is a serious problem in the region. Among other things, crime has a negative influence on investment confidence, on production and on other aspects of the economy, including integration. Crime contributes to the loss of human and physical capital and it can lead to violence.
- 7 The HIV/AIDS pandemic is a major disaster in the SADC region. This region is the epicentre of the pandemic globally, with Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa having the highest rates of HIV/AIDS infection rates among the 15-49 year old age group. Reductions in life expectancy and in rates of economic growth are some of the consequences of HIV/AIDS. These have had a major negative impact on the regional Human Development Index. As acknowledged by the SADC organisation, HIV/AIDS is not just a serious health problem — it is an emergency development challenge.
- 8 The SADC sub-region is experiencing serious environmental problems due to various pressures on the ecosystem. The biophysical or socio-economic causes and consequences of some of these problems operate on a regional scale. An example is transboundary air pollution where, due to the atmospheric circulation over Southern Africa, air pollution impacts can be experienced far away from the source of pollution. Other examples are water degradation caused by inappropriate land management practices, pollution and lack of proper waste disposal systems; and biodiversity loss, especially outside national parks. The causes and consequences of other environmental problems are purely local; for example, overfishing, deforestation and unsustainable land use where the current level of productive output cannot continue indefinitely at the current level of inputs. All these environmental problems undermine human development by adversely affecting the growth of output and the quality of life generally. The rising relative scarcity of natural resources is also a potential cause of conflicts.
- 9 Colonisation and racism have left a legacy of extremely uneven distribution of land in Southern Africa. Between them they have created a pattern of land distribution characterised by concentration

among a few people of European origin of the most fertile land, located in good rainfall areas and close to transport infrastructures. This phenomenon is a major cause of inequality in the distribution of income and poverty in the SADC. It is also a potential source of tension that can easily lead to instability in the sub-region. Clearly, it is neither desirable nor sustainable in the long run. Therefore, it is imperative to promote an equitable pattern of land distribution.

- 10 Globalisation offers opportunities in the form of trade, foreign investment and finance, and information and communications technologies. But these opportunities do not outweigh the immense risks that it poses. These risks include: intense competition leading to de-industrialisation; increased exposure to the vagaries of economic fluctuations in the world economy; capital flight and brain drain; loss of control over biodiversity, other resources, patents, and transfer of technology.

E Are there opportunities for deep integration?

SADC member states are endowed with diverse natural and other resources

- 1 SADC member states are endowed with diverse natural and other resources, implying that they can specialise in producing different products and export primary as well as secondary products to the region. In mining and other sectors, the potential for expanding products is enormous. SADC has a competitive advantage in mineral production, mineral beneficiation and in mining technology. As a region, it also has a large potential market.
- 2 Changes in the direction of trade in favour of intra-SADC trade and increasing complementarity of regional economies offer new opportunities for increasing regional trade. So does the adoption of electronic or digital switching technology and electronic communications technology, such as Internet and e-mail. This reduces the cost of production, making adopting firms more competitive.
- 3 Levels of foreign direct investment, portfolio investment and cross-border investment in SADC are increasing. These capital movements are supplementing domestic savings to raise the overall rate of expansion of the productive capacity of the original economy.
- 4 Interest in currency convertibility among SADC member states is growing. In conjunction with an improvement in the policy environment, this development offers a rare opportunity for monetary harmonisation.
- 5 Strengthening solidarity and creating a Southern African identity have been hailed as major successes of SADC. These achievements offer firm foundations for further co-operation and integration.
- 6 Lastly, there is the growing involvement of non-governmental organisations, academia, the media, chambers of commerce and industry, the labour movement, and so on, in the work of SADC. This involvement by non-state actors and stakeholders should also assist in promoting deep integration.

Experience has shown that it is not enough to merely increase public expenditure on education.

In conclusion, the executive summary highlights the policy issues arising from the analysis of human development and regional integration in SADC.

- 1 Concerning human development, the relevant policy issues relate to the following:
 - Reducing poverty by increasing rates of economic growth and job creation, improving the distribution of income and wealth and restoring macroeconomic stability.
 - Reversing the decline in the combined gross enrolment ratio and in the adult literacy rate. Experience has shown that it is not enough to merely increase public expenditure on education. SADC countries need also to improve the management of the education system, apart from devising cost-effective ways of delivering education services, such as cost sharing, joint procurement of school materials and mounting joint training programmes.
 - Increasing capacity for HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns, for planning and for research.
 - Finding effective ways of arresting environmental degradation at state and inter -state levels in SADC.
 - Empowerment of women and progress towards achieving 30 per cent representation in parliament by the year 2005.
 - Strengthening the fight against crime by preventing the proliferation of small arms, supporting joint military/police operations, improving the management of the police and increasing the resources available to it as well as enhancing the independence of the judiciary, and so on.
 - Establishing effective mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution.
- 2 With respect to regional integration, the pertinent policy issues relate to:
 - Eliminating non-tariff barriers and establishing an appropriate machinery to monitor compliance.
 - Increasing intra-SADC investment by further liberalising capital movements where barriers exist.
 - Promoting deep integration through monetary harmonisation, macroeconomic policy co-ordination, eliminating constraints that operate within countries, and strengthening SADC structures.
 - Promoting orderly and planned migration of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled labour to meet specific needs for the benefit of both sending and receiving countries.
 - Improving the capacity of the SADC Secretariat by according it more power and authority, upgrading the status of the executive secretary and strengthening all divisions of the secretariat.
 - Implementing the SADC Programme of Action through a small number of commissions to replace the present eighteen sectors.
 - Prioritising sectors, projects, policies and strategies.
 - Establishing stable and credible regional regimes for regulating extractive industries in order to protect the environment, conserve resources and enhance export earnings.
 - Strategically integrating, which would involve deep integration in the SADC and selective delinking from the world capitalist system.
 - Transforming the SADC Parliamentary Forum into a full-fledged regional parliament and the SADC Electoral Commissions Forum into a regional electoral commission.
 - Removing capacity constraints in the economies of SADC member countries.

G Organisation of the report

The *SADC Regional Human Development Report 2000* presents analyses and data in a structured manner.

Chapter 1 begins by reviewing the concept of human development and explaining its measurement in general terms as well as with reference to the SADC sub-region. The chapter then considers the meaning of and rationale for deep integration in SADC and its relationship to pan Africanism, worldwide regionalism and globalisation. This chapter explains the prerequisites for deep integration, the challenges of deep integration and the links between regional integration and human development.

Chapter 2 examines recent achievements and setbacks in human development in the SADC sub-region with the aid of the SADC-specific Human Development Index, Gender-related Human Development Index (GDI) and Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), with the aid of the same indices adjusted for the pattern of income distribution. The Human Poverty Index (HPI) is also used to measure achievements and setbacks. This chapter also examines progress towards economic, political and social integration in the SADC sub-region. In this connection, the chapter introduces a SADC Integration Index to measure such progress.

Chapter 3 analyses the major challenges to human development and regional integration in the SADC sub-region. These challenges are grouped into economic development, peace and security, migration (displaced persons and refugees), HIV/AIDS, environment and promoting deep integration

Chapter 4 laments the fact that SADC has not taken advantage of enormous opportunities that exist to promote deep integration. The chapter explains why this is so, before proposing how SADC can capitalise on its opportunities to promote human development through deep integration.

Lastly, Chapter 5 summarises the main findings of the report and underscores the policy issues that need attention in order to deepen integration and improve human development in the SADC sub-region.

Human development and regional integration

The meaning of human development

Women and men should be equal partners in the development process.

The 1990 *Human Development Report* defined human development as 'the process of enlarging people's choices'. People's choices can be infinite as well as dynamic. So what type of people's choices? Irrespective of the level of development of a country, the basic choices are for people to lead long and healthy lives, to be educated and to have access to resources for a decent standard of living. These choices are basic in the sense that without them other choices, equally valued, are not available to people. These other choices include political, economic, social and cultural freedoms, human rights, self-esteem, and opportunities for being creative and productive. In other words, human development refers to all issues in society from the perspective of people and focuses on expanding all human choices, not just income (UNDP, 1995).

Through subsequent human development reports, the UNDP has refined the concept of human development, extended its meaning and identified the operations needed for it. From the 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994 human development reports, the concept has been paraphrased as 'a process of expanding people's choices by enabling them to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives. It is a paradigm of development built on people's own aspirations for security, justice, empowerment and freedom. It has emerged as an alternative to the traditional perspective on development that focuses merely on economic progress. From the human development perspective, economic growth is not an end in itself, only a means to human development. The purpose of wealth should be to enrich every child, every woman and every man to reach her or his full potential' (SAPES, UNDP and SADC, 1998).

The human development model can also be summed up in terms of its components. The first component is the creation of human capabilities - improved health, knowledge and skills so that people can increase their productivity and participate fully in income generation and remunerative employment. The second component is that all barriers to economic and political opportunities must be eliminated so that people have equal access to and benefit from these opportunities. The third component is that people must participate fully in the decisions and processes that affect their lives. In other words, 'development must be by the people, not only for them' (UNDP, 1995).

The fourth and final component identified in the 1995 *Human Development Report* relates to sustainability of the development process where human development is sustainable only if the present generation can earn its living without compromising the ability of future generations to do the same and vice versa. The livelihoods of present and future generations can be compromised if the development process does not allow all people, men and women, to participate in it or when women are excluded from it, rendering development fragile and inequitable. Sustainable human development thus requires engendering the process and empowering all people. If the development process does not create appropriate institutions that support people's rights human development cannot be sustainable in the long run. Yet another way of measuring sustainability is if economic growth or a rise in per capita GDP in the short run is achieved by reducing environmental capital. If this reduces the future rate of economic growth, then such economic growth is said to be environmentally unsustainable. The effect of environmental damage on the rate of economic growth varies from country to country, depending on the nature of economic growth itself and on environmental institutions in a particular country.

...environmental protection at the expense of survival is seen as morally wrong and unviable.

Dr Julius Nyerere wrote that the purpose of development is the human person whom it must serve.

Some studies have stressed other ways in which the livelihoods of present and future generations can be compromised. One way is if economic growth is achieved by undermining human capital, therefore we need to ensure that economic growth develops human capital. Extreme concern for environmental protection, for example, might neglect the need for people to survive through intensive use of the environment. In this situation, environmental protection at the expense of survival is seen as morally wrong and unviable. So we must strike a balance between environmental sustainability and human sustainability. Another compromising situation arises if there are no economic policies to avoid serious macroeconomic disequilibrium. These economic policies are essential for the economy to function properly, to raise per capita income and to increase social development (Pezzy, 1992).

As characterised above, the notion of human development is not new. It can be traced to early periods in human history and is found in many cultures and religions throughout the world (UNDP, 1994). For example, until the end of the 19th century, many writings in economics were concerned with the creation of wealth as well as with the development of human lives. This is true of the writings of ancient philosophers, such as Aristotle, as well as those of classical economists, like Adam Smith, Robert Thomas Malthus, Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill. However, during the 20th century, this approach to economics gave way to concentration on the creation of wealth.

The notion of human development is also found in the writings of several African scholars and leaders. This indicates a disenchantment with 20th century economics and its narrow concerns with wealth rather than with people, with the economy rather than society and with maximising income rather than expanding people's opportunities. For example, the late Dr Julius Nyerere wrote that the purpose of development is the human person whom it must serve and, in explaining his philosophy of humanism, Dr Kenneth Kaunda was making a case for human development which was neglected in conventional economics with its emphasis on material success instead of placing people at the centre of development.

The first *SADC Regional Human Development Report* was published in 1998. This *SADC Regional Human Development Report* is the second in the series. These reports are designed as advocacy tools to advance the need to develop common approaches to the national and regional dimensions of human development in the SADC bloc. To this end, the reports analyse the state of and progress in human development in the SADC sub-region, paying attention to such problems as HIV/AIDS, inequality in the distribution of wealth and income, armed conflicts, labour migration, refugees and displaced persons, globalisation, poverty, racism, land reform, crime and environmental degradation. But in order to examine a particular problem in depth, each report focuses on a specific theme.

The *1998 SADC Regional Human Development Report* was published under the theme 'Governance and human development in Southern Africa'. This report explained how governance and human development have interacted in the SADC sub-region from the colonial period until now.

It also explored the

relationship between governance and human development and assessed the contextual factors of governance from a Southern African perspective, including human rights, civil society organisations, democracy, the electoral process, transparency and accountability.

The main finding of the 1998 report was that until the mid-1990s the SADC sub-region had made significant achievements in human development, especially with respect to life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rates and gross enrolment ratios at primary and secondary school levels. However, less than two-thirds of the SADC member states had a Human Development Index (HDI) above 0.5. Poverty and inequality, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, economic problems and civil wars constituted threats to human development in SADC. The report found a positive relationship between governance and human development. But using the Index of Democratic Governance, the report found that SADC governments were still far behind in their progress towards participatory democracy and accountability.

In conclusion, the report appealed to SADC to act quickly to identify peaceful methods of resolving intra-regional conflicts, to strengthen the focus on human development and good governance and to reinforce the regional organisation.

The theme of this report is 'Challenges and opportunities for regional integration'. It examines the major challenges to and the relationship between regional integration and human development. The report also explores progress towards deep integration and how SADC can accelerate the rate of integration.

Both reports provide valuable information, statistical data and indicators on human development. In addition, the 1998 report has information and data on governance, while the *SADC Regional Human Development Report 2000* has information and data on regional integration in Southern Africa. Despite the many challenges that the sub-region is facing, the 2000 report points out that there are significant opportunities for promoting human development through deep integration.



II Measurement of human development

The 1990 *Human Development Report* proposed an index known as the Human Development Index (HDI) to provide a general measure of human development. As shown in Table 1.1, the Human Development Index is a composite of three basic components of human development, namely: longevity, education level and living standards. For the purpose of the measurement, these components are expressed by the index of life expectancy at birth, the education index (measured by a combination of adult literacy and the combined gross enrolment ratio at primary, secondary and tertiary levels), and the gross domestic product (GDP) index (measured by real per capita GDP converted to US dollars or international dollars using purchasing power parities). The index focuses the attention of policy-makers on important challenges of development. It provides a general measure of human progress in a country as an alternative to gross national product (GNP). Moreover, on the basis of this index, it is possible to compare human progress in different countries, in different regions or among different groups of people within the same country. Usually countries and regions are classified into those with low human development (HDI lower than 0.500), those with medium human development (HDI between 0.500 and 0.799) and those with high human development (HDI equal to or higher than 0.800).

As human development is much broader than the Human Development Index shows, three other indices have been constructed. The 1995 Human Development Report introduced the Gender-related Human Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM). The Gender-related Human Development Index uses the same variables as the Human Development Index but adjusts the average achievement of each country in terms of life expectancy, educational level and income according to the disparity in the achievements of women and of men. The greater the disparity between women and men, the lower the value of the Gender-related Human Development Index relative to the Human Development Index.

The Gender Empowerment Measure gauges inequality between

Table 1.1 HDI, GDI, HPI — same dimensions, different indicators

INDEX	LONGEVITY	KNOWLEDGE	DECENT STANDARD OF LIVING
HDI	Life expectancy at birth	1 Adult literacy 2 Combined enrolment ratio	Adjusted per capita income in PPP US\$
GDI	Female and male life expectancy at birth	1 Female and male adult literacy rates 2 Female and male combined enrolment ratios	Female and male per capita incomes (PPP US\$) based on female and male earned income shares
HPI	Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40	Adult illiteracy rate	Deprivation in economic provisioning measured by 1 Percentage of people without access to safe water 2 Percentage of people without access to health services 3 Percentage of children under five who are underweight

women and men in the areas of economic and political participation and decision making. Specifically, it takes into account the percentage of women in parliament, women's percentage share of administrative and managerial positions, their percentage shares of professional and technical jobs, and their income relative to that of men.

We need to adjust these UN indices to reflect the regional priorities and problems and also the region's level of development. In this case they have been adjusted to reflect SADC income and gender inequalities and these are termed the SADC-specific Human Development Index, Gender-related Human Development Index and Gender Empowerment Measure (See the technical notes at the back of this book).

The 1997 *Human Development Report* introduced a human poverty index (HPI) for measuring poverty as indicated in Chapter 2. Unlike the Human Development Index which measures overall human progress, the human poverty index measures the distribution of progress and backlogs of deprivation in the various dimensions of the Human Development Index. More specifically, for developing countries the human poverty index measures the proportion of the population affected by deprivation in survival (probability of dying before 40), deprivation in knowledge (percentage of adults who are illiterate) and deprivation in economic provisioning (percentage of people without access to health services and safe water, as well as the percentage of underweight children below five years) as shown in Table 1.1. For developed countries the human poverty index measures the proportion of people not expected to live to age 60, the functional literacy rate based on level one of the aptitude for reading prose (according to the results of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development International Adult Literacy Survey), the proportion of people living below the income poverty line (50 per cent of median disposable income), and the long-term unemployment rate (12 months or more).

III Human development and regional integration in Southern Africa

*Human development
declines between 1985
and 1994*

*Low popular
participation in
economic development
a possible cause of the
deterioration in human
development*

Data on the Human Development Index and key components of this index for SADC member countries for selected years are shown in Table 1.2. The data show that for all countries in the low human development category, the value of the Human Development Index in 1994 was lower than in 1985. For three countries in the medium human development category, the value of the Human Development Index in 1994 was also lower than in 1985. The data also show that for all countries in the low human development category, except two, real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) was lower in 1997 than in 1985. Among the countries in the medium human development category, only one had a lower real per capita GDP in 1997 than in 1985. And whereas the adult literacy rate improved in most of the countries between 1990 and 1997, life expectancy at birth fell in all except four of the fourteen countries (Table 1.2).

There are many complex factors behind the widespread deterioration in human development in SADC. One popular view in SADC circles in the early 1990s was that development was adversely affected by low levels of popular participation in economic development and in political processes (SADC, 1992). With a few exceptions, most of the SADC member states adopted a one-party system of governance soon after attaining independence, claiming that the multi-party system was divisive and led to political instability. Contrary to expectations, the one-party system of governance did not prevent political instability or ethnic discrimination. Besides, many human rights and civil liberties were curtailed (SAPES, UNDP and SADC, 1998). This negative policy environment is believed to have bred lack of accountability, corruption, low

*Positive correlation
between human
development and
democratic governance*

*Armed conflicts impact
negatively on human
development*

*Military expenditure...
rose substantially
across the sub-region
and absorbed as much
as 40 per cent of the
budget in Angola and
Mozambique*

*Creating a regional
mechanism to prevent
and resolve conflicts is
...identified as a pillar
of a strategy to promote
peace and security in
the sub-region.*

work ethic, low productivity and inefficiency. It is also believed to have undermined corporate and individual initiative (SADC, 1992).

The 1998 SADC Regional Human Development Report investigated the relationship between democratic governance and human development. The report found a positive correlation between levels of democratic governance and levels of human development. In particular, not only did countries with high levels of democratic governance achieve high levels of per capita income, but they also experienced higher rates of economic growth. Regrettably, the report also found that SADC governments were generally far behind in progress towards accountability and participatory democracy. For example, a large section of the population consisting of women, the young and the poor, did not fully participate in the democratic process. This section of the population needs to be fully integrated into the social and political development processes of their countries.

It is widely recognised that the deterioration in human development in the SADC region was also due to other problems that, along with low levels of democratic governance, can be addressed through regional integration. These problems include armed conflicts, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the decline in per capita income and the threat to educational development throughout the SADC region. For a long time Southern Africa has suffered from the effects of armed conflicts. These conflicts have included the campaign of aggression and destabilisation launched by apartheid South Africa in the 1980s against SADC member countries. This campaign clearly had an adverse impact on the economies of the sub-region. For example, it is estimated that between 1980 and 1988 1.5 million people died in the original nine SADC member countries (Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe) as a direct or indirect result of this assault. According to UN and SADC estimates, the economies of the nine countries suffered losses of about US\$62.45 billion over the same period. The worst affected SADC member countries were Angola and Mozambique but the assault created a sense of insecurity which was felt throughout the sub-region, leading to serious socio-economic distortions. Military expenditure, for example, rose substantially across the sub-region and absorbed as much as 40 per cent of the budget in Angola and Mozambique (SADC, 1992). While it was generally anticipated that the demise of apartheid would bring about regional peace, violent conflicts still beset Southern Africa with dire consequences for human development and regional integration.

The resumption of hostilities in Angola following the abortive 1992 election and the recent outbreak of the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo represent continued armed conflicts in the sub-region. There have also been sporadic conflicts between Botswana and Namibia over Sidudu Island and between Angola and Zambia. The 1998 conflict in Lesotho following a general election also represented a threat to regional stability. Creating a regional mechanism to prevent and resolve conflicts is thus identified as a pillar of a strategy to promote peace and security in the sub-region. It is hoped that this will help to minimise the threat of conflicts and to reduce defence expenditure.

Geographically, six of the countries of the sub-region, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe are landlocked. They need to collaborate closely with the coastal states of Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania and South Africa in transport.

In terms of population, the size of most SADC member states is com-

Table 1.2 The Human Development Index and its components for SADC member countries, 1985 to 1992

	Human Development Index				GDP Per Capita (1987 US\$)			Life expectancy (Years)			Adult Literacy Rate %		
	1985	1990	1992	1994	1985	1990	1997	1990	1992	1997	1990	1992	1997
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT													
Seychelles	0.810	0.845	3 513	4 400	4 632	70.0	71.0	71.0	89.0	77.0	84.0
Mauritius	0.682	0.718	0.821	0.831	1 550	2 128	2 752	69.6	70.2	71.4	86.0	81.1	83.0
South Africa	0.678	0.705	0.705	0.716	2 543	2 468	2 336	61.7	62.9	54.7	70.0	80.6	84.0
Swaziland	0.564	0.613	0.522	0.582	693	961	947	56.8	57.5	60.2	72.0	74.0	77.5
Namibia	0.624	0.644	0.611	0.582	1 571	1 515	1 670	57.5	58.8	52.4	40.0	40.0	79.8
Botswana	0.611	0.651	0.763	0.673	1 301	1 781	2 101	59.8	64.9	47.4	73.6	67.2	74.4
Lesotho	0.531	0.561	0.473	0.457	229	286	391	57.3	60.5	56.0	78.0	68.6	82.3
Zimbabwe	0.606	0.599	0.539	0.513	782	842	830	59.6	53.7	44.1	66.9	83.4	90.9
LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT													
DR Congo	0.447	0.450	0.384	0.381	225	190	97	53.0	52.0	50.8	71.8	74.1	77.0
Zambia	0.470	0.451	0.425	0.369	329	302	300	54.4	48.9	40.1	72.8	75.2	75.1
Tanzania	..	0.406	0.364	0.357	..	152	..	54.0	52.1	47.9	65.0	64.4	71.6
Angola	0.291	0.335	832	847	662	45.5	46.5	46.5	41.7	42.5	45.0
Malawi	0.347	0.348	0.330	0.320	159	154	166	48.1	45.6	39.3	47.0	53.9	57.7
Mozambique	0.297	0.328	0.246	0.281	123	173	199	47.5	46.4	32.9	32.9	36.9	40.5

Source: UNDP. *Human Development Reports* (Various Issues).

paratively small (Table 1.3). This implies that the per capita cost of providing infrastructure individually is high. Cost savings or scale gains can be achieved if these countries can co-operate to develop infrastructure.

Most SADC member states are small not only in terms of population size but also in terms of the annual output of goods and services (gross domestic product) and per capita gross domestic product (Table 1.3) This limits the size of the market, making it difficult for them individually to attract and sustain the investment they need for development, growth and restructuring at higher levels of efficiency and productivity.

Continued imbalances in the regional economy, as illustrated by the data in Table 1.3, constitute yet another contributory factor. The data in the table show the large disparities among member countries in terms of physical and economic size, as measured by area, population, real GDP

Table 1.3 SADC member countries – basic indicators, 1998

Country	Population millions	Area 000 sq km	Real GDP US\$ millions at 1995 prices	Real per capita GDP US\$ at 1995 prices	Gini Coefficient (Most recent)	Infant mortality rate (Per 1 000 live births) 1998
Angola	12.1	1 247.0	7 472	618	0.54	170
Botswana	1.6	582.0	4 834	3 021	0.54	38
DR Congo	49.1	2345.0	6 248	127	..	128
Lesotho	2.1	30.0	825	393	0.57	94
Malawi	10.3	118.0	1688	164	0.62	134
Mauritius	1.1	2.0	4 253	3 866	0.52	19
Mozambique	18.9	802.0	3 893	206	..	129
Namibia	1.7	824.0	3 044	1 791	0.70	57
Seychelles	0.1	0.5	535	5 350	0.46	18
South Africa	39.4	1221.0	133 962	3 400	0.59	60
Swaziland	1.0	17.0	1 210	1 210	0.51	64
Tanzania	32.1	945.0	8 828	275	0.38	91
Zambia	8.8	753.0	3 352	381	0.56	112
Zimbabwe	11.4	391.0	6338	556	0.63	59
SADC	189.7	9277.5	20 823	32 535	0.58	54

*South Africa's economy
dominates all other
SADC economies*

*South Africa is a
developing country
with a small enclave of
prosperity, leaving most
South Africans outside
this enclave with little
access to resources and
social amenities.*

and per capita GDP in 1998. The data show the dominance of South Africa in terms of GDP. In the mid-1980s, the value of South Africa's exports to the SADC member states was more than five times her imports from these countries (SADCC, 1988). The gap between South Africa's intra-SADC exports and imports widened further in the 1990s and stood at six to one in 1998. South Africa's economy is also the most sophisticated and diversified.

This pre-eminence of South Africa has created a dependency relationship between South Africa and the rest of the sub-region. Internally, South Africa is a developing country with a small enclave of prosperity, leaving most South Africans outside this enclave with little access to resources and social amenities. Disparities within South Africa are replicated throughout the SADC sub-region in varying degrees as shown by the gini co-efficients in Table 1.3 and also as indicated in Chapter 3. These disparities are a legacy of racism. They cannot be the basis of sustained economic growth and development as they imply that many people are denied economic opportunities.

Often SADC member countries experience unfavourable external factors and other exogenous shocks which adversely affect their economies. Most of them suffer from deteriorating terms of trade (Figure 1.3) due to their dependence on exports of minerals and agricultural products and imports of manufactured goods. They suffer from an unsustainable external debt burden (Figure 1.3) and from periodic droughts which reduce agricultural and livestock output, and make it necessary to import foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials. These factors make it imperative for SADC member countries to transform and restructure their economies to make them more productive, diversified and regionally and globally competitive.

Box 1.2 Dominance of South Africa in the SADC region

Figure 1.1a Percentage share of total SADC exports, 1997






Figure 1.1b Percentage share of total SADC imports, 1997



Source: *Direction of Trade Quarterly* (various)

Figure 1.2 South Africa's share of SADC's GDP and population, 1997




Source: SAKIPS, SAPES databank




Figure 1.3 Terms of trade, external debt service burden and rates of growth of GDP


Average annual change in terms of trade (%), 1991/99




External debt service as % of exports, 1977



Total external debt at a % of GDP, 1998



Average rate of growth of real GDP (%), 1991-99



Source: SARIPS/SAPES databank and African Development Bank, *African Development Report 2000*

IV Pan Africanism

Strengthening Southern African solidarity and creating a Southern African identity are probably the biggest achievements of SADC.

SADC reflects the spirit of Pan Africanism and the ... need for regional integration as the means towards African continental unity and the recovery of African dignity and status in global affairs.

Most of the arguments for regional integration explained above focus on mutual gain but whether mutual gain is the basis for a viable regional integration scheme is questionable. Attempts at regional co-operation and integration are often the result of insecurity felt by two or more states. Examples of this abound in history. These include the American colonies which federated to defend themselves against the colonial power, the well known dominions in the Commonwealth which are unions of different states formed for defence purposes, and the failed Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland which was formed to defend settler interests against African nationalism. The birth of the successful European Union was also due to security considerations — to prevent another war in a continent which had experienced two major wars during the first half of the 20th century. SADC (formerly SADCC) was created as a result of the insecurity and vulnerability of Southern African states due to destabilisation and attacks by the then apartheid South Africa. In light of this hostility, these states felt that solidarity was necessary for their defence and survival. Strengthening this solidarity and creating a Southern African identity are probably the biggest achievements of SADC.

Above all, however, SADC reflects the spirit of Pan Africanism and the latter's preoccupation with the need for regional integration as the means towards African continental unity and the recovery of African dignity and status in global affairs. These are the principles enshrined in both the OAU Treaty of 1963 and the Abuja Treaty of 1991.

Box 1.3 Selected regional integration arrangements among African countries: Membership, objectives, instruments and achievements

MEMBERSHIP		OBJECTIVES	INSTRUMENTS	ACHIEVEMENTS
ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States formed in 1975)				
Benin Burkina Faso Cape Verde Cote d'Ivoire Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea Bissau	Liberia Mali Mauritania Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra Leone Togo	Promote co-operation and development in economic, social and cultural activity; raise the standard of living of the people in member countries; maintain economic stability; eliminate tariffs and other barriers to trade and establish a common market by 1990	Elimination of tariffs and other non-tariff barriers on intra-trade in 10 years; adopt a common external tariff by 1990; labour and development; abolish obstacles to free movement of factors of production; harmonise monetary and fiscal policies	Trade liberalisation programme not fully implemented to date; no national allocations to the fund for compensation development; limited labour mobility
CEAO				
West African Economic Community Formed in 1972 and replaced in 1994 by the West African Monetary Union (WAEMU)				
Benin Burkina Faso Cote d'Ivoire Mali	Mauritania Niger Senegal	Promote co-operation and economic development through trade and community projects; establish a common external tariff	A single tax on intra-trade (replaces customs duties); harmonisation of investment rules; a fund to finance regional projects	Common market not achieved; only 428 products receive regional preferences; some labour mobility



MEMBERSHIP	OBJECTIVES	INSTRUMENTS	ACHIEVEMENTS
MRU (Mano River Union) formed in 1973			
Guinea Sierra Leone Liberia	Promote economic co-operation through the establishment of a customs and economic union	Elimination of tariffs on intra-trade; common external tariff	Common external tariff implementation in 1997; industrial projects in agricultural and energy
CEPGL (Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries) formed in 1976			
Burundi Rwanda DR Congo	Promote economic co-operation and development	Reduce tariff barriers and free factor mobility; joint	Slow progress towards trade liberalisation and factor mobility; industrial projects in agriculture and energy.
UDEAC Central African Customs and Economic Union Formed in 1964 and replaced in 1998 by the Central African Monetary and Economic Community (CEMAC)			
Cameroon Central African Republic Chad DR Congo Equatorial Guinea Gabon	Promote economic development in order to increase living standards; establish a custom-union	A single tax on intra-trade (replaces customs duties); elimination of non-tariff barriers; common investment	No common external tariff; no labour mobility; substantial barriers to intra-trade remain
COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa formed in 1994 - formerly PTA, formed in 1981)			
Angola Burundi Comoros DR Congo Djibouti Egypt Eritrea Ethiopia Kenya Madagascar	Malawi Mauritius Namibia Rwanda Seychelles Sudan Swaziland Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe	Establish a common market; co-operation on monetary and financial matters to pave the way for macro-economic and social development and eventual free movement of people	Multilateral clearing house; tariff reductions; a PTA Trade Bank; a commercial arbitration centre; court of justice
Multilateral clearing house; traveller's cheques; some tariff reductions introduced in 1988; simplification and harmonisation of customs procedures and documents; facilitate intra-regional trade using the Automated System for Customs Data Management			
SADC (Southern African Development Community formed in 1992) (formerly SADCC, formed in 1980)			
Angola Botswana DR Congo South Africa Swaziland Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe	Namibia Seychelles Lesotho Malawi Mauritius Mozambique	To promote co-operation and integration in the Region, sectoral co-ordination and improve transport links	Sector co-ordination units in each member state
Significant improvement in trade links, little progress on intra-regional trade flows			
AMU (Arab Maghreb Union) Formed in 1989			
Algeria Morocco Libya Tunisia Mauritania	To promote co-operation and integration among the Arab States of Northern Africa; to implement progressively free movement of people, goods, services and capital among member countries; to create a customs union by 1995 and common market by 2000	Elimination of customs duties and taxes of equivalent effects; common external tariff; reduce the barriers to intra-regional trade	Dynamism into economic cooperation among the Maghreb countries; trade relations remain largely on a bilateral basis

Source: OECD (1993); for SADC, various sources.



Box 1.4 Major regional integration arrangements involving SADC countries

Country	CBI	CMA	COMESA	CEPGL	ECCAS	IOC	SACU	SADC
Angola			*		*			*
Botswana						*	*	*
DR Congo			*	*	*			*
Lesotho		*					*	*
Malawi	*		*					*
Mauritius	*		*			*		*
Mozambique								*
Namibia	*	*	*				*	*
Seychelles	*		*			*		*
South Africa		*					*	*
Swaziland	*	*	*				*	*
Tanzania	*				*			*
Zambia	*		*					*
Zimbabwe	*		*					*

Key to abbreviations

CBI: Cross-Border Initiative

CMA: Common Monetary Area;

COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern African States

CEPGL: Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries

ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States

IOC: Indian Ocean Council

SACU: Southern African Customs Union

SADC: Southern African Development Community

Source: Adapted from African Development Bank, *African Development Report 2000*

Comment

The information in this box shows that most of the SADC member states belong to two or more of the regional integration organisations. These organisations pursue conflicting rules, obligations and administrative strategies, dissipate the integration efforts of member states, increase the cost of regional integration; serve to reduce potential trading gains from regionalism and undermine incentives for increased investment because internal inconsistencies and conflicting regulations hinder the creation of a larger unified market.



As stated in the framework of co-operation, SADC views its efforts at regional integration as part of the effort to create an African Economic Community (AEC) which will offer a much larger market. This effort to create closer economic relations in Africa, mainly under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), also owes its origins to Pan African solidarity. Both the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980 and the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community which was signed in 1991 and became effective in 1994 make regional economic communities such as SADC the building blocks for the continental community (See boxes 1.3 and 1.4 for regional integration arrangements in Southern Africa and Africa).

V People to people integration

A significant amount of integration in Southern Africa is taking place outside these official efforts through undocumented cross-border trade and illegal movement of labour and people. Often, these processes are aided by parallel markets for foreign exchange which serve to promote currency convertibility. Undocumented cross-border trade may be carried on by small-scale quasi-professional traders, including women, who use various means to move small quantities of goods across national frontiers. Personal relationships with local residents on both sides of the border allow relatively easy movement that can elude control by customs officials. The amounts carried by each individual are not large but in aggregate these flows may be quite significant. Such trade may also be carried out on a large scale by organised professionals. Given the high visibility of goods being transported, large-scale undocumented cross-border trade often requires the participation of government officials and other politically powerful actors.

The types of goods exchanged through undocumented cross-border trade are usually ones where domestic supplies have been affected by government policies. Some are luxury goods, but consumer demand for food, clothing, tools, spare parts and construction materials is also served. The trade in manufactured goods also involves products that actually originate outside the Southern African region. Locally produced agricultural products, minerals and wild animal products enter undocumented cross-border trade because of export restrictions or unfavourable government-fixed producer prices. Exchange rate policies, domestic industry protection, government subsidies and tariffs are among other determinants influencing the direction of undocumented cross-border trade flows. These flows are likely wherever divergent government policies in neighbouring states result in significant differentials between local market prices.

Undocumented cross-border trade is particularly visible among Southern African countries that do not belong to the same monetary or customs union. Divergences in economic policies which result in different price levels are a major incentive to carry goods out or in to take advantage of lower prices. But the price premium is not the only incentive for this. When there are widespread shortages of consumer goods, traders have an incentive for undocumented deals in commodities to bring back goods that are in short supply on the domestic market. Undocumented cross-border trade is also encouraged by restrictions on importing and exporting certain goods. However, people to people integration has been enhanced in the SADC region over the years, through the activities of non-governmental organisations and intellectual organisations like the SAPES Trust, media organisations like MISA, human rights organisations and other bodies with specific regional mandates.

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VI Regionalism for globalisation

The evolution of regional integration in Southern Africa is also taking place against the background of important developments in international economic relations. One is the trend towards regional integration especially, but not only, in Europe, North America and Asia. The reason behind this wave of regionalism does not seem to be definite. Is it a second best solution to the malfunctioning of the multilateral trading system? Does it represent the triumph of the ideology of interdependence? Or is it a manifestation of the dominance of many, not one, trading powers? Whatever the exact reason, worldwide regionalism appears to have made SADC member states mutually vulnerable, making solidarity and collective action for their survival necessary. By increasing the size of markets and hence the scope for economies of scale and competition, regionalism elsewhere can improve the efficiency of firms there. Similarly, firms in SADC can produce on a large scale by supplying a bigger regional market and so become more competitive.

The other development is globalisation. This is a popular term to explain the structure of the world economy today but its meaning and implications, especially for developing countries, are far from clear. This phenomenon is certainly not new since skilled labour migration, trade and investment, the most commonly used measures of globalisation, grew rapidly even in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The latest phase (the 1980s and 1990s) of globalisation represents the acceleration of an old process. This current phase differs from the earlier phases in the following respects:

- Information and communications technologies have led to an unprecedented growth of trade in services and the replacement of mass production methods by flexible production systems.
- There has also been rapid growth in trade in goods, investment, finance and technology flows. Rapid expansion in trade has exposed industries in SADC and other developing countries to intense competition.
- Apart from these features, globalisation has also been associated with:
 - standardising consumer tastes;
 - loss of national sovereignty;
 - liberalising trade, investment and finance;
 - corruption of senior public officials;
 - monopolising scientific knowledge and information;
 - centralising Africa's resources and intensifying exploitation
 - centralising and concentrating wealth
 - rapid accumulation of capital and forming large trading blocs.

SADC... considers regional integration in Southern Africa as a means of globalisation or integration into the world economy.

SADC looks upon globalisation as a given or as something it has to confront. Hence, it considers regional integration in Southern Africa as a means of globalisation or integration into the world economy. Through regional integration, it is argued, regional firms will produce for a larger competitive market, become more efficient through economies of scale and hence will be able to penetrate the global market. Regionalism is not considered as a defensive instrument for protecting local industries. In view of the fact that regionalism is following, rather than leading globalisation, it is particularly desirable to adopt a defensive or closed form of regionalism, instead of open regionalism. The point is to ensure that regionalism does not become the means towards negative globalisation.

Globalisation poses other challenges. Basically, it defines how integrated and marginalised countries and regions of the world are within the larger global economy. So it prescribes the rules and procedures of inclu-

sion and exclusion in terms of which countries and regions wield power and authority in shaping the world economy. In the process, it determines winners and losers in the fast changing post-cold war world order. Thandika Mkandawire aptly observes that 'how Africa goes global will be determined to a large extent by the degree of social cohesion African countries can individually and collectively muster. It is this that will determine whether globalisation is enriching or immiserising' (SAPES, UNDP and SADC, 1998). Box 1.5 summarises the challenges and risks of globalisation to SADC.

The adverse effects of globalisation have combined with the internal problems of weak nation-states in Southern Africa to propel intra-state and inter-state conflicts which have risked tearing the region apart. Although the protracted armed conflicts in Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa were resolved peacefully during the early 1990s, major wars still rage in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. As the 1999 Human Development Report notes, globalisation has given new characteristics to conflicts. Feeding these conflicts is the global traffic in weapons involving new actors and barring political and business interests. In the power vacuum of the post-cold war, military companies and mercenary armies began offering training to governments and corporations. Accountable only to those who pay them, these hired military services pose a severe threat to human security (UNDP, 1999). Surely, violent conflicts and political instability do not augur well for regional integration. To respond effectively to the above challenges, Southern African states must commit themselves in both words and deeds to the noble principles and goals of deep integration.

Box 1.5 Challenges and risks of globalisation

- 1 People being marginalised
- 2 Intensification of resources access and exploitation
- 3 States disintegrate and societies fragment
- 4 Inequality between and within states intensifies
- 5 Progressively weak states and weak societies
- 6 Declining rates of investment and increasing poverty
- 7 Loss of control over biodiversity, other resources, patents and transfer of technology
- 8 Undermining public revenue, exacerbating public debt
- 9 Capital flight and brain drain
- 10 Intensification of unequal relations between North and South.
- 11 Increased exposure to the vagaries of competition and fluctuations in the world economy

Mwesiga Baregu
Professor of Political Science
University of Dar-es-Salaam



Box 1.6 An African view of globalisation

From the African perspective, globalisation is a complex and contradictory process, reflected in the reach and power of multinational corporations. It is the radical division of the world into rich and poor nations, aggregations usually referred to in geopolitical terms as north and south. The disparity of means and power is stunning by any conventional measure of economic and technological distance and military capability. For instance, on a rough estimate, 75 per cent of the world's population in the south accounts for less than 25 per cent of the world's productive output and less than 15 per cent

of global trade.

It is about growing structural differentiation and functional integration in the world economy; it is about growing interdependence across the globe; it is about the nation-state coming under pressure from the surge of transnational phenomena, about the emergence of a global mass culture driven by mass advertising and technical advances in mass communication.

It uniformalises and diversifies, concentrates and de-centres; it universalises but also engenders particularities; it complexifies and simplifies. Always, it is mediated and

differentiated in form and content by historical specificities.

With the transnationalisation of more and more things, especially economic activities, more decisions which are important for our lives are made in distant places, often anonymously by agents and forces we hardly know or control. In so far as more important decisions are beyond us, democratic choices become vacuous.

Claude Ake
Late Director of the Centre
for Advanced Social Science,
Nigeria



VII From functional co-operation to deep integration

Regional integration has been defined as the process by which a geographic region achieves an identity as a community (Chipeta, Imani and CSIR, 1997). This process can be through three alternative approaches.

The first, which is also the most common, is the trade integration approach which focuses on trade liberalisation between member countries and proceeds in linear succession from shallow to deep integration, as follows:

- a preferential trade area, in which tariffs are lowered among members but in which duties are levied on external imports;
- a free trade area in which tariff and non-tariff barriers among members are eliminated;
- a custom-union in which there is free trade among members and common external tariffs;
- a common market in which there is free trade, common external tariffs and free movement of factors of production;
- an economic union in which, in addition to the features of a common market, there is co-ordination and harmonisation of economic and other policies; and
- a political union in which the political institutions of member states are unified or federated.

The second approach is functional co-operation. This approach explicitly avoids trade liberalisation, arguing that the theory of trade integration is most appropriate for developed countries. Instead, it asserts that a priority among developing countries should be to promote projects in the fields of co-operation as a catalyst for regional integration.

The third approach, development integration, is an approach to integrating national economies that combines co-ordination of sector plans and policies with a trade and factor market component (Chr Michelsen Institute, 1986, Mhlongo, 1991).

Faced with economic stagnation and underdevelopment arising from inappropriate production and trade structures, SADC decided that the conventional trade liberalisation approach to integration was not suitable for the sub-region. In SADC, many of the critical barriers to intra-regional trade are capacity related. In other words, they arise from underdeveloped production structures and inadequate infrastructure rather than from tariff or regulatory barriers. The potential for polarisation in a region with economies of different sizes and levels of development is another key consideration. For these reasons, SADC adopted the development integration approach which combines functional co-operation and a trade and factor market integration element. This particular approach starts from the assumption that unequal and uneven development among member countries make it difficult to promote integration through trade liberalisation.

The approach sees deliberate efforts to define the scope and sectors of co-operation and to identify appropriate policies and mechanisms as essential to overcome the structural constraints to the production of and trade in goods and services. The central component of development integration is the co-ordinated development and integration of basic infrastructure, investment and production systems to promote the material production, service and exchange sectors of the regional economy. Hence, it emphasises the need for close political co-operation early in the process of integration, unlike the trade integration approach in which this emerges at a later stage. Furthermore, development integration emphasises the need for equity and balance in regional relations. In this connection, it argues that trade liberalisation should be accompanied by compensatory and corrective measures for the benefit of the least devel-

In SADC, many of the critical barriers to intra-regional trade are capacity related.

The central component of development integration is the co-ordinated development and integration of basic infrastructure, investment and production systems to promote the material production, service and exchange sectors of the regional economy.

...deep integration is the highest form of inter-state or inter-country co-operation, bordering or approximating... the notion of 'union' or 'federation', the kind of unity that is implied in the charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and in the goals of the African Economic Community (AEC).

Regional integration cannot be left to market forces

Regional integration goes beyond trade. It is a means to human development

oped member countries. In addition, it advocates co-ordination of regional industrial development. At an early stage, there is also provision for co-ordination of macroeconomic policies in relation to incentives for investment as well as general economic conditions.

SADC did more than merely adopt the development integration approach. According to the declaration by heads of state or government dated January 1992, SADC decided to promote:

- deeper economic co-operation and integration, on the basis of balance, equity and mutual benefit, providing for cross-border investment and trade, and free movement of factors of production across national frontiers;
- common economic, political and social systems enhancing enterprise and competitiveness, democracy and good governance, respect for the rule of law and the guarantee of human rights, popular participation and alleviation of poverty;
- and strengthen solidarity, peace and security so that people of the region live and work in peace and harmony.

The concept of deep integration transcends the idea of 'development integration' or the relationship between pure trade liberalisation and overall policy co-ordination within a grouping such as SADC, (Lawrence, 1996; Evans, Holmes and Mandaza, 1999). Deep integration is more than regional co-operation: 'essentially it means regional co-operation and liberalisation that go substantially beyond General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organisation (WTO) commitments in the breadth and depth of areas covered and in the mechanisms for reaching and enforcing common decisions' (Evans, Holmes and Mandaza, 1999). For deep integration to be effective, there must either be an unequivocal and unhesitant political commitment to internal liberalisation by the member states or a set of strong supra-national rules. But shallow integration — removing border barriers and national treatment — does not create genuinely integrated markets. On the contrary, deep integration is the highest form of inter-state or inter-country co-operation, bordering or approximating as it does the notion of 'union' or 'federation', the kind of unity that is implied in the charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and in the goals of the African Economic Community (AEC). The Windhoek Treaty does in principle commit SADC to economic integration on a wide and deep range of fronts (See Box 1.7). This is different from 'fast trade liberalisation' and therefore we need political co-operation for deep integration to succeed.

This is a full agenda which goes beyond creating a free trade area but for which free trade is an essential precondition. It is an agenda for deep integration. The activities of SADC demonstrate that the region is, in principle, committed to concerted action on the series of fronts represented by the sectors chosen for policy development (See Figure 1.5).

All these themes have a marked cross-border aspect. They are all classic areas where there is reason to suppose that market forces, whilst important, may not always do the job without help and where purely voluntary co-operation among states or between states and the private sector is likely to be inadequate. Also, as some analysts of integration in Africa have argued, infrastructure co-ordination may well actually be even more important than the removal of trade barriers.

SADC has clear integration ambitions that go beyond trade and are symbiotic with trade aims but it needs to be able to proceed more deeply and broadly to achieve both its narrow trade aims and broader developmental goals. Shortly, we will refer to the challenges and political obstacles we need to overcome. At this juncture we would like to point out

that, like human development, deep integration more or less covers all development issues in society. Similarly, it focuses on expanding income and all other human choices. These similarities are evident from the objectives and strategies of SADC — as contained in the treaty that set up the organisation in 1992, in the areas of co-operation specified in the treaty and in the sectors selected for co-operation, all of which have been described above. This relationship between human development and deep integration suggests that the two phenomena share similar concerns and may reinforce each other. These related phenomena also represent some of the major challenges that the SADC sub-region is facing.

Box 1.7: The Windhoek Treaty and its objectives

The treaty defines the objectives of the community as to:

- achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration.
- evolve common political values, systems and institutions.
- promote and defend peace and security.
- promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance, and the inter-dependence of member states.
- achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes.
- promote and maximise productive employment and use of resources of the region.
- achieve sustainable use of natural resources and effective protection of the environment.
- strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the region.


Among the ways to do this are to:

- harmonise political and socio-economic policies and plans of member states.
- create appropriate institutions and mechanisms to mobilise required resources to implement the programmes and operations of SADC and its institutions.
- develop policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to free movement of capital and labour, goods and services, and of the peoples of the region generally among member states.
- promote the development of human resources.
- promote the development, transfer and mastery of technology.
- improve economic management and performance through regional co-operation.
- promote the co-ordination and harmonisation of the international relations of member states.
- develop such other activities as member states may decide to further the objectives of SADC.


Source: Treaty of the Southern African Development Community



Figure 1.4: SADC organisational structure



Source: The official *SADC Trade, Industry and Investment Review*



Source: The official *SADC Trade, Industry and Investment Review*

VIII Translating objectives into action

SADC was born and bred in the context of immense political solidarity — Pan Africanism — that was generated and reinforced by the struggle against white settlers, colonialism and apartheid.

Unlike the European Union whose origins and historical development were premised on the fear of another war in Europe, SADC was born and bred in the context of immense political solidarity — Pan Africanism — that was generated and reinforced by the struggle against white settlers, colonialism and apartheid. Whereas the predecessor to SADC, the SADCC, was based upon the political solidarity of nation states, successful economic integration through SADC will require political solidarity through supra-nationalism. This is because supra-nationalism requires transcending 'national interests'. National interests will in effect be enhanced through some sacrifice of the principles of sovereignty in the pursuit of regional economic reciprocity. In this regard, supra-nationalism is akin to deep integration; it is the pooling of sovereignty on a wide range of policy issues.

No doubt political solidarity and political co-operation have been the main characteristics of international relations in Southern Africa and may turn out to have given an important headstart to the more difficult and complex process towards deep integration in the sub-region. In the meantime, however, the obvious merits of political solidarity have tended to cloud the historical reality that will have to be confronted if regional economic integration is to be achieved in SADC. In general, political co-operation has been conflated with economic integration per se, at least in the minds of many SADC politicians. We need to go beyond political co-operation through definitive legal, institutional, technical and economic or trade arrangements that prescribe the parameters and content of regional integration.

So the challenge for SADC in the current historical conjuncture might be summarised as the need to overcome a deep-seated psychological and political mindset that views political co-operation as synonymous with regional economic integration, almost becoming a self-defence against the development of an institutional framework that would in effect guide and assist SADC towards that goal. However, this might also be a reflection of the lack of economic capacity for economic integration and, more importantly, of the absence of the political will to acknowledge and thereby also confront these historical and economic constraints for rapid integration in the region, towards deep integration per se.

IX SADC: Challenges for deep integration

The challenge now facing SADC is to bring the political solidarity that has been achieved to bear on the economic integration of the region.

Therefore, the main underlying historical, economic and political factors that impact the SADC countries' capacity to enhance the degree of co-operation and deep integration are:

- 1 the problem of vertical integration into the northern hemisphere: this is particularly so with respect to the African economies which are largely the colonial type, dependent and devoted to the export of raw materials and therefore failing to industrialise; in Southern Africa (especially, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique), 'integration' into Europe was almost complete because of white settler colonialism and its objective of creating white dominions;
- 2 the problem of unequal and uneven development between and within African countries: for example, in Southern Africa this imposes an obvious hierarchy of power which, if not managed well, could undermine regional co-operation and deep integration; and
- 3 the problem of the nation-state-in-the-making: most states in Africa are too fragile and none have got the full confidence to enter into supra-national arrangements.

Notwithstanding these problems, the existence of SADC itself constitutes not only a statement of intent and resolve to overcome the burden of history but also an acknowledgement of the immense benefits of regional economic integration. As already stated, the SADC Treaty itself

and its various instruments — including the SADC trade protocol — constitute both a genuine commitment to development integration and an important step in the direction of deep integration. The challenge now is how SADC can develop the political consensus it needs among its member states and the technical capacity among those charged with the responsibility for such a task, towards both an unequivocal commitment to deep integration and the full acceptance of the inevitable but short-lived political costs of such an undertaking. The vagueness of many of the provisions in the SADC Treaty itself, the inadequacies in both the SADC's institutional framework and its programme of action, and even the ambivalence and half-hearted intentions in the SADC trade protocol — all describe a sub-region needing to swim with the tide towards deeper integration and yet somewhat hesitant to take the plunge.

X Links between regional integration and human development

*Removal of barriers to trade
in transport,
communication, energy
and agriculture all
benefit human
development.*

*The static and dynamic
gains and losses from
deeper forms of
integration are likely to
be larger.*

How do cross border trade, investment and movement of labour and people across national frontiers generally affect empowerment of people, their access to resources for a decent standard of living, their access to knowledge and a long and healthy life? This is the basic question we must seek answers for in addressing links between regional integration and human development.

Under the SADC Protocol on Trade, which is being implemented, tariff and non-tariff barriers will be brought down within the sub-region. The protocol is expected to lead to an expansion in trade within SADC from regional production but not to replacement of imports from outside SADC with regional products. This short-run or static effect will be beneficial to the extent that extra imports from the sub-region will displace dearer products from domestic industries.

The SADC free trade area may also have other important effects due to the larger market. First, integration under the SADC free trade area is likely to promote competition which will affect prices and costs, and the growth of output and employment. Secondly, if there are economies of scale, the unit costs of production will fall and drive down prices which will benefit consumers. Thirdly, enlarging the market within SADC is likely to attract regional and international investment which will create employment and income. These three are known as long run or dynamic effects. But while there are likely to be static and dynamic gains from intra-regional trade, there is nothing in the theory of regional integration which says that the gains will be equitably distributed. Moreover, the gains from trade, based on specialisation, may be offset by welfare losses of unemployment and deterioration in the terms of trade.

The static and dynamic gains and losses from deeper forms of integration are likely to be larger. Consider, for example, the case of a customs union where removal of internal barriers to trade are accompanied by the erection of a common external tariff. In this situation, cheaper foreign goods will be replaced by domestic products and consumers will buy relatively cheaper products from other customs union member countries. This is the trade creation effect. But in a related development, cheaper goods from the rest of the world will be replaced by more expensive goods from within the customs union and consumers will suffer a loss by having to pay more for more expensive goods from the customs union. This represents the trade diversion effect. A customs union is likely to be beneficial if, on balance, it results in more trade creation than trade diversion. As with any other deep form of integration, it is also likely to be beneficial if it is accompanied by co-ordination and harmonisation of macroeconomic policies. Price stability resulting from policy co-

ordination and harmonisation should give rise to an increase in real income while exchange rate stability resulting from the same should stimulate trade and investment.

Conventional regional integration theory ignores the contribution that regional export growth makes to supply of output, especially by providing the foreign exchange to pay for imports of consumption, investment and government expenditure. Many SADC countries are constrained in their growth performance by a shortage of foreign exchange. They can therefore grow faster with more regional exports.

Improvements in transport and communications through regional co-operation should help to reduce transaction costs and hence increase competitiveness of regional economies

Also ignored by conventional regional integration theory is the contribution that functional co-operation can make to human development. Improvements in transport and communications through regional co-operation should help to reduce transaction costs and hence increase competitiveness of regional economies. Co-operation in energy and water should help to increase quantity, reduce cost and improve reliability of supply. In agriculture, benefits from co-operation include improvements in food security and prevent loss of animal life through disease control. The benefits from co-operation in other fields may be less obvious but they do exist. These include improvement in services by adopting better practices and policies, increases in output of skilled labour through joint education and training programmes, and so on.

Another limitation of the theory of regional integration is that it does not explain how integration affects longevity and education. According to conventional wisdom, integration does not directly influence longevity or education. It affects longevity indirectly through increases in income which enable individuals to increase expenditure on nutritious foodstuffs and on health services. It also affects longevity indirectly by increasing the capacity (through direct taxation) of governments to expand health services. The correlation between income and education has been found to be weak, implying that mere availability of resources is not the overriding factor. Policy decisions to expand enrolment are the more important factor.

SADC has established an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security as a basis for continuing political solidarity and co-operation. The aim here is to guarantee peace by minimising conditions which can lead to national and regional instability and insecurity. Peace will promote human development in the sub-region to the extent that it will avoid destroying infrastructure, disrupting the provision of social and economic services and escalating military expenditures.

Skilled labour is relatively scarce throughout the sub-region. The employment of this labour in receiving countries helps to improve human development through increases in national income and the provision of social and economic services. In the sending countries, emigration of skilled labour undermines human development through a reduction in domestic income and the provision of social and other services. Receipt of migrants' remittances may or may not offset this adverse consequence. Semi-skilled and unskilled labour is relatively abundant in the sub-region. In receiving countries, migrant semi-skilled and unskilled labour competes with local labour and puts downward pressure on wages. The pressure on wages and on social services undermines human development. Often semi-skilled and unskilled people end up in the ranks of the unemployed. On their part, sending countries are deprived of labour which undermines the development of their own economies.

Regional integration can ... impact positively on human development if it results in an increase in regional output, and hence in employment and income, and if it results in a reduction in product prices.

Regional integration can thus impact positively on human development if it results in an increase in regional output, and hence in employment and income, and if it results in a reduction in product prices. It can also impact positively on human development if it stimulates cross-border investment and promotes productive labour migration.

There is a view that regional integration can also undermine human development by facilitating the spread of small arms, diseases, transnational crime and the growth of drug trafficking. However, the benefits of regional integration far outweigh such negative aspects as long as the benefits are balanced and equitable. As outlined in the *African Development Report 2000* and the study, *SADC: The Cost of Non-integration*, regional integration is essential for human development. Indeed, this is the central import in this *SADC Regional Human Development Report*.


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Chapter 2

Human development and regional integration Achievements and setbacks



I Chapter 1 presents the historical context of relatively low human development in the SADC sub-region. This is the economic, social and political context within which the human development situation in the sub-region is being examined. It is a region striving to improve human development against the background of economic stagnation, inequalities between and within states, inadequate popular participation in decision-making, and an unfavourable external environment characterised by worsening terms of trade and high external debt service burdens, as well as conflicts and insecurity. In this connection, SADC is attempting a transition from a shallow form of regional integration to deep integration to achieve equitable and sustainable human development.

II The 1998 *Regional Human Development Report* stated that despite the many economic, social and political challenges, until the mid-1990s, long-term achievements were impressive in aspects of human development. Since independence, progress had been made towards universal access to primary education and enrolment rates had increased markedly. As a consequence, between 1970 and 1995, adult literacy in the sub-region had increased from 48 per cent to 71 per cent. In addition, people in the sub-region could expect to live 11 years longer than 35 years earlier. The infant mortality rate had fallen from a sub-regional average of 131 in 1970 to 105 per 1 000 live births in 1996 and the percentage of people with access to safe drinking water had increased in most countries, as had the percentage of people with access to health services and to sanitation. Since about 1995, the infant mortality rate has continued to fall, as the percentage of people with access to safe drinking water, to health services and to sanitation has increased. And the number of people living in human poverty, as defined below, has decreased from two-fifths in the mid-1990s to one-third.

Despite these achievements in human development, many challenges remain. The average combined gross enrolment ratio and the adult literacy rate were lower in 1998 than in 1995. The average life expectancy in 1998 was 49 years as against 54 years in 1990. This decline in average life expectancy was largely due to HIV/AIDS. Meanwhile, the proportion of underweight children below five years remained at about one-fifth. With respect to income, average per capita GDP in US dollar purchasing power parity terms was lower in 1998 than in 1995. As a result of these setbacks, human development has come under threat in the SADC region.

III The first SADC regional human development report published in 1998 introduced the SADC-specific Human Development Index (HDI), the Gender-related Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), as well as these measures adjusted for the pattern of income distribution. These human development indices referred to 1995. This regional human development report presents indicators for 1995, 1997 and 1998. Since their construction is based on a new methodology and revised data on per capita gross domestic product (GDP) based on purchasing power parity (PPP) and current international US dollar terms, these indicators are not comparable with the 1995 indicators used in the 1998 regional human development report. These measures are also not comparable with the global indicators because of

differences in the level of the maximum income per capita and in the gender inequality aversion factor used in constructing them. As regards the Human Poverty Index (HPI), there is no comparability problem because the one used in the report is extracted from the global report.

The Human Development Index, Gender-related Human Development Index, Human Poverty Index and Gender Empowerment Measure are used to assess different aspects of human development. The Human Development Index, Gender-related Human Development Index and Gender Empowerment Measure are composite indicators which range from zero to one and show the length travelled in each aspect. The Human Poverty Index ranges from 100 per cent to zero. The Human Development Index, Gender-related Human Development Index and Human Poverty Index look at the same dimensions but use different indicators to measure them as shown in Table 1.1. Indices of a particular area or region must reflect the major and peculiar socioeconomic aspects of the region and also its level of development. In the case of the SADC region, the indices reflect a lower maximum income per capita and higher gender and income inequalities than the global indicators.

IV Use of the human development indices

The four human development indices are useful policy making tools. They enable people and their governments to evaluate progress over time and to determine priorities for policy intervention. When disaggregated, they can also be used to show disparities in human development between rural and urban areas, districts, males and females and also language groups. Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe are some of the SADC countries which have disaggregated their human development indices to these levels. But since they cannot exhaustively show all aspects of human development, other indicators should complement these indices.

V The Human Development Index Human development performance in SADC

Only Seychelles is in the high human development category...seven SADC countries are in the medium human development category... whilst six countries are in the low human development category

The SADC-specific Human Development Index reveals that for 1998 the SADC region has a Human Development Index of 0.538. Seychelles has the highest Human Development Index value of 0.808, followed by Mauritius with 0.782 and then South Africa with 0.718. At the lower end are Mozambique with 0.350, Malawi with 0.393 and Angola with 0.419 as shown in Table 2.1. Seychelles has a shortfall in human development of about 19 per cent whereas Mozambique with the lowest Human Development Index has a shortfall of 65 per cent. Only Seychelles is in the high human development category (with an index of 0.800-1.000). Seven SADC countries are in the medium human development category (with an index value of 0.500 - 0.799) whilst six countries are in the low human development category as shown in Table 2.1. The SADC region as a whole falls in the medium human development category.

The SADC-specific Human Development Index has been adjusted by multiplying the income component by one minus the gini coefficient¹ to take into account inequality in the distribution of income. Table 2.2 presents the SADC-specific human development indices with and without adjustment for inequality in income distribution and also the gini coefficients for SADC countries. For the twelve SADC countries with data on gini coefficients, this adjustment reduces their Human Development Index values significantly.

¹ The gini coefficient measures the extent to which distribution of income among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A gini coefficient of zero represents total equality whilst that of 1 implies complete inequality.

Table 2.1 SADC countries human development indices and human development categories, 1998

HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT CATEGORY (0.800-1.000)		
HDI rank	Country	HDI
1	Seychelles	0.808
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT CATEGORY (0.500 - 0.799)		
HDI rank	Country	HDI
2	Mauritius	0.782
3	South Africa	0.718
4	Swaziland	0.672
5	Namibia	0.651
6	Botswana	0.613
7	Lesotho	0.583
8	Zimbabwe	0.570
	SADC	0.538
LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT CATEGORY (0.200-0.499)		
HDI rank	Country	HDI
9	DR Congo	0.440
10	Zambia	0.429
11	Tanzania	0.422
12	Angola	0.419
13	Malawi	0.393
14	Mozambique	0.350

Source: SARIPS/SAPES databank

Country	HDI	Life expectancy at birth (years)	Adult literacy rate (%)	
1	Seychelles	0.808	0.770	0.47
2	Mauritius	0.782	0.738	0.52
3	South Africa	0.718	0.665	0.59
4	Swaziland	0.672	0.629	0.51
5	Namibia	0.651	0.578	0.70
6	Botswana	0.613	0.566	0.54
7	Lesotho	0.583	0.532	0.57
8	Zimbabwe	0.570	0.510	0.63
9	Tanzania	0.422	0.393	0.38
10	Zambia	0.429	0.387	0.50
11	Angola	0.419	0.372	0.54
12	Malawi	0.393	0.335	0.62
	DR Congo	0.440
	Mozambique	0.350
	SADC	0.538	0.505	0.58


Source: SARIPS/SAPES databank

Table 2.3 SADC-specific human development index and rank: SADC countries, 1998

Country	HDI	GDP per capita ppp	Income rank	HDI rank
Seychelles	0.808	10 600	1	1
Mauritius	0.782	8 312	2	3
South Africa	0.718	8 488	3	2
Swaziland	0.672	3 816	4	6
Namibia	0.651	5 176	5	5
Botswana	0.613	6 103	6	4
Lesotho	0.583	1 626	7	9
Zimbabwe	0.570	2 669	8	7
DR Congo	0.440	822	9	10
Zambia	0.429	719	10	12
Tanzania	0.422	480	11	14
Angola	0.419	1 821	12	8
Malawi	0.393	523	13	13
Mozambique	0.350	782	14	11
SADC	0.538	2 663	—	—

Source: SARIPS/SAPES databank

Figure 2.1 Angola, Tanzania and Zambia: Similar HDI but different incomes, 1998



Source: SARIPS/SAPES databank

There is a high positive correlation between human development and income in the SADC region, with a correlation coefficient² of 0.92. Even though there is this general strong relationship, there are exceptions — a higher income in Angola than in Tanzania and Zambia does not necessarily mean a higher level of human development (see Table 2.3 and Figure 2.1). These three countries have a similar level of human development but different incomes, implying that higher income in Angola has not been transformed into better human development.

² The correlation coefficient measures the relationship between two variables. It ranges from -1 to 1. A correlation coefficient of 0.92 shows a very strong positive relationship

Between 1995 and 1998 the Human Development Index of the SADC sub-region declined by 5.3 per cent.

Human development deteriorated in eight countries between 1995 and 1998


Figure 2.2 shows that in six SADC countries, namely Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, the human development indices fell between 1995 and 1997 and also between 1997 and 1998. In Angola, Seychelles and South Africa the human development indices fell then rose between these periods. In Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho and Namibia, human development indices rose between 1995 and 1997 and then fell between 1997 and 1998, whilst in Seychelles it rose continuously during these periods.

Figure 2.2 and Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show the changes in human development indices between 1995, 1997 and 1998. (See Annex Tables 1 to 3 for levels of life expectancy, combined gross enrolment ratio, adult literacy and GDP per capita in US dollar purchasing power parity terms for 1998, 1997 and 1995.) Between 1995 and 1998 the Human Development Index of the SADC sub-region declined by 5.3 per cent.

This was caused by a fall in all components of life expectancy, adult literacy, gross enrolment and income of 5.95 per cent, 4.51 per cent, 2.22 per cent and 7.80 per cent, respectively. Life expectancy for the region has been falling due to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Only in Mauritius and Swaziland did life expectancies rise during this period.

Human development deteriorated in eight countries between 1995 and 1998, namely the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Botswana and Malawi. The highest fall of 12.81 per cent was in the Democratic Republic of Congo, followed by Angola with a fall of 6.58 per cent and South Africa with a fall of 5.23 per cent. The Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia had all

Figure 2.2 SADC-specific HDI changes, 1995, 1997 and 1998



Source: SARIPS/SAPES databank

Although Lesotho had the highest improvement in human development, it experienced a decline in life expectancy.

their components falling. Angola's fall is due to a fall in income which is the highest in the region and also a fall in enrolment, which is the second highest in the region. South Africa has the highest fall in life expectancy in the region between 1995 and 1998. Its income also declined between 1995 and 1998. Zimbabwe's deterioration in human development was due to the decline in life expectancy and enrolment.

Lesotho, Mauritius, Swaziland, Mozambique, Seychelles and Tanzania in that order saw their human development situation improving between 1995 and 1998. Although Lesotho had the highest improvement in human development, it experienced a decline in life expectancy. All Mauritius' components improved whilst Swaziland had a fall in enrolment and income. Tanzania, like Botswana, had all its components improving except life expectancy.

Table 2.4 Changes in the SADC-specific Human Development Index between 1995 and 1998

HDI Rank 1998	Country	HDI 1995	HDI 1997	HDI 1998	Absolute change in HDI 1995-1998
1	Seychelles	0.805	0.793	0.808	0.003
2	Mauritius	0.767	0.778	0.782	0.015
3	South Africa	0.758	0.725	0.718	-0.040
4	Swaziland	0.666	0.671	0.672	0.006
5	Namibia	0.672	0.660	0.651	-0.021
6	Botswana	0.627	0.616	0.613	-0.014
7	Lesotho	0.565	0.593	0.583	0.018
8	Zimbabwe	0.593	0.583	0.570	-0.023
9	DR Congo	0.505	0.487	0.440	-0.065
10	Zambia	0.450	0.428	0.429	-0.021
11	Tanzania	0.422	0.417	0.422	0.000
12	Angola	0.448	0.415	0.419	-0.029
13	Malawi	0.394	0.395	0.393	-0.001
14	Mozambique	0.348	0.350	0.350	0.002
	SADC	0.568	0.552	0.538	-0.030

Source: SARIPS/SAPES databank

Table 2.5 Changes in Human Development Index components between 1995 and 1998 as percentages

	Life expectancy	Adult literacy	Gross enrolment ratio	GDP per capita (PPP)	HDI
Seychelles	-1.39	-4.55	24.59	2.42	0.40
Mauritius	0.99	1.09	3.28	11.12	1.95
South Africa	-17.00	3.42	17.28	-1.10	-5.23
Swaziland	3.23	2.09	-6.49	-3.34	0.93
Namibia	-10.22	6.32	1.20	-2.47	-3.19
Botswana	-10.64	8.31	0.00	5.88	-2.25
Lesotho	-4.99	15.57	1.79	13.71	3.11
Zimbabwe	-11.04	2.47	-1.45	6.25	-3.81
DR Congo	-2.29	-23.80	-19.51	-13.20	-12.81
Zambia	-5.15	-2.43	-5.77	-1.91	-4.62
Tanzania	-5.34	8.55	0.00	4.12	0.03
Angola	-0.84	0.00	-16.67	-26.69	-6.58
Malawi	-3.66	3.19	-1.32	-6.95	-0.23
Mozambique	-5.40	5.49	0.00	-21.43	0.69
SADC	-5.95	-4.51	-2.22	-7.80	-5.30

Source: SARIPS/SAPES databank

Incomes per capita falling in SADC

The SADC region's life expectancy ...has been falling mainly because of the HIV/AIDS pandemic

Table 2.6 Changes in Human Development Index rank: SADC countries, 1995, 1997 and 1998

	1995 HDI rank	1997 HDI rank	1998 HDI rank
Seychelles	1	1	1
Mauritius	2	2	2
South Africa	3	3	3
Swaziland	5	4	4
Namibia	4	5	5
Botswana	6	6	6
Lesotho	8	7	7
Zimbabwe	7	8	8
DR Congo	10	9	9
Zambia	9	10	10
Tanzania	11	11	11
Angola	12	12	12
Malawi	13	13	13
Mozambique	14	14	14

Source: SARIPS/SAPES databank

As shown in Table 2.6, Seychelles has been the region's number one in terms of human development since 1995. South Africa, Botswana, Tanzania, Angola, Malawi and Mozambique maintained their Human Development Index ranks in 1995, 1997 and 1998. Swaziland, Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of Congo improved their ranks by one between 1995 and 1997. Namibia and Zimbabwe worsened by one position during the same period. Seychelles rose from the medium development category into the high human development category between 1997 and 1998. This is mainly because of its improvements in enrolment, which was the highest in the region between 1995 and 1998.

Comparing the SADC region with other regions

Table 2.6 shows that the SADC region's level of human development is higher than that of sub-Saharan Africa, ECOWAS³ and COMESA⁴ but it is lower than that of other regions such as South Asia, East Asia, all developing countries and that of the whole world. The SADC region's life expectancy, which has been falling mainly because of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, is now lower than those of the other regions except sub-Saharan Africa. ECOWAS and COMESA's life expectancies at birth are slightly higher than that of the SADC region. On enrolment the pattern is the same as it is for human development. However, SADC's literacy rate and GDP per capita exceed those of both sub-Saharan Africa, ECOWAS, COMESA and South Asia. For all components of the Human Development Index, the SADC region is well below the world average.

³ECOWAS includes 15 countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Liberia and Togo.

⁴COMESA includes 20 countries: Angola, Burundi, Comoros, DR Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe

Table 2.7 The Human Development Index and its components in selected regions of the world, 1998

	SADC	Sub-Saharan Africa	ECOWAS*	COMESA	South Asia	East Asia	All developing countries	World
Life expectancy (years)	49.00	48.9	50.5	51.6	63.0	70.2	64.7	66.9
Adult literacy, %	67.3	58.5	51.2	46.9	54.3	83.4	72.3	78.8
Combined gross enrolment ratio %	51.1	42	38.7	35.0	52	73	60	64
GDP per capita US\$ (PPP)	2663	1607	1012	1712	2112	3564	3270	6526
HDI	0.548	0.464	0.424	0.361	0.560	0.716	0.642	0.712

Note

The HDI values in this table are taken from the global *Human Development Report 2000* and are therefore not comparable with the SADC-specific HDI values. The SADC region's HDI in this table is comparable to that of the other regions. The table shows the relative level of human development in the various regions.

* Ecowas excludes Liberia

Source: UNDP, *Human Development Report 2000* and SARIPS/SAPES Databank

Table 2.8 Lesotho national and regional human development indices based on literacy in Sesotho and English and GDP, 1997

Region	Sesotho liter. and GDP based HDI	English literacy and GDP based HDI
Northern Lowlands	0.4978	0.4222
Southern Lowlands	0.4822	0.3844
Foothills	0.4867	0.3800
Senqu River Valley	0.4711	0.3711
Mountains	0.4600	0.3578
National	0.4833	0.3899

Source: UNDP 1998, *Human Development Report Lesotho*, 1998

VI Disaggregated human development indices

Disaggregated human development indices are important policy-making tools at sub-national level as they highlight the differences in terms of human development at this level.

Lesotho has constructed a Human Development Index by language groups and regions as shown in Table 2.8. Their Human Development Index reflects literacy in English as well as the local language and literacy in the local language is higher than in English. Mozambique has published human development indices by regions as shown in Table 2.9. It shows that the largest human development disparities in Mozambique are not between the southern provinces and the centre and the north as widely believed, but between Maputo city and the rest of the country. Maputo city enjoys a level of human development that is more than twice as high as that of most other provinces. The capital city is in the medium human development category whilst the other ten provinces are in the low human development category. Disaggregated human development indices are important policy-making tools at sub-national level as they highlight the differences in terms of human development at this level.

Table 2.9 The Human Development Index by regions: Mozambique, 1998

Region/Province	HDI value
North	0.212
Niassa	0.227
Cabo Delgado	0.204
Nampula	0.200
Centre	0.267
Zambezia	0.176
Tete	0.287
Manica	0.340
Sofala	0.305
South	0.427
Inhambane	0.306
Gaza	0.303
Maputo province	0.410
Maputo city	0.605
Mozambique	0.285

Source: Mozambique, *National Human Development Report, 1999* — Annex Table 5

VII Human poverty

Poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon that is reflected in malnutrition, poor health, low survival rates, low literacy levels, inadequate clothing, housing and living conditions and so on, apart from low incomes. The 1990 *World Development Report* defined poverty as the 'inability to attain a minimal standard of living measured in terms of basic consumption needs or income required to satisfy them.' According to this definition poverty is measured in terms of income or the percentage of people below a certain income level, whilst the former concept measures it as deprivation in basic dimensions necessary for human life. The global *Human Development Report 1997* introduced the Human Poverty Index which measures poverty in three dimensions— a long and healthy life, knowledge and economic provisioning. Deprivation of a healthy and long life is measured by the percentage of newborns not expected to survive to age 40 years, deprivation in knowledge by illiteracy and deprivation in economic provisioning by the percentage of people lacking access to health services and safe water and the number of children who are moderately or severely underweight.

Table 2. 10 The Human Poverty Index (HPI) for SADC, 1998

Country	Rank	Human Poverty Index (HPI-1) value (%)	% of newborns not expected to survive to total age 40 years	Adult illiteracy rate (%)	Population without access to safe water (%)	Population without access to health services (%)	Under-weight children under five years
	1998	1998	1998	1990-98	1981-93	1990-98	1990-98
Angola	1	54.7	37.7	58.0	69	76	42
Mozambique	2	50.7	41.9	57.7	54	70	26
Malawi	3	41.9	47.5	41.8	53	20	30
Zambia	4	37.8	46.2	23.7	62	25	24
Zimbabwe	5	30.0	41	12.8	21	29	15
Tanzania	6	29.2	35.4	26.4	34	7	27
Namibia	7	28.6	33.5	19.2	17	45 ^a	26
Botswana	8	28.3	37.1	24.4	10	14	17
Swaziland	9	27.3	20.2	21.7	50	45	10
Lesotho	10	23.3	26	17.6	38	20	16
South Africa	11	20.2	25.9	15.4	13	25	9
Mauritius	12	11.5	4.8	16.2	2	1	16
DR Congo	31.7	41.1	32
Seychelles	16	..	1	6
SADC		31.5	35.3	29.0	35.4	31.3	21.7

Source: UNDP, *Human Development Report, 2000* and SARIPS/SAPES databank

Note: The HPI for Namibia has been recalculated using a more up to date statistic on percentage of households without access to health facilities.

^a Namibia *Human Development Report, 1999*


In 1998, about a third of the people in the SADC region were living in poverty.

...human poverty increased in Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe between 1995 and 1998.

In 1998 about a third of the people in the SADC region were living in poverty. Angola and Mozambique were the most deprived nations in terms of survival, knowledge and economic provisioning with about half of their populations in human poverty — 54.7 per cent and 50.7 per cent respectively as shown in Table 2.10. On the other hand the country with the lowest level of human poverty was Mauritius with only 11.6 per cent of its people in poverty, followed by South Africa with 20.2 per cent and Lesotho with 23.3 per cent. Angola's high human poverty was due to high levels of deprivation in all areas except survival. Angola had an adult illiteracy rate of 58 per cent, 69 per cent of population without access to safe water, 76 per cent of the population without access to health services and 42 per cent of children under the age of five underweight. Almost all of Mauritius' population had access to safe water and health services.

The level of human poverty in the SADC region decreased from 39.9 per cent in 1995 to 31.5 per cent in 1998. However, human poverty increased in Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe between 1995 and 1998 as shown in Figure 2.3. In Malawi, Tanzania, Swaziland and Mauritius poverty levels have declined continuously between 1995 and 1998. In Mozambique, Namibia and Lesotho poverty levels fell between 1995 and 1997 but increased between 1997 and 1998.

Figure 2.3 Trends in human poverty, 1995-1998



Source: UNDP Human Development Report, 1997, 1999 and 2000

VIII Gender inequality and human development

*SADC ... is one of the
regions in the world
which has committed
itself to achieving
gender equality.*

The issue of gender inequality is pertinent to SADC's development and integration efforts and it is one of the regions in the world which has committed itself to achieving gender equality. In order to improve gender empowerment in the region, the SADC Council of Ministers in 1997 adopted a policy and institutional framework which consists of:

- A committee of ministers responsible for Gender/Women's Affairs;
- An advisory committee consisting of government and non-governmental organisation representatives from each SADC member state;
- A gender unit at the SADC secretariat; and
- Gender focal points in the sector co-ordinating units.

Box 2.1 gives an account of women and empowerment in Southern Africa. A summary analysis of policy and institutional frameworks for gender in SADC member states is given in Box 2.2.

A Declaration on Gender and Development which was signed by the SADC heads of state and government in Blantyre, Malawi, in 1997 committed SADC countries to the following, among others:

- Achieving at least 30 per cent representation of women in political and decision-making structures by 2005;
- Promoting women's full access to and control over productive resources to reduce the level of poverty among women;
- Repealing and reforming all laws, amending the constitutions and changing social practices which still subject women to discrimination;
- Taking urgent measures to prevent and deal with the increasing levels of violence against women and children.

IX Measuring gender inequalities Gender-related Development Index

The Gender-related Human Development Index measures achievement in the same dimensions as the Human Development Index but adjusts the result for gender inequality. The dimensions are longevity, knowledge and decent standard of living which are measured by life expectancy, educational attainment and income respectively (see Technical note 2). Since all countries have some degree of gender inequality this means that the Gender-related Human Development Index is always lower than the Human Development Index. If there was gender equality, the Gender-related Human Development Index would equal the Human Development Index. In 1998 Mauritius had the highest Gender-related Human Development Index of 0.765, followed by South Africa with 0.706 and Swaziland with 0.659. Mozambique had the lowest Gender-related Human Development Index of 0.320, followed by Malawi with 0.370 and Tanzania with 0.411 as shown in Table 2.11. As with the Human Development Index, adjustment for income distribution reduces Gender-related Human Development Index values.

Changes in the
gender-related
Development Index
between 1995 and 1998

Table 2.12 shows the percentage change in the Gender-related Human Development Index components between 1995 and 1998. The regional Gender-related Human Development Index declined by 0.87 between 1995 and 1998 because of a fall in all components except income (See Annex Tables 4, 5 and 6 for the levels of life expectancy, combined gross enrolment ratio, adult literacy and GDP in US dollar purchasing power parity per capita by gender for 1998, 1997 and 1995 respectively). The Gender-related Human Development Index fell in all SADC countries with sufficient data, except Swaziland and South Africa (See Figure 2.4 and Table 2.12). Malawi had the highest fall in the Gender-related Human Development Index of 4.25 per cent, followed by Botswana with 4.14 per cent, then Zambia with 3.25 per cent.

Table 2.11. SADC-specific Gender-related Development Index, 1998

SADC Gender GDI rank	Country	SADC-specific GDI score	SADC-specific GDI adjusted for income inequality (value)
1	Mauritius	0.765	0.719
2	South Africa	0.706	0.651
3	Swaziland	0.659	0.614
4	Namibia	0.638	0.564
5	Botswana	0.598	0.550
6	Zimbabwe	0.562	0.501
7	Lesotho	0.558	0.504
8	DR Congo	0.416	..
9	Zambia	0.415	0.371
10	Tanzania.U.Rep.	0.411	0.381
11	Malawi	0.370	0.308
12	Mozambique	0.320	..
	Angola
	Seychelles
	SADC	0.536	0.501

Source: SARIPS /SAPES databank

Although all its components improved, Mauritius' Gender-related Human Development Index still fell by 0.41 per cent because there is a wide gap between genders. Swaziland had all its components improving except enrolment and female income. In Zambia all the Gender-related Human Development Index components fell, whilst in all the other SADC countries with falling gender-related human development indices there was a fall in at least three of its components as shown in Table 2.12.

Gender Empowerment Measure

The Gender Empowerment Measure captures gender inequality in key areas of economic and political participation and decision-making in both public and private sectors (see Table 2.13 and Technical note 3). However, in reality gender empowerment is much more than what the Gender Empowerment Measure captures. It also includes empowerment in terms of improving women's access to and control of economic structures and resources and also presence of laws that give women their fundamental rights and so on.

In 1997 South Africa had a Gender Empowerment Measure of 0.540—the highest in SADC, followed by Botswana with 0.403 and then Lesotho with 0.389 (see Table 2.14). Malawi and Zambia had the lowest Gender Empowerment Measures in the region with 0.204 and 0.238 respectively. High human development does not necessarily translate into high gender empowerment. For example Mauritius which was ranked number one in the region in 1997 fell to number four according to the Gender Empowerment Measure. This is because of the low per-

Box 2.1 Women and empowerment in Southern Africa

‘Women’ and ‘gender’ have become buzz words in current discourses on democracy and development. The terms have become especially fashionable in situations where funding happens to be at stake. Unfortunately, even a category of élitist women have joined this army of closeted Robin Hoods, weeping so loudly that sympathisers can hardly hear the bereaved. So on a cynical note you could argue that to a large extent, ‘women’ and ‘gender’ have been turned into horses on whose backs a conglomeration of professional profiteers are hitching a free ride to donors for funding.

Yet others specialise in eulogising the precarious plight of women and the woes of gender discrimination, never bringing their mourning to an end. Meanwhile the bemoaned continue to defy historical containment and register survival at incredible human cost. As for neo-colonial governments, many of them seem to passionately resent efforts to interrogate and expose gender inequalities. They discredit or dismiss women’s contention for power under the pretext that it is a foreign project or a false text fabricated by scattered elements of frustrated, disgruntled, male-bereft single women. If, when and where the problem is acknowledged, it is only given token attention, mostly for political mileage by those in power.

We are now in the third decade since the United Nations launched the Women’s Decade but the progress made in closing the gender privilege gap is

minimal. Admittedly some changes have taken place but to be complacent about these is to mistake mediocrity for real performance. The volumes of talk, canvassing and activism invested by gender advocates in the pursuit of gender equality should have produced wonders by now. But is this the case? One after the other national, regional and world conferences have emerged with resolutions, declarations and conventions advocating women’s empowerment. However, most times these have been trounced by trouser-uniformed coups. At best, the delivery process has been entrusted to the proverbial tortoise, chameleon or snail of African orature — messengers who have so far taken an eternity to reach their destination. Extending the analogy, we observe that so far only a token number of women have caught sight of the messengers. Sisters from the lower sectors of society might as well take the deliverers for lost.

What accounts for this negligence that amounts to a serious social and global crisis? First of all, it is evident that even though time-wise we are in 2001, in terms of progressive consciousness, many people’s mental clocks stopped in the 1950s if not earlier. Such frozen minds cannot be expected to take women’s liberation seriously. For them any discourse on women’s emancipation or empowerment is an affront to what, in their definition, constitutes ‘manhood’. Their response is to either dismiss such advocacy, or turn it into a sarcastic joke and at best to just ignore it. Overall,

I would argue that there is a lot of institutionalised unease, if not downright reluctance to confront injustices perpetrated against women. Only a month ago, I sat down with a group of men who nearly laughed a colleague of theirs out of existence for claiming that he was a feminist. Advocacy for women’s empowerment is still looked upon by many as a woman thing. This is unfortunate.

Secondly, it is clear that by and large global societies and in particular so-called ‘third world’ countries have clearly refused to come to terms with the unpalatable truth that patriarchal cultural privileging of males is no different from all other forms of domination and so it must go. This ostrich head-in-the-sand syndrome among societies that have struggled against colonialism, imperialism and other forms of domination is inexcusable. Common sense alone should tell us that even from a developmental perspective, the privileging of males, who constitute the lesser half of global population, does not make any economic sense. A nation cannot impoverish the higher percentage of its citizens and hope to prosper.

Recognising the centrality of



women within the home space, rural production and the rearing of children, the feminisation of poverty is not just an abuse of women's basic human rights but a threat to family security in general.

Thirdly, it is obvious that on the whole, the global society has socialised itself to either deny the role of women in human development or to condone its abduction by males. In other words, beyond paying reluctant or token, opportunistic lip service to women as agents of change, the male world has not taken their counterparts seriously as equal partners in development. The irony is that figures and facts before our very eyes speak loud and clear in affirmation of the indispensability of women, especially in times of human and natural calamities or crises.

Fourthly, the blatant denial of space and agency to women in resolving a crisis that directly affects them is the worst possible abuse of human rights. Self-determination is at the centre of the Freirean thesis that in the final analysis, only the oppressed can usher in their emancipation. Sadly, not many neo-colonial governments seem able to understand this simple proposition. Thus even in situations where governments have embarked on tackling gender inequity, real executive power is invested in males. This is to say that official structures entrusted with the task of enforcing legal instruments to bring about women's empowerment are presided over by a predominantly male team. It is the proverbial situation of the hunter narrating the deer's tale. We can only echo Amilcar Cabral who once cautioned that



it is only in stories that human beings cross the river on the back of the crocodile or that of the crocodile's friend.

In case this seems exaggerated or too pessimistic, let us invoke some facts and figures to demonstrate the seriousness of the situation. Let us examine the overall continental picture and then focus specifically upon SADC.

The UNIFEM biennial report entitled, Progress of the World's Women 2000, provides us with the facts listed below. The point registered is that as time moves forward, women's potential development in black Africa regresses in many ways.

- Sub-Saharan Africa shows a steep deterioration in economic conditions.
- The region is the worst affected by growing indebtedness, which places 22 countries out of 48 in so-called sub-Saharan Africa in critical condition.
- Regionally, there is a proven association between increased indebtedness and deterioration in girls' education — especially

enrolment in secondary school.

- There is an increase in household inequality, most of it affecting poor women.
- In the region, 55 per cent of those living with HIV/AIDS are women.
- Women typically provide approximately 70 per cent of unpaid time caring for family.

Although by and large, the Gender-related Human Development Index for SADC countries combined is better than the average sub-Saharan one, it is still about 22 per cent lower than the average Gender-related Human Development Index for all developing countries. Moreover, most of the problems highlighted in the 1998 SADC Regional Human Development Report remain the same in most countries. In fact in a few the situation has worsened. However, since good economic-political news is so rare in Africa, it is crucial to celebrate the improvement of participation by women in parliament from 15 per cent to 17 per cent during 2000, thanks to the Plan of Action for Gender. Nonetheless, we are nowhere near the comfort zone. This percentage is just slightly above the halfway mark of the targeted 30 per cent by the year 2005. The following facts serve to modify possible smugness:

- Women, who constitute close to 51 per cent of SADC's total population, have an average GDP of US\$1 730.8 as compared to that of US\$3 625.0 for men. Thus, women remain a lot poorer than men.
- Women in government make up only about 9.8 per cent of the total official workforce.



Box 2.1 continued

- Women cabinet ministers roughly add up to 12.4 per cent.
- Women deputy ministers amount to approximately 15.6 per cent.
- Women parliamentarians constitute 17 per cent.
- Adult literacy among women is 63.17 per cent as compared to 77.4 per cent among males.
- Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment shows 48.9 per cent against 55.5 per cent for the opposite gender.

These facts demonstrate that as human resources, women are not just being wasted but are greatly undermined. While being denied their rightful place as agents of 'her story,' their energy is being sapped as they negotiate their existence through draining conditions, which are not of their making. For instance, men make coups and wars, elevate themselves from warmongers to warlords and, after tiring of overseeing the wiping out, maiming and displacement of their populations, they transform into peacemakers.

Ultimately, many of them succeed in converting bullets into ballots, ending up in state house. In the meantime, most women remain languishing in

refugee camps, serving the warlords as 'managers' of hunger, suffering, destitution and often disease. In other situations, male despots have so mismanaged, looted and ruined national economies that basic public facilities such as hospitals no longer function. Faced with family members threatened by the HIV/AIDS scourge, women are forced to become involuntary indentured family nurses. In these and other ways, women are robbed of their democratic rights: they end up with no representation, no choices and no opportunities. They are never consulted — not even over decisions that directly



affect their lives and those of their families.


Unless this suffocation of human potential and reversal of development are brought to an end, African governments will stand accused of incarcerating the history of future generations. Plagiarising its record by systemically erasing women's text is bad enough but fencing life in to construct a metaphoric prison against the very laws of historical motion is an even bigger crime.

Finally, I advocate that women make the year 2005 the deadline for honouring all the conventions, legislations and declarations on their empowerment. On that deadline, they should call a global strike, downing all tools: domestic, private and professional, until all promises, ignored and broken, are officially honoured. Hopefully, each and every progressive man and youth will not cross the picket line. Let us remember: it is not just the lives of women that are at stake but the very foundation of utu (human essence) that distinguishes between people as producers and their a-historical, mock version as dehumanised, powerless objects.

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Figure 2.3 Changes in the Gender-related Development Index (GDI) in selected SADC countries between 1995 and 1998



Source: SARIPS/SAPES databank

%

Table 2.12 Percentage change in the Gender-related Development Index between 1995 and 1998

	Life expectancy at birth (years)		Adult literacy rate (%)		Organised primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (%)		Real GDP per capita (SPPP) (1995)		GDI (1998)
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	
Angola	-1.02	-1.09	-31.39	-31.41	..
Botswana	-11.30	-9.98	30.55	-9.57	-0.84	1.45	-13.54	18.70	-4.14
DR Congo	-2.41	-2.17	..	-16.41	-21.49	-9.51	-10.25
Lesotho	-5.21	-5.26	49.12	-12.45	0.00	3.31	11.72	10.30	-2.55
Malawi	-3.86	-3.21	5.50	1.67	-1.96	-0.88	-6.70	-7.09	-4.25
Mauritius	1.07	0.59	1.90	0.23	3.11	6.53	14.41	10.73	-0.41
Mozambique	-5.86	-4.91	15.88	1.21	-2.44	0.00	32.04	30.64	-0.04
Namibia	-11.23	-9.34	7.70	5.00	-1.06	1.65	-5.34	-4.93	-1.49
Seychelles
South Africa	-16.37	-17.81	2.69	4.27	13.39	23.34	-0.15	-0.78	0.07
Swaziland	3.11	3.36	2.25	1.92	-7.16	-4.76	-0.57	3.45	1.56
Tanzania	-5.77	-4.88	13.20	4.91	-0.31	-1.20	5.82	4.66	-2.30
Zambia	-5.53	-4.77	-3.09	-1.87	-5.15	-3.64	-16.02	-15.92	-3.25
Zimbabwe	-11.82	-10.02	3.75	1.44	1.07	1.87	3.81	7.11	-0.91
SADC	-5.55	-6.05	-5.10	-8.26	-6.09	-2.38	22.80	16.31	-0.87

Source: SARIPS/SAPES databank

Table 2.13 Measurement of Gender Empowerment Measure

Dimension	Variable
Economic participation and Decision making power	Women's and men's shares of administrative and managerial positions in both private and public sectors Women's and men's shares of professional and technical jobs in both private and public sectors Women's and men's shares of national income
Political participation and decision-making power	Women's and men's shares of parliamentary seats

Table 2.14 GEM ranking of selected SADC countries, 1995 and 1997

	SADC GEM 1995	SADC GEM 1997	SADC GEM 1995 Rank	SADC GEM 1997 Rank	SADC HDI 1997	Delta 1995-1997
South Africa	0.540	0.501	1	2	2	1
Botswana	0.403	0.419	2	4	4	2
Lesotho	0.389	0.391	3	6	5	2
Mauritius	0.359	0.355	4	1	1	-3
Zimbabwe	0.359	0.357	5	5	6	1
Mozambique	0.331	0.329	6	9	9	3
Swaziland	0.329	0.353	7	3	3	-4
Zambia	0.238	0.234	8	7	7	-1
Malawi	0.204	0.203	9	8	8	-1

Note:

A negative sign shows that a country is doing badly in gender empowerment because its rank is lower in the GEM than in the HDI. It has not translated its human development into the empowerment of females.

Source : SARIPS/SAPES databank

*In 1997 South Africa
had a Gender
Empowerment Measure
of 0.540 – the highest
in SADC*

centage of women in parliament — only 7.6 per cent compared to South Africa's percentage of 28.4 per cent — the highest in the region. Sweden, with the highest percentage of women members of parliament, had 42.7 per cent, whilst Norway with the highest Gender Empowerment Measure in the world had a percentage of 36.4 in 1997. Swaziland, Zambia and Malawi also had a lower rank in the Gender Empowerment Measure than in the Human Development Index as shown in Table 2.14. Mozambique had done notably better in empowering women than in human development. It rose from being the lowest in terms of human development to rank six in terms of creating opportunities for women. Mozambique's improvement is mainly due to its relatively high percentage of women in parliament, 25.2 per cent, second after South Africa. Besides Mozambique, other countries that have done better in empowering women than in human development are Botswana, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Annex tables 7 and 8 show the values of the Gender Empowerment Measure components for 1995 and 1997.

Between 1995 and 1997 the SADC Gender Empowerment Measure for those countries with sufficient data improved by 33.28 per cent. The Gender Empowerment Measure improved in six countries — South Africa, Mauritius, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Zambia and Malawi. Women's real GDP per capita increased significantly in the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Africa, 140.55 per cent and 102.62 per cent respectively between 1995 and 1997. The representation of women in parliament worsened in Swaziland by 25 per cent and Lesotho by 5.36 per cent between 1995 and 1997. In the rest of the countries the situation with regard to women's participation in parliament has either remained constant or improved. The highest improvement of 63.16 per cent was in Angola.

The increases in the representation of women in political and decision-making positions following elections in five SADC countries in 1999 and 2000 shows that the Plan of Action for Gender of 1998 is starting to bear fruit (see Table 2.15). Mozambique maintained the same proportion of women in parliament, 28.4 per cent, whilst in Botswana, Malawi, South Africa and Namibia these proportions increased by 100

Table 2.15 Representation of women in parliament in SADC countries that held elections in 1999 and 2000

Country	1999		2000		Change Increase Decrease
	Women Total	%	Women Total	%	
Botswana	4/44	9.0	8/44	18.0	+100
Malawi	9/171	5.2	16/192	8.3	+59
Mauritius	5/65	7.6	4/68	5.9	-22
Mozambique	71/250	28.4	71/250	28.4	0
Zimbabwe	21/150	14.0	15/150	10.0	-29
Namibia*	14/99	14.1	19/99	19.1	+5
South Africa*	128/490	26.1	137/490	28.0	+7

*Upper and Lower House

Source: IPU; SADC Secretariat, member states in SADC Secretariat: 1999/2000 *Progress Report on Gender and Development*

Table 2.16 Proportion of women parliamentarians 1999/2000

Region	% Women in parliament
SADC	17
Sub-Saharan Africa	9
Africa	11
Americas and Europe	15
Global	13.4

Source: SADC Secretariat: 1999/2000 Progress Report on Gender and Development

...half of SADC states are still below 15 per cent in terms of women's representation in parliament which is far below the targeted 30 per cent

per cent, 59 per cent, 7 per cent and 5 per cent respectively. In Zimbabwe and Mauritius the proportions of women parliamentarians decreased by 29 and 22 per cent, respectively. This has raised the SADC average for women in parliament from 15 per cent to 17 per cent which is higher than that of most regional groupings as shown in Table 2.16. South Africa, Mozambique and Seychelles are among the top ten countries in the world regarding the representation of women in parliament. However, half of SADC states are still below 15 per cent in terms of women's representation in parliament which is far below the targeted 30 per cent.

Although not doing so well in terms of the percentage of women in parliament, Namibia has done very well in terms of women's empowerment in local government with 41 per cent of local government officials being women. Seychelles has done extremely well with 60 per cent of positions in local government being filled by women, 31 per cent of principal secretaries and 42 per cent of the director generals being women. In Tanzania an amendment of the National Constitution has raised the quota of women members of parliament from 15 to 20 per cent and that for local government from 25 to 33 per cent. Table 2.17 shows that South Africa and Seychelles had the highest percentages of women in cabinet with 29.6 and 21.4 per cent. In South Africa and Botswana 61.5 per cent and 50 per cent of the deputy ministers are women, respectively.

Table 2.17 Women in parliament and cabinet in the SADC region, 2000

Country	Women in parliament (%)	Women in cabinet (%)	Women deputy ministers (%)
Angola	15.1	14.3	11.6
Botswana	18.0	20.0	50.0
DR Congo
Lesotho	10.3	8.3	0
Malawi	8.3	9.0	12.9
Mauritius	5.9	4.0	..
Mozambique	28.4	14.2	12.1
Namibia*	19.0	14.2	22.7
South Africa*	29.8	29.6	61.5
Seychelles	24.0	21.4	-
Swaziland	7.3	13.3	..
Tanzania	16.3	13.0	13.0
Zambia	10.1	8.3	7.1
Zimbabwe	10.0	5.0	28.5

Note : *Upper and Lower House

Source: SADC Secretariat, member states

Other gender imbalances

Women in the region remain disadvantaged in terms of access to and control of economic structures and resources.

Laws that deny women their fundamental rights within the SADC countries still exist

Women in the region remain disadvantaged in terms of access to and control of economic structures and resources. This is generally due to their subordinate legal status, limited access to productive resources such as land, technology, credit, education and training, formal employment as well as their susceptibility to HIV/AIDS. (SADC Secretariat, 2000). Some SADC countries are taking initiatives to empower women in terms of putting in place laws, policies and programmes which target women as a special group. Tanzania has enacted a Land Law that gives rights of ownership of land to women. South Africa has introduced a developmental programme for unemployed women with children under five years of age, as well as a child support grant. In Mauritius, the Ministry of Women, Family Welfare and Child Development is implementing an entrepreneurship development programme for women. Both governments and non-governmental organisations in the region are making some efforts for women to access funding for micro-projects, at low interest or no interest.

Laws that deny women their fundamental rights within the SADC countries still exist, especially in the field of family law. Married women do not have the same rights as their husbands over family property and decision making. Sons and daughters also do not have the same rights over property. An example is the case of *Magaya versus Magaya* in the Zimbabwe Supreme Court where it was ruled that a daughter could not have the same inheritance rights as her brother. Amendments to criminal laws to increase penalties for sexual offences have been made in Botswana and Mauritius. Seychelles has revised their penal code to prosecute a husband who has raped his wife and is also making provisions for the protection of women from all forms of violence, including visual, verbal, psychological, emotional and physical. Mauritius, Seychelles and South Africa have domestic violence legislation, whilst Botswana, Namibia and Zambia are still working on such legislation (SADC Secretariat, 2000).

In spite of the progress made in the advancement of women by SADC states a number of challenges still remain in terms of:

- attaining the 30 per cent target of power sharing between men and women by 2005;
- ensuring improved access to and control of productive resources such as land, technology, credit, education, training and formal employment and
- amendments to the existing laws.



Box 2.2 Summary analysis of policy and institutional frameworks for gender in SADC member states

Country	Gender institution/ machinery	Gender policy status	Other gender policy and institutional mechanisms
Angola	Ministry of Family and women's promotion	National strategy for the promotion of women	Network for women's promotion
Botswana	Department of Women's Affairs, Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs	Policy on women in development, 1996	National gender programme framework; Gender focal points in ministries
Lesotho	Ministry of Environment, Gender and Youth Affairs	Consultations under way to draft national gender policy	National steering committee on gender and development
Malawi	Ministry of Gender, Youth and Community Services	National Gender Policy launched March 2000	Gender focal points in ministries; Gender implementation structure and strategy
Mauritius	Ministry of Gender, Family Welfare and Child Development	National gender action plan 2000	Gender bureau; National advisory committee on the status of women; Gender focal points in ministries
Mozambique	Ministry of Women and Social Welfare	Post-Beijing government plan	Task force on women's advancement
Namibia	Ministry of Women's Affairs and Child Welfare	National Gender Policy 1998	Gender sectoral committees; Gender focal points in ministries
Seychelles	Gender Unit, Ministry of Social Affairs and Manpower	National gender action plan	National gender steering committee
South Africa	Office on the Status of Women, Presidency	Consultations under way to draft national gender policy	
Swaziland	Gender Unit, Ministry of Home Affairs	Consultations under way to draft national gender policy	Independent commission on gender equality; Gender focal points in ministries
Tanzania	Ministry of Community Development, Women Affairs and Children	National gender policy	
Zambia	Gender in Development Division, Cabinet Office	National gender policy, March 2000	Guidelines and checklist for gender mainstreaming
Zimbabwe	Ministry of National Affairs, Employment Creation and Co-operation; Ministry for Gender, Office of the President	National gender policy almost ready	Gender focal points in ministries

Source: SADC Secretariat, 1999/2000 Progress Report on Gender and Development



X The regional integration situation in the SADC region

Progress in economic integration

For several years after the establishment of SADC, intra-regional trade was low, at less than 5 per cent of the total trade of the sub-region. During the late 1980s, intra-regional trade increased in SADC. This upward trend continued throughout the 1990s (see Table 4). The increase in intra-SADC trade reflected not only this upward trend but also the entry into SADC of five new members: South Africa, Mauritius, Seychelles, Namibia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

As indicated by the ratios of intra-SADC trade between all the member countries of SADC (see Table 2.18), total intra-SADC trade nearly doubled between 1990 and 1997. On the basis of the same indices, which can be taken to be a measure of trade integration of national economies, most member countries recorded an increase in their total intra-SADC trade. The only exception was Botswana where import-substitution industrialisation reduced the proportion of imports originating in the rest of SADC. Otherwise, an increase in imports originating in the rest of the SADC was recorded by all countries, with the total figure also nearly doubling between 1990 and 1997. But although most countries have experienced an increase in their intra-SADC exports, the changes at both country and sub-regional level have been modest.

The above account underestimates the total level of intra-regional trade by leaving out informal intra-regional trade. Informal intra-regional trade is not recorded because it takes place outside formal economic structures, subject to state regulation and control. The recent African development report on regional integration stated that such trade was no more than 5 per cent of total intra-regional trade (ADB, 1995). The technique used to measure such trade was not explained. Total informal trade may be a small proportion of total intra-regional trade but a large proportion of the total trade of some individual countries, where the revenue lost may be quite significant.

Following the SADC industry and trade co-ordination division (SITCD, 1995), the factors which explain the growth of intra-regional trade can be classified into trade development, trade facilitation and trade promotion factors. Trade development factors have to do with increasing the production of exports, trade facilitation factors have to do with market access, while trade promotion factors have to do with the art of marketing.

The SADC industry and trade co-ordination division emphasises the contribution of economic infrastructure developed by SADC. It also recognises the contribution of efforts to:

- further develop the local manufacturing sector in Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland;
- increase productivity of existing industrial facilities through rehabilitation and diversification in Angola, Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania;
- expand the manufacturing base in Malawi;
- intensify the diversification of manufacturing activities in Zimbabwe; and
- restructure industry in order to make it globally competitive in South Africa.

Other trade development factors that have contributed to the increase in intra-SADC trade include the establishment of export processing zones and rising inflows of foreign capital.

With regard to trade facilitation, the most important development has been the lifting of economic sanctions against South Africa. Unilateral reduction of tariff and other barriers to international trade have also played an important role, although to some extent this has been offset by

Table 2.18: Extra-SADC merchandise trade for selected years as percentages of total trade

	1990			1992			1993			1994
	Exports	Imports	Total	Exports	Imports	Total	Exports	Imports	Total	
Angola	0.1	2.0	0.7	0.3	2.0	0.9	0.9	6.7	2.8	0.4
Botswana	12.4	87.8	51.7	12.3	90.2	52.8	14.9	92.7	53.7	17.2
DR Congo
Lesotho	96.9	78.8	76.0	50.6	90.1	86.1	47.1	83.7	79.1	42.6
Malawi	11.3	38.2	27.1	17.8	43.1	34.1	17.6	50.9	38.6	20.3
Mauritius	0.8	9.1	5.6	1.3	13.4	8.0	1.5	14.0	8.6	1.0
Mozambique	24.2	15.5	14.9	35.3	28.7	28.0	37.4	38.5	36.6	47.5
Namibia	28.7	24.0	57.6	0.2	31.2	0.1	31.8	27.4	58.1	30.7
Seychelles
South Africa	21.8	1.8	13.4	19.6	3.1	12.4	22.8	2.1	14.0	22.6
Swaziland	54.5	80.1	..	76.4	98.1	88.0	65.4	98.0
Tanzania	1.8	1.0	1.2	9.0	4.8	5.8	2.0	10.5	8.3	1.1
Zambia	2.7	24.3	13.3	4.0	20.6	13.0	5.7	35.1	20.6	6.8
Zimbabwe	32.8	23.8	28.4	27	37.6	32.7	29.0	38.9	33.8	32.8
SADC	19.8	27.8	26.4	21.5	33.2	24.9	23.9	41.5	36.8	24.0

Source: SADC Industry and Trade Co-ordination Division, Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania

the imposition of excise duties, surtax and other taxes on imports in a number of countries. Nor can we ignore liberalisation of international trade through old bilateral trade agreements (which have been renegotiated), new bilateral trade agreements and regional integration schemes other than SADC.

With respect to trade promotion, SADC relies on trade fairs, trade missions, buyers/sellers meetings and so on. While the desirability of these measures is not in doubt, some authorities regard the following more important:

... the export-excellence of the product including packaging, quality, preservation and delivery time for agricultural products ... is important

- the act of selling and marketing, including marketing arrangements;
- the export-excellence of the product, including packaging, quality, preservation and delivery time for agricultural products; and
- the design, ease of maintenance, reliability, delivery-time and after-sale services for manufactured goods.

Intra-SADC investment, which takes the form of foreign direct investment, portfolio investment and loans, is also on the increase. The main flow of intra-SADC investment is from corporations in South Africa. But there have also been flows of intra-SADC investment from other countries, for example: from Zimbabwe into the financial sector of Malawi and Tanzania and into the dairy industry of Malawi; from Zambia into the financial sector of Malawi; from Malawi into retail trade and insurance industry of Zambia. These flows have been facilitated by

Country	1988				1992			
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	
Botswana	6.3	2.6	0.1	1.0	
Lesotho	92.1	52.4	25.0	79.7	50.7	18.3	77.3	
Malawi	
Mozambique	89.4	82.8	..	93.3	80.3	..	88.5	
Namibia	46.3	36.3	18.0	45.8	33.3	22.8	54.6	
South Africa	12.5	7.8	1.0	12.1	7.2	2.4	12.9	
Swaziland	34.3	29.3	..	33.7	33.0	..	45.7	
Tanzania	27.0	70.9	0.1	26.4	44.6	..	23.6	
Zambia	
Zimbabwe	1.9	12.9	24.5	2.0	14.2	
Total	82.3	66.1	111.8	90.4	0	
Other	9.0	7.0	5.4	5.8	5.7	
South Africa	27.9	17.0	9.5	25.8	17.8	12.0	47.4	
Other	46.1	39.6	30.6	43.2	37.9	31.4	42.4	
Total	40.9	36.7	18.0	40.1	34.6	12.4	49.0	

liberalisation of national economies (including capital inflows), privatisation of public enterprises and the establishment of stock exchanges in recipient countries.

Concerning current labour markets, the number of skilled migrant workers is rising. Teachers, doctors, engineers and so on, are moving into South Africa, Botswana and Namibia, for example, in search of a richer and safer life from poor and unstable countries. Tables 2.19 and 2.20 show the main SADC nationalities employed in South Africa and the main sectors they are employed in. However, the largest number of foreign professionals in these countries is not from SADC. In 1993 for example, the largest number of skilled workers in South Africa came from Uganda and Ghana.

The main destination for unskilled workers is South Africa where the market for them has already declined. Whereas in 1986, for example, 211 247 foreign workers were employed on South Africa mines, by 1992 there were only 155 374 foreign workers. Correspondingly, the number of South African unskilled workers on the mines has increased proportionately. The reasons for these changes are complex. They include trade union struggles in the mining sector, growing unemployment among local black workers and the need to increase productivity to maintain financial viability under conditions of declining grades of ore. These factors have led to greater mechanisation of mining, which has resulted in a decline in demand for unskilled labour.

Table 2.19 Main SADC nationalities employed in South Africa by sector, 1996

Sector	Main nationalities in sector as a per cent of total SADC citizens in the sector
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing	Mozambique(49.7%), Lesotho(25.2%), Zimbabwe(19.7), Swaziland (2.1%)
Mining and Quarrying	Lesotho(47.6%), Mozambique (38.7%), Swaziland(8.1%), Botswana (4.8%)
Manufacturing	Mozambique (55.7%), Zimbabwe (22.8%), Lesotho (7.5%), Malawi (4.7%)
Electricity, gas and water	Mozambique (58.9%), Zimbabwe (21%), Lesotho (7.5%), Mauritius(2.7%)
Construction	Mozambique (73.9%), Zimbabwe (12.7%), Lesotho (7.5%), Swaziland (1.6%), Botswana (1%)
Wholesale and retail trade	Mozambique (55.2%), Zimbabwe (22.1%), Lesotho (8.6%), Malawi (4.1%)
Transport, storage and communication	Mozambique (49%), Zimbabwe (19.8%), Lesotho (12.4%), Malawi (4.8%), Swaziland (4.7%)
Financial, insurance, real estate and business services	Zimbabwe (39.6%), Mozambique (30.8%), Lesotho (6.2%), Malawi (5.9%)
Community, social and personal services	Zimbabwe (29.5%), Mozambique (29.3%), Lesotho (12.3%), Zambia (7.2%)
Private households	Zimbabwe (27.7%), Mozambique (28.5%), Lesotho (21%), Malawi (12.1%)
Diplomatic services	Mozambique (44.9%), Zimbabwe (20.4%), Lesotho (10.2%), Zambia (6.1%)

Source: SAPIDS/SAPIS databank from South Africa, 1996 Population Census

Other categories of migrant workers in South Africa include those with temporary residence permits whose number increased from 38 571 in 1993 to 52 704 in 1996 (ILO/SAMAT, 1998); visa overstayers, estimated at 760 000, from other SADC member countries and unauthorised or illegal immigrants, officially cited at between 2.5 and 5 million but put at as high as 12 million by other estimates. Tables 2.18 and 2.19 and appendix Table 38 show the SADC citizens employed in South Africa by main sector.

In addition to work-seekers, there has been a large increase in legal cross-border movement of people within Southern Africa since 1990. Most of this movement consists of people travelling to South Africa temporarily to tour the country, visit relatives, shop, seek medical treatment or to study. Their number increased from less than 500 000 in 1990 to 3.3 million in 1995 (ILO/SAMAT, 1998).

Measuring performance in SADC regional integration through a statistical index

A statistical measure of regional integration has been proposed and developed in this report for the Southern African sub-region. This statistical measure is called the SADC Integration Index (SII). The index measures the level of intra-SADC activities or the degree of openness in the goods, capital and labour markets. It ranges from zero to one. How it is calculated is explained in Technical note 5. It is based on the assumption that we can achieve full integration in the three markets at one extreme end and no integration at all at the other end. A SADC Integration Index of one implies that there is full integration whilst an index of zero implies that there is no integration. It is not possible to construct a SADC

Annex 2.10: Main sectors in which SADC nationals are employed by South Africa by country, 1996

Country	Main sectors
Angola	Wholesale and retail trade (26%), Financial, insurance, real estate and business services (14%), Construction (11%)
Botswana	Mining and quarrying (88%), Private households (2.5%), Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing (2.2%)
DR Congo	Mining and quarrying (30%), Financial, insurance, real estate and business services (18%), Wholesale and retail trade (16%)
Lesotho	Mining and quarrying (83%), Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing (8%), Private households (2.3%)
Malawi	Private households (29.9%), Wholesale and retail trade (13%), Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing (11.3%)
Mauritius	Wholesale and retail trade (17%), Manufacturing (15%), Mining and Quarrying (14%)
Mozambique	Mining and Quarrying (55%), Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing (13.7%), Wholesale and retail trade (10%)
Namibia	Community, social and personal services (17%), Mining and quarrying (16%), Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing (14%)
South Africa	Community, social and personal services (17.5%), Manufacturing (12.4%), Wholesale and retail trade (12.1%), Private households (10%)
Swaziland	Mining and Quarrying (83%), Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing (4.3%), Wholesale and retail trade (2.3%)
Tanzania	Manufacturing (32.4%), Electricity, gas and water supply (11.8%), Mining and Quarrying (17%)
Zambia	Community, social and personal services (33.7%), Wholesale and retail trade (15.7%), Financial, insurance, real estate and business services (10.57%)
Zimbabwe	Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing (27.6%), Private households (13.9%), Wholesale and retail trade (12.5%), Manufacturing (8.5%), Construction (8.5%)

Source: SARIPS/SAPES databank from South Africa 1996 Population Census
 Note: Probably the 1996 Census did not capture undocumented migration.

The purpose of constructing a SADC Integration Index is to help SADC monitor and evaluate its performance in relation to regional integration.


Integration Index is to help SADC monitor and evaluate its performance in relation to regional integration. In this connection, we need to measure regional integration however difficult it may be to do so. There are at least three reasons for this. First, such indicators set standards and articulate ideals which a regional organisation should endeavour to attain. Secondly, statistical measurements impose common meanings and develop consensus on the object of measurement. And thirdly, statistical measurements are indicators of progress or failure against which an organisation can review its policies, strategies and programmes and, if necessary, make appropriate adjustments.

As proposed and constructed, the SADC Integration Index comprises three components. These components are intra-SADC trade, intra-SADC investment and intra-SADC labour migration. The intra-SADC trade component is measured by a summation of intra-SADC merchandise exports and intra-SADC merchandise imports as a percentage of GDP. The intra-SADC investment component is measured by intra-SADC foreign assets plus intra-SADC foreign liabilities as a percentage of GDP. The intra-SADC labour migration component is measured by intra-SADC labour emigration and immigration as a percentage of the total employed persons. Each component of the index is discussed and explained more fully below. SADC member countries are then categorised on the basis of their performance on the three components of regional integration and on the overall SADC Integration Index

intra-SADC trade component

The construction of the intra-SADC trade index is explained in Technical note 4. The actual index is shown in Figure 2.5. For several reasons, this index must be treated with caution. First, as has been indicated, it relates to merchandise trade only, not to total trade which is the sum of merchandise trade and trade in non-factor services. Data on trade in non-factor services were not available. Secondly, the data on merchandise trade excludes the value of informal trade. As such, the merchandise trade data are believed to be underestimates. Thirdly, the data on gross domestic product are also underestimates in that they do not include informal sector or second economy gross domestic product. These caveats may affect the magnitude of the intra-SADC trade index. But they do not affect the ranking of individual SADC member countries in terms of their trade integration.

Figure 2.5 The intra-SADC total merchandise trade ratio (in percent) of the member countries



According to the intra-SADC merchandise trade index (Figure 2.5), the member country that is most integrated is Swaziland, followed by Lesotho, Botswana and Namibia, in that order.

According to the intra-SADC merchandise trade index (Figure 2.5), the member country that is most integrated is Swaziland, followed by Lesotho, Botswana and Namibia, in that order. The high extent of trade integration of these four countries, especially their import trade integration, is a reflection of their close trade relations with South Africa. In 1997, for example, South Africa was the source of 93.4 per cent of Botswana's intra-SADC imports, 99.9 per cent of Lesotho's intra-SADC imports, 99.1 per cent of Namibia's intra-SADC imports and 99.0 per cent of Swaziland's intra-SADC imports. With respect to exports, in 1994 South Africa was the destination of 98.4 per cent of Lesotho's intra-SADC exports, 98.8 per cent of Namibia's and 81.1 per cent of Swaziland's intra-SADC exports. These high levels of trade are due to the dominance of the South African economy, proximity to South Africa, the sub-region's relatively low transport costs, a common language and trade and monetary integration through the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Common Monetary Area (CMA).

South Africa's index of intra-SADC merchandise trade is comparatively low, ranking it tenth (see Figure 2.5). As a large and diversified economy, its level of intra-SADC trade is relatively low. In 1995 it was 4.84 per cent of GDP compared to 58.16 per cent for Botswana, 98.92 per cent for Lesotho, 43.73 per cent for Namibia and 132.77 per cent for Swaziland. The small size of population and lower per capita gross domestic product limit the size of the market in Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. Hence a larger proportion of their domestic absorption is satisfied through imports.

Compared to South Africa, Mozambique, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia have smaller populations and lower per capita gross domestic products as well. So the size of their markets is limited. The size of the market in Mauritius is also limited, not by the magnitude of per capita gross domestic product, which is higher, but by the small size of its population (see Table 1.3). Hence, Mozambique, Malawi, Mauritius, Zimbabwe and Zambia are more dependent on intra-regional trade and have higher intra-SADC trade indices than South Africa.

In terms of direction of trade, South Africa as the dominant economy in the sub-region is the main source of imports for all these countries, as well as for Tanzania and Angola. South Africa is also the main destination of their exports. The other main players in intra-SADC trade are Zimbabwe, followed by Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique and Swaziland. Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mauritius, Tanzania and Angola do not enjoy the advantages of membership of SACU or the advantages of membership of the Common Marketing Area (CMA). Proximity to South Africa and hence relatively low transaction costs, common borders and complementarity of their economies with that of South Africa account for the relatively large trade with South Africa. As do bilateral trade agreements between South Africa and each of Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

Between Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, the relatively high level of their trade reflects proximity and lower transaction costs, common borders, transport links, and a trade agreement between Malawi and Zimbabwe. Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe have unilaterally liberalised their trade under structural adjustment programmes. Under the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African states (COMESA), Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe have also multilaterally liberalised their trade. The data in Table 2.21 show that these countries have significantly reduced their tariffs. But the trade links between Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe also reflect their common history —

imperial trade preferences, an economic community as part of the defunct Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953-63) under which barriers to trade were abolished, a common currency from 1938 to the end of the Federation and a common central bank.

Table 2.21 Changes in average tariffs before and after adjustment

Country	Pre-SAP average tariff (%)	Post-SAP average tariff (%)
Angola	11.4	11.4
Botswana	9.4	8.1
Lesotho	9.4	8.1
Malawi	22.9	7.5
Mauritius	15.3	11.6
Mozambique	25.5	11.8
Namibia	9.4	8.1
South Africa	9.4	8.1
Swaziland	9.4	8.1
Tanzania	24.2	4.0
Zambia	29.7	15.2
Zimbabwe	40.3	11.4

¹ Most recent

Source: D. Evans, 'Study of the impact of the removal of tariffs for the Free Trade Area of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)'.

Intra-SADC investment component

Intra-SADC investment is believed to be on the increase in the sub-region with South Africa as the leading source of this type of investment, followed by Seychelles, Swaziland, Namibia and Zimbabwe. But virtually all member countries of SADC carry out investment across their borders. Intra-SADC investment takes three forms. First, there is foreign direct investment (FDI) which includes equity capital, reinvested earnings and other capital associated with various inter-company transactions between affiliated enterprises. Foreign direct investment takes place through joint ventures or individual enterprises where a foreign firm provides not only capital but also technology, technical and managerial skills. Given the scarcity of entrepreneurs and of technical and managerial human resources in SADC, this type of investment has many potential advantages. But often it is sensitive to supply and demand conditions, to the general economic climate and even to the political situation in recipient countries.

Secondly, there is portfolio investment in which institutions simply buy a stake in an existing enterprise in order to earn dividends on their investment or to profit from an increase in the value of the investment. This type of investment, which includes transactions in corporate securities, bonds, notes, money market instruments and financial derivatives, can be very speculative. But unlike foreign direct investment, portfolio investment does not seek a controlling interest in the enterprise it is invested in, hence problems of foreign control do not arise as much as with foreign direct investment. Furthermore, there are a number of pension funds and insurance firms whose resources can be used through the

Lesotho is the most integrated country with respect to intra-SADC investment.

South Africa's intra-SADC investment index is low because its intra-SADC investment is low relative to its large gross domestic product.

The establishment of stock exchanges and offshore banking in Mauritius and Botswana has ... helped to attract South African investment.

mechanism of portfolio investment. It is possible to use these resources if appropriate mechanisms for doing so are established and if barriers to such investment such as restrictions on the types of shares which foreign investors can hold and discriminatory treatment of foreign investors are removed. Thirdly, there are other foreign investments (FIs) in the form of currency, deposits, commercial loans and trade credit. The first two forms can be as speculative as portfolio investment

The distribution of South Africa's combined intra-SADC assets and liabilities in 1998 were as follows: foreign direct investment US\$777 million; portfolio investment US\$393 million; and other investments US\$1 629 million. So other investments exceeded foreign direct investment which in turn exceeded portfolio investment.

Data on the intra-SADC investment index are shown in Figure 2.6. The calculation of these indices is explained in Technical note 4. Like the intra-SADC trade indices, treat these indices with caution. First, it must be noted that complete data on intra-SADC assets and liabilities are available only for South Africa. For all the other countries shown in Figure 2.6 and Annex Table 34, their intra-SADC liabilities correspond to South Africa's intra-SADC assets and their intra-SADC assets correspond to South Africa's intra-SADC liabilities. The indices shown in Figure 2.6 are therefore believed to be underestimates. Secondly, the data on South Africa's intra-SADC assets and liabilities which have been used in calculating the intra-SADC investment index are available for two years only, 1997 and 1998. Hence the indices are based on averages of intra-SADC assets and liabilities for these two years only which is not long enough.

According to the data in Figure 2.6, Lesotho is the most integrated country with respect to intra-SADC investment, followed by Swaziland and Namibia, with Botswana not far off in ranking at number five. The data in Table 2.20 show that Botswana and Swaziland are significant destinations of South African intra-SADC investment; while all four, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland are significant sources of intra-SADC investment in South Africa. The relatively large investment flows between these countries and South Africa are accounted for by their significant trade relations, freedom of movement of capital between them owing to absence of foreign exchange controls, accessibility of Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland to the South African capital market and, with the exception of Botswana, membership of a common monetary area. Despite these advantages however, South Africa's intra-SADC investment index is low because its intra-SADC investment is low relative to its large gross domestic product. The rest of the countries shown in Table 2.22 do not enjoy any of the advantages stated above. Nevertheless, some receive significant amounts of investment from South Africa to exploit their mineral wealth (Angola, Botswana and the Democratic Republic of the Congo) or on account of relatively high levels of development (Mauritius and Zimbabwe). The establishment of stock exchanges and offshore banking in Mauritius and Botswana has also helped to attract South African investment.

Figure 2.6 Intra-SADC investment index, 1998




Table 2.22 Distribution of South African assets and liabilities in the SADC sub-region, 1998


Country	Assets		Liabilities	
	US\$ million	%	US\$ million	%
Angola	5	0.3	9	0.8
Botswana	329	19.6	172	14.6
DR Congo	36	2.2	4	0.3
Lesotho	87	5.2	349	29.7
Malawi	49	2.9	54	4.6
Mauritius	227	13.5	51	4.3
Mozambique	20	1.2	26	2.2
Namibia	322	19.2	193	16.4
Seychelles	2	0.1	1	0.1
Swaziland	295	17.6	222	18.8
Tanzania	37	2.2	5	0.4
Zambia	73	4.4	10	0.9
Zimbabwe	196	11.7	79	6.7
Total	1 678	100	1 175	100

Source: Reserve Bank of South Africa

Table 2.22 Intra-SADC labour migration component

The intra-SADC labour migration index is shown in Figure 2.7. According to the data in this figure, Zimbabwe has the highest intra-SADC labour migration index, followed by Swaziland, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, Lesotho and Mauritius in that order. Also treat this index with caution. Ideally, it should have been measured by a five-year average of the number of SADC citizens employed in a country as a percentage of the total number of employed persons and the number of a country's citizens employed in other SADC countries as a percentage of the total number of persons employed in the country. In some countries, the data on the number of SADC citizens employed in a country and the number of its own citizens employed in other SADC countries were not available. Hence, we made use of the number of SADC citizens in a country as a percentage of the total population and the number of its own citizens in other SADC countries as a percentage of the total population of the country. For other countries even this data is not available. Since such data can only be obtained from a population census, the data used to calculate the index relates to a single year only, not five years.

Figure 2.7 Intra-SADC labour migration index 1998



Source: SARIPS/SAPES databank

Classifying SADC member countries according to performance on the regional integration criterion

Three components have been used to assess the regional integration performance of SADC member countries based on data on intra-SADC trade, investment and labour migration. For each component, every country has been awarded a value and the values of the three have been added and averaged to form the SADC Integration Index (SII) shown in Table 2.23. Owing to measurement errors in the data on intra-SADC trade, investment and labour migration, we believe the SADC Integration Index is an underestimate.

Nine countries for which data on all three components were available have been ranked, with Swaziland as number one with a SADC Integration Index of 0.556, followed by Lesotho with 0.362, Zimbabwe with 0.322, Namibia with 0.285, Malawi with 0.215, Botswana with 0.198, South Africa with 0.080, Zambia with 0.075 and finally Mauritius with 0.038. Treat both the SADC Integration Index and the ranking of countries with caution. The SADC Integration Index includes trade, investment and migration but excludes other essential elements of integration such as policy co-ordination and infrastructure. As such, it is not

Table 2.23 The SADC Integration Index(SII) for selected countries, 1998

Country	SII Rank	Inter-SADC trade index	Inter-SADC investment index	Inter-SADC Labour migration index	SII
Swaziland	1	0.761	0.434	0.473	0.556
Lesotho	2	0.487	0.581	0.019	0.362
Zimbabwe	3	0.102	0.058	0.807	0.322
Namibia	4	0.227	0.295	0.332	0.285
Malawi	5	0.117	0.069	0.459	0.215
Botswana	6	0.304	0.162	0.127	0.198
South Africa	7	0.025	0.028	0.188	0.080
Zambia	8	0.063	0.032	0.131	0.075
Mauritius	9	0.039	0.072	0.004	0.038

Source: SARIPS/SAPES databank

a reliable indicator of integration. The countries with high SADC Integration Index values are ones which are structurally dependent on South Africa. Their SADC Integration Index values are not indicators of mutually beneficial integration.

*Economic integration
constraint:*

*Currency convertibility
would lessen the
foreign exchange
constraint.*

To promote intra-regional trade, SADC publishes trade information. However the problem is how to keep this information up-to-date. Efforts to improve the transport systems in the corridors are welcome. But we need to increase these efforts and to rehabilitate internal roads and railways. Other non-tariff barriers that we need to address are shortages of foreign exchange, import licensing, communication problems, customs procedures, other border procedures and official inconvertibility of most of the regional currencies. Apart from the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers, intra-regional trade growth would benefit from official convertibility of the region's currencies at fixed exchange rates or the establishment of a common currency. Currency convertibility would lessen the foreign exchange constraint. Fixed (regional) exchange rates would facilitate joint monetary policy aimed at controlling transactions between the sub-region and the outside world. It would also make it possible to co-ordinate or harmonise the monetary policies required to avoid inconsistent and contradictory actions and signals.

Intra-SADC investment continues to be constrained by restrictions on the extent of shareholding that individuals can own in local firms and by restrictions on the channels through which inward and outward transfers of investments can be made. Other barriers to increased movement of capital in the SADC sub-region include restrictions on the freedom of citizens of certain countries to invest and contract loans abroad, lack of general, official convertibility of most of the regional currencies outside the Common Monetary Area and exchange rate instability. These barriers would need to be reduced or eliminated for higher levels of intra-SADC investment.

There are a number of barriers constraining the migration of workers to all countries and hence the integration of markets for unskilled labour

in particular but also for skilled labour. These are:

- xenophobia
- fear of unskilled and undocumented migration
- inadequate labour market information
- high rates of open unemployment — estimated for example at 32.0 per cent in South Africa (1995), 19.6 per cent in Zambia (1996), 32.0 per cent in Zimbabwe (1996) and 21.0 per cent in Botswana (1994). These unemployment rates seem to have been based on the broad definition of unemployment which includes those who are not working but are actively seeking employment and those who are discouraged from seeking employment. According to the narrow definition which would give lower unemployment rates, the unemployed are those who are not working but are actively seeking employment;
- low wage rates, estimated, for example, at the equivalent in manufacturing of 19.94 rands per month in Malawi (1991), 31.95 rands per month in Mauritius (1995) 218.00 rands per month in Zimbabwe (1995) and 1,308 rands per month in Swaziland (1993), on average; and
- unsatisfactory living conditions and social facilities in Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Lesotho.

Then there are legal barriers such as visa requirements, other restrictive migration laws and physical controls at the borders, which are a reflection of economic barriers. These and other barriers are being addressed by SADC and national governments but little improvement has been achieved, especially in reducing economic barriers.


Involvement of stakeholders

The framework and strategy document states that integration schemes in the past failed because they were drawn up by officials and ministers, with little or no involvement by interested parties in civil society such as professionals, the business community, educational institutions, non-governmental organisations and sporting and cultural bodies. For the integration process to succeed these stakeholders must be involved. The involvement of the business community in particular is fundamental since they will be taking many of the critical decisions that will determine the effectiveness of the integration process in the economic sector. The business community is represented by the Association of SADC Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASCCI) formed in 1999.

The involvement of the business community in particular is fundamental

The framework and strategy for integration envisages that much of the regional co-operation will take place between governments (as through bilateral co-operation agreements), between private sector organisations, between non-governmental organisations or between other types of stakeholders. In this regard, the SADC secretariat believes that we have made some progress, citing as examples the SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (SADC-CNGO), and the Southern African Regional Police of Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPC-CO). Among other examples are the regional chapter of the World Customs Organisation (WCO) and the Federation of Farmers' Organisations.

The culture, information and sport sector is at the centre of social integration of the citizens of SADC. This sector has already held a number of festivities in the past, including the Arts and Music Festival, the Theatre Festival and the SADC Visual Arts and Crafts Exhibition. A SADC Dance Festival is being organised for the year 2001. Every year 14 October is celebrated as SADC Day for Creators and Performers and every 17 August as SADC Day. Other official social integration activi-



ties include the Annual Essay Competition and sports competitions. It is worth pointing out, however, that many more social integration activities take place in the SADC under auspices of non-governmental organisations; for example, the Confederation of Southern African Football Associations (COSAFA) which organises soccer tournaments and the Confederation of Southern African Netball Associations (COSANA) which organises regional netball competitions.

Progress in political and social integration

Three major achievements in furthering political integration in the SADC region include the establishment of:

- the SADC Parliamentary Forum,
- the SADC Electoral Commissions Forum and
- the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.

Careful monitoring of these organisations for effectiveness is vital for the region. The SADC Parliamentary Forum was established in 1997 and its objectives are, inter alia, to:

- strengthen the implementation capacity of SADC by involving parliamentarians in SADC activities;
- facilitate the effective implementation of SADC policies and projects;
- promote the principles of human rights and democracy within the SADC region;
- familiarise the people of SADC countries with the aims and objectives of SADC;
- promote peace, democracy, security and stability on the basis of collective responsibility by supporting the development of permanent conflict resolution mechanisms in the SADC sub-region;
- strengthen regional solidarity and build a sense of common destiny among the people of SADC;
- encourage good governance, transparency and accountability in the region and in the operation of SADC institutions; and
- promote the participation of non-governmental organisations, business and intellectual communities in SADC activities.

The SADC Electoral Commissions Forum was established in 1998 to strengthen regional co-operation among electoral management bodies in the SADC countries with a view to:

- strengthen democratic electoral processes and a democratic culture;
- establish mechanisms of co-operation and assistance in a range of electoral matters;
- develop common electoral practices and standards;
- establish conflict resolution procedures during elections;
- assess the practicability and usefulness of various electoral systems employed in Africa;
- develop a code of conduct for officials, political parties, electoral commissions and observers.

One of the principles embraced by Article 4 of the SADC Treaty to which member states have to adhere is that of 'solidarity, peace and security'. To realise this principle, Article 5 of the Treaty sets out one of the objectives of SADC as to 'promote and defend peace and security' while Article 21 obliges members states to co-operate in the areas of 'politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security' (see Berman and Sams, 2000: 160). The Frontline States grouping which had been solely responsible for security co-operation among majority-ruled independent

states since the mid-1970s was disbanded in 1994 and replaced by a new security structure, the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security.

Although controversy surrounds the role, status and mandate of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security, the important achievement of SADC in the field of security co-operation is the recognition that regional states must make every effort to resolve their own conflicts and further that a sustainable conflict management mechanism requires a regional structure (Matlosa, 2000). For such a structure to respond effectively to the multivariate conflicts in the region it must exercise autonomous existence from SADC even if it remains answerable and accountable to the SADC summit. The effectiveness of the SADC organ in managing conflicts will be determined profoundly by the pending decision of the Council of Ministers whether to fully integrate the organ within SADC or to allow it autonomous leverage for driving and directing security co-operation (Baregu, 2000).

Despite political differences among the SADC member states regarding the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security, the states have exhibited the political will to develop an effective structure

The decision must be made with the full appreciation of the deleterious effects of conflicts and instability for regional integration. Whereas major and violent inter-state conflicts which were linked to both the cold war and apartheid have been resolved by political means during the early 1990s, large-scale and costly wars still rage in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola with dire consequences not only for security co-operation but for the wider project of deep integration. Although inter-state conflicts still prevail, the Southern African region is likely to be confronted more by complex resource-based intra-state conflicts, which will need a well-organised and sufficiently prepared regional structure for conflict management. These wars and conflicts claim enormous amounts of resources which would otherwise be earmarked for socio-economic development.

Despite political differences among the SADC member states regarding the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security, the states have exhibited the political will to develop an effective structure and have undertaken joint peace-keeping training exercises under the auspices of the Inter-state Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), which has been turned into a sub-committee of the organ after the dismantling of the Frontline States (FLS).

Political achievements

The foundation of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) was premised upon political solidarity of the majority-rules states of the region to reduce their economic dependence upon the then racist minority regime in South Africa. This was a noble principle which was not only anchored within the framework of Pan-Africanism but also found its practical expression in the political commitment and activities of SADCC and the Frontline States in support of the liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa. As both a political movement and ideology, Pan-Africanism is a crucial foundation for the quest for deep integration (Mugo, 2000; Kaumbi, 2000; Prah, 2000; Nabudere, 2000; Mandaza, 2000).

Within the overall framework of the 1963 OAU Charter and the activities of its African Liberation Committee, both the Frontline States and the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) have been relatively successful in building inter-state political solidarity which was crucial to decolonisation. More than three decades after independence, this political solidarity still has great potential to contain the adverse effects of globalisation. Due in part to this solidarity, Southern Africa has developed a distinct regional identity over the years. Although the achievements of SADCC at the level of economic integration have

been severely constrained by, among others:

- marginalisation and fragmentation associated with globalisation;
- the problem of vertical integration;
- the problem of unequal and uneven development; and
- the problem of the nation-state-in-the-making (Mandaza, 2000).

SADC(C) has made tremendous achievements in the political arena.

Both the Frontline States and SADCC member states played a crucial role in the mid-1970s in support of the wars of decolonisation in the region that culminated in political independence for Angola (1974), Mozambique (1975) and Zimbabwe (1980). Although they did not completely succeed in harmonising the foreign policies of the member states, a majority of the members joined calls by the United Nations for economic sanctions against South Africa in the 1980s. A combination of the liberation struggle, international sanctions and political solidarity among the member states of SADCC and the Frontline States contributed to the achievements of political independence and majority rule in Namibia in 1990 and South Africa in 1994, respectively. So we could argue that one of the major achievements of SADCC and the Frontline States between the 1970s and early 1990s was the establishment of an unprecedented political solidarity among the hitherto disparate states torn asunder by colonial conquest and balkanisation. For the Southern African region to strive towards a sustainable regional integration this political solidarity needs to be strengthened. In other words, Pan-Africanism must be at the heart of efforts towards deep integration if we are to maintain a proper balance between economic integration and political integration.

With a view to striving towards a political community, the 1992 SADC Treaty commits member states to the evolution of common political values, systems and institutions in order to build a firm foundation for democratic governance. The most notable achievement by SADC on this front is that a majority of member states have since the 1990s abandoned mono-party, one-person rule and military authoritarianism and embraced political pluralism and regular multi-party elections. This process of nurturing and consolidating democratic governance in Southern Africa is crucial not only to broaden political participation but also to ensure relative stability of political systems and legitimacy of governments.

The 1998 *SADC Regional Human Development Report* used the Index of Democratic Governance to measure the depth and breadth of democratic governance in the region. Four main components of governance were used as key indicators for the index namely:

- the political,
- the institutional,
- the economic and
- gender empowerment.


The report concluded that although much progress has been made in regular elections, observance of human rights, strengthening of local government, active participation of civil society actors and increased participation of women in the political process, much still remains to be done to institutionalise democracy and 'translate constitutional provisions of fundamental freedoms and rights into political culture and practice' of societies in the region (SAPES, UNDP and SADC, 1998). In the next chapter, we consider all these factors in the context of a discussion of the relationship between and challenges of regional integration and human development.

Pan-Africanism must be at the heart of efforts towards deep integration

The most notable achievement by SADC on this front is that a majority of member states have since the 1990s abandoned mono-party, one-person rule and military authoritarianism and embraced political pluralism and regular multi-party elections.

Chapter 3

Challenges
of human development
and regional integration



I Introduction

Chapter 2 notes that the level of human poverty in SADC declined between 1995 and 1998 and some progress was made towards empowering women. However, the SADC Human Development Index fell between 1995 and 1998 due to a widespread decline in life expectancy at birth, decreases in per capita incomes in purchasing power parity terms and due to setbacks in school enrolment ratios. Chapter 2 also notes that there was a marked increase in intra-SADC trade in the 1990s but a modest increase in intra-SADC investment and skilled labour migration. This chapter examines the major challenges that are constraining regional integration and human development in SADC.

II Challenges of economic development

Low rates of growth of output

Although most countries have achieved some economic growth since the 1990s, high rates of economic growth are a long term to reduce poverty.

The average annual rate of growth of output in the SADC region between 1991 and 1998 was 2.2 per cent, which was below the average population growth implying that on average output per capita decreased. This average rate of economic growth conceals wide variation, ranging from -6.0 per cent in the Democratic Republic of Congo to 7.6 per cent in Mozambique. Low or negative rates of economic growth were due to droughts, the Asian financial crisis which depressed global demand, low international prices of commodities and the resurgence of hostilities in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The low income base in Mozambique accounted for the high rate of economic growth there.

Towards the end of the 1990s, there was a marked improvement in the average rate of economic growth. Between 1995 and 1998 five countries (Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius and Mozambique) recorded average growth rates in excess of 5 per cent, compared with four (Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique and Namibia) during 1991-94. And while two countries (Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo) had negative average rates of economic growth during 1991-94, only one (Democratic Republic of Congo) recorded a negative average growth rate during 1995-98.

Although growth rates have generally improved in recent years, the challenge facing the SADC sub-region is to sustain high rates of economic growth over the long term to reduce poverty. Growth rates of 5 per cent may do no more than prevent the incidence of poverty from rising. We need growth rates of at least 6 per cent to reduce the incidence of poverty in the absence of improvement in the distribution of growth itself. Between 1991 and 1998, only two countries (Mauritius and Mozambique) recorded an average annual growth rate above 5 per cent, while one (Botswana) achieved an average annual growth rate of just 5 per cent. Of the other countries, eight recorded average annual growth rates below 4 per cent (see Table 3.1). The challenge for the SADC region is to increase and sustain rates of economic growth at between 6 and 8 per cent per year in order to reduce poverty. This necessitates increases in investment rates to between 25 and 30 per cent of gross domestic product, assuming that the distribution of economic growth does not change in favour of the poor.

Over time, there have been marked shifts in the sectoral composition of output or gross domestic product (GDP) (Figure 3.1), reflecting long-term changes in patterns of regional and global demand. As a result of these shifts, the share of services in GDP increased in most SADC member countries between 1990 and 1998. Services now account for at least 50 per cent of GDP in six of these countries now. This large share of services in GDP has a stabilising influence on the economies concerned since services are not subject to wide fluctuations caused by changes in demand or supply. The share of manufacturing, which similarly helps to

stabilise the regional economy, declined or remained static in most member countries between 1990 and 1998 where it was adversely affected by the influx of cheaper foreign goods, higher input costs and shortages of foreign exchange for importing inputs. The share of industry (mining, construction, utilities and manufacturing) also decreased in most of the countries. But extractive industries remained the dominant activities in Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia. Agriculture also remained the dominant activity in the Democratic Republic of Congo (where its share of GDP increased) and in Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania (despite the fall in its share of GDP). Agriculture's contribution to GDP increased in Swaziland and Zimbabwe. In other words, many economies in the SADC region remain structurally disarticulated.

This structural disarticulation of Southern African economies makes them susceptible to external shocks and limits their ability to respond to those shocks

This structural disarticulation of Southern African economies makes them susceptible to external shocks and limits their ability to respond to those shocks. A recent study assessed the income effects of external shocks resulting from changes in external terms of trade, interest rates and net transfers of external resources for a medium African country. It found out that the loss of income from these shocks in sub-Saharan Africa is significantly higher than in other developing regions. The study also found that net transfers of foreign resources only partially offset the negative effects of the sustained decline in the external terms of trade (Elbadawi and Ndulu, 1997). Hence, diversification of SADC economies to lessen dependence on agriculture and extractive industries is the most promising option for the sub-region.

Table 3.1 Economic growth rates in SADC, 1991-1998

Country	Average Annual Growth Rates		
	1991-92	1995-98	1991-98
Angola	-7.0	7.9	0.5
Botswana	3.7	6.4	5.0
DR Congo	-9.0	-3.0	-6.0
Lesotho	5.1	4.2	4.7
Malawi	0.2	8.5	4.3
Mauritius	5.4	5.7	5.5
Mozambique	7.0	8.3	7.6
Namibia	5.1	2.7	3.9
Seychelles	3.7	2.8	3.3
South Africa	0.2	2.1	2.3
Swaziland	2.7	3.3	3.0
Tanzania	3.2	3.7	3.4
Zambia	0.2	1.4	1.6
Zimbabwe	0.9	2.4	3.3
SADC	-0.03	2.6	2.2

Source: SADC Finance and Investment Sector Co-ordinating Unit.

Table 3.2 Gross Domestic Investment as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product

Country	1980s			1990s		
	Private	Public	Total	Private	Public	Total
Angola	16.3	14.0
Botswana	23.8	33.1
DR Congo	8.4	..	13.7	6.4
Lesotho	49.9	29.7	49.2	82.3
Malawi	7.9	9.4	17.3	8.6	8.6	16.6
Mauritius	15.0	7.9	26.6	19.4	8.5	29.0
Mozambique	15.7	14.9	30.6	30.8	18.8	49.5
Namibia	7.5	7.7	14.1	13.2	8.0	21.7
Seychelles	14.9	7.6	23.6	13.5	..	23.4
South Africa	12.4	8.0	19.3	..	5.1	16.4
Swaziland	11.7	..	21.6	9.6	..	18.8
Tanzania	17.1	..	23.8	20.0	..	32.8
Zambia	4.1	..	14.7	7.0	..	12.8
Zimbabwe	14.4	3.9	20.7	16.8	4.0	21.5
SADC	12.1	16.8	7.9	5.6	19.3	17.9


Source: World Bank. African Development Indicators, 1997, pages.24, 25 and 26

Relatively low rates of investment and savings present other challenges in the sub-region's quest to raise the rate of economic growth. Assuming that the minimum required rate of investment is 25 per cent, with the exception of Lesotho, Botswana, Mozambique and Mauritius (see Table 3.2), the general situation in the 1980s and 1990s was not satisfactory. Tanzania did better in the 1990s than in the 1980s (see Table 3.2). As regards gross private investment, there was an improvement in all countries in the 1990s except in Seychelles and Swaziland (see Table 3.2). With respect to gross public investment, again all countries recorded an improvement in the 1990s except Malawi and South Africa (see Table 3.2).


The data shown in Table 3.3 indicate that savings rates were high in Angola, Botswana, Mauritius, Seychelles, South Africa and Zimbabwe in the 1980s. In the 1990s rates of savings had declined in all these countries except Angola and Botswana. The rest of the member countries of SADC had relatively low rates of savings throughout. In the 1990s their savings rates were actually lower than in the 1980s (see Table 3.3). Increasing the rate of domestic savings to finance a higher rate of domestic investment is a major challenge for the SADC sub-region. A study

Figure 2.10. Value of Exports as a Percentage of GDP


Agriculture as a percentage of GDP




Industry as a percentage of GDP



Services as a percentage of GDP



Total as a percentage of GDP



1990
1998

Note: Manufacturing is also included in industry

Source: World Bank African Development Indicators, CD-ROM 2000

Table 3.3 Gross Domestic Savings as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product, 1985/89 and 1990/96

Country	1985/89	1990/96
Angola	25.9	30.4
Botswana	42.0	31.5
DR Congo	13.3	7.2
Lesotho	67.2	26.7
Malawi	10.0	4.0
Mauritius	25.5	23.9
Mozambique	-1.2	9.6
Namibia	16.4	13.5
Seychelles	30.1	21.9
South Africa	26.8	19.5
Swaziland	20.4	10.7
Tanzania	6.5	4.1
Zambia	14.9	9.9
Zimbabwe	24.7	18.2
SADC	24.3	18.7

Source: World Bank. African Development Indicators, 1997.

carried out by the African Development Bank concluded that raising income is the most potent means of raising domestic savings. The same study also concluded that interest rates are weak determinants of savings. Thus, reliance should not be placed on higher interest rates as the sole means of raising the rate of savings. The study found that export income was positively associated with saving. This type of income largely accrues to export firms in the corporate sector, which accounts for most of the savings in the region. Measures for promoting exports can thus be expected to have a positive impact on savings.

Slow expansion in employment

Table 3.4 presents data on aggregate employment growth although the information is incomplete and shows only formal sector employment. The data in Table 3.4 show that rates of growth of employment between 1994 and 1997 were either negative or positive, but very low. These rates of growth of employment were all below the rates of economic growth in the countries concerned and below the average rate of growth of the labour force which was 2.4 per cent. The reasons for this jobless growth include the low absorptive capacity of energy, transport and communications and certain industrial activities in the sub-region, a big fall in employment on South African coal and gold mines (Table 3.6) and the inability of SADC member states to restructure their economies in the face of globalisation.

The generally slow growth in formal sector wage employment means that a larger proportion of the new labour entrants must be absorbed in agriculture or informal sector activities (estimates put the number of

Growth of informal activities also means survivalist tactics and loss of quality, although the informal sector has become the major source of employment.

informal sector workers in both Malawi and Zimbabwe (at over one million people) with the likely result of substantial underemployment. This is especially true because, with rising populations, new entrants into the agricultural labour force till or graze poorer and higher-drought-risk land, while those in the non-agricultural, informal sector often divide up existing demand-limited, output possibilities rather than raising overall production. Growth of informal activities also means survivalist tactics and loss of quality, although the informal sector has become the major source of employment.

Data on unemployment, disaggregated by gender, are shown in Table 3.5. These data are based on the narrow definition of unemployment which assumes that during the reference period, the unemployed were without work, that they were willing to work and that they were looking for work. On the basis of the broad definition of unemployment which includes the strict definition plus discouraged workers, the unemployment rate is estimated at between 30 and 40 per cent of the labour force in the SADC sub-region. These rates of open unemployment show only the visible aspects of the unemployment problem in the sub-region. The actual underuse of labour takes many other forms, including various forms of underemployment and hidden unemployment on which data are more scarce.

SADC has, on the basis of available data, categorised the skills required in the region into:

- high-level managerial personnel.
- high and medium level technicians.
- artisans and
- trainers or instructors.

These skills are in short supply in relation to both the SADC Programme of Action and national programmes. Having shortages of skills and rising unemployment simultaneously implies that one method of reducing unemployment among school leavers and even university graduates is by expanding vocational and technical training programmes. Related to this is the need for primary and secondary school pupils to learn more agricultural, technical and managerial skills. Most pupils in the region who start school do not complete primary school. Of those who do, relatively few go on to secondary school and even fewer go on

Table 3.4 Formal sector wage employment in selected SADC member countries, 1994/97

Country	1994	1995	1996	1997	Annual % change 1994/97
Botswana	230 614	233 457	234 116	226 001	-0.7
Mauritius	454 800	460 500	466 000	475 700	1.5
Namibia	350 280	356 849	0.6
South Africa	7 971 000	8 063 000	7 590 000	7 548 000	-1.8
Swaziland	109 624	110 930	111 643	112 744	1.0
Zambia	496 000	485 000	479 400	475 161	-1.4 ¹

¹1994-98

Source: SADC Employment and Labour Co-ordinating Unit.

Table 3.5 Unemployment rates in selected SADC countries by gender, %, 1991-99

	Female	Male	Total
South Africa	27.8	19.8	23.3
Botswana	21.0
Mauritius	9.9 ¹	3.9 ¹	5.9 ¹
Namibia	21.0	18.0	19.0
Swaziland	23.3	20.7	21.8
Zambia*	16.0	15.0	15.0
Zimbabwe*	15.0	15.0	15.0

¹Data are for 1997 only

Sources : SARIPS/SAPES databank

Table 3.6 Distribution of miners employed on gold and coal mines owned by members of the South African Chamber of Mines by country of origin, 1985, 1990 and 1994

Country of Origin	1985	1990	1994
South Africa	312 778	257 332	170 290
Lesotho	107 442	103 920	82 585
Botswana	18 088	14 920	10 043
Mozambique	51 698	44 408	43 894
Swaziland	13 013	16 834	14 451
Malawi	17 056	70	0
Other	10	277	16
Total	520 085	437 761	321 379

Source: Southern African Migration Project databank

Another way to accelerate employment creation is to promote commercial activities in the informal sector:

ricula are designed to serve the interests of these few and not the interests of the majority who are likely to end up in informal sector self-employment. To best serve their interests we must modify school curricula to accommodate the fields mentioned above.

Another way to accelerate employment creation is to promote commercial activities in the informal sector. These activities are labour-intensive. But the small size of the enterprises in this sector limits the number of workers that each can employ. What they have great potential for is self-employment if they can provide an adequate income for the owner-operator. Most programmes to promote the informal sector can be stimulated by fiscal and other incentives that are now available only to the formal sector, by providing information on means of transport, assistance in procurement and by granting government tenders to informal sector enterprises. Some sectors in the formal economy are labour-intensive (such as services, distribution and agriculture). There are also others that have high employment coefficients. Expanding these sectors is surely a way to secure rapid expansion in employment, especially if a low-wage policy is followed and if employers can freely hire and lay off workers. Other measures that would assist job creation are increasing the size of the capital stock through net investment and restraining rural-urban migration by preventing a widening in the rural-urban real earnings gap and promoting rural development.

Macroeconomic instability

Macroeconomic instability in SADC is characterised by:

- unsustainable budget deficits, the financing of which crowds the private sector out of the domestic financial market;
- high inflation and interest rates which discourage investment;
- unsustainable balance of payments deficits, which have to be financed by foreign borrowing;
- high levels of external public debt, the servicing of which has a major impact on the capacity of governments to invest in human development; and
- exchange rate instability which discourages trade and investment.

So there are compelling reasons for restoring macroeconomic stability, even if it does not lead to immediate economic benefits.

Budget deficits

Data on overall budget deficits in the 1990s as percentages of GDP for SADC member countries are shown in Table 3.7. The data in Table 3.7 show that the average (SADC) overall budget deficit as a percentage of GDP was lower during 1995/98 than during 1990/94. Botswana and Lesotho recorded overall budget surpluses throughout the two time periods. As a percentage of GDP, the overall budget deficit of the Democratic Republic of Congo was lower during 1995/98 than during 1990/94 but, like that of Angola, it remained high throughout the period owing to the exigencies of defence spending. And in Mauritius and Seychelles, there was an acceleration in the overall budget deficit as a percentage of GDP.

With open economies and market determined exchange rates, internal disequilibrium causes external disequilibrium in these countries. Sometimes, budget deficits caused by delays in disbursement of anticipated foreign aid and deficit financing spark inflation which leads to exchange rate depreciation. With high import dependence of domestic production and consumption, this leads to more inflation. At the same time, the domestic financing of the budget deficit pushes up interest rates

Table 3.7 Overall budget deficits as a percentage of GDP, 1990/98

Country	Average 1990/94	Average 1995/98	Average 1990/98
Angola	-16.3	-17.6	-16.9
Botswana	8.2	4.6	6.6
DR Congo	-16.5	-11.0	-14.0
Lesotho	2.5	1.7	2.2
Malawi	-8.7	-5.5	-7.3
Mauritius	-2.1	-5.2	-3.5
Mozambique	-4.6	-2.8	-3.8
Namibia	-2.5	-4.0	-3.2
Seychelles	-5.8	-11.7	-3.4
South Africa	-6.3	-4.2	-5.4
Swaziland	1.6	-1.2	-1.4
Tanzania	-1.9	-0.3	-1.2
Zambia	-5.8	-1.3	-3.8
Zimbabwe	-6.3	-7.0	-6.6
SADC	-6.6	-4.6	-5.7

Source: FISCU, 'Macroeconomic Convergence in SADC', page 16

which reduces private sector borrowing and investment. The higher level of interest rate payments makes it difficult to reduce the budget deficit, thus complicating the domestic debt burden and government financing.

Inflation

...rates of inflation in the SADC sub-region were very high throughout the 1990s

For the purpose of this study, inflation is measured by changes in consumer prices. As with other statistics, treat data on consumer price indices with caution. In some of the SADC member states, these indices cover urban areas only. In others, the weights used in compiling these indices are out of date. And in terms of coverage, some of the indices exclude certain items of expenditure. According to the data in Table 3.8, the average rate of inflation fell towards the end of the 1990s. However, rates of inflation in the SADC sub-region were very high throughout the 1990s, ranging from an average annual rate of 1.2 per cent in the Seychelles to 3.711 per cent in the Democratic Republic of Congo, with an average annual rate of 10 per cent during 1990/98 (see Table 3.8). The main causes of these high rates of inflation were fiscal indiscipline, shortages caused by droughts and foreign exchange constraints, deficit financing and rising import costs partly related to currency devaluations. The average lower rate of inflation in Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland was due to a decline in the rate of inflation in South Africa, their main source of imports. Botswana also benefited from an independent exchange rate policy that avoided an undue depreciation of the Pula against the Rand, whilst the lower average rate of inflation in Mauritius and the Seychelles reflected prudent macroeconomic policies.

While moderate (single-digit) inflation has few measurable consequences in SADC, the more rapid the inflation, the more serious its effects. First, rapid inflation discourages and distorts investments.

*Rapid inflation
discourages and
distorts investments*

Studies show that when there is a rapid inflationary trend, prices also tend to become unstable around the trend. The resulting uncertainty encourages short-term speculation, such as stockpiling of imported goods and agricultural products. Speculators anticipate future price increases and withhold stocks until prices have risen, leading to scarcities and further price increases. Second, high and unpredictable inflation has a negative impact on long-term private investment because investors face greater uncertainties and will therefore be reluctant to commit themselves to long-term projects. Moreover, the composition of investment tends to be distorted by rapid inflation. Not all prices rise by the same percentage and the resulting changes in relative prices distort their information content and reduce the social efficiency of investment.

A further adverse consequence arises from the way inflation erodes the government's tax revenue in SADC. This partly arises because taxes are based on nominal values and are subject to time lags, so that inflation erodes their real value. Moreover, receipts from taxes on international trade are liable to suffer because domestic inflation is likely to reduce the profitability of exporting and hence the volume of imports that can be financed. There is danger of a vicious circle arising with these adverse budgetary effects leading governments to finance the resulting budget deficits through money creation, adding further to inflationary pressures.

It is also likely that rapid inflation will worsen the position of the poor. This is most obvious with the urban poor whose incomes are unlikely to keep pace with rises in their cost of living. Many of the rural poor are partially protected by their limited involvement in monetised activity and their ability to grow food for themselves. However, poor rural households typically have net food deficits and, in any case, have

Table 3.8 Inflation rates: Change in consumer prices, 1990/95

Country	Average 1990/94	Average 1990/95	Average 1990/98
Angola	543	1 750	1 079
Botswana	13	9	11
DR Congo	6 403	347	3 711
Lesotho	12	9	11
Malawi	20	40	29
Mauritius	9	6	8
Mozambique	46	27	37
Namibia	11	8	10
Seychelles	2	0.1	1
South Africa	12	8	10
Swaziland	12	9	10
Tanzania	24	19	22
Zambia	122	32	82
Zimbabwe	27	24	25
SADC	12	9	10

Source: FISCO, 'Macroeconomic convergence in SADC'.

other essential purchases to make. Partly because it affects the distribution of income, rapid inflation is also liable to be associated with increased labour unrest which also retards long-term investment. Furthermore, large inflationary pressures are very likely to spill over into heightened balance of payments difficulties, again impacting negatively on the level of economic activity. Among other things, they may precipitate further depreciation of currencies. As prices and costs of production rise, export competitiveness and the competitiveness of import-substitution industries decline. To restore their competitiveness, the country may have no choice but to further depreciate the currency. So there are good reasons to regard rapid inflation as a bane and to encourage governments to avoid it.

External imbalances

As a percentage of GDP, the average current account deficit in the SADC sub-region increased during the course of the 1990s (see Table 3.9). Among individual SADC member countries, the current account deficit as a percentage of GDP increased in Angola, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Seychelles but fell in Mauritius, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Botswana and Namibia realised current account surpluses over most of this period. In Swaziland surpluses were realised in some years and deficits were incurred in other years.

Many countries resorted to currency devaluation as a balance of payments policy tool.

Many countries resorted to currency devaluation as a balance of payments policy tool. Currency devaluation as a tool for stimulating exports, restraining demand for imports and hence for correcting balance of payments disequilibrium had limited impact because of structural rigidities in the economies of the sub-region which could not be removed within a short period of time. These structural rigidities included limited supply capacity, inadequate producer price incentives, low elasticity of demand for imports and high transport costs which reduced net export receipts.

The disequilibrium in the balance of payments of several member states also proved difficult to correct through expansion in exports because of the generally unfavourable world economic climate— protectionism, growing competition from other developing regions and the emergence of a service economy in industrial countries all of which tended to reduce demand for exports from SADC member states. Enhancement of trade prospects required increasing the level of trade among SADC member states and other developing countries and hence reducing reliance on the markets of industrial countries, diversifying into non-traditional exports and generally improving the competitiveness of exports.

High external debt burden

As a percentage of exports of goods and non-factor services, external public debt in the SADC sub-region was lower during 1995-98 than during 1990-94 but was generally high, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia (Table 3.10). During the course of the 1990s, external public debt as a percentage of exports of goods and non-factor services fell in Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. But it rose in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia (Table 3.10).

Table 3.9 External current account as a percentage of GDP (2002)

Country	Volume (billion)	Current account	External debt
Angola	-9.5	-14.7	-11.8
Botswana	5.5	7.9	6.6
DR Congo	-4.5	-1.9	-3.4
Lesotho	-30.9	-30.0	-30.5
Malawi	-10.0	-8.7	-9.4
Mauritius	-2.3	1.6	0.8
Mozambique	-20.9	-16.8	-19.1
Namibia	3.2	4.8	3.9
Seychelles	-1.1	-2.3	-1.6
South Africa	0.7	-1.5	-0.2
Swaziland	0.7	-0.6	0.1
Tanzania	-6.2	-14.7	-9.9
Zambia	-1.4	-5.6	-3.2
Zimbabwe	-4.0	-2.8	-3.4
SADC	-0.8	-2.6	-1.5

Source: FISCU, *Macroeconomic Convergence in SADC*, page 21

Since the external debt is mainly owned by governments, debt service payments limit their ability to invest in physical and human infrastructure as well as to increase growth enhancing expenditure on education and health.

The consequent debt overhang is having an adverse impact on investment and economic growth in Southern Africa. Since the external debt is mainly owned by governments, debt service payments limit their ability to invest in physical and human infrastructure as well as to increase growth enhancing expenditure on education and health. The debt overhang also creates a policy credibility problem and considerable uncertainty for domestic and foreign investors who run the risk that returns from their investment could be taxed to service external debt. Moreover, foreign investors run the risk that debt-servicing problems may make it difficult for them to purchase inputs abroad or remit profits. These problems make it difficult for a country suffering from debt overhang to have access to foreign private capital markets.

Past and recent efforts to deal with the debt burden have had limited impact. In the 1980s, the emphasis was on rescheduling debt with longer repayment and grace periods under the Paris and London clubs. This only served to postpone and compound the problem as interest was capitalised. As an ongoing gesture, part of the bilateral debt has been cancelled. But this is of little consequence to many least developed countries most of whose debt is owed to multilateral institutions like the African Development Bank, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

The introduction of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative promised SADC more than it could deliver. Few countries were eligible and fewer still qualified under the first initiative because of the stringent criteria and conditionality. In the SADC region, only Mozambique benefited from HIPC 1. Plans are under way for Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia to benefit from HIPC 2. The common complaint was that the debt relief was not fast enough and did not go deep enough. While the criteria have been relaxed under the second initiative intro-

duced in 1999, the conditionality remains stringent. Besides, the volume of intended debt reduction may be inadequate. At a political level, the actions of the Group of Seven have not helped. When it met in Germany in 1999, it promised US\$100 billion in debt relief. In Japan in 2000, the group backtracked on their promise. It is desirable, therefore, that not only should all official external debt be cancelled but that the governance of the global economic system should be transformed based on equitable and inclusive principles.

Table 3.10 External public debt as a percentage of exports of goods and non-factor services, 1990/98

Country	Weighted average (1990/98)	Average (1990/98)	Weighted average (1990/98)
Angola	285.6	205.9	248.5
Botswana	29.9	20.5	25.7
DR Congo	747.3	920.5	824.3
Lesotho	330.7	216.5	279.9
Malawi	454.6	440.9	448.3
Mauritius	41.9	41.5	41.7
Mozambique	1902.8	1139.4	563.5
Namibia	23.3	12.8	18.6
Seychelles	57.9	59.2	58.5
South Africa	18.3	31.2	24.0
Swaziland	28.3	20.3	24.7
Tanzania	596.2	618.2	606.0
Zambia	566.9	598.3	581.8
Zimbabwe	170.6	146.2	159.7
SADC	129.3	123.0	127.3

Source: FISCO, *Macroeconomic Convergence in SADC*, page 18.

Harmonising member states' policies, plans and external relations

SADC needs to harmonise the sector policies and strategies of its member countries

...harmonisation of investment policies is essential to ensure that appropriate incentives are offered to potential investors by all countries;

SADC needs to harmonise the sector policies and strategies of its member countries to make them consistent with those of the organisation. These sector policies and strategies are prepared after extensive discussions carried out by consultants with National Contact Points, Sector Contact Points, Sector Co-ordinating Units, line ministries, the private sector, non-governmental organisations, academics and other stakeholders in the 14 member states. This process and subsequent approval by consensus ensure that the policies and strategies adopted reflect common positions of member states. But in the absence of a coherent framework for formulating policies and strategies, each sector follows its own approach in designing its policies and strategies. As a result there is no cohesion among sector policies and strategies. The main weaknesses are that:

- no attempt has been made to harmonise the actual plans and activities of member states;
- no attempt has been made to use a regional macroeconomic model to ensure optimality and consistency; and that
- there is no centrally co-ordinated, internally consistent set of principles and policies chosen as the optimal means of implementing the strategies and achieving the targets, and intended to be used as a framework to guide subsequent day-to-day decisions.

The case for co-ordinating macroeconomic policies is based on three grounds. First, changes in macro-economic policies in one country have spill over effects on others, necessitating adjustments which would not have been needed otherwise. Secondly, to avoid competitive currency devaluations to improve competitiveness of national economies. And thirdly, it has been predicted that poorer countries could catch up with richer ones because they can take advantage of existing technological developments without having to develop their own (Jenkins and Thomas, 1996).

Between integrated economies, changes in domestic fiscal policy are transferred through:

- changes in the price of exports relative to the price of imports (terms of trade);
- changes in after-tax returns on international capital in different locations; and through
- changes in demand for imports.

Changes in domestic monetary policy are transmitted to other countries through:

- changes in interest rates; and
- changes in the exchange rate.

Harmonisation of fiscal policy is required so that changes in one country do not adversely affect:

- the exports and imports of other countries; and
- the relative profitability of investment in other countries.

Harmonisation of monetary policy is necessary so that changes in one country do not necessitate:

- interest rates adjustments in other countries which may be undesirable; and
- currency devaluations in other countries, which may create more problems than it solves.

Lastly, harmonisation of investment policies is essential to ensure that:

- appropriate incentives are offered to potential investors by all countries;

- competition for investors among countries, who may try to outbid each other by offering increasingly attractive concessions, is avoided; and that
- there is uniformity in incentives so that location decisions are ultimately based on comparative advantage.

Fiscal (and investment) policy co-ordination entails harmonisation of:

- tax rates; and
- expenditure on subsidies.

SADC has so far not co-ordinated the macroeconomic policies of member states

Monetary policy co-ordination takes the form of uniform interest rates and a fixed exchange rate relationship among regional currencies. Co-ordinating macroeconomic policies therefore entails adopting similar macroeconomic policy instruments to achieve common policy objectives.

Apart from co-ordinating trade policy which has just begun with the SADC Trade protocol, SADC has so far not co-ordinated the macroeconomic policies of member states. Membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) by Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland means that they are subject to the same customs and excise duties. But their fiscal policies can differ with regard to direct taxes. In the Common Monetary Area (CMA), monetary policies are indirectly co-ordinated to the extent that Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland relate their exchange rates and interest rates to those of South Africa, the dominant member country, far more so than Botswana which is not a member of the Common Monetary Area. The conclusion is that there is no genuine policy co-ordination in the Southern African Customs Union or in the Common Monetary Area. Among other SADC member states, the situation is worse. Most of these states have implemented structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). These programmes have been conceived as national rather regional programmes. Despite adopting similar principles, they have not resulted in co-ordinated policies like uniform interest rates, similar tax rates and a fixed exchange rate regime which would serve the objectives of regional integration. The Finance and Investment Sector Co-ordinating Unit (FISCU) intends to co-ordinate these policies.

To enhance policy co-ordination SADC needs to harmonise the international relations of member states as

To enhance policy co-ordination SADC needs to harmonise the international relations of member states as well. Policy harmonisation is desirable on a number of fronts here. First, it needs to harmonise relations with bilateral donors like the EU to avoid self defeating intra-regional competition for investment, trade, aid and other favours that a member state believes it might obtain at the expense of other member states. A recent study has summarised the problem as declining economic and technical capacity to integrate among member states, and the risk of disintegration as a result of the growing competition for the favours of the north (Evans, Holmes and Mandaza, 1999). The same study observes that current trade practices of the north, reflecting the structure of preferences of foreign firms in their investment dealings with their counterparts in the sub-region, reinforce inequality among SADC member states.

Secondly, it needs to harmonise relations with other regional integration blocs, particularly the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African States (COMESA). Most SADC member states belong to at least one other regional integration scheme: the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) or COMESA. To avoid overlapping and conflict between SADC and COMESA, SADC decided that its member countries should withdraw from the COMESA. Mozambique followed this advice and

bowed out of COMESA. Recently Tanzania has also left COMESA. But most SADC member countries that also belong to COMESA have decided not to quit. SADC has no choice but to accept the status quo. In the interest of regional development, however, it must ensure that its programme of action is consistent, not in conflict, with that of COMESA.

Thirdly, SADC needs to harmonise relations with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The aim here should be to coordinate structural adjustment programmes and other policy reforms to avoid:

- spill over effects of policy changes in one member state on others which might have adverse consequences;
- self defeating competitive currency devaluations; and
- differences in policy regimes between those member countries that are carrying out reforms under structural adjustment programmes and those that are not.

Poverty and inequality

The roots of poverty were outlined in the first SADC *Human Development Report* (1998). The main argument in the report is that poverty is endemic in SADC and is rooted in an inflexible economic structure which has evolved over time since the onset of colonialism. Initially colonial economic activity was concentrated in the mining and agricultural enterprises of South Africa. Soon, however, the northward expansion of mining capital led to the colonisation of other countries. The development of large-scale mining in countries such as South Africa, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo created a growing demand for an African workforce. On the other hand, the rapid expansion of estate agriculture in nearly all countries was accompanied by massive land alienation especially in Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique and Angola. However, land alienation was more intense in the settler dominated countries of South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. In Mozambique and Angola, Portuguese settlers owned agricultural estates, which mainly produced coffee, sugar and cashew nuts for export.

Today, a dominant feature of most SADC states is a high degree of poverty which is superimposed by a high degree of inequality in resource and income distribution. The inherited economic structure is too rigid to provide a basis for sustained economic growth and development. Except, perhaps, for South Africa, all countries in the region depend for their exports on a few primary and semi-processed commodities. As a result, most of them are heavily indebted to the developed world. Nearly all countries are in economic crisis, symbolised by high or rising unemployment and inflation, weak export performance, high domestic and foreign debt burdens, weak or declining currency values, reduced access to social services facilities and rising poverty levels. The debt burden is now both a symptom and cause of the crisis in most SADC states. Box 3.1 summarises Amartya Sen's theory on entitlements, poverty and famines.

Box 3.1
Amartya Sen's theory on entitlements, poverty and famines

Box 3.1 Entitlements, poverty and famines

In his seminal work, Sen (1981) developed an alternative theory to explain the causes of famines and starvation. This theory, based on entitlements, holds that people starve if and when they have no command over food through the legal means available in society. These legal means include production possibilities, trade opportunities and entitlements vis-a-vis the state (p 45). People starve either because they are unable to produce food or fail to acquire it through exchange or a combination of both. Thus starvation emanates from a lack of entitlement to adequate food.

So Sen's entitlement theory is based on being unable to command food and emphasises a person's entitlement to a commodity bundle. Whether a people avoid starvation or not depends on their ownership structure and the exchange entitlements faced by people depend on their economic position, the modes of production and the production relations in the economy.

Entitlement relations in a market economy may be trade and production based.

They may also be based on own labour, inheritance and transfer. These entitlements can be influenced by factors such as being employed, having assets to sell or ability to produce. Other factors that may influence entitlement relations include the cost of purchasing resources and the nature of the social security system.

Sen then uses the entitlement approach to develop a link between starvation and poverty. He argues that famines imply starvation while starvation implies poverty. However, there is no automatic link between poverty and starvation. Wealth and starvation tend to coexist in many countries. In fact, people may starve not only due to food shortages but also due to how it is distributed. Food distribution is itself governed by entitlements. Thus food supply may be adequate but some people may starve if they are not entitled to it.

Using examples from Ethiopia, the Sahel, India and Bangladesh, Sen demonstrates that in the extreme the operation of market forces can result in famine and starvation

even in situations of plentiful food supply. The main reason for this is that some people may not have entitlement to the consumption of that food. This is more likely to occur in situations where there are large numbers of landless poor buyers of food as was the case in India and Bangladesh. Starvation may also be caused or exacerbated by 'bad governance' especially in countries without a free press, as was the case in Ethiopia during the early and mid 1970s.

What Sen's entitlement theory suggests is that elimination of poverty (and famines) is a rather complex process since it does not only involve changes in income and its distribution. Policy makers would do well to understand the complex link between famines or starvation, poverty and entitlements. Elimination of poverty and starvation requires not only changes in income but also in the ownership structure, production and exchange relations and entitlements.

SOURCE:
Poverty and Famines 1981
by Amartya Sen



Factors associated with income poverty in SADC

...poverty levels have risen during the recent past mainly as a result of the negative impact of economic reform programmes.

There is a higher incidence of poverty among female-headed households than among male-headed ones.

The main causes of poverty in SADC member states are known. A cursory glance at the available literature suggests that poverty levels have risen during the recent past mainly as a result of the negative impact of economic reform programmes. Furthermore whereas in many countries poverty was essentially a rural phenomenon, it has now become more pronounced and concentrated in urban areas. Boxes 3.2 and 3.3 show the income poverty levels in Zimbabwe and Mozambique respectively. This is partly a result of the elimination of the subsidy and price control programmes which were enjoyed mainly by the urban populace. In the health and education arena, the introduction of cost sharing as part of the adjustment effort has drastically reduced the access of large numbers of the poor sections of society to these services.

Table 3.11 shows the incidence of poverty in selected SADC countries using the US\$1 a day poverty line and the national poverty line. In most SADC member states, factors associated with income poverty include the following (Social Policy Project, 2000):

- Size of the household — large households (of more than six members) tend to be poorer than small household of (four members);
- Educational level of the head of the household — evidence suggests that households headed by people with tertiary education or more tend to have higher incomes than those headed by people with less education (for example, primary education only);
- Gender of the household head — there is a higher incidence of poverty among female-headed households than among male-headed ones. This is mainly due to the tendency for women to have less access to assets or resources than men. In Mozambique, however, male-headed households are poorer than female-headed ones as shown in Box 3.2;
- Type of occupation — rural or agricultural households (including farm labour) tend to earn less income than their urban counterparts. Thus the occupation of the household head is an important indicator of poverty;
- Access to productive assets — households with 'good access' to productive resources or assets are likely to be richer than those with less access;
- Distance from major services — a household located far from major services such as health, education, transport or marketing facilities tends to be poorer than the one living near these facilities; and
- Age of the head of the household — a household headed by someone who is either too young (under 20) or too old (above 60) and who does not have a permanent source of income or productive resources is likely to be very poor. In many rural areas, the most vulnerable household is headed by a female who is either too young or too old, who has no or little access to productive assets, a low level of education and yet heads a large household. In urban areas, poor households also tend to have limited or no access to land and opportunities for earning income.

Income inequality

Another factor that is closely associated with poverty is the extent or degree of income inequality in any society. Table 2.2 in the previous chapter indicates the extent of income inequality in SADC. Countries whose gini coefficients are 0.5 and above are considered to have high levels of income inequality.

It has been argued that resource distribution inequality tends to be high in settler-dominated economies. From Table 2.2, we see that income is more unequally distributed in settler-dominated countries than in others. Namibia has an annual per capita income of US\$2000, which is above the SADC average of US\$1892. However, income distribution in that country is highly skewed as indicated by a high gini coefficient of 0.70. Income inequality is wide along class and racial lines and reflects the impact of the colonial legacy. Presently, Namibia is considered to be one of the most unequal societies in SADC and in the world.

Zimbabwe, with a gini coefficient of 0.63 also exhibits the impact of the colonial legacy. Although the post-independence government tried to redress the situation by implementing redistributive policies the income gap remains high and as in the case of Namibia, largely follows the racial divide. Malawi's high income inequality is mainly due to the impact of large estates owned either by the settler community or by the emerging black agrarian class. Resource and asset ownership is also highly concentrated which contributes to high income inequality.

Box 3.2: Income poverty in Zimbabwe 1995

The 1990 World Development Report defines poverty as the 'inability to attain a minimal standard of living measured in terms of basic consumption needs or income required to satisfy them'. According to this definition poverty is measured in terms of income or the percentage of people below a certain income level. The poverty line is the amount of

income required to buy a basket of consumption goods (food and non-food) needed by an average person per annum. The Food Poverty Line (FPL) refers to the income required to buy a food basket whereas the Total Consumption Poverty Line (TCPL) refers to income required to buy a non-food basket (clothing, housing, education, health, transport and so on) basket. In Zimbabwe the very

poor (percentage of households with incomes below the Food Poverty Line) is 45 per cent. Sixteen per cent of the households had incomes above the Food Poverty Line and below the Total Consumption Poverty Line — the poor — whilst 39 per cent had incomes above the Total Consumption Poverty Line - the non-poor. Rural households are poorer than urban ones and also female-headed households are poorer than male-headed ones.

Zimbabwe poverty incidence national, rural and urban areas - 1995




Table 3.14 Incidence of income poverty in Africa, 1987-97

Country	Population below the national poverty line (US\$1 a day (1993 PPP\$) 1989-98)	National poverty line 1987-97
Mauritius	..	10.6
South Africa	11.5	..
Swaziland	..	66.0
Namibia	34.9	..
Zimbabwe	36.0	74.0
Botswana	33.3	47.0
Lesotho	50.4	26.0
Zambia	72.6	86.0
Tanzania	19.9	51.1
Malawi	42.1	54.0
Mozambique	37.9	69.5

Source : National Statistical Offices and *Human Development Report 2000*

Box 3.3 Income poverty in Mozambique

Male-headed households poorer than female-headed ones!

Contrary to the general observation that female-headed households are poorer than male-headed ones, in Mozambique the findings of the National Household Survey on Living Conditions in Mozambique, 1996/97 and the 1997 Population Census


revealed the contrary, as shown in the table below. Of the 11.2 million poor people in Mozambique only 17 per cent (1.9 million) are in female-headed households whilst 83 per cent are in male-headed households. Out of a total of 2.8 million people in female-

headed households 67.86 per cent are poor whilst out of 13.3 million persons in male-headed households, 69.92 per cent are poor. When Boxes 3.2 and 3.3 are compared it appears that the rural and urban divide is a more significant determinant of poverty than the gender divide.

Population of Mozambique by household, millions

	Headed by		Total
	Men	women	
Total	13.3	2.8	16.1
Non poor	4.00	0.9	4.9
Poor	9.3	1.9	11.2
Men	4.5	0.9	5.4
Women	4.8	1.0	5.8

Poverty by gender of head of household Mozambique, 1995



Source: UNFPA (1999) Mozambique National Human Development Report

An important step in reducing income inequality in South Africa would involve redistributing the land in favour of the black majority.

South Africa, with a gini coefficient of 0.59, has the fourth highest income inequality in SADC. Due to policies of the apartheid regimes, which included the most comprehensive land alienation programme, inequality remains wide along racial lines. An important step in reducing income inequality in South Africa would involve redistributing the land in favour of the black majority. With a gini coefficient of 0.56 Zambia has the fifth highest income distribution inequality in SADC. Like other countries, Zambia inherited a high degree of income inequality at independence. However, the new government sought to redress inherited inequality by implementing redistributive policies. As a result, by the mid-1970s, income inequality had declined from 0.67 to 0.51 (ILO/JASPA, 1980). However, since the late 1980s, income inequality has increased, being provoked by the impact of reform programmes, which have further eroded the incomes of large sections of the society. High inflation and unemployment have reduced the real earnings of the urban workforce while the privatisation programme has led to more concentration of resource and asset ownership. Other countries with high income inequality are Lesotho (0.57), Botswana (0.54), Mauritius (0.52), Swaziland (0.51) and Angola (0.5). The high income inequality in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland largely reflects the absence (or poor implementation) of redistributive policies in those countries. Although Botswana has a per capita income of US\$3000, 47 per cent of the population has an income below the poverty datum line. On the other hand, the situation in Mauritius largely reflects the complexity of the racial mix in that country.

Income inequality tends to be low in the Seychelles (0.46) and Tanzania (0.38). Since the 1980s Seychelles has experienced a high growth rate mainly due to large resource inflows emanating from tourism and fishing. Tanzania's egalitarian policies helped to reduce the income gap during the 1960s and 1970s. However, some anecdotal evidence suggests that income inequality may be on the rise due to the negative impact of the economic reforms being implemented in that country.

Land alienation and emerging agrarian relations

There persist gross inequalities in land access largely defined by race

One of the unique features of the Southern African region is the contrasting colonial land expropriation experience, the nature of the decolonisation process, patterns of land distribution and varied land reform experiences (Moyo, 2000a) (see Box 3.4). Whereas independence ended the violent conflict over land of the liberation struggle, in the name of peace-making, the structural forms of conflict have remained. There persist gross inequalities in land access largely defined by race and at the same time there is emerging polarisation on how the land question should be resolved between donors, governments, civil society and local communities. Land alienation rooted in colonial history is one of the major causes of poverty in the SADC region (Moyo, 1998a).

Extremely skewed land tenure is evident in South Africa where the white South African farming population, who make up only 5 per cent of the population, own almost 87 per cent of the land (Moyo, 2000a). Although their number is steadily declining, there are currently about 60 000 white commercial farmers in South Africa (SAIRR, Survey 1993/94:247 as quoted in Hendricks, 1999). The mean amount of land held per person in South Africa is slightly more than one hectare for blacks and 1 570 hectares for whites. In Zimbabwe, approximately 4 500 white commercial farmers (0.03 per cent of the population) control 31 per cent of the country's land under freehold tenure or about 42 per cent of the agricultural land, while 1.2 million families subsist on 41 per cent

The mean amount of land held per person in South Africa is slightly more than one hectare for blacks and 1 570 hectares for whites.

Approximately 70 per cent of the available potential arable land

In Zimbabwe...the large-scale commercial farming sector accounts for 40 per cent of export earnings, contributes about 18 per cent to the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employs 250 000 people (Moyo, 2000c).

of the country's area of 390 076 square kilometres (Moyo, 2000a). Over a third of large-scale commercial farmland is of prime quality compared to less than one-tenth of communal area lands, three-quarters of which is marginal in quality. However, there are significant reserves of underused land, estimated at over five million hectares, in the 11 million hectares of commercial farming areas. In contrast, in Botswana today freehold tenure covers only 4 per cent and tribal land comprises 70 per cent (Adams et. al., 1999). The state controls 96 per cent of the land with 25 per cent owned by the state and 71 per cent controlled through the tribal land boards. The contest in Botswana is around the land owned by the state and land leased to diamond mining concessions with little regard for the security of minority tribal groups. Figure 3.2 shows the land ownership patterns in selected SADC countries.

Paradoxically, the prime land and natural resources in Southern Africa tend to be underused by the handful of local and foreign élite owners (Moyo, 2000a). While only about 6 per cent of available land in Southern Africa is arable, less than 25 per cent of the available 40 million arable hectares are cropped (Moyo, 1998a). Zimbabwe and Zambia use less than 15 per cent of their high potential arable land, while marginal grazing or pasturelands are increasingly brought under full-scale cultivation and overuse by the poor peasantry. In most countries, pastures still occupy about 45 per cent of the lands, while forests and woodlands occupy up to 33 per cent of the land (Moyo *et al.*, 1993).

Today an outstanding characteristic of the agricultural sector in many SADC member states are large settler-owned farms close to the main urban centres with the best infrastructure in the form of communication, electricity, roads and water resources. In addition the agriculture sector — particularly the large-scale commercial sector — traditionally benefits from tax incentives and various export incentives that do not benefit smallholders (Moyo, 2000c). The large farms dominate production of the main crops and account for large proportions of exports. In Zimbabwe, for instance, the large-scale commercial farming sector accounts for 40 per cent of export earnings, contributes about 18 per cent to the country's gross domestic product (GDP) and employs 250 000 people (Moyo, 2000c).

In Namibia, commercial agricultural land covers 36.5 million hectares which constitutes about 44 per cent of the natural territory. The 4 000 white settler freeholders own 6 400 farms, averaging 5 700 hectares each. Commercial agriculture in Namibia contributes 5 per cent of GDP, 90 per cent of total agricultural output and 10 per cent of exports. These farmers also employ about 36 000 farm workers who constitute 8 per cent of the country's workforce. On the other hand, communal farms cover 34 million hectares, support 140 000 families or about 50 per cent of the population and contribute only 3 per cent of GDP (Africa Confidential, 2000). They produce about 90 per cent of gross farm income and contribute about 3.9 per cent to the gross domestic product. About 20 000 or one third of all white farmers produce 75 per cent of total agricultural income and 6 per cent of these farmers produce 40 per cent of total farm income (de Klerk, 1990:181). White farmers in Namibia and South Africa, as in Zimbabwe, dominate and control the agricultural sector and have close ownership links with other sectors of industry (Hendricks, 1999).

Agriculture dominates Malawi's economy and accounts for 35 per cent of GDP, more than 90 per cent of foreign exchange earnings and provides paid employment to 92 per cent of the rural population. Malawi's arable land is estimated at 45 000 square kilometres and is divided into customary, public and private land (Moyo, 2000a). Most of

Box 3.4: The land question in Southern Africa

Some of the major challenges concern developing appropriate policies, institutions and programmes capable of redressing the longstanding land ownership patterns in a just manner, increasing access to land by the majority and ensuring sustainable land use. The land ownership imbalances that confront a number of the Southern African countries are a major source of contestation. Whilst there is a clear need to promote sustainable natural resources management and an equitable rural economic production base, this should be underpinned by a land reform programme that includes the marginalised rural poor as well as empowers aspiring small to medium scale agricultural entrepreneurs.

The main challenges in this regard are to balance majoritarian concerns with social justice and equal land resource redistribution as part and parcel of structural reforms in a predominantly dualistic enclave economy that benefit a few. It is only within this context that appropriate governance systems in implementing land redistribution programmes - including especially transparency, fairness and equity - can be realised. Some of the questions that arise in this debate are how to balance arms of central and local government with civil society vis-a-vis powerful producer interest groups, traditional leaders and dominant party systems at the national and local level.

Experiences with land reform policies or redistributing land are relatively uneven in Southern Africa. Since decolonisation, radical land reforms were pursued in the Lusophone countries of Angola and Mozambique, which now have 25 years of post-colonial land reform policy experience, although this was truncated by civil war. In the three Anglophone settler states, experiences with land reform — whether efforts led by the state, communities or non-governmental organisations — are less than 20 years old. Land reforms in Southern Africa are discernibly shifting to radical land reform strategies in the face of waning international investment and economic decline in most countries, and in a context of growing local agitation led by peasants and social movements due to the slow pace of land transfer. The recent Zimbabwean experience coming 20 years after independence has brought in question the strategies, mechanisms and pace of land reform that not only satisfy various interest groups but also ensure equity, economic growth and long-term social justice.

The financing for previously alienated land now held by owners with legal title is a

major recurring problem in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. There is a tendency to recognise law in the context of the current problems without much clarity on the historical origins of such law. The tendency is to rely on legally accepted mechanisms and the rule of law vis-a-vis the resurgence of social pressure for reclaiming lost land in the peri-urban areas of South Africa and Botswana or in rural areas in Zimbabwe, Malawi and Mozambique. The challenge is to mobilise appropriate financial and technical resources, legal procedures or instruments and adequate participation of various interests in defining the type, timing and methods of compensation, while keeping pace with the demands on the ground for land and develop appropriate skills and techniques to use the land.

The land question is organically entrenched in the extreme polarisation of racial interest groups with class and ethnic tension over history and contemporary historical processes of land alienation and redistribution. When political parties, civil society organisations and donor interests become polarised around such historical resource conflicts during periods of electoral competition and political transition and times of economic crisis, there are major challenges. Land reform is not an event, as it happens over time. In most cases it is implemented in phases with the intensity of its execution



coinciding mostly with political and economic crises and declining external financing. When there are problems with economic performance and political transitions there is a tendency to pay more attention to land reform. Land reform using market instruments is emphasised during more stable periods accompanied by intense donor support, while compulsory approaches and land seizures accompany economic stress and political conflict. Economic decline coincides with increased political agitation for land reform, including increased demand by the poor and élites,

and the lack of state fiscal capacity to acquire land for redistribution.

The idea of a negotiated planned and orderly land redistribution programme based primarily on market land purchases is contested and in fact rooted in real struggles for land. State power and force, as well as social pressures through land occupations, are critical to the 'negotiation' of land




acquisition procedures and patterns. Promoting negotiation through opening dialogue among the actors and stakeholders (farm owners, governments, local communities and their social movements, civil society organisations and the financing sector) seems to be the only route open for resolving land reform in Southern Africa and elsewhere. The threats of massive land re-appropriation and land occupations, as in countries such as Zimbabwe, indeed provoke a discourse for alternative indigenous approaches to land reform.

Source: Sam Moyo
Director of SARIPS of the
SAPES Trust



Figure 3. 2 Land ownership patterns in selected SADC countries



Source: Moyo (2000a)

Box 3.5: Land reform

Extract from a speech by President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe

Land reforms and the whole redistribution programme are key to government's overall agenda. Indeed the programme is central to our sense of sovereignty as an independent, self-determining people. Therefore, and in spite of apparent hostility from some quarters, government remains steadfast and focused on addressing the land question. There is an obvious social and economic impact expected from the programme, including prospective beneficiaries of the programme.

Zimbabwe's economy is agrarian, making land the economy and the economy land. Programmes of socio-economic transformation can only be meaningful if hinged on this primary but finite resource. Equally, Zimbabweans are an agrarian people which is why more than half of our people live in rural areas. Given such a scenario, equitable land distribution will not only improve agricultural production but remains the principal vehicle for attacking the root of national poverty and for introducing the majority of our people into the mainstream economy. In fact, it is a way of bringing back a sense of self-worth and durable social security for our people.

We have a situation where a racial élite of 4 000 farmers owns a disproportionate amount of land while millions of black Zimbabweans are landless and live in abject poverty. Since our independence in 1980,

numerous legal impediments and financial conditionalities were put in our way to ensure that we would not move rapidly on land reforms. Thus, the resettlement process has been very slow since 1980. Against a target of 8.3 million hectares, government has acquired only slightly over 3.5 million hectares and resettled about 70 000 households over the last two decades. Put differently, there have been deliberate attempts to keep us down, mired in poverty, by simply denying us control and ownership of a principal means of production. Presently the chorus-like hue and cry coming from the west over our attempts to restore equity in land ownership is in fact about keeping the indigenous person down. It may come in various

guises: an appeal for rule of law, democracy, transparency, property rights, and so on. Such guises are mere facades for making our collective continued impoverishment look natural, right, even modern, while making our efforts at self-redemption appear uncivilised and against international norms.

The amendment of the Lancaster House Constitution through the enactment of the Constitution Amendment (Number 16) Act, 2000, earlier this year, to provide for compulsory acquisition, has paved the way for accelerated land redistribution. I want to assure you that government has embarked on this policy. Government will compulsorily acquire more than five million hectares from the 12 million hectares of prime land owned by the white commercial farmers. Up to 500 000 people will be resettled on this land. These include our war veterans, the landless peasants, agricultural graduates and any other Zimbabweans who wish to pursue a career in commercial farming.

With respect to the implementation of this programme, government has to date served preliminary acquisition notices on 804 farms the acquisition of which is already under way. More farms will become available in due course. Resettlement on some of these properties has already started in some of the provinces and the process should embrace all the provinces in the coming days.



The resettlement programme has a far reaching positive social and economic impact. Through the efficient use of 30 per cent of under-used land currently under the large-scale commercial sector, which will be brought under resettlement, a net increase in livestock and crop production is envisaged. I am informed that an additional Z\$10 billion should be generated in agriculture in the medium term. If we take into account the knock-on effects of agricultural growth, it is envisaged that an additional Z\$13,5 billion will be generated downstream. Consequently, agricultural exports and general economic activity are set to increase.

Countless social benefits will accrue from the programme. The increase in crop and livestock production will in turn increase farm incomes and hence improve standards of living. It will also increase economic activity thereby creating much-needed employment. Perhaps of greater significance is the positive impact which land reforms will have on food security. Increased food production, employment and incomes will significantly increase access to food by the majority of our population.

In order to assess progress in the resettlement process, the government has put in place production targets for the projected period of five years. The national herd is projected to increase from 5.8 million to 7.9 million, maize from an average of 2.4 million tonnes to 3.75 million tonnes, and cotton from an average of 250 000 metric tonnes to over 400 000 metric tonnes. These targets can

only be achieved if there is commitment to agriculture by farmers. I therefore challenge all, especially those who will be resettled, to use the land wisely for the good of our country.

The struggle for independence and sovereignty is never a painless process. We are aware that the forces opposed to the land reforms and therefore to our own self-reassertion are many and strong. We have upset the colonially ordained economy; we have disturbed the peace of sons of a higher god. We have dared and challenged the owners of 'little Englands', those that reduce our country and its finite resources to one vast resort they withdraw to when blizzards descend on Europe making the sun shine no more. We have disturbed a whole economy built around our landlessness and yet our labour. For our poverty has always been gainful to them. A reversal of such a relationship necessarily provokes their wrath and backlash which comes in many forms. It comes by way of undeclared sanctions; by way of political interference through sponsored politics; it comes by way of threatening our hard-won peace and stability. Indeed, it comes by way of dividing us as they are now trying to do: the low-waged urban worker versus the landless peasant; war veterans versus the workers; Ndebeles versus Shona, and so on. The price to pay is enormous and happily this lesson was learnt way back as we struggled for independence. Our strength should always lie in our unity as we fight for and assert our inherent rights.

It is important for the

grouping of the landless in particular to avoid playing shy on such a matter. The land must come, whatever the hardships! Their claim must be heard, whatever the consequences. They must take a bold step as a union, not so much to please government or ZANU (PF), but to recognise and act on the right their membership is demanding. That we feel it so keenly in government means that the latter is truly representative of the landless communal people. Let the land come and come in abundance. It is ours, we fought for it; we liberated it, we deserve it; we are ready to die for it and we will get it. That is how the national question should be viewed, and let us all rally to answer and resolve it.

Finally, I wish to reassure all that government will continue to provide basic services to agriculture, especially those of a developmental nature. Without such services, the production targets envisaged cannot be attained. Yes, those concerned may begin without as much support as they should get. This is not for want of will; it is for want of adequate resources at any one given time. But sooner or later, the support will come and facilitate the land reform and resettlement programme. Let that new sense of regained ownership, that quest for empowerment, spur us on until government comes in with the necessary support.

Robert Gabriel Mugabe,
President of Zimbabwe
Extract from Official Opening
Speech at the 61st Congress of
the Zimbabwe Farmers' Union
(2 August 2000)




this is occupied by settlers mainly of South African origin who produce the grain, tea and tobacco which constitute the chief exports of the country. In the 1920s, the decision by the colonial authorities to issue legal titles to land encouraged the emergence and expansion of estate agriculture. Land alienation, through the grouping of freehold and leasehold titles, was most extensive in the southern region where large tea and tobacco estates were developed. By the time of independence in 1964, the basic structure of Malawian agriculture had been established with an estate subsector consisting of rich estate owners growing lucrative crops (such as tea and tobacco) on freehold or leasehold land. Yet the majority poor peasants without recourse to agricultural resources nor adequate land continued to grow food or cash crops on customary land.

Land reform through redistribution has been implemented in most of the countries in the region. For instance in Zimbabwe over 70 000 families were resettled on 7 per cent of the total area. The government intends to acquire five million hectares from the commercial farm sector and hence the problems with the current land reform exercise (Moyo, 2000b). Yet in South Africa by 1998 only 200 000 hectares of land had been transferred to 20 000 households, less than 1 per cent of the initial target. In practice, this means that merely 0.2 per cent of the total number of households demanding land have been served under this programme (Hendricks, 1999). In Malawi, a class of rich indigenous (black) farmers has emerged as a result of policies which have encouraged the development of the estate sector. This class consists largely of leading politicians and civil servants who were encouraged to establish tobacco estates by the generous allocation of land which had been alienated from customary land (Mkandawire, 1999:47). Land alienation through the rapid expansion of tobacco estates, compiled with a rapid population growth rate (3.2 per cent), have created a lot of land pressure for small-scale producers and led to further subdivision of house plots. As an example, the proportion of smallholders cultivating a minimum of two hectares fell from 71 per cent in 1968/69 to 12.6 per cent. Breaking the land monopoly of large land owners in the context of land underuse and poverty will improve the conditions of the region's poor.

Case studies from Zimbabwe show that due to underuse of land and large farm sizes land reform can be done without damaging the economy (Moyo, 1995). Since most crop production in the large farms in Zimbabwe, Malawi and South Africa is concentrated in the irrigated farmlands these farms can remain viable if the unused parts of their farms are transferred to the majority (Moyo, 2000a). Losses of agricultural output are not entirely new in the region, given that the agricultural sector has regularly had to adapt to drought 'shocks' (Ibid.). So economic, social and political net gains can be realised through the use of the land by the beneficiaries as this expands the production base and involves more indigenous participation in land use. In particular the idea of changing the socio-economic conditions of the impoverished black majority and broadening the economic base while reducing problems based upon racial legacies, are key long-term benefits

The dominant perception is that tinkering with property rights negatively affects the investment climate due to uncertainty among investors regarding property rights and the declining collateral value of land (Moyo, 1998b). Loss of investor confidence arguments tend to overlook speculative gains and costs to the victims and the impact of them having access to land. The recent World Economic Forum conference in Durban, South Africa and the Windhoek Southern Africa Trade and Investment Summit rather alienated governments from presenting a cogent regional

Breaking that land monopoly of large land owners in the context of land underuse and poverty will improve the conditions of the region's poor.



approach to make sense of the land reform struggles in countries such as Zimbabwe. In the context of competition for investment in the region and with some countries having stable economies such as Botswana and South Africa, it will be problematic to come up with a regional approach because the countries are at different stages in implementing land reform. So a common agenda for addressing the land problem will remain a major challenge.

Racial inequalities There are wide racial imbalances in the region in terms of incomes and housing conditions such as access to toilet facilities, safe water and so on, in favour of minority populations of European ethnic origin, as shown in Boxes 3.6 and 3.7.

Box 3.6 Racial imbalances in selected SADC countries

The black population constitutes the majority of the total populations in the SADC region but they have the lowest levels of human development and they are the most socially deprived as shown by the high levels of human poverty in Tables 3.12 to 3.14.

Table 3.12 Population by race origin: selected SADC countries, 1990–1996

	Zimbabwe 1992	South Africa 1996	Namibia 1991	Zambia 1990
African	98.8	76.3	88.6	98.7
European	0.8	13.7	11.1	0.1
Asiatic	0.1	2.5		0.1
Mixed	0.29	8.5		

Note: For Namibia European includes English, Afrikaans and Germans
Source: SARIPS/SAPES databank

Table 3.13 Estimated indicators of inequality: South Africa, 3Q, 1999

Indicator	%
Income accruing to the wealthiest 10%	Over 50
Income accruing to the poorest 40%	6
Share of white population living in poverty	2.1
Share of black population living in poverty	57.2
Share of mixed race living in poverty	19.8
Share of Asian population living in poverty	6.8

Source: *Business Monitor International*: South Africa 1999: Country Forecast Report

Table 3.14 HDI and HPI by language groups, Namibia, 1994

Language group	HDI	HPI (%)
Afrikaans	0.810	9.3
Caprivi/Lozi	0.579	23.1
English	0.845	7.0
German	0.917	9.2
Nama/Damara	0.578	23.7
Oshiwambo	0.612	29.4
Otjiherero	0.628	24.6
Rukavambo	0.551	31.4
San	0.295	58.1
Tswana	0.681	17.2

Source: *Namibia Human Development Report, 1999*




Box 3.7 Housing characteristics by race of head of household: Zimbabwe

In Zimbabwe, Europeans enjoy better housing facilities than Asians and Coloureds. Africans are the most disadvantaged as shown in the charts below. Over 90 per cent of Europeans have


access to safe water which is piped inside their houses, have toilet facilities and use electricity as a source of fuel. For those households headed by Africans, 77 per cent have access to safe

water and 35.95 per cent of them have to travel at least 500 metres to fetch water, 34.74 per cent have no toilet facilities at all and 67 per cent use wood as fuel for cooking.

Racial imbalances: Main household characteristics, Zimbabwe 1992
Household source of drinking water




Household's distance to water supply




Household's toilet facility by race of head of household


African




European



Asian




Mixed race




Household's main source of fuel by race of head of household


African




European



Asian



Mixed race



III Volatile and fragile peace and security in Southern Africa

Challenges of peace and security

Armed conflicts

The end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994 and the subsequent democratisation of the country did not end tensions and violent conflicts in the region as many had hoped.

The major conflicts in the latter half of the 20th century in Southern Africa were the wars of liberation in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. Besides the black against white racial nature of these struggles, there was also the left against right ideological conflict fuelled by the cold war between the super powers. The height of these conflicts in the region were the armed struggles and the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa which culminated in a new political dispensation.

However, the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994 and the subsequent democratisation of the country did not end tensions and violent conflicts in the region as many had hoped so the peace and security dividend did not materialise. Instead, the end of apartheid gave rise to new regional conflicts and challenges such as regional hegemonic and balance of power struggles and struggles for resources. Besides the current conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo which has pitted SADC allied forces (Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe) against Rwanda, Uganda and armed rebels, historically peaceful Lesotho erupted into violence after a disputed election, triggering the military intervention of South Africa and Botswana in 1998. Despite the many attempts at conflict resolution by the UN and other stakeholders, the Angolan conflict has yet to abate and recently the Angolan government threatened to attack Zambia for allegedly supporting Jonas Savimbi's rebel UNITA movement. Botswana and Namibia almost fought a war over the Sidudu Island on the Cunene River, while in Zimbabwe government attempts to redistribute land resulted in rising political instability. There is political tension in Swaziland with the monarchy resisting democratisation pressures; and there are secessionist tendencies in the Caprivi in Namibia which recently led to armed confrontation; and there is violent crime leading to latent political instability in South Africa. In the region as a whole, democratisation processes remain hesitant and potentially reversible as demonstrated by political and election problems in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania (Zanzibar), Namibia and Angola.

Implications for human development and regional integration

The 1998 *Regional Human Development Report* called attention to the fact that defence expenditure in the region continued to outpace health spending. That situation remains essentially unchanged. Therefore, the region presents a mixed picture with regard to military and social spending. The following patterns emerge from available data:

- Overall levels of military expenditure seem to have declined unevenly. Between 1995-1996, in absolute (US\$) terms, there were recorded increases in Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia and Mauritius; modest declines in Lesotho, Malawi, Seychelles; more-than-half declines in Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe remained stable.
- Another discernible trend at the regional level is that public expenditure on education and health as a percentage of GDP has declined or remained stagnant. On the other hand, military spending has exhibited dramatic increases in Angola and equally dramatic decreases in Mozambique.
- Recent developments such as South Africa's decision to invest 200 million rand in 'modernising' its armed forces, the Democratic Republic of Congo war and the Allied countries involvement in it are likely to trigger a re-armament wave in the region.

The diversion of resources to the war effort, the destruction of assets in the social sectors and the war-related disruptions to the normal operation of social services have taken a heavy toll.

On the military state security side, there have been a number of bilateral defence agreements.

The economic costs of civil wars in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo have been high. There has been significant loss of life and damage to physical assets which has reduced their productive capacity. As a result, the average rate of growth of GDP was negligible in Angola and negative in the Democratic Republic of Congo during the 1990s. Due to war-related public expenditure, Angola recorded the highest overall budget deficit in SADC during the 1990s. Democratic Republic of Congo's budget deficit was the second highest. Large borrowings from domestic banks fuelled inflation with the Democratic Republic of Congo experiencing the highest rate and Angola experiencing the second highest rate in SADC. These two countries also had high external debt ratios in the 1990s. Because of the civil wars in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo, investors regard the entire SADC region as risky. This negative perception of the region is impacting negatively on inflows of foreign investment and hence on economic growth.

The social costs of the civil wars in these countries have, similarly, been high. The diversion of resources to the war effort, the destruction of assets in the social sectors and the war-related disruptions to the normal operation of social services have taken a heavy toll in terms of reduced school enrolment rates in both countries, a reduced literacy rate in the Democratic Republic of Congo and reduced life expectancy in both.

Collective SADC peace and security initiatives

In the last 20 years, leaders in Southern Africa have supported measures that promoted collective security in the regions. On the political front, these measures range from the formation of the Front-Line States (FLS) in 1970, the Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992. On the military state security side, there have been a number of bilateral defence agreements. More practical measures were the creation of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security in 1996, the establishment of the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), the Regional Peace-Keeping Training Centre (RPTC) and the Southern Africa Police Chiefs' Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO). Most of these arrangements are operating although in conflict situations there are still problems of overlap and divergent perceptions of what should be done by whom and how.

The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security

The idea of a SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security was proposed at a meeting of the SADC Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security held in Gaborone Botswana on the 18 January 1996. The idea was then adopted and approved by SADC heads of state and government on 28 June 1996. The functions of the organ are listed in Box 3.7.

The tension that emerged over the organ in the wake of the Democratic Republic of Congo Allied intervention revolve around:

- autonomy — the relationship between the organ and the SADC summit;
- the legal framework in which the organ should operate; and
- hegemonic power struggles in the post-liberation/post-apartheid period.

The 1999 SADC Summit recognised some of these problems and requested Swaziland to review the organ and make recommendations to the summit on how it can be reformed.

Box 3.8 Functions of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security

- To protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability arising from a breakdown of law and order and inter-state conflict;
 - To promote political co-operation among member states and the evolution of common political value systems and institutions;
 - To develop a common foreign policy in areas of mutual concern and interest and to lobby as a region on issues of common interest at international fora;
 - To co-operate fully in regional security and defence through conflict prevention, management and resolution;
 - To mediate in inter-state and intra-state disputes and conflicts;
 - To use preventive diplomacy to pre-empt conflict in the region, both within and between states, through an early warning system;
 - Where conflict does occur, to seek to end this as quickly as possible through diplomatic means.
- Only where such means fail would the organ consider other necessary measures to restore peace and stability. Such measures shall be immediately reported to the Organisation of African Unity and/or the United Nations for their consideration under the provisions of their respective charters;
- To promote and enhance the development of democratic institutions and practices within member states and encourage them to observe universal human rights as provided for in the charters and conventions of the Organisation of Africa Unity and United Nations.
 - To promote peace-making and peace-keeping in order to achieve sustainable peace and security;
 - To develop a collective security capacity, conclude a Mutual Defence Pact for responding to external threats and build up regional peacekeeping capacity within national armies that could be called upon within the region, or elsewhere;
- To develop close co-operation between the police and security services of the region with a view to addressing cross-border crime as well as promoting a community-based approach on matters of security;
 - To encourage implementation of United Nations, Organisation of African Unity, and other international conventions and treaties on arms control and disarmament, human rights and peaceful relations between states;
 - To co-ordinate the participation of member states in international and regional peacekeeping operations;
 - To address conflicts outside the region which impact on peace and security in Southern Africa.

Source:
 Professor Murray, Bruce
 (1999), Preventive Diplomacy and
 Peacebuilding in Southern
 Africa. SARPIS, Peace and
 Security Series 2,
 pages 73-78, 1999



Box 3.9 The role of the OAU in promoting peace, stability and development in the SADC

Resolving conflicts in Africa:
A major challenge for the OAU

Conflict in Africa constitutes a major challenge to the efforts of the Organisation of African Unity to ensure peace, prosperity and human rights for the peoples of Africa. Although one of the main objectives of the OAU at its creation in 1963 was to promote peaceful inter-state relations in Africa, the changing nature of conflicts on the continent along with instability within some member states has made it imperative that the organisation is increasingly required to respond to intra-state conflicts and insecurity. Consequently, member states of the OAU have come to expect their organisation to use all necessary measures to ensure that the deep root causes of conflicts in Africa are satisfactorily addressed in order to establish an enabling environment for durable peace and sustainable economic growth on the continent.

The OAU's quest to promote peace and development in the SADC region

Following the historic 1994 all-race elections in South Africa which ushered into office a broad based, multiracial and democratically elected government, there was widespread optimism that a larger political and economic co-operation arrangement, inclusive of a free and democratic South Africa, would transform the Southern African region into a powerhouse of economic growth and political stability. That optimistic outlook for the region's future had gradually crystallised as a result of the peaceful manner in which Namibia attained independence in 1990, the orderly political transition in Zambia of 1991, the agreement of 1991 by the parties in the long running Angolan civil war to resolve their differences through the ballot box rather than the barrel of the gun, and the Mozambican elections of 1993 which conclusively ended that country's tragic internal conflict. In this broad context, the OAU played a catalytic role in terms of supporting the overall process of democracy building and national reconciliation in the region by lending its moral authority to the series of

delicate negotiations intended to build trust and mutual confidence among erstwhile adversarial parties, thus paving the way for initiating peace or national reconciliation accords.

The OAU and the challenge of stabilising Southern Africa

The OAU's view is that the SADC political and economic co-operation framework can evolve into an institutional mechanism through which confidence and security building measures among SADC member states will be promoted. Through this framework, measures can also be instituted to ensure that regional resources such as fresh water and arable land are equitably managed for the benefit of all member states of the community. It is in this vein that the OAU's mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution welcomed the formation of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security in 1996 and assured the organ of full support in its mission of encouraging 'full co-operation in regional security and defence through conflict prevention, management and resolution'. The OAU also supports the endeavours undertaken by SADC states under the auspices of the SADC organ to build capacity in regional peacekeeping as well as preparedness for complex humanitarian emergencies. It is in this context that the OAU is hopeful that issues relating to the structure and leadership of the organ will find an early resolution, to facilitate a consolidation of the SADC organ and the attainment of its lofty objectives.

For its part, the OAU remains deeply involved in multi-layered diplomatic initiatives intended to resolve conflict and promote durable peace in at least three member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The OAU attaches the highest priority to the conflict that continues to devastate the Democratic Republic of Congo which unfortunately has involved some member states of SADC and, of course, the long running conflict that continues to traumatise the people of Angola. The political crisis that continues to loom over Lesotho is also matter of concern.



The OAU and the conflict in Angola

The position of the OAU in respect of the conflict in Angola is that failure by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) to fully comply with its obligations under the Lusaka protocol of 1994 remains the major cause of the ongoing civil war in that country. The OAU's mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution thus fully supports the stance of SADC, which calls for the diplomatic isolation of UNITA in order to compel its leadership to return to the negotiating table as well as fulfil its obligations under the Lusaka protocol. The OAU is also emphatically supportive of the efforts by the United Nations security council to enforce a wide range of sanctions against UNITA in order to reduce its capacity to raise finances for its war machine from its illicit sale of 'conflict/blood diamonds'. Hence, by its decision CM/Dec.2164 (LXXII), the OAU council of ministers, meeting in its 72nd ordinary session in July 2000 in Lome, Togo, set up an ad-hoc committee to evaluate the implementation of the UN security council resolution 1295/2000, particularly with regard to the range of sanctions contained in the resolution and the extent to which these sanctions have been implemented by OAU member states.

The committee comprises Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Namibia and Nigeria. This committee will make known its findings to the next session of the council scheduled for February 2001.

The OAU and the unresolved political impasse in the kingdom of Lesotho.

The OAU has provided its full diplomatic backing to the SADC Extended Troika comprising of Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Botswana in its endeavour to find a just and lasting solution to the problems that arose following the Lesotho general election held on 23 May 1998. Under the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement between the government of Lesotho and the Interim Political Authority (IPA) signed on the 3 December 1999, with the Extended Troika, the OAU, the United Nations and the Commonwealth acting as moral guarantors, the concerned parties were required to appoint an expert group to review the state of preparations for the forthcoming general election, taking into account everything that needs to be done to ensure a thorough and transparent electoral process.

The OAU is therefore closely following the preparations for the next elections in Lesotho, provisionally scheduled for late May 2001 to ensure that the process is not only credible and transparent but that it can generate a national consensus on the way forward which is critical for Lesotho's long term socio-economic growth and political stability. The OAU is determined to support the interrelated processes of political democratisation and national reconciliation by deploying a team of election observers to monitor the forthcoming elections in order to verify the integrity of the electoral process in that country.

Source: The Protocol Department
of the Organisation of African Unity on behalf
of Sahnin Ahmed Salim,
Secretary General of the OAU



The Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC)

A less controversial and most active arm of the SADC organ is the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC).

A less controversial and most active arm of the SADC organ is the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). The committee is a forum of ministers of defence, home affairs, commissioners of police and commanders of armed forces whose mandate is to periodically review defence and security issues pertinent to the region and advise on appropriate policy. The main objectives of the Interstate Defence and Security Committee include the following:

- combating cross-border crime including drug trafficking;
- stopping the illegal flow of small arms;
- undertaking joint training;
- logistical support for regional peacekeeping operations;
- developing confidence-building measures; and
- building civil-military relations consistent with democracy.

The major activities of the Interstate Defence and Security Committee are co-ordinated by the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Harare, Zimbabwe. Two joint military training operations have so far been held: Blue Hungwe in Zimbabwe in 1997 and Blue Crane in South Africa in 1999. Both exercises covered a wide range of skills. Other peacekeeping training activities at different levels continue to gain popularity and legitimacy in the region.

The Southern Africa Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPPCO)

The Southern Africa Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation (SARPPCO) was established at a meeting of SADC Police Chiefs held on 2 August 1995, under the framework of the ISDSC. All SADC countries except the Democratic Republic of Congo and Seychelles are members of the organisation.

The Southern Africa Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation has since become the primary operational mechanism for the prevention and fighting of cross-border crime, including the trafficking of small arms in Southern Africa.

It is also the key regional link with the International Police Organisation, Interpol.

Women in the peace process

...the gender unit ...has mounted a regional campaign on the gender implications of violence and various forms of conflicts.

The SADC secretariat in Gaborone, Botswana, has a gender unit and one of the objectives of this unit's plan of action reads as follows:

'To facilitate the promotion of peace and stability in the region and evaluate the impact of war and conflict on the social, economic, psychological and emotional development of women and children.'

In pursuit of these objectives the gender unit has advocated an addendum to the 1997 SADC Declaration on Gender and Development entitled, 'Prevention and eradication of violence against women and children in Southern Africa'. It has also mounted a regional campaign on the gender implications of violence and various forms of conflicts.

On a continental level, SADC has also provided leadership in promoting the role of women in the peace process.

Crime, small arms and drug trafficking

Crime is increasing in most regions of the world, and Southern Africa is no exception. Such violent crimes as murder, rape and assault have topped the list but the most numerous have been crimes against property. Tables 3.15 and 3.16 show the reported crimes for 1994 and 1996 in South Africa and Zimbabwe, respectively. These include car-jacking, burglary, theft, robbery, corruption and other economic crimes. Crimes have a negative influence on investment confidence, on production and on other aspects of the economy; crimes contribute to loss of human and physical capital and crimes can lead to violence. Most of these crimes have been associated with economic hardships in the region as a whole, and in certain countries in particular. However, the levels and types of crime are the result of a range of local, national and regional factors which include political and economic instability, the quality of policing and the availability of guns and other weapons.

Table 3.15 Crime by type of offence, including attempts, in South Africa, 1994 and 1999

	1994	1999	Change 1994-99
Murder	13 257	11 513	-13.2
Rape and attempts	18 801	23 900	27.1
Statutory rape	356	195	-45.2
Indecent assault	1 840	2 533	37.7
Cruelty towards and ill-treatment of children (Excluding sexual offences)	1 164	1 137	-2.3
Kidnapping	1 878	2 155	14.7
Abduction	1 296	1 604	23.8
Grievous bodily harm	97 267	118 238	21.6
Common assault	90 753	105 410	16.2
Burglary: Business premises	44 596	46 630	4.6
Burglary: Residential premises	110 464	142 350	28.9
Stock-theft	20 490	20 604	0.6
Shoplifting	32 012	32 062	0.2
Theft of motor vehicles	49 975	51 579	3.2
Theft from car	86 911	94 145	8.3
Other theft	186 008	233 522	25.5
Arson	5 555	4 467	-19.6
Malicious damage to property	58 548	63 288	8.1
Fraud, forgeries, embezzlements, malappropriations, and so on	30 082	32 762	8.9
Drug related crime	23 920	19 889	-16.9
Drunk driving	12 747	12 232	-4.0
Illegal possession, of firearms and ammunition	5 127	7 317	42.7
Explosives act	276	46	-83.3
Carjacking	..	7 708	..
Hijacking of trucks	..	2 697	..
Robbery of cash in transit	..	112	..
Bank robbery	..	223	..
Total	893 323	1 038 318	16.2

Source: South African Republic Police General Headquarters

Table 3.16 Crime by type of offence, including attempts.
Zimbabwe, 1994 and 1999

	1994	1999	% change
Infanticide	343	202	-41.1
Abortion	641	334	-47.9
Assault (Common)	41 976	62 514	48.9
Assault (GBH)	25 622	26 082	1.8
Assault (Indecent)	814	1 484	82.3
Culpable homicide	781	944	20.9
Murder	655	969	47.9
Rape	3 091	4 453	45.5
Arson	1 929	1381	-28.4
Fraud	6 319	5 530	-12.5
Malicious injury to property	9 766	13 432	37.5
Receiving stolen property	468	318	-32.1
Housebreaking and theft	57 943	57263	-1.2
Theft of car	1 144	1 794	56.8
Theft from car	16 943	22 306	31.7
Theft of stock	17 493	14 906	-14.8
Theft (other)	129 141	129 219	0.1
Robbery	11 990	9 418	-21.5
Armed robbery	388	587	51.3
Other common law	2 264	3 879	71.6
Broadcasting Act	4 367	1 332	-69.5
Control of goods	713	11	-98.5
Criminal law amendment	1 697	2 342	38.0
Criminal procedure and evidence	275	444	61.5
Customs and excise	882	506	-42.6
Dangerous drugs	10 487	6 216	-40.7
Exchange Act	260	296	13.8
Firearms	663	607	-8.4
Forests	2 068	1 153	-44.2
Harmful liquids	1 933	517	-73.3
Immigration	13 187	34 806	163.9
Income tax	319	62	-80.6
Law and order maintenance	114	207	81.6
Road motor transportation	53 451	73 190	36.9
Liquor	30 495	90 921	198.2
Miscellaneous Offence Act	39 702	27 355	-31.1
Municipal by-laws	19 245	14 970	-22.2
Parks and wildlife	4 569	3 198	-30.0
Precious stones	246	100	-59.3
Road Traffic Act	77 915	104 523	34.2
Construction equipment	62 488	64 691	3.5
Vehicle Registration Licensing Act	9 390	10 090	7.5
All other statute law	18 790	11435	-39.1
Total	682 964	805 987	18.0

Source: Central Statistical Office, Zimbabwe

Economic hardships and liberalisation promote crime in many ways

Liberalising capital movements has opened SADC to sophisticated international crime syndicates which the sub-region's crime detection system may not be able to deal with.

For example:

- Attempts to restore consumption lost through unemployment or reduction in real income have stimulated underground illegal activities, rising white collar crime (fraud), corruption, robbery, and so on.
- Cuts or restraints in government recurrent expenditure have reduced the level of real resources available for law enforcement, thereby making it difficult to control crime.
- Liberalising capital movements has opened SADC to sophisticated international crime syndicates which the sub-region's crime detection system may not be able to deal with.

Sources of arms

The sources of arms are:

- Western countries which supplied arms to the former minority regimes of South Africa and Zimbabwe.
- Warsaw Pact Countries which supplied Southern African liberation movements with arms and ammunition.
- Illegal arms market.
- State armouries and security forces.
- Local arms factories in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa.

It is not enough to stop the procurement of such arms into the region, those arms already in circulation must be collected and destroyed.

Suggested arms management strategies

If Southern Africa is to have a real chance of realising sustainable economic and social development, we must tackle the proliferation of arms seriously. The volume of presently available small arms already circulating outside official controls is sufficient to keep illicit arms trafficking going for decades without the introduction of new weapons into Southern Africa. It is not enough to stop the procurement of such arms into the region, those arms already in circulation must be collected and destroyed. Other arms management strategies include:

- Voluntary arms collection programmes, such as amnesty for guns, gun buy-back programmes and gun exchange programmes;
- Confiscation of weapons from criminals and illicit arms traders;
- Disarmament clauses in peace agreements, spelling out the disarmament of ex-combatants and the collection and destruction of their weapons;
- Regional confidence-building programmes such as harmonising policies against illicit arms trafficking and keeping regional registers of military equipment and new purchases; and reliable marking of small arms to boost regional co-operation in tracking firearm-related crimes.

Drug trafficking

The law of the market and other forces (such as trauma arising out of racist policies) have resulted in South Africa being the major destination of drugs in the region, followed by Zimbabwe, to the extent that all drugs are available, including cocaine, heroin, mandrax, opium and marijuana. Table 3.21 shows drug offences by type of drug and amount for 1994 and 1999 in South Africa. As a result of foreign exchange scarcities, unemployment and the high cost of living, the drugs trade in the other countries has been on the increase. Mauritius is a transit point for drugs as well as a significant consumer. Namibia is said to be the main transit cen-

Table 3.17 Nationals arrested in Zambia for drug offences, 1994 and 1999

Nationality	1994	1999
Angola	2	13
Australia	..	1
Botswana	2	..
British	..	5
Burkina Faso	..	1
DR Congo	7	24
Croatia	..	2
China	..	3
France	..	1
Ghana	..	1
Greece	..	3
India	1	4
Ireland	..	1
Italy	..	2
Kenya	4	6
Lebanon	7	..
Liberia	2	1
Malawi	3	5
Mali	3	1
Mozambique	..	1
Namibia	1	..
Portugal	..	1
Russia	1	..
Senegal	1	1
Sierra Leone	1	1
Somali	2	14
South Africa	3	2
South Korea	1	..
Sudan	..	2
Tanzania	10	23
Zambia	293	1 743
Zimbabwe	3	5
SADC nationals (excluding Zambia)	31	73
Total (excluding Zambia)	54	124
TOTAL (including Zambia)	347	1 867
SADC Total (as % of total, excluding Zambia)	57.4	58.9

Source: Drug Enforcement Commission, Zambia

tre for drugs to and from Angola and Zambia. Tanzania is connected to two corridors from Pakistan and India via the Middle East by air and sea to the larger markets south and to Europe by air. Inland, Zimbabwe-Botswana-Johannesburg is a major route, using rail and road links to lower the probability of interception especially for bulky drugs which are trafficking in large quantities for example, marijuana and mandrax. South Africa is said to be the world's worst abuser of mandrax, and this is mainly accounted for by the townships where poverty and crime levels are high. Supplies of cocaine come from Colombia and Peru, and those of heroin from Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Marijuana is the main drug trafficked and used in most of the countries. In Namibia and Botswana, marijuana is mainly produced and trafficked by unemployed women while in South Africa, where it is a multi-billion dollar business, it is mainly produced in the Tugela Valley.

Evidence shows that in most countries the nationals of that country form the majority of drug traffickers, as shown in Tables 3.17 and 3.18 for Zambia and Swaziland respectively. However, in Zambia of all the foreigners involved in drug trafficking 88 per cent were SADC nationals. The percentage of SADC nationals involved in drug trafficking in Zambia increased from 62 per cent in 1994 to 88 per cent in 1999. Tanzanians and Angolans are the main foreign SADC national drug traffickers in Zambia whilst in Swaziland it is Mozambicans and South Africans.

In Zimbabwe between 1994 and 1999 the highest number of foreign SADC nationals arrested for drug trafficking were Mozambicans (596), followed by Zambians (21) and South Africans (17) as shown in Table 3.19. The Mozambicans and Zambians were trafficking marijuana (dagga), mandrax and hashish whilst the South Africans were dealing in the same drugs and also cocaine.

Table 3.18 Nationals arrested in Swaziland for drug related offences, 1994 and 1999

Nationality	1994	1999
Britain	..	1
Mozambique	6	15
Nigeria	..	5
South Africa	9	14
Swaziland	632	619
Zambia	..	2
Zimbabwe	..	1
Total (excluding Swaziland)	15	38
TOTAL	647	657

Source: Royal Swaziland Police Headquarters

Table 3.19 People arrested for drug trafficking by nationality and type of drug: Zimbabwe, 1994-1999.

Nationality	Number of drug traffickers	Type of drugs
Malawians	7	mandrax, marijuana, heroin, hashish.
Mozambicans	596	marijuana, mandrax, hashish.
Tanzanians	6	mandrax, heroin.
Zambians	21	marijuana, mandrax, hashish.
Batswana	2	marijuana
South Africans	17	mandrax, hashish, cocaine, marijuana
Nigerians	10	cocaine, heroin.
Kenyans	4	cocaine
Angolans	3	ecstasy
Germans	1	marijuana
Italians	2	ecstasy, cocaine

Source: Zimbabwe Republic Police

Some possible solutions

There are increasing demands from the international community for democratisation in developing countries and corruption and crime are generally considered to be major stumbling blocks.

Corruption and other crime in pre-democracy Africa could be politically and subjectively defined, identified and punished, for example by those found guilty falling from political grace and favour, by detentions and even elimination. In principle democratisation should provide for the accounting of such activities through the justice system. But as has been noted, the democratisation trend has not as yet guaranteed full accountability and openness in the sense that political and bureaucratic corruption has not been fully criminalised with perpetrators being openly prosecuted. There are increasing demands from the international community for democratisation in developing countries and corruption and crime are generally considered to be major stumbling blocks. It is not surprising that bilateral and multilateral aid donors are increasingly willing to augment individual countries' efforts in this area or those of regional groupings. The coverage of crime in the mass media has vastly improved and in countries where corruption - political or otherwise - is deemed to be rampant international donors have made its criminalisation and eradication one of the aid conditionalities. This has been the case for Malawi, Zambia and Tanzania. A kingpin of crime eradication strategies has been the strengthening of the institutional framework both in terms of breadth and depth.

Broadening the institutional framework has typically involved introducing new institutions and cross-border co-operation, such as Anti-Corruption Bureaux, (in Malawi, Tanzania, and Zambia), the Office of the Ombudsmen (Malawi), several types of non-governmental organisation and media watchdogs on democracy and corruption, the setting up of special commissions of inquiry on crime and corruption (Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe), special police units (South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe) and proposals for special juvenile courts (South Africa). In addition the approach to cross-border crime has been considerably boosted by the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO), which made it possible to establish the Regional Interpol Bureau against crime syndicates in 1996. The effectiveness of such co-operation was demonstrated by the Voyager 4 operation against organised car theft syndicates in Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Table 3.20 Drug offences by type of drug, arrests and amount:
South Africa, 1994 and 1999

			1994	1999
CANNABIS*	Possession	Arrests possession	3 169	2 442
		Mass confiscated (Kg)	4 451.000	7 650.365
	Dealing	Arrests Dealing	7 896	4 195
		Mass confiscated (Kg)	264 201.000	282 293.196
		Mass destroyed in cultivation areas	6914254.000	672243.824
MANDRAX	Possession	Arrests possession	324	495
		Tablets confiscated	27 121	8 200
		Powder confiscated (kg)	0.04	..
	Dealing	Arrests dealing	2 459	748
		Tablets confiscated	4 726 100	2 490 606
		(Includes 208 500 in Swaziland in 1994) Powder confiscated (kg)	0.057	
COCAINE	Possession	Arrests possession	28	245
		Mass confiscated (kg)	0.666	3.349
		Rocks	1 209	
	Dealing	Arrests dealing	266	456
		Mass confiscated (kg)	68.895	324.200
		Rocks		11 731
HEROIN	Possession	Arrests possession	4	17
		Mass confiscated (kg)	0.078	0.170
	Dealing	Arrests dealing	29	64
		Mass confiscated (kg)	24.667	7.265
LSD	Possession	Arrests possession	23	19
		Units confiscated	199	285
	Dealing	Arrests dealing	65	68
		Units confiscated	16 502	1 264
ECSTASY	Possession	Arrests possession	0	70
		Units confiscated	0	1 120
	Dealing	Arrests dealing	7	195
		Units confiscated	1 262	29 012
		Chemicals used for production		R4 000 000.00
SPEED	Possession	Arrests possession	0	4
		Units confiscated	0	9
	Dealing	Arrests dealing	0	32
		Units confiscated	0	360
HASHISH	Possession	Arrests possession	2	6
		Units confiscated	0.008	0.410
	Dealing	Arrests dealing	5	7
		Units confiscated	27.078	15.202
		Seized --- no arrests (kg)		7.000

Source: South African Narcotic Bureau

*Also called marijuana and dagga

which rapidly recovered over a thousand stolen vehicles.

Major impediments to the regional approach are gaps in the extradition agreements, lapses in prosecution in some countries (Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) and asymmetries in legislation and sentences. A recent incident involving South Africa and Zimbabwe illustrates some of the problems. Zimbabwe refused to release former apartheid South African agents accused of sabotage but who would qualify for release under the provisions of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. There have been other differences between the two countries because South Africa has abolished the death sentence while Zimbabwe still maintains it.

IV Challenges of migration, displaced populations and refugees

Contract migrant labour

Since the discovery of gold, diamonds and other minerals in South Africa various methods were used, including land alienation and taxation, to draw cheap migrant labour from the reserves to the South African mining industry.


The first Regional Human Development Report (1998) traced the history of labour migration in Southern Africa to the peculiar nature of capitalist penetration in the region since the 19th century. The uneven development of colonial capitalism led to the emergence of white settler states acting as the key locus of capital accumulation (namely South Africa and present-day Zimbabwe). A majority of the neighbouring states, notably Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Botswana and Malawi, were relegated to labour reserves. Since the discovery of gold, diamonds and other minerals in South Africa various methods were used, including land alienation and taxation, to draw cheap migrant labour from the reserves to the South African mining industry.

Up to the late 1970s, labour migration in Southern Africa was dominated by unskilled and semi-skilled workers recruited mainly by the South African mines. The deleterious effects on the supplier states of labour migrating to the South African mines include increased dependence of these states on external sources of revenue and the burden of bringing up this future migrant labour — social reproduction — being shifted to the peasant sector (Sachikonye, 1998). Whereas in the early 1970s foreign migrant workers on the South African mines comprised 80 per cent of the total labour complement, this proportion declined to about 40 per cent a decade later (ILO/SAMAT, 1998, Chipeta, 2000). The number declined from 183 000 foreign migrants on the South African mines in 1984 to 147 000 in 1994.

The effects on the supplying states of declining job opportunities for migrant miners include:

- loss of valuable revenue which in Lesotho constitutes more than 50 per cent of GDP;
- worsening domestic unemployment, with its social ills, in the labour reserves
- aggravation of rural poverty and fragmentation of the economic base of rural subsistence production
- destabilisation of the social fabric due to intra-household conflicts, mainly between wife and husband, as income dwindles but demands for livelihood multiply and
- intensification of rural-urban migration which in turn exacerbates the urbanisation problem in the labour reserves.

All these could affect regional integration negatively and hamper human development progress in the region.



Undocumented or clandestine labour migration

Undocumented migration flows will not be reversed either by brutality of law enforcement agencies, xenophobic upsurges, deportations, erecting electric fences along borders or mounting heavy police and military presences along borders

Whereas contract labour migration to the South African mines is experiencing declines, the reverse is true for undocumented/unregulated migration. As the formal gates of migration to the mines are closed, floodgates of undocumented migration have been opened up as ordinary people strive for daily survival under conditions of abject rural poverty in most SADC states. An estimated 34 027 Mozambicans are employed as informal labour in South Africa's commercial farm and services sectors (ILO/SAMAT, 1997). It is also estimated that about 400 000 Zimbabwean migrants (including undocumented labour) are employed in South Africa's commercial farming, services and construction sectors. Other numbers of undocumented migrants to the South African farming, services and construction sectors are 15 000 from Botswana, 15 000 from Lesotho and 5 000 from Swaziland (ILO/SAMAT, 1997). Although the rights of these migrant workers are usually violated, their situation is further worsened by the rising tide of xenophobia in South Africa after the 1994 political changes in that country.


The South African government has responded to undocumented migration by deporting so-called illegal immigrants. Table 3.21 and Figure 3.3 presents data on deportation of SADC citizens from South Africa between 1990 and 1996. Undocumented migration flows will not be reversed either by the brutality of law enforcement agencies, xenophobic upsurges, deportations, erecting electric fences along borders or mounting heavy police and military presences along borders but rather by regional states co-operating to address the root cause (not symptoms) of uneven development within the framework of deep integration.

Table 3.21 Deportations of SADC citizens from South Africa, 1990-96

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Angola	..	1	4	1	18	39	69
Botswana	596	604	458	105	48	11	7
Lesotho	3 832	4 440	6 235	3 090	4 073	4 087	33 344
Malawi	78	177 157	..	250	398	1154	1 920
Mozambique	42 330	47 074	61 210	80 926	71 279	131 689	157 425
Namibia	337	219	88	84	..
Swaziland	1 225	1 828	2 283	789	981	837	1 589
Tanzania	6	15	47	52	241	836	998
Zambia	1	1	11	1	16	23	20
Zimbabwe	5 363	7 174	12 033	10 861	12 931	17 549	14 651
TOTALS	53 431	238 294	82 618	96 294	90 073	156 309	210 023

Source: The Southern African Migration Project database

Figure 3.3 Deportation of SADC citizens from South Africa 1990-1996



Source: The Southern African Migration Project database

Skilled and professional labour migration

South-south professional labour migration is a positive development in not only adding value to regional human resources but also as a critical multiplier for deep integration.

The migration of skilled and professional labour within the SADC region is also on the increase. The common assumption is that supplying states stand to lose while receiving states stand to gain from skilled labour migration. That is why conventional wisdom has it that professional labour migration translates into a brain-drain for the supplying states and brain gain for the receiving states. If this is accepted then the main losers from skilled labour migration are resource-poor states (including Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia and Malawi) and the winners through this migration are resource-rich states (including Botswana, Namibia and South Africa). Zimbabwe is both an exporter and importer of skilled and professional labour. South-south professional labour migration is a positive development in not only adding value to regional human resources but also as a critical multiplier for deep integration. However, like other forms of migration discussed above, it needs to be regulated, controlled and planned within the framework of a supra-national entity like SADC. Driven by market forces, skilled labour migration may not add a lot of value to balanced and mutually interdependent development let alone deep integration in Southern Africa. SADC member states need to revisit the protocol on free movement of people with a view to turning it into a regulatory mechanism for all forms of migration, not a document that opens up countries' borders for any form of labour when regional labour markets are not yet harmonised and levels of economic advancement are still highly differentiated and uneven.

Displaced populations

Internally displaced populations and refugees are phenomena linked to political instability and armed conflict in Southern Africa. These problems still confront Southern Africa and pose a grave challenge for regional integration and human development even after the end of the cold war and demise of apartheid in South Africa. The problem of internally displaced populations is more pronounced in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo and less so in Mozambique and South Africa (see Table 3.22). Out of a total population of about 12 million, 1.5 million Angolans have been displaced by the war. Of the total population of about 47 million, 300 000 people in the Democratic Republic of Congo are internally displaced by the violent conflict there. The population of displaced people in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo is 83 per cent and 17 per cent of the overall SADC total respectively (see Table 3.23 and Figure 3.4). Other SADC states which did not experience protracted armed conflict do not face a major problem of displaced people. Box 3.8 gives the profile of displaced persons in Angola.

Table 3.22 Significant populations of internally displaced people: % of SADC, 1992-1998

Country	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Angola	9.47	22.99	28.37	55.05	57.14	91.95	83.33
Congo DRC	10.53	8.05	7.80	8.26	19.05	7.66	16.67
Mozambique	36.84	22.99	7.09	18.35	(.)	(.)	(.)
South Africa	43.16	45.98	56.74	18.35	23.81	0.38	(.)
SADC (Number)	9 500 000	8 700 000	7 050 000	2 725 000	2 100 000	1 305 000	800 000
SADC as % Africa	54.61	51.51	44.82	26.76	24.69	17.19	20.52
SADC as % world	40.11	35.52	26.68	13.36	10.66	7.48	9.99

Box 3.3 Displaced people in Southern Africa

On the basis of available data it was possible to conclude that:



- Most displaced people are women and children;
- Households of displaced people are distinctive by their small size (an average of three people per household);

- On average, 50 per cent of heads of household are illiterate;
- Agriculture was the main activity in the area of origin of displaced people.

Their expectation is to return to their areas of origin since that is where they have their roots. However, their return is predicated upon:

- there being no mines in the fields;
- being satisfied with security conditions in their areas of origin;
- returning by stages, with the head of household going first to evaluate prevailing conditions.

Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 1997




Source: International Federation of Red Cross Crescent societies, World Disasters Reports, Geneva, 1999.

Refugees are those migrants who have been forced to flee their countries of origin to seek asylum in other countries, for fear of political persecution and repression at home. Like the problem of displaced people, refugee flows are a by-product of the armed conflicts which have beset Southern Africa for a long time. Of the total refugee population of about 702 000 in the SADC region in 1998, Tanzania was home to about 300 000 refugees, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 200 000 and Zambia 160 000. Other countries have insignificant refugee populations as illustrated in Table 3.23 and Figure 3.5. Tanzania shoulders the largest burden of refugee population, estimated at 43 per cent of the SADC total, followed by the Democratic Republic of Congo (about 29 per cent) and Zambia (about 23 per cent).

It is abundantly evident that the violent wars in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo continue to worsen the refugee problem in Southern Africa. South Africa also plays host to a number of refugees from Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, the largest population of refugees in South Africa is from the Mozambican war which was settled politically in 1992. With the cessation of hostilities in 1992, it was anticipated that at least 250 000 refugees would be repatriated under the auspices of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. In fact, the number returned home was less than 70,000. The rest have remained in South Africa (ILO/SAMAT, 1998).

The next section demonstrates lucidly the widespread prevalence of

Figure 3.5 Refugees and asylum seekers by host, 1998



Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, World Disasters Report, 1999, Geneva, Switzerland.

Table 3.23 Refugees and asylum seekers by host as a % of SADC, 1992-1998

Country	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Angola	0.36	0.47	0.41	0.48	0.98	1.27	1.42
Botswana	0.02	0.02	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Congo (DRC)	17.67	19.12	56.47	58.83	47.90	36.07	28.49
Lesotho	0.01	0.00	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Malawi	42.75	29.62	2.59	0.09
Mauritius	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mozambique	0.01	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Namibia	0.01	0.21	0.04	0.04	0.11	0.14	0.14
Seychelles	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South Africa	9.99	12.69	7.40	3.97	2.37	3.96	4.27
Swaziland	2.08	2.41	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Tanzania	10.30	20.29	27.81	31.05	35.27	41.73	42.74
Zambia	6.22	6.71	4.55	5.54	13.27	16.69	22.79
Zimbabwe	10.59	8.46	0.74	(.)	0.11	0.14	0.14
SADC (Number)	2 503 000	2 363 600	2 704 000	2 264 300	949 800	707 000	702 000
SADC as% Africa	43.93	40.58	45.99	43.36	25.79	24.01	24.44
SADC as % world	14.32	14.61	16.62	14.76	6.56	5.21	5.20

- means not applicable

Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, World Disasters Report, 1999, Geneva, Switzerland.

Surely the SADC protocol on free movement of persons also needs to be revisited with a view to developing common labour market and migration policies and gradually striving towards a Common Labour Market on a regional scale.

HIV/AIDS in the Southern African region and the extent to which this disease is adversely affecting human development. Although the HIV/AIDS pandemic is afflicting all SADC states in various degrees of intensity, it is also propelled across the boundaries of these states through cross-border movement. In this regard, part of the spread of HIV/AIDS and other diseases which have a negative impact on human development is directly linked to various types of cross-border migration. This suggests that the strategies to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS and other diseases must have a regional focus which transcend national policies. Harmonisation and co-ordination of employment and migration policies among SADC countries could also scale down the spread of HIV/AIDS and other diseases in the SADC region.

So it is imperative that SADC member-states strive to harmonise and co-ordinate cross-border migration to ensure mutually beneficial regional integration, enhance human development and evolve regional strategies for controlling the spread of HIV/Aids and other diseases.

In conclusion, migration is an important element of Southern African economies. Efforts towards deep integration must grapple with this reality. To this end, issues of harmonisation of labour market policies and collective regulation and control over various forms of migration flows in the region must form part of the agenda of deep integration. Surely the SADC protocol on the free movement of persons also needs to be revisited with a view to developing common labour market and migration policies and gradually striving towards a Common Labour Market on a regional scale. It is worth noting that whereas considerable advances are now under way regarding trade integration in Southern Africa, progress lags far behind on the labour market and migration front.

V Challenge of HIV/AIDS

The HIV/AIDS epidemic


In 1999 it was estimated that Botswana had the highest adult HIV prevalence rate (36.1 per cent), followed by Zimbabwe (24.3 per cent), Lesotho (24.1 per cent) and Zambia (20.1 per cent) (see Figure 3.6). The lowest prevalence rates are in Tanzania (8.0 per cent), Democratic Republic of Congo (5.1 per cent), Angola (2.8 per cent) and Mauritius (0.1 per cent). The insignificant prevalence rate in Mauritius may reflect the relative geographic isolation of that island state and the efficiency of its health system. On the other hand a low adult HIV prevalence rate in Angola may reflect the difficulty of accessing reliable data in a war-torn country.

Another useful indicator of the severity of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in each country is the proportion of the adult HIV prevalence in selected populations. This proportion is given by estimating the percentage of high risk groups infected with HIV. High risk groups include the following:

- people with many sexual partners who do not use condoms, including sex workers;
- people who inject drugs and share unsterilised needles and syringes; and
- populations located along the major highways and living in urban and trading centres.

From Table 3.24 we notice that Zimbabwe and Malawi have the highest percentage of the high-risk groups infected by HIV (86 per cent), followed by Tanzania (60.9 per cent), Zambia (58 per cent) and Botswana (43.9 per cent). High-risk group infection rates are also high in Lesotho (35.6 per cent), the Democratic Republic of Congo (29 per cent), Mozambique (21 per cent), South Africa (20.1 per cent) and Namibia

Figure 3.6 HIV/AIDS prevalence: Adults aged 15–49 years SADC countries, %, 1999



Source: Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, UNAIDS, Report on the Global HIV/AIDS epidemic, June 2000

Table 3.3 HIV/AIDS prevalence in high risk groups and women attending prenatal clinics and stage of HIV/AIDS pandemic

Country	Survey Year	Adult HIV in selected high risk group infected (%)	Prevalence population survey year	Women attending urban antenatal clinics % infected	Stage of HIV/AIDS epidemic (1997)
Angola	1992	2.5	1995	0.9	C
Botswana	1997	43.9	1997	4.7	G
DR Congo	1997	29	1997	4.7	C
Lesotho	1993-94	35.6	1994	12.9	G
Malawi	1994	86	1996	21.9	G
Mauritius	n/a	(.)	1986	0.0	..
Mozambique	1995	21	1996	18.2	G
Namibia	1993-94	18.2	1996	17.4	G
Seychelles	-	(.)	-	(.)	-
South Africa	1994	20.1	1997	16.0	G
Swaziland	-	(.)	-	(.)	-
Tanzania	1993	60.9	1995-96	13.7	G
Zambia	1992-93	58	1995	33.8	G
Zimbabwe	1994-95	86	1996	47.4	G

C = Concentrated G = Generalised

Source: World Development, World Bank, 1999 pp.106-107

Another useful indicator of the magnitude of the HIV/AIDS phenomenon is the percentage of the women attending (urban or rural) antenatal clinics who are infected.

Harsh realities in Botswana from 1990s to HIV is similar

The HIV/AIDS situation in SADC

(18.2 per cent). Namibia's high-risk group prevalence of 18.2 roughly approximates that of HIV prevalence among that country's adult population. In Mauritius HIV prevalence among the high-risk group is insignificant. Angola's high-risk group HIV prevalence (2.5 per cent) is roughly equal to that country's adult prevalence (2.12 per cent). Once more the Angolan situation may reflect the paucity of data in a country that is at war.

Another useful indicator of the magnitude of the HIV/AIDS phenomenon is the percentage of the women attending (urban or rural) antenatal clinics who are infected. Table 3.24 presents data on infection rates among women attending urban antenatal clinics in SADC member states. Zimbabwe, with 47.4 per cent, once more has the highest percentage of HIV infection among women attending antenatal clinics, followed by Botswana (34 per cent), Zambia (33.8 per cent) and Malawi (21.9 per cent). Other countries with relatively high rates of infection are Mozambique (18.2 per cent), Namibia (17.4 per cent), South Africa (16 per cent), Tanzania (13.7 per cent) and Lesotho (12.9 per cent). Low infection rates in this category are found in the Democratic Republic of Congo (4.7 per cent) and Angola (0.9 per cent). In Mauritius, the infection rate among women attending antenatal clinics is zero.


The World Bank (1999) uses a four-fold classification of countries based on HIV prevalence. HIV prevalence is characterised as nascent, concentrated, generalised and unknown. The stage of HIV/AIDS is defined as nascent if prevalence in groups practising high-risk behaviour is less than 5 per cent. It is concentrated if HIV prevalence is higher than 5 per cent among high risk groups but prevalence among women attending antenatal clinics is still less than 5 per cent. HIV prevalence is characterised as generalised when it has spread beyond the original sub-populations with high risk behaviour which are now heavily infected. In this case HIV prevalence among women attending antenatal clinics is 5 per cent or higher. (World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1999:109).

From Table 3.24 we see that except for Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mauritius, HIV prevalence in SADC has become generalised. The lack of information on Swaziland is unfortunate but it is difficult to imagine that country would be an exception in a region facing a high incidence of HIV/AIDS. Only in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo is the HIV prevalence said to be concentrated. But the concentration marks the transition to a generalised prevalence. It is possible that more recent data could indicate that HIV prevalence in those countries is now generalised.

More recent information indicates that most of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa hardest hit by the scourge are located in Southern Africa. These include Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe in which 24 per cent to 36 per cent of the population aged 15 - 49 is living with AIDS.


Recent estimates indicate that the AIDS menace is worsening. In Zimbabwe about 700 people are dying from AIDS every week and UNAIDS (1999) estimates that 200 000 people have died from the disease since 1985. In South Africa more than 500 000 people have died of AIDS since the disease emerged (ING Barings, 1999, 2000). The number of deaths is projected to grow by the year 2015 (by a factor of 20) to more than 10 million deaths. Life expectancies in most SADC countries, which have been rising since the 1960s, started to fall during the early 1990s mainly due to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, as shown in Figure 3.8. In Zambia, the cumulative number of AIDS cases rose rapidly after

Figure 3.7 Trend in life expectancy at birth SADC countries 1960 to 2010



Source: Population Division, Dept. of Econ. & Social Affairs of the UN Secretariat and SARIPS/SAPES Databank

Figure 3.8 Gain/loss in life expectancy SADC countries, 1990 and 1998



Source: Human Development Report 2000

Gains in life expectancy being eroded by HIV/AIDS.

Nine SADC countries have seen a reversal of their gains in life expectancy since 1990.

the initial identification of an AIDS case in 1984. By 1995, the number had risen to 200 000 and by the end of 1996 the figure had risen to 400 000. By 1997, 1.02 million people consisting 950 000 adults and 70 000 children, were infected with HIV (Kamwanga and Bhat, 1999:47).

Figure 3.8 shows the number of years gained or lost in life expectancy because of the HIV/AIDS pandemic between 1990 and 1998. Nine SADC countries have seen a reversal of their gains in life expectancy between 1990 and 1998. Zimbabwe's earlier gains in life expectancy, for example, have been eroded by 12.66 years between 1990 and 1998, followed by Botswana which lost 10.56 years, South Africa, 8.73 years and Zambia, 8.65 years. For Zimbabwe this means a child born today will on average expect to survive for 12.66 years less than a child born in 1990.

Box 3.11 HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa

Responding to the rapid spread and consequences of Human Immuno-deficiency Virus (HIV) and Acquired Immune-Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) presents one of the critical challenges to human development in sub-Saharan Africa. Although only 10 per cent of the world population is in sub-Saharan Africa, more than 70 per cent of the estimated 34.3 million people living with HIV and AIDS or 24.5 million infected people are in the region. Of the estimated 13.2 million AIDS orphans, more than 90 per cent are in sub-Saharan Africa. The opportunity costs and effects of increased HIV-related morbidity and mortality particularly for those within the age group 15-49 are enormous. Some of the emerging costs include the slow collapse of the political, social and economic systems in the worst affected countries if measures are not taken to mitigate the impact of AIDS. For example, in some of the worst affected countries, repeated by-elections and delays in court cases attributed to AIDS related illnesses and deaths is on the increase posing a challenge to the fragile emerging democracies in the region. Evidence is beginning to emerge that increased illnesses and deaths among certain critical staff in the power generation sector is negatively affecting the maintenance of power equipment. Poorly maintained power generating and transmission equipment will negatively affect the availability of electrical power for the trade,

agricultural and manufacturing industry. It is the total aggregation of these indirect and direct costs, which are going to undermine the growth of economies in the sub-region.

On the whole, the HIV and AIDS challenge is complicating an already complicated development agenda in the sub-region. On the technological front, is the expense of the anti-retroviral which is beginning to change the face of AIDS in the developed world with hopes of transforming what should have been a fatal condition to a chronic condition. News of the closure of hospices and decline in mortality among AIDS patients in the developed world raises hope for the many millions of HIV infected people worldwide. The prices of these drugs are so high at the moment that implementing them at 80 per cent coverage in many countries in the region would bankrupt the health budget. These drugs have raised a new set of political, economical, social and ethical challenges at global, regional and country level in responding to HIV and AIDS. Policy makers in developed and developing countries struggle to find a balance between social justice and ensuring that government expenditure is maintained at the

required level to allow for economic growth while in the meantime poor households are using their limited financial resources to purchase anti-retroviral therapies of unknown quality. This not only has the potential to bankrupt households and therefore leave survivors in dire economic straits but also the potential to generate increased resistance to anti-retroviral therapy.

These and many other challenges require a fundamental re-think of responding to HIV and AIDS in the developing world in general and in the SADC region in particular.

Response analysis

Initiatives in response to this growing development challenge have been mounted by several African governments with the support of international donors and the UN agencies in recent years. In terms of success, Uganda, Senegal and now Zambia are more of exceptions rather than the rule in sub-Saharan Africa. After more than 15 years of responding to HIV and AIDS in the region, it is critical for future prevention efforts that we understand why we are still talking of increases in HIV infections in the young. Some of the potential fault lines in our current programmes include:

- 1 Most prevention efforts have been limited to increasing individual awareness about the risks of transmission without taking into account the context within which such risks are taken.



Box 3.11 continued

- 2 Successes made in a few countries are not well studied to provide viable and useful lessons elsewhere.
- 3 The current preventative technology is on the whole male-dominated and does not take into account the purposes for which sex take place in a relationship. For example in a situation where the couple would like to have a child, a condom may not be the appropriate prevention technology. Equally challenging with the current prevention technology is how to prevent HIV infections in cases of sexual abuse of children, rape and experimentation.
- 4 Although it is now clear that HIV is being sustained from one generation to another through sex between older men and young girls, very little is being done to address this particular entry point.

At institutional level, in addition to the poorly functioning systems in many African countries and sub-regional organisations, the following have emerged as major challenges:

- Translating the growing political pronouncements about and commitment to incorporating HIV in appropriate policies, into strategies and action plans for responding to HIV and AIDS at the operational level;
- Establishing a clear understanding of the determinants and dynamics of the bi-directional

relationship between HIV and development;

- Factoring in the effects of HIV and AIDS in overall macroeconomic forecasting, planning and budgeting;
- Conceptualising, developing and using methods, tools and approaches for monitoring and evaluating multi-sectoral responses to HIV and AIDS;
- Creating a conducive environment that would lend community support to and encourage those living with HIV and AIDS to speak out; and
- Mounting a concerted multi-sectoral, multi-disciplinary and community-oriented assault on the HIV/AIDS challenge from all angles and at all levels.


Three critical interventions are needed to redress existing limitations. Firstly, the necessary human and institutional capacities to provide a clearer picture of the inter-relationships between HIV and development would need to be strengthened within and across various sectors of

society. Secondly, knowing what the determinants are is not sufficient. Appropriate methods, tools and approaches for undertaking the tasks of formulating policies and programmes to reduce the spread of HIV and its consequence must be developed and applied. Thirdly, training policy makers within and outside UNDP in the use of such methods and tools for responding to HIV and AIDS.

UNDP Regional Project on HIV and AIDS

In addition to its co-ordinating role at country level within the framework of the UN theme group on HIV and AIDS, UNDP is re-orienting its Regional Project on HIV and Development to build capacity for institutions at regional, national and sub-national levels to respond to this emerging development challenge. The long-term objective of the regional project is to enhance sustained development in sub-Saharan Africa through:

- increased understanding of the inter-relationships between the spread of HIV and development efforts and trends;
- the formulation and integration of policies and strategies that will mitigate the impact of AIDS on development efforts; and
- ensuring that national preventative efforts are synchronised and harmonised to facilitate a regional response to AIDS and human development. In the next five years UNDP will work with key regional and national partners to



achieve the following:

- 1 Strengthen policy measures, institutional arrangements and strategies aimed at reducing the consequences of HIV infection on human and social capital formation and use;
- 2 Develop methodologies, tools and approaches to assess the impact of HIV on development efforts and to integrate HIV policies and strategies into development agendas;
- 3 Strengthen capacities of regional institutions and UNDP country offices to provide technical and

advisory assistance on HIV and development to countries; and

- 4 Formulate a regional long-term strategic action plan for a regional response to HIV and AIDS in the context of sustained human development.


Global Network on HIV and Development

To facilitate learning and exchange ideas on responding to HIV within the framework of sustainable human development, UNDP is linking the Regional Project to

the special initiative on HIV at headquarters and the sub-regional resource facility based in Zimbabwe and Ethiopia. Such linkages will not only provide a platform for exchange of ideas but will also develop south-to-south collaborative projects. The collaborative initiative between the governments of Brazil and Botswana on distance learning that is being facilitated by UNDP is a case in point.

Roland Msiska
 Chief Technical Advisor
 UNDP Regional Project on
 HIV and Development in sub
 Saharan Africa
 Pretoria

Figure 3.9 Cumulative AIDS orphans, 1997



Note: These are cumulative AIDS orphans. Some of them have already died and some are above 15 years of age.

Source: UNAIDS Global HIV/AIDS Report, 1999

Poverty and HIV/AIDS

Recently there has been a lot of debate on the possible link between poverty and HIV/AIDS. The relationship between HIV/AIDS and income poverty is two-fold. First, the poor are more likely to be exposed to HIV/AIDS for a number of reasons. Secondly, the HIV/AIDS infection is likely to cause impoverishment. The poor are more susceptible to HIV/AIDS infection because:

- They lack access to health services. This means that they are unable to get treated when they get infected by other sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). This, in turn, makes them more vulnerable to HIV/AIDS infection.
- They often participate in labour migration. Such activity is associated with the breakdown of male-female relationships which, in turn, results in multiple-partner sexual relationships. The breakdown of community traditions and maturity tends to worsen the situation.
- They do not have information about HIV/AIDS and so are unlikely to be well-informed about how to prevent infection.
- The poor do not have enough resources and cannot therefore afford preventive activities, such as condom use. They also cannot pay for treatment.

HIV/AIDS also causes impoverishment since it usually leads to the death of the economically active or the breadwinners. This contributes to reductions in income or production which is aggravated by high costs of care.

*HIV/AIDS and income
impoverishment since it
leads to the loss of
breadwinners and the
destruction of the
extended family*

Lucas (1999) has argued that there is a close link between poverty and HIV and that poverty influences the spread and impact of HIV. This is because poverty tends to create vulnerability to infection. For instance, poor women may be forced to enter into high risk sexual relationships in areas where there are no alternative economic opportunities. As a result, HIV/AIDS prevalence is high in shantytown areas where poverty and overcrowding mean no places where people who are ill receive help. The progression of HIV infection to AIDS is likely to be faster in poor people because of malnutrition. Household incomes drop and there is loss of earnings as adults become ill or die from AIDS. Health care and funeral costs place substantial burdens on households. The dependency situation will worsen with AIDS, with a lot of orphans and the elderly remaining with no-one to support them (see Figure 3.9). The extended family structures are likely to break down as the burden from AIDS will not be possible to contain.

Low level or lack of education

Lack of education or high illiteracy implies that a person may not easily access information and is therefore unable to make informed decisions. In many SADC states, girls tend to have less access to education than boys do. As a result some tend to marry earlier or to enter into high risk sexual behaviour which in turn increases the chance of infection. High or rising costs of education have reduced access for most of the poor and vulnerable.

Lack of access to health services


People with little or no access to health services are generally weakened by untreated illness and so become more vulnerable to HIV when exposed. HIV/AIDS has been associated with the persistence of untreated sexually transmitted diseases, such as syphilis and gonorrhoea. The introduction of cost sharing as part of the adjustment effort has reduced access to public health provision for most of the poor in SADC.

People associated with HIV/AIDS

In some countries, men and women with secondary or higher education are more likely to be HIV positive than those with no education.

Many studies have estimated the economic costs associated with high levels of HIV/AIDS. Some show that HIV/AIDS has a negative impact on productivity, savings and investment. Per capita income growth may be reduced as a result of the reduction in savings and productivity. HIV/AIDS has an adverse impact on economic performance since it tends to affect the adult and adolescent sub-groups who comprise the most productive and reproductive components of the populations. Due to the negative impact of AIDS, many years of productive life are lost with any rise in infections. Furthermore, in the early years of the epidemic, the disease tended to spread more rapidly among the more highly skilled or trained people. Evidence from Malawi shows that people with higher incomes and from better-off classes may have an above average risk of contracting HIV (see Table 3.25) In some countries, men and women with secondary or higher education are more likely to be HIV positive than those with no education.

Some estimates indicate that 6.3 million people in Africa will fall sick due to AIDS during the period 1995 to 2005, thus exacting high costs on the economy (Africa Development Indicators, 1998:157). Figure 3.10 shows the number of hours lost due to funerals and sickness which have been increasing because of AIDS at Chilanga Works in Zambia .



Source: HIV/AIDS in Zambia: Paper presented at the AIDS Workshop held in Durban, July 2000

Table 3.25 HIV prevalence among blood donors by occupation: Malawi

Occupation	HIV prevalence (%)
Soldier /policeman	62
Malawi Young Pioneer*	28
Educated	28
Skilled	24
Unspecified	20
Unskilled	18
Small producer	16
Housewife	16
Student	13

* The youth league of Malawi's MCP party

Source: Mozambique Human Development Report, 1999, page 77

HIV/AIDS has a negative impact on food security through its effects on population and economic growth

HIV/AIDS is also closely related to food security. Various studies indicate that people who are food insecure, especially those who take inadequate amounts of calories and nutrients, are more vulnerable to HIV infection. In such cases, HIV infection tends to process rapidly to full blown AIDS which in turn leads to rapid death.

Moreover, HIV/AIDS has a negative impact on food security through its effects on population and economic growth. In the rural areas, HIV/AIDS reduces food security by causing the death of the productive population. At the national level, high costs associated with the disease may impair the country's capacity to import food.

Economic costs

The adverse economic impact would result from the loss of skilled manpower and use of resources for consumption rather than investment

The ripple effect is from HIV/AIDS to institutions and policies and to growth. However, some studies indicate more direct causality between HIV/AIDS and economic performance. In Zambia, for example, Forgy and Mwanza (1994) argue that at the macro level AIDS has a large impact on economic capacity since there are other costs associated with AIDS deaths which include medical expenses, worker transition costs and loss of human capital. Given the direct costs of medical treatment and worker absenteeism, the costs associated with AIDS, in the absence of increased foreign resources, GDP would decline by 9 per cent below projected levels by the year 2000. If the additional costs are met by foreign resources, then GDP would fall by 5 per cent (Forgy and Mwanza, 1994). The adverse economic impact would result from the loss of skilled manpower and use of resources for consumption rather than investment which also would lower production by 5 per cent. In the absence of massive foreign aid infusion, Zambia's national income is projected to decline by as much as 10 per cent (Forgy and Mwanza, 1994).

In South Africa, GDP is likely to decline by 17 per cent by the year 2010 as a result of the AIDS pandemic while per capita income will fall by 7 per cent by the same year (Arndt Jeffrey, 2000).

HIV/AIDS treatment

Southern Africa seems to be particularly hard hit by the high cost of drugs when compared to other regions.

Up to now the strategy to contain the HIV/AIDS pandemic has consisted largely of measures designed to encourage 'safe sex' which includes the use of condoms, abstinence or sticking to one sexual partner. However, this preventive strategy does not take account of those who are already infected and need medical care. Treatment of HIV/AIDS has proved to be an expensive exercise due mainly to the high cost of drugs. Southern Africa seems to be particularly hard hit by the high cost of drugs when compared to other regions. For instance, whereas a 100mg of AZT, an important anti-retroviral drug, costs US\$20 in South Africa, in Thailand it costs US\$0.30!

The cost of another drug — Fluconazole — also suggests that multinational pharmaceutical firms tend to discriminate against Southern Africa. One 200mg Fluconazole pill costs only US\$0.30 in Thailand, while in South Africa, it costs about US\$4.20, which is roughly 14 times more (ACTSA, 2000).


There are also costs associated with the treatment of symptomatic and opportunistic infections such as tuberculosis and meningitis which also tend to be higher in Southern Africa than other poor regions. This is partly because some countries have either placed such vital drugs off patent or they produce them. (ACTSA News, October, 2000).

In Africa, however, many people are dying with HIV/AIDS because they are unable to buy the anti-retroviral drugs. They are also unable to

buy those drugs that treat the illnesses which threatened the lives of people living with HIV/AIDS. The costs are prohibitive. For instance, it has been estimated that for a country like Zambia it would cost more than 50 per cent of the GNP to treat the HIV-positive population for a year. So most Southern Africa countries are unable to provide the necessary treatment to their people. There is an urgent need to reduce the costs of anti-retroviral drugs if the HIV/AIDS pandemic is to be halted in Southern Africa. Box 3.10 gives some quotations on the treatment of HIV/AIDS and also the situation of HIV/AIDS in the SADC region.

Box 3.12: About HIV/AIDS and its treatment

- 'People are dying in chillingly high numbers. We are losing the best of our young people. It is a crisis of the first magnitude.'
Festus Mogae, President Of Botswana.
 - 'HIV has led to the premature death of more than 10 million people from AIDS worldwide. Access to treatment is essential in order to save the lives of more than 35 million people. Treatment will encourage people to come forward, live openly with HIV/AIDS and give the real meaning to prevention efforts. Treatments are available. The prices are too high!'
Opening of the South African Treatment Action Campaign and Health Gap's Global Call for HIV/AIDS Treatment Access. Endorsed by over 250 organisations worldwide, July 2000.
 - 'On a continent in which
- 290 million Africans survive on less than a dollar a day, I can afford monthly medication costs of US\$400. I am here because I can afford to pay for life itself.'
South African Judge, Edwin Cameron, July 2000.
- 'The pharmaceutical companies continue to play with our emotions by offering free or cheap AIDS drugs on the front pages of the media but not delivering in practice.'
Jubilee 2000 South Africa, May 2000.
 - 'Treatment of Zambia's HIV positive people at current prices would cost US\$2 billion a year - over half of Zambia's Gross National Product.'
 - 'The US government announced in June 2000 that it would offer US\$1 billion a year for AIDS drugs in 24 African countries. This offer came with strings attached. Not only would 100 per cent of the drugs have to be brought from the US, but also the 'loan' would have to be paid back at commercial interest rates. Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and Malawi have refused this offer because it will add to their debt burdens.'



Source: Campaign for Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs in Southern Africa (ACTSA, October, 2000).
London



Box 3.13 An AIDS policy for the region

It has always been imperative in the African environment and context to adopt a holistic strategic response to the challenge of HIV/AIDS. Such a development-oriented approach should not only encompass the medical-scientific aspects but it must continue to include sociological, economic, religious, cultural and other angles in a fully multidisciplinary manner.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and indeed sub-Saharan Africa as such work in keeping with the Africa-wide and worldwide trend of multi-sectoralism. This means that

governments and government structures on a national or regional basis coalesce with the different sectors of civil society to combat HIV/AIDS. In this collaborative way integrated strategies and programmes are formulated and implemented with greater synergy and economies of scale result from the pooling, sharing and optimal use of resources.

There is a fast-growing realisation that the impact of HIV/AIDS is universal and that substantial investment ought to be made in the effort to deal with the challenge. Getting involved in the fight against HIV/AIDS should not be done as an altruistic or philanthropic option. The

campaign must be waged with the resolve that is founded on the hard realism of HIV/AIDS as one of the most urgent and potent threats ever to confront Africa and the world.

Communication

It must be acknowledged that communication has been and continues to be the most effective method of dealing with the HIV/AIDS problem up to now and that the vaccine against HIV or a cure for AIDS has not yet been found. Communication therefore continues to be the main strategic tool and must be stepped up mainly for the following purposes:



- To raise and maintain awareness, understanding and knowledge at the highest possible levels.
- To change behaviour and promote responsible sexual attitudes and practices.
- To build broad, strong and effective partnership and stakeholder networks as an infrastructure for advocacy and multi-sectoral work.

Research

It is of critical importance that the region be involved in research initiatives within itself and in the greater international environment in a vigorous and urgent search for lasting, accessible and cost-effective

scientific solutions.

Research must not be confined to medicine and related scientific fields. It should also be systematically expanded into the economic, social and other areas, using, integrating and developing the capacity of the research bodies and institutions of higher learning already in existence.

Preventing stigmatisation and discrimination

Special focus must be given to the area of non-discrimination against those infected with the virus and affected by HIV and/or AIDS. Just as is the case with all other diseases, HIV and AIDS should not be stigmatised as this would be a sure way to

cause discrimination against those affected by the disease.

Treatment, care and support

The matter of access to drugs and treatment continues to require priority attention with emphasis on suitability, accessibility and affordability. This subject should command serious political, economic and scientific leadership on the part of the region.

There is need for certain societal and community structures and facilities within the region to be looked at in order to address the need for care and support. Much mobilisation will need to be embarked upon to achieve co-ordinated and robust participation by religious bodies, social workers, humanitarian and philanthropic societies and other social and community-based organisations.

Conclusion

The question of a well-integrated and orchestrated multidisciplinary and multi-sectoral; regional approach cannot be over-emphasised.

Thabo Mbeki
President of South Africa



VI The Challenge of mobilising natural resources for human development

The regional
environmental context

*The SADC region is
ecologically and
infrastructurally inter-
connected in a manner
which calls for the
management of natural
resources at a supra-
national level*

Environmental insecurity

*The issue of
environmental security
has become pivotal in
regional co-operation
strategies.*

The economies of the SADC region are dependent on natural resources through their international commodity export orientation and because the livelihoods of 70 per cent of their populations depend on natural resource exploitation (Tevera and Moyo, 2000). The regional natural resource base (its environmental goods) is fundamental to realising human development in the region (through natural resources, shelter, energy, medicines, social services and biodiversity). However, increased demand for natural resources for both local and export markets and the escalating competition for control of natural resources have increased the incidence of environmental conflicts in the SADC region.

Environmentally sustainable development has now become a crucial component of regional co-operation programmes of the SADC organs and within national socio-economic policies and governance systems in Southern Africa. The SADC region is ecologically and infrastructurally inter-connected in a manner which calls for the management of natural resources at a supra-national level (Tevera and Chimhowa, 2000). The existing transportation linkages, the joint use of river systems, common wildlife policies and similar approaches for the tourism sector, all show how the region is inter-connected (Swain and Stalgrén, 2000; Lopes and Kundishora, 2000; and Tevera and Chimhowa, 2000).

Escalating national environmental problems, with direct trans-boundary impacts, as well as the increasingly globalised framework within which the environmental agenda is set, have meant a greater need for conflict management than was the case in the past. Dependence on natural resources and related extractive industries underlies the growing competition and conflict over environmental resources in the SADC region.

Demographic change and the emergence of regional and global markets for natural resources under liberalising markets have increased the levels of competition and conflicts over the physical control of shared natural resources, such as shared water systems, migratory wildlife and watersheds.

Environmental insecurity can be a major threat to human development in the region due to unequal access to resources, exposure to pollution generated elsewhere and inter-state struggles over natural resources. The key environmental problems that underlie and define environmental security in the region include:

- the resurgence of unresolved historical claims over national boundaries and land, including the natural resources which are embedded in them;
- conflict over the definition, security and realisation of rights to land, water and other natural resources; and
- conflicting authority and relations of governance between the state and civil society groupings.

These problems span the local, national and inter-state levels of governance. The issue of environmental security has become pivotal in regional co-operation strategies. This is a result of the diminishing ability of the nation-state to control natural resources whose use has trans-boundary effects. The environmental trans-boundary processes that have an impact on human development potentials include involuntary migrations, cross-border pollution and degradation and planned cross-border investments, including settler migrations (Tevera and Moyo, 2000).

ADC includes some of the driest deserts, largest tropical rain forests and highest equatorial mountains in the world. The natural resources in the region encompass minerals, wildlife and biological diversity. But this natural wealth is not reflected in the welfare of most of the community's inhabitants.

Furthermore, these natural resources and the environment are constantly at risk due to escalating and unsustainable pressures from fast-growing urban populations and rapidly increasing industrial activities. Water erosion, which in some member states accounts for declining agricultural yields, has also led to the uncontrolled use of fertilisers and pesticides. Under those circumstances, it is not surprising that the human condition remains appalling on the African continent in general and in SADC in particular.

Faced with the challenge of alleviating poverty, national decision-makers have regarded concern about the unsustainable impacts of development projects on the environment and human health as too much of a luxury to take into account. Consequently, governments in the region have often turned a blind eye to air pollution from mining operations as they are a major source of income.

SADC has realised that development processes often compromise their own sustainability through negative health impacts which incur increasingly higher costs. These threaten the health gains of the past decades, further reducing life expectancy, quality of life and social development.

Pesticide residues have been largely responsible for reducing

populations of several bird species and other organisms. Moreover, pesticide residues found in Ugandan freshwater fish are a major barrier to export and trade.

The main challenge facing SADC is how to reconcile and simultaneously achieve the following economic and environmental objectives:

- reduce environmental pollution;
- protect the natural resource base;
- maintain economic efficiency;
- generate economic growth; and
- ensure the orderly development of international trade and investment.

A number of economic principles for environmental protection and sustainable development of natural resources could be pursued from the regional level. In reality, however, SADC member states have different assimilative capacities, different social objectives and different degrees of industrialisation and population density. And to effectively avoid unjustified disruption of inter-regional and international trade patterns, the principles should be harmonised, meaning that implementation necessarily draws on:

- a harmonised range of regulatory and economic instruments;
- harmonised and restructured administrative framework and;

- harmonised, amended legislative and judicial arrangements.

The degree of success will depend on implementation and the principles used to guide that implementation.

For manufacturing industries across SADC, the combination of more stringent environmental management requirements and the emergence of environment as a market issue likely to affect the the bottom line, will push the environmental management debate forward.

Most of SADC's legal code predates the current high level of environmental awareness. Environmental laws as such are rare. However, environment-related laws that do exist give latitude to authorities in various ministries and departments. Standard environmental and health impact assessment requirements are being developed nationally but some effort is also being put into approaching the matter with a regional perspective. But developments are still governed by by-laws and standards on a largely ad-hoc basis.

Legislation spread across different bodies (despite the existence of a ministry of environment in some cases) means that enforcement is primarily left to the ministries concerned. The lack of national standards regarding polluting activities complicates matters.

Successful pollution control and resource management policies aiming at long-term sustainable development are fundamental for SADC.

Introducing these policies, however, implies fulfilling a complex mix of criteria.

Two of the most important of



these criteria are:

- to ensure long-term efficient natural resource management and
- to improve the environment.

Environment and resource management could be broken down further into the following priorities:

- efficient use of natural resources;
- public waste-water treatment;
- air pollution control; and
- integrated pollution treatment.

There are also three environmental issues involved:

- Exhaustive exploitation of natural resources to speed up economic development could be avoided by management options that result in long-term durability of natural resources.
- Preservation of ecosystems, an integral component of several natural resources, could be achieved by strictly regulating their use. SADC might need compensation from developed countries should these ecosystems be of worldwide importance.
- Degradation resulting from pollution or inappropriate use could be dealt with drawing on economic instruments such as the polluter pays principle and the user pays principle and, in some cases, could be restored with low-level state support.

In terms of human health, waste-water treatment and clean drinking water could contribute significantly to increased life expectancy. It is particularly important to control the pollution level of internationally-shared water resources such as lakes, rivers and coastal waters.



Waste-water treatment requires expenditures beyond the capacities of individual SADC member states. These costs could be charged regionally and proportionally to the polluters in the industrial sector and households, in keeping with the polluter pays principle, whereby the poorest segment of the community would have to be subsidised.

A large proportion of air pollution is ascribed to the energy production sector, (for example, oil) and energy use. Although major stationary air pollution sources are relatively easy to handle technically, retrofitting them can be expensive. Henceforth, SADC member states could require that new power plant be equipped with built-in pollution control devices.

Like anywhere else in Africa, multinational enterprises use the natural resources of SADC member states. Industrial development in both pre- and post-independence eras in most states seems to have been a result of expediency rather than conscious planning taking into account, for example, occupational health and safety or environmental impacts of the activities.

However, due to financial and human resource constraints throughout SADC, the health sector cannot meet the demands in major exposure-related disease cases such as pesticide poisoning. There is no adequate infrastructure to assess, for example, the level of spray or

people's exposure to pesticides and successfully relate this to any symptoms and disabilities that may be found among end-users. There is need for training programmes that could address both environmental and health risk assessment and ensure control of pollution emissions as well as hazardous waste management. Such programmes could mainly target:

- training urgently-needed occupational physicians, industrial hygienists, both occupational and environmental health and safety inspectors; and
- establishing occupational health and safety standards.

In response to decision-makers' increasing concern over the sustainability of their developments and to afford national authorities in their respective structures the means to mitigate the upsurge of preventable environment-related diseases, SADC member states are gradually shifting emphasis from curative health services to preventive health care. In that context an environmental, sanitation and hygiene policy is being proposed throughout the SADC region to ensure that related standards are set, maintained and enforced.

Regional centres are being strengthened to provide expertise in environmental management at regional level. Botswana and Namibia have developed natural resource accounts to better assess their economic value and management options. Malawi, Mozambique and Uganda have incorporated the environmental rights and responsibilities of their citizens in their respective constitutions.

Paul Roger TIA, PhD
WHO-AFRO, DES / ERA



More than 60 per cent of the people in the region lack access to an adequate supply of safe water.

Regional co-operation and integration can enhance access and use through major projects which co-ordinate resource management and pool resources, leading to improved human development. For example, water is critical for long-term economic development and for ensuring environmental sustainability. More than 60 per cent of the people in the region lack access to an adequate supply of safe water. So water resources management must help alleviate poverty and ensure that the poor are beneficiaries of effective decisions and policies rather than the victims of bad ones.

Challenges

The challenges are quite diverse and all emerge from five principal policy failures:

- 1 lack of consensus on how to distribute resources like land, water, rights to woodlands;
- 2 direct confrontation along racial and class lines over these resources due to failure to address historical injustices;
- 3 failure of technologies or management systems that have been imposed;
- 4 extractive and degrading uses of resources, mostly exported without adding value; and
- 5 regulating markets to the benefit of improved resources.

Land resources which were expropriated from indigenous people during the colonial era continue to be inequitably distributed and dominated by a few land owners

For the semi-arid SADC region, the locus of growing struggles over natural resources is water. The exponential increase in current and future national and regional demand for water resources for domestic, urban, industrial and agricultural development has already created several conflicts. The rapid expansion of the tourist industry and export markets based upon natural resources such as wildlife, forest products and consumptive biodiversity, is a more recent potential trans-boundary source of conflict given the growing regional competition to capture global markets. Land resources which were expropriated from indigenous people during the colonial era continue to be inequitably distributed and dominated by a few land owners (Tevera, 1994). Similarly, the exploitation of hydro and coal power for energy has been concentrated among a few industries, as has been the benefits of nature conservation and natural resources trade.

More recently, national sovereignty has been circumscribed by the increased globalisation of natural resources management. Cross-border investments, especially in sectors such tourism, transport corridors, sea ports, agriculture and mining, have increased the foreign control of land and natural resources. There is growing nationalistic resentment about the limited local benefits of land transfers and the increasing concentration of land ownership by a few national élites (Mogwe and Tevera 2000). Also, there is resentment about territorial and natural resources recolonisation, especially where governments have facilitated such land transfers through legislative change.



VII Mechanisms for promoting deep integration

Inadequacies of the
SADC Programme of
Action and institutional
framework

SADC pursues its objectives through a programme of action referred to as the SADC Programme of Action (SPA). The SADC Programme of Action emphasises concrete projects, sector plans and programmes. Formulating sectoral policies and strategies has become an active component of the work of sector co-ordinating units and commissions, most recently through the design of protocols. At present, functional co-operation is undertaken in 18 sectors, with about 400 projects and numerous objectives and strategies. The absence of effective prioritisation within and between sectors, and problems of funding, co-ordinating and managing such a large programme have become quite serious. Besides, the programme is dominated by consultancy studies and contains many projects which are not viable.

Sector co-ordinating units (SCUs) form an important tier of SADC structures. They have been effective in ensuring a sense of ownership of SADC by member states, since they are each responsible for a part of it (through SCUs). They have helped to avoid excessive tensions within SADC with respect to the distribution of benefits, since all countries get something. The main weakness of the sector co-ordinating units structure is that the level of activity within different sectors varies greatly as a result of the capacity of the host country to support them. The other weakness is that the sector co-ordinating units structure promotes sectoral activities that are national rather than sub-regional in character. Furthermore, establishing the units within national governments has not prevented their unchecked growth in size and has promoted an increase in the number of sectors which works against integration and has led to a loss of focus.

*Lack of political
commitment could
undermine integration.*

From policy making to administration, the business of SADC is conducted through a number of institutions. The main ones are: the Summit of Heads of State or Governments which has responsibility for overall policy direction and control of the functions of the community; the Council of Ministers, which reports to the Summit, oversees the work and the development of SADC and approves SADC policies; the Standing Committee of Officials which is a technical advisory committee and advises the council; the Tribunal which interprets the treaty and adjudicates upon disputes referred to it; and the Secretariat which is responsible for strategic planning and management of SADC programmes. The machinery and procedure provided by these institutions are deemed unsuitable for promoting development integration in the sub-region. The secretariat lacks authority to make decisions. Women and stakeholders generally are not adequately involved in the process of economic integration. In some countries, the private sector is consulted more than in other countries.

The Framework and Strategy document states that the integration process should be based on real political commitment by governments in formulating as well as in executing integration programmes. Lack of political commitment could undermine integration. Therefore, for integration to succeed, there must be strong and sustained political commitment. To date there has been an insufficient level of commitment by member states.

Promoting mutually
beneficial and equitable
intra-regional trade

*Implementing the
SADC Trade Protocol
could be complicated
by weak provisions on
anti-dumping and strict
rules of origin on some
product lines.*

Problems of mobilising
requisite resources

SADC prepared a protocol on free movement of people a few years ago. Labour importing countries objected to this protocol as they feared the consequences of an uncontrolled influx of people into their countries and so it was turned down. The organisation has yet to formulate a protocol on free movement of people that is acceptable to all members. A protocol on finance and investment is in the pipeline.

A protocol on trade called the SADC Trade Protocol (STP) was signed in 1996, subsequently ratified by the required number of members and became effective at the beginning of September 2000. The SADC Trade Protocol provides for an asymmetrical process of removing tariffs on 'substantially all' intra-regional trade and establishing a Free Trade Area within eight years. It calls for the development of regional industrial strategies but does not itself define procedures for the development of industries. Implementing the SADC Trade Protocol could be complicated by weak provisions on anti-dumping and strict rules of origin on some product lines. Trade liberalisation could also be frustrated if member states raise discriminatory taxes that replace import duties and if SADC does not eliminate all non-tariff barriers. Leakage of extra-regional imports could arise as a result of external tariffs. Combating this would require much more effective customs co-operation and control.

The implementation of trade liberalisation will also be frustrated if: monopolies and cartels from one part of the sub-region can collude to keep out imports from other parts or dump goods at predatory prices. Such action can be prevented by firm codes and anti-trusts rules.

The impact of implementing the trade protocol on the regional economy will be relatively small. According to one study, regional income will expand by 0.33 per cent, skilled labour employment by 0.7 per cent and unskilled labour employment by 0.9 per cent (Lewis, Robinson and Thierfelder, 1999). According to another study, employment and GDP will each increase by 1 per cent (Evans, Holmes and Mandaza, 1999). Essentially, the trade protocol is a shallow instrument for promoting regional integration.

With respect to mobilising resources, the policy position of SADC is that the SADC Programme of Action should be funded primarily by member states from their own resources. However, an analysis of the programme reveals that it has continued to depend largely on resources from international co-operating partners. As of June 1999, for example, SADC had been able to put together 378 projects. Of the required funding 86.5 per cent was external and only 13.5 per cent was local. About 48 per cent of the funding had been secured and 8 per cent was under negotiation, leaving a financing gap of 44 per cent (Table 3.29). Naturally, concern has been expressed over the low level of mobilisation of local resources in support of the SADC Programme of Action. The reasons for this state of affairs are many. They include limited budgetary and foreign exchange resources of member states and the structure of the programme which accords priority to infrastructure and utility sectors where traditionally the private sector does not play a significant role. Fortunately, this perception is changing and there is growing private sector investment in these sectors.

Reliance on external sources of funding has given rise to a number of problems. As an organisation, SADC has not had adequate capacity to take maximum advantage of this support. Specifically, SADC has had technical capacity constraints in the conception and design of projects for inclusion in the SADC Programme of Action. SADC has also experi-

Table 3.26 SADC protocols/charters and dates ratified or accessed, July 2000

Date protocol entered in to force	Declaration and treaty	Immunities and privileges	Shared water-course systems	Energy	Transport, communication & meteorology	Combating illicit drug trafficking	Memo. of understand. on co-op. qual. ass., accret. & meteorology
	30/9/93	30/9/93	28/09/98	17/04/98	07/06/98	20/03/99	16/07/2000
Angola	*	*		*	*		
Botswana	*	*	*	*	*	*	
DR Congo	*	*					
Lesotho	*	*	*	*	*	*	
Malawi	*	*	*	*	*	*	
Mauritius	*	*	*	*	*	*	
Mozambique	*	*					
Namibia	*	*	*	*	*	*	
Seychelles	*	*					
South Africa	*	*	*	*	*	*	
Swaziland	*	*	*	*	*	*	
Tanzania	*	*	*	*	*	*	
Zambia	*	*	*	*	*	*	
Zimbabwe	*	*	*	*	*	*	
Total	14	14	10	11	10	10	0

Source: SADC secretariat

Table 3.27 SADC project financing status by sector (US\$ million), 1998/99

	Estimated cost						Funding status					
	No	Total	Foreign	%	Local	%	Secured	%	Under neg..	%	Gap	%
FANR	76	488.26	445.88	91.3	42.46	8.7	278.95	55.5	-	-	188.10	38.5
1 ART	15	122.41	96.42	78.8	25.99	21.2	78.77	64.4	-	-	43.64	35.7
2 Inland fisheries	9	54.41	52.64	96.8	1.77	3.3	27.29	50.2	0.75	1.4	26.37	48.5
3 Forestry	13	103.14	97.32	94.4	5.82	5.6	43.00	41.7	22.26	1.3	37.88	36.7
4 Wildlife	10	91.70	90.73	98.9	0.97	1.1	77.89	84.9	-	-	13.81	15.1
5 Food security	11	69.56	62.97	90.5	6.59	9.5	24.18	34.8	-	-	45.38	65.2
6 L PAD	12	8.33	7.01	84.1	1.32	15.9	2.10	25.2	3.70	44.4	2.53	30.4
7 Marine fish& res	6	38.71	38.71	100.0	-	-	17.72	45.8	2.50	6.5	18.49	47.8
8 Mining	36	18.16	12.54	69.1	5.62	31.0	11.83	65.1	-	-	6.33	34.9
9 Water	2	27.83	23.89	85.8	3.94	14.1	11.88	42.7	0.11	0.4	15.84	56.9
10 Industry and trade	7	9.97	9.96	99.9	0.01	0.1	0.98	9.8	4.13	41.4	4.86	48.8
11 Energy	41	603.92	566.42	93.8	37.50	6.2	382.28	63.3	28.68	4.8	192.96	32.0
12 Tourism	11	4.96	4.21	84.9	0.75	15.1	2.95	59.5	-	-	2.01	40.5
13 Trans. & com	174	6 474.40	5 528.10	85.4	946.30	14.6	2 991.70	46.2	550.90	8.5	2 931.80	45.3
14 Finance & invest	1	0.40	0.40	100.0	-	-	0.38	95.5	-	-	-	-
15 HRD	16	44.76	44.76	100.0	-	-	17.27	36.4	1.50	3.4	26.99	60.3
16 Enviro& land	7	7.80	6.55	84.0	1.25	16.1	2.03	26.1	3.70	47.4	2.07	26.5
17 Culture and inform	7	15.90	15.90	100.0	-	-	4.95	31.1	-	-	10.95	68.9
Grand Total	378	7 696.36	6 658.53	86.5	1 037.83	13.5	3 696.20	48.1	618.23	8.1	3 381.93	43.9

L PAD = Livestock production and animal disease control; ART = Agricultural research and training; HRD = Human resource development; FANR = Food, agriculture and natural resources.

The column 'secured' includes both local and foreign resources; The column 'negotiation' refers to resources for which there is a clearly defined commitment. Environment and land management

Under- de-op. served ology 2000	Trade 5/01/2000	Education and training 09/08/97	Mining 01/02/2000	Development of tourism	Health	Wildlife conser- vation and law enforcement	SADC charter of RETOSA 09/08/97	Total
								4
*		*	*	*	*	*		12
								2
*		*	*					9
*								7
*		*	*	*				10
*			*					4
*		*	*	*	*			11
								2
*		*	*					9
*		*						8
*		*	*					9
			*					6
*		*	*	*				10
10	8	9	9	4	2	1	0	

...reliance on external sources of funding means that not much effort is exerted to mobilise local resources.

Southern Africa has enormous potential for promoting human development through deep integration of its economies

enced a related problem of absorptive capacity for resources made available by international co-operating partners, particularly from the European Union (EU) and the Nordic countries. So it is not surprising that only about 48 per cent of the SADC Programme of Action has been funded. In addition, disbursement of resources to projects which have secured funding has been slow.

Furthermore, reliance on external sources of funding means that not much effort is exerted to mobilise local resources. This is reinforced by the absence of a mechanism, such as a regional development bank, for regularly mobilising resources from the region. Yet, considering the problems explained above, the SADC resource mobilisation strategy should emphasise local sources of funding.

It is clear from this chapter that the efforts of SADC member states to promote human development and deep integration of their economies are constrained by serious challenges. While all these challenges can be addressed in one way or another, there are no easy solutions. Some of the challenges, such as armed conflicts, refugees, displaced people and the nation state in the making, are conjectural and may be merely transitory. Others, such as those related to racism, labour migration, poverty and inequality, are structural and long-term problems that will take time to resolve. Despite these challenges, Southern Africa has enormous opportunities for promoting human development through deep integration of its economies. It is to these opportunities that we turn to in the next chapter.

Box 3.14 Some past reviews of SADC

The need to transform SADC is recognised by member states. Hence the organisation commissioned a comprehensive study on 'Review and rationalisation of SADC Programme of Action' in 1997. This study reviewed the institutional arrangements, technical capacity and the programme of action of SADC and suggested appropriate reform measures. Two years later, another profound treatise on 'The cost of non-integration' in the SADC region was undertaken under the auspices of SARIPS of the SAPES Trust. The three most important findings of the studies are that:

- 1 SADC institutions, especially the secretariat, are extremely weak and lack technical capacity to drive a programme of deep integration under the daunting challenges posed by globalisation; and
- 2 There exists a tension in SADC between the imperative to develop a rule-based supra-national framework for deep integration and the desire by members to cling to narrow national interests in protection of sovereignty;
- 3 Although SADC has been successful in mobilising external resources with about 86 per cent of its financial resources externally derived, this trend has entrenched an enormous donor dependency and reinforced the vertical integration of the region into the north.

Some of the key recommendations emanating from the above studies for transforming SADC which are

pertinent to this report are:

- Changing the role of SADC away from project planning and implementation towards policy formulation, co-ordination and harmonisation, which idea was accepted in principle during the 1998 SADC Summit in Mauritius;
- Active involvement of other stakeholders involving capital and labour organisations in implementing the SADC programme of action. This recommendation has surely enhanced the involvement of chambers of commerce and industry in the annual summits of SADC, although involvement of the labour movement and other non-governmental organisations still lags behind;
- SADC should decide and agree upon the form and content of as well as time-frames for deep integration with a strong recommendation for establishing a customs union and this suggests a radical transformation of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) as it is currently constituted;
- SADC should be more selective about key issue areas for regional integration rather than basing its programme of action on allocation of sectional responsibility to each country; and
- SADC should strive towards determining its own programme priorities and deliberately reduce donor influence on the form and content of the programme of action. The weakest partners in the regional integration

scheme should be given more support on the basis of balance, equity and mutual benefit.


So various studies have bemoaned the weakness of all SADC institutions, including the secretariat, which has, in turn, led to slow progress towards achieving regional integration (Evens, Holmes and Mandaza, 1999; Chipeta, CSIR and Imani Development, 1997). Although all other divisions and departments of the SADC secretariat will need strengthening, the role and status of the executive secretary has to be reviewed as a matter of urgency. For the secretariat to be accorded more power and authority over the regional integration process, the status of the executive secretary could be upgraded to that of a senior cabinet minister. Furthermore, the relative autonomy of the secretariat from other structures of SADC must be ensured in order to build a supra-national framework able to determine the form and content of the regional integration programme. In this regard, the status of the secretariat could also be upgraded above the Council of Ministers. Effective institutional reform and restructuring of SADC will require a comprehensive review and revision of the Windhoek Treaty.

Sources: Review and Rationalisation of the SADC Programme of Action, C. Chipeta, Imani and CSIR (1997); and The Cost of Non-Integration, Evans, Holmes and Mandaza (1999).



Chapter **4**

Regional integration for human development



I Introduction

...the failure of the community to promote sustained human development also reflects its inability to take advantage of numerous opportunities to integrate...

When SADCC (now SADC) was formed, it was believed that the sub-region was set on a path to economic development which would contribute to sustained human development. It is clear from previous chapters, however, that sustained human development has eluded the SADC sub-region. It is also clear that SADC's efforts to promote human development and deep integration have been constrained by serious challenges. While all the challenges can be addressed in one way or another, there are no easy solutions. Some of the challenges, such as armed conflicts, refugees, displaced persons and the nation-state-in-the-making, are conjunctural and may be merely transitory. Others, such as racism, labour migration, poverty and inequality, are structural and long-term problems which will take time to resolve. But the failure of the community to promote sustained human development also reflects its inability to take advantage of numerous opportunities to integrate the sub-region's markets for goods, services and capital: to fully integrate water and energy sectors; to integrate transport and communications; to integrate and promote closer co-operation in all other economic and social sectors; to co-ordinate monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies of member states; and to promote monetary integration, among other things.

SADC's inability to take advantage of its opportunities reflects a number of unfavourable political and economic factors. Among those unfavourable political factors are the following:

- lack of genuine commitment to regional integration;
- inability to put regional goals before national ones;
- absence of a country that can act as a leader and has the full confidence of other member countries; and
- built-in administered bias, favouring non-regional products.

And among the unfavourable economic factors are the following:

- non-tariff barriers and other market distortions designed to ensure the survival of inefficient domestic industries;
- the retention of intra-regional barriers which inhibit the free flow of factors of production;
- macroeconomic imbalances which make both domestic adjustment and adjustment to integration onerous; and
- exogenous shocks, such as commodity price declines, increase in import costs, droughts and floods.

What are the opportunities that SADC has not capitalised on to promote human development through deep integration? How can SADC seize these opportunities?

II Economic potential for deep integration

As a sub-region, Southern Africa is a relatively large part of the African continent. The present fourteen member countries together account for 9 278 square kilometres or 30.9 per cent of the total African land mass (see Table 1.3). This large land mass implies that member states are endowed with diverse natural resources, ranging from tropical to sub-tropical climates, high plateaux to lowlands, wildlife, lakes to rivers and with diverse coastlines and soils. This geographical diversity of the sub-region's natural resource base means that member states can specialise in producing different products and export to the sub-region water, power, tourism, livestock and agricultural products, and so on.

The potential for expanding natural resource based sectors is enormous. It is estimated, for example, that less than 20 per cent of the sub-region's arable land is under cultivation. It is also estimated that only 10

It is estimated that about 75 per cent of the sub-region's hydro electric potential of 142 000 megawatts is being exploited.

Natural resources tend to be managed more sustainably when local communities and individual households have unambiguous ownership and secure control over resources that they use.

per cent of the water available is used for irrigation purposes. So there is enormous potential to bring more arable land under cultivation. Using modern irrigation systems would help to reduce the sub-region's dependence on rain-fed agriculture. Furthermore, it is estimated that only 7 per cent of the sub-region's hydro electric potential of 142 000 megawatts is being exploited. Thus, here too, there is enormous unused potential.

For example, there are several unfinished projects that could provide better quality environmental goods such as the development of water projects for electricity. However, the management of water resources requires institutional bases far in excess of what a nation's private sector or a non-governmental organisation can provide. It also requires high level and diversified management capabilities backed by research and institutional infrastructure and this has not always been available in the region. Furthermore, the relations between the regional organisation and communities are also important, particularly with respect to the control of natural resources. Regional experiences regarding the management of wildlife have shown that natural resources tend to be managed more sustainably when local communities and individual households have unambiguous ownership and secure control over resources that they use.

The challenges highlighted above can be transformed into opportunities through the appropriate sustainable development policies. However, we need to move beyond traditional natural resources management approaches. Similarly, the new natural resources management should:

- address natural resources policies through integrated approaches;
- integrally link resource use management with sustainable development; and
- recognise natural resources as economic goods and promote cost-effective interventions.

Table A.1 Annual SADC mineral production, 1993-1997

Mineral	Unit	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Major SADC contributors, %
Copper	T x1000	635	588	527	511	523	Zambia 60.8%, South Africa 29.3% Namibia 4.8%, Zimbabwe 1.3% Botswana 3.8%
Nickel	T x100	63	63	59	66	67	South Africa 52.2%, Botswana 29.85% Zimbabwe 14.92%
Coal	T x1,000,000	188	198	213	212	224	South Africa 96.7%, Zimbabwe 2.1%, Other 1.2%
Cobalt	T x10	477	3223	50	555	531	Zambia 85.5%, Botswana 6.2% South Africa 5.8%
Asbestos	T	297	271	257	249	236	Zimbabwe 68.2% South Africa 21.2%, Swaziland 11.0%
Zinc	T x1000	16	141	130	143	144	Namibia 50.7%, South Africa 49.3%
Lead	T x1000	133	122	91	106	85	South Africa 97.6%, Namibia 2.3%
Chromite	T x10	308	411	579	566	645	South Africa 89.6%, Zimbabwe 10.4%
Diamond	Ct x 100,000	265	278	288	305	336	Botswana 60%, South Africa 30%, Namibia 4.22%, Angola 3.91%, Zim. Tanzania etc. 2%
Gold	Kg x1000	644	606	552	525	520	South Africa 94.8%, Zimbabwe 4.6%

Notes: T = tonnes Ct = carat; DR Congo Contribution is not included;

% Contribution based on the 1997 production figures of major mining investments

Source: SADC mining Sector Annual Progress Report, 1998

National governments within the region need to embark on interventions that improve the lives of people and the quality of their environment. However, implementing such interventions requires at least two essential elements:

- a shift from segmented national to regional strategies, whereby water resources development is approached using regional approaches; and
- a shift from incremental to strategic investments in natural resource development.

It is vital that we give special attention to ensuring that long term environmental costs are not neglected in the desire to achieve short-term successes.


The sub-region also has extensive mineral resources, including gold, manganese, platinum, diamonds, oil, copper, nickel, ferro-chrome, cobalt, iron, asbestos, coal, chromite, zinc, lead, tin, silver and uranium. Of the known world reserves, the sub-region has significant amounts of all key minerals. Furthermore, it produces a significant proportion of total world output of a number of these mineral products as shown in Table 4.1. At present most of these minerals are exported in raw form. So there is potential for adding value to these mineral products through beneficiation, possibly through plants serving two or more countries. Southern Africa not only produces primary products but manufactured goods as well. Differential endowments of capital, skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled labour implies that different countries can specialise in the assembly and manufacture of different products for sale to others.

Relative to the rest of Africa, SADC has a large potential market. In 1999, for example, the total population of SADC member states was estimated to be 193.5 million people or 25.3 per cent of the total African population in that year (see Table 1.3). This population is projected to rise at an average annual rate of 3 per cent and will reach 267.8 million in the year 2015. In addition to a relatively large population, SADC is also responsible for a significant part of the African continent's income. Figure 4.1 shows that SADC member countries accounted for less than half of the continent's GDP in 1998 but for more than half of the GDP of sub-Saharan Africa. In terms of market size, the absolute value of GDP is actually an underestimate as it excludes unrecorded informal economy GDP, estimated at between 40 per cent and 50 per cent of the recorded GDP in some SADC countries.


Although SADC is a powerful economic force in African continental terms, it is a small player by world standards. Table 4.2 shows that the GDP of SADC countries is less than 1 per cent of world GDP. It exceeds the GDP of Thailand, Nigeria and Denmark, considered individually. But it is less than that of Spain or Argentina.

Furthermore, in per capita terms, current income levels in the SADC sub-region are not particularly high, even though they are above income levels in Africa as a whole (see Figure 4.2).

In the following section we identify and discuss the various opportunities for promoting development in SADC. These opportunities are mainly located in trade, infrastructure, investment and monetary co-operation.



Sources: UNDP *Human Development Report 2000*; *African Development Report 2000*



Sources: African Development Bank, *African Development Report 1999 and 2000*

Table 4.2 SADC nominal GDP in comparison with other countries, 1998

	GDP (US\$ billion)	% of world GDP
SADC countries	186.0	0.7
South Africa	133.5	0.5
Nigeria	41.4	0.2
Denmark	174.9	0.6
Spain	553.2	2.0
Thailand	111.3	0.4
Argentina	298.1	1.1
World	28 228.1	100

Source: UNDP, *Human Development Report 2000*.

III Emerging opportunities in SADC

For increasing
intra-SADC trade

Between 1991 and 1997, SADC exports to the EU as a percentage of total SADC exports decreased by 1.7 percentage points due to rising competition from other developing regions.

The fast growing economies of Asia provide not only role models but also sources for investment and destination for exports.

...the total volume of South Africa's imports from other SADC member countries is far higher than its recorded trade with the rest of Africa.

Data on merchandise trade, exports and imports as a percentage of GDP for SADC member countries are shown in Appendix Table 37. The data in those tables indicate that as a percentage of GDP, total merchandise exports increased by 0.8 percentage points between 1991 and 1997. In the same period total merchandise imports increased by 3.8 percentage points while total merchandise trade increased by 4.9 percentage points between 1992 and 1997.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the level of extra-regional trade of Southern African countries was higher than its intra-regional trade (see Appendix Tables 31 and 37). The African Development Bank Report attributed this to the pattern of trade of Southern African countries which was similar and structurally weak (African Development Bank, 1993). The bulk of their exports (about 90 per cent) were mineral and agricultural commodities with little or no value added, sold mainly to industrialised countries. While the bulk of their imports (about two thirds) were intermediate and capital goods purchased mainly from industrialised countries. However, recently changes have occurred in both the direction of trade and in its commodity composition.

Between 1991 and 1997, SADC exports to the EU as a percentage of total SADC exports decreased by 1.7 percentage points due to rising competition from other developing regions. For all SADC countries except Mozambique, the ratio of exports going to the EU decreased. Between the same time periods, the ratio of SADC imports originating in the EU fell by 5.1 percentage points, reflecting rising costs of imports from there. The ratio of imports originating in the EU fell in all countries except Mauritius, Seychelles and South Africa. Export and import trade was diverted to Asia and other African countries. Consequently, total SADC trade with the EU also declined between 1991 and 1997 (by 2.7 percentage points). Total SADC trade with the North American Free Trade Area also declined during the same period.

The fast growing economies of Asia provide not only role models but also sources for investment and a destination for exports. A number of modalities for association between Southern Africa and Eastern and South Eastern Asia are worth considering. Among these is the shifting of textile and other production from Asian countries that have exhausted their quota in Europe or North America. The other is the use of the high level of savings in Asia for investment in Southern Africa — perhaps with the intention of re-exporting products back to Asian markets.

For several years after the establishment of SADCC, intra-regional trade was low at less than 5 per cent of the total trade of the sub-region. During the late 1980s, intra-regional trade increased in the SADCC. This upward trend continued throughout the 1990s (see Appendix Table 37). But the rise in intra-SADC trade reflected not only this upward trend but also the entry into SADC of five new members, namely, South Africa, Mauritius, Seychelles, Namibia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. As indicated by the ratios of intra-SADC trade to total trade of SADC, total intra-SADC trade nearly doubled between 1990 and 1997.

The 1993 *African Development Bank Report on Economic Integration in Southern Africa* underscored the considerable scope for increasing intra-SADC trade, especially between South Africa and other member countries. South Africa imports from the SADC region not only primary commodities such as coffee, tea and tobacco, but also manufactured goods like clothing and textiles. Furthermore, the total volume of South Africa's imports from other SADC member countries is far higher than its recorded trade with the rest of Africa. In 1998, for example, the value of South African imports from other SADC countries was double

As South Africa's import requirements grow, other SADC member countries stand to increase their exports to this country further.

the value of its imports from the rest of Africa. As South Africa's import requirements grow, other SADC member countries stand to increase their exports to this country further.

Whereas South Africa's exports to the developed world are mainly commodities, its exports to other SADC member countries are mainly consumer, intermediate and capital goods. The SADC sub-region is thus an important market for South Africa's manufacturing and service sectors, accounting for 25 per cent of total exports of manufactured goods. In 1998, South Africa's exports to other SADC countries were three times the value of its exports to other African countries. An examination of the commodity composition of intra-SADC trade suggests that there is significant complementarity between South Africa's exports and imports of other SADC member states, with scope for more trade (African Development Bank, 1993).

Is the SADC sub-region integrating with the world economy? Table 4.3 presents data on merchandise exports, merchandise imports and total merchandise trade, each as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product which can be used to ascertain whether the SADC sub-region is integrating with the world economy. The data in Table 4.3 show that the export, import and the total trade ratios grew marginally between 1980 and 1998. These data are averages for the entire SADC. An examination of data on individual countries reveals that there were significant increases in export ratios for Lesotho and Zimbabwe, in import ratios for Mozambique and Zimbabwe and in total trade ratios for Mozambique and Zimbabwe.


Another indicator of integration is the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and a country's GDP. The increase in this relationship suggests that there is growing integration with the world economy. From Figure 4.3 we notice that there was a steady increase in the foreign direct investment /Gross Domestic Product ratio for some countries overtime, although it was rather low. The foreign direct investment/Gross Domestic Product ratio rose for Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. However, only Angola, Namibia, Seychelles, Swaziland and Zambia registered high increases in this ratio.

Table 4.3 SADC merchandise exports, imports and total trade as a percentage of GDP, 1980 to 1998

	1980/84	1985/89	1990/94	1995/98
SADC merchandise exports/GDP	26.8	29.9	26.8	29.6
SADC merchandise imports /GDP	27.0	25.3	25.4	29.9
SADC total merchandise trade/GDP	53.8	55.2	52.2	60.1

Source: IMF, *International Financial Statistics* (various issues)

Figure 4.3 SADC foreign direct investment as percentage of GDP, 1983 to 1997



Source: UNCTAD Foreign Direct Investment in Africa, 1999

For improving
infrastructure

...countries can benefit from digital switching technology by integrating their telecommunications systems and hence pooling their skills and capital and by liberalising their information and communication sectors so as to increase competition.



Many believe that the rapid growth of trade, foreign direct investment and international finance would not have been possible without improvements in information and communications technologies. The effects of these technologies can be felt through two mechanisms. The first is the adoption and diffusion of information technology. By reducing production and communication costs and improving quality, this technology tends to create new trade opportunities. The second mechanism is the production of information technology itself. Rapid growth in demand for electronic products offers valuable export opportunities for firms in SADC and other regions.

Electronic switching technology represents one type of information technology that can easily be adopted in less developed countries and enable them to leapfrog because it is cheaper and less complex to install from scratch than when it is added to an existing electro-mechanical network and because they do not have a large existing network of this old technology to replace (Antonelli, 1991). The adoption of electronic switching technology favours those developing countries with high rates of investment, skills, transnational corporations located in urban areas, free markets and, hence, absence of restrictive regulations and licensing requirements. With generally low rates of investment, inadequate skills, small-scale firms located in rural areas and one or a few firms engaged in information and communications sectors, many SADC countries have not benefited from it. As a result, the waiting time for telephone installations is long and the cost of local and international telephone calls is relatively high (see Appendix Table 34). These countries can benefit from digital switching technology by integrating their telecommunications systems and hence pooling their skills and capital and by liberalising their information and communication sectors so as to increase competition.

Apart from digital or electronic switching technology, firms in SADC can also adopt electronic communications technology, such as internet and e-mail. By providing them with information about prices and markets and by enabling them to place orders more rapidly, this technology can enhance the competitive position of adopting firms. Installation and use of electronic communications is relatively simple and inexpensive.

Box 4.1 An information and communication technology policy for national development, Mozambique

The Government of Mozambique's Five-Year Programme (2000–2004) sets as its objectives and priorities:

- a reduction in the levels of absolute poverty;
- rapid and sustainable economic growth, based on a favourable environment for the private sector;
- the country's economic development, with emphasis on rural areas and with the aim of reducing imbalances; and
- the consolidation of peace, national unity, justice, democracy and patriotic conscience, as indispensable conditions for the country's balanced and sustainable development.

On the other hand, the government's programme recognises that the globalisation phenomenon resulting from the information technology revolution demands the country's active participation in the global information society as well as the production of knowledge for the resolution of the country's pressing problems. It thus calls for the promotion of a scientific culture within society, individuals and institutions.

It is in this context that we have sought to develop an information and communication technology (ICT) policy, recognising that information and communication technologies have become today's indispensable lever for a country's development. Mozambique cannot afford to miss out on the opportunities made available by the ongoing

information revolution. In the globalisation era, the ability to efficiently and effectively use information and communication technologies plays an increasingly important role in determining a country's relevance and competitiveness in the global economy.

Experience has shown that one of the reasons for the failure of many policies adopted by governments around the world is the absence, in their elaboration, of proper consultation on the views and concerns of those whom the same policies involve or seek to serve.

One of the greatest and most frequently praised merits of Mozambique's information and communication technology policy is that it stems from a broad process of consultation and participation of stakeholders throughout all phases of its preparation. Debates were held via radio, television, written press, electronic mail, internet, and provincial and national seminars involving government leaders, representatives of state bodies, public and private sectors, industry, information and communication service providers, donors, non-governmental organisations and civil society at large.

The broad nationwide debate helped not only to de-

mystify terms and concepts usually seen as intimidating to the common citizen, but also contributed towards a national consensus around the major objectives and priorities of the policy which should:

- contribute towards the fight against poverty and the improvement of the living conditions of Mozambicans;
- guarantee citizens' access to global knowledge;
- raise the efficiency and effectiveness of state institutions and public utilities in service delivery;
- improve governance and public administration;
- make Mozambique a producer, not just a consumer, of information and communication technologies; and
- raise Mozambique to the status of a relevant and competitive partner in the global information society.

In other words, through the information and communication technology policy, we want to help reduce the current digital divide between north and south which tends to widen rather than narrow. It is unacceptable that in sub-Saharan Africa only one in every 5 000 people has access to the internet whereas that ratio is one to four in North America and Europe. It is important that we all work and commit ourselves to fundamentally alter this situation.

But how can we implement our information technology agenda with so many problems and such resource constraints?



Box 4.1 continued

This is the question we are inevitably confronted with.

That is our vision and we know it corresponds to the situation we live in. We are certain and confident that, with will and determination, it is possible to transform our vision into a tangible reality for our people. With that in mind, we have identified priority areas of intervention; we will implement some programmes and leave others out; we will allocate some of our scarce resources to the priority programmes; and we will work with our partners to secure their technical and financial support in our gigantic endeavour.

Within the information and communication technology policy, we have identified as priority areas of intervention: education, human resource development, health, telecommunications infrastructure, universal access and governance. Although not contemplated within the priorities, agriculture and natural resources, environment and tourism, public protection, e-commerce, academic and research institutions, women and youth, culture and the arts, and the media are also addressed.

We recognise that our programme will carry a high cost: but we are also aware that the cost of not doing anything now will be even greater!

Throughout the five years of the government programme, we wish to achieve concrete results that will make a difference in



the lives of the Mozambicans and in the role of Mozambique in the global information society. Internet access must increase from one person in every 1 700 to at least one in every 200; all secondary and middle schools, including teacher training colleges and

Mozambique – the country in a nutshell
AREA
799,380 km ²
POPULATION STATISTICS (%)
Total: 16,841,000
WHERE THE POPULATION LIVES
In the city: 29%
In rural areas: 71%
REITERATION RATE
Total: 60.5%
THE EXPECTANCY OF LIFE
Average: 42 years
PER CAPITA GDP
US\$ 238.1 (1997)
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX
0.341 (UNDP 1997)
ILLITERATES
0.46
INTERNET ACCESS PER 1000
10
TELEPHONE LINES
1/1 700

teacher training centres, will be connected to the internet: all information deemed essential to citizens will be made available electronically from both central and provincial government departments; many businesses will take advantage of the e-commerce opportunities; and all provinces will have at least one telecentre or community access point, thereby ensuring progress towards universal access.

We are convinced that these measures, combined with those taken in other areas, will contribute decisively towards reducing absolute poverty, significantly reducing illiteracy,

raising public awareness about HIV/AIDS and how to avoid it, and raising the country's Human Development Index.

We also believe that success in the area of information and communication technologies is only possible through collaboration and joint efforts at national, regional and international levels.

Mozambique attaches special importance to co-operation with all SADC countries, with other African countries within the framework of the African information society initiative and with the international community at large.

We cannot but praise the efforts of the United Nations, especially the UNDP leadership, in bringing the information technology revolution within reach of disadvantaged peoples and nations. Mozambique will always be an active participant in initiatives such as the Global Knowledge Partnership, the Digital Opportunity Initiative, the Global Network Readiness and Resource Initiative and others.

To conclude: through the information and communication technology policy, the government of Mozambique and its partners will work relentlessly and tirelessly to make information and communication technologies not only a lever for the development of the country and for the improvement of the living conditions of Mozambicans but also an instrument for the progress of African countries and peoples.

Dr Pascoal Manuel Mocumbi
Prime Minister and Chairman
of the ICT Policy Commission
Mozambique



Hence, we would expect a rapid diffusion of this technology. But only South Africa and to some extent Namibia have done so in the SADC region. Appendix Table 33 shows the SADC countries by cellular mobile phone subscribers, fax machines, personal computers and internet hosts. It also gives the telephone lines waiting time and the cost of communicating by telephones and access to radios and televisions. Once again, integrating national electronic communications systems would help to spread the use of this technology in SADC, as would creating a level playing field to allow more firms to enter the electronic communications sector; similarly, television and radio systems.

Information technology also affords developing countries the opportunity to produce and export new technologies such as electronic micro-circuits, diodes, transistors, automatic data processing peripherals and digital computers. But with the exception of Mauritius, South Africa and Zimbabwe, the SADC sub-region has barely participated in the international markets for production or assembly of these products. The export of electronic products is generated by foreign direct investment, from which these countries have benefited, and by the availability of low-cost skilled and semi-skilled labour, good telecommunications facilities, political stability and open financial systems. Computer software, computing services and data processing offer other export opportunities.

Information and communications technologies can thus be a significant force for human development in SADC by creating new economic opportunities, providing information more cheaply and raising productivity. These technologies can also help promote human development by providing information on diseases and how to combat them, by facilitating long distance learning and by empowering non-governmental organisations and women through instant network communication to respond to new challenges, among other ways.

Programmes or projects which are designed to benefit many members of a regional grouping may help to enhance regional integration. A number of regional spatial development initiatives which have been identified in SADC are designed to spread benefits to many countries and thus to strengthen the feeling of regionality. However, some of these initiatives are designed to benefit individual member states while others are operating bilaterally. The third category consists of initiatives which are designed to spread the benefits among many states. Initiatives which are designed to benefit individual member countries include the following:

- The Zambezi River Development Initiative (Mozambique)
- Malange Development Corridor (Angola)
- Namibe Development Corridor (Angola)
- Phalaborwa (South Africa)

Bilateral initiatives include the following:

- The Tazara Development Corridor (Tanzania and Zambia)
- Nacala Development Corridor (Malawi and Mozambique)
- Beira Development Corridor (Mozambique and Zimbabwe)
- Maputo Development Corridor (Mozambique and South Africa)
- Walvis Bay Development Corridor (Botswana and Namibia), and
- Platinum Special Development Initiative (South Africa and Botswana)

Development initiatives which involve many countries are the following:

- Lobito Development Corridor (Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia)
- Coast to Coast (Namibia, Botswana, South Africa, Swaziland and Mozambique)
- Okavango– Upper Zambezi Tourism Initiative (Botswana, Angola, Zambia and Zimbabwe)
- Lubombo Special Development Initiative (Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland).

...most development initiatives are bilateral and probably designed to fulfil the objectives of both parties.

It is evident from the above categorisation that most development initiatives are bilateral and probably designed to fulfil the objectives of both parties. The Tazara Corridor project has its history in the politics of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. It was designed to provide Zambia with an alternative route to the sea as the country faced the prospect of losing its traditional outlets in South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The corridor consists of the Tanzania–Zambia oil pipeline (Tazama), the Tanzania–Zambia railway (TAZARA) and the Great North road. However, the project has already helped transport goods destined to such countries as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Malawi. There are also plans to involve other countries, for instance, by providing future links into the rail and road network of the Nacala Corridor in Mozambique.


The Nacala development initiative is essentially designed to provide an export and import route to Malawi, although eastern Zambia would benefit also. As already discussed there is potential for linking the Tazara Corridor with that of Nacala. The Beira Development Corridor is principally designed to provide an outlet to the sea for Zimbabwe.

The spatial development initiatives involving South Africa and Mozambique are mainly for the benefit of the former. Their main objective is to improve the transport networks and hence access to the sea through Maputo harbour, to South Africa's industrial and agricultural enterprises located in Mpumalanga and Northern provinces. The Maputo Corridor, which is the most advanced of all regional development corridors provides a link with Gauteng province of South Africa and the port of Maputo.

The Walvis Bay Development Corridor will provide a transport link between Walvis Bay, Windhoek and Botswana while the Platinum initiative will focus on mineral and individual projects in the Rustenburg–Jwaneng areas of South Africa and Botswana which have large-scale platinum deposits.

The Coast to Coast corridor initiative has the largest number of partners since it is in essence a collection of development projects, such as the Walvis Bay, Maputo, Rustenburg–Jwaneng corridors. It also includes the Trans–Kalahari highway. As a result it will provide a vital link between Maputo harbour (east coast) and Walvis Bay (west coast). The Lobito and Lubombo development corridors will each involve three parties. While Lobito intends to rehabilitate the railway line linking Zambia to the coast in Angola, Lubombo seeks to promote tourism in Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland. The Okavango–Upper Zambezi initiative aims to boost tourism among the four member states. This initiative involves the second largest number of parties and is based on the exploitation of the tourism potential of the two river systems.

It is evident that some development initiatives, especially the bilateral and multilateral ones, have the potential to help foster regional integration. Indeed some, such as those involving Mozambique and South



Africa, Tanzania and Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique are already playing their part in fostering those bilateral and multilateral relations. Hopefully, SADC will create more regional development initiatives and allow them to operate on a regional basis.

For increasing investment and finance

The inflow of foreign direct investment into Southern Africa has increased significantly since the end of economic sanctions against South Africa.

This suggests that natural resources are a major attraction for foreign direct investment

The inflow of foreign direct investment into Southern Africa has increased significantly since the end of economic sanctions against South Africa. In absolute terms, total foreign direct investment inflows rose from an annual average of US\$108 million during 1988–92 to US\$313 million during 1993–97. This increased the sub-region's share in total African foreign direct investment receipts from 17 per cent during 1988–92 to 26 per cent during 1993–97. In other words, Southern Africa has improved its attractiveness as a destination for foreign direct investment due to the end of apartheid and sanctions against South Africa and an improvement in the economic environment and investment regulatory framework.

However, not all SADC member countries have received an absolute increase in foreign direct investment. The largest absolute increase in has gone to South Africa, followed by Angola, Namibia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, in that order of magnitude (Table 4.4). Increases in foreign direct investment flows into Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius and Seychelles have been modest; while those to Botswana and Zambia have actually declined (Table 4.4). So foreign direct investment tends to be concentrated in a few countries. The 1999 UNCTAD report on Foreign Direct Investment in Africa analysed this phenomenon which is not peculiar to Southern Africa. On the basis of per capita foreign direct investment receipts for the years 1987–91 and 1992–96, the report identified Botswana, Mozambique and Namibia as recent front runners. These countries owe their foreign direct investment receipts to some or all of the following factors: a stable and predictable policy and macroeconomic environment, privatisation programmes, high GDP growth rates, efforts to improve the education levels of their citizens and deregulation accompanied by intense investment promotion activities (UNCTAD, 1999).

Apart from geographical concentration, there is also industrial concentration of foreign direct investment into the sub-region, with most of it going into gold and diamond mining, the oil industry and, more recently, into the telecommunications sector. This suggests that natural resources are a major attraction for foreign direct investment, as confirmed in Table 4.5.

As shown in Table 4.6, annual inflows of portfolio investment into Southern Africa outweigh inflows of foreign direct investment shown in Table 4.4. The data in Table 4.6 indicate that South Africa is the main recipient of portfolio investment in the sub-region. Measured against what South Africa gets, the receipts of other countries shown in the table look very insignificant. The disparity reflects the relative size and development of the South African economy which mean that its demand for capital is larger and it has more public companies which are legally allowed to issue shares to the general public. But the dominance of South Africa reflects something else — a large securities market in the name of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. In fact this stock exchange is the largest and the oldest (established in 1887) in Africa. Its market capitalisation is 243.4 per cent of GDP, more than four times greater than the market capitalisation of the second biggest stock exchange in the continent, Harare, whose market capitalisation is 54 per cent of GDP.

Table 4.4 FDI Inflows into Southern African countries, 1983 to 1997
(Annual average, US\$m)

Country	1983/1987	1988/1992	1993/1997
Angola	160	190	254
Botswana	65	34	-12
DR Congo	-41	-3	0
Lesotho	3	12	13
Malawi	1	14	19
Mauritius	8	27	29
Mozambique	2	13	50
Namibia	5	53	110
Seychelles	13	19	35
South Africa	-38	9	755
Swaziland	20	63	39
Tanzania	0	4	100
Zambia	39	108	93
Zimbabwe	-5	-5	79
Total	232	538	1 564

Source: UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Performance and Potential 1999, pages.53–54

Table 4.5 SADC: Selected mining foreign direct investment, 1995–1999 (US\$m)

Target companies	Target country	Company	Source country	US\$m	Kind	Year
Hartley Platinum Mines	Zimbabwe	BHP Minerals & Zimplats	Australia	500.0	New	1998
Kolwezi Tailing Project	DR Congo	Anglo American Corp (AAC) and AMF	SA & USA	130.0	Mergers & acquisitions	1999
Nkana, Nchanga, Konkola & Nampundwe Copper Mines (ZCCM)	Zambia	Anglo American Corp. (AAC)	SA	90.0	Privatisation	1999
ZCCM Power Station	Zambia	Copperbelt Energy Corporation	UK	50.0	Privatisation	1997
Gecamines	DR Congo	Isacor	SA	66.7	Expansion	1998
Tsumeb Corporation	Namibia	Danae Resources	Australia	49.2	Mergers & acquisitions	1999
Golden Pride Mine	Tanzania	Resolute Ltd & Samax Gold	Australia	47.0	New	1997
Turk Mine	Zimbabwe	Casmyn Corporation	Canada	30.0	Mergers & acquisitions	1995
ZCCM/Kansanshi Copper Mines	Zambia	Cyprus Amax Minerals	USA	28.0	Privatisation	1997
Bwana Mkubwa Copper Mine	Zambia	First Quantum Minerals	Canada	26.0	Mergers & acquisitions	1997
Eureka Gold Mines	Zimbabwe	Delta Gold	Australia	24.0	New	1998
Maamba Collieries	Zambia	Benicon	SA	22.0	Privatisation	1997

Source: Business Map SADC – FDI database

Table 4.6 Portfolio investment flows into selected Southern African countries (US\$m), 1992 to 1997

Country	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Botswana	0.1	0.2	-0.1	5.8	31.0	10.8
Mauritius	n/a	n/a	2.1	175.9	36.8	31.4
Namibia	15.1	60.0	64.2	82.2	31.2	26.0
Seychelles	-7.1	0.5	1.5	5.8	9.9	8.1
South Africa	-10.6	1 097	2 133.0	3 076.0	3 011.0	12 856.0
Swaziland	n/a	-0.9	0.1	0.8	0.4	-0.1
Zimbabwe	-37.1	-5.1	50.2	-	-	-
Total	-39.6	1 151.7	2 251.0	3 346.5	3 120.3	12 932.2

Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (Various Issues).

Note: - = not applicable

...the disparity reflects the relative size and development of the South African economy which mean that its demand for loans and trade credit is bigger but also the existence of a developed financial infrastructure.

In terms of market capitalisation and the number of listings, the rest of the stock exchanges in SADC are comparatively small. All are relatively new (established between 1989 and 1995), some operate in economies where the public company (or even corporate) form of business organisation is not common or where public ownership of some enterprises exists. Then there are restrictions on the amount of shares that foreigners can buy if they are allowed to buy at all.

Data on other foreign investment flows into selected Southern African countries are shown in Table 4.7. The data in this table also indicate that other foreign investment flows into SADC exceed annual inflows of foreign direct investment (see Table 4.4) and that South Africa gets the lion's share of these other investments. Once again, the disparity reflects the relative size and development of the South African economy which mean that its demand for loans and trade credit is bigger but also the existence of a developed financial infrastructure.

Loans can impact positively on human development. If they are used by the private sector, the impact will be similar to that of foreign direct investment and portfolio investment that finances business investment. If used by governments, their impact will be positive but different depending on how the finances are used. Deposits enlarge the lending base of lending institutions. But like currency, deposits are short term and can be subjected to massive withdrawals. Where the amounts involved are large, such withdrawals can be destabilising.

Intra-SADC investment is relatively insignificant but it is rising. This type of investment can play a crucial role in counteracting trade imbalances in the region, transferring skills and technology, and increasing intra-regional export capacity. Many see the acute shortage of investment finance as a major constraint to intra-SADC investment. In this connection, the accelerated development of securities markets, involving the networking of regional stock exchanges, is timely. This should help to attract and mobilise both regional and international investment capital. According to the African Development Bank report, the most immediate priority in stimulating intra-SADC investment is restoring macroeconomic stability. Since their report was published in 1993, several SADC countries have made progress towards reducing budget deficits, inflation rates, external account deficits and debt ratios.

Table 4.7 Other foreign investment flows into selected Southern African countries (US\$ million) 1992 to 1997

Country	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Botswana	-5.6	23.1	-2.8	-2.5	17.8	-3.4
Lesotho	0.5	1.5	1.9	-	-	-
Mauritius	-5.8	26.6	9.2	27.7	-6.9	-10.4
Namibia	-9.8	19.9	64.2	0.3	-49.1	116.5
Seychelles	-7.1	0.5	-1.5	5.8	9.9	8.1
South Africa	1 170.0	1 042.0	556.0	2 432.0	1 772.0	228.0
Swaziland	12.5	-0.3	0.7	0.4	41.5	-25.9
Tanzania	0.2	-1.4	6.7	22.9	-23.5	2.6
Total	1 154.9	-972.1	634.4	2 486.6	1 761.7	315.5

Source: International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics* (various issues).

There may be a foreign exchange gain from selling existing public enterprises to foreign investors which can be used to promote intra-SADC investment.

Clustering may help to reduce unit costs by creating a common pool of skilled labour, of specialised input suppliers and of specialised markets.

Intra-SADC investment has also benefited and is poised to benefit further from institutions that have been adopted at regional (and national) level. These include:

- The strategic use of privatisation as a vehicle for mobilising domestic and foreign capital. There may be a foreign exchange gain from selling existing public enterprises to foreign investors which can be used to promote intra-SADC investment. If the enterprises are sold to domestic investors, then resources for intra-SADC investment may not be generated.
- Harmonising investment laws and regulations as planned by FISCO.
- Specific initiatives such as the African Development Bank–European Community–World Bank cross-border initiative which targets financial and technical aid to those countries that adopt liberalisation measures to promote intra-regional trade and facilitate payments and cross-border investment.
- Regional special development initiatives which offer a vehicle to attract intra-SADC and foreign investment (see Box 4.1). Regional special development initiatives involve both public and private sectors in promoting development. They are concerned with the rehabilitation or construction of transport and other infrastructure as well as with the development of other sectors, typically along development corridors. By locating in a particular corridor or clustering, geographical and sectoral concentration of firms enable them to reduce unit costs, a phenomenon that is referred to as external economies. Clustering may help to reduce unit costs by creating a common pool of skilled labour, of specialised input suppliers and of specialised markets. Clustering may also help to reduce unit costs by facilitating the sharing of know-how and ideas.

co-operation and
harmonisation

The Framework and Strategy for Building the Common Market stressed that to facilitate intra-SADC trade and investment, an efficient and effective payments mechanism is essential. In the early 1990s when this document was published, monetary co-operation among SADC countries was limited. Since 1995 when FISCO was established, SADC has co-ordinated the development of national clearing, payments and settlement arrangements with a view to facilitating financial settlements among different member countries.

This initiative has two objectives. The first is to assist SADC member countries to define a domestic payments system or strategy and a development plan for the reform of their payments systems. The second is to define a regional approach to intra-SADC payments. The first phase of the project was completed in June 1999 and focused on sensitisation, information gathering, stock-taking and situation analysis. The second phase involved formulating a vision and strategy. This phase has not been completed by all countries. It is important that countries that have not done so urgently complete their work so we can start implementing the strategic framework as soon as possible.

The Framework and Strategy document further noted the diverse and non-convertible currency systems in the region as a whole which had rendered intra-regional trade and intra-SADC investment difficult to implement. In this regard, the document stated that, at an early stage in the integration process, efforts should be made to overcome this problem through intra-regional currency convertibility. Earlier, at the 1991 Summit held in Arusha, Tanzania, the Authority of SADC had decided that the organisation should embark on macroeconomic and sectoral policy planning and co-ordination. As pointed out by the organisation's executive secretary during the Annual Consultative Conference held in Maputo in January 1992, macroeconomic policy planning and co-ordination would include the creation of a monetary union.

Beyond official statements of intent, there is growing interest in currency convertibility among SADC member countries themselves which offers a rare opportunity for monetary harmonisation. As in the past, only the South African rand is convertible in most SADC member countries. But a number of regional currencies have attained some measure of convertibility, for example: the Botswana pula in Zambia and Zimbabwe, the Malawi kwacha in Mozambique, the Mozambican metical in Malawi, the Zimbabwe dollar in South Africa and Zambia and the Tanzanian shilling in Kenya and Uganda. More recently, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African States (COMESA), to which nine SADC member countries belong, has decided to start implementing its monetary harmonisation programme. The phased implementation of this programme will start with currency convertibility, then exchange rate unification and finally, a common currency.

The ultimate aim of a monetary union in Southern Africa is to create a favourable environment for the integration of national economies. Such an environment is expected to be created by reducing transaction costs associated with the present use of separate national currencies in intra-regional trade and by reducing the unfavourable effects of exchange rate uncertainty on intra-regional trade and investment. Other reasons for creating a monetary union are to promote price stability and to save on the use of scarce foreign exchange.

The literature on the desirable extent of a monetary union suggests that the benefits from such a union will be greatest when:

- labour and capital mobility among member countries is high;

...there is growing interest in currency convertibility among SADC member countries themselves which offers a rare opportunity for monetary harmonisation.

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Seychelles	-7.1	0.5	-1.5	5.8	9.9	8.1
South Africa	1 170.0	1 042.0	556.0	2 432.0	1 772.0	228.0
Swaziland	12.5	-0.3	0.7	0.4	41.5	-25.9
Tanzania	0.2	-1.4	6.7	22.9	-23.5	2.6
Total	1 154.9	-972.1	634.4	2 486.6	1 761.7	315.5

Source: International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics* (various issues).

There may be a foreign exchange gain from selling existing public enterprises to foreign investors which can be used to promote intra-SADC investment.

Clustering may help to reduce unit costs by creating a common pool of skilled labour, of specialised input suppliers and of specialised markets.

Intra-SADC investment has also benefited and is poised to benefit further from institutions that have been adopted at regional (and national) level. These include:

- The strategic use of privatisation as a vehicle for mobilising domestic and foreign capital. There may be a foreign exchange gain from selling existing public enterprises to foreign investors which can be used to promote intra-SADC investment. If the enterprises are sold to domestic investors, then resources for intra-SADC investment may not be generated.
- Harmonising investment laws and regulations as planned by FISCO.
- Specific initiatives such as the African Development Bank–European Community–World Bank cross-border initiative which targets financial and technical aid to those countries that adopt liberalisation measures to promote intra-regional trade and facilitate payments and cross-border investment.
- Regional special development initiatives which offer a vehicle to attract intra-SADC and foreign investment (see Box 4.1). Regional special development initiatives involve both public and private sectors in promoting development. They are concerned with the rehabilitation or construction of transport and other infrastructure as well as with the development of other sectors, typically along development corridors. By locating in a particular corridor or clustering, geographical and sectoral concentration of firms enable them to reduce unit costs, a phenomenon that is referred to as external economies. Clustering may help to reduce unit costs by creating a common pool of skilled labour, of specialised input suppliers and of specialised markets. Clustering may also help to reduce unit costs by facilitating the sharing of know-how and ideas.

Box 4.2 Regional spatial development initiatives

As of mid-1999, regional spatial development initiatives identified for development included the following:

Tazara Development Corridor (Tanzania-Zambia)

Following the route of the existing Tazara railway, this corridor extends from the port of Dar-es-Salaam to Lusaka. The project is likely to involve substantial new investment into the rail and road routes, and possible future links into the rail and road network of the Nacala Corridor for access to the port of Nacala. Concessioning of aspects of Tazara (which is jointly owned by the two countries) is in the early stages of consideration. In early 1999, negotiations between the Tanzania government and DTI were opened around co-operation in the development of the Tazara spatial development initiative. A memo of understanding was signed between the two governments and a technical team from the spatial development initiative project was to carry out initial survey work in Tanzania in mid-1999.

Nacala Development Corridor (Malawi-Mozambique)

Progress is being made in the development of this transport-based corridor which links Nacala's naturally deep port with Malawi. A memo of understanding between the two governments is currently at an advanced stage of preparation. A large part of the rail route has been repaired, with only 77km of unrehabilitated track remaining. Concessioning of the rail line, services and port operations has

been completed on the Mozambique side of the border (Nacala-Entre Lagos); a decision and awarding of a tender is expected soon for the Malawi section of the rail line. The improvement of the Nacala transport line offers large benefits for Malawi, which currently exports most of its goods via the distant ports of Dar-es-Salaam and Durban.

Beira Development Corridor (Mozambique-Zimbabwe)

The transport route between Beira and Harare was one of the first partially rehabilitated in the 1980s, as a result of efforts to build alternatives to apartheid South Africa's transport and freight routes. In the 1990s the idea of developing the route was revived. Mozambique and Zimbabwe have each appointed national co-ordinators to guide the development of the project, and a memo of understanding is in the final drafting stages. The regional spatial development initiative programme has begun to identify potential investment projects but the hiring of a project manager and full-scale promotional activities await a final agreement between the two governments involved. Meanwhile, operations at the port of Beira were concessioned in late 1998, with a Dutch venture winning the bid.

Mozambique Zambezi River Development Initiative (Mozambique)

A large development area in the Mozambique Zambezi river basin has been identified and given special priority status by government. A special committee made up of ministers now back the concept and in 1998 an

independent planning and 'think tank' unit, GPZ (Zambezi Planning Authority) was established in Maputo. Initial project identification has begun with help from DTI through a survey and a conceptual workshop in December 1998. A tender is being prepared for a manager of the project but a formal agreement on the spatial development initiative has yet to be signed by the Mozambique government.

Maputo Development Corridor (Mozambique-South Africa)

The Maputo Corridor, linking Gauteng with the port of Maputo, is the most advanced of all regional development corridors. Work on the road link began in 1997 and is centred on a toll road between Witbank and Maputo. Parts of the port in Maputo, notably the container terminal, has been concessioned, and final negotiations on the main docks at the port are continuing with a preferred bidder. Development of the rail link has been less rapid and a decision remains to be made on the concessioning of the crucial Maputo-Pessano Garcia line in Mozambique. An initial investment conference which focused on the corridor was held in 1997.

East Coast Corridor (Namibia, Botswana, South Africa, Swaziland, Mozambique)

This corridor is really a collection of development corridors and spatial development initiatives, including the Walvis Bay Corridor, the Maputo Corridor and the envisaged Platinum spatial development initiative (which is centred on the



Rustenburg–Jwaneng route). The completion of the Trans–Kalahari highway, continuing progress on the Maputo Corridor and advances made in planning the Platinum spatial development initiative, point to likely future interest of the coast-to-coast concept.

Walvis Bay Development Corridor (Botswana–Namibia)

Likely to be the next functioning corridor within the regional spatial development initiative, the corridor which links Walvis Bay with Windhoek has been accepted in principle by the Namibian government. A formal agreement has yet to be signed but a project manager is being sought in the meantime. The focus of investment promotion on this corridor will be mining and tourism and it is likely that Austrian assistance will include specialist consulting and advice on the prospects and modalities of desert tourism. A consortium of prominent Namibian business figures is understood to be examining transport investment opportunities on this and other major routes in the country.

Malange Development Corridor (Angola)

Connecting Malange with Luanda, the development of the Malange Corridor, like other projects in Angola, has been severely disrupted by the continuing political and military conflict in the country.

Beira Development Corridor (Zimbabwe–Angola–Mozambique)

Linking the port of Benguela, via the Benguela rail route, to the southern Democratic Republic of Congo, the Zambian Copperbelt

and city of Lusaka, this corridor follows an old route that eventually fell into disservice as a result of military and political conflicts in the region. The rail routes are no longer functioning but they present large potential for freighting, particularly for the Zambian mining and agricultural industry, and the Democratic Republic of Congo mining sector. Development of the concept is pending given the security situation along much of the route. Some work has been done, with assistance from SATCC-TC in identifying investment prospects and infrastructure needs along the route.

Namibe Development Corridor (Angola)

This Development Corridor stretches from the interior city of Menongue to the port of Namibe. Progress has been disrupted by the continuing conflict in Angola.

Okavango–Limpopo Development Initiative (Botswana, Angola, Zimbabwe and Zambia)

This is a cross-border zone with enormous tourism potential. Conceptualisation is at an early stage. In early 1999 a spatial development initiative — commissioned study was to be undertaken, with the agreement of the governments of Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, for the rapid scanning of investment potential for the initiative. The study will focus on tourism, and issues related to the common management of the natural resources in the area.

In addition, the following South African spatial development initiative projects include regional components:

Lusaka–Durban–Maputo/Mozambique

Work is continuing on this tourism and agriculture-focused initiative, launched in 1998 by the three respective heads of state. This includes the construction of a new road linking Maputo with Durban which among other benefits will provide access to unique ecological tourism opportunities. Road construction has started on the South African side of the border and road design is in its final stages on the Mozambican side. Preparations are in progress for holding an investment conference for the initiative.

Phalaborwa–Mpumalanga

This initiative includes establishing an improved transport link between the Mozambican border on one hand and the mining and industrial area of Phalaborwa in Mpumalanga, and agricultural activity around Xenon in South Africa's Northern Province, on the other. This route links with the Maputo Corridor and terminates at the national boundary.

Rustenburg–Jwaneng–Maputo

The primary focus of this initiative is mineral and industrial projects in the Rustenburg–Jwaneng region, an area of large-scale platinum mining.



- economies within the monetary union are open and there is a high volume of trade between them;
- co-operating economies have a diversified economic and export base which obviates the need for exchange rate flexibility; and, among other things,
- nominal wage and price flexibility is considerable.

SADC has made progress towards satisfying these conditions:

- the proportion of intra-regional trade to external trade has increased;
- there has been some diversification of the structure of production;
- capital and skilled labour have become more mobile; and
- nominal wage and price flexibility are considerable.

All these factors would facilitate the operation of a monetary union.

The argument that economic stability and real (per capita GDP) and nominal (inflation and interest rates) convergence are prerequisites for monetary union is sterile, implying that the latter is viable before these conditions are met. There are three grounds for saying so. First, free movement of goods and services in the absence of exchange risk will tend to promote equalisation of factor prices and per capita output. In other words, monetary integration will make real convergence possible. Secondly, in the long run, monetary integration will promote convergence of inflation and interest rates through harmonisation of monetary policies. Thirdly, harmonisation of monetary and fiscal policies should result in price stability.

The options before SADC are:

- Full monetary union, comprising the following elements:
 - Use of a common currency or, if there are several currencies, a permanently and rigidly fixed exchange rate relationship between the various currencies;
 - Common monetary and fiscal policies to ensure collective control over the rate of creation of money and the expansion of government debt;
 - Joint management of the common pool of foreign exchange reserves, external debt and exchange rate policy;
 - A regional monetary authority or central bank in the case of a common currency which is the sole issuer of the common currency;
 - Harmonisation of domestic credit policy achieved by imposing maximum credit ceilings. The allocation and distribution of credit between sectors would be retained by national monetary authorities;
 - A common development bank to finance regional and national projects to assist in the integration process and reduce economic disparities between SADC member countries.
- Limited currency convertibility, which would entail:
 - Acceptance of each other's currency in all transactions;
 - Establishing a convertibility arrangement that would permit exchange and unrestricted use of regional currencies;
 - Member states maintaining their separate currencies and foreign exchange reserves;
 - Member states maintaining exchange rates that are near their equilibrium level; and

- Member states pursuing separate macroeconomic policies but committing themselves to reducing inflation rates, cutting budget deficits and growth of money supply to acceptable levels.
- Fixed exchange rate union which would entail:
 - Fixing exchange rates within defined fluctuation bands;
 - Pooling a certain percentage of member countries' foreign exchange reserves;
 - Co-ordinating monetary and fiscal policies;
 - Establishing a regional monetary authority to manage pooled reserves, the fixed exchange rate system, and to co-ordinate monetary and fiscal policies;
 - Member states maintaining their separate currencies; and
 - Designating a currency in which the pooled reserves would be kept.

However, forming a monetary union is resisted by some SADC member states, especially those with relatively strong economies, on the grounds that it may be costly for them. There are those who insist that a monetary union, including the adoption of a common currency, may lead to loss of national sovereignty over the conduct of monetary policies. For instance, countries may lose control over exchange rates and interest rates which may, in turn, worsen their economic position. Others may not accept the pooling of foreign exchange reserves since this may imply subsidising the poorer members of a union. So each country should maintain the powers of the Central Bank over monetary policy.

Another argument against forming a monetary union hinges on the need for policy co-ordination and macroeconomic convergence. Some insist that since the region has not yet attained macroeconomic convergence, the monetary union would not be effective. However, others argue that lack of convergence need not delay forming a union since it can be attained through better policy coordination.

IV Translating opportunities into benefits

*...deep integration
refers to eliminating
both border restrictions
and constraints that
operate within
countries*

For SADC to seize the various opportunities, we need to replace shallow integration with deep integration. Shallow integration refers to eliminating border restrictions such as tariffs and quotas, leaving internal barriers intact. The SADC Trade Protocol is an example of shallow integration. As we have stated, the benefits of this trade protocol to the sub-region will be quite modest. On the other hand, deep integration refers to eliminating both border restrictions and constraints that operate within countries, such as monopolies, taxation, investment licensing and regulations, financial controls, health and phyto-sanitary rules. For deep integration to succeed, there must be:

- strong and sustained political will and commitment;
- effective mechanisms to distribute more equitably the costs and benefits of integration. Many believe that fiscal transfers do not work and do nothing to promote economic development, while compensation schemes usually lack adequate resources to have any real impact. Greater factor mobility is seen as a more effective means of equalising the distribution of costs and benefits;
- regional trade liberalisation as a complement to overall trade liberalisation;
- macroeconomic stability: instability slows or even reverses the integration process;

To demonstrate unequivocal political will and commitment, SADC will need to go beyond Pan-Africanism to the pooling of sovereignty.

- Structural flexibility: structural rigidities, often the result of import-substitution-industrialisation, reduce the potential gains from integration;
- Design of better arrangements — involving the inclusion of virtually all trade in goods and services, removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to intra-regional trade and including provisions covering investment; and
- Overall welfare gains as national policies (for example, the rand exchange rate or South Africa's labour policy) are modified with regional repercussions in mind.

To demonstrate unequivocal political will and commitment, SADC will need to go beyond Pan-Africanism to the pooling of sovereignty. This will require member states to give up a part of their sovereignty and agree that this will be written into law. As it stands now, the SADC Treaty is narrow as it does not provide specific rules on give and take.

Unequivocal political will and commitment will also require transforming SADC at three levels, at the level of the organisation's:

- 1 institutional framework to emphasise a transition towards a rule-based supra-nationalism;
- 2 technical capacity to empower the SADC secretariat; and
- 3 programme of action which needs to transcend sectoral co-ordination to a strategic prioritisation of key areas for deep integration.

Sectoral co-ordination could reinforce the conflict between national interest and supra-nationalism and in the process inhibit progress towards deep integration. So we need to consider moving towards establishing issue-based commissions at the centre funded by member states with technical back-up provided by regional experts. This requires institutional reform that will balance the current decentralised system of regional integration with a strong centre that is able to establish binding rules and procedures and to implement major decisions and policies efficiently and effectively. Basically it is linked to the need to enhance the institutional capacity of the SADC secretariat to build a firm foundation for supra-nationalism.

The principle of variable geometry may be usefully applied as SADC tries to promote deep integration. This principle is essentially pragmatic and incremental; it allows integration to proceed on the basis of progressive steps; permits smaller sub-groups to move faster than the whole group and provides for many decisions to be made by majority rather than consensus. If accepted, the principle of variable geometry could, for example, permit SACU and CMA to exist as sub-groups of SADC, allowing other member countries to join as they qualify to do so.

Strengthening linkages and co-ordinating activities among regional integration blocs will reinforce the political will and commitment needed for regional integration within the spirit of Pan-Africanism

At the broader continental level, SADC will need to develop stronger strategic linkages with other regional integration blocs, particularly the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African States (COMESA). The tense relations that have beset these two organisations over the years are costly to both and can hamper efforts towards deep integration in SADC itself. Strengthening linkages and co-ordinating activities among regional integration blocs will reinforce the political will and commitment needed for regional integration within the spirit of Pan-Africanism as defined in the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the principles of the African Economic Community (AEC). Furthermore, these inter-regional bloc linkages and co-ordination will enhance SADC's capacity to exploit opportunities presented by globalisation and at the same time to avert the adverse effects of this global change.

Lowering regional trade barriers and increasing intra-regional currency convertibility... would encourage the absorption of parallel market activity into the official economy and improve the availability of hard currency.

Among the possible benefits of deep integration to SADC are:

- efficiency gains — from an enlarged market, reduced market distortions and lower transaction costs. Efficiency gains usually occur to the private sector as a result of market-based trade liberalisation;
- scale gains — cost savings on major projects realised through regionally co-ordinated investments and operations, especially in energy, transport, health care and education;
- acceleration of the process of structural adjustment: through stimulation of supply side responses in Southern African economies;
- attracting more foreign direct investment;
- increasing competitiveness in the operation of regional firms;
- lowering regional trade barriers and increasing intra-regional currency convertibility which would encourage the absorption of parallel market activity into the official economy and improve the availability of hard currency.

The future of SADC

I Overview

...the level of human development in the SADC sub-region was lower in 1998 than in 1995

The analysis in this report has shown that the level of human development in the SADC sub-region was lower in 1998 than in 1995, reflecting a decline in all components of the Human Development Index; namely, life expectancy, adult literacy, combined gross enrolment ratio and per capita GDP. Furthermore, as in 1995, in 1998 the level of human development in SADC was higher than that of sub-Saharan Africa but lower than that of South Asia, East Asia, the average for developing countries and for the entire world. Meanwhile, intra-regional trade has increased significantly. Intra-SADC investment and legal intra-SADC migration are still relatively small. Similarly, little progress has been made towards political or social integration.

This closing chapter will do two things. First, it will highlight the main findings of this study. Secondly, it will examine policy issues related to improving human development and deepening regional integration in SADC.

II Human development

Achievements and setbacks in human resource development

...the level of human development in the SADC sub-region was lower in 1998 than in 1995

Between 1980 and 1995, there was a marked improvement in the SADC gross combined enrolment ratio at primary, secondary and tertiary levels which rose from 38 per cent to 51.8 per cent. However, by 1998, this ratio had fallen marginally to 51.14 per cent. Among individual countries, the gross combined enrolment ratio increased in Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. But it decreased in Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique and Tanzania.

Reflecting gains in the combined gross enrolment ratio, SADC achieved high rates of adult literacy until 1995. Between 1970 and 1995, for example, the adult literacy rate increased by 23 percentage points from 48 per cent to 71 per cent. And while there was only one country with an adult literacy rate above 70 per cent in 1970 by 1995 this had increased to nine. Partly owing to setbacks in the combined gross enrolment ratio, the average SADC adult literacy rate was down to 67.32 per cent by 1998.

The challenge for SADC is to arrest the decline in the combined gross enrolment ratio and in the adult literacy rate. The 1998 *SADC Regional Human Development Report* recommended that SADC should use the education protocol to actively intervene in the process of educational reform in the sub-region. In particular, the report recommended that SADC should set uniform targets for gross enrolment at all levels and assist member states to achieve them. In light of the decline in resources in real terms, cost-effective ways of delivering education services must be sought and cost-sharing should be encouraged. Joint procurement of school materials to cut costs should also be encouraged.

Further decline in life expectancy


...the level of human development in the SADC sub-region was lower in 1998 than in 1995

In 1995, SADC life expectancy was 52 years. Life expectancy in the same year ranged from 41 years in Malawi to 72 years in Seychelles, representing a spread of 31 years. By 1998 SADC life expectancy had decreased to 48.6 years. The range was from 39.5 years in Malawi to 71.6 years in Mauritius, representing a slightly wider spread of 32 years. The decline in life expectancy between 1995 and 1998 occurred in all countries except Mauritius and Swaziland.

The declining trend in life expectancy was largely due to the AIDS pandemic. This has exacerbated the process of decline already experienced through inadequate resource allocation for health. Between 1995 and 1997, for example, the number of AIDS cases increased from 33 to 174 cases per 100 000 people in the SADC sub-region. Since 1997, the

number of AIDS cases has continued to escalate, with four countries having infection rates higher than 400 per 100 000 people. To address this problem, SADC has adopted a multi-sectoral approach which looks at the issue not as a health problem per se but as an emergency development problem. The challenge for SADC member states is to allocate adequate resources not only for public awareness to combat the threat but also for planning and research activities.

Infant mortality continues to fall



After declining from 113 in 1970 to 59 in 1996, the average infant mortality rate in the SADC fell further to 54 in 1998. The continuing decline in the SADC infant mortality rate was due to improvements in the general health and nutrition of the population and in the education of women. However, the infant mortality rate remained high in Malawi and Zambia due to poverty; in Mozambique due to poverty and the low education status of women; in Angola due to the low education status of women and disruptions to normal life caused by the civil war; and in the Democratic Republic of Congo due to disruptions caused by the civil war. Reducing poverty in Malawi and Zambia and improving the education status of women in Angola and Mozambique are important policy issues. While ending civil wars in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo is a major challenge for these countries and the entire SADC sub-region.

Gender gap is narrowing but still wide

SADC has set a target for women of 30 per cent representation in political and decision-making structures by 2005.

The institutional machinery, the policies and the programmes which member states have put in place to promote gender equality have begun to pay off. Between 1995 and 1997, for example, there was an improvement in economic and political participation and decision making as shown by the fact that the Gender Empowerment Measure increased by 33.28 per cent. Women improved their incomes relative to those of men. Women also suffered a smaller reduction in their literacy rate than men, 5.1 per cent against 8.26 per cent. However, their literacy rate was 80 per cent of that of men. Women also constituted only 44 per cent of the labour force, although they constituted more than 50 per cent of the population, and experienced a higher rate of unemployment than men.

SADC has set a target for women of 30 per cent representation in political and decision-making structures by 2005. So far only South Africa has made adequate progress towards achieving this target. Mozambique has done relatively well in the participation of women in parliament, which is currently at 28.4 per cent. The challenge for SADC is to find a way of enforcing this decision

Economic achievements and setbacks

Between 1991 and 1994, the annual rate of economic growth in SADC averaged -0.03 per cent. Towards the end of the 1990s, the rate of economic growth increased, averaging 2.6 per cent between 1995 and 1998. But, in the absence of a redistribution of growth in favour of the poor, this was not enough to prevent the incidence of income poverty from rising. The challenge is to increase the rate of economic growth to 5 per cent to prevent poverty from rising or to at least 6 per cent to reduce poverty.

Available data indicate that the rate of growth of formal sector employment has recently fallen short of the rate of economic growth. So formal sector employment growth cannot be substantial until output growth accelerates. The rate of growth of formal sector employment has


The challenge is to make economic growth more job-creating by developing labour intensive sectors and by expanding vocational and technical training



Poverty and inequality

Poverty is a major constraint on human development in SADC

The challenge in SADC is to reduce poverty and improve the distribution of income



also fallen short of the rate of growth of the labour force. This has a number of implications. First, many new labour force entrants are absorbed in low productivity small-scale agriculture or informal activities. Improving productivity in these sectors is essential for output growth, for the adequacy of household incomes to meet basic needs and for meaningful increases in employment. Other new labour force entrants are absorbed in open unemployment. The challenge is to make economic growth more job-creating by developing labour intensive sectors and by expanding vocational and technical training, among other measures.

The SADC sub-region has also suffered from economic instability, characterised by:

- rising budget deficits which have led to deficit financing;
- high rates of inflation which have eroded incomes and government revenue and discouraged investment;
- rising balance of payments deficits; and
- high external public debt service burdens.

SADC countries need to reduce budget deficits, inflation, balance of payments deficits and external public debts, and create a belief that these will remain relatively low and stable. In addition, they need to reduce exchange rate instability. Acting individually, it may take a long time for some SADC countries to achieve macroeconomic stability. SADC can help them to speed up restoration of macroeconomic stability by co-ordinating their fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies.

Income poverty affects about one-third of the SADC population. Poverty is normally but not only prevalent among large households, households headed by people with low levels of education, female-headed households, rural or agricultural households, households headed by old people, households without access to productive resources and households that are located far from major services. Poverty is a major constraint to human development in SADC. By constraining savings, poverty limits the rate of domestic investment and hence the rate of growth per capita GDP. And since poverty limits the access of poor people to education and health services, it also retards improvement in these aspects of human development.

A related problem is inequality in the distribution of income, both between and within the countries. The sub-region as a whole has one of the most unequal distributions of income in the world, ranging from a gini coefficient of 0.46 in Seychelles to 0.70 in Namibia. Inequalities in income reflect inequalities in ownership distribution of land and other assets and in access to resources in general.

Like poverty, inequality in income distribution can undermine political stability. Inequality in the distribution of income can also serve as a constraint to human development. Among other things, extreme inequality in the distribution of income implies that many people are denied economic opportunities and that a few people are better off. Furthermore, given the high degree of income inequality, most of the resources are allocated to the production of goods and services of interest to these few, thus resulting in inequality in real income distribution and impairing employment creation as well, since luxury and semi-luxury goods which are produced are relatively capital intensive. The challenge in SADC is to reduce poverty and income inequality through policies designed to change relative factor prices, redistribution of asset ownership, taxation of income and wealth and through direct transfer payments and public provision of goods and services for the benefit of the poor.

The SADC region continues to confront a number of armed conflicts

Armed conflicts

such as those in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In the past armed conflicts were largely internal and had to do with armed struggles for political liberation and the fight against apartheid and racism. The long period of liberation wars and military destabilisation encouraged the growth of the arms trade and the formation of armed groups which further undermined regional security. Currently, the region is living in the aftermath of conflicts inspired by external interests and the residual effects of the destabilisation policies of apartheid South Africa. Another cause of post-independence armed conflicts is the failure of the nation-state-in-the-making. Basically these conflicts are internal in character but they are spreading across borders and threatening to engulf the sub-region.

The 1998 Regional Human Development Report alluded to the fact that defence expenditure exceeded health expenditure and that it was a significant proportion of education and health expenditure combined. That situation remains unchanged. In terms of defence spending as a percentage of GDP, the leading military spenders in 1998 were Angola (14.9 per cent), Mozambique (4.2 per cent), Botswana (3.5 per cent), Lesotho (3.2 per cent), Namibia (2.6 per cent) and Zimbabwe (2.6 per cent); and, in terms of numbers of soldiers, there has been a marked expansion in defence forces in Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia.

Military expenditure, the mining of land and the destruction of life and property in armed conflicts impose enormous opportunity costs in terms of foregone economic and social activities. In other words, armed conflicts divert resources away from peace-time activities, leading to a reduction in output of goods and services, civilian employment, income and exports and so on. Ultimately, therefore, armed conflicts undermine human development as well as development integration.

Continuing armed conflicts despite efforts to resolve them implies that resolution of these crises is a daunting task. The conflicts are proving difficult to resolve because of the increasing number of actors involved, the ease with which the actors obtain arms and the personal interests of the warring parties. Failure to resolve conflicts also implies that existing security arrangements in the region are not adequate for the task. In particular, the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security lacks the human and material capacity to prevent and deal with conflicts in the sub-region.

*...armed conflicts
divert resources away
from peace-time
activities*

Migration, displaced populations and refugees

One consequence of armed conflicts in Southern Africa has been the exodus of people into neighbouring countries as political refugees and internal displacement of people. For several decades, the SADC region was host to over two million refugees and a much larger number of internally displaced people. With a decrease in the number of armed conflicts, the number of refugees and displaced people has declined markedly, except in Tanzania due to the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region and the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Zambia due to the Angolan and Congo conflicts. Like armed conflicts, refugees and displaced people are associated with enormous opportunity costs which undermine the ability of host countries to promote development.

*...refugees and
displaced people are
associated with
enormous opportunity
costs*

In a number of countries in the sub-region, there is permanent displacement of indigenous people due to discriminatory land policies pursued by the former apartheid regime in South Africa and former colonial governments in Namibia, Zimbabwe and other countries. This displacement has created inequality in the distribution of land which is one of the



Transnational crime,
small arms and drug
trafficking

major causes of poverty and underdevelopment. For this reason, it is imperative that land must be redistributed equitably in the countries affected.

Orderly and planned migration for unskilled and semi-skilled labour to meet specific needs can be beneficial to both sending and receiving countries. The orderly and planned migration of qualified human resources could also be beneficial. At present labour migration is a challenge in the region because it is neither planned nor orderly. There is a lot of illegal migration of unskilled and semi-skilled labour in search of non-existent jobs. This migration imposes opportunity costs on both the sending and the receiving countries. Although beneficial to receiving countries, the exodus of trained human resources undermines the ability of sending countries to promote their own development. In light of these problems, it would be helpful if SADC could develop a mechanism to facilitate and manage the movement of labour in the region.

Transnational crime, which includes car-jacking, fraud associated with money laundering, transfer pricing, small arms and drug trafficking, is a serious problem in the region. Among other things, crime has a negative influence on investment confidence, on production and on other aspects of the economy, including development integration. Crime contributes to the loss of human and physical capital and crime can lead to violence.

Transnational crime, small arms and drug trafficking are related problems. They owe their origin to past wars of liberation and to illegal migration, urbanisation, increasing openness of national economies due to globalisation as well as rising levels of poverty and deprivation. Many governments are ill-equipped to deal with the magnitude and sophistication of transnational crime, small arms and drug-trafficking on their own. At the regional level, the Protocol on Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking in SADC is operational. But there are no agreements covering small arms or other forms of transnational crime. The Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation is playing a useful role in combating transnational crime but is constrained by inadequate resources.

III Regional integration Trade and investment

The analysis in this report has shown that Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana and Namibia have higher intra-SADC trade ratios than other member countries. All four countries share borders with South Africa, the dominant economy in the sub-region. However, closeness to a rich neighbour is not the main explanation as illustrated by the fact that Mozambique and Zimbabwe which also share borders with South Africa have relatively low intra-SADC trade ratios. Membership of the Southern African Customs Union and (with the exception of Botswana) of the Common Monetary Area appears to be only a minor explanation also. The main explanation is the small population and hence small market size of these countries which implies that a larger proportion of their domestic output is exported and a larger proportion of their consumption is satisfied through imports. But for this factor, their intra-SADC trade ratios would not be so high. The general picture then is one of a region where trade integration is comparatively low.

The report has noted the efforts that have been made in SADC to develop trade by improving infrastructure, rehabilitating existing industrial facilities and diversifying and restructuring manufacturing activities. These efforts to develop trade in SADC have been undermined by importation of cheaper competing products and by the domestic and for-

... liberalisation has opened up the South African market to third countries and so has eroded the preferences that South Africa extended to other SADC countries

... liberalisation also leaves out many non-tariff barriers



eign input cost raising effects of currency depreciations and other factors.

With regard to trade facilitation, tariffs on intra-SADC imports are relatively low. This is due to unilateral tariff liberalisation programmes implemented by the economically weaker countries in the context of structural adjustment programmes. In 1995, for example, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia had the lowest levels of tariffs. On the other hand, Mauritius, the Southern African Customs Union and Zimbabwe had relatively high tariffs. Multilaterally, SADC countries are involved in reducing tariffs and simplifying their complicated tariff systems. As a more developed country, South Africa has undertaken significant trade liberalisation under the World Trade Organisation. This liberalisation has opened up the South African market to third countries and so has eroded the preferences that South Africa extended to other SADC countries through bilateral trade agreements or is about to extend to them through the SADC Trade Protocol.

The scope for trade liberalisation under unilateral, bilateral and multilateral arrangements has been limited, hence many trade barriers have remained or will remain. Structural adjustment programmes have emphasised external liberalisation, involving replacing quota restrictions with reduced tariffs, abolishing import and export licensing requirements and liberalising exchange controls and so on. The first trade negotiations held under the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the forerunner of the World Trade Organisation, dealt mainly with tariff reduction. Other areas, such as anti-dumping and non-tariff measures were added later. But most of these measures do not deal with matters of interest to intra-regional trade. The scope of bilateral trade liberalisation also leaves out many non-tariff barriers.

Non-tariff barriers still occurring in the region and not covered by the liberalisation arrangements described above include:

- Communication problems
- Customs procedures
- Transport bottlenecks
- Lack of market information
- Other border procedures
- Trade finance
- Foreign exchange availability
- Levies
- Other border charges
- Customs charges
- Quota restrictions
- Domestic content requirements

These and other non-tariff barriers are believed to be more important barriers to intra-regional trade than tariff barriers. For this reason, serious efforts should be made to eliminate them and an appropriate machinery should be established to monitor compliance, keeping in mind the fact that new non-tariff barriers come up all the time.

Promoting closer trade relations will also require:

- eliminating constraints that operate within countries, such as industrial and environmental standards, government procurement rules and health and phyto-sanitary regulations;
- institutions to make rules about all aspects of trade policy and to enforce them;
- co-ordinating monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy to create macroeconomic stability;

- monetary harmonisation, involving currency convertibility or a fixed exchange rate union or full monetary union with a single currency and a common central bank; and
- a regional trade and development bank.

In the context of the trade protocol, SADC itself has identified only a handful of core non-tariff barriers which it intends to eliminate. These are quantitative restrictions (quotas), surcharges on imports, customs and other trade restricting procedures and export subsidies. Certain non-tariff barriers, such as rules of origin and anti-dumping are permitted under the trade protocol.

The challenge for the region is to increase cross-border investment by further liberalising the movement of capital where barriers still exist.

Concerning investment, the analysis in the report has shown that Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia have higher intra-SADC investment ratios than other SADC member states, with Botswana not far off from these three countries. However, the general picture is one of a region where investment integration is comparatively low. The challenge for the region is to increase intra-SADC investment by further liberalising the movement of capital where barriers still exist. These barriers include restrictions on the type of sectors in which foreigners can invest, on the proportion of shares that they can buy in companies, on purchase of foreign government securities, on investment abroad and on contraction of loans abroad.

Deepening integration in SADC is contingent upon expansion in the productive capacity of the sub-region. Apart from encouraging intra-SADC investment which has been explained, this requires increasing the overall rate of investment through higher levels of domestic savings and foreign capital inflows.

Improving human resources and infrastructure

Improving the capability of human resources by acquiring skills and reducing infrastructure constraints are other prerequisites for deep integration. Among other measures, these require:

- joint procurement of medical, educational and other supplies;
- collaboration in the provision of certain health, education and training services;
- effective co-ordination of regional infrastructure development; and
- regional integration of utilities, transport and communications, including television and radio systems.

The institutional framework

The 1992 Windhoek treaty that transformed SADCC (a development co-ordination organisation) into SADC (a development integration organisation) reflected a new commitment to deep integration by member states. Among other things, it was envisaged that deep integration would depend on the extent of national and regional institutions with adequate competence and capacity to stimulate and efficiently and effectively manage the complex process of integration. It would also depend on the willingness of member states to cede some of their decision-making powers to the regional body. In addition, deep integration would require mechanisms that could achieve the high level of political commitment to direct the process of integration. Strengthening the powers and capacity of regional decision-making, co-ordinating and executing bodies is one way of enhancing political commitment.

The SADC secretariat

The SADC secretariat is the principal executive institution of SADC and is headed by the executive secretary. It is responsible for strategic planning and management of SADC programmes; implementing decisions made by the Summit of Heads of State and Government and the Council of Ministers; organising and managing SADC meetings; and administering the community generally. So essentially its role is administrative. It lacks the power and authority to take decisions on behalf of member states. For the amount of work that it is mandated to do, the secretariat is relatively small. Moreover, the conditions of service are not good enough to attract highly trained personnel. This weakness of the SADC secretariat is believed to be partly responsible for the slow progress towards deep integration.

In the light of this, all divisions of the SADC secretariat need strengthening through improved personnel conditions. The secretariat itself needs some autonomy from other SADC structures to ensure a supra-national framework capable of determining the form and content of the regional programme. In order for the secretariat to be accorded more power and authority over the regional integration process, the status of the executive secretary will need upgrading

Sector co-ordinating units

Sector co-ordinating units are key structures in the organisational set-up of SADC. They are responsible for formulating sectorial policies, strategies and programmes. They are also responsible for designing, implementing and monitoring projects. In this regard, their performance has varied quite a lot from one sector co-ordinating unit to another. Often, the various actors in these structures have no clear line of authority and accountability, in implementing regional programmes. The staff are subject to different traditions, management and administrative procedures and performance criteria. And not too infrequently there is inadequate provision of staff and other resources to co-ordinate and manage the regional programme, leading to inequitable distribution of responsibilities and obligations to the organisation (Mandaza and Tostensen, 1994).

Sector co-ordinating units suffer from many other weaknesses. We shall mention only two here. First, the sector co-ordinating unit structure promotes sectoral activities that are national rather than regional in character. Secondly, establishing sector co-ordinating units within national governments has not prevented their unchecked growth and has promoted an increase in the number of sectors which works against integration and has led to a lack of focus. In the light of these limitations, we admit that sector co-ordinating units are not appropriate structures for promoting deep integration in SADC.

Establishing commissions instead of sector co-ordinating units in some sectors has avoided most of the problems stated above. Regional funding of commissions is through contributions of member states while their staff of experts is drawn from the region. However, the expense involved is high. Hence, it is not feasible to run all sector co-ordinating units as commissions at present. So SADC must consider alternative, hopefully more cost-effective, options.

One such option worth reconsidering was proposed by the Review and Rationalisation of the SADC Programme of Action Study in 1997. This study proposed setting up five planning and co-ordination directorates, as follows:

- 1 Human resource development, science and technology;
- 2 Agriculture, natural resources and environment;

- 3 Infrastructure, communications and information technology;
- 4 Trade, industry, investment and finance;
- 5 Community development, culture and information.

Between them, these directorates would cover the work of all existing sector co-ordinating units and commissions. As proposed, they would:

- be funded by regional resources;
- be staffed by professionals drawn from the region;
- have task-bound and time-bound arrangements with SADC;
- have strategies bound by the SADC strategic areas of co-operation and protocols; and
- carry out functions which include regional project initiation, co-ordination, monitoring and policy advisory role to the Standing Committee of Officials and the Council of Ministers.

The SADC Programme of Action

SADC has 18 sectors, which is large. These sectors are involved in nearly 400 projects with their attendant objectives and strategies. The size of the SADC Programme of Action exceeds the capacity of the organisation to manage it. Given limited financial and human resources, can SADC sustain such a large number of sectors, sectoral objectives, strategies and projects? While all sectors are important to the development of the sub-region, SADC needs to review their relevance to regional integration. SADC also needs to prioritise its sectors with more focus on those where deep economic, political and social integration will promote human development, such as health, human resources development, trade and industry, investment and finance, politics, defence and security, and information, culture and sports. The large number of objectives, strategies and projects can also be addressed by prioritising with emphasis on those that are catalytic to deep integration for human development, are consistent with the aims and objectives of SADC and are genuinely regional in content.

Globalisation

For SADC, globalisation has created new opportunities in the form of trade investment, finance and new technology. But at the same time it has thrown up new challenges, such as competition and the threat of marginalisation. For this reason it has been suggested that developing countries should delink from the world capitalist system. According to this suggestion, delinking is not autarky. Rather, it is a strategy which subordinates external relations to the logic of internal development, as opposed to structural adjustment policies which demand grafting internal development to the possibilities offered by the world capitalist system. Any discussion of opportunities under globalisation must be deeply rooted in the analysis of these two broad strategic choices. This is even more necessary in the SADC situation where the economies of the region are relatively unequal with significant elements of dominance and uneven exposure and vulnerability to the impact of globalisation. The real issue for SADC is not to choose the one or the other of the two strategies. Rather, it is to find a prudent combination which minimises the risks of both globalisation and selective delinking while maximising the benefits from both. In specific terms, the questions are:

- How can integration strengthen the regional economy and prepare it for global competition?

- How can globalisation strengthen the economies of member states and prepare them for regional competition?
- How can integration save SADC from marginalisation in the world economy?

- SADC needs to adopt strategic integration

So far regional integration in Southern Africa has been approached as a matter of choice rather than necessity. Accordingly, assumptions of mutual gain or mutual affection have dominated the rationale for integration. Rarely do perceptions of external threats to the sub-region enter the debate. One such threat is globalisation. For SADC to exploit the opportunities offered by globalisation, it must not only integrate the economies of member states but also stimulate their largely dormant markets on the basis of a regional division of labour designed to produce primarily for the regional market. This requires a regionally inward looking or closed liberalisation strategy. This strategy is also the only way of counteracting the impact of marginalisation, disintegration and fragmentation.

- SADC countries need to invest heavily in education, health, technology and environmental infrastructure to combat the risks and threats of globalisation and avoid being marginalised

This will improve human capital and stimulate further investment. SADC countries also need to improve macroeconomic and sector management, create a more conducive environment for the private sector and improve financial intermediation.

- We must establish stable and credible regional regimes for regulating extractive industries, to protect the environment, conserve resources and enhance earnings. Predatory behaviour on the part of multinational corporations is emerging, particularly in natural resource sectors, for example in mining and logging, with dire consequences for the environment and income from these sectors.

- We must concentrate on supplying the regional market and in the long run stimulate demand and supply dynamics leading to export competitiveness of the region.

Structural adjustment policies stress export orientation and import liberalisation. In many countries these twin policies have led to depletion of natural resources at low rates of return and to loss of production capacity (deindustrialisation) in the largely fragile industrial sector. Export competition is becoming stiffer with stringent demands on quality and timely delivery to survive. Import liberalisation has led to dumping.

Political integration

Much less progress has been made towards achieving political integration. The much talked-about SADC Parliamentary Forum is a consultative, not legislative body. As such, it does not serve as a mechanism for harmonising political, economic and social policies of member states. The existence of this forum outside the formal structures of SADC per se is not the problem. The challenge is to transform it into a fully fledged regional parliament as part of the institutional basis for a Federation of Southern African States. Other institutions worth establishing are a SADC Cabinet Forum and a SADC Judiciary Forum.

The controversies surrounding several general elections in SADC are due to lack of transparency in conducting the elections.

Similarly, the SADC Electoral Commissions Forum is a consultative not an executive body of national electoral commissions. The controversies surrounding several general elections in SADC are due to lack of transparency in conducting the elections. Lack of transparency in turn reflects lack of independence of national electoral commissions. If a regional electoral commission were established to conduct elections in member states, its conduct would be more neutral. It would therefore lend credibility to the electoral process and hence to the development of multi-party democracy.

People to people integration

One of the objectives of SADC is to strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the region. It is intended to achieve this objective by encouraging the peoples of the region and their institutions to take initiatives to develop economic, social and cultural ties across the region and to participate fully in implementing the programmes and projects of SADC.

A large proportion of the regional population is not aware of the existence of SADC.

Opinions differ over the extent to which SADC is making progress towards attaining this objective. In view of the SADC secretariat, the greatest success of the organisation has so far been in strengthening solidarity and creating a Southern African identity. While acknowledging this as an achievement, others have stressed that there should be no delusion that it applies generally. A large proportion of the regional population is not aware of the existence of SADC. This study endorses this view. It acknowledges the official and unofficial efforts that have been made to involve stakeholders in regional co-operation and integration. No doubt there have been successes, as in sporting and cultural activities. But the involvement of stakeholders in implementing SADC programmes and projects has been quite insignificant.

IV Conclusion: Regional integration for human development

Like human development, regional integration focuses on expanding income and all other human choices and is concerned with all development issues in SADC. Hence, in the SADC context, regional integration and human development share similar concerns. These seemingly related phenomena also represent some of the major challenges facing the SADC sub-region. This chapter has summarised the findings of the report. It has shown that the performance of the SADC region in human development and regional integration requires improvement. In certain areas, past gains in human development have been lost. In other areas, the gains in human development are holding but fragile. The gains in regional integration have similarly been mixed. In the light of these findings and taking into account the opportunities for integration, it is recommended that SADC pursue deep integration to promote human development. To do this, SADC will need to transform its programme of action and its structures to make them effective instruments for deep integration. By reducing capacity constraints and promoting effective policy co-ordination, deep integration should impact positively on human development.

Annexes

Note on statistics

This report presents data on broad aspects of human development and regional integration. The data is presented as part of the narrative and also as a statistical annex. The sources are mainly the United Nations and its agencies, the SADC country national sources, SADC and the African Development Bank. The sources of all data used in the statistical annex are given in this annex and also as references in the narrative part of the report. We continuously face a low response to statistical queries from national statistical offices. The problems faced in compiling and analysing statistics include unavailability of data, lack of comparability of data across time and countries, out-of-date data and inaccuracies in some of the data sets.

There are still too many data gaps in human development and other socio-economic statistics for most SADC countries, as is evident in many of the annex tables. This is especially so in such areas as intra-SADC trade, investment and labour migration, income distribution, employment, environment, crime and gender. SADC countries with insufficient data need make the effort to fill the gaps to enable meaningful monitoring of human development and integration in the region. SARIPS/ SAPES Trust is setting up a databank for the SADC region to make socio-economic and political data readily available to users in the region and from outside.

The *Human Development Report 1999* introduced a new methodology for calculating the income component of the HDI, GDI and GEM (see technical note). The HDIs published in this report are based on improved life expectancy data from the United Nations Population Division and revised data on adult literacy and combined gross primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios from UNESCO. Data on purchasing power parities have been updated by the World Bank following the more comprehensive 1997-98 surveys by the International Comparison Programme. The HDI, GDI and GEM published in this report are not comparable to those in the 1998 *Regional Human Development Report* because of the differences in methodology and use of new data sets.

The population estimates have been adjusted for the demographic impact of HIV/AIDS as incorporated in the 1998 revision of the United Nations database *World Population Prospects 1950-2050* by the United Nations Population Division. This revision gives special attention to the demographic impact of HIV/AIDS on the population estimates and projections for developing countries with a population of at least one million and an adult HIV prevalence of two per cent or more or with very large populations of infected adults. Ten SADC countries are included in the 34 countries in the world where these adjustments have been made and these are Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Changes in population statistics have an effect on all other indicators such as adult literacy rates, gross enrolment ratios, and so on, with population as a base indicator.

In the statistical annex, SADC countries are listed in descending order of their HDI value.

Aggregated data is compiled mainly from the weighted arithmetic mean and where appropriate from the median and harmonic and geometric means. Aggregates are only presented in cases when at least two thirds of the total SADC population is covered and in cases where there is an appropriate weighting procedure.

Signs used in statistical data

- .. Data not available
- Not applicable
- * Weighting not done because population is less than two thirds of the SADC region.
- (.) Less than half the unit shown
- (...) Less than one-tenth of the unit shown
- < Less than
- 1990-1995 Indicates that data was collected during one of the years shown.
- 1990/95 Indicates an average for the years shown

Technical notes

This section presents the methodology for the SADC human development indices and what these indices reveal in terms of intra-regional disparities and similarities. These indices are:

- the Human Development Index (HDI);
- the Gender-related Development Index (GDI);
- the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM);
- the Human Poverty Index (HPI).

Some vital issues in the assessment of human development in SADC countries are of particular importance in the region and need to be reflected in the indices. These are:

- inequality of income distribution; and
- very pronounced gender inequality.

The global UNDP indices were, therefore, adapted to the SADC situation producing:

- the SADC-specific HDI;
- the SADC-specific GDI; and
- the SADC-specific GEM.

The maximum value of the income component in the HDI and GDI has been modified to make it region specific and the SADC average real GDP per capita has been used as the income threshold level. For some countries income inequality has been adjusted using the gini coefficient in the HDI and GDI. The aversion for inequality between women and men has been reinforced in the GDI and GEM calculations by increasing the parameter from 2 to 5.

The HPI measures the proportion of people in the community who are left out of progress while the HDI measures progress in a country as a whole. Thus a comparison of HDI and HPI values shows how well (or how poorly) distributed the achievements of a country are. The HPI reveals deprivation that would otherwise be masked in income measures of poverty.

In addition to the adjustments to the HDI, GDI and GEM a new index has been compiled which attempts to assess the level of integration in the SADC region, namely the SADC Integration Index (SII). The SII measures the level of integration in the labour, capital and trade markets and also ratification of protocols.

The SADC-specific HDI, GDI and GEM values are not comparable to the global indices because of the income adjustments made and also gender inequality conversion factors used. The SADC-specific HDI and GDI are also not comparable to these two indices published in the 1998 *SADC Regional Human Development Report* because of the refinement in the treatment of the income component introduced in the 1999 global *Human Development Report* and also the use of revised GDP per capita, PPP (current international US\$). Comparisons are only possible in the rankings and values within the region.

Technical note I

Constructing the Human Development Index (HDI) for SADC

The HDI is based on three indicators:

- 1 longevity, as measured by life expectancy at birth;
- 2 educational attainment, as measured by a combination of adult literacy (two-thirds weight) and combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios (one-third weight); and
- 3 standard of living, as measured by real GDP per capita (PPP\$).

For the construction of the index the following fixed minimum and maximum values have been used for each of these indicators.

- Life expectancy at birth: 25 years and 85 years
- Adult literacy: 0% and 100%
- Combined gross enrolment ratio: 0% and 100%
- Real GDP per capita (PPP\$): US\$100 and US\$25,000 (PPP\$).

The SADC maximum GDP per capita of US\$25 000 (PPP) was based on the assumption that if Mauritius (which had the highest income in the SADC region at US\$ 13 294 [PPP\$] in 1995) maintains an average annual growth rate of 2 per cent for the next 30 years, its GDP per capita will reach the level of US\$25 000 (PPP\$). This was the assumption used in the *1998 SADC Human Development Report* and continued here.

For any component of the HDI, individual indices can be computed according to the general formula:

$$\text{Index}_i = \frac{\text{Actual } x_i \text{ value} - \text{minimum } x_i \text{ value}}{\text{Maximum } x_i \text{ value} - \text{minimum } x_i \text{ value}}$$

Where x_i is the value of the i^{th} indicator in a particular country

The construction of the HDI is illustrated using Zimbabwe as an example:

Life expectancy (years)	43.5
Adult literacy rate (%)	87.2
Combined gross enrolment ratio (%)	68.0
Real GDP per capita, PPP\$	2669

Life expectancy index

$$\text{Zimbabwe} = (43.5 - 25)/(85 - 25) = \mathbf{0.308}$$

Educational attainment index

ZIMBABWE

$$\text{Literacy Index} = (87.2 - 0)/(100 - 0) = 0.872$$

$$\text{School enrolment Index} = (68.0 - 0)/(100 - 0) = 0.680$$

$$\text{Educational attainment Index} = [2(0.872) + (0.680)]/3 = \mathbf{0.808}$$

The income index

The basic approach in the treatment of income has assumed that achieving a respectable level of human development does not require an unlimited income. To reflect this, income has always been discounted in calculating the HDI. In the *1998 SADC Human Development Report* the HDI adjusts real income above a certain threshold, the underlying assumption being that people need a certain income to attain a decent standard of living and that income beyond a certain level has a diminishing marginal utility. The SADC average income has been taken as the threshold level (y^*), and any income

Atkinson's Formula for the utility of income :

$$\begin{aligned}
 W(y) &= y^* \text{ for } 0 < y < y^* \\
 &= y^* + 2[(y - y^*)^{1/2}] \text{ for } y^* \leq y \leq 2y^* \\
 &= y^* + 2(y^*)^{1/2} + 3[(y - 2y^*)^{1/3}] \text{ for } 2y^* \leq y \leq 3y^* \\
 &= y^* + 2(y^*)^{1/2} + 3[(y - 2y^*)^{1/3}] + n \{ [1 - (n-1)y^*] \}^{1/n} \text{ for } (n-1)y^* \leq y \leq ny^*
 \end{aligned}$$

where $W(y)$ = adjusted per capita income

y^* = threshold per capita income (US\$1 800) (PPP)

To calculate discounted value of the maximum income of \$25 000 (PPP\$), the Atkinson's formula is used:

$$W(y) = y^* + 2(y^*)^{1/2} + 3(y^*)^{1/3} + \dots + 13(y^*)^{1/13} + 14((25\,000 - 13y^*)^{1/14})$$

This is because US\$25 000 (PPP) is between $13y^*$ and $14y^*$. Then the discounted value of the maximum income of US\$25 000 (PPP) is US\$2 164(PPP).

The problem of this method was that it discounted the income above the threshold level very heavily, penalising the countries in which incomes exceeded the threshold. It meant that income lost its relevance as a proxy for all dimensions of human development other than a long and healthy life and knowledge.

In 1999 the global *Human Development Report* refined the treatment of income in an attempt to rectify this problem. Anand and Sen (1999) have come up with a formula, which rectifies this problem, which is as follows:

$$W(y) = [\log y - \log y_{\min}] / [\log y_{\max} - \log y_{\min}]$$

This formulae has the advantage that it does not discount income as severely as the old formulae and that it discounts all income and not only income above a certain level. The middle income countries are not penalised unnecessarily by this method and countries continue to receive recognition for their increasing income, as a potential means for further human development.

Adjusted real GDP per capita (PPPS) Index

$$\text{Zimbabwe} = [\log (2669) - \log (100)] / [\log (25000) - \log (100)] = \mathbf{0.595}$$

SADC Human Development Index (HDI)

The HDI is the simple average of the life expectancy Index, educational attainment Index and the adjusted real GDP per capita (PPPS) index, and so is derived by dividing the sum of these three indices by 3.

$$\text{Zimbabwe HDI} = (0.308 + 0.808 + 0.595) / 3 = \mathbf{0.570}$$

SADC HDI adjusted for income inequality

The income distribution in SADC countries is skewed. One way of taking into account the reduced value of the average income in societies with high income inequality, is to reduce the average income by a factor which measures the level of inequality. The gini coefficient is such a measure. The adjusted real GDP per capita (PPPS) is multiplied by a factor $(1 - G)$ to give more income weight to 'egalitarian' countries, and less weight to those countries where income inequalities are high. The adjustment of income for inequality has been derived for 12 countries where the gini coefficient is available.

Zimbabwe	
GDP per capita (\$PPP)	US\$2669
Gini coefficient	0.63
GDP per capita adjusted for income inequality	= 2669(1-0.63) = 988

Income adjusted for inequality index

$$\text{Zimbabwe} = [\log(988) - \log(100)] / [\log(25000) - \log(100)] = \mathbf{0.415}$$

$$\text{Zimbabwe HDI adjusted for income inequality (HDI-A)}$$

$$= (0.308 + 0.808 + 0.415) / 3 = 0.510$$

Technical note 2

The Gender-related Development Index (GDI)

The GDI uses the same variables as the HDI. The difference is that the GDI adjusts the average achievement of each country in life expectancy, educational attainment and income in accordance with the disparity in achievement between women and men. (For a detailed explanation of the GDI methodology see technical note 1 in the *UNDP Human Development Report 1995*). For this gender-sensitive adjustment we used a weighting formula that expresses a high aversion to inequality; setting the weighting parameter at 5, given the broad disparity between women and men in the SADC region. (The UNDP GDI weighting parameter is 2).

The GDI also adjusts the maximum and minimum values for life expectancy, to account for the fact that women tend to live longer than men do. For women the maximum value is 87.5 years and the minimum value 27.5 years; for men the corresponding values are 82.5 and 22.5 years.

Calculating the index for income is fairly complex. Female and male shares of earned income are derived from data on the ratio of the average female wage to the average male wage and the female and male percentage shares of the economically active population aged 15 and above. We used the earned income given in the relevant human development reports. Before income is indexed, the average adjusted real GDP per capita of each country is discounted on the basis of the disparity in the female and male shares of earned income in proportion to the female and male population shares.

The indices for life expectancy, educational attainment and income are added together with equal weight to derive the final GDI value.

Illustration of the GDI methodology

Tanzania is given as an example to illustrate the steps for calculating the Gender-related Development Index. The parameter of inequality aversion, equals 5. (Any discrepancies in results are due to rounding).

Population (millions)

Total	32.10
Females	15.89
Males	16.21

Percentage share of total population

Females	50.5
Males	49.5

Percentage share of the economically active population

Females	49.0
Males	51.0

Life expectancy at birth (years)

Females	49.0
Males	46.8

Adult literacy rate (per cent)

Females	64.3
Males	83.3

Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (per cent)

Females	32
Males	33

Real GDP per capita, US\$(PPP)

Females	400
Males	561

STEP ONE

Computing the equally distributed life expectancy index

Life expectancy index

$$\text{Females } (49.0 - 27.5)/60 = 0.358$$

$$\text{Males } (51.0 - 22.5)/60 = 0.405$$

The equally distributed life expectancy index

{[female population share x (female life expectancy index)⁻⁴] + [male population share x (male life expectancy index)⁻⁴]}^{-1/4}

$$\{0.51(0.358)^{-4} + 0.49(0.405)^{-4}\}^{-1/4} = \mathbf{0.378}$$

STEP TWO

Computing the equally distributed educational attainment index

Adult literacy index

$$\text{Females } (64.3 - 0)/100 = 0.643$$

$$\text{Males } (83.3 - 0)/100 = 0.833$$

Combined gross enrolment index

$$\text{Females } (32.0 - 0)/100 = 0.320$$

$$\text{Males } (33.0 - 0)/100 = 0.330$$

Educational attainment index

2/3 (adult literacy index) + 1/3 (combined gross enrolment index)

$$\text{Females } = [2(0.643) + 1(0.320)] / 3 = 0.535$$

$$\text{Males } = [2(0.833) + 1(0.330)] / 3 = 0.665$$

The equally distributed educational attainment index

{[female population share x (female educational attainment index)⁻⁴] + [male population share x (male educational attainment index)⁻⁴]}^{-1/4}

$$\{0.51(0.535)^{-4} + 0.49(0.665)^{-4}\}^{-1/4} = \mathbf{0.583}$$

STEP THREE

Computing the equally distributed income index

The weighting parameter (e = 5) is applied

$$\begin{aligned} W(y_f) &= [\log(400) - \log(100)] / [\log(25000) - \log(100)] \\ &= 0.251 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} W(y_m) &= [\log(561) - \log(100)] / [\log(25000) - \log(100)] \\ &= 0.312 \end{aligned}$$

Equally distributed income index

{[female population share x [W(y_f)]⁻⁴] + [male population share x [W(y_m)]⁻⁴]}^{-1/4}

$$\{0.51 (0.251)^{-4} + 0.49 (0.312)^{-4}\}^{-1/4} = \mathbf{0.273}$$

Computing the Gender-related Development Index (GDI)

$$1/3(0.378 + 0.583 + 0.273) = \mathbf{0.411}$$

GDI adjusted for income inequality (GDI-A)

In the calculation of GDI-A, GDP adjusted for income inequality replaces GDP(US\$PPP) in the calculation of $W(y_f)$ and $W(y_m)$.

Technical note 3

The GEM uses variables constructed explicitly to measure the relative empowerment of women and men in political and economic spheres of activity.

The first two variables are chosen to reflect economic participation and decision-making power: women's and men's percentage shares of administrative and managerial positions and their percentage shares of professional and technical jobs. These are broad, loosely defined occupational categories. Because the relevant population for each is different, we calculated a separate index for each and then added the two together. The third variable, women's and men's percentage shares of parliamentary seats, is chosen to reflect political participation and decision-making power.

For all three variables we use the methodology of population-weighted $(e - 1)$ averaging to derive an 'equally distributed equivalent percentage (EDEP) for both sexes taken together'. Each variable is indexed by dividing the EDEP by 50%.

An income variable is used to reflect power over economic resources. It is calculated in the same way as for the GDI except that unadjusted rather than adjusted real GDP per capita is used. The maximum value for income is thus PPP\$25 000 and the minimum PPP\$100.

The three indices — for economic participation and decision making; political participation and decision-making; and power over economic resources — are added together to derive the final GEM value.

We chose Swaziland to illustrate the steps in calculating the GEM for 1998. The parameter of inequality aversion, e , equals 5 (Any discrepancies in results are due to rounding).

APPENDIX

Computing indices for parliamentary representation; administrative and managerial; and professional and technical positions.

Percentage share of parliamentary representation

Females	6.3
Males	93.7

Percentage share of administrative and managerial positions

Females	24.1
Males	75.9

Percentage share of professional and technical positions

Females	61.2
Males	38.8

Percentage share of population

Females	50.6
Males	49.4

Percentage of economically active population

Females	37
Males	63

Percentage share of earned income

Females	32.6
Males	67.4

Female GDP per capita	US\$2 082
Male GDP per capita US\$	US\$4 720

Computing the EDEP for parliamentary representation

$$[0.51(6.3)^{-4} + 0.49(93.7)^{-4}]^{-1/4} = 7.47$$

Computing the EDEP for administrative and managerial position

$$[0.51(24.1)^{-4} + 0.49(75.9)^{-4}]^{-1/4} = 28.05$$

Computing the EDEP for professional and technical positions

$$[0.51(61.2)^{-4} + 0.51(38.8)^{-4}]^{-1/4} = 44.54$$

Indexing parliamentary representation

$$7.47/50 = \mathbf{0.149}$$

Indexing administrative and managerial positions

$$28.05/50 = 0.570$$

Indexing professional and technical positions

$$44.54/50 = 0.891$$

Combining the indices for administrative and managerial; and professional and technical, positions

$$(0.570 + 0.891)/2 = \mathbf{0.730}$$

Computing the index for share of earned income

$$\text{Index of female GDP per capita} = (2082-100)/(25000-100) = 0.080$$

$$\text{Index of male GDP per capita} = (4720-100)/(25000-100) = 0.186$$

Computing the equally distributed income index

$$[0.506(0.080)^{-4} + 0.494(0.186)^{-4}]^{-1/4} = \mathbf{0.094}$$

Computing the GEM

$$[1/3(0.149 + 0.730 + 0.094)] = \mathbf{0.308}$$

Technical note 4

The SADC Integration Index measures the level of intra SADC activities or the degree of openness in the labour, capital and the goods and services markets. It ranges from zero to one. It is assumed that it is possible to achieve full integration in the three markets on one extreme and no integration at all on the other. An Integration Index of one means there is full integration whilst that of zero means there is no integration at all.

The integration index is based on six variables:

- Labour immigration
- Labour emigration
- Foreign assets
- Foreign liabilities
- Imports
- Exports

Fixed minimum and maximum for the indicators

- Number of employed SADC citizens in a country as a percentage of the total number of employed persons in the country: 0% and 10%
- Number of a country's citizens employed in other SADC countries as a % of the total number of persons employed in a country: 0% and 10%
- Total foreign liabilities and assets as a percentage of GDP: 0% and 80%
- Total exports and imports as a % of GDP: 0% and 180%

The three components of the SII

- Intra-SADC labour migration as measured by a five year average of the average of number of employed SADC citizens in a country as a percentage of the total number of employed persons and number of a country's citizens employed in other SADC countries as a percentage of total number of employed persons in a country.
- Intra- SADC foreign investment as measured by a five year the average of total foreign investment to SADC countries as a percentage of GDP and total investment from SADC countries as a percentage of GDP
- Intra-SADC trade as measured by a five-year average of total exports from SADC countries plus total imports from SADC countries as a percentage of the GDP.

Missing data and approximations used for the six indicators

- Number of employed SADC citizens in a country as a percentage of the total number of employed persons in the country. (Were this data is not available an approximation of this indicator is the number of SADC citizens in a country as a percent of total population).
- Number of a country's citizens employed in other SADC countries as a % of the total number of persons employed in a country. (Not available for all countries)
- Data for a five-year average is not available and the latest available data for one year has been used for intra SADC labour migration.
- Foreign liabilities of a country to other SADC countries plus foreign assets of a country in other SADC countries as a percentage of GDP. (Only available for South Africa. For all the other SADC countries South Africa's assets in these countries are assumed to be the minimum liabilities of the countries to other SADC countries. Also, South Africa's liabilities in the other SADC countries are assumed to be the minimum foreign assets of the other SADC countries in the region.
- Data is only available for South Africa liabilities and assets for two years 1997 and 1998 and this is what has been used in the compilation of the intra SADC foreign investment component.
- Total exports to SADC countries plus total imports from SADC countries as a % of GDP (Only intra SADC merchandise exports and imports data is available)
- Data for intra SADC trade is only available for four years (1992–1995) and not five years for all countries

Protocol ratification can be added as a fourth component of the SADC Integration Index. The indicator, which is used, is the protocols ratified by a country as a % of the total protocols in SADC. Its minimum and maximum values are 0 and 100%.

Example: South Africa Integration Index

For the South Africa Integration Index there is no data on South Africans employed elsewhere in the region so only labour immigration data has been used. This data is only available once in every ten years from the population census so data for one year (1996) has been used. Data on South Africa's foreign liabilities and assets is only available for two years (1997 and 1998) instead of the proposed 5 years, therefore a two year average has been used. Intra SADC trade data is from 1992 to 1995.

South Africa's Integration Index, data, 1998

Variable	Unit/Period	Value	Source
Number of SADC citizens employed in South Africa	No.(1996)	175 169	S.A. CSO
Number of South Africans employed in other SADC countries	S.A. CSO
Total number of employed persons in South Africa	No.(1996)	9 306 448	S.A. CSO
Number of a SADC citizens employed in South Africa as a % of the total number of persons employed in South Africa	%	1.88	
Number of a South Africans employed in other SADC countries as a % of the total number of persons employed in South Africa	
Foreign liabilities of South Africa	US\$ millions		Central Bank of S.A.
	1997	2 115	
	1998	1 175	
Foreign assets			
	1997	1 234	
	1998	1 678	
Foreign liabilities plus assets of South Africa as a percentage of GDP	%		
	1997	2.27	
	1998	2.14	
	1997&98	2.20	
Total imports to South Africa from other SADC countries	US\$		SITCD
	1992	559.05	
	1993	374.48	
	1994	427.33	
	1995	474.28	
Total exports from South Africa to other SADC countries	US\$m		SITCD
	1992	4 637.60	
	1993	5 552.39	
	1994	5 745.28	
	1995	6 844.43	
Total Trade of South Africa to other SADC countries as a % of GDP	%		SITCD
	1992	3.98	
	1993	4.54	
	1994	4.54	
	1995	4.84	
	1992-95	4.48	
South Africa GDP at current prices	US\$m		SADC databank
	1992	130 533	
	1993	130 488	
	1994	135 822	
	1995	151 118	
	1997	147 637	
	1998	133 380	
Protocols ratified as a % of Total SADC Protocols	1998	64.3%	SADC secretariat

South Africa's SADC Integration Index computation

	Unit/Period	Computation/Formulae	Index
Intra-SADC Trade Index (TI)	1992-1996	$(4.48-0)/(180-0)$	0.028
Intra-SADC Foreign Investment index (FII)	1997 and 1998	$(2.20-0)/(80-0)$	0.025
Intra-SADC Labour Migration Index (LMI) = Labour immigration index (LII)	1996	$(1.88-0)/(10-0)$	0.188
Protocol ratification Index (PRI)	1998	$(64.3-0)/(100-0)$	0.643
SADC Integration Index (SII)	1998	$(TI+FII+LMI)/3$	0.080
Foreign Investment and Trade Index (FITI)	1998	$(FII+TI)/2$	0.026
SII (including protocol ratification)	1998	$(TI+FII+LMI+PRI)/4$	0.221

Note: Individual indices are calculated according to the general formula: $\text{Index} = \frac{\text{Actual } x_i \text{ value} - \text{Minimum } x_i \text{ value}}{\text{Maximum } x_i \text{ value} - \text{Minimum } x_i \text{ value}}$

List of Indicators, sources and methods of aggregation

Table Indicator	Source	Aggregation Method
Life expectancy at birth, years, 1998	HDR2000	WAM/ T.Pop
Adult literacy rate, %, 1998	HDR2000	WAM/Pop15+
Combined 1st, 2nd & 3rd level gross enrolment ratio, %, 1998	HDR2000	WAM/ T.Pop
Real GDP per capita, PPP\$, 1998	HDR2000	WAM/ T.Pop
Real GDP-A per capita, PPP\$, 1998	SSDB	WAM/ T.Pop
Life expectancy index, 1998	HDR2000	Calculated
Adult literacy index, 1998	SSDB	Calculated
Combined 1st, 2nd & 3rd level gross enrolment index, 1998	SSDB	Calculated
Education index, 1998	HDR2000	Calculated
GDP per capita index, 1998	SSDB	Calculated
GDP-A per capita index, 1998	SSDB	Calculated
SADC-specific HDI value, 1998	SSDB	Calculated
SADC-specific HDI-A value, 1998	SSDB	Calculated
Global HDI value, 1998	HDR2000	Calculated
SADC-specific HDI rank, 1998	SSDB	-
SADC-specific HDI rank, 1997	SSDB	-
SADC-specific HDI rank, 1995	SSDB	-
SADC-specific HDI-A rank, 1998	SSDB	-
Global HDI rank, 1998	SSDB	-
SADC-specific HDI value, 1998	SSDB	Calculated
SADC-specific HDI-A value, 1998	SSDB	Calculated
SADC-specific HDI value, 1997	SSDB	Calculated
SADC-specific HDI value, 1995	SSDB	Calculated
SADC-specific HDI absolute change, 1995–97, 1997–98 and 1995–98	SSDB	Calculated
Life expectancy at birth, years, 1997	HDR1999	WAM/ T.Pop
Adult literacy rate, %, 1997	HDR1999	WAM/Pop15+
Combined 1st, 2nd & 3rd level gross enrolment ratio, %, 1997	HDR1999	WAM/ T.Pop
Real GDP per capita, PPP\$, 1997	WDI-CD-Rom2000	WAM/ T.Pop
Real GDP-A per capita, PPP\$, 1997	SSDB	WAM/ T.Pop
Life expectancy index, 1997	HDR1999	Calculated
Adult literacy index, 1997	SSDB	Calculated
Combined 1st, 2nd & 3rd level gross enrolment index, 1997	SSDB	Calculated
Education index, 1997	HDR1999	Calculated
GDP per capita index, 1997	SSDB	Calculated
GDP-A index, 1997	SSDB	Calculated
SADC-specific HDI value, 1997	SSDB	Calculated
SADC-specific HDI-A value, 1997	SSDB	Calculated
Global HDI value, 1997	HDR1999	Calculated
SADC-specific HDI rank, 1997	SSDB	-
Global HDI rank, 1997	SSDB	N/A
Life expectancy at birth, years, 1995	HDR1998	WAM/ T.Pop
Adult literacy rate, %, 1995	HDR1998	WAM/Pop15+
Combined 1st, 2nd & 3rd level gross enrolment ratio, %, 1995	HDR1998	WAM/ T.Pop
Real GDP per capita, PPP\$, 1995	WDI-CD-Rom2000	WAM/ T.Pop
Real GDP-A per capita, PPP\$, 1995	SSDB	WAM/ T.Pop
Life expectancy index, 1995	HDR1998	Calculated
Adult literacy index, 1995	SSDB	Calculated
Combined 1st, 2nd & 3rd level gross enrolment index, 1995	SSDB	Calculated
Education index, 1995	HDR2000	Calculated
GDP per capita index, 1995	SSDB	Calculated

	GDP-A per capita index, 1995	SSDB	Calculated
	SADC-specific HDI value, 1995	SSDB	Calculated
	SADC-specific HDI-A value, 1995	SSDB	Calculated
	Global HDI value, 1995	HDR2000	Calculated
	SADC-specific HDI rank, 1995	SSDB	-
	SADC-specific HDI-A rank, 1995	SSDB	-
	Global HDI Index rank, 1995	SSDB	-
4	SADC specific Gender-related Development Index , 1998		
	Life expectancy at birth, females and males, years, 1998	HDR2000	WAM/Female and Male Pop15+
	Adult literacy rate, %, females and males, 1998	HDR2000	WAM/Female and Male Pop15+
	Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio, %, females and males, 1998	HDR2000	WAM/Female and Male Pop15+
	Real GDP per capita, PPP\$, females and males, 1998	HDR2000	WAM/Female and Male Pop15+
	Real GDP -A per capita, PPP\$, females and males, 1998	SSDB	WAM/Female and Male Pop15+
	Equally distributed life expectancy index, females and males, 1998	SSDB	Calculated
	Equally distributed education index 1998 females and males, 1998	SSDB	Calculated
	Equally distributed income index, 1998	SSDB	Calculated
	Equally distributed income-A Index, 1998	SSDB	Calculated
	SADC-specific GDI value, 1998	SSDB	Calculated
	SADC-specific GDI-A value, 1998	SSDB	Calculated
	Global GDI Value, 1998	SSDB	WAM/ T.Pop
	SADC-specific GDI rank, 1998	SSDB	-
	Global GDI rank, 1998	SSDB	-
	SADC-specific GDI-A rank, 1998	SSDB	-
5	SADC specific Gender-related Development Index , 1997		
	Life expectancy at birth, females and males, years, 1997	HDR1999	WAM/Female and Male Pop15+
	Adult literacy rate, %, females and males, 1997	HDR1999	WAM/Female and Male Pop15+
	Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio, %, females and males, 1997	HDR1999	WAM/Female and Male Pop15+
	Real GDP per capita, PPP\$, females and males, 1997	SSDB	WAM/Female and Male Pop15+
	Real GDP -A per capita, PPP\$, females and males, 1997	SSDB	WAM/Female and Male Pop15+
	Equally distributed life expectancy index, females and males, 1997	SSDB	Calculated
	Equally distributed education index, females and males, 1997	SSDB	Calculated
	Equally distributed income index, 1997	SSDB	Calculated
	Equally distributed income-A index , 1997	SSDB	Calculated
	SADC-specific GDI value, 1997	SSDB	Calculated
	SADC-specific GDI-A value, 1995	SSDB	Calculated
	Global GDI value, 1997	HDR1999	WAM/ T.Pop
	SADC-specific GDI rank, 1997	SSDB	-
	Global GDI rank, 1997	SSDB	-
	SADC-specific GDI value, 1995	SSDB	Calculated
	SADC -specific GDI-A value, 1995	SSDB	Calculated
6	SADC specific Gender-related Development Index , 1995 (Revised)		
	Life expectancy at birth, females and males, years, 1995	HDR1998	WAM/Female and Male Pop15+
	Adult literacy rate, %, females and males, 1995	HDR1998	WAM/Female and Male Pop15+
	Combined 1st, 2nd & 3rd level gross enrolment ratio, %, females and males, 1995	HDR1998	WAM/Female and Male Pop15+
	Real GDP per capita, PPP\$, females and males, 1995	SSDB	WAM/Female and Male Pop15+
	Real GDP -A per capita, PPP\$, females and males, 1995	SSDB	WAM/Female and Male Pop15+
	Equally distributed life expectancy index, females and males, 1995	SSDB	WAM/ T.Pop
	Equally distributed education index, females and males, 1995	SSDB	WAM/ T.Pop
	Equally distributed income index, 1995	SSDB	WAM/ T.Pop
	Equally distributed income-A index index, 1995	SSDB	WAM/ T.Pop
	SADC-specific GDI Value, 1995	SSDB	Calculated
	SADC-specific GDI -A, value, 1995	SSDB	Calculated
	Global GDI Value, 1995	HDR1998	Calculated
	SADC-specific GDI rank, 1995	SSDB	-
	Global GDI rank, 1995	SSDB	-

	Human Poverty Index Rank	SSDB	–
	Human Poverty Index (HPI-1) value %, 1998	HDR2000	Calculated
	Percentage of newborns not expected to live beyond 40 years of age, 1998	HDR2000	WAM/ T.Pop
	Adult illiteracy rate, %, 1998	HDR2000	WAM/Pop 15+
	Population without access to safe water, %, 1990–98	HDR2000	WAM/ T.Pop
	Population without access to health services, %, 1981–93	HDR2000	WAM/ T.Pop
	Under weight children under five years, 1990–98	HDR2000	WAM/Pop under 5
	Children not reaching grade 5, %, 1995–1997	HDR2000	WAM/Pop under 15
	Population without safe water and health services and underweight children, %, 1981–98	SSDB	–
	Refugees by country of asylum, thousands, 1996	HDR2000	Sum
	Real GDP per capita, PPPS, richest and poorest 20%, 1980–1994	HDR2000	*
	Percent of population below income poverty line, US\$1 a day, PPPS, 1989–98	HDR2000	WAM/ T.Pop
	Percentage of population below national poverty line, 1987–97	HDR2000	*
	Percentage of population below 2/3 of national per capita income, urban and rural, 1991–95	HDR2000	*
	Gini coefficients, 1980–98	National Offices	WAM/GDP
	Percentage of households' income spent on food, 1991–95	National Offices	WAM/ T.Pop
8	Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), 1997		
	Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), rank, 1997	SSDB	–
	Seats held in parliament, % of total, 1997	HDR1999	WAM/T.Fem. Pop
	Administrators and managers, % of total, 1997	HDR1999	WAM/T.Fem. Pop
	Professional and technical workers, % of total, 1997	HDR1999	WAM/T.Fem. Pop
	Women's real GDP per capita, PPPS, 1997	HDR1999	WAM/T.Fem. Pop
	SADC GEM value, 1997	SSDB	WAM/T.Fem. Pop
	SADC GEM-A value, 1997	SSDB	Calculated
	SADC GEM value, 1995	SSDB	Calculated
9	Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), 1995		
	Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), rank, 1995	SSDB	–
	Seats held in parliament, %, 1995	HDR2000	WAM/Total MPs
	Administrators and managers, %, 1995	HDR2000	WAM/T.Fem. Pop
	Professional and technical workers, % of total, 1995	HDR2000	WAM/T.Fem. Pop
	Women's real GDP per capita, PPPS, 1995	HDR2000	WAM/T.Fem. Pop
	SADC-specific GEM value, 1995	SSDB	WAM/T.Fem. Pop
	SADC-specific GEM-A, value, 1995	SSDB	WAM/T.Fem. Pop
	SADC-specific GEM-A, rank, 1995	SSDB	–
10	Integration index		
	Intra SADC imports as a % of GDP, 1992, 1993 and 1994	SSDB	WAM/GDP
	Intra SADC exports as a % of GDP, 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995	SSDB	WAM/GDP
	Intra SADC total trade as a % of GDP, 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995	SSDB	Calculated
	Intra SADC total trade as a % of GDP, 1992–95	SSDB	Calculated
	Intra SADC foreign assets, US\$ millions, 1997 and 1998	SSDB	SUM
	Intra SADC foreign liabilities US\$ millions, 1997 and 1998	SSDB	SUM
	Percentage of protocols ratified, 1998	SADC	*
	Intra SADC Total Foreign Investment as a % of GDP, 1997 and 1998	SSDB	WAM/GDP
	Intra SADC foreign assets and liabilities as a % of GDP, 1997 and 1998	SSDB	*
	Average intra SADC total foreign assets and liabilities as a % of GDP, 1997–98	SSDB	*
	Employed SADC citizens as a % of total employed	National sources	*
	Intra SADC total trade as a % of GDP, index (TI)	SSDB	*
	Intra SADC total foreign investment as a % of GDP index, (FII)	SSDB	*
	Employed SADC citizens as a % of total employed, index, (LMI)	SSDB	*
	Protocol ratification index (PRI)	SSDB	*

SADC Integration Index, (SII), 1998	SSDB	*
SADC Integration Index (including protocol ratification) (SIIP), 1998	SSDB	*
Trade and Investment Index, (TII)	SSDB	*
11 Trends in human development		
SADC-Specific HDI, 1995, 1997 and 1998	SSDB	WAM/T. Pop
Life expectancy Index, 1970–75, 1995 and 1998	SSDB	WAM/T. Pop
Infant mortality rate per 1000 live births, 1970, 1996 and 1998	HDR various	WAM/No. of births
Population with access to safe water, %, 1975–80 and 1990–98	HDR various	WAM/T. Pop
Under weight children under age five years, %, 1975 and 1990–98	HDR various	WAM/Pop < 5 years
Adult literacy rate, %, 1970, 1995 and 1998	HDR various	WAM/Pop 15+
Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio, %, 1980, 1995 and 1998	HDR various	WAM/T. Pop
Real GDP per capita PPP\$, 1960, 1995 and 1998	HDR various	WAM/T. Pop
12 Governance		
Date of last elections	SSDB	–
Members of parliament Elected (E) or Appointed (A)	SSDB	*
Total members of parliament	SSDB	Sum
Percentage of female members of parliament	SSDB	WAM/T. MPs
Year members in parliament	SSDB	–
Voter turnout last election, %	SSDB	AM
Political parties represented in parliament	SSDB	AM
Year first woman elected (E) or nominated(N) to national parliament	SSDB	–
13 Population Trends		
Estimated population, Millions, 1975, 1980, 1990, 1995, 1998, 2000 and 2015	HDR various	SUM
Annual population growth rate, %, 1975–1998 and 1998–2015	HDR2000	GM
Females as a percentage of population, 1999	HDR2000	WAM/T. Pop
Urban population as a % of total, 1975, 1998 and 2015	HDR2000	WAM/T. Pop
Dependancy ratio, %, 1998 and 2015	HDR2000	WAM/T. Pop
Total fertility rate, 1990 and 1997	HDR2000	WAM/T. Pop
Contraceptive prevalence, % women 15–45 years, 1990–1999	HDR2000	WAM/T.Fem. Pop 15–45
Maternal mortality rate deaths per 1 000 000 live births, 1990 and 1998	ADB1998	WAM/T.Fem. Pop 15–45
14 Education profile		
Adult literacy rate, %, 1998	HDR2000	WAM/Pop 15+
Youth literacy rate, % age 15–24, 1998	HDR2000	WAM/Pop 15–24
Age group enrolment ratios (adjusted) primary age group as % of relevant age group, 1997	HDR2000	WAM/Pop 5–14
Age group enrolment ratios (adjusted) secondary age group, as % of relevant age group, 1997	HDR2000	WAM/Pop 15–24
Children reaching grade 5, %, 1995–97	HDR2000	WAM/Pop 5–14
Tertiary natural and applied students in science as % of total tertiary, 1995–97	HDR2000	WAM/T. Pop
R & D scientist and technicians per 1 000 people, 1990–96	HDR2000	*
Public education expenditure as % of GNP, 1985, 1995–97	HDR2000	WAM/GNP
Public education expenditure as % of total government expenditure, 1995–97	HDR2000	WAM/GDP
Public education expenditure primary and secondary education as % of all levels, 1995–97	HDR2000	WAM/GDP
Public education expenditure tertiary as % of all levels, 1995–97	HDR2000	WAM/GDP
Primary School starting age, 1990	UNESCO	AM
Duration of primary education, years, 1995	UNESCO	AM
Expenditure per student as a % of GNP per capita, primary, 1980 and 1996	HDR2000	*

	Expenditure per student as a % of GNP per capita, secondary, 1980 and 1996	HDR2000	*
	Expenditure per student as a % of GNP per capita, tertiary, 1980 and 1996	HDR2000	*
	Primary pupil teacher ratio, no of pupils per teacher, 1996	ADR97	WAM/GDP
	Secondary pupil teacher ratio, no of pupils per teacher, 1992–94	ADR97	*
15	Gender and education		
	Female adult literacy rate, % age 15 and above, 1998	HDR2000	WAM/ Fem.Pop 15+
	Female adult literacy Index 1985= 100, 1998	HDR2000	*
	Female adult literacy as % of male rate, 1998	HDR2000	WAM/Pop 15+
	Primary education female teachers, % of total, 1996	WDI2000	WAM/Pop 15+
	Primary education female pupils, % of total, 1996	WDI2000	WAM/ Fem.Pop <15
	Female primary age group enrolment (adjusted) ratio, % of primary school age girls, 1997	WDI2000	WAM/Pop <15
	Female primary age group enrolment (adjusted) index (1985=100), 1997	WDI2000	*
	Female primary age group enrolment (adjusted) as % of male rate, 1997	WDI2000	WAM/Pop <15
	Secondary education female teachers, % of total, 1996	WDI2000	WAM/ Fem.Pop <15
	Secondary education female pupils, % of total, 1996	WDI2000	WAM/Pop 15+
	Female secondary age group enrolment (adjusted ratio, % of secondary school age girls, 1997	HDR2000	WAM/ Fem.Pop 15+
	Female secondary age group enrolment adjusted index (1985=100), 1997	HDR2000	*
	Female tertiary students as % of male rate, 1997	HDR2000	WAM/Pop 15+
	Female tertiary students, per 100 000 women, 1994–97	HDR2000	WAM/ Fem.Pop 15+
	Female tertiary students index (1985= 100), 1994–97	HDR2000	*
	Female tertiary science as % of males, 1994–97	HDR2000	WAM/Pop 15+
16	Gender and economic activity		
	Female economic activity rate, age 15 and above, rate, %, 1998	HDR2000	WAM/ Fem.Pop 15+
	Female economic activity rate, age 15 and above, index (1985=100), 1998	HDR2000	*
	Female economic activity rate, age 15 and above, as % of male rate, 1998	HDR2000	WAM/ Fem.Pop 15+
	Unemployment rates, age 15–64, female 1998	HDR2000	*
	Unemployment rates, age 15–64, male 1998	National Stats Offices	*
	Unemployment rates, age 15–64, total, 1998	National Stats Offices	*
	Female clerical and sales workers as % of male, 1990	HDR1998	WAM/Pop 15+
	Female service workers, %, 1990	HDR1998	WAM/Pop 15+
	Female service workers as % of male, 1998	HDR1998	WAM/Pop 15+
	Women in government, all levels, %, 1998	HDR2000	WAM/ Fem. Pop 15+
	Women in government at ministerial level, %, 1998	HDR2000	WAM/Fem. Pop 15+
	Women in government at sub- ministerial level, %, 1998	HDR2000	WAM/Fem.Pop 15+
17	Health profile		
	One-year-olds fully immunised against tuberculosis, %, 1995–98	HDR2000	WAM/1 yr pop
	One-year-olds fully immunised against measles, %, 1995–98	HDR2000	WAM/1 yr pop
	AIDS cases, per 100 000 people, 1995	HDR1998	WAM/T.Pop
	AIDS cases, per 100 000 people, 1997	HDR1999	WAM/T.Pop
	HIV/AIDS prevalence total number, age 0–49, 1997	HDR2000	WAM/T.Pop
	HIV/AIDS prevalence, adults 15–49, %, 1997	WDI1999	WAM/T.Pop
	Nurses, per 100 000 people, 1992–95	HDR 1998	*
	Physicians, per 1000 people, 1980 and 1997	WDR1999	*
	Tuberculosis cases, per 100 000 people, 1995 and 1997	HDR2000	WAM/T.Pop
	Malaria cases, per 100 000 people, 1994 and 1997	HDR2000	WAM/T.Pop
	Cigarette consumption per adult (1970–72=100), 1990–92, (1983–86=100) 1993–97	HDR2000	*
	Hospital beds, per 1000 people, 1980 and 1990–98	WDR1998	*

People with disabilities as % of total population, 1985–95	WDR1999	*
Public expenditure on health as % of GDP, 1990 and 1996–98	HDR1998	WAM/GDP
Private expenditure on health as a % of GDP, 1990–97	HDR1999	*
Total expenditure on health as a % of GDP, 1990–97	WDR1999	*
Health expenditure per capita, PPP\$, 1990–97	WDI1999	*
18 Child survival and development		
Infant mortality rate, per 1 000 live births, 1989 and 1998	HDR2000	WAM/1Yr Pop
Under-five mortality rate, per 1 000 children under 5 years, 1996 and 1998	HDR2000	WAM/POP<5
Pregnant women aged 15–49 with anaemia, %, 1985–95	HDR2000	WAM/W15–49
Births attended by trained health personnel, %, 1990–96	HDR2000	WAM/Births
Maternal mortality rate, deaths per 1 000 live births, 1990–98	HDR2000	WAM/W15–45
Mothers exclusively breast-feeding at six months, %, 1990–96	HDR2000	WAM/W15–45
Mothers exclusively breast-feeding at three months, %, 1990–96	HDR2000	WAM/W15–45
Oral rehydration therapy use rate, %, 1990–97	HDR2000	WAM/POP<5
Low birth weight, % of births, 1982 and 1993–96	HDR2000	*
Prevalence of child malnutrition, weight for age of children under five 1992–97	WDI1999	WAM/Pop<5
Prevalence of child malnutrition, height for age % of children less than 5, 1992–97	WDI1999	WAM/Pop<5
19 Labour profile		
Labour force as a % of total population, 1980, 1995 and 1997	HDR2000	WAM/T.Pop
Labour force participation rate, 1990	HDR2000 CD Rom	WAM/Pop 15+
Percent of labour force in agriculture, 1970 and 1990	HDR2000 CD Rom	WAM/Pop 15+
Percent of labour force in industry, 1970 and 1990	HDR2000 CD Rom	WAM/Pop 15+
Percent of labour force in services, 1970 and 1990	HDR1999	WAM/Pop 15+
Women's share of adult labour force, % age 15 years and above, 1970 and 1998	HDR2000	WAM/Pop 15+
Under 14 in the labour as a % of population aged 10–14 years, 1997	HDR2000	WAM/Pop 15+
Age dependancy ratio, 1995	HDR2000	WAM/T.Pop
Unemployment rate, females, males and total, 1991–97	HDR2000	*
Wages in non-agricultural activities, monthly earnings in current US\$, 1994–97	HDR2000	*
Wages in manufacturing sector, monthly earnings in current US\$, 1997	HDR2000	*
Wages in mining and quarrying, monthly earnings in current US\$, 1997	HDR2000	*
Wages in construction, monthly earnings in current US\$, 1997	HDR2000	*
Wages in transport, storage and communications, monthly earnings in current US\$, 1997	HDR2000	*
20 Food security and nutrition		
Daily per capita supply of calories, 1970 and 1997	HDR2000	AM
Per capita supply of protein, total grams, 1997	HDR2000	AM
Per capita supply of proteins, change %, 1970–97	HDR2000	AM
Daily per capita supply of fat, total grams, 1997	HDR2000	AM
Daily per capita supply of fat, change %, 1970–97	HDR2000	AM
Food production index, 1989–91=100, 1998	HDR2000	*
Food imports, as % of merchandise imports, 1997–1998	HDR2000	*
Food aid in cereals, thousands of metric tons, 1998	HDR2000	*
Food consumption, as % of total household consumption, 1997	HDR2000	*
21 Crime		
Volume of crime by type of offenses, crime per 100 000 inhabitants, selected SADC Countries, 1998	Interpol, Zimbabwe	*
Persons responsible for offences, total, selected SADC countries, 1998	Internol, Zimbabwe	*

	Persons responsible for offences, %, female, selected SADC countries, 1998	Interpol, Zimbabwe	*
	Persons responsible for offences, %, aliens, selected SADC countries, 1998	Interpol, Zimbabwe	*
22	Personal distress		
	Suicides, per 100 000 people, male and female, 1993–98	HDR2000	*
	Births to mothers under 20, %, 1993–98	HDR2000	*
	People killed by disasters, total killed, 1980–99	HDR2000	Sum
	Persons killed by single worst disaster, 1980–99	HDR2000	Sum
	Refugees by country of asylum, thousands, 1998	HDR2000	Sum
	Refugees by country of origin, thousands, 1998	HDR2000	Sum
23	Environmental profile		
	Land Area, 1000 ha	HDR2000	Sum
	Forest and woodland as a % of land area, 1995	HDR1998	WAM/TLA
	Annual Internal renewable water resources, cubic metres per capita, 2000	HDR2000	WAM/T.Pop
	Annual fresh water as a % of water resources, 1987–97	HDR2000	WAM/T.Pop
	Annual fresh water per capita, cubic metres, 1987–97	HDR2000	WAM/T.Pop
	Average annual rate deforestation, %, 1980–90 and 1990–95	HDR2000	WAM/T.Pop
	Annual rate of reforestation, %, 1980–90	WDI1999	WAM/T.Pop
	Carbon dioxide emissions, total, millions of metric tons, 1996	HDR2000	Sum
	Carbon dioxide emissions, share of world total, 1996	HDR2000	*
	Carbon dioxide emissions, per capita, metric tons, 1996	HDR2000	AM
	Loss of mangroves, %, 1980–90	HDR1998	AM
	Arable land hectares, per capita, 1994–96	HDR1998	WAM/T.Pop
24	National Income Accounts		
	GDP at current prices, US\$ millions, 1998	SADC DB/ HDR2000	SUM
	Agriculture as a % of GDP, 1998	HDR2000	WAM/GDP
	Industry as a % of GDP, 1998	HDR2000	WAM/GDP
	Services as a % of GDP, 1998	HDR2000	WAM/GDP
	Government consumption as a % of GDP, 1998	SADC DB	WAM/GDP
	Private consumption as a % of GDP, 1998	SADC DB	WAM/GDP
	Government investment as a % of GDP, 1998	SADC DB	WAM/GDP
	Private savings investment as a % of GDP 1998	SADC DB	WAM/GDP
	Government savings as a % of GDP 1998	SADC DB	*
	Private savings as a % of GDP 1998	SADC DB	*
	Manufacturing production index (1992=100), 1998	SADC DB	*
	Mining production index (1992=100), 1998	SADC DB	*
	Agricultural production index, 1998	SADC DB	*
25	Trends in Economic Performance		
	GNP, US\$ billions, 1998	HDR2000	Sum
	GNP annual growth rate, %, 1975–95 and 1990–98	HDR2000	WAM/GNP
	GNP per capita, US\$, 1998	HDR2000	WAM/T.Pop
	GNP per capita annual growth rate, %, 1975–90 and 1990–98	HDR2000	WAM/GNP
	Average annual rate of inflation, %, 1990–98 and 1998	HDR2000	WAM/GDP
	Tax revenue as a % of GDP, 1991 and 1998	SADC DB	WAM/GDP
	Government expenditure as a % of GDP, 1991 and 1998	SADC DB	*
	Overall budget surplus/deficit as a % of GDP, 1991 and 1998	SADC DB	*
	Tax revenue as a % of GDP, 1991 and 1998	SADC DB	*
26	Monetary indicators and prices		
	Money supply M1, M2, M3, US\$ Millions, 1998	SADC DB	Sum
	M3 as a percent of GDP, 1998	SADC DB	WAM/GDP
	Net foreign assets, US\$ millions, 1998	SADC DB	Sum
	Domestic credit, millions of local currency, 1998	IFS 2000	–
	International reserves, US\$ millions, 1998	SADC DB/IFS2000	Sum
	Exchange rate, local currency per US\$, period average, 1998	IFS2000	N/A

WAM/GDP	SADC DB/IFS2000	SADC DB	Interest rate, bank rate end of year, 1998
WAM/GDP	SADC DB	SADC DB	Interest rate, deposit, 1998
WAM/GDP	SADC DB	SADC DB	Interest rate lending, 1998
Sum	SADC DB	SADC DB	Balance of payments
Sum	SADC DB	SADC DB	Current account, US\$ m, 1998
Sum	SADC DB	SADC DB	Trade balance, US\$ m, 1998
Sum	SADC DB	SADC DB	Capital account, US\$ m, 1998
Sum	SADC DB	SADC DB	Financial account, US\$ m, 1998
Sum	SADC DB	SADC DB	Direct investment, US\$ m, 1998
Sum	SADC DB	SADC DB	Portfolio investment, US\$ m, 1998
Sum	SADC DB	SADC DB	Other investment, US\$ m, 1998
WAM/GDP	SADC DB	SADC DB	Exports of goods and services as a % of GDP, 1998
WAM/GDP	SADC DB	SADC DB	Imports of goods and services as a % of GDP, 1998
WAM/GDP	SADC DB	SADC DB	Merchandise exports as a % of GDP, 1998
WAM/GDP	SADC DB	SADC DB	Merchandise imports as a % of GDP, 1998
WAM/GDP	SADC DB	SADC DB	Current account as a % of GDP, 1998
WAM/GDP	SADC DB	SADC DB	Capital and financial accounts as a % of GDP, 1998
WAM/GDP	SADC DB	SADC DB	Overall balance as a % of GDP, 1998
Sum	SADC DB	SADC DB	Gross external assets, 1998
Sum	SADC DB	SADC DB	Gross external liabilities, 1998
External debt	WD1999		Indebtedness classification, 1997
WAM/GNP	HDR2000	HDR2000	Present value of debt as a % of GNP, 1997
WAM/GNP	HDR2000	HDR2000	Present value of debt as a % of exports of goods and services, 1997
Sum	HDR2000	HDR2000	Long term external debt, US\$ millions, 1990 and 1997
Sum	HDR2000	HDR2000	Short-term external debt as a % of total external debt, 1980 and 1997
WAM/GDP	HDR2000	HDR2000	Total debt service as a % of GNP, 1980 and 1997
29			Aid and Debt
Sum	HDR2000	HDR2000	Official development Assistance (ODA) received, net disbursements: total, US\$m, 1992 and 1998
WAM/GNP	HDR2000	HDR2000	as a % of GNP 1992 and 1998
Sum	HDR2000	HDR2000	per capita, US\$, 1992 and 1998
Sum	HDR2000	HDR2000	External debt total, US\$ millions, 1985 and 1998
WAM/GNP	HDR2000	HDR2000	External debt as a % of GNP, 1985 and 1998
WAM/GDP	HDR2000	HDR2000	Total debt service as a % of exports of goods and services, 1985 and 1998
30			Intra-SADC Import/Export Matrix, %
	SADB	SADB	Percentage distribution of intra SADC imports, 1995
	SADB	SADB	Percentage distribution of intra SADC exports, 1995
31			Merchandise Exports, Imports and Total Trade as a % of GDP, SADC Countries, 1990-98
WAM/GDP	WDR CD 2000	WDR CD 2000	Exports of goods and services as a % of GDP, 1990-98
WAM/GDP	WDR CD 2000	WDR CD 2000	Imports of goods and services as a % of GDP, 1990-98
WAM/GDP	WDR CD 2000	WDR CD 2000	Total trade as a % of GDP, 1990-98
32			Resource flows
WAM/GDP	HDR2000	HDR2000	Exports of goods and services as % of GDP, 1990 and 1998
WAM/GDP	HDR2000	HDR2000	Imports of goods and services as % of GDP, 1990 and 1998
Sum	HDR2000	HDR2000	Net foreign direct investment flows, US\$ millions,
Sum	HDR2000	HDR2000	annual average, 1987-92 and 1998
Sum	HDR2000	HDR2000	Net foreign direct investment flows, US\$ millions, 1990 and 1998
Sum	HDR2000	HDR2000	Net portfolio investment flows, US\$ Millions, 1990 and 1998
Sum	HDR2000	HDR2000	Net bank & trade related lending : US\$ Millions, 1990 and 1998
Sum	HDR2000	HDR2000	Sovereign long-term debt rating, 1999

32	Recreation		
	Public expenditure on education as a % of GNP, 1990 and 1995-97	HDR2000	WAM/GNP
	Public expenditure on health as a % of GDP, 1990 and 1996-98	HDR2000	WAM/GDP
	Military expenditure as a % of GDP, 1990 and 1998	HDR2000	WAM/GDP
	Total armed forces, thousands, 1998	HDR2000	SUM
	Total armed forces, index (1985=100) 1998	HDR2000	*
34	Communications, information, and science and technology		
	Daily newspapers per 1000 people, 1996	HDR2000	WAM/T.Pop
	Radios per 1000 people, 1990 and 1996-98	HDR2000	WAM/T.Pop
	Television sets per 1000 people, 1990 and 1996-98	HDR2000	WAM/T.Pop
	Cellular mobile subscribers per 1000 people, 1990 and 1996-98	HDR2000	WAM/T.Pop
	Fax machines per 1000 people, 1996	HDR2000	WAM/T.Pop
	Personal computers per 1000 people 1990 and 1996-98	HDR2000	*
	Internet hosts per 10000 people, 1998	HDR2000	*
	Telephone mainlines waiting time, years, 1997	HDR2000	WAM/T.Pop
	Telephone mainlines, cost of local call, US\$ per minute, 1997	HDR2000	WAM/T.Pop
	Telephone mainlines, cost of call to U.S., US\$ per minute, 1997	HDR2000	WAM/T.Pop
	Road/Population ratio, 1000/ km/1m people, 1990	HDR2000	WAM/T.Pop
	Paved roads, %, 1997	HDR2000	WAM/T.Pop
	Post Offices, per 100000 people, 1995	HDR2000	WAM/T.Pop
35	Energy		
	Electricity consumption, total, millions of kilowatt hours, 1995 and 1997	HDR2000	Sum
	Electricity consumption index, (1980=100), 1995 and 1997	HDR2000	*
	Electricity consumption per capita, kilowatt hours, 1980 and 1997	HDR2000	WAM/T.Pop
	Traditional fuel consumption, as % of total energy, 1980 and 1996	HDR2000	WAM/T.Pop
	Household energy from fuelwood, %, 1990	National Sources	WAM/T.Pop
	Commercial energy use (oil equivalent), total, 1000 metric tons, 1980 and 1997	HDR2000	WAM/T.Pop
	Commercial energy use (oil equivalent), per capita (kg), 1980 and 1997	HDR2000	WAM/T.Pop
	Commercial energy use (oil equivalent), GDP output, per kg, US\$, 1980 and 1997	HDR2000	WAM/GDP
	Net energy imports, as a % of commercial energy use, 1980 and 1997	HDR2000	WAM/T.Pop
36	SADC Protocols/Charters and dates ratified/accessed, as at July 2000	SADC secretariat	
37	Intra-SADC Merchandise trade by country	SITCD Dar es Salaam	
38	Extra-SADC merchandise trade for selected years as percentage of total trade	IMF Direction of trade statistics, various	
39	SADC citizens employed in South Africa by sector, 1996	CSO South Africa	

Annex tables

I SADC-specific Human Development Index, 1998

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Life expectancy at birth (years) 1998	Adult literacy rate (%) 1998	Combined 1 st 2 nd & 3 rd level gross enrolment ratio (%) 1998	Real GDP per capita (PPPS) 1998	Real GDP-A per capita (PPPS) 1998
1	Seychelles	71.0	84.0	76	10 600	5 618
2	Mauritius	71.6	83.8	63	8 312	3 990
3	South Africa	53.2	84.6	95	8 488	3 480
4	Swaziland	60.7	78.3	72	3 816	1 870
5	Namibia	50.1	80.8	84	5 176	1 553
6	Botswana	46.2	75.6	71	6 103	2 807
7	Lesotho	55.2	82.4	57	1 626	699
8	Zimbabwe	43.5	87.2	68	2 669	988
9	DR Congo	51.2	58.9	33	822	..
10	Zambia	40.5	76.3	49	719	360
11	Tanzania	47.9	73.6	33	480	298
12	Angola	47.0	42.0	25	1 821	838
13	Malawi	39.5	58.2	75	523	199
14	Mozambique	43.8	42.3	25	782	..
	SADC	48.6	68.8	51	2663	1550

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Life expectancy index 1998	Adult literacy index 1998	Combined 1 st 2 nd & 3 rd level gross enrolment index 1998	Education index 1998	GDP per capita index 1998	GDP-A per capita index 1998
1	Seychelles	0.767	0.840	0.760	0.813	0.845	0.730
2	Mauritius	0.777	0.838	0.630	0.769	0.801	0.668
3	South Africa	0.470	0.846	0.950	0.881	0.804	0.643
4	Swaziland	0.595	0.783	0.720	0.762	0.660	0.530
5	Namibia	0.418	0.808	0.840	0.819	0.715	0.497
6	Botswana	0.353	0.756	0.710	0.741	0.745	0.604
7	Lesotho	0.503	0.824	0.570	0.739	0.505	0.352
8	Zimbabwe	0.308	0.872	0.680	0.808	0.595	0.415
9	DR Congo	0.437	0.589	0.330	0.503	0.382	..
10	Zambia	0.258	0.763	0.490	0.672	0.357	0.232
11	Tanzania	0.282	0.736	0.330	0.601	0.284	0.198
12	Angola	0.367	0.420	0.250	0.363	0.526	0.385
13	Malawi	0.242	0.582	0.750	0.638	0.300	0.124
14	Mozambique	0.313	0.423	0.250	0.365	0.372	..
	SADC	0.394	0.688	0.511	0.629	0.594	0.496

SADC HDI Rank	Country	SADC HDI (value) 1998	SADC HDI-A (value) 1998	Global HDI (value) 1998	SADC HDI rank 1998	SADC HDI rank 1997	SADC HDI rank 1995	SADC- specific HDI-A rank 1998	Global HDI rank 1998
1	Seychelles	0.808	0.770	0.786	1	2	2	1	1
2	Mauritius	0.782	0.738	0.761	2	1	1	2	2
3	South Africa	0.718	0.665	0.697	3	3	3	3	3
4	Swaziland	0.672	0.629	0.655	4	4	5	4	4
5	Namibia	0.651	0.578	0.632	5	5	4	5	5
6	Botswana	0.613	0.566	0.593	6	6	6	6	6
7	Lesotho	0.583	0.532	0.569	7	7	8	7	7
8	Zimbabwe	0.570	0.510	0.555	8	8	7	8	8
9	DR Congo	0.440	..	0.430	9	9	10	..	9
10	Zambia	0.429	0.387	0.420	10	10	9	11	10
11	Tanzania	0.422	0.393	0.415	11	11	11	9	11
12	Angola	0.419	0.372	0.405	12	12	12	10	12
13	Malawi	0.393	0.335	0.385	13	13	13	12	13
14	Mozambique	0.350	..	0.341	14	14	14	..	14
	SADC	0.539	0.360	0.548					

SADC HDI Rank	Country	SADC HDI (value) 1998	SADC HDI-A (value) 1998	SADC HDI (value) 1997	SADC HDI (value) 1995	1995-97	SADC HDI absolute change 1997-98	1995-98
1	Seychelles	0.808	0.771	0.793	0.805	-0.012	0.015	0.003
2	Mauritius	0.782	0.738	0.778	0.767	0.011	0.004	0.015
3	South Africa	0.718	0.665	0.725	0.758	-0.033	-0.007	-0.040
4	Swaziland	0.672	0.629	0.671	0.666	0.005	0.001	0.006
5	Namibia	0.651	0.578	0.660	0.672	-0.012	-0.009	-0.021
6	Botswana	0.613	0.566	0.616	0.627	-0.011	-0.003	-0.014
7	Lesotho	0.583	0.532	0.593	0.565	0.028	-0.010	0.018
8	Zimbabwe	0.570	0.510	0.583	0.593	-0.010	-0.013	-0.023
9	DR Congo	0.440	..	0.487	0.505	-0.018	-0.047	-0.065
10	Zambia	0.429	0.387	0.428	0.450	-0.022	0.001	-0.021
11	Tanzania	0.422	0.393	0.417	0.422	-0.005	0.005	0.000
12	Angola	0.419	0.388	0.415	0.448	-0.033	0.004	-0.029
13	Malawi	0.393	0.335	0.395	0.394	0.001	-0.002	-0.001
14	Mozambique	0.350	..	0.350	0.348	0.002	0.000	0.002
	SADC	0.539	0.360	0.552	0.568	-0.016	-0.013	-0.029

2 SADC specific Human Development Index, 1997

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Life expectancy at birth (years) 1997	Adult literacy rate (%) 1997	Combined 1 st 2 nd & 3 rd level gross enrolment ratio (%) 1997	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$) 1997	Real GDP-A per capita (PPP\$) 1997
1	Seychelles	71.0	84.0	61	10 923	5 789
2	Mauritius	71.4	83.0	63	8 126	3 900
3	South Africa	54.7	84.0	93	8 783	3 601
4	Swaziland	60.2	77.5	73	3 941	1 931
5	Namibia	52.4	79.8	82	5 288	1 586
6	Botswana	47.4	74.4	70	6 132	2 821
7	Lesotho	56.0	82.3	58	1 769	761
8	Zimbabwe	44.1	90.9	68	2 713	1 004
9	DR Congo	50.8	77.0	39	855	..
10	Zambia	40.1	75.1	49	766	383
11	Tanzania	47.9	71.6	33	473	293
12	Angola	46.5	45.0	27	1 540	708
13	Malawi	39.3	57.7	75	564	214
14	Mozambique	45.2	40.5	25	728	..
	SADC	49.4	72.6	52.5	2 461	925

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Life expectancy index 1997	Adult literacy index 1997	Combined 1 st 2 nd & 3 rd level gross enrolment index 1997	Education index 1997	GDP per capita index 1997	GDP-A per capita index 1997
1	Seychelles	0.767	0.840	0.610	0.763	0.850	0.735
2	Mauritius	0.773	0.830	0.630	0.763	0.796	0.664
3	South Africa	0.495	0.840	0.930	0.870	0.811	0.649
4	Swaziland	0.587	0.775	0.730	0.760	0.665	0.536
5	Namibia	0.457	0.798	0.820	0.805	0.719	0.501
6	Botswana	0.373	0.744	0.700	0.729	0.745	0.605
7	Lesotho	0.517	0.823	0.580	0.742	0.520	0.367
8	Zimbabwe	0.318	0.909	0.680	0.833	0.598	0.418
9	DR Congo	0.430	0.770	0.390	0.643	0.389	..
10	Zambia	0.252	0.751	0.490	0.664	0.369	0.243
11	Tanzania	0.382	0.716	0.330	0.587	0.281	0.195
12	Angola	0.358	0.450	0.270	0.390	0.495	0.355
13	Malawi	0.238	0.577	0.750	0.635	0.313	0.138
14	Mozambique	0.337	0.405	0.250	0.353	0.360	..
	SADC	0.406	0.726	0.525	0.659	0.580	0.403

4. SADC specific Human Development Index (revised)

SADC HDI Rank	Country	SADC-specific HDI (value) 1997	SADC-specific HDI-A (value) 1997	Global HDI (value) 1997	SADC-specific HDI rank 1997	Global HDI rank 1997
1	Seychelles	0.793	0.755	0.755	2	2
2	Mauritius	0.778	0.733	0.764	1	1
3	South Africa	0.725	0.671	0.695	3	3
4	Swaziland	0.671	0.628	0.644	4	4
5	Namibia	0.660	0.588	0.638	5	5
6	Botswana	0.616	0.569	0.609	6	6
7	Lesotho	0.593	0.542	0.582	7	7
8	Zimbabwe	0.583	0.523	0.560	8	8
9	DR Congo	0.487	..	0.479	9	9
10	Zambia	0.428	0.386	0.431	10	10
11	Tanzania	0.417	0.388	0.421	11	11
12	Angola	0.415	0.368	0.398	12	13
13	Malawi	0.395	0.337	0.399	13	12
14	Mozambique	0.350	..	0.341	14	14
	SADC	0.548	0.520	0.531		

4. SADC specific Human Development Index (revised)

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Life expectancy at birth (years) 1995	Adult literacy rate (%) 1995	Combined real GDP		
				1st level gross enrolment ratio (%) 1995	2nd & 3rd level gross enrolment ratio (%) 1995	
				Real GDP per capita (PPPS) 1995	Real GDP-A per capita (PPPS) 1995	
1	Seychelles	72.0 ^a	88.0 ^a	61	10 350	5 486
2	Mauritius	70.9	82.9	61 ^b	7 480	3 590
3	South Africa	64.1	81.8	81	8 582	3 519
4	Swaziland	58.8	76.7	77	3 948	1 935
5	Namibia	55.8	76.0 ^b	83	5 307	1 592
6	Botswana	51.7	69.8	71 ^b	5 764	2 651
7	Lesotho	58.1	71.3	56 ^b	1 430	615
8	Zimbabwe	48.9	85.1	69	2 512	929
9	DR Congo	52.4	77.3	41 ^b	947	..
10	Zambia	42.7	78.2	52 ^b	733	367
11	Tanzania	50.6	67.8	33	461	286
12	Angola	47.4	42.0 ^a	30 ^b	2 590	1191
13	Malawi	41.0	56.4	76 ^b	489	186
14	Mozambique	46.3	40.1	25	644	..
	SADC	52.8	70.8	52.3	2 888	1 628

3 SADC specific Human Development Index, 1995 (revised) continued

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Life expectancy index 1995	Adult literacy index 1995	Combined 1 st 2 nd & 3 rd level gross enrolment		GDP per capita index 1995	Real GDP-A per capita index 1995
				index 1995	Education index 1995		
1	Seychelles	0.783	0.880	0.610	0.790	0.840	0.725
2	Mauritius	0.765	0.829	0.610	0.756	0.781	0.649
3	South Africa	0.652	0.818	0.810	0.815	0.806	0.645
4	Swaziland	0.563	0.767	0.770	0.768	0.666	0.537
5	Namibia	0.513	0.760	0.830	0.783	0.719	0.501
6	Botswana	0.445	0.698	0.710	0.702	0.734	0.594
7	Lesotho	0.552	0.713	0.560	0.662	0.482	0.329
8	Zimbabwe	0.398	0.851	0.690	0.797	0.584	0.404
9	DR Congo	0.457	0.773	0.410	0.652	0.407	..
10	Zambia	0.295	0.782	0.520	0.695	0.361	0.235
11	Tanzania	0.427	0.678	0.330	0.562	0.277	0.190
12	Angola	0.373	0.420	0.300	0.380	0.589	0.449
13	Malawi	0.267	0.564	0.760	0.629	0.287	0.112
14	Mozambique	0.355	0.401	0.250	0.351	0.337	..
	SADC	0.463	0.705	0.523	0.644	0.609	0.505

SADC HDI Rank	Country	SADC HDI (value) 1995	SADC HDI-A (value) 1995	Global HDI (value) 1995	SADC HDI rank 1995	SADC HD-A rank 1995	Global HDI rank 1995
1	Seychelles	0.805	0.766	0.766	2	2	2
2	Mauritius	0.767	0.723	0.779	1	1	1
3	South Africa	0.758	0.704	0.699	3	3	4
4	Swaziland	0.666	0.623	0.632	5	4	5
5	Namibia	0.672	0.599	0.638	4	5	6
6	Botswana	0.627	0.580	0.606	6	6	3
7	Lesotho	0.565	0.514	0.547	8	8	9
8	Zimbabwe	0.593	0.533	0.569	7	7	8
9	DR Congo	0.505	..	0.440	10	..	13
10	Zambia	0.450	0.408	0.457	9	9	10
11	Tanzania	0.422	0.393	0.432	11	10	11
12	Angola	0.448	0.401	0.413	12	11	7
13	Malawi	0.394	0.336	0.412	13	12	12
14	Mozambique	0.348	..	0.361	14	..	14
	SADC	0.568	0.533	0.526			

Notes

The global HDI index is recalculated using the new methodology introduced in 1999 but using the threshold income of US\$40000.

The SADC HDI and SADC HDI-A uses the new methodology and a SADC threshold income of US\$25 000

^a UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998.

^b First or second level data, or both, have been estimated by UNESCO.

Table 10.1: Human Development Indicators (HDI)

SADC		Life expectancy at birth (years)		Adult literacy rate (%)		Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (%)	
		Female 1998	Male 1998	Female 1998	Male 1998	Female 1998	Male 1998
HDI Rank	Country						
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	75.3	68.1	80.3	87.3	63	62
3	South Africa	56.2	50.3	83.9	85.4	94	93
4	Swaziland	63.0	58.4	77.3	79.5	70	74
5	Namibia	50.6	49.5	79.7	81.9	84	80
6	Botswana	47.1	45.1	78.2	72.8	71	70
7	Lesotho	56.4	54.0	92.9	71.0	61	53
8	Zimbabwe	44.0	43.1	82.9	91.7	66	71
9	DR Congo	52.7	49.6	47.1	71.3	27	38
10	Zambia	41.0	39.9	69.1	84.0	46	53
11	Tanzania	49.0	46.8	64.3	83.3	32	33
12	Angola	48.6	45.4
13	Malawi	39.8	39.2	44.1	73.2	70	79
14	Mozambique	45.0	42.6	27.0	58.4	20	29
	SADC	50.2	47.1	57.0	72.6	47	51

SADC		Equally distributed					
		Real GDP per capita (PPP\$)		Life expectancy index	Education index	Income index	Income index-A
HDI Rank	Country	Female 1998	Male 1998	1998	1998	1998	1998
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	4 375	12 666	0.777	0.765	0.752	0.614
3	South Africa	5 205	11 886	0.471	0.876	0.773	0.607
4	Swaziland	2 267	5 485	0.595	0.762	0.621	0.486
5	Namibia	3 513	6 852	0.411	0.812	0.692	0.469
6	Botswana	3 747	8 550	0.347	0.738	0.710	0.566
7	Lesotho	982	2 291	0.501	0.714	0.461	0.298
8	Zimbabwe	1 990	3 359	0.300	0.806	0.580	0.396
9	DR Congo	590	1 060	0.434	..	0.356	..
10	Zambia	540	903	0.247	0.661	0.337	0.204
11	Tanzania	400	561	0.378	0.583	0.273	0.184
12	Angola	1 403	2 249	0.365	..	0.512	0.368
13	Malawi	432	616	0.228	0.593	0.288	0.104
14	Mozambique	647	921	0.309	0.288	0.363	..
	SADC	1 730	3 625	0.378	0.665	0.564	0.461

4 SADC specific Gender-related Development Index - 1998 (continued)

SADC HDI Rank	Country	SADC GDI (value) 1998	SADC GDI-A (value) 1998	Global GDI (value) 1998	SADC GDI rank 1998	Global GDI rank 1998	SADC GDI-A rank 1998
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	0.765	0.719	0.750	1	1	1
3	South Africa	0.706	0.651	0.689	2	2	2
4	Swaziland	0.659	0.614	0.646	3	3	3
5	Namibia	0.638	0.564	0.624	4	4	4
6	Botswana	0.598	0.550	0.584	5	5	5
7	Lesotho	0.558	0.504	0.556	7	6	6
8	Zimbabwe	0.562	0.501	0.551	6	7	7
9	DR Congo	0.416	..	0.418	8	8	..
10	Zambia	0.415	0.371	0.413	9	9	9
11	Tanzania	0.411	0.381	0.410	10	10	8
12	Angola
13	Malawi	0.370	0.308	0.375	11	11	10
14	Mozambique	0.320	..	0.326	12	12	..
	SADC	0.536	0.501	0.526			

5 SADC-specific Gender-related Development Index - 1997

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Life expectancy at birth (years)		Adult literacy rate (%)		Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (%)	
		Female 1997	Male 1997	Female 1997	Male 1997	Female 1997	Male 1997
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	75.1	67.9	79.2	86.9	63	62
3	South Africa	58.1	51.5	83.2	84.7	94	93
4	Swaziland	62.5	57.9	76.3	78.9	71	74
5	Namibia	53.0	51.8	78.5	81.2	84	80
6	Botswana	48.4	46.2	76.9	71.7	72	69
7	Lesotho	57.3	54.7	92.5	71.5	62	53
8	Zimbabwe	44.7	43.6	87.6	94.3	66	71
9	DR Congo	52.3	49.2	31.0	47.0
10	Zambia	40.6	39.5	67.5	83.3	46	53
11	Tanzania	49.1	46.8	62.0	81.7	32	33
12	Angola	48.1	44.9	25	29
13	Malawi	39.6	38.9	43.4	72.8	70	79
14	Mozambique	46.6	43.9	25.0	56.7	20	29
	SADC	50.7	47.3	65.3	79.3	48	56

Equally distributed

SADC		Real GDP per capita (PPP\$)		Life expectancy index 1997	Education index 1997	Income index 1997	Index adjusted for income inequality 1997
HDI Rank	Country	Female 1997	Male 1997				
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	4 080	12 205	0.774	0.760	0.740	0.601
3	South Africa	5 339	12 268	0.496	0.871	0.778	0.612
4	Swaziland	2 382	5 538	0.587	0.758	0.628	0.494
5	Namibia	3 602	6 994	0.451	0.806	0.696	0.473
6	Botswana	4 642	7 715	0.367	0.729	0.733	0.590
7	Lesotho	1 061	2 506	0.514	0.716	0.476	0.313
8	Zimbabwe	2 059	3 369	0.311	0.832	0.584	0.401
9	DR Congo	611	1 105	0.428	..	0.363	..
10	Zambia	576	961	0.240	0.652	0.349	0.217
11	Tanzania	392	555	0.379	0.568	0.270	0.180
12	Angola	1 186	1 902	0.357	..	0.481	..
13	Malawi	465	666	0.224	0.588	0.302	0.118
14	Mozambique	599	862	0.334	0.272	0.349	..
	SADC	1 765	3 697	0.379	0.660	0.460	0.376

SADC		SADC	SADC	Global GDI	SADC	Global	SADC	SADC
HDI Rank	Country	GDI (value) 1997	GDI-A (value) 1997	(value) 1997	GDI rank 1997	GDI rank 1997	GDI (value) 1995	GDI-A (value) 1995
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	0.758	0.712	0.754	1	1	0.748	0.702
3	South Africa	0.715	0.660	0.689	2	2	0.745	0.690
4	Swaziland	0.658	0.613	0.636	3	3	0.650	0.605
5	Namibia	0.651	0.577	0.633	4	4	0.664	0.590
6	Botswana	0.610	0.562	0.606	5	5	0.616	0.568
7	Lesotho	0.569	0.515	0.57	7	6	0.549	0.495
8	Zimbabwe	0.576	0.514	0.555	6	7	0.584	0.523
9	DR Congo	0.483	..
10	Zambia	0.414	0.370	0.425	8	8	0.446	0.403
11	Tanzania	0.406	0.376	0.418	9	9	0.408	0.378
12	Angola	0.428	0.380
13	Malawi	0.371	0.310	0.39	10	10	0.379	0.318
14	Mozambique	0.319	..	0.326	11	11	0.309	..
	SADC	0.500	0.472	0.346			0.532	0.441

1) SADC-specific Gender-related Development Index (SDGI) (revised)

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Life expectancy at birth (years)		Adult literacy rate (%)		Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (%)	
		Female 1995	Male 1995	Female 1995	Male 1995	Female 1995	Male 1995
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	74.5	67.7	78.8	87.1	61.1	58.2
3	South Africa	67.2	61.2	81.7	81.9	82.9	75.4
4	Swaziland	61.1	56.5	75.6	78.0	75.4	77.7
5	Namibia	57.0	54.6	74.0 ^a	78.0 ^a	84.9	78.7
6	Botswana	53.1	50.1	59.9	80.5	71.6	69.0
7	Lesotho	59.5	57.0	62.3	81.1	61.0	51.3
8	Zimbabwe	49.9	47.9	79.9	90.4	65.3	69.7
9	DR Congo	54.0	50.7	67.7	86.6	32.3	48.4
10	Zambia	43.4	41.9	71.3	85.6	48.5	55.0
11	Tanzania	52.0	49.2	56.8	79.4	32.1	33.4
12	Angola	49.1	45.9	29.0 ^a	56.0 ^a	27.5	31.8
13	Malawi	41.4	40.5	41.8	72.0	71.4	79.7
14	Mozambique	47.8	44.8	23.3	57.7	20.5	29.0
	SADC	53.6	51.1	65.1	79.0	48.7	53.3

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$)		Equally distributed			
		Female 1995	Male 1995	Life expectancy index 1995	Education index 1995	Income index 1995	Income index-A 1995
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	3 824	11 439	0.768	0.750	0.728	0.589
3	South Africa	5 213	11 979	0.653	0.809	0.773	0.608
4	Swaziland	2 280	5 302	0.563	0.767	0.620	0.486
5	Namibia	3 711	7 207	0.511	0.779	0.702	0.479
6	Botswana	4 334	7 203	0.441	0.686	0.720	0.578
7	Lesotho	879	2 077	0.552	0.656	0.440	0.276
8	Zimbabwe	1 917	3 136	0.394	0.787	0.571	0.387
9	DR Congo	652	1 181	0.455	0.618	0.375	..
10	Zambia	643	1 074	0.287	0.683	0.369	0.238
11	Tanzania	378	536	0.425	0.537	0.263	0.173
12	Angola	2 045	3 279	0.373	0.328	0.581	0.438
13	Malawi	463	663	0.255	0.582	0.301	0.117
14	Mozambique	490	705	0.353	0.262	0.312	..
	SADC	1 409.4	3 116.6	0.442	0.628	0.528	0.387

6 SADC-specific Gender-related Development Index, 1995 (revised) continued

SADC HDI Rank	Country	SADC GDI (value) 1995	SADC GDI-A (value) 1995	Global GDI (value) 1995	SADC (GDI) rank 1995	Global (GDI) rank 1995
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	0.748	0.702	0.761	1	1
3	South Africa	0.745	0.690	0.686	2	2
4	Swaziland	0.650	0.605	0.620	4	4
5	Namibia	0.664	0.590	0.629	3	3
6	Botswana	0.616	0.568	0.596	5	5
7	Lesotho	0.549	0.495	0.530	7	7
8	Zimbabwe	0.584	0.523	0.560	6	6
9	DR Congo	0.483	..	0.417	10	10
10	Zambia	0.446	0.403	0.445	8	8
11	Tanzania	0.408	0.378	0.420	9	9
12	Angola	0.428	0.380	0.392	11	11
13	Malawi	0.379	0.318	0.390	12	12
14	Mozambique	0.309	..	0.328	13	13
	SADC	0.532	0.486	0.508		

Note: The Global GDIs are compiled using the new methodology and a threshold income of US\$40 000 used in the global *Human Development Report*.

^a UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998b.

7 Human Poverty Index for SADC, 1998

SADC HDI Rank	Country	HPI rank	Human	% of	Adult illiteracy rate %	Population without access to		Underweight	Population without safe	
			Poverty Index (HPI-1) Value %	members not expected to live beyond 40 yrs of age 1998		safe water (%)	health services %	children under five years %	water & health services & underweight children %	Children not reaching grade 5 (%)
			1998	1998	1998	1990-98	1981-93	1990-98	1981-98	1995-97
1	Seychelles		16.0	..	1	6 ^a	..	1
2	Mauritius	12	11.5	4.8	16.2	2	1	16	6.3	1
3	South Africa	11	20.2	25.9	15.4	13	25	9	15.7	35
4	Swaziland	9	27.3	20.2	21.7	50	45	10	35.0	24
5	Namibia	7	28.6	33.5	19.2	17	45 ^c	26	29.3	14
6	Botswana	8	28.3	37.1	24.4	10	14	17	13.7	10
7	Lesotho	10	23.3	26.0	17.6	38	20	16	24.7	20
8	Zimbabwe	5	30.0	41.0	12.8	21	29	15	21.7	21
9	DR Congo		..	31.7	41.1	32.0	0	26
10	Zambia	4	37.8	46.2	23.7	62	25	24	37.0	16
11	Tanzania	6	29.2	35.4	26.4	34	7	27	22.7	19
12	Angola	1	54.7	37.7	58.0	69	76	42	62.3	..
13	Malawi	3	41.9	47.5	41.8	53	20	30	34.3	..
14	Mozambique	2	50.7	41.9	57.7	54	70	26	50.0	54
	SADC		31.5	35.3	29.0	35.4	31.3	22.0	29.4	22

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Refugees by country of asylum (thousands) 1996	Real GDP per capita (PPPS)		% of population below income poverty line		% of population below 2/3 of national income per capita		% of households' income spent	
			poorest 20% 1980-94	richest 20% 1980-94	US\$1 a day (1993 PPP\$) 1989-98	National poverty line 1987-97	Urban 1991-1995	Rural 1991-1995	Gini coefficients 1980-98	on food 1991-95
1	Seychelles	0.47	..
2	Mauritius	10.6	0.52	..
3	South Africa	22.6	516	9 897	11.5	..	82	..	0.59	48
4	Swaziland	0.6	66.0	0.51	..
5	Namibia	2.2	0.70	..
6	Botswana	0.2	33.3 ^a	47.0	0.54	..
7	Lesotho	..	137	2 945	50.4	26.0	0.57	..
8	Zimbabwe	0.6	420	6 542	36.0	74.0	0.63	63 ^b
9	DR Congo	676.0
10	Zambia	131.1	216	2 797	72.6	86.0	75	75	0.50	75
11	Tanzania	498.7	217	1 430	19.9	51.1	52	52	0.38	70
12	Angola	9.4	0.54	..
13	Malawi	1.3	42.1	54.0	0.62	..
14	Mozambique	0.2
	SADC	1 342.9							0.58	

^a Data refer to a period or year other than the one specified in the column heading.^b Source is Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare 1998. *Poverty Assessment Study Survey 1995*. Government printers, Zimbabwe.

8 Gender Empowerment Measure, 1997

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) rank, 1997	Seats held in parliament (% of total) ^a	Administrators and managers (% of total) ^b	Professional and technical workers (% of total) ^b	Women's real GDP per capita (PPP\$) ^b	SADC GEM value 1997	SADC GEM-A value 1997	SADC GEM value 1995
1	Seychelles	..	23.5
2	Mauritius	4	7.6	22.6	38.4	4 893 ^c	0.372	0.332	0.401
3	South Africa	1	28.4	17.4 ^d	46.7 ^d	4 637 ^c	0.529	0.485	0.461
4	Swaziland	7	6.3	24.1	61.2	2 082 ^c	0.324	0.308	0.345
5	Namibia	..	17.3	3 439 ^c
6	Botswana	2	8.5	25.7	52.8	5 990 ^c	0.423	0.374	0.418
7	Lesotho	3	10.6	33.4	56.6	1 145 ^c	0.390	0.38	0.389
8	Zimbabwe	5	14.7	15.4	40.0	1 764 ^c	0.355	0.338	0.352
9	DR Congo	..	4.6	648 ^c	0.140
10	Zambia	8	10.3	6.1	31.9	753	0.240	0.234	0.235
11	Tanzania	..	17.5	549
12	Angola	..	15.5	1 127 ^c
13	Malawi	9	5.7	4.8	34.7	600 ^c	0.206	0.2	0.206
14	Mozambique	6	25.2	11.3	20.40	612	0.331	..	0.334
	SADC		15.7	14.12	38.3	1 663.6 ^c	0.413	0.385	0.396

Notes:

^a Dates are as of 5 February 1999.

^b Data refer to latest available year.

^c No wage data available. An Estimate of 75% — the mean for all countries with data available — was used for the ratio of the female non-agricultural wage to the male non-agricultural wage

^d Calculated on the basis of data from UN 1994 and ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1994 and Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1995.

^e Refers to International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) 1988 which is not strictly comparable with the ISCO-1968 classification. See selected definitions.

DR Congo — % of female MPs is from *SADC Regional Human Development Report 1998*

9 Gender Empowerment Measure, 1995

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)rank 1995	Seats held in parliament (% of total) 1995	Adminis- trators and managers (% of total) 1995	Professional	Women's real GDP per capita (PPP\$) 1995	SADC GEM value 1995	SADC GEM-A value 1995	SADC GEM-A rank 1995
					and technical workers (% of total) ^a 1995				
1	Seychelles	..	23.5
2	Mauritius	3	7.6	22.6 ^c	38.4 ^c	6 674	0.355	0.324	6
3	South Africa	1	23.7	17.4 ^b	46.7 ^b	2 635	0.501	0.453	1
4	Swaziland	6	8.4	25.7	60.3	1 785	0.353	0.335	5
5	Namibia	..	15.3	2 761
6	Botswana	2	8.5	36.1 ^b	61.4 ^b	4 247	0.419	0.383	2
7	Lesotho	4	11.2	33.4 ^b	56.6 ^b	773	0.391	0.383	3
8	Zimbabwe	5	14.7	15.4 ^b	40.0	1 621	0.357	0.338	4
9	DR Congo	10	4.6	9.0	16.6	254	0.146
10	Zambia	8	9.7	6.1	31.9	741	0.234	0.229	7
11	Tanzania	..	17.5	527
12	Angola	..	9.5	1 417
13	Malawi	9	5.6	4.8 ^b	34.7 ^b	637	0.203	0.199	8
14	Mozambique	7	25.2	11.3	20.4 ^b	789	0.329
	SADC		14.5	12.7	26.15	1 195.6	0.310	0.230	

DR Congo — % of female MPs is from the *Regional Human Development Report 1998*

^a Data refer to latest available year.

^b Carried over from *UNDP Human Development report, 1997*.

^c Refers to International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) 1988 which is not strictly comparable with the ISCO-1968 classification. See selected definitions.

10 Integration index

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Intra-SADC Imports as a % of GDP				Intra-SADC Exports as a % of GDP			
		1992	1993	1994	1995	1992	1993	1994	1995
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	6.28	7.09	6.81	5.89	0.49	0.57	0.37	0.37
3	South Africa	0.43	0.29	0.31	0.31	3.55	4.26	4.23	4.53
4	Swaziland	94.90	81.98	78.13	87.45	56.56	55.18	48.72	45.32
5	Namibia	0.00	42.37	48.99	43.67	0.06	15.57	13.02	0.06
6	Botswana	39.78	39.96	48.79	42.28	6.42	8.38	17.29	15.88
7	Lesotho	91.39	90.44	92.78	98.92	5.82	7.23	7.26	0.00
8	Zimbabwe	9.19	8.711	1.72	15.74	5.69	6.92	7.90	7.93
9	DR Congo
10	Zambia	8.56	10.31	7.81	10.02	1.38	1.61	2.02	3.52
11	Tanzania	0.35	1.40	3.40	2.57	0.32	0.79	0.22	0.11
12	Angola	1.10	1.77	2.55	0.32	0.31	0.45	0.25	0.08
13	Malawi	16.69	13.43	21.13	15.82	3.84	2.72	5.78	5.04
14	Mozambique	25.63	12.70	16.77	20.67	2.47	2.64	3.57	3.93
	SADC	3.91	4.25	4.94	4.81	3.6	4.52	4.71	4.62

10 Integration index continued

SADC HDI		Intra-SADC									
		Intra-SADC Total Trade as a % of GDP				Total Trade as a % of GDP	Foreign assets US\$m	Foreign liabilities US\$m	% of Protocols ratified		
		1992	1993	1994	1995	1992-95	1997	1998	1997	1998	1998
Rank	Country										
1	Seychelles	2	1	3	2	14.29
2	Mauritius	6.77	7.66	7.19	6.26	6.97	51	51	155	227	71.43
3	South Africa	3.98	4.54	4.54	4.84	4.48	1 234	1 678	2 115	1 175	64.29
4	Swaziland	151.46	137.16	126.85	132.77	137.06	177	222	161	295	57.14
5	Namibia	0.06	57.94	62.01	43.73	40.94	649	193	289	322	78.57
6	Botswana	46.20	48.34	66.08	58.16	54.70	627	172	122	329	85.71
7	Lesotho	89.53	82.61	89.05	89.66	87.71	367	349	78	87	64.29
8	Zimbabwe	14.88	15.63	19.61	23.67	18.45	110	79	244	196	71.43
9	DR Congo	6	4	4	3	14.29
10	Zambia	9.95	11.93	9.84	13.54	11.31	21	10	52	73	42.86
11	Tanzania	0.68	2.19	3.63	2.68	2.29	3	5	29	37	64.29
12	Angola	1.41	2.22	2.80	0.40	1.71	19	9	11	5	28.57
13	Malawi	20.53	16.15	26.92	20.85	21.11	62	54	64	49	50.00
14	Mozambique	28.09	15.34	20.34	24.60	22.09	21	26	22	20	28.57
SADC							3 349	2 853	3 349	2 853	
Correlations with HDI											
		Intra SADC Foreign assets and liabilities as a % of GDP	Average Intra SADC foreign assets and liabilities as a % of GDP	Employed SADC citizens as a % of total employed	Intra SADC Total Trade as a % of GDP (TI) index	Intra SADC Total Foreign Invest- ment as a % of GDP (FII)	SADC citizens as a % of total employed index (LMI)	Protocol ratificat- ion index (PRI)	SADC Integra- tion index (SII) 1998	SADC Integra- tion Index (Including Protocol) (SIIP) 1998	Trade+ Investment index (TII)
		1997	1997-98								
	Angola	29.470	13.514	21.492	..	0.009	0.269	..	0.286	..	0.139
	Botswana	15.610	10.303	12.957	1.270	0.304	0.162	0.127	0.857	0.198	0.233
	DR Congo	0.184	0.737	0.461	0.006	..	0.143
	Lesotho	43.275	49.709	46.492	0.190	0.487	0.581	0.019	0.643	0.362	0.433
	Malawi	4.966	6.107	5.536	0.459	0.117	0.069	0.046	0.500	0.077	0.183
	Mauritius	4.921	6.539	5.730	0.040	0.039	0.072	0.004	0.714	0.038	0.207
	Mozambique	1.221	1.252	1.236	..	0.123	0.015	..	0.286	..	0.069
	Namibia	30.206	16.931	23.569	3.320	0.227	0.295	0.332	0.786	0.285	0.410
	Seychelles	0.904	0.513	0.708	0.009	..	0.143
	South Africa	2.268	2.139	2.204	1.880	0.025	0.028	0.188	0.643	0.080	0.221
	Swaziland	25.775	43.649	34.712	4.730	0.761	0.434	0.473	0.571	0.556	0.560
	Tanzania	0.416	0.547	0.482	..	0.013	0.006	..	0.643	..	0.009
	Zambia	1.966	3.198	2.582	1.310	0.063	0.032	0.131	0.429	0.075	0.164
	Zimbabwe	4.299	4.949	4.624	8.070	0.102	0.058	0.807	0.714	0.322	0.420
	Correlations with HDI				0.312	0.168	0.062	0.318	0.149	0.285	0.311

II Trends in human development

SADC HDI		SADC-Specific Human Development Index (HDI)			Life Expectancy index			Infant mortality rate (per 1 000 live births)			Population with access to safe water (%)	
Rank	Country	1995	1997	1998	1970-75	1995	1998	1970	1996	1998	1975-80	1990-98
1	Seychelles	0.805	0.776	0.808	..	72.0	71.0	..	32	14
2	Mauritius	0.767	0.786	0.782	62.9	70.9	71.6	64	20	19	99	98
3	South Africa	0.758	0.715	0.718	53.6	64.1	53.2	80	50	60	..	87
4	Swaziland	0.666	0.661	0.672	47.3	58.8	60.7	140	68	64	..	50
5	Namibia	0.672	0.657	0.651	48.7	55.8	50.1	104	60	57	..	83
6	Botswana	0.627	0.630	0.613	53.2	51.7	46.2	98	40	38	..	90
7	Lesotho	0.565	0.596	0.583	49.5	58.1	55.2	125	96	94	17	62
8	Zimbabwe	0.593	0.574	0.570	51.5	48.9	43.5	86	49	59	..	79
9	DR Congo	0.505	0.489	0.440	46.1	52.4	51.2	147	128	128	19	68
10	Zambia	0.450	0.442	0.429	47.3	42.7	40.5	109	112	112	42	38
11	Tanzania	0.422	0.429	0.422	46.5	50.6	47.9	129	93	91	39	66
12	Angola	0.448	0.410	0.419	38.0	47.4	47.0	179	170	170	17	31
13	Malawi	0.394	0.409	0.393	41.0	41.0	39.5	189	137	134	51	47
14	Mozambique	0.348	0.351	0.350	42.5	46.3	43.8	163	133	129	..	46
	SADC	0.533	0.518	0.504	47.4	52.9	48.7	113	110	107		66

SADC HDI		Underweight children under age five years (%)		Adult literacy rate (%)			Combined primary, secondary and tertiary Gross enrolment ratio (%)		
Rank	Country	1975	1990-98	1970	1995	1998	1980	1995	1998
1	Seychelles	..	6	..	88	84.0	..	61	76
2	Mauritius	32	16	65	83	83.8	48	61	63
3	South Africa	..	9	70	82	84.6	..	81	95
4	Swaziland	..	10	49	77	78.3	59	77	72
5	Namibia	..	26	..	76	80.8	..	83	84
6	Botswana	..	17	44	70	75.6	51	71	71
7	Lesotho	20	16	47	71	82.4	52	56	57
8	Zimbabwe	25	15	66	85	87.2	41	69	68
9	DR Congo	44	77	58.9	46	41	33
10	Zambia	17	24	48	78	76.3	46	52	49
11	Tanzania	25	27	37	68	73.6	44	33	33
12	Angola	..	42	..	42	42.0	54	30	25
13	Malawi	19	30	38	56	58.2	33	76	75
14	Mozambique	..	26	16	40	42.3	29	25	25
	SADC		19	49	71	68.7	38	51.8	51.14

11 Trends in human development continued

SADC

HDI

Real GDP per capita (PPPS)

Rank	Country	1960	1995	1998
1	Seychelles	..	10 350	10 600
2	Mauritius	2 113	7 480	8 312
3	South Africa	2 984	8 582	8 488
4	Swaziland	1 182	3 948	3 816
5	Namibia	..	5 307	5 176
6	Botswana	474	5 764	6 103
7	Lesotho	346	1 430	1 626
8	Zimbabwe	937	2 512	2 669
9	DR Congo	..	947	822
10	Zambia	1 172	733	719
11	Tanzania	272	461	480
12	Angola	..	2 590	1 821
13	Malawi	423	489	523
14	Mozambique	1 368	644	782
	SADC	1 592	2 888	2663

12 Governance

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Date of last elections	Elected (E) or appointed(A)	Members of Parliament			Voter turn out last election %	Political parties represented in Parliament	Year first woman elected (E) or nomi- nated (N) to national Parliament
				Total	% female	Year			
1	Seychelles	03 1998	E+A	34	30.8	7 2000	87	3	1976E
2	Mauritius	12 1995	E+A	66	7.6	2 2000	80	5	1976E
3	South Africa	06 1999	E	400	28 ^c	2 2000	89	7	1933E
4	Swaziland	10 1998	E+A	95	6.3	2 2000	..	1	1972E
5	Namibia	11 1999	E+A	104	20.4	2 2000	63	5	1989E
6	Botswana	10 1999	E+A	44	17	2 2000	77	3	1979E
7	Lesotho	05 1998	E	80	10.7	2 2000	74	2	1965N
8	Zimbabwe	06 2000	E+A	150	9.3	8 2000	62	3	1980E
9	DR Congo	10 1993 ^a	E	738	4.6	1998 ^c	1970E
10	Zambia	11 1996	E+A	158	8.9	7 2000	40	4 ^b	1964E
11	Tanzania	10 1995	E+A	275	16.4	2 2000	77	5	..
12	Angola	09 1992	E	220	16.4	7 2000	91	12	1980E
13	Malawi	06 1999	E	177	8.3	2 2000	92	3 ^b	1964E
14	Mozambique	12 1999	E	250	30	2 2000	80	2	1977E
	SADC			2791	14.5	76	4		

^a Transitional unicameral parliament dissolved following change of regime in May 1997

^b There are also independent and other parties not sufficiently represented to constitute a parliamentary group.

^c The parliament has been suspended.

13 Population trends

SADC HDI	Rank	Country	Estimated population (millions)							Annual population growth rate %		Females as % of population
			1975	1980	1990	1995	1998	2000	2015	1975-98	1998-2015	1999
1		Seychelles	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	..	0.1	1.1	1.0	48.7
2		Mauritius	0.9	0.9	1	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.1	0.8	50.1
3		South Africa	24.7	28.8	36.9	41.5	39.4	40.4	43.4	2	0.6	50.9
4		Swaziland	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.5	3	2.6	51.8
5		Namibia	0.9	1.0	1.4	1.5	1.7	1.7	2.0	2.7	1.2	50.1
6		Botswana	0.8	0.8	1.1	1.5	1.6	1.6	2.0	3.2	1.3	50.8
7		Lesotho	1.2	1.4	1.8	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.9	3.3	2.9	50.7
8		Zimbabwe	6.1	7.2	9.8	11.2	11.4	11.7	13.6	2.7	1.0	50.3
9		DR Congo	23.3	28.1	38.9	45.5	49.1	51.7	80.3	2.4	2.0	50.5
10		Zambia	4.8	5.5	7.2	8.1	8.8	9.2	12.8	2.6	2.2	50.5
11		Tanzania	15.9	18.8	25.7	30.0	32.1	33.5	47.2	3.1	2.3	50.4
12		Angola	6.1	7.3	9.5	10.8	12.1	12.9	19.7	3.0	2.9	50.6
13		Malawi	5.2	6.1	8.3	9.7	10.3	10.9	15.8	3.0	2.5	50.4
14		Mozambique	10.5	12.0	15.4	17.3	18.9	19.7	25.2	2.6	1.7	50.6
		SADC	101	118.5	157.8	181.2	189.7	197.5	267.8	2.4	1.6	50.6

SADC HDI	Rank	Country	Urban population (as a % of total)			Dependency ratio (%)		Total Fertility Rate		Contraceptive prevalence (% women 15-45 years)	Maternal mortality rate (deaths per 100 000 live births)
			1975	1998	2015	1998	2015	1990	1997	1990-99	1990-98
1		Seychelles	33.3	56.9	67.3	3.4	2.1
2		Mauritius	43.4	40.9	48.6	47.6	42.0	1.9	1.9	75	50
3		South Africa	48.0	49.9	56.3	63.9	53.6	..	2.8	50	160
4		Swaziland	14.0	33.9	47.2	85.3	68.9	6.5	4.7	21	230
5		Namibia	20.6	38.9	53.2	83.9	74.5	..	4.9	29	230
6		Botswana	12.0	68.8	88.7	82.6	64.7	6.7	4.4	48	330
7		Lesotho	29.5	29.6	39.3	103.1	89.2	5.8	4.8	23	..
8		Zimbabwe	19.6	33.99	45.9	82.1	56.3	5.6	3.8	66	400
9		DR Congo	10.8	26.4	38.9	79.1	72.7	6.1	6.4	8	..
10		Zambia	34.8	43.9	51.5	99.7	78.5	7.2	5.6	26	650
11		Tanzania	10.1	26.4	38.3	93.6	78.8	7.1	5.5	18	530
12		Angola	17.8	32.9	44.1	102.2	88.0	6.4	6.8	8	..
13		Malawi	7.7	14.6	22.7	99.6	86.1	7.6	6.4	22	620
14		Mozambique	8.6	37.8	51.5	92.8	84.5	6.3	5.3	10	1 100
		SADC	22.1	34.5	43.8	83.6	71.8	4.9	5.1	25	398

Maternal mortality data is from the African Development Bank 1998, *Selected Statistics on African Countries, 1998*.
Namibia maternal mortality rate is from UNDP and UNAIDS 1997, *Namibia Human Development Report 1997*.

14 Education profile

		Age group enrolment ratios (adjusted)				Tertiary natural and applied science students (as % of total tertiary) ^a
SADC HDI Rank	Country	Youth literacy rate (% age 15–24) 1998	Primary age group (% of relevant age group) 1997	Secondary age group (% of relevant age group) 1997	Children reaching grade 5 (%) 1995–97 ^b	1995–97 ^b
1	Seychelles	99	45
2	Mauritius	94	97	68	99	17
3	South Africa	91	100	95	..	18
4	Swaziland	90	95	82	76	22
5	Namibia	91	91	81	86	4
6	Botswana	87	80	89	90	27
7	Lesotho	90	69	73	80	13
8	Zimbabwe	97	93	59	79	23
9	DR Congo	80	58	37	64	..
10	Zambia	87	72	42
11	Tanzania	90	47	..	81	39
12	Angola	..	35	31
13	Malawi	70	99	73	..	18
14	Mozambique	58	40	22	46	46
	SADC	83	66	49	69	31

		R & D scientist and technicians (per 1000 people) 1990–96	Public education expenditure					
SADC HDI Rank	Country		(as % of GNP) 1985	(as % of total government expenditure) 1995–97 ^b	Primary and secondary education (as % of all levels) 1995–97 ^b	Tertiary (as % of all levels) 1995–97 ^b	Primary School starting age	
1	Seychelles	..	10.7	7.9	24.1	66	16	..
2	Mauritius	0.5	3.8	4.6	17.4	63	25	5
3	South Africa	1.2	6.0	8.0	23.9	73	14	6
4	Swaziland	..	5.9	5.7	18.1	63	27	..
5	Namibia	9.1	25.6	87	13	7
6	Botswana	..	6.8	8.6	20.6	7
7	Lesotho	..	4.3	8.4	..	70	29	6
8	Zimbabwe	..	9.1	7.1	..	78	17	6
9	DR Congo	..	1.0	6
10	Zambia	..	4.7	2.2	7.1	60	23	7
11	Tanzania	..	4.4	7
12	Angola	..	5.1	6
13	Malawi	..	3.5	5.4	18.3	68	21	6
14	Mozambique	..	4.2	7
	SADC		5.8	7.6	22.2	70	19	6

14 Education profile continued

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Duration of primary education (years) 1995 ^c	Expenditure per student (as a % of GNP per capita)						Primary pupil	Secondary pupil
			Primary ^c		Secondary		Tertiary		teacher ratio (No of pupils per teacher) 1996	teacher ratio (No of pupils per teacher) 1992-94
			1980	1996	1980	1996	1980	1995		
1	Seychelles	17.0	12
2	Mauritius	6	15.8	9.8	343.6	67.5	24	..
3	South Africa	7	..	15.5	..	23.7	..	37.6	14	28
4	Swaziland	33	..
5	Namibia	7	..	15.5	..	33.8	..	100.7	32	..
6	Botswana	7	12.5	611.7	..	25	16
7	Lesotho	7	8.6	16.2	72.2	62	999.7	397.6	47	..
8	Zimbabwe	7	24.3	20.2	..	38.2	407.1	406.5	39	30
9	DR Congo	6	748.1	..	45	23
10	Zambia	7	10.6	5.1	..	15.4	605.0	369.0	39	..
11	Tanzania	7	36.0	18
12	Angola	4
13	Malawi	8	7.6	9.0	..	79.9	1 839.9	1 636.0	59	..
14	Mozambique	5	58	..
	SADC	7							30	

^a Data refers to enrolment in natural and applied sciences.

^b Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified in the column heading.

^c World Development Indicators 1999

15 Gender and education

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Female adult ^b literacy			Female primary ^a age group enrolment (adjusted)				
		Rate (% age 15 and above) 1998	Index (1985= 100) 1998	As % of male rate 1998	Primary education		Ratio (% of primary school age girls)		As % of male rate 1997
					Female teachers (% of total) 1996	Female pupils (% of total) 1996	1997	Index (1985=100) 1997	
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	80.3	112	92	51	49	97	97	100
3	South Africa	83.9	108	98	74	49	100	123	100
4	Swaziland	77.3	120	97	95	118	102
5	Namibia	79.7	118	97	..	50	94	98	106
6	Botswana	78.2	120	107	77	50	83	87	106
7	Lesotho	92.9	107	131	79	52	74	90	118
8	Zimbabwe	82.9	120	90	44	49	92	92	98
9	DR Congo	47.1	174	66	36	48	48	91	70
10	Zambia	69.1	131	82	43	48	72	84	98
11	Tanzania	64.3	150	77	44	49	48	85	102
12	Angola	34	70	97
13	Malawi	44.1	139	60	39	47	100	244	102
14	Mozambique	27.0	186	43	23	42	34	73	76

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Secondary education		Female secondary age group enrolment (adjusted)		Female tertiary students			Female tertiary science as % of males 1994-97
		Female teachers % of total 1996	Female pupils % of total 1996	Ratio (% of secondary school age girls 1997	Index (1985=100) 1997	As % of male rate 1997	per 100 000 women 1994-97	Index (1985 = 100) 1994-97	
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	45	..	70	141	106	568	68	101
3	South Africa	70	49	97	140	104	1590	..	90
4	Swaziland	79	128	93	627	..	99
5	Namibia	84	113	108	890	..	154
6	Botswana	43	52	91	195	106	545	349	87
7	Lesotho	53	59	80	93	122	250	208	115
8	Zimbabwe	36	44	56	111	91	386	..	41
9	DR Congo	16	..	29	99	63
10	Zambia	..	38	35	104	71	135	233	39
11	Tanzania	26	44	367	24
12	Angola	28	33	28	73	82
13	Malawi	1	21	54	211	59	34	179	42
14	Mozambique	17	39	17	74	62	19	380	31
	SADC	8	39	45		84	97		54

16 Gender and economic activity

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Female economic activity rate (age 15 and above)			Unemployment rate (% (age 15-64))		
		Rate % 1998	Index (1985=100) 1998	As % of Male rate 1998	Female	Male 1991-99	Total
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	37.4	121.0	47.1	9.9	3.9	5.9
3	South Africa	46.2	103.5	58.7	27.8	19.8	23.3
4	Swaziland	41.9	105.0	51.9	23.3	20.7	21.8
5	Namibia	53.9	100.8	67.1	21.0	18.0	19.0
6	Botswana	64.7	95.0	77.6	21.0
7	Lesotho	47.1	100.2	55.8	26.6	21.9	..
8	Zimbabwe	66.6	99.6	78.0	15.0	15.0	15.0
9	DR Congo	61.1	97.2	72.4
10	Zambia	65.4	97.9	76.2	16.0	15.0	15.0
11	Tanzania	82.1	97.8	92.9
12	Angola	73.1	97.8	81.7
13	Malawi	78.3	97.7	90.3
14	Mozambique	83.0	97.7	91.8
	SADC	63.9		75.1			

16 Gender and economic activity continued

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Clerical and sales workers Female (as % of male) 1990	Service workers Female (%) 1990	Service workers Female (as % of male) 1990	Women in government		
					All levels (%) 1998	At ministerial level (%) 1998	At sub- ministerial level (%) 1998
1	Seychelles	143	59	141	20.3	33.3	17.5
2	Mauritius	44	41	70
3	South Africa	66	196	15.6	14.8	15.9	..
4	Swaziland	116	45	82	11.9	5.9	16.0
5	Namibia	15.1	8.3	16.5
6	Botswana	151	70	238	19.0	14.3	20.4
7	Lesotho	144	68	209	13.3	6.3	14.9
8	Zimbabwe	52	30	42	8.5	12.0	..
9	DR Congo	3.7	4.0	..
10	Zambia	136	22	29	9.9	3.3	12.1
11	Tanzania	11.8	12.9	11.1
12	Angola	11.1	13.8	10.2
13	Malawi	58	28	39	3.8	4.2	3.7
14	Mozambique	13.7	..	15.8
	SADC	84	52	138	10.5	9.1	9.4

17 Health profile

SADC HDI Rank	Country	One-year-olds fully immunised against		AIDS cases		HIV/AIDS prevalence		Nurses (per (100000 people) 1992-95 ^a
		Tuberculosis (%) 1995-98 ^a	Measles (%) 1995-98 ^a	(per 100000 people) ^b 1995	(per 100000 people) ^b 1997	Total number (age 0-49) 1997 ^c	(Adults 15-49 (%) 1997 ^c	
1	Seychelles	100	93	8.2	417
2	Mauritius	87	85	0.6	3.8	..	0.08	241
3	South Africa	95	76	6.8	29.6 ^d	2 900 000	12.91	175
4	Swaziland	85	62	18.0	270.3	84 000	18.50	..
5	Namibia	85	63	119.1	420.6	150 000	19.94	81
6	Botswana	66	80	35.9	351.6	190 000	25.10	..
7	Lesotho	46	43	16.6	114.3	85 000	8.35	33
8	Zimbabwe	73	65	118.6	564.4	1 500 000	25.84	164
9	DR Congo	13	10	4.3	80.0	950 000	4.35	..
10	Zambia	81	69	45.3	530.1	770 000	19.07	..
11	Tanzania	83	72	95.5	281.4 ^d	1 400 000	9.42	738
12	Angola	71	65	2.9	11.2 ^c	110 000	2.12	..
13	Malawi	100	90	47.3	505.4	710 000	14.92	6
14	Mozambique	99	87	7.4	33.5	1 200 000	14.17	..
	SADC	64	55	33.0	174	10 049 000	10.77	..

17 Health profile continued

SADC		Physicians (per 1000 people)		Tuberculosis cases (per 100 000 people)		Malaria cases (per 100 000 people)	
HDI Rank	Country	1980	1990	1995	1997	1994	1997
1	Seychelles	12.3	26.7
2	Mauritius	0.52	0.81	13.7	13.7 ^d	3	5.7
3	South Africa	209.6	242.7	25	75.2
4	Swaziland	..	0.11	239.8	441.9 ^d
5	Namibia	100.3	372.2	27 209	26 216.6
6	Botswana	0.12	..	390.0	455.7	2 089	..
7	Lesotho	..	0.04	239.1	257.2
8	Zimbabwe	0.06	0.14	275.5	374.6	2 964	..
9	DR Congo	..	0.07	88.1	98.3 ^d
10	Zambia	0.09	0.08	157.7	488.4 ^d	498	37 458.2 ^d
11	Tanzania	132.7	147.4	343	3 602.1
12	Angola	..	0.04	73.8	123.8	6 377	..
13	Malawi	..	0.02	198.0	205	49 410	..
14	Mozambique	0.3	..	103.6	103.2
	SADC			147	196.8	5 762	

SADC		Cigarette consumption per adult		Hospital beds (per 1 000 people)		People with disabilities (as % of total population)
HDI Rank	Country	(1970-72=100) 1990-92	(1983-86=100) 1993-97 ^c	1980	1990-98	1985-95
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	140	86	3.1	3.1	2.6
3	South Africa	128
4	Swaziland
5	Namibia
6	Botswana	2.4	1.6	4.0
7	Lesotho
8	Zimbabwe	61	64	3.1	0.5	2.0
9	DR Congo	123	1.4	..
10	Zambia	86	..	3.5	..	1.6
11	Tanzania	97	82	1.4	0.9	..
12	Angola	100	1.3	..
13	Malawi	165	80	..	1.3	2.9
14	Mozambique	124	..	1.1	0.9	..

17 Health profile continued

SADC HDI	Rank	Country	Public expenditure on health as % of GDP		Private expenditure on health (as a % of GDP)	Total expenditure on health (as a % per capita of GDP)	Health expenditure PPPS
			1990	1996–98 ^b	1990–97 ^a	1990–97 ^a	1990–97 ^a
	1	Seychelles	3.6	5.4
	2	Mauritius	..	1.9	1.7	4.0	304
	3	South Africa	3.1	3.2 ^d	4.3	7.9	542
	4	Swaziland	1.9	2.5
	5	Namibia	3.8	3.8	3.4	6.8	315
	6	Botswana	1.3	2.7	1.4	3.1	..
	7	Lesotho	2.6	3.7 ^d
	8	Zimbabwe	..	3.1	3.1	4.7	133
	9	DR Congo	..	1.2
	10	Zambia	2.6	2.3	0.7	3.3	31
	11	Tanzania	1.8	1.3
	12	Angola	1.4
	13	Malawi	..	2.8
	14	Mozambique	3.6	2.1
		SADC	2.9	2.8			

^a Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified in the column heading.

^b The number of cumulated reported cases among adults and children

^c Data refer to end of 1997

^d Data refer to year other than that specified in column heading

^e Data refer to a moving average calculated over three years within the period specified in the column heading

^f Data refer to a year prior to 1997

18 Child survival and development

SADC HDI	Rank	Country	Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births)		Under-five mortality rate (per 1000 children under 5 years)		Pregnant women aged 15–49 with anaemia %	Births attended by trained health personnel %	Maternal mortality rate (deaths per 1000 live births)
			1989	1998	1996	1998	1985–95	1990–96	1990–98
	1	Seychelles	18	14	19	18	..	99	..
	2	Mauritius	22	19	23	23	29	97	50
	3	South Africa	80	60	66	83	37	82	404
	4	Swaziland	115	64	97	90	..	55	230
	5	Namibia	103	57	77	74	16	68	230
	6	Botswana	64	38	50	48	..	78	330
	7	Lesotho	97	94	139	136	7	40	598
	8	Zimbabwe	63	59	73	89	..	69	400
	9	DR Congo	81	128	207	207	76
	10	Zambia	78	112	202	202	34	51	650
	11	Tanzania	103	91	144	142	..	53	530
	12	Angola	173	170	292	292	29	15	..
	13	Malawi	147	134	217	213	55	55	620
	14	Mozambique	173	170	211	206	58	15	1 100

18 Child survival and development continued

SADC HDI		Mothers exclusively breast- feeding at six months %	Mothers exclusively breast- feeding at three months %	Oral rehydration therapy use rate %	Low birth weight babies % of births		Prevalence of child malnutrition	
Rank	Country	1990-96	1990-96	1990-97	1982	1993-96	Weight for age % of children less than 5 1992-97	Height for age % of children less than 5 1992-97
1	Seychelles	55
2	Mauritius	55	16	15	10
3	South Africa	9	23
4	Swaziland	87	37	99
5	Namibia	86	22	66	26	29
6	Botswana	90	41	8	27	..
7	Lesotho	..	54	84	8	..	16	44
8	Zimbabwe	92	16	60	15	14	16	21
9	DR Congo	99	32	90	13	..	34	45
10	Zambia	99	13	99	..	13	24	42
11	Tanzania	90	40	91	..	14	31	43
12	Angola	..	3	35	..
13	Malawi	..	11	78	22	20	30	48
14	Mozambique	93	..	83	16	20	26	36
	SADC	95.1	27	86			21	27

Maternal mortality data is from the African Development Bank 1998, *Selected Statistics on African Countries 1998*.
 Namibia maternal mortality rate is from UNDP and UNAIDS 1997 *Namibia Human Development Report 1997*
The Impact of HIV/AIDS in Namibia

19 Labour profile

SADC HDI		Labour force (as % of total population)		Labour force participation rate	Percentage of labour force in						
Rank	Country	1980	1995	1997	1990	Agriculture		Industry		Services	
						1970	1990	1970	1990	1970	1990
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	38.7	42	44.9	28.4	34	17	25	43	41	40
3	South Africa	36.4	39	40.2	24.4	31	14	30	32	39	55
4	Swaziland	40.6	36	34.5	20.0	65	39	13	22	22	38
5	Namibia	44.3	41	39.1	24.9	64	49	15	15	21	36
6	Botswana	49.9	44	42.2	23.5	82	46	5	20	13	33
7	Lesotho	40.4	41	39.3	25.8	43	40	36	28	21	32
8	Zimbabwe	43.8	46	46.3	26.2	77	68	11	8	12	24
9	DR Congo	42.3	42	40.0	23.8	75	68	11	13	14	19
10	Zambia	43.8	41	45.1	23.0	79	75	7	8	14	17
11	Tanzania	50.4	51	49.8	26.0	90	84	3	5	7	11
12	Angola	47.1	46	44.3	24.9	78	75	7	8	15	17
13	Malawi	50.7	48	47.9	27.4	91	87	4	5	5	8
14	Mozambique	55.4	52	45.8	27.4	86	83	6	8	8	9
	SADC	44.4	44.5	43.6	25	68	69	14	15	18	26

19 Labour profile continued

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Women's share of adult labour force (% age 15 years and above)		Under 14 in the labour force (as a % of pop aged 10–14 years	Age dependency ratio	Unemployment rate ^a %		
		1970	1998 ^d	1997	1995	Female	Male	Total
1	Seychelles	0.6
2	Mauritius	20	32.16	2.6	0.5	9.9 ^b	3.9 ^b	5.9 ^b
3	South Africa	33	37.64	..	0.7	27.8	19.8	23.3
4	Swaziland	34	37.62	13.8	0.9	23.3	20.7	21.8
5	Namibia	39	40.82	20.0	0.9	21.0	18.0	19.0
6	Botswana	55	45.54	15.9	0.8	21.0
7	Lesotho	40	36.82	21.5	0.8	26.6	21.9	..
8	Zimbabwe	44	44.46	28.5	0.8	15.0	15.0	15.0
9	DR Congo	45	43.48	29.2	1.0
10	Zambia	44	45.04	16.0	1.0	16.0	15.0	15.0
11	Tanzania	51	49.22	38.4	0.9
12	Angola	47	46.34	26.7	1.0
13	Malawi	50	48.80	33.7	1.0
14	Mozambique	50	48.40	33.2	0.9
	SADC	43	44.00	22.5	0.9			

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Wages in non-agricultural activities (monthly earnings in current US\$)	Wages in manufacturing sector (monthly earnings in current US\$)	Wages in mining and quarrying (monthly sector earnings in current US\$)	Wages in construction (monthly earnings in current US\$)	Wages in transport storage and communications (monthly earnings in current US\$)
		1994–97	1997 ^c	1997 ^c	1997 ^c	1997
1	Seychelles	424.4	527.7 ^c
2	Mauritius	257.5	305.5	414.6	488.2	426.3
3	South Africa	..	641.7	..	393.9	702 ^d
4	Swaziland	381.2	555.5	..	246.1	455.2
5	Namibia
6	Botswana	236.8	173.4	370.9	217.5	343.7
7	Lesotho
8	Zimbabwe	152	230.1	157	123.9	288.7
9	DR Congo
10	Zambia
11	Tanzania
12	Angola
13	Malawi	64.1	12.8 ^e	..	17.1 ^e	25.3 ^e
14	Mozambique

^a Unemployment rate data are from the National Statistical Offices^b Data is for 1997^c Data is for 1995 Income Consumption and Expenditure Survey^d Source: African Development Indicators - CD 2000

20 FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Daily per capita supply of protein ^a				Daily per capita supply of fat ^a	
		Daily per capita supply of calories ^a		Total (grams)	Change %	Total (grams)	Change (%)
		1970	1997	1997	1970-97	1997	1970-97
1	Seychelles	1 930	2 487	79	52.5	72	112.7
2	Mauritius	2 355	2 917	72	43.2	87	72.0
3	South Africa	2 831	2 990	77	2.9	77	12.8
4	Swaziland	2 347	2 483	60	-9.4	42	-0.4
5	Namibia	2 162	2 183	60	-7.7	38	-12.6
6	Botswana	2 103	2 183	70	-6.5	60	38.0
7	Lesotho	1 986	2 243	64	6.5	33	46.7
8	Zimbabwe	2 225	2 145	52	-14.6	53	6.8
9	DR Congo	2 178	1 755	28	-25.3	28	-19.2
10	Zambia	2 173	1 970	52	-19.2	30	-27.1
11	Tanzania	1 770	1 995	49	14.4	31	13.2
12	Angola	2 103	1 903	40	-9.8	37	9.9
13	Malawi	2 359	2 043	54	-25.0	30	-28.6
14	Mozambique	1 896	1 832	35	-0.2	32	13.0
	SADC	2 173	2 224	57	0.1	46	16.9

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Food production index (1989-91) =100	Food imports (as % of merchandise imports)	Food aid in cereals (thousands of metric tons)	Food consumption (as % of total household consumption)
		1998	1997-98	1998	1997
1	Seychelles	143	20 ^b
2	Mauritius	109	16	..	24
3	South Africa	97	5
4	Swaziland	96	27
5	Namibia	124	..	1	..
6	Botswana	91	25
7	Lesotho	100	..	4	..
8	Zimbabwe	93	7	82	28
9	DR Congo	95	..	10	..
10	Zambia	94	10 ^b	33	47
11	Tanzania	103	17	36	..
12	Angola	143	..	113	..
13	Malawi	116	..	41	45
14	Mozambique	140	22 ^b	112	..

^a Amount available for human consumption.

^b Data refer to a year or period other than that specified in the column heading.

21 Crime

Volume of Crime by Type of Offences (Crime per 100 000 habitants). Selected SADC Countries, 1998

Type of Crime	Angola	Mauritius	Tanzania	Nambia	Zimbabwe	Swaziland
Murder	10.41	4.36	6.15	45.17	9	17.6
Sex offences	4.09	16.54	10.11	42.1	54.5	90.02
Rape	3.22	3.73	5.86	34.38	31.18	69.22
Serious Assault	7.13	10.4	1.8	466.8	179.85	474.23
Theft of all kinds	11.78	1 086.07	565.38	1 879.78	1 524.17	1822.68
Aggravated theft	2.94	231.12	101.85	643.46	491.71	927.87
Robbery and violent theft	..	121.3	2.62	80.84	93.98	201.17
Breaking and Entering	78.05	562.62	384.04	726.7
Theft of Motor Cars	3.72	..	0.77	57.72	13.69	60.91
Other thefts	5.13	854.95	97.56	1178.6	2.31	833.9
Fraud	..	126.99	0.74	98.35	138.32	17.28
Counterfeit Currency Offenses	0.27	9.69	1.33	0.71	..	3.73
Drug Offenses	6.32	188.35	13.56	36.73	47.47	54.61
Total number of of offences contained in national crime statistics	40	3 340.31	1 723.59	4 061.56	5 179.98	3987
Number of cases known to the police(number)	4 400	37 562	517 078	68 884	673 397	37 379

Persons Responsible for Offences - Total - Selected SADC Countries, 1998

Type of Crime	Angola	Mauritius	Tanzania	Nambia	Zimbabwe	Swaziland
Murder	..	72	1 729	..	773	371
Sexual Offences	..	180	2 603	..	4 418	710
Rape	..	47	1 581	..	2 874	577
Serious assault	..	224	264	..	15 310	3 632
Theft of all kinds	..	2 987	53 027	..	63 632	7 820
Aggravated theft	..	855	23 973	..	13610	3247
Robbery and violent theft	..	564	1 698	..	4 581	722
Breaking and Entering	17 758	..	8 642	2525
Theft of motor cars	150	..	387	158
Other thefts	..	2 132	22 369	..	253	4 415
Fraud	..	968	8 308	114
Counterfeit currency Offences	..	38	468	25
Drug offences	..	2 010	5 960	..	5 164	624
Total number of of offences contained in national crime statistics	..	29 515	112 124	..	265 261	24 940

Persons responsible for offences - per 100 000 habitants - Selected SADC Countries - 1998

Type of Crime	Angola	Mauritius	Tanzania	Nambia	Zimbabwe	Swaziland
Murder	..	5.55	0.05	7.00
Sex Offences	0.99
Rape	0.35
Serious Assault	..	3.57	3.78	18.41
Theft of all kinds	..	5.96	0.07	17.11
Aggravated theft	..	6.20	0.08	5.54
Robbery and violent theft	..	7.09	1.66
Breaking and Entering	..	4.47	0.10	6.65
Theft of Motor Cars
Other thefts	..	5.86	26.45
Fraud	..	9.09	11.40
Counterfeit Currency Offenses	..	15.79	0.42	4.00
Drug Offenses	..	3.58	19.23

Total number of of offences contained

21 Crime continued

Persons Responsible for Offences, ^a Juveniles, Selected SADC Countries, 1998

Type of Crime	Angola	Mauritius	Tanzania	Nambia	Zimbabwe	Swaziland
Murder	..	16.6	10.51
Sex Offences	..	8.33	26.05
Rape	27.03
Serious Assault	1.89	14.10
Theft of all kinds	..	2.51	0.01	27.86
Aggravated theft	..	1.99	32.02
Robbery and violent theft	..	1.06	15.37
Breaking and Entering	..	3.78	36.79
Theft of Motor Cars	1.26
Other thefts	..	2.77	25.75
Fraud	12.28
Counterfeit Currency Offences	1.06	24.00
Drug Offences	..	1.29	6.08
Total number of of offences contained in national crime statistics	..	12.18	25.45

Persons Responsible for Offences, ^a Adults, Selected SADC Countries, 1998

Type of Crime	Angola	Mauritius	Tanzania	Nambia	Zimbabwe	Swaziland
Murder	..	5.55	1.33
Sex offences	1.19
Rape	1.58
Serious Assault	..	0.50	4.16
Theft of all kinds	..	0.35	0.25
Aggravated theft	..	0.35	0.42
Robbery and violent theft	..	0.34	1
Breaking and Entering	0.26
Theft of Motor Cars	..	0.61	1.3	3.79
Other thefts	0.07
Fraud
Counterfeit Currency offences	1.7	8.00
Drug offences	..	0.49	0.35	6.89
Total number of of offences contained in national crime statistics	..	0.17	0.2

22 Personal distress

SADC		Suicides (per 100,000 people)			Births to mothers under 20 %	People killed by disasters		Refugees	
HDI	Country	Male 1993-98	Female 1993-98	1993-98		Total killed 1980-99	By single worst disaster 1980-99	By country of asylum (thousands) 1998	By country of origin (thousands) 1998
Rank	Country	1993-98	1993-98	1993-98	1980-99	1980-99	1998	1998	
1	Seychelles	16.2	5	5	
2	Mauritius	20.6	6.4	10.6	166	159	..	0.1	
3	South Africa	3 323	400	8.4	..	
4	Swaziland	663	500	0.6	..	
5	Namibia	120	100	3.5	1.9	
6	Botswana	211	183	2.1	..	
7	Lesotho	40	22	
8	Zimbabwe	10.6	5.2	14.5	2 221	1 311	0.8	..	
9	DR Congo	3 663	500	240.3	152.4	
10	Zambia	3 162	1 231	168.6	..	
11	Tanzania	5 441	1 871	543.9	..	
12	Angola	4 162	2 168	10.6	315.9	
13	Malawi	14.9	1 273	700	0.4	..	
14	Mozambique	113 974	100 000	0.1	..	
	SADC				138 424	109 150	979.0	470.0	

23 Environmental profile

SADC		Land Area (1 000 ha)	Forest and woodland (as a % of land area)	Annual internal renewable water resources		Annual fresh water withdrawals		Average annual rate deforestation (%) ^c		Annual rate of reforesta- tion (%)
HDI	Country			(cubic metres per capita) ^a	As a % of water resources	Per capita (cubic metres)	1980-90	1990-95	1980-90	
Rank	Country	1995	2000	1987-97 ^b	1987-97 ^b	1980-90	1990-95	1980-90		
1	Seychelles	45		
2	Mauritius	203	5.9	1 908	16.3	410	-1.2	0.0	2	
3	South Africa	122 104	7.0	1 110	29.7	391	0.1	0.2	2	
4	Swaziland	1 720	8.5	2 619	25.0	1 178	0.0	0	..	
5	Namibia	82 329	15.0	3 592	4.0	185	0.3	0.3	..	
6	Botswana	56 673	24.6	1 788	3.8	81	0.5	0.5	..	
7	Lesotho	3 035	0.2	2 430	1.0	31	-14.6	0	16	
8	Zimbabwe	38 685	22.5	1 208	8.7	136	0.7	0.6	2	
9	DR Congo	226 705	48.2	18 101	0	8	0.7	..	10	
10	Zambia	74 339	42.2	8 747	2.1	214	0.9	0.8	6	
11	Tanzania	88 359	36.8	2 387	1.5	40	1.1	1.0	8	
12	Angola	124 670	17.8	14 288	0.3	57	0.6	1.0	1	
13	Malawi	9 408	35.5	1 606	5.4	98	1.2	1.6	8	
14	Mozambique	78 409	21.5	5 081	0.6	40	0.7	0.7	4	
	SADC	906 684	28.6	7 406	10.4	132	0.5	6.0	5.8	

23 Environmental profile continued

		Carbon dioxide emissions				
SADC HDI Rank	Country	Total (millions of metric tons) 1996	Share of world total 1996	per capita (metric tons) 1996	Loss of mangroves (%) 1980-90	Arable land hectares per capita 1994-96
1	Seychelles	0.2	(.)	2.3
2	Mauritius	1.7	(.)	1.5	..	0.09
3	South Africa	293.2	1.2	6.9	50	0.4
4	Swaziland	0.3	(.)	0.4	0	0.51
5	Namibia	0	0.27
6	Botswana	2.1	(.)	1.4	0	0.16
7	Lesotho	0	0.27
8	Zimbabwe	18.4	0.1	1.6	0	0.17
9	DR Congo	2.3	(.)	(.)	50	0.17
10	Zambia	2.4	(.)	0.3	0	0.59
11	Tanzania	2.4	(.)	0.1	60	0.11
12	Angola	5.1	(.)	0.4	50	0.28
13	Malawi	0.7	(.)	0.1	0	0.17
14	Mozambique	1	(.)	0.1	60	0.17
	SADC	316.9		1.4	54	0.24

^a These annual averages disguise large seasonal, inter-annual and long-term variations

^b Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified in the column heading

^c A positive number indicates a loss of forest area, a negative number a gain.

24 National income accounts

		GDP at			Consumption			
SADC HDI Rank	Country	current prices (US\$ millions) 1998	Agriculture (as a % of GDP) ^a 1998	Industry (as a % of GDP) ^a 1998	Services (as a % of GDP) ^a 1998	Government (as a % of GDP) 1998	Private (as a % of GDP) 1998	Government investment (as a % of GDP) 1998
1	Seychelles	500.0	4.1	23.6	72.4	33.2	46.5	..
2	Mauritius	4 251.7	8.6	33.1	58.3	11.9	63.1	6.4
3	South Africa	133 380.0	4.0	31.8	64.3	20.2	63.0	2.4
4	Swaziland	1 184.5	16.0	38.7	45.3	22.3	64.6	6.4 ^b
5	Namibia	3 041.8	10.0	34.2	55.9	31.5	58.5	4.8
6	Botswana	4 862.6	3.6	46.1	50.4	29.4	31.4	24.8
7	Lesotho	1 028.3 ^d	11.5	42	46.5	19.30 ^d	110.40 ^d	13.14 ^d
8	Zimbabwe	5 557.1	19.5	24.4	56.1	17.10 ^b	69.50 ^b	2.50 ^b
9	DR Congo	7 000.0	57.9 ^b	16.9 ^b	25.2 ^b	8.5 ^b	82.6 ^b	..
10	Zambia	2 595.3	17.3	26.4	56.3	16.1	74.8	..
11	Tanzania	7 677.1	45.7	14.9	39.4	8.5	89.9	..
12	Angola	7 500.0	12.3	51.5	36.3	43.6 ^b	33.40 ^a	10.7
13	Malawi	1 686.5	35.9	17.8	46.4	59.1	348.9	18.5
14	Mozambique	3 675.0	34.3	20.8	44.8	9.0	88.0	10.9
	SADC	182 911.6	10.0	31.2	58.9	20.5	66.5	4.0

24 National income accounts continued

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Savings		Manufacturing production index (1992=100) 1998	Mining Production index (1992=100) 1998	Agricultural production index 1998
		Private investment (as a % of GDP) 1998	Government (as a % of GDP) 1998			
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	16.8	..	188.8	..	101.7
3	South Africa	10.0	-3.90	101.2	98.8	113.3
4	Swaziland	22.6	..	120.3 ^b	80.5 ^b	89.3 ^b
5	Namibia	14.9	-7.90	178.5	105.0	87.4
6	Botswana	75.2	14.00	124.4	136.6	97.0
7	Lesotho	42.2 ^d	15.06 ^d	17.40 ^d
8	Zimbabwe	18.1 ^b	9.33 ^b	..	385.1 ^b	156.6 ^b
9	DR Congo
10	Zambia	8.00 ^e	94.8	70.6
11	Tanzania
12	Angola	14.7 ^b	108.1	131.1
13	Malawi	10.1	112.9	..
14	Mozambique	12.4	105.6	100.6
	SADC	13.0

^b refers to 1997

^c refers to 1996

^d refers to 1997

^e refers to 1993

^f Data refer to value added

Notes

For Mauritius Manufacturing production index base year =1987

For Mozambique all indices base year=1996

For South Africa the base years are:

Manufacturing, 1995=100

Mining, 1990=100

Angola GDP source is *Human Development Report 2000*

DR Congo and Seychelles data is from *Human Development Report 2000*

2.5 Trends in economic performance

SADC HDI	Rank	Country	GNP (US\$ billions)	GNP annual growth rate (%)		GNP per capita (US\$)	GNP per capita annual growth rate (%)		Average annual rate of inflation (%)	
				1998	1975-95		1990-98	1975-90	1990-98	1990-98
	1	Seychelles	0.5	4.7	2.9	6 420	3.5	1.4	1.4	2.0
	2	Mauritius	4.3	5.5	5.2	3 730	4.3	4.0	6.2	5.6
	3	South Africa	136.9	1.7	1.7	3 310	-0.7	-0.4	10.6	7.9
	4	Swaziland	1.4	6.0	3.0	1 400	2.7	-0.2	12.4	8.5
	5	Namibia	3.2	..	3.8	1 940	..	1.1	9.5	11.4
	6	Botswana	4.8	12.3	3.9	3 070	8.5	1.4	10.3	7.9
	7	Lesotho	1.2	4.6	3.2	570	2	0.9	7.7	3.7
	8	Zimbabwe	7.2	3.0	1.8	620	-0.2	-0.5	21.9	29.8
	9	DR Congo	5.4	-0.2	-5.3	110	-3.3	-8.3	1 423.1	15.0
	10	Zambia	3.2	0.6	1.4	330	-2.5	-1.3	63.5	23.2
	11	Tanzania	7.2	..	3.4	220	..	0.4	24.3	17.3
	12	Angola	4.6	..	-3.3	380	..	-6.4	924.3	60.9
	13	Malawi	2.2	2.8	3.6	210	-0.5	0.9	33.2	23.2
	14	Mozambique	3.5	..	5.8	210	..	3.5	41.1	3.8
		SADC	185.6	338.8	1.7	944.3	-1	-2.2	444.1	17.1

SADC HDI	Rank	Country	Tax revenue as a (as a % of GDP)		Government Expenditure (as a % of GDP)		Overall budget surplus/deficit (as a % of GDP)		Tax revenue as a % of GDP (as a % of GDP)	
			1991	1998	1991	1998	1991	1998	1991	1998
	1	Seychelles	1.4
	2	Mauritius	25.9	24.4	20.8	17.6	2.6	3.9	1.6	1.2
	3	South Africa	21.7	23.0	26.8	26.4	-4.2	-2.6	0.8	2.0
	4	Swaziland	29.8	31.6	28.4	36.1	0.1	-1.6
	5	Namibia	31.1	32.6	44.1	41.9	-2.0	-5.6
	6	Botswana	41.2	30.5	44.9	47.7	7.1	-10.5	..	1.1
	7	Lesotho	30.1	..	-45.4	..	-11.1	-4.3	-1.0	4.1
	8	Zimbabwe	20.0	41.0	26.0	52.7	-5.4	-8.1	0.6	3.0
	9	DR Congo	-0.8 ^a
	10	Zambia	..	22.6	..	21.1	-31.3	0.3	-0.4	..
	11	Tanzania	11.7	10.8	2.3	16.9	-2.0	-1.6
	12	Angola	13.7 ^a
	13	Malawi	16.8	10.3	-13.2	-12.7	-4.0	0.7	-1.7	..
	14	Mozambique	14.4	10.9	36.2	21.7	-4.3	-3.9	-2.6	..
		SADC	21.2	18.9

a refers to 1997

For DR Congo and Seychelles, budget deficit/surplus as a % of GDP is from *Human Development Report 2000*

26 Monetary indicators and prices

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Money Supply			M3 as a % of GDP 1998	Net foreign assets US\$millions 1998
		MI 1998	M2 US\$millions 1998	M3 1998		
1	Seychelles	148.5	0.1	16.1
2	Mauritius	483.1	3 143.7	818.7
3	South Africa	36 494.8	65 401.9	7 3131.1	56.32	-6 613.8
4	Swaziland	85.3	327.9	418.7
5	Namibia	625.4	1 224.3	230.3
6	Botswana	335	1 106.7	1 563.7	32.16	6 567.3
7	Lesotho	164.4	284.4	658.0
8	Zimbabwe	660.2	1 154.3	1 515.4	43.36	-594.0
9	DR Congo	0.3 ^b	0.1 ^b	-1.3 ^b
10	Zambia	172.9	480.7	-799.5
11	Tanzania	801.1	1 240.7	1 508.1	19.64	672.6
12	Angola	801.4	892.2	239.5
13	Malawi	99.9	196.9	196.9	11.68	173.8
14	Mozambique	403.0	649.0	705.0	19.19	577.9
	SADC	41 275.2	76 102.8	79 278.1		1 706.4

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Domestic credit (millions of local currency) 1998	International reserves (US\$millions) 1998	Exchange rate (local currency per US\$) period average 1998	Interest rates		
					bank rate end of year 1998	deposit 1998	lending 1998
1	Seychelles	3 202.80	21.6 ^a	5.26	1.00	7.53	14.39
2	Mauritius	75 245.30	588.3	22.80	19.32	9.28	19.92
3	South Africa	537 863.00	7 193.0	5.53	19.32	16.50	21.79
4	Swaziland	-261.20	350.5	0.18	18.00	13.43	21.00
5	Namibia	9205.50	259.5	5.53	18.80	12.94	20.72
6	Botswana	-16179	5 941.0	4.23	12.50	8.72	13.53
7	Lesotho	-983.01	573.1	5.53	19.50	10.73	20.06
8	Zimbabwe	67 209.00	213.1	21.41	39.50	29.06	42.06
9	DR Congo	673.00 ^b	157.5 ^b	143 021.00 ^a	238.00 ^c
10	Zambia	3 963 700.00	68.6	1 862.07	43.40	13.08	31.80
11	Tanzania	681 390.00	595.7	664.67	17.64	7.75	26.67
12	Angola	449.04 ^d	392.0	392 824.00	58.00	36.88	45.00
13	Malawi	334 268.00	259.8	31.07	43.00	19.06	37.67
14	Mozambique	1 144 600.00	608.8	11874.6	9.95
	SADC	..	17 222.4	..	29.88	15.86	22.26

^a refers to 1997^b refers to 1995^c refers to 1996^d refers to trillions^e refers to total reserves minus gold

27 Balance of payments

SADC		Current	Trade	Capital	Financial	Direct	Portfolio	Other	Exports of
HDI		account	balance	account	account	investment	investment	investment	goods and
Rank Country		US\$m	US\$m	US\$m	US\$m	US\$m	US\$m	US\$m	(as a % of
		1998	1998	1998	1998	1998	1998	1998	GDP)
									1998
1	Seychelles	62.5
2	Mauritius	35.0	-280.0	-0.50	-93.00	-2.00	-11.00	-79.0	65.2
3	South Africa	-2 102.0	1 846.0	-56.00	1 432.00	-1 170.00	3 683.00	662.0	24.4
4	Swaziland	-49.5	-140.2	0.10	47.20	49.10	-3.00	-1.1	76.8
5	Namibia	171.4	172.5	121.60	-130.80 ^a	96.10	-15.30	-228.4	50.4
6	Botswana	171.2	78.0	32.02	-203.67	92.38	-59.98	-244.1	55.4
7	Lesotho	356.2	653.3	175.70	253.60	205.8	..	47.8	14.1
8	Zimbabwe	-384.0	45.0	124.00	47.00	436.00	11.00	-400.0	22.9
9	DR Congo	29.5
10	Zambia	-568.9	-152.7	466.00	87.80	163.50	1.00	-76.7	35.9
11	Tanzania	-494.9	-588.55	360.25	-201.23	171.98	..	-375.2	12.1
12	Angola	38.8
13	Malawi	-284.3	60.0	..	301.71	301.7	24.8
14	Mozambique	-476.6	-533.3	..	261.10	212.70	..	48.4	8.2
	SADC	-3 599.3	1 009.55	894.35	1 412.77	-349.42	3 692.00	-191.0	27

SADC		Imports of	Merchandise		Current	Capital and	Overall	Gross	Gross
HDI		goods and	exports	imports	account	financial	balance	external	external
Rank Country		(as a % of	(as a % of	(as a % of	(as a % of	(as a % of	(as a % of	assets	liabilities
		GDP)	GDP)	GDP)	GDP)	GDP)	GDP)	1998	1998
		1998	1998	1998	1998	1998	1998	1998	1998
1	Seychelles	70.2	-0.70
2	Mauritius	64.8	40.90	47.5	0.80	-2.20	-5.50	578.0	..
3	South Africa	25.8	21.80	20.4	-1.60	1.40	4.00	47 849.0 ^a	-69 354.0 ^a
4	Swaziland	101.5	62.80	-70.8	-4.20	4.00	4.70	1 080.7	809.1
5	Namibia	63.1	41.90	48.0	0.10	4.00
6	Botswana	35.0	42.60	40.2	3.50	-3.50	..	7 308.3	2 387.0
7	Lesotho	33.5	19.07 ^a	94.9	-43.46 ^a	56.65 ^a	-0.70	656.6	23.5
8	Zimbabwe	45.9	36.90	36.1	-5.40	2.20
9	DR Congo	24.0 ^a	13.22 ^a
10	Zambia	29.4	31.40	37.4	-3.30
11	Tanzania	18.4	8.80	16.5	-6.50	4.70	..	595.7	324.8
12	Angola	51.8	1.30
13	Malawi	30.5	28.00	24.4	-16.90	17.90	-1.50	29.4 ^b	9.80 ^b
14	Mozambique	11.7	6.80	-21.3	-13.00	7.10	0.00	846.0	268.0
	SADC	29.3	23.30	21.7	-2.40	2.00	3.60	58 943.7	-65 531.8

^a refers to 1997

^b refers to 1995

28 External debt

SADC HDI		Indebt- edness classifi- cation ^a	Present value of debt			Long term		Short-term		Total debt service	
			as a % of GNP ^b	as a % of exports of goods and services ^b	External debt US \$millions	External debt US \$millions	external as a % of total external debt	external as a % of total external debt	as a % of GNP	as a % of GNP	
Rank	Country	1997	1997	1997	1990	1997	1980	1997	1980	1997	
1	Seychelles	
2	Mauritius	M	55	92	318	1 976	10.1	20.1	4.7	6.5	
3	South Africa	L	19	65	..	13 879	..	43.3	..	3.8	
4	Swaziland	
5	Namibia	4	
6	Botswana	L	9	..	143	522	2.7	7.1	1.6	2.1	
7	Lesotho	L	35	62	58	624	11.1	1.2	0.9	3.6	
8	Zimbabwe	M	49	136	696	3 599	11.5	19.7	1.0	8.0	
9	DR Congo	S	215	783	4 071	8 617	6.8	26.8	3.8	0.2	
10	Zambia	S	138	374	2 227	5 246	18.0	5.5	11.4	7.3	
11	Tanzania	S	72	427	3 381	6 094	33.3	11.7	..	2.2	
12	Angola	S	200	165	..	8 885	..	12.6	..	19.2	
13	Malawi	M	46 ^c	182 ^c	634	2 073	14.0	1.2	7.7	3.1	
14	Mozambique	S	171 ^c	785 ^c	..	5 475	..	5.5	..	4.1	
	SADC		39	129	11 532	56 990	14.6	35.8		4.3	

^a S, M and L refer to severely, moderately and less indebted respectively

^b GNP and exports of goods and services are averages of three years 1995–1997

^c Data are substantially for analysis undertaken as part of the Heavily Indebted poor countries Initiative.

Present values for these countries are for public and publicly guaranteed debt only, and export figures exclude workers' remittances

29 Aid and debt by recipient country

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Official Development assistance (ODA) received (net disbursements)						External debt				Total debt service (as % of exports of goods & services)	
		Total (US\$ Millions)		As % of GNP		Per Capita (US\$)		Total (US\$ Millions)		As % of GNP		1985	1998
		1992	1998	1992	1998	1992	1998	1985	1998	1985	1998		
1	Seychelles	..	512.3	..	0.5	..	12.4	..	25	..	18.9	..	12.2
2	Mauritius	45.5	39.6	1.5	1.0	42.1	34.2	629	2 482	61.1	59.6	24.3	11.3
3	South Africa	53.0	30.4	5.1	2.3	62.3	30.8	243	251	60.8	18.7	9.9	2.1
4	Swaziland	19.2	23.2	4.5	4.5	270.7	294.9	97	187	59.6	36.3	7.9	5.7
5	Namibia	142.4	180.1	5.1	5.7	100.2	108.2
6	Botswana	111.9	106.4	3.0	1.9	82.4	68.1	351	548	33.1	11.8	5.4	2.7
7	Lesotho	143.4	66.2	11.8	6.2	75.8	32.1	175	692	36.7	64.7	6.8	8.4
8	Zimbabwe	791.7	280.0	16.7	5.1	76.0	24.0	2 415	4 716	43.9	79.8	29	38.2
9	DR Congo	269.1	125.6	3.3	2.0	6.7	2.6	6	12 929	93.0	208.2	24.8	1.2
10	Zambia	1 035.3	348.7	36.2	11.0	119.7	36.1	4 499	6 865	226.5	217.4	15.9	17.7
11	Tanzania	1 338.4	997.8	28.6	12.9	49.3	31.1	9 107	7 603	..	94.3	40.0	20.8
12	Angola	346.1	335.2	9.9	9.7	34.9	27.9	2 993	12 173	47.6	297.1	6.4	34.4
13	Malawi	572.4	433.7	31.5	27.2	57.0	41.2	1 021	2 444	94.6	137.5	39.8	14.7
14	Mozambique	1 462.9	1 039.3	140.1	27.9	98.9	61.3	2 871	8 208	65.9	223.0	34.5	18.0
	SADC	6 331.3	4 518.5	5.7	2.5	1076.0	804.9	24 407	59 123	57.4	43.5	12.3	5.4

30 Intra SADC Import/Export Matrix, %

Percentage distribution of intra-SADC imports, 1995

Rank	Country	Seychelles	Mauritius	South Africa	Swaziland	Namibia	Botswana	Lesotho	Zimbabwe	DR Congo	Zambia	Tanzania	Angola	Malawi	Mozambique
1	Seychelles	-
2	Mauritius	..	-	92.90	1.50	0.89	0.03	0.00	3.8
3	South Africa	..	2.12	-	61.2
4	Swaziland	0.00	0.03	99.46	-	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.15
5	Namibia	..	0.0	97.53	0.02	-	1.02	0.00	1.16
6	Botswana	..	0.0	92.40	0.05	0.29	-	0.02	6.95
7	Lesotho	..	0.0	99.97	-	0.05
8	Zimbabwe	0.00	1.15	90.40	0.00	0.87	5.02	0.00
9	DR Congo
10	Zambia	0.00	0.01	19.28	0.05	2.64	1.44	0.00	31.70
11	Tanzania	84.44	0.37	4.740	..	0.00	0.44	0.00	3.85
12	Angola	..	0.00	0.44	..	49.78
13	Malawi	0.00	0.42	66.00	1.53	0.00	1.10	0.25	20.77
14	Mozambique	..	0.20	188.20	23.30	1.60	0.10	0.00	30.70

Note: For example, 92.4% of Botswana's imports were from South Africa

Percentage distribution of intra-SADC exports, 1995

Rank	Country	Seychelles	Mauritius	South Africa	Swaziland	Namibia	Botswana	Lesotho	Zimbabwe	DR Congo	Zambia	Tanzania	Angola	Malawi	Mozambique
1	Seychelles	-
2	Mauritius	..	-	42.96	0.68	0.01	0.00	0.00	43.7
3	South Africa	..	2.54	-	26.94	..	37.57
4	Swaziland	0.17	0.92	84.88	-	0.91	0.80	0.30	2.13
5	Namibia	0.00	0.00	-
6	Botswana	..	0.01	83.42	0.10	0.61	-	0.03	14.13
7	Lesotho	..	0.00	0.00	..	-
8	Zimbabwe	0.16	1.06	41.08	0.28	2.88	16.10	0.21
9	DR Congo
10	Zambia	0.00	0.01	17.14	0.04	2.35	1.28	0.00	28.18
11	Tanzania	..	1.6	17.86
12	Angola	..	0.00	2.38	35.15	..	23.75
13	Malawi	0.05	0.79	58.18	0.21	0.00	1.23	0.80	9.39
14	Mozambique	0.00	0.19	0.19	0.19	78.74	0.00	4.98

NOTE: For example, 83.42% of Botswana's exports were to South Africa

Zimbabwe	DR Congo	Zambia	Tanzania	Angola	Malawi	Mozambique
..
3.87	..	0.01	0.69	0.00	0.06	0.05
61.22	..	16.70	0.77	2.18	13.21	3.80
0.15	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.29
1.16	..	0.18	0.00	0.07	0.01	0.01
6.93	..	0.18	0.07	0.01	0.06	0.00
0.03
..	0.00	1.37	0.16	0.13	0.49	0.41
..	-
31.70	26.49	-	21.85	0.33	8.54	0.15
3.85	..	5.33	-	0.00	0.44	0.30
49.78	..	49.78	..	-
20.77	0.00	2.63	0.89	0.00	-	6.40
10.70	..	0.40	0.00	0.00	0.70	-

Zimbabwe	DR Congo	Zambia	Tanzania	Angola	Malawi	Mozambique
..
43.7	..	1.69	6.22	0.00	3.45	1.29
17.57	..	15.94	4.91	1.58	2.43	8.09
2.13	0.07	2.94	1.24	0.00	1.10	4.53
..	100.00	..
4.13	..	0.91	0.07	0.00	0.66	0.06
..
..	0.00	16.47	1.72	2.07	8.84	9.15
..	-
8.18	23.55	-	19.42	0.29	7.59	0.13
7.86	..	53.57	-
8.75	..	23.75	..	-	14.96	..
0.39	0.67	6.84	8.63	0.00	-	13.20
..	0.00	..	15.13	0.19	0.19	-

31 Merchandise exports, Imports and total trade as a % of GDP, SADC countries, 1990–98

	Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)								
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Seychelles	62.48	58.48	56.02	54.84	51.81	53.39	62.45	67.67	70.18
Mauritius	65.23	62.87	59.96	59.43	57.61	59.65	65.14	63.44	64.85
South Africa	24.40	22.45	21.33	21.49	22.16	22.96	24.68	24.76	25.76
Swaziland	76.78	80.47	78.46	84.75	78.79	82.99	81.36	81.84	101.49
Namibia	50.42	53.19	51.65	55.74	52.42	51.61	53.59	52.63	63.08
Botswana	55.42	53.34	48.17	46.92	48.23	49.70	54.10	43.73	34.96
Lesotho	14.06	15.30	20.10	22.41	22.00	21.49	25.48	32.53	33.45
Zimbabwe	22.87	23.88	27.23	30.72	34.6	38.24	36.47	37.60	45.93
DR Congo	29.50	20.38	16.68	11.33	22.63	28.48	28.12	23.98	..
Zambia	35.88	34.61	36.11	31.95	35.09	37.63	33.75	31.75	29.35
Tanzania	12.07	11.28	11.48	15.53	19.49	22.58	21.78	17.72	18.39
Angola	38.76	30.31	68.76	53.9	85.36	69.05	66.2	68.49	51.84
Malawi	24.81	23.27	23.21	16.13	29.63	28.59	22.73	24.40	30.51
Mozambique	8.17	11.19	13.87	13.24	13.97	15.17	15.04	12.74	11.70
SADC	39.14	37.67	40.12	38.68	42.64	43	43.78	43.5	46.93

	Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)								
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Seychelles	66.74	62.07	59.62	65.11	55.86	60.24	73.79	81.37	87.4
Mauritius	72.46	66.65	63.24	65.65	66.51	62.11	66.02	67.30	64.96
South Africa	18.65	17.48	17.30	17.82	19.86	22.09	23.31	23.64	24.53
Swaziland	75.95	82.88	85.98	85.03	84.85	88.15	92.67	96.29	94.59
Namibia	60.23	62.07	60.67	62.28	58.59	59.48	62.56	58.17	63.25
Botswana	50.10	46.05	41.57	37.41	36.27	36.04	36.50	34.94	33.75
Lesotho	115.25	144.89	143.88	130.62	116.91	121.62	116.51	127.82	124.69
Zimbabwe	22.79	27.17	36.48	32.45	36.52	40.92	36.28	44.61	47.75
DR Congo	29.20	24.12	17.52	9.11	19.89	23.73	21.83	22.13	..
Zambia	36.59	37.25	47.96	38.00	39.34	43.4	39.91	36.97	38.36
Tanzania	35.49	35.29	36.83	44.01	45.38	42.42	36.20	28.64	25.00
Angola	20.85	27.08	70.73	55.16	75.85	78.35	68.71	52.73	41.66
Malawi	34.86	29.31	42.46	32.22	50.48	36.99	34.28	34.63	43.83
Mozambique	36.07	38.44	46.68	48.36	47.66	39.91	35.67	30.18	30.47
SADC	48.23	50.05	55.06	51.66	53.85	53.96	53.16	52.82	55.4

11 Merchandise exports, imports and total trade as a % of GDP
SADC countries, 1990–98 continued

Rank	Country	Trade (% of GDP)								
		1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
1	Seychelles	129.23	120.55	115.64	119.94	107.67	113.63	136.24	149.04	157.58
2	Mauritius	137.69	129.52	123.19	125.08	124.12	121.76	131.16	130.73	129.80
3	South Africa	43.05	39.93	38.63	39.31	42.02	45.06	47.99	48.40	50.29
4	Swaziland	152.73	163.34	164.43	169.79	163.63	171.14	174.03	178.13	196.07
5	Namibia	110.65	115.26	112.32	118.02	111.01	111.09	116.14	110.8	126.34
6	Botswana	105.51	99.40	89.74	84.33	84.50	85.74	90.6	78.66	68.71
7	Lesotho	129.31	160.18	163.97	153.03	138.91	143.11	141.98	160.35	158.14
8	Zimbabwe	45.66	51.05	63.71	63.17	71.12	79.16	72.74	82.21	93.68
9	DR Congo	58.71	44.51	34.20	20.44	42.52	52.21	49.95
10	Zambia	72.47	71.86	84.07	69.95	74.44	81.03	73.66	68.72	67.71
11	Tanzania	47.56	46.58	48.30	59.54	64.86	65.00	57.98	46.36	43.39
12	Angola	59.61	57.39	139.49	109.06	161.21	147.41	134.91	121.23	93.50
13	Malawi	59.67	52.58	65.66	48.35	80.11	65.58	57.01	59.04	74.34
14	Mozambique	44.24	49.63	60.55	61.59	61.63	55.08	50.72	42.92	42.17
	SADC	85.43	85.84	93.14	88.68	94.84	95.5	95.37	98.2	100.13

32 Resource flows

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Exports of goods and services		Imports of goods and services		Net foreign direct investment flows (US\$ millions)		Net portfolio investment flows		Net bank & trade- related lending		Sovereign Long-term debt rating
		As % of GDP 1990	As % of GDP 1998	As % of GDP 1990	As % of GDP 1998	Annual Average 1987–92	1998	(US\$ Millions) ^a 1990	(US\$ Millions) ^a 1998	(US\$ Millions) ^b 1990	(US\$ Millions) ^b 1998	1999
1	Seychelles	24.4	25.8	18.6	24.5	-24	371	..	922	..	-689	BB+
2	Mauritius	65.2	64.8	72.5	65.0	25	13	0	8	45	-99	..
3	South Africa	76.8	101.5	76.0	94.6	62	19	0	0	-2	0	..
4	Swaziland	62.5	70.2	66.7	87.4	19	55	0	0	-6	5	..
5	Namibia	50.4	63.1	60.2	63.3	44	96
6	Botswana	55.4	35.0	50.1	33.8	47	168	0	0	-19	-4	..
7	Lesotho	14.1	33.5	115.2	124.7	11	30	0	0	(.)	16	..
8	Zimbabwe	22.9	45.9	22.8	47.8	-8	444	-30	-27	127	-266	..
9	DR Congo	29.5	24.0	29.2	22.1	-11	..	(.)	0	-12	0	..
10	Zambia	35.9	29.4	36.6	38.4	102	222	0	0	-9	-32	..
11	Tanzania	12.1	18.4	35.5	25.0	3	172	0	0	4	-16	..
12	Angola	38.8	51.8	20.8	41.7	178	396	0	0	..	-320	..
13	Malawi	24.8	30.5	34.9	43.8	12	70	0	24	2	-1	..
14	Mozambique	8.2	11.7	36.1	30.5	12	213	0	24	26	-4	..
	SADC	64.8	83.9	65.9	81.7	472	2 269	-30	951	156	-1 410	

a Portfolio investment flows are net and include non-debt-creating portfolio equity flows and portfolio debt flows.

b Bank and trade-related lending covers commercial bank lending and other private credits

33 Resource use

SADC HDI	Rank	Country	Public expenditure on education (as a% of GNP)		Public expenditure on health (as a% of GDP)		Military expenditure (as a% of GDP)		Total armed forces Thousands Index (1985=100)	
			1990	1995-97 ^a	1990	1996-98 ^a	1990	1998	1998	1998
1		Seychelles	8.1	7.9	3.6	5.4	4.0	2.0	(.)	17
2		Mauritius	3.6	4.6	..	1.9	0.3	0.2
3		South Africa	6.5	8	3.1	3.2	4.0	1.6	82	77
4		Swaziland	5.5	5.7	1.9	2.5	1.6
5		Namibia	7.5	9.1	3.8	3.8	..	2.6	9	..
6		Botswana	6.9	8.6	1.3	2.7	3.9	3.5	9	213
7		Lesotho	3.7	8.4	2.6	3.7	4.1	3.2	2	100
8		Zimbabwe	8.0	7.1	..	3.1	4.5	2.6	39	95
9		DR Congo	1.2	50	104
10		Zambia	2.6	2.2	2.6	2.3	3.7	1.8	22	133
11		Tanzania	3.4	..	1.8	1.3	..	1.4 ^b	34	84
12		Angola	4.9	..	1.4	..	5.8	14.9	114	230
13		Malawi	3.4	5.4	..	2.8	1.3	0.8 ^d	5	94
14		Mozambique	4.1	..	3.6	2.1	10.1	4.2 ^c	6	39
		SADC	6.18	7.7	2.9	3.0	4.1	2.3	372	

^a Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified in the column heading

^b Data refer to estimates by SIPRI 2000

^c Data refer to estimates deemed uncertain by SIPRI 2000

^d Data refer to 1991.

34 Communications, information, and science and technology

SADC HDI	Rank	Country	Daily newspapers	Radios	Television sets per 1000 people		Cellular mobile subscribers		Fax machines	Personal computers (per 1000 people)	
			1996	1996	1990	1996-98 ^c	1990	1996-98 ^c	1996	1990	1996-98 ^c
1		Seychelles	71	190	0	49
2		Mauritius	75	368	170	228	2	53	24.5	4	87.0
3		South Africa	32	316	97	125	(.)	56	3.5	7	47.0
4		Swaziland	19	107	0	5
5		Namibia	19	143	22	32	0	12	18.6
6		Botswana	27	155	16	27	0	15	2.3	..	25.0
7		Lesotho	8	48	6	24	0	5	0.3
8		Zimbabwe	19	96	30	29	0	4	0.4	(.)	9.0
9		Congo	3	98	43	43	(.)	(.)	0.0
10		Zambia	12	121	34	137	0	1	0.1
11		Tanzania	4	278	2	21	0	1	2.0
12		Angola	38	239	6	124	0	1	0.2	..	1.0
13		Malawi	3	256	..	2	0	1	0.1
14		Mozambique	3	39	3	4	0	(.)	0.4	..	2.0
		SADC	14	189	39	60	2	20	1.7		

Telephone mainlines

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Internet hosts (per 10000 people)	Waiting time (years)	Cost of local call (US\$ per min)	Cost of call to U.S. (US\$ per min)	Road/ Pop ratio (1000 km/ 1m people)	Paved roads %	Post Offices (per 100000 people)
		1998	1997	1997	1997	1990	1997	1995
1	Seychelles	0.09	7.1
2	Mauritius	0.5	0.7	0.050	5.11	1.7	93.0	9.4
3	South Africa	3.26	0.4	0.070	..	5.0	..	41.5 ..
4	Swaziland	0.29	3.5	..	8.3
5	Namibia	1.6	0.8	0.040	..	28.7	8.3	..
6	Botswana	0.42	1.0	0.030	5.52	7.0	23.5	12.8
7	Lesotho	0.01	6.0	0.040	..	2.8 ^a	17.9	..
8	Zimbabwe	0.08	4.2	0.030	6.49	8.9 ^a	47.4	2.8
9	DR Congo	(.)	3.8 ^b	..	1.3
10	Zambia	0.03	..	0.090	3.91	4.8
11	Tanzania	(.)	6.7	0.100	4.46	21 ^a	4.2	3.7
12	Angola	(.)	...	0.090	2.92	7.9	25.0	0.7
13	Malawi	(.)	10.0	0.030	11.02	3.2	19.0	..
14	Mozambique	0.01	5.9	0.040	..	2.5	18.7	1.6
	SADC	1.56	1.29	0.046	4.85	4.2	15.2	2.3

^a refers to 1991^b refers to 1992

35 Energy use

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Electricity consumption ^a				Per capita		Traditional fuel consumption (as % of total energy use)		Household energy from fuelwood (%)
		Total (millions of kilowatt hours)		Index (1980=100)		1980	1997	1980	1996	1990
		1995	1997	1995	1997					
1	Seychelles	128	148	256	296	794	1 973
2	Mauritius	1 120	1278	240	274	482	1 128	59.1	32.4	60
3	South Africa	188 975	187 740	189	188	3 025	4 185	4.9
4	Swaziland
5	Namibia
6	Botswana	35.7	..	57
7	Lesotho
8	Zimbabwe	10 350	10 930	142	150	1 020	975	27.6	23.4	..
9	DR Congo	4 898	4 431	113	102	161	90	73.9	90.8	94
10	Zambia	6 310	6 315	98	98	1 125	736	37.4	73.1	86
11	Tanzania	1 738	1 744	227	228	41	56	92.0	91.4	89
12	Angola	1 870	1 895	125	126	214	162	64.9	69.3	85
13	Malawi	803	876	196	214	66	87	90.6	89.7	89
14	Mozambique	1 164	1 174	26	27	364	64	43.7	91.4	83
	SADC	217 356	216 531			994	1 149	26.0	55.0	78

35 Energy use continued

SADC HDI Rank	Country	Commercial energy use (oil equivalent)				GDP output per kilogram (US\$) ^b		Net energy imports (as a% of commercial energy use) ^c	
		Total (1000 metric tons)		Per capita (kg)		1980	1997	1980	1997
1	Seychelles	4 538	6 848	647	587	1.1	0.9	-149	-505
2	Mauritius	384	549	426	387	2.1	4.7	32	55
3	South Africa	8 706	14 539	322	311	1	0.4	(.)	1
4	Swaziland
5	Namibia	334	370	54	39	3.2	3.4	70	59
6	Botswana	339	431	351	387	3.7	6.3	94	92
7	Lesotho	8 079	7 664	668	461	0.2	0.4	8	9
8	Zimbabwe
9	Congo	..	122	1 110	1 691	3.2	2.9	100	100
10	Zambia	65 417	107 220	2 372	2 636	1.9	1.5	-12	-33
11	Tanzania	191	232	338	264	2.2	3	19	22
12	Angola	10 280	14 258	553	455	..	0.4	8	5
13	Malawi	4 551	5 987	793	634	0.7	0.6	8	7
14	Mozambique	6 488	9 926	929	866	0.7	0.8	12	18
	SADC	21 513	32 575	976	1 469	0.9	0.9	-2.1	-30

^a Data refer to apparent consumption

^b Estimated real GDP (at 1995 prices) divided by the oil equivalent of commercial energy use.

^c A negative value indicates that the country is a net exporter.

36 SADC Protocols/Charters and dates ratified/accessed as at July 2000

Date protocol came into force		Memorandum of understanding on co-op- eration, quality assurance & accreditation & meteorology							Trade
		Declaration and treaty	Immunities and privileges	Shared watercourse systems	Energy	Transport communications and meteorology	Combating illicit drug trafficking	16-07-00	
		30-09-93	30-09-93	28-09-98	17-04-98	07-06-98	20-03-99	16-07-00	25-01-00
1	Seychelles	24.6.98 ^a	24.6.98 ^a
2	Mauritius	28.8.95 ^a	28.8.95 ^a	12.2.96 ^a	11.10.96	11.10.96	17.10.96	..	11.10.96
3	South Africa	29.8.94 ^a	29.8.94 ^a	26.11.97	29.4.99	24.12.97	22.7.98	..	24.12.99
4	Swaziland	16.4.93	2.9.93	14.1.98	23.12.97	20.11.97	25.3.99	..	9.12.99
5	Namibia	14.12.92	14.12.92	5.6.98	17.1.98	19.9.97	18.8.98	..	22.12.98
6	Botswana	7.1.98	7.1.98	21.11.97	16.7.97	28.8.97	7.10.97	..	7.1.98
7	Lesotho	26.8.93	26.8.93	30.7.96	27.8.97	24.5.99	12.8.97	..	12.8.98
8	Zimbabwe	17.11.92	17.11.92	3.9.98	14.10.98	21.4.98	13.2.98	..	24.7.98
9	DR Congo	28.2.98 ^a	28.2.98 ^a
10	Zambia	16.4.92	16.4.92	18.5.98	3.12.98	..	30.10.98
11	Tanzania	27.8.93	27.8.93	9.2.99	19.4.99	6.6.98	19.2.99	..	3.7.97
12	Angola	20.8.93	20.8.93	..	19.12.97	19.9.96
13	Malawi	12.8.93	5.5.93	21.7.97	17.3.98	30.6.97	10.2.98	..	23.7.99
14	Mozambique	30.8.93	30.8.93	11.1.2000
	Total	14	14	10	11	10	10		10

Education and training	Mining	Development of tourism	Health	Wildlife conservation and law enforcement	SADC charter of the regional tourism organisation of Southern Africa (RETOSA)	Total
09-08-97	10/02/2000				09-08-97	
..	2
26.8.98	9.9.98	3.3.99	10
14.5.99	29.4.99	9
20.5.98	8
18.8.98	22.12.98	13.6.00	10.7.2000	11
21.11.97	4.11.97	18.6.99	19.2.2000	19.2.2000	..	12
16.12.98	6.7.99	9
2.3.99	19.7.99	2.5.2000	10
..	2
..	3.12.98	6
4.2.2000	7.1.2000	9
..	4
..	7
..	9.2.99	4
8	9	4	2	1		

37 Intra SADC merchandise trade by country, 1990–1998

Angola: Imports in millions US \$ (Merchandise)							
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Total imports	1 578	..	1 988	1 463	1 633	1 700	..
SADC totals	31.9	0	38.5	98.7	103.5	16.1	0.1
Botswana	1.4	..	1.5	1.1	0.0	0.1	0.1
Lesotho	0.0
Malawi	0.7	..	0.8	1.3	1.5
Mauritius	0	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0
Mozambique	3.5
Namibia	32
South Africa	19.8	..	32.6	58.1	88.0
Swaziland
Tanzania
Zambia	3.0	..	0.7	0.4	8.0	8.0	..
Zimbabwe	7.0	..	3.0	2.2	6.0	8.0	..

Angola: Exports in million US \$ (Merchandise)							
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Total exports	3 884	..	3 833	2 900	2 821	3 880	..
SADC totals	4.21	0	10.89	24.87	10.2	4.058	..
Botswana	1.48	..	0.47	..	0.4	0.058	..
Lesotho
Malawi	0.63	..	1.33	1.6	0.8
Mauritius	0	..	0.02	0	0	0	0
Mozambique
Namibia	20
South Africa	0.1	..	0.3	0.1	5
Swaziland
Tanzania
Zambia	1	..	2.77	3.14	3	3	..
Zimbabwe	1	..	€	0.03	1	1	..

Angola: Merchandise imports and exports and total trade as a % of GDP							
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Angola							
Imports	1 578.00	..	1 988.00	1 463.00	1 633.00	1 700.000	..
Exports	4.21	0	10.89	24.87	10.20	4.058	..
Total	1 582.21	0	1 998.89	1487.87	1 643.20	1 704.058	..
GDP US\$	3 513.00	5575.00	4 060.00	5 059.000	6617
Import as a % of GDP	56.59	26.24	40.22	33.600	..
Export as a % of GDP	0.31	0.45	0.25	0.080	..
Total trade as a % of GDP	56.90	26.69	40.47	33.680	..

Source: SADC Member States, African Development. Indicators 1994/95 and *IMF Direction of Trade Year Book 1995* and March 1996/1997 *Official SADC Trade Industry and Investment Review* February 1996 paper by Madalena Ramalho *et al.* at the Trade and Investment Conference

	1990	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Total imports	2681	2488	1670.7	1621.9	2503.4	2224.0	2852.5
SADC totals	2353.9	2244.3	1549.3	1494.2	1995.8	1869.2	2205.6
Angola	0.01	0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0	0
Lesotho	1.36	1.1	23.8	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.4
Malawi	3.24	2.19	9.4	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.8
Mauritius	0.33	0.26	0.0	0.1	0	0.2	0.8
Mozambique	0.15	0.2	1.8	0.0	0	0	0.1
Namibia	0.01	0.4	2.5	2.3	5.8	6	6.6
Seychelles	0.0
South Africa	2205	2113	1404.1	1276.9	1844.2	1728.1	2059.9
Swaziland	0.64	0.27	2.5	110.3	1	0	0.1
Tanzania	1.48	0.47	6.2	0.3	1.3	1.8	0.3
Zambia	5.7	5.4	17.4	6.5	3.6	4	8.6
Zimbabwe	136	121	81.6	96.3	138.3	127.6	127.1

	1990	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Total exports	2460	2302	1681.3	1827.1	2830.4	3230.8	3690.7
SADC totals	305.88	284.1	250.0	313.4	707.2	702.0	674.1
Angola	0.06	0.01	1.141	0.035	0.1	0	0.0
Lesotho	0.04	0	2.246	5.951	0.4	0.2	0.9
Malawi	2.5	9.2	14.654	1.132	4.4	4.6	4.1
Mauritius	0.5	0.02	0.302	0.263	0.2	0.1	0.2
Mozambique	3.33	2.32	3.417	0.156	0.5	0.4	0.6
Namibia	0	0	1.553	3.112	7.7	4.3	8.8
Seychelles	0.0
South Africa	116.2	159.9	146.72	247.74	597.9	585.6	516.6
Swaziland	0.26	0	0.06	0.46	2	0.7	0.6
Tanzania	1.44	1.47	4.64	0.61	0.8	0.5	1.1
Zambia	14.25	6.88	16.97	4.02	6.7	6.4	5.5
Zimbabwe	167.3	104.3	58.27	49.96	86.5	99.2	135.6

Source: SADC member states' Central Statistics Office

Botswana: Merchandise imports and exports and total trade as a % of GDP							
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Imports	2 353.90	2 244.3	1 549.3	1 494.20	1 995.80	1 869.20	2 205.60
Exports	305.88	284.1	250.0	313.40	707.20	702.00	674.10
Total	2 528.40	1 799.3	1 807.6	2 703.00	2 571.20	2 879.70	
GDP US\$		3 716.01	3 894.39	3739.30	4 090.53	4 420.73	4 301.61
Imports as a % of GDP		60.40	39.78	39.96	48.79	42.28	51.27
Exports as a % of GDP		7.65	6.42	8.38	17.29	15.88	15.67
Total trade as a % of GDP		68.04	46.20	48.34	66.08	58.16	66.94

Lesotho: Imports in million US \$ (Merchandise)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Total imports	621	..	784	852	871	988	1,038.5	1,064.2	880.6
SADC totals	489.2	0	706.5	713	778.8	922	947.7	942.2	790.6
Angola
Botswana	0.32	..	0.13	0.66	4.724	..	0.223
DR Congo
Malawi	0	..	0	0	0.1
Mauritius	0.02	..	0	0	0.0003	0	0.54
Mozambique
Namibia
Seychelles
South Africa	488.9	..	705.6	712.0	774.0	921.7	946.2	941.4	788.9
Swaziland
Tanzania
Zambia	0.32	0.015
Zimbabwe	0.43	0.31	..	0.2755	0.72093	0.824295	1.6968

Lesotho: Exports in million US \$ (Merchandise)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Total exports	59	..	89	121	143	160		
SADC totals	27.678	0	45.012	57.017	60.96	0	0.223	0
Angola	0.04	..	0	0
Botswana	1.36	..	1.1	0.51	0.6	..	0.223	..
DR Congo
Malawi	0.09	..	0.02	0.1	0.36
Mauritius	0.02	..	0	0	0	0	0	..
Mozambique	0	..	0	0.27
Namibia	0	..	0	0	..	0
Seychelles
South Africa	26.1	..	43.6	55.9	60
Swaziland	0	..	0	0
Tanzania	0	..	0.002	0
Zambia	0.008	..	0.18	0.037
Zimbabwe	0.06	..	0.11	0.2

Source: SADC Member States, African Development Indicators 1994/95; IMF Direction of Trade Yearbook 1995 and March 1996; Bureau of Statistics and Customs Department

Lesotho: Merchandise imports and exports and total trade as a % of GDP

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Imports	489.2	0	706.5	713	778.8	922	947.7	942.2	790.6
Exports	27.678	0	45.012	57.017	60.96	0	0.223	0	0
Total	516.9	0.0	751.5	770.0	839.8	922.0	947.9	942.2	
GDP US\$		695.36	773.02	788.38	839.41	932.1	943	1028.3	
Imports as a % of GDP			91.39	90.44	92.78	98.92	100.50	91.63	
Exports as a % of GDP			5.82	7.23	7.26	0.00	0.02	0.00	
Total trade as a % of GDP			97.22	97.67	100.04	98.92	100.52	91.63	

Source: Imports and Exports are from the SITCD and GDP from the SADC databank

Malawi Exports in million US \$ (Merchandise)	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Total imports	581	705	719	546	533	515	595	441.8
SADC totals	221.7	266	310	277.9	246.6	235.9	297.1	241.2
Angola	0	0	0	0	0
Botswana	3.6	4	9.2	3.7	1.7	2.6	5.3	2.87
DR Congo	0	0	0	0
Lesotho	0.1	..	0	0.1	0.4	0.6	1.5	0.01
Mauritius	0.1	..	0.1	0.5	1.8	1	6.3	5.52
Mozambique	1.1	2	1	0.6	4.4	15.1	3.1	3.5
Namibia	0.2	..	0.2	33	0.3	0	2.2	0.23
Seychelles	0	0	0	..	0
South Africa	178.2	196	244.7	181.6	165	155.7	201	160.46
Swaziland	2	2	3.7	5.2	4.3	3.6	4.5	6.2
Tanzania	0.8	2	1.3	1.6	1.4	2.1	3.4	1.41
Zambia	9	13	4.8	4.6	13.2	6.2	10.8	5.6
Zimbabwe	26.7	47	45	47	54.2	49	59.1	55.44
Exchange rate (US\$)	2.7289	2.8033	3.6033	4.4028	8.7364	15.28178	15.29755	16.4

Malawi Exports in million US \$ (Merchandise)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Exports row	406.4	475.5	399.9	320.2	333.1	418.0	483.0	512.8
SADC totals	46.1	45.0	71.3	56.4	67.5	75.1	94.4	116.9
Angola	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2
Botswana	1.8	2.0	2.2	1.2	0.9	0.9	0.7	1.3
DR Congo	2.0	0.8	0.5	0.2	0.0
Lesotho	0.0	..	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.6	0.5	0.0
Mauritius	0.1	..	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.3	0.1
Mozambique	0.9	2.0	17.0	0.0	7.5	9.9	15.3	2.3
Namibia	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Seychelles	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
South Africa	28.5	31.0	46.9	48.8	43.6	43.7	50.1	68.0
Swaziland	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.0
Tanzania	0.9	2.0	0.8	1.3	2.2	6.5	4.6	7.3
Zambia	5.5	5.0	2.1	1.8	4.0	5.1	3.8	5.0
Zimbabwe	6.5	3.0	2.0	2.0	7.9	7.1	18.9	32.8

Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Lilongwe: *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1997*, IMF: *Annual External Trade Report 1994*, National Statistical Office, Malawi

Notes 1991 to 1993 has not yet been supplied by the Malawi National Statistical Office. Malawi uses the General Trade System. In this system, imports consist of goods imported directly into consumption and goods imported into bond. Neither imports nor exports include goods in transit through Malawi.

Malawi: Merchandise imports and exports and total trade as a % of GDP

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Imports	221.7	266	310	277.9	246.6	235.9	297.1	241.20
Exports	46.1	45.0	71.3	56.4	67.5	75.1	94.4	116.90
Total	267.8	311.0	381.3	334.3	314.1	311.0	391.5	358.10
GDP US\$..	2177.97	1857.71	2069.86	1166.95	1491.33	2321.88	2537.5
Imports as a % of GDP	..	12.21	16.69	13.43	21.13	15.82	12.80	9.51
Exports as a % of GDP	..	2.07	3.84	2.72	5.78	5.04	4.07	4.61
Total trade as a % of GDP	..	14.28	20.53	16.15	26.92	20.85	16.86	14.11

Source: Imports and Exports are from the SITCD and GDP from the SADC databank

Mauritius Imports (million of US\$) (Merchandise)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Total imports	1655	1576	1491	1629	1915	1931	2075	2242
SADC totals	151.3	192.0	200.4	227.3	239.2	233.8	..	288.2
Angola	0.0	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	..	0.0
Botswana	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	..	0.0
DR Congo	0.1
Lesotho	0.0	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	..	0.0
Malawi	0.5	..	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1	..	0.1
Mozambique	0.1	..	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	..	1.0
Namibia	0.0	..	0.0	0.1	1.5	2.1	..	0.4
Seychelles	0.3
South Africa	145.8	183.0	192.9	218.0	225.1	217.2	..	274.8
Swaziland	1.5	3.0	2.8	2.8	3.2	3.5	..	4.6
Tanzania	0.4	4.0	0.7	0.5	0.9	1.6	..	1.0
Zambia	0.0	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	..	1.5
Zimbabwe	2.5	2.0	3.6	5.8	8.3	9.0	..	4.6

Mauritius Exports (million of US\$) (Merchandise)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Total exports	1256	1195	1194	1236	1339	1503	1593	1164
SADC totals	10.2	9.0	15.5	18.3	13.0	14.8	20.6	27.84
Angola	0.0	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0
Botswana	0.3	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.53
DR Congo	0.04
Lesotho	0.0	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0
Malawi	0.1	..	0.1	0.5	1.2	0.5	2.5	3.3
Mozambique	0.0	..	1.0	4.1	1.0	0.2	0.0	0.04
Namibia	0.0	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.01
Seychelles	3.53
South Africa	6.2	5.0	9.6	6.4	5.2	6.4	8.8	6.89
Swaziland	0.2	..	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.0	0
Tanzania	0.1	..	0.6	1.7	0.2	0.9	3.7	0.92
Zambia	0.3	..	1.0	1.0	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.79
Zimbabwe	3.3	4.0	3.3	4.5	4.6	6.5	5.4	12.36

Source: *Annual Digest of Statistics 1984-1994*; Economic Indicators (CSO), May 1997; 1991 is from *Direction of Trade IMF*

Mauritius Merchandise Imports and Exports as a % of GDP

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Imports	151.3	192.0	200.4	227.3	239.2	233.8	..	288.2	
Exports	10.2	9.0	15.5	18.3	13.0	14.8	20.6	27.84	
Total	161.5	201.0	215.9	245.6	252.2	248.6	20.6	316.0	0.0
GDP US\$	2 831.7	3 189.8	3 205.1	3 510.2	3 972.5	4 307	4 186.2	4 251.7	
Imports as a % of GDP	6.78	6.28	7.09	6.81	5.89	0.00	6.88		
Exports as a % of GDP	0.32	0.49	0.57	0.37	0.37	0.48	0.67		
Total trade as a % of GDP	7.10	6.77	7.66	7.19	6.26	0.48	7.55		

Source: Imports and Exports are from the SITCD and GDP from the SADC databank

Mozambique Imports in million US \$ (Merchandise)

	1990	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Total imports	877	898	855	544	727	782.6
SADC totals	136.1	257.3	329.3	186.3	245.2	311.9
Angola	0	0
Botswana	3.3	2.3	0.4	0.1	0.1	0
Lesotho	0	0	0.1	..	0	0
Malawi	14	17	0.6	0.8	0.7	10.7
Mauritius	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.6	0.2	0
Namibia	0	0.3	1.6	0.4
South Africa	118.7	237.8	280.5	150.9	188.2	259.7
Swaziland	20.8	12.3	23.3	10.3
Tanzania	0	0	0	0.1
Zambia	..	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.2
Zimbabwe	26.1	21.2	30.7	30.6

Mozambique Exports in million US \$ (Merchandise)

	1990	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Total exports	127	139	132	224	174.3	226.1
SADC totals	13.7	33	31.7	38.7	52.2	59.3
Angola	3.4	0.7	0.1	0.5
Botswana	0.2	0.2	0	0	0	0
Lesotho	0	0
Malawi	1	1	0.6	0.6	2.6	1.4
Mauritius	0.1	0.1	0	0	0.1	0
Namibia	2	..	0.1	0
South Africa	8.8	23	21	28.7	41.1	43.8
Swaziland	0.1	0.2	0	0.1
Tanzania	3.5	1.1	0.1	3.6
Zambia	..	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
Zimbabwe	0.3	8.3	4.3	7.3	7.9	9.8

Source: SADC Member States, *African Development Indicators 1994/95* and IMF *Direction of Trade Yearbook 1995* and March 1996; *Anuario Estadístico 1994* and 1996; 1997 *Official SADC Trade, Industry and Investment Review*

Mozambique: Merchandise imports and exports and total trade as a % of GDP

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Imports	136.1	257.3	329.3	186.3	245.2	311.9	347
Exports	13.7	33	31.7	38.7	52.2	59.3	
Total	290.3	361.0	225.0	297.4	371.2	347.0	
GDP US\$	1 433.49	1 285	1 466.92	1 462	1 509	2 900	
Imports as a % of GDP	17.95	25.63	12.70	16.77	20.67	11.97	
Exports as a % of GDP	2.30	2.47	2.64	3.57	3.93	0.00	
Total trade as a % of GDP	20.25	28.09	15.34	20.34	24.60	11.97	

Source: Imports and Exports are from the SITCD and GDP from the SADC databank

Namibia Imports in million US \$ (Merchandise)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Total imports	940	..	1 125	1 325	1 395	1 597	..	1 194.7
SADC totals	794.7	..	0	1 104.9	1 518.7	1 468	..	1 039.6
Angola	3.5	0.7	1	..	1.9
Botswana	0	..	0	0.2	0.3	15	..	1.3
Lesotho	0	..	0	0	0	0	..	0
Malawi	0	0	0	0.1	..	0
Mauritius	0	..	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mozambique	0	0	0.1	..	0
South Africa	794.7	1 096.6	1 168.2	1 431.8	..	1 030.3
Swaziland	1	1.5	0.3	..	0.1
Tanzania	0	86.9	0	..	0
Zambia	0.4	2.7	2.7	..	0.5
Zimbabwe	3.1	258.5	17	..	5.4

Namibia Exports in million US \$ (Merchandise)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Total exports	876	..	1 195	1 277	1 317	1 700	..
SADC totals	251.32	..	1.74	406.1	403.7	2.05	0.72
Angola	9.1
Botswana	0.01	..	0.4	3.4	3
Lesotho
Malawi	0.1	..	0.2	33.0	0.2
Mauritius	0.01	..	0	0.0	1.5	2.05	0.72
Mozambique	108.0
South Africa	251.2	251.3	399
Swaziland
Tanzania	0.0	..	0	..
Zambia	1.14	1.2	..	0	..
Zimbabwe	0.2

Source: SADC Member States, *African Development Indicators 1994/95* and IMF *Direction of Trade Yearbook 1995* and March 1996; Bank of Namibia Sept. 1995; 1997 *Official SADC Trade, Industry and Investment Review*

Namibia: Merchandise imports and exports and total trade as a % of GDP

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Imports	794.70	..	0	1104.9	1518.7	1468.0	—	1039.6
Exports	251.32	..	1.74	406.1	403.7	2.1	0.72	0
Total			1.70	1 511.0	1 922.4	1 470.1	..	1 039.6
GDP US\$	2 578.9	2 713.40	2 607.8	3 100.0	3 361.8	2965.50	3 105.3	
Imports as a % of GDP			0.00	42.4	48.9	43.7	..	33.5
Exports as a % of GDP			0.06	15.6	13.0	0.1	0.02	0.0
Total trade as a % of GDP			0.06	57.9	62.0	43.7	..	33.5

Source: Imports and Exports are from the SITCD and GDP from the SADC databank

South Africa Imports in million US \$ (Merchandise)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Total imports	17,045	17,459	18,203	18,053	22,393	23,782	..
SADC totals	313.22	180	559.05	374.475	427.325	474.278	594.42
Angola	0.1	..	0.3	0.191	5.252	10.356	..
Botswana	116.2	..	159.9	585.6
DR Congo
Lesotho	26.1	..	43.6
Malawi	29	33	46.9	50.925	49.221	62.656	..
Mauritius	6.22	5	9.55	6.53	4.03	10.041	8.82
Mozambique	8.8	5	23	13.355	15.046	18.015	..
Namibia
Seychelles
Swaziland
Tanzania	2.9	..	3.6	4.012	2.332	3.661	..
Zambia	1.8	5	4.8	15.863	69.719	79.215	..
Zimbabwe	122.1	132	267.4	283.599	281.725	290.334	..

South Africa Exports in million US \$ (Merchandise)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Total exports	23383	23306	23673	24331	25411	27900	..
SADC totals	5094.8	978.4	4637.6	5552.393	5745.281	6844.433	1951.1
Angola	19.8	..	32.6	36.716	83.265	107.862	..
Botswana	2205	..	2113	1973	1175	1844.2	1728.1
DR Congo
Lesotho	488.9	..	705.6	712	774
Malawi	179	176.4	244.7	115.892	177.183	166.651	..
Mauritius	68	167	137	107.725	195.713	173.845	223
Mozambique	118.7	..	238	242.991	424.75	554.024	..
Namibia	794.7	1057.2	1143
Seychelles
Swaziland	725.7	..	401.9	714.9	794
Tanzania	0.7	..	9.7	15.658	96.36	335.756	..
Zambia	152.2	165	210.4	228.759	248.282	1090.745	..
Zimbabwe	342.1	470	544.7	347.552	633.728	2571.35	..

Source: *SADC Member States*; 1991 data from IMF *Direction of Trade*; 1997 *Official SADC Trade, Industry and Investment Review*.

Notes: Data on trade within SACU is usually not available, only Botswana compiles its own trade statistics.

1997 figure is for the period January to October as reported by Botswana.

South Africa: Merchandise imports and exports and total trade as a % of GDP

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Imports	313.22	180	559.05	374.475	427.325	474.278	594.42
Exports	5094.8	978.4	4637.6	5552.393	5745.281	6844.433	1951.1
Total	1158.4	5196.7	5926.9	6172.6	7318.7	2545.5	0.0
GDP US\$		120245	130533	130488	135822	151118	143128
Imports as a % of GDP		0.15	0.43	0.29	0.31	0.31	0.42
Exports as a % of GDP		0.81	3.55	4.26	4.23	4.53	1.36
Total trade as a % of GDP		0.96	3.98	4.54	4.54	4.84	1.78

Source: Imports and Exports are from the SITCD and GDP from the SADC databank

Swaziland Imports in million US \$ (Merchandise)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Total imports				793	847	991		
SADC totals	629.4	716	857.5	777.7	829.8	1107.4		1163.8
Angola	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Botswana	0	0	0	0	0	0.2	0	0
DR Congo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lesotho	0	0	0	0	0.2	0	0.1	
Malawi	0	0	0.1	0.2	1.8	0.2	0	
Mauritius	0.1	0	0.1	0	0.3	0.3	0.7	
Mozambique	0.5	1.5	0.2	0.9	2.8	3.2	9.7	
Namibia	0	0	0	0	0.2	0.4	0.1	
Seychelles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
South Africa	627.5	713.7	851.4	770.2	819.9	1101.4	1152.1	
Tanzania	0	0	0.1	3.3	1.5	0.2	0	
Zambia	0	0.1	0	0.1	0	0	..	
Zimbabwe	1.2	0.8	5.6	3.1	2.9	1.7	1.1	
Exchange rate (1US\$)	2.58732	2.76132	2.85201	3.26774	3.5508	3.62709	4.29935	

Swaziland Exports in million US \$(Merchandise)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Total exports	550	594	638	685	791	868	896
SADC totals	299.6	335.9	511.1	523.5	517.5	573.9	671
Angola	0	0	0.4	0	0	0	0
Botswana	0	0	2.6	2.8	3.2	4.6	1.6
DR Congo	0	0	0	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.2
Lesotho	0	0.6	0.8	0.9	2.1	1.7	0.5
Malawi	1.5	3.1	4.5	3.8	5.7	6.3	8.8
Mauritius	1.5	4.5	3.2	4.3	7	5.3	3.2
Mozambique	13.8	14.8	21.8	24.1	49.7	26	43.6
Namibia	0	0	3	18.4	10.4	5.2	1.9
Seychelles	0	0	0	0.9	0.7	1	0.5
South Africa	266	291.2	464.9	437.4	419.5	487.1	584.9
Tanzania	5.4	3.8	3.5	2.4	7.2	7.1	9
Zambia	2.6	4.2	3.2	5.5	5.3	16.9	7
Zimbabwe	8.8	13.7	3.2	22.7	6.7	12.2	9.7

Source: Customs Department, Swaziland; Central Bank of Swaziland

Swaziland: Merchandise imports and exports and total trade as a % of GDP

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Imports	629.4	716	857.5	777.7	829.8	1107.4	1163.8
Exports	299.6	335.9	511.1	523.5	517.5	573.9	671
Total	929.0	1051.9	1368.6	1301.2	1347.3	1681.3	1834.8
GDP US\$		885.95	903.63	948.65	1062.11	1266.28	1219.19
Imports as a % of GDP		80.82	94.90	81.98	78.13	87.45	95.46
Exports as a % of GDP		37.91	56.56	55.18	48.72	45.32	55.04
Total trade as a % of GDP		118.73	151.46	137.16	126.85	132.77	150.49

Tanzania Imports in million US \$ (Merchandise)

	1990	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Total imports	1290	1411	1239	1466	1500	1394	1266
SADC totals	12.9	16.2	59.6	153.5	135	81.4	120.3
Angola	0	0	0	0
Botswana	1.4	1.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.1	0.1
DR Congo	0.2
Lesotho	0	0	0	0	0.2
Malawi	0.7	0.8	1.3	1.2	0.6	1.5	2.7
Mauritius	0.1	0.6	1.7	0.2	0.5	2.4	0.5
Mozambique	3.5	0.1	0.4	0	5
Namibia	32	0	0	0.1	0.1
South Africa	0.7	9.7	17.9	133.8	114	61.7	94.1
Swaziland	5.8	6.4	12	8.8
Seychelles	0
Zambia	3	0.7	0.4	2.9	7.2	2.3	4
Zimbabwe	7	3	2.2	9	5.2	1.4	4.6

Tanzania Exports in million US \$ (Merchandise)

	1990	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Total exports	405	374	372	506	519	750	599
SADC totals	7.4	14.9	33.6	10.1	5.6	40.7	42.4
Angola	0.6	0.1
Botswana	1.5	0.5	0.2	0.4	..	0.4	0
DR Congo	8.7
Lesotho	0	0
Malawi	0.6	1.3	1.6	0.8	..	9.7	5.4
Mauritius	0.4	0.7	2	0.9	1.6	0.5	1.4
Mozambique	0.3	0.3
Namibia	20	0	0
South Africa	2.9	3.6	6.7	4	..	8.6	7.9
Swaziland	0.3	0.2
Seychelles	0
Zambia	1	2.8	3.1	3	3	17.6	1.6
Zimbabwe	1	6	0	1	1	2.7	16.7

Source: Tanzania Revenue Authority; Bank of Tanzania; *SADC Member States, African Development Indicators 1994/95*

Tanzania: Merchandise imports and exports and total trade as a % of GDP

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Imports	12.9	16.2	59.6	153.5	135	81.4	120.3
Exports	7.4	14.9	33.6	10.1	5.6	40.7	42.4
Total		31.1	93.2	163.6	140.6	122.1	162.7
GDP US\$		4 956.53	4 601.37	4 257.74	4 510.85	5 255.24	6 496.16
Imports as a % of GDP		0.33	1.30	3.61	2.99	1.55	1.85
Exports as a % of GDP		0.30	0.73	0.24	0.12	0.77	0.65
Total trade as a % of GDP		0.63	2.03	3.84	3.12	2.32	2.50

Zambia Imports in million US \$ (Merchandise)								
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Total imports	1207	801	1351	1019	1003	1244	1198	928.4
SADC totals	293.1	224.6	277.6	357.2	279.8	320.3	461.6	439.8
Angola	0.01	0	0	0	0	0.01	0	0.04
Botswana	6.44	3.04	4.14	4.22	2.23	2.31	6.96	4.13
DR Congo	8.82	..	1.98	0.46	0.44	0.41	0.12	0.34
Lesotho	0.16	0.12	0	0	0	0.06	0.07	0.02
Malawi	4.23	4.76	0.85	1.84	8.13	1.29	25.01	3.43
Mauritius	0.19	0.57	0.37	1	1.09	0.95	0.84	1.24
Mozambique	0.02	1.43	0.47	0.16	0.14	0.86	0.31	0.39
Namibia	0.51	0	1.3	0.3	0.8	0	6.03	1.24
Seychelles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
South Africa	205.65	165.11	210.4	293.9	193.09	242.54	311.39	350.71
Swaziland	7.91	4.08	3	6.21	4.99	5.87	9.65	6.1
Tanzania	2.21	1.21	2.77	3.14	2.77	9.66	14.59	2.41
Zimbabwe	56.96	44.34	52.3	45.93	66.1	56.35	86.59	69.72
Exchange Rate (1US\$)	30.29	64.64	172.21	452.76	669.37	857.23	1203.71	1309.07

Zambia Exports in million US \$								
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Total exports	1254	1124.4	1124.4	990	1066.4	1186	976	1092.3
SADC totals	34.1	79.9	44.9	55.9	72.4	112.5	214.7	131.4
Angola	0.84	1.13	0	0.03	0.14	0.33	0.61	1.02
Botswana	0.18	7.43	5.4	4.3	2.39	1.44	4.9	3
DR Congo	7.62	0.03	5.26	10.68	24.81	26.49	41.31	26.59
Lesotho	0	0.09	0.32	0.02	0.03	0	0	0
Malawi	3.94	12.21	4.79	4.62	1.92	8.54	49.9	19.61
Mauritius	0.01	0	0	0	0.02	0.01	0	0.72
Mozambique	0.08	0.02	0.1	1.98	0.24	0.15	6.15	0.08
Namibia	0.27	0	1	1	0.85	2.64	4.13	2.24
Seychelles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.01
South Africa	1.85	4.73	4.8	12.4	14.29	19.28	42.61	43.3
Swaziland	0	0.15	0.3	0.34	0	0.05	0.91	0.43
Tanzania	2.85	9.82	0.68	0.42	5.26	21.85	11.53	5.11
Zimbabwe	16.47	44.29	22.25	20.16	22.41	31.7	52.66	29.31

Source: SADC Member States, *Direction of Trade Yearbook 1997*, IMF; *International Financial Statistics*, December 1997, IMF; *Quarterly Digest of Statistics*, 3rd and 4th Quarter 1996, Central Statistical Office, Zambia

Zambia: Merchandise imports and exports and total trade as a % of GDP								
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Imports	293.1	224.6	277.6	357.2	279.8	320.3	461.6	439.8
Exports	34.1	79.9	44.9	55.9	72.4	112.5	214.7	131.4
Total		304.5	322.5	413.1	352.2	432.8	676.3	571.2
GDP US\$		3333.98	3242.61	3463.63	3580.31	3197.09	3064.09	3712.99
Imports as a % of GDP		6.7	8.56	10.31	7.81	10.02	15.06	11.84
Exports as a % of GDP		2.4	1.38	1.61	2.02	3.52	7.01	3.54
Total trade as a % of GDP		9.1	9.95	11.93	9.84	13.54	22.07	15.38

Zimbabwe Imports in million US \$ (Merchandise)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Total imports	1 518	1 650	1 650	1 444	1 739	2 600	2 834	2 999
SADC totals	360.6	653.2	619.9	561.7	801.2	1 122.10	1 219.50	1 272.30
Angola	11.6	0	0	1.2	2.6	1.5	0	0
Botswana	89.6	66.1	30.3	38.8	37.1	56.3	38.8	59.6
DR Congo	0.2	0.1	0.1	0	0	0	0.2	0
Lesotho	2.5	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.1	0	0.1	0.2
Malawi	4.9	3.1	2.7	2.1	4	5.5	23.9	15.6
Mauritius	1.0	7.5	5.6	5.0	6.7	12.9	16.1	15
Mozambique	54.2	5.4	5.1	0.7	5.3	4.6	12.4	22.3
Namibia	0.8	0.3	0.8	3.6	7.7	9.8	11.1	8.3
Seychelles	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.1	0	0	0
South Africa	131.2	546.1	537.3	491.5	730.3	1 014.4	1 085.9	1 099
Swaziland	0.9	9.3	17.4	2.6	0	0	13.8	11
Tanzania	11.9	3	6.1	1.4	0.7	1.8	2.3	14.9
Zambia	51.6	12.1	14.2	14	6.6	15.4	15	26.4
Exchange rate(1Z\$ in US\$)	0.4085	0.2917	0.1963	0.1545	0.1227	0.1155	0.1008	0.08258

Zimbabwe Exports in million US \$ (Merchandise)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Total exports	1 633	1 418	1 418	1 537	1 646	1 849	2 118	2 104
SADC totals	535.1	331.5	383.4	445.9	540	565.3	566.6	660.2
Angola	0.1	7.7	4.5	3.2	10.3	11.7	7.1	7.3
Botswana	65	87.4	65.3	73.9	93.4	91	84.2	93.8
DR Congo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lesotho	0.6	1.1	0.5	1.6	1.5	1.2	0.2	0.3
Malawi	71.1	0.7	40.6	42.8	46	50	61.4	78.7
Mauritius	5.2	0.7	3	4.7	5.8	6	2.8	2.2
Mozambique	0.7	37.3	42.5	54.1	55.1	51.7	78.6	70.7
Namibia	0.1	3.1	2.1	3.4	21.6	16.3	24.5	19.5
Seychelles	0.1	0.8	1.0	0.3	0.4	0.9	4.5	2.5
South Africa	368.5	139.3	171.3	188.4	218.3	232.2	204.1	254.5
Swaziland	11.0	0.8	1.2	1.4	1.2	1.6	2.1	1.3
Tanzania	1.8	3.9	3.0	5.0	23.2	9.7	5.2	13.3
Zambia	10.9	48.4	48.3	67	63.2	93.1	91.9	116

Source: SADC member states; Central Statistical Office, Harare; *Quarterly Economic and Statistical Review* — Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Sept. 1996

Zimbabwe: Merchandise imports and exports and total trade as a % of GDP

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Imports	360.6	653.2	619.9	561.7	801.2	1 122.1	1 219.5	1 272.30
Exports	535.1	331.5	383.4	445.9	540	565.3	566.6	660.2
Total	984.7	1003.3	1007.6	1341.2	1687.4	1786.1	1932.5	
GDP US\$		8611.3	6743.5	6446.3	6837.7	7127.5	8474.7	8235.0
Imports as a % of GDP		7.6	9.2	8.7	11.7	15.7	14.4	15.5
Exports as a % of GDP		3.9	5.7	6.9	7.9	7.9	6.7	8.0
Total trade as a % of GDP		11.4	14.9	15.6	19.6	23.7	21.1	23.5

38 Extra-SADC merchandise trade for selected years as percentage of total trade

SADC HDI Rank		1990			1992			1993			1994	
		Exports	Imports	Total	Exports	Imports	Total	Exports	Imports	Total	Exports	Imports
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	99.2	90.9	94.4	98.7	86.6	92	98.5	86	91.4	99	87.5
3	South Africa	78.2	98.2	86.6	80.4	96.9	87.6	77.2	97.9	86.0	77.4	98.1
4	Swaziland	45.5	19.9	23.6	1.9	12.0	34.6	2
5	Namibia	71.3	76	42.4	99.8	68.8	99.9	68.2	72.6	41.9	69.3	73
6	Botswana	87.6	12.2	48.3	87.7	9.8	47.2	85.1	7.3	46.3	82.8	7.9
7	Lesotho	3.1	21.2	24	49.4	9.9	13.9	52.9	16.3	20.9	57.4	10.6
8	Zimbabwe	67.2	23.8	28.4	27.0	37.6	32.7	71.0	61.1	66.2	67.2	53.9
9	DR Congo
10	Zambia	97.3	24.3	13.3	4.0	20.6	13	94.3	64.9	79.4	93.2	72.1
11	Tanzania	98.2	1	1.2	9.0	4.8	5.8	98.0	89.5	91.7	98.9	91
12	Angola	99.9	98	99.3	99.7	98	99.1	99.1	93.3	97.2	99.6	93.7
13	Malawi	88.7	61.8	72.9	82.2	56.9	65.9	82.4	49.1	61.4	79.7	53.7
14	Mozambique	75.8	84.5	85.1	64.7	71.3	72	62.6	61.5	63.4	52.5	65.7
	SADC	80.2	72.2	73.6	78.5	66.8	75.1	76.1	58.5	63.2	76	59.1

Intra-SADC Merchandise Trade for Selected Years as Percentage of Total Trade

SADC HDI Rank		1990			1992			1993			1994	
		Exports	Imports	Total	Exports	Imports	Total	Exports	Imports	Total	Exports	Imports
1	Seychelles
2	Mauritius	0.8	9.1	5.6	1.3	13.4	8	1.5	14	8.6	1	12.5
3	South Africa	21.8	1.8	13.4	19.6	3.1	12.4	22.8	2.1	14	22.6	1.9
4	Swaziland	54.5	80.1	76.4	98.1	88	65.4	98
5	Namibia	28.7	24	57.6	0.2	31.2	0.1	31.8	27.4	58.1	30.7	27
6	Botswana	12.4	87.8	51.7	12.3	90.2	52.8	14.9	92.7	53.7	17.2	92.1
7	Lesotho	96.9	78.8	76	50.6	90.1	86.1	47.1	83.7	79.1	42.6	89.4
8	Zimbabwe	32.8	23.8	28.4	27	37.6	32.7	29	38.9	33.8	32.8	46.1
9	DR Congo
10	Zambia	2.7	24.3	13.3	4	20.6	13	5.7	35.1	20.6	6.8	27.9
11	Tanzania	1.8	1	1.2	9	4.8	5.8	2	10.5	8.3	1.1	9
12	Angola	0.1	2	0.7	0.3	2	0.9	0.9	6.7	2.8	0.4	6.3
13	Malawi	11.3	38.2	27.1	17.8	43.1	34.1	17.6	50.9	38.6	20.3	46.3
14	Mozambique	24.2	15.5	14.9	35.3	28.7	28	37.4	38.5	36.6	47.5	34.3
	SADC	19.8	27.8	26.4	21.5	33.2	24.9	23.9	41.5	36.8	24	40.9

1995 mpc	1995			1997			
	Total	Exports	Imports	Total	Exports	Imports	Total
..
7.5	92.2	99	87.9	92.8	97.6	87.1	90.7
8.1	87.1	75.5	98.0	85.8
2	17.7	33.9	-11.8	9.6	100.0
73	29.1	99.9	73.6	55.4	100.0	76.4	13.0
7.9	47.6	75	20.3	49.3	81.7	22.7	56.0
0.6	17.2	100	6.7	19.7	100	11.5	11.5
3.9	60.4	69.4	56.8	62.1	68.6	57.6	62.1
..
2.1	83	90.5	74.2	82.2	88.0	52.6	71.7
01	93	94.6	94.2	94.3
7	97.4	99.9	99.0
7	63.7	82	54.2	66.7	77.2	45.4	62.5
5.7	70.7	100	66.3	67.0	100.0	54.3	54.3
8.1	63.3	82	59.9	65.4	87.6	51	52.7

1995 ppo	1995			1997			
	Total	Exports	Imports	Total	Exports	Imports	Total
..
2.5	7.8	1	12.1	7.2	2.4	12.9	9.3
1.9	12.9	24.5	2	14.2
08	82.3	66.1	111.8	90.4	0
7	70.9	0.1	26.4	44.6	..	23.6	87
2.1	52.4	25	79.7	50.7	18.3	77.3	44
9.4	82.8	..	93.3	80.3	..	88.5	88.5
5.1	39.6	30.6	43.2	37.9	31.4	42.4	37.9
..
7.9	17	9.5	25.8	17.8	12	47.4	28.3
9	7	5.4	5.8	5.7
3	2.6	0.1	1
3	36.3	18	45.8	33.3	22.8	54.6	37.5
3	29.3	..	33.7	33	..	45.7	45.7
0	36.7	18	40.1	34.6	12.4	49	47.3

39 SADC citizens employed in South Africa by sector, 1996

Excluding SA	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
2 Mauritius	0.1	0.1	1.9	2.7	0.2	1.5	1.7	3.8	2.0	0.6	4.1	1.4
4 Swaziland	2.2	8.1	2.8	1.8	1.6	2.9	4.7	3.4	4.7	3.0	0	3.2
5 Namibia	0.6	0.1	1.0	0.2	0.7	1.4	1.9	2.4	4.2	0.3	0	1.4
6 Botswana	0.6	4.8	1.0	1.6	1.0	0.6	1.6	0.8	2.3	2.2	4.1	1.1
7 Lesotho	25.2	47.6	7.5	7.5	7.5	8.6	12.4	6.2	12.3	21	10.2	12.5
8 Zimbabwe	20.0	0.4	22.8	21.0	12.7	22.1	19.8	39.6	29.6	31.3	20.4	22.5
9 DR Congo	0	0	0.1	0.7	0	0.2	0.3	0.8	0.4	0.1	2.0	0.1
10 Zambia	0.1	0	1.3	2.0	0.3	1.3	2.8	2.6	7.2	0.4	6.1	1.1
11 Tanzania	0	0	0.2	0.9	0	0	0.2	0.1	0.1	0	4.1	0
12 Angola	0.1	0	1.0	0.4	0.8	2.1	0.9	3.5	1.6	0.5	2.0	2.0
13 Malawi	1.5	0.2	4.7	2.4	1.4	4.1	4.8	5.9	6.3	12.1	2.0	3.4
14 Mozambique	49.8	38.7	55.7	58.9	73.9	55.2	49.1	30.8	29.3	28.5	44.9	51.5
SADC/Excl. SA	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
SADC/Excl. SA	21 028	108 367	5 718	453	10 238	8 658	1 600	2 963	3 461	6742	49	5 849

SADC citizens employed in South Africa by sector, 1996

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
2 Mauritius	2.8	14.1	15	1.7	3.3	17.7	3.7	15.5
3 South Africa	9.1	4.8	12.4	1.2	6.1	12.1	5.4	7.5
4 Swaziland	4.3	83.2	1.5	0.1	1.6	2.4	0.7	1
5 Namibia	14.1	16.0	6.7	0.1	8	14.1	3.5	8.5
6 Botswana	2.2	88.2	1	0.1	1.8	0.8	0.4	0.4
7 Lesotho	8.6	83.5	0.7	0.1	1.2	1.2	0.3	0.3
8 Zimbabwe	27.6	3.1	8.6	0.6	8.5	12.6	2.1	7.7
9 DR Congo	0	30.7	4.7	2.4	2.4	15.9	3.2	18.1
10 Zambia	2.9	3.8	9.9	1.2	4.1	15.7	6	10.6
11 Tanzania	0	17.7	32.4	11.8	5.9	0	8.8	5.9
12 Angola	2.6	5.0	8.2	0.3	11.5	26.2	2.1	14.9
13 Malawi	11.3	5.8	9.8	0.4	5.1	13.1	2.8	6.4
14 Mozambique	13.8	55.3	4.2	0.4	10	6.3	1	1.2
SADC Inc. SA	9.1	5.8	12.2	1.2	6.1	12	5.3	7.4

Sectors

- 1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
- 2 Mining and Quarrying
- 3 Manufacturing
- 4 Electricity, gas and water supply
- 5 Construction
- 6 Wholesale and retail trade
- 7 Transport, storage and communication
- 8 Financial, insurance, real estate and business services
- 9 Community, social and personal services
- 10 Private households
- 11 Diplomatic services
- 12 Sector not classified elsewhere

9	10	11	12	Total	Number
9.7	5.4	0.3	11	100	725
17.5	11.9	0	12.1	100	9040392
1.6	1.9	0	1.8	100	10493
17	2.7	0	9.3	100	851
1.4	2.5	0	1.1	100	5835
0.7	2.3	0	1.2	100	61794
6.7	13.9	0.1	8.6	100	15224
11	4.7	0.8	6.3	100	127
33.7	3.3	0.4	8.5	100	738
8.8	0	5.9	2.9	100	34
7.8	5.1	14	16.2	100	705
8	29.9	0	7.3	100	2735
1.3	2.5	0	4	100	75865
17.3	11.8	0	11.9	100	9 215 518

Definitions of statistical terms

Following are brief explanations of selected statistical indicators presented in the report. Detailed definitions can be found in the original sources.

Administrators and managers are defined according to the International Standard Classification Occupations (ISCO—1968).

Agricultural production refers to production under divisions 1–5 of the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC revision 2).

Aid refers to flows that qualify as official development assistance (ODA) or official aid (see these terms).

Bank and trade-related lending covers commercial bank lending and other private credit.

Budget deficit or surplus refers to central government current and capital revenue and official grants received, less total expenditure and lending minus repayments.

Carbon dioxide (CO²) emissions are anthropogenic (human-originated) carbon dioxide emissions stemming from the burning of fossil fuels and the production of cement. Emissions are calculated from data on the consumption of solid, liquid and gaseous fuels and gas flaring.

Cellular mobile subscribers refers to people subscribing to a communications service in which voice or data are transmitted by radio frequencies.

Children reaching grade 5 is the percentage of children starting primary school who eventually attain grade 5 (grade 4 if the duration of primary school is four years). The estimate is based on the reconstructed cohort method, which uses data on enrolment and repeaters for two consecutive years.

Cigarette consumption per adult is the sum of production and imports minus exports of cigarettes divided by the population aged 15 years and older.

Combined gross enrolment ratio (See enrolment ratio, gross)

Commercial energy use is the domestic primary commercial energy supply. It is calculated as local production plus imports and stock changes, minus exports and international marine bunkers.

Contraceptive prevalence rate is the percentage of married women of child-bearing age who are using, or whose husbands are using, any form of contraception, whether modern or traditional.

Current account balance is the difference between (a) exports of goods and services as well as inflows of unrequired transfers but exclusive of foreign aid and (b) imports of goods and services as well as all unrequired transfers to the rest of the world.

Daily per capita calorie supply is the calorie equivalent of the net food supply (local production plus imports minus exports) in a country, divided by the population, per day.

Deforestation is the permanent clearing of forest land for all agriculture uses and for other land uses such as settlements, other infrastructure and mining. It does not include other alterations such as selective logging.

Dependency ratio is the ratio of the population defined as dependent — those under 15 and over 64 — to the working and population aged between 15 and 64.

Disasters includes natural and technological disasters. Natural disasters include avalanches, cold waves, cyclones, hurricanes, typhoons, drought, earthquakes, epidemics and famine (but do not include famine relating to conflict because of a lack of reliable data). Technological disasters include accidents, chemical accidents and other fires.

Disbursement (aid) records the actual international transfer of financial resources or of goods or services, valued at the cost to the donor.

Doctors include physicians and all graduates of any faculty or school of medicine in any medical field (including practice, teaching, administration and research).

Drug crimes are any crimes involving drugs, including the illicit brokerage, cultivation, delivery, distribution, extraction, exportation or importation, offering for sale, production, purchase, manufacture, sale, traffic transportation or use of narcotic drugs.

Economic activity rate is the proportion of the specified group supplying labour for the production of economic goods and services during a specified period.

Education index is one of the three indicators on which the Human Development Index is built. It is based on the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio and the adult literacy rate. For details on how the index is calculated, see the technical note.

Education levels — education has been categorised as primary, secondary or tertiary in accordance with the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). Primary Education (ISCED level 1) provides the basic elements of education at such establishments as primary or elementary schools. Secondary education (ISCED levels 2 and 3) is based on at least four years of previous instruction at such institutions as middle school, secondary school, high school, teacher training school at this level and vocational or technical school. Tertiary education (ISCED levels 5–7) refers to education at such institutions as universities, teachers' colleges and higher level professional schools — requiring as a minimum condition of admission the successful completion of education at the second level or evidence of the attainment of an equivalent level of knowledge.

Electricity consumption is the production of heat and power plants less own use and distribution losses.

Enrolment ratio, age group (adjusted) is the primary school age group enrolment ratio which is the enrolments of primary school age (regardless of the education level in which the pupils are enrolled) as a percentage of the population of official primary school age. The secondary school age group enrolment ratio is the enrolments of secondary school age (regardless of the education level in which the pupils are enrolled) as a percentage of the population of official secondary school age. The term *adjusted* indicates that the age groups used to calculate the ratios correspond to the structure of the education system in each country.

Enrolment ratio, gross is the number of students enrolled in a level of education, regardless of age, as a percentage of the population of official school age for that level. The combined gross primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratio refers to the number of students at all these levels as a percentage of the population of official school age for those levels.

Exports of conventional weapons are exports of weapons as defined under transfers of conventional weapons (see this term).

Exports of goods and services is the value of all goods and non-factor services provided to the rest of the world, including merchandise freight, insurance, travel and other non-factor services.

External debt is the debt owed by a country to non-residents that is repayable in foreign currency, goods or services.

Food aid in cereals is the quantity of cereals provided by donor countries and international organisations, including the World Food Programme and the International Wheat Council, as reported for a crop year.

Foreign direct investment (net flows) is capital provided by a foreign direct investor (parent enterprise) to an affiliate enterprise in the host country. It implies that the foreign direct investor exerts significant influence on the management of the enterprise resident in the other economy. The capital provided can consist of equity capital, reinvested earnings or intra-company loans.

Fresh water withdrawals are total water withdrawals, not counting evaporation losses from storage basins. Withdrawals include water from non-renewable groundwater sources, river flows from other countries and desalination plants in countries where they are a significant source.

Functional illiteracy rate is the proportion of the adult population aged 16—65 scoring at level 1 on the prose literacy scale of the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS).

GDP see Gross Domestic Product.

GDP index is one of the three indicators on which the Human Development Index is built. It is based on GDP per capita (PPP US\$). For details on how the index is calculated, see the technical note.

GDP index adjusted for the inequalities in income distribution (GDP-A) is the same as the GDP index but the income is multiplied by a factor one minus the gini-coefficient (1-G) so as to give more income weight to egalitarian countries, and less weight to those countries where income inequalities are high.

GDP per capita (PPP US\$) is the GDP per capita of a country converted into US dollars on the basis of the purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate.

GDP per unit of energy use is the US dollar estimate of real GDP (at 1995 prices) per kilogramme of oil equivalent of commercial energy use.

Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) is a composite index using variables constructed to measure the relative empowerment of women and men in political and economic spheres of activity. Three indices — for economic participation and decision-making, for political participation and decision making and for power over economic resources — are added to derive the final GEM value.

Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM-A) is the same as the GEM but the income is multiplied by a factor one minus the gini coefficient (1-G) to give more income weight to egalitarian countries and less weight to those countries where income inequalities are high.

Gender-related Development Index (GDI) is a composite index using the same variable as the Human Development Index. The difference is that the GDI adjusts the average achievement of each country in life expectancy, educational attainment and income in accordance with the disparity in achievement between women and men. For more details on how the index is calculated, see the technical note.

Gender-related Development Index adjusted for inequality in income distribution (GDI-A) is the same as the GDI but the income is multiplied by a factor one minus the gini coefficient (1-G) to give more income weight to egalitarian countries, and less weight to those countries where income inequalities are high.

Gini coefficient measures the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A gini coefficient of zero represents perfect equality whilst that of 1 implies total inequality.

GNP — see Gross National Product.

Government consumption includes all current expenditures for purchases of goods and services by all levels of government, excluding most government enterprises.

Government expenditure includes non-repayable current and capital expenditure. It does not include government lending or repayments to the government or government acquisition of equity for public policy purposes.

Gross domestic investment outlays are additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the total output of goods and services from final use produced by an economy by both residents and non-residents, regardless of all the allocation to domestic and foreign claims. It does not include deductions for depreciation of physical capital or depletion and degradation of natural resources.

Gross domestic savings are calculated as the difference between GDP and total consumption.

Gross National Product (GNP) comprises GDP plus net factor income from abroad, which is the income residents receive from abroad for factor services (labour and capital), less similar payments made to non-residents who contribute to the domestic economy.

Hazardous waste refers to the waste streams to be controlled according to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. The data do not necessarily represent all hazardous waste nor its potential toxicity.

Health services (access to) is the proportion of the population that can expect treatment for common diseases and injuries, including essential drugs on the national list, within one hour's walk or travel.

Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index based on three indicators: longevity, as measured by life expectancy at birth; educational attainment, as measured by a combination of adult literacy (two thirds weight) and the combined gross primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratio (one-third weight); and standard of living, as measured by GDP (per capita PPP US\$). For more details on how the index is calculated, see the technical note.

Human Development Index adjusted for inequality in income distribution (HDI-A) is the same as the HDI but the income is multiplied by a factor one minus the gini coefficient (1-G) so as to give more income weight to egalitarian countries and less weight to those countries where income inequalities are high.

Human Poverty Index (HPI) — the Human Poverty Index for developing countries (HPI-I) measures deprivations in three dimensions of human life — longevity, knowledge and decent standard of living .

Illiteracy rate (adult) calculated as 100 minus the literacy rate (adult) (see this term).

Imports of goods and services is the value of all goods and non-factor services purchased from the rest of the world, including merchandise, freight, insurance, travel and other non-factor services.

Industrial production comprises value added in mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, water and gas.

Infant mortality rate is the probability of dying between birth and exactly one year of age times 1 000.

Infants with low birth-weight is the percentage of babies born weighing less than 2 500 grammes.

Inflation is a fall in the purchasing power of money reflected in a persistent increase in the general level of prices as generally measured by the retail price index.

Internal renewable water resources refers to the average annual flow of rivers and recharge of groundwater generated from endogenous precipitation.

Internally displaced refers to people who are displaced within their own country and to whom the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees extends protection or assistance or both, in fulfilment of a special request by a competent organ of the United Nations.

International tourism departures is the number of departures that people make from their countries of usual residence to any other country for any purpose other than a remunerated activity in the country visited.

Internet host is a computer system connected to the internet — either a single terminal directly connected or a computer that allows multiple users to access network services through it.

Involuntary part-time workers are part-time workers who say they are working part time because they could not find full-time work.

Life expectancy at birth is the number of years a new-born infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of birth were to stay the same throughout the child's life.

Life expectancy index is one of the three indicators on which the Human Development Index is built. For details on how the index is calculated, see the technical note.

Literacy rate (adult) is the percentage of people aged 15 and above who can, with understanding, both read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life.

Main telephone line refers to a telephone line connecting a subscriber to the telephone exchange equipment.

Major protected areas — see protected areas (major).

Maternal mortality ratio is the annual number of deaths of women from pregnancy-related causes per 100 000 live births.

Military expenditure is all expenditure of the defence ministry and other ministries on recruiting and training military personnel as well as on construction and purchase of military supplies and equipment. Military assistance is included in the expenditure of the donor country.

Ministerial level includes ministers, secretaries of state and heads of central banks and cabinet agencies.

Municipal waste is waste collected by municipalities by their order that has been generated by households, commercial activities, office buildings, schools, government buildings and small business.

Nuclear waste generated refers to spent fuel, one part of the radioactive waste generated at various stages of the fuel cycle (uranium mining and milling, fuel enrichment, reactor operation, spent fuel reprocessing). Data do not represent all radioactive waste generated, and the amounts of spent fuel generated depend on the share of nuclear electricity in the energy supply and on the nuclear plant technologies adopted.

Official aid grants or loans are those that meet the same standards as for official development assistance (ODA) (see that term) except that recipients do not qualify as recipients of ODA. Part two of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) list of recipient countries identifies these countries.

Official development assistance (ODA) comprises grants or loans to qualifying developing countries or territories, identified in part one of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) list of recipient countries, that are undertaken by the official sector with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective, on concessional financial terms.

Oral rehydration therapy use rate is the percentage of all cases of diarrhoea in children under five years of age treated with oral rehydration salts, recommended home fluids or both.

Paper (printing and writing) consumed is newsprint and other paper used in printing or writing. This does not cover articles manufactured from printing paper, such as stationery, exercise books, registers and the like.

Part-time employment refers to people who usually work less than 30 hours a week in their main job. Data include only people declaring usual hours.

People incarcerated is the number of people in prison. Prison refers to all public and privately financed institutions in which people are deprived of their liberty. These institutions could include, but are not limited to, penal, correctional or psychiatric facilities.

People not expected to survive to age 40, % data refer to the probability at birth of not surviving to age 40, times 100.

Population includes all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship — except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of their country of origin. Data refer to mid-year estimates.

Population below income poverty line refers to the percentage of the population living below the specified poverty line:

- \$1 a day — at 1993 international prices, adjusted for purchasing power parity.
- \$2 a day — at 1993 international prices, adjusted for purchasing power parity.
- National poverty line — the poverty line deemed appropriate for a country by its authorities.
- 50% of median income — 50% of the median disposable household income.

Portfolio investment flows (net) are non-debt-creating portfolio equity flows (the sum of country funds, depository receipts and direct purchases of shares by foreign investors) and portfolio debt flows (bond issues purchased by foreign investors).

Primary education — see education levels.

Printing and writing paper — see paper (printing and writing) consumed.

Private consumption is the market value of all goods and services, including durable products, purchased or received as income in kind by households and non-profit institutions.

Probability of surviving to age 40 (60) is the probability of a newborn infant surviving to age 40 (60) if the prevailing patterns of age-specific mortality at the time of birth remain the same throughout the child's life.

Professional and technical workers are defined according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-1968).

Protected areas (major) are natural areas of at least 1 000 hectares that are totally or partially protected.

Public expenditure on education is public spending on public education plus subsidies to private education at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels. It includes expenditure at every level of administration — central, regional and local.

Public expenditure on health is recurrent and capital spending from central and local government budgets, external borrowings and grants (including donations from international agencies and non-governmental organisations) and social health insurance funds.

Purchasing power parity (PPP) — at the PPP rate, one dollar has the same purchasing power over domestic GDP as the US dollar has over US GDP. PPP could also be expressed in other national currencies or in special drawing rights (SDRs). PPP rates allow a standard comparison of real price levels between countries, just as conventional price indices allow comparison of real values over time; normal exchange rates may overvalue or undervalue purchasing power

Refugees are people who have fled their own country because of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group, and who cannot or do not want to return.

SADC Integration Index (SII) measures the level of intra-SADC activities or the degree of openness in the labour, capital and the goods and services markets. It ranges from zero to one. It is assumed that it is possible to achieve full integration in the three markets on one extreme and no integration at all on the other. An integration index of one means there is full integration whilst that of zero means there is no integration at all (see technical note 4 for details).

Safe water (access to) is the proportion of the population using any of the following types of water supply for drinking: piped water, public tap, borehole or pump, well (protected or covered) or protected spring.

Sanitation (access to) is the proportion of the population who have, within their dwelling or compound, a toilet connected to a sewerage system, any other flush toilet, an improved pit latrine or a traditional pit latrine.

Seats in parliament held by women refers to seats held by women in a lower or single house and an upper house or senate, where relevant.

Secondary education — see education levels.

Services production refers to production under divisions 50–99 of the International Standard Industrial classification (ISIC revision 2).

Share of ODA through NGOs is the percentage of official development assistance (see this term) distributed through non-governmental organisations.

Share of income or consumption is the distribution of income or expenditure accruing to percentile groups of households ranked by total household income or consumption.

Sovereign long-term debt rating — as determined by Standard & Poor's, assessment of a country's capacity and willingness to repay debt according to its terms. The ratings range from AAA to CC (investment grade AAA to BBB — and speculative grade BB+ and lower).

Sub-ministerial level includes deputy and vice ministers (or their equivalent); permanent secretaries (or their equivalent); deputy permanent secretaries, directors and advisers (or their equivalent)

Sulphur dioxide (SO₂) emissions are emissions of sulphur in the form of sulphur oxides and of nitrogen in the form of its various oxides, which together contribute to acid and adversely affect agriculture, forests, aquatic habitats and the weathering of building materials

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