

LESSONS LEARNING

LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE FOR AFGHANISTAN

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REPORT ON AFGHANISTAN PROGRAMMING
WORKSHOPS
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I. INTRODUCTION

By November 2001, as the crisis in Afghanistan reached epidemic proportions, it became clear that the United Nations Development Programme would have a central role to play in developing and implementing a rehabilitation strategy for the country. In order to prepare for this upcoming task, the Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific, in coordination with the UNDP Evaluation Office, decided to hold a series of workshops to address the anticipated reconstruction effort. The workshops were conceived in order to strengthen the empirical foundations upon which UNDP's programming efforts would be based, and specifically to apply lessons learned from previous experiences in post-conflict and peace building situations to Afghanistan.

The first Lessons Learning Workshop, held on 30 November, 2001, at UNDP headquarters in New York, was largely an internal event, designed so that UNDP could assess its store of knowledge on post-conflict and peace building situations. As such, most speakers came from within UNDP or the larger UN system, as did the majority of attendees at the day-long conference. The broad objective was to discuss lessons learned from reconstruction efforts in other post-conflict situations, and to have these lessons inform UNDP strategies, policies, and operations in Afghanistan. The workshop focus was on a series of case studies, and the target beneficiaries for the event were the UNDP programming staff that would be working directly on Afghanistan's reconstruction.

The second Lessons Learning Workshop, held on 4-5 February 2002 at the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations, contained a similar overall mandate of applying lessons learned to Afghanistan. However, while the first workshop was concerned mainly with *case studies* from other countries, the second workshop focused on *principles* that might guide UNDP's reconstruction efforts. In this regard, speakers and attendees came from both within and outside the UN system; these included academics, representatives from the donor community, outside experts and UN staff. The target beneficiaries for the workshop included all the relevant actors (UNDP, donors, NGOs, governments) that would come to play a role in the future of Afghanistan.

Each of the workshops had distinct thematic focus areas, and the practical approaches (case studies versus principles) also differed as well. This report is therefore a compilation of the two workshops, containing a separate overview for each event, the broad thematic issues discussed therein, and an overall summary that combines the conclusions drawn from both workshops.

It is the hope of both the Evaluation Office and the Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific that the case studies and principles discussed herein can serve as useful examples and aids for operational strategy as the UN moves forward with the momentous task of peace building, rehabilitation, and reconstruction in Afghanistan.

FIRST LESSONS LEARNING WORKSHOP

II. OVERVIEW

The first Afghanistan Programming Workshop was held on 30 November, 2001 to discuss lessons learned from previous experiences and to apply them to the extent possible to the crisis in Afghanistan. It began with a brief introduction by Hafiz Pasha, Assistant Administrator and Director of UNDP's Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific and Khalid Malik, Director of the Evaluation Office. Mr. Pasha, who had recently returned from the region, commented that the meeting was "extremely timely" as Afghanistan was currently in the process of establishing its reconstruction strategy. The planners involved in that strategy, as well as the major aid donors such as the US, have all been asking the same question - what strategies have worked in similar situations elsewhere?

Mr. Pasha closed his remarks with a few suggestions for the joint effort of which this meeting was the beginning. First, he stated that receiving funds for pure reconstruction was going to be difficult. It is more probable that significant sums will be given foremost for a relief effort. Second, Mr. Pasha asserted that the return of refugees should be a high priority. Finally, he emphasized the significance of the Afghanistan Programming Workshop and requested that the outcome of the meeting's exchange be formalized as a compilation of lessons learned that could be directly applied to Afghanistan's reconstruction.

Khalid Malik welcomed the participants and thanked the speakers for agreeing to prepare presentations on such short notice. He then briefly gave suggestions regarding areas he hoped the dialogue would bear in mind. Mr. Malik commented that he was "struck by how little emphasis is placed on the economic or macroeconomic factors involved in the reconstruction and revival of a country." He further observed a tendency of most reconstruction efforts to focus on getting things done rather than helping others to help themselves. He hoped that this dialogue would underscore the practical concerns on the ground. In general, Mr. Malik observed that "the development side tends to get ignored as the humanitarian and peace sides are emphasized." Each of these factors has individual impacts, he noted, but ultimately they all have a synergistic effect on a given society and its revival. He concluded that neglecting the long-term process of development at any point in the strategy could have negative consequences.

Mr. Malik then outlined the key issues for discussion during the workshop session:

- (1) Local governance
- (2) Rehabilitation and reconstruction
- (3) Reintegration: what works and what does not
- (4) Vulnerable groups/gender issues
- (5) Case Study: Mozambique (in addition to other examples of lessons learned in Haiti, Palestine, Kosovo, Bosnia and Somalia)

In conclusion, Mr. Malik mentioned two items of concern that may need some future discussion:

- the role of 'social funds' as a "jumpstart" for the economy and job creation, and
- how best to develop an accurate assessment of financial and other support needs for social and economic reconstruction

The following report captures the key issues raised by the presenters and the discussion that followed.

III. LOCAL GOVERNANCE

Rajiv Pillay began this section with a presentation on local governance and lessons learned. The following were his main points:

➤ **Local governance should be seen as an essential part of peace building.**

Decentralization is a useful tool in post-conflict situations because it broadens participation in peace building, helps groups overcome ethnic conflict, and drives growth and development at the grassroots level. A decentralized approach also allows for broader participation in decision making. Most conflicts arise from competition for scarce resources. While the root causes of conflict are typically structural, “triggers” are the specific events that spark these conflicts. Decentralization is a means of jumpstarting development at the local level while processes are underway at the center.

➤ **There are specific preconditions for effective local governance.**

Effective local governance is possible in situations where the following preconditions are met: 1) A cease fire at the local level. 2) Potentially diverse sources of revenue available for reconstruction. 3) Local leaders’ dynamism and their willingness to take risks. 4) A potential for growth. 5) Access to internal and external markets. 6) The rule of law. (Currently, very few of these preconditions are present in Afghanistan).

➤ **Development should be used as a means of peace building in Afghanistan.**

Most recent development programs in post-conflict peace building situations (including Afghanistan) have focused on Area Development Schemes, with a heavy emphasis on the rebuilding of infrastructure. However, it is also important to provide early support for the development of local institutions for decision-making. In Afghanistan, community based institutions (*shuras*) at the village level can be a hook for local governance and cooperation. The rule of law largely depends on the credibility of these *shuras*.

➤ **Strengthen capacity at the local level first.**

In most peace building governance programs, capacity is created at the center and then gradually extended down to the local level. However, in Afghanistan a strong argument can be made for the opposite approach, with an initial focus on the local level. At the same time, care should be exercised so that strengthening local level institutions does not prevent the emergence of a national identity; local governance alone cannot ultimately substitute for a strong and modern national polity.

➤ **Gender issues must be addressed.**

Mainstreaming women and gender issues in development may prove difficult, but should be a priority for the development as peace building approach.

DISCUSSANTS

Lessons on Local Development Funds were presented by Alberic Kacou, UNCDF

UNCDF focuses on local governance and the empowerment of local communities. The UNCDF emphasis on local governance in peace building situations began in the early 1990s, when problems with national peace building projects arose because the local population was not involved enough. UNCDF now focuses on bringing people together at the local level, creating local consultative bodies, and working through local governments.

Local Development Programs promote ownership and cooperation at local level. UNCDF's flagship program, known as the Local Development Program (LDP), focuses on local participatory planning, capacity assistance at the local level, and the creation of transparent financial management and accountability systems. In addition, LDPs finance small-scale infrastructure (schools, etc.) and avoid focussing on recurrent budget items as a constraint. Grant financing (block grants) for local projects also provide an incentive for institutional change.

LDP has limitations, cannot substitute for national development programs. Weaknesses of the LDP approach include the fact that local representative bodies have limited capacities (human resources, etc.) In addition, LDPs entail tradeoffs between institutional development and infrastructure delivery. There is also a bias towards local public goods – this may not be an appropriate channel for private goods or more strategic public goods. Bias towards one-time capital investments versus recurrent budget items also exists.

Cambodia as a case study of LDP success. The first phase of UN assistance to Cambodia (1992-1995) involved resettlement and reintegration. The second phase (1995- present) focused on institutional development and capacity building. UNCDF employed an LDP approach, beginning with the formation of village committees, followed by communal committees, extending all the way to the provincial level. The program has now been extended to all five Cambodian provinces, and includes communal administration support, election law assistance, and the creation of small-scale infrastructure. The Cambodian government has endorsed this model and adopted its elements as part of an overall development policy.

Some additional lessons from Jennifer Topping, BDP

Analysis of preconditions for successful peace building needed for Afghanistan. UNDP must examine which preconditions for peace building currently exist in Afghanistan; virtually no legal establishment exists upon which to build the rule of law; very few of the preconditions are met. Given this fact, UNDP must exercise caution in its approach – large infusions of resources can create distortions, with different donors each running parallel Area Development Schemes.

Institutional Hooks are important. With a focus on local governance strategies, the UN as an institution plays a large role in helping to work out the details of governance. There is a need for extensive dialogue within Afghanistan; the basic tenets of how people govern must be negotiated. In addition, how institutional hooks are chosen is important, because they can serve as triggers to conflict if the wrong hooks are chosen; deliberation is advised.

DISCUSSION

- *A decentralized approach to intervention must recognize the linkage to the national level – the center needs to be included.* The UN has often been too locally based, ignoring the fact that financing and decision-making for recurrent budget costs often comes from intermediate levels (provinces, prefectures). The intermediate level is therefore an important platform from which to build upwards.
- *Experience of Kosovo demonstrates the need to set clear goals and avoid overly complex program planning at the outset.* The ultimate goal of local governance is to ensure access to basic social services for all. In addition to donor funds, it is important to generate revenue locally (i.e. taxation system). In Kosovo, with over one million returnees and a completely destroyed infrastructure, there was a need for immediate service provision. UNMIK established a small committee and drew up a plan with basic goals, including the provision of identification cards for returnees.
- *Decision-making must be made at the local level, not from headquarters.* Kosovo program administrators determined that day-to-day operational decisions concerning procurement and program needs were better made by program managers in the field – this enabled the program to respond rapidly and efficiently to its own needs.
- *Try to achieve financial independence (viability) for a program as early as possible.* Kosovo program administrators made financial independence an early goal of their program – coordination with headquarters on every spending need was proving too cumbersome. An emphasis was placed on creating an independent capacity to collect taxes. By 2001, local revenue supplied 75% of the government's funding, and by next year is expected to supply 95%.
- *UNDP must recognize triggers early and address them immediately.* Based on experiences in Palestine, Haiti, Sudan, Somalia, etc. -- triggers of conflict have to be addressed immediately. UNDP as an organization has too often been slow to address them. The Agency must look at and establish quickly the delivery mechanism that needs to put in place. Expertise does exist; a roster of key specialists with practical experience of other reconstruction efforts should be rapidly assembled. Key issues that UNDP must focus on early on include job and employment creation, establishment of the rule of law, income security, and local, regional, and national capacities. In addition, infrastructure delivery can define the success of a project.
- *Afghans must be involved early in planning and implementation process.* Afghanistan will not accept a Kosovo-type administration; Afghans must be running it from the outset, the local population must be relied on heavily.
- *The Poverty Eradication and Community Empowerment (P.E.A.C.E.) program in Afghanistan.* The P.E.A.C.E program is alive in Afghanistan and will recommence as soon as the situation becomes more stable.
- *UN intervention in post-conflict Afghanistan should be based on the Brahimi report.* The UN should move toward a more holistic approach and away from sequenced emphasis on different areas (security, human rights, prison reform, local governance schemes - quick fixes).

IV. REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

Douglas Keh, of the UNDP Evaluation Office, began this section with a presentation on infrastructure rehabilitation in Kosovo and East Timor and the lessons learned therewith.

➤ **Program scope and sustainability presents a challenge to infrastructure rehabilitation.**

The broad target base of programs in Kosovo and East Timor creates difficulties – would-be beneficiaries are diffuse; multiple layers of decision-making (individual, local, national, international) were required. In addition, there are weak decision-making structures at the communal level. Questions of sustainability also arose – in the long-term, the beneficiaries themselves will finance recurrent costs, but this is not possible in the short-term. The free-rider complex is also an impediment.

➤ **Tied-aid for technical projects can be detrimental to project success in the long run.**

Some technical infrastructure projects lead donors to employ tied-aid and demand that their own home-country specialists be used on a project. However, while these foreign specialists are usually skilled, they often face cultural challenges due to lack of knowledge about local conditions.

➤ **Implementation phase can be an opportunity to build trust with local population.**

Infrastructure rehabilitation can be a chance to establish dialogue with local players and to build UNDP credibility on other issues as well. (However, the window of opportunity to establish trust with local people in Afghanistan is very short and must be taken advantage of early). This can be done through Quick Impact Projects in order to demonstrate that UNDP backs its words with actions. UNDP must also consult with target beneficiaries during planning and implementation; multi-stakeholder forums should be established to monitor project implementation and to create ownership of the development process.

➤ **Allowance for delays, lack of data, and rapid turnover should be built into project planning.**

Delays are inevitable in large-scale peace building efforts, and should be factored into the conceptual framework. In addition, rapid turnover of international staff, and a lack of empirical data (historical data on socio-economic issues often intentionally destroyed) should also be taken into account.

DISCUSSANTS

Some additional lessons were presented by Peter Schumann, UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

Competition amongst donors for 'sexy' projects can interfere with local markets. In Kosovo, there was a lot of competition between foreign donors over what were perceived as large-scale or attractive projects that involved large sums of money. This led to interference and disruption of local markets – outside companies and contractors competed heavily for the big projects, often ignoring local conditions and local skills. In addition, local companies were squeezed out of big contracts because they could not compete with foreign firms in some cases. It is essential to make efforts to involve local companies in the bidding process, and to award them contracts to create a sense of ownership of the rehabilitation process. (“Unbundle” large projects so that local companies can compete.)

Property ownership disputes can cause problems and must be addressed early. In places like Kosovo [or Afghanistan], the rule of law has almost entirely broken down. In this environment, people revert to traditional property ownership patterns and rules, which can lead to disputes and unfair outcomes. In addition, infrastructure development projects themselves can create land disputes among local populations and trigger conflict; a rational and transparent system regarding property rights must be established early on.

Funds for sustainability of project must be factored into every budget. There is a clear need to account for a project's sustainability over the long-term; current funds must be allocated accordingly with the future in mind.

DISCUSSION

- *Rapid action is critical on several fronts.* The key issues that need to be addressed immediately include job creation, reintegration of IDPs, and provision of loans for the local economy. In addition, international NGOs can be used for project implementation as UN staff is stretched thin. (Although there was some debate over this).
- *Limitations and requirements attached to funding for infrastructure rehabilitation in post-conflict peace building can constrain decision-making.* During infrastructure rehabilitation, the needs are large and varied, but the sources of funding are usually grant-based pledges from donors for specific projects. This can limit the options of decision-makers and sometimes prevent urgent needs from being met – in Cambodia de-mining was an urgent issue but infrastructure grants did not adequately address this area. The broadest possible array of funding sources should be pursued (bilateral, multilateral, Bretton Woods, private sector) in order to provide maximum flexibility for program choices.)
- *Issue of responsibility for asset maintenance must be addressed up front.* Responsibility for maintenance of assets – i.e. ownership – after construction must be addressed early on.
- *Credibility of an operation is shown in the first three to four months.* The first two years of a project are characterized by managing of grant money and building the capacity of local municipalities. The question then is how to accompany these structures. The hope is to be able to identify in-house expertise and not to reinvent the wheel.
- *Skilled Afghans should be recruited to join reconstruction efforts.* Afghanistan may have a lack of institutions, but it does not necessarily have a lack of capacity – this is a key distinction. Since fighting a war requires local skills, qualified local Afghans, together with skilled (managerial skills) Afghans living abroad, should be enlisted in the peace building efforts.
- Afghans must be put in the driver's seat during not only during implementation but also during the planning stage.
- Infrastructure rehabilitation must be combined with a de-mining program – most infrastructure is heavily mined.
- Entire credibility of a rehabilitation project generally hinges on performance in first three or four months.
- There is disagreement within the World Bank over grants versus loans for peace building, but complete consensus that peace building should become a large part of World Bank portfolio in future.
- UNDP has an important role to play as a coordinating agency for the UN system.

V. REINTEGRATION OF REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

Sam Barnes, BCPR, began this section by highlighting some of the preconditions necessary for successful reintegration.

➤ **UNDP has a unique role to play in post-conflict assistance.**

UNDP's role in crisis and post-crisis situations with refugees and IDPs emphasizes long-term sustainability. UNHCR focuses on quick, ad-hoc projects not linked to UNDP work. The UNDP approach to post-conflict situations is viewed as linked to governance issues.

There are many divisive definitions for beneficiaries used by the humanitarian agencies, which can create further potential for conflict. For example, the humanitarian agencies draw a distinction between refugees and internally displaced persons. In post-conflict relief efforts these two groups are provided with different support packages. This difference in support packages for the two classes of beneficiaries causes a potential for new conflict. Reintegration efforts need to focus on assistance for all members of the affected community.

➤ **Coordination with other humanitarian agencies and appropriate time frames are essential.**

While UNDP and the humanitarian agencies play different roles in the reintegration of refugees and displaced persons, close coordination is necessary, especially in the pre-planning phase of a relief effort concerning issues of repatriation and rehabilitation.

Successful programs are usually three to five years in duration. Some might even last longer such as the project in Cambodia - a ten-year program divided into two phases, and in Tajikistan, a five-year program entering its second five-year phase. After three to five years it must be determined how to transit out of a rehabilitation program into a longer-term program.

➤ **Humanitarian relief with a longer-term developmental approach should be the goal.**

UNDP's goal in humanitarian assistance should be to reintegrate people and to build a functional social infrastructure. A sustainable program must be created that helps achieve this goal and allows control to rest at the local level. Recurrent costs should be secured in the local budget. For example, teachers should be paid through the local budget and not hired as international organization staff.

In addition, links to implement the relief effort should be made with local organizations as much as possible. For instance, in administering vaccinations, it is a better use of resources to strengthen a national health system with patient records while conducting the vaccinations rather than have UN staff administer the vaccinations then disappear.

Some additional lessons by discussant Sarah Poole, RBEC

IDPs are not the primary responsibility of any humanitarian agency and are often overlooked in development issues. During the past two years, considerable debate has occurred concerning how the UN deals with internally displaced persons (IDPs). Until recently, IDPs were not included as part of development work, and instead were classified solely as a humanitarian issue. As the former UNDP focal point for IDPs it was a challenge to try to integrate the concerns of internally displaced persons into the UNDP framework. However, a peace building strategy cannot be implemented without giving serious attention and consideration to IDPs. The case of Azerbaijan is an example of this, since the large numbers of IDPs in this case caused continuing human rights abuses and ethnic conflict. In Kosovo, efforts to reintegrate IDPs were integrated in the overall reconstruction and rehabilitation processes.

IDPs are more vulnerable to poverty than refugees. In a post-conflict situation, IDPs are among the most defenseless of groups. They can be vulnerable to conflict and risk to a greater degree than other populations. Since IDPs get less support than refugees, they are more likely to fall into poverty and a poor

quality of life. Without their integration, poverty alleviation cannot be achieved. IDPs usually do not show up in refugee camps, they simply fend for themselves. Since IDPs are still within their national borders, they are often viewed as the responsibility solely of their national government.

Peace building can prevent internal displacement. Peace building and reintegrating IDPs as functioning members of their communities should be the focus of UNDP's efforts. Job creation should be a central focus of this approach. IDPs reentering the community must be equipped with the skills to come back and support themselves. These job-training programs could work through local capacities for job training. (Often, although job creation was initiated in certain areas, IDPs were excluded as beneficiaries). IDPs should be returned and the underlying problems, which led them to become internally displaced, should be addressed.

DISCUSSION

- The Evaluation Office book on lessons learning, documenting UNDP experiences in 17 countries, will be completed shortly.
- *When displaced persons return, land ownership issues must be resolved.* In situations where large segments of the population become IDPs or refugees, reintegration becomes a complex task. In both Somalia and Kosovo, nearly the entire population had left the area. In the Kosovo post-conflict situation, a Housing and Claims Commission to deal with the Kosovar Albanians attempting to take back property from the Kosovar Serbs, was established. This was effective in resolving many property disputes, which could cause further conflict.
- *A civil registration program is necessary in a post-conflict situation.* In a post-conflict situation where people were displaced, a civil registration exercise becomes necessary. People need an identity card. When elections are held, people must be able to verify their identity to ensure the legitimacy of the election.
- *Convert former combatants into peace builders.* Militias must be demobilized. However, taking away their guns is often not the best solution. These local militia should be converted into a national force to keep the peace or converted into police force with adequate training and support for this transition.
- *Reintegration requires institution building and judicial reform.* In Bosnia in 1999 there were two million registered minority returnees. In this case, resources were devoted to physical structural reconstruction without much emphasis on institution building or judicial reform. At this time, these goals were not factored into the reintegration solution. Today, the international community factors these concerns into the equation, but funding has plummeted while the number of minority returnees is skyrocketing.

VI. VULNERABLE GROUPS

Jasmine Sherif, UNIFEM, began this section with a presentation of UNIFEM's gender strategy for women in Afghanistan.

➤ **UNIFEM recognizes the need for a targeted strategy.**

Afghanistan, a nation never colonized, has always been self-reliant and independent. It is therefore likely that Afghans will and should demand a strong role in their own recovery and rehabilitation. UNIFEM has recognized the need for a progressive approach adapted to Afghan customs and culture and is currently attempting to build knowledge by identifying partners in- and outside the country. This is in an effort to draw on their diverse range of expertise and experiences. The objective of UNIFEM's strategy is to produce a country analysis that takes into account the absence of an all-encompassing generic solution to the many dimensions of the Afghan crisis.

➤ **UNIFEM attempts to create a common platform for Afghan women.**

There are notable differences between the Afghan women in Pakistan and Afghanistan and the Afghan women in the United States. The numerous groups and their distinct voices mark these variances. UNIFEM is working with international and national NGO's in Afghanistan to identify local groups and establish a common platform on which to give the women in Afghanistan a strong and sustainable voice.

UNIFEM's Strategy for Women in Afghanistan:
<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Support capacity building of women in the peace process (only 3 women in Bonn)2. Provide awareness raising education in the communities.3. Increase women's involvement in local community structures (<i>shuras</i>) and the decision-making process and integrate a gender perspective in recovery programs.4. Integrate and draw on women's capacity in rebuilding the new government and constitution and strengthen their political participation.5. Enable Afghan women to study abroad during the reconstruction process.6. Strengthen women's economic ability to survive – economic empowerment.7. Maintain UN role as a catalyst with local government and grassroots NGO's. (Establish field office with gender coordinator while UNIFEM headquarters will continue working with governments and the Security Council)

In addition, UNIFEM will focus on the following issues:

- Working on the ground with UNHCR to provide programs and vocational skills for the empowerment of women.
- Promote policies to bring an end to violence against women in Afghanistan.
- Conducting an economic analysis from a gender perspective.
- Together with UNHCR, planning on establishing social and legal aid centers and trained law officials.
- Providing trauma counseling to combat mental health issue confronting Afghan women.

DISCUSSION

- *Gender issues must be part of a mandate.* Gender issues need to be integrated into the mainstream recovery agenda and incorporated in Security Council resolutions. This will provide increased prestige and legitimacy and ensure that UNIFEM's strategy will not be dismissed as an "add-on" to the actual strategy. In Kosovo, a gender office was established within the SRSG's Office in response to a SC resolution.
- *Afghan women in Afghanistan will have jurisdiction over reintegration process.* There are substantial differences of opinion between the Afghan women living in the country and those abroad. Ultimately however, Afghan women in Afghanistan will decide at what rate and how much to push in reintegration. There is a significant number of qualified Afghan women with skills who are ready to work on rehabilitation; a database of these women must be created and maintained.
- *Women are not the only group vulnerable to inequitable reintegration.* Besides women, IDPs are also a particularly vulnerable group for reintegration in Afghanistan. All vulnerable groups must be integrated in the overall program planning processes to ensure equitable reintegration.
- UNIFEM must also learn from recent experiences. Many skills are needed to integrate women.
- There were no women in the UN delegation to Bonn

VII. CASE STUDY: MOZAMBIQUE IN TRANSITION

*Jennifer Topping, BDP, presented lessons learned in a case study of Mozambique.
(See appendix for detailed outline of background and lessons)*

Stage I: UN provides humanitarian aid; UNDP focuses on capacity building of central ministries during the civil war (1980-1992).

The Mozambican civil war created 1.7 million refugees, 3.5 million IDPs, crippled the economy and destroyed much of the country's infrastructure. Given the urgent needs of the country during this period, the UN provided mostly humanitarian emergency aid. UNDP worked primarily to strengthen the capacity of central government ministries.

Stage II: UNDP focuses on DDR, election support during lead up to peace agreement (1988-1994).

Mozambique underwent tremendous changes during the lead up to its first democratic elections in 1994. The changes included a transition from war to peace, from a command to a market economy, and from authoritarianism to multi-party democracy. The UNDP focused during this period on the massive tasks of demobilizing and reintegrating former combatants as well as refugees, in addition to creating a new electoral system and organizing elections.

Stage III: Consolidation of democratic institutions is priority during first postwar period (1995-1999).

After the 1994 elections, UNHCR, the SRSG and most other UN agencies withdrew or scaled down their operations as the immediate humanitarian emergency had waned. UNDP assumed the main UN role during this period; its goal was to move from the humanitarian stage of peace building to strengthening the major institutions needed to consolidate democracy. Working together with the World Bank, UNDP supported elections, decentralization programs, a strengthening of the justice sector, and creation of a civilian police force, among other tasks.

Lessons learned: economic incentives, time and resources needed to sustain peace.

- UNDP needs to devote more time to long-term planning, and take into account the question of sustainability in its programs.
- While the humanitarian emergency agenda dominated programs at the outset, UNDP should have devoted greater resources and planning even at this early stage to longer-term development concerns, and to coordination among between UN and beneficiaries.
- The economic incentives UNDP provided (extended demobilization and economic reintegration, macroeconomic reform) were crucial to preventing a re-emergence of war.
- Former combatants will pick up arms again unless they see the tangible benefits of peace early on.
- Longer-term staffing and investment in rapid independent baseline information should also be considered.

SECOND LESSONS LEARNING WORKSHOP

VIII. OVERVIEW

“Learning from Experience for Afghanistan – The Second Lessons Learning Workshop” was held on 4-5 February 2002, at the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations. The workshop was convened in order to apply lessons learned from previous experiences in post-conflict countries to the current situation in Afghanistan, and to have these lessons inform UNDP strategies, policies, and operations in Afghanistan.

The workshop agenda was guided in particular by the Preliminary Needs Assessment undertaken by the UNDP, the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank at the January 2002 Tokyo pledging conference. As noted previously, while the first Afghanistan workshop focused mainly on case studies from relevant countries, the second workshop’s aim was to underscore the principles by which UNDP and the international community should approach reconstruction in Afghanistan.

Hafiz Pasha, UNDP Assistant Administrator and Director of the Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific, began the opening session by welcoming the participants and outlining the major operational issues the UN faces in Afghanistan. Mr. Pasha said that following the Tokyo Conference, in which preliminary needs were assessed and pledges made, the key issue was now program implementation. He noted that the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan had shifted from questions of resource mobilization to resource utilization. Finally, Mr. Pasha stated that the two groups most likely to benefit from the current workshop were the Afghan Task Force and the people in Afghanistan, including the Interim Authority and the UN country offices and staff. He expressed his desire that the information from the current workshop be made available to all UN staff and relevant agencies and individuals.

Khalid Malik, Director of the UNDP Evaluation Office, followed Mr. Pasha with some brief remarks on the current situation in Afghanistan and the anticipated objectives of the current workshop. He outlined the five major themes to be addressed:

- (1) Outcomes of the Tokyo Conference and Operational Frameworks for Reconstruction
- (2) Human Security
- (3) Macro Perspectives on Economic Revival and Management
- (4) Social Transformation
- (5) Democratic Governance

The following report presents the key issues identified by speakers at the workshop, as well as the discussions following each presentation.

IX. OUTCOMES OF THE TOKYO CONFERENCE

Ambassador Motohide Yoshikawa, of the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, gave an address on the outcomes of the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, held in Tokyo in January 2002. He stated that the Tokyo Conference was a success, and highlighted the two guiding principles outlined at the Conference:

➤ **Reinforce the political process.**

The process began with the inauguration of the Afghan Interim Authority based on the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, and continued at Tokyo, where over 61 countries and 21 international organizations participated, and over \$4.5 billion was raised. The Tokyo Conference demonstrated the commitment of the international community to supporting Afghanistan as it begins its recovery efforts. However, donors made clear that international assistance was conditional on the steady implementation of the Bonn Agreement, with the aim of establishing peace, representative government, and stability in Afghanistan, as well as eliminating terrorism and narcotics production and trafficking. In addition, there are plans to establish a Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency *Loya Jirga*.

➤ **Ensure a seamless transition from humanitarian relief to recovery and reconstruction.**

There is a need for strong complementarity between humanitarian assistance, recovery, reconstruction, and development. The conference agreed that humanitarian assistance would continue to be extended as long as necessary. However, development agencies must begin to draw up plans that complement and support ongoing humanitarian activities. Resettlement of refugees and IDPs was identified as one area where humanitarian and reconstruction activities should complement each other. In this regard, it is urgent that there be a coordinating mechanism among actors engaged in relief, recovery, reconstruction, and development.

Note: With regard to aid coordination, the Tokyo Conference endorsed the creation of an Implementation Group in order to manage aid coordination and reconstruction implementation in the field. The Afghan Interim Authority will chair the Group. The first meeting was held on 22 January at the Tokyo Conference, and subsequent meetings will be held in Kabul. The chair of the Afghan Support Group will co-chair the Implementation Group meetings.

X. FRAMEWORKS FOR RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION

Julia Taft, UNDP Assistant Secretary General and Director of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, gave a talk on “Constructing and Operationalizing Frameworks for Relief, Recovery, Return and Reconstruction.” The following were her main points:

➤ **The gap from relief to recovery must be addressed.**

The “relief to development gap” presents a challenge for the UN, and requires a multifaceted approach to Afghanistan. In the past, various donors and UN agencies funded short-term humanitarian relief in post-conflict countries, but often neglected long-term development programs. In addition, there was often a great deal of attenuation, as when UNCHR supported refugees for years after their return home, while the refugees’ longer-term development issues were not fully addressed. This gap is now beginning to be addressed, as the international community realizes that the continuum from relief to reconstruction to development is not linear, and all three areas must be tackled simultaneously. In line with this, the 2002 Agenda is a combination of initiatives that will fill the “relief to development gap”.

➤ **The gap between political institutions and processes must be dealt with.**

The Brahimi Report identified a major gap between political institutions and processes, and urged a greater harmonization between development concerns and peace processes. Lakhdar Brahimi is now in charge of coordinating and harmonizing these issues within Afghanistan. A resource gap between the Afghan government and the UN system also exists; the government has virtually nothing and must request even basic supplies (pens, notepads) from the UN. The BCPR has attempted to alleviate this gap by raising funds for direct distribution to support the government’s operation; \$20 million has been raised thus far, \$30 million is the target.

➤ **The Poverty Gap.**

The UN Millennium Report captured the nature of the poverty gap and highlighted the way in which it contributes to conflict. The UN is administering quick-impact projects (QUIPS) and area development schemes in order to restore economic livelihoods and generate incomes. The Report of the Secretary General on the Prevention of Armed Conflict underscored the point that real responsibility for conflict prevention remains with the national government. In this regard, UNDP is focusing on helping Afghans build national capacity.

➤ **Salary disparities create disincentives.**

Employees of the UN and NGOs receive salaries much higher than the local population; as a result, local people gravitate to UN jobs. The example of Kosovo shows that local skilled professionals (doctors, engineers) will take jobs as UN translators and truck drivers if the salaries are higher. The UN is currently trying to coordinate a salary regime to avoid disincentives for needed skilled professions.

➤ **Timely implementation of development projects will enhance government credibility.**

The Afghan Interim Authority has only four months left to its mandate; it needs to be able to show the people of Afghanistan that it has made their lives better. UN projects must be on the ground and running sooner rather than later, so that the government can demonstrate that it has delivered tangible benefits to its citizens. The UN system must deliver faster on QUIPS and other projects. In the past, UNDP has not been equipped to address rapid government reconstruction needs; it must improve in this area.

XI. HUMAN SECURITY

Erin Mooney, Deputy Director of the Brookings Institution – CUNY Project on Internal Displacement, gave a presentation on the issue of refugees, internally displaced persons, and the security issues they face. Following are her main points:

➤ **Ensuring human security (in all aspects) for returning refugees and IDPs is critical.**

Over two million people (refugees and IDPs) have been displaced in Afghanistan; there is a great urgency to finding solutions for the displaced. Refugee camps have had security problems; recent fighting has made the situation worse; serious protection issues must be addressed.

➤ **Ensuring security requires both national and international involvement.**

A fully functioning government does not exist in Afghanistan – there is an urgent need to strengthen the national government and provide training in how to deal with displaced persons. A national police force and army will need to be created, and these institutions will need to be trained in international human rights law. In the interim, there is a need for an ongoing international presence to ensure that the return of refugees and IDPs is *voluntary*; after they return, there is a continued need for monitoring and protection of their [human] rights. In order to achieve this, the safety of international personnel must also be ensured.

➤ **A comprehensive approach to returnees is necessary.**

The needs of returnees are extensive and varied; in addition to security, issues such as access to water and healthcare must be addressed. There is also a need for mine clearance for areas of return, as well as mine awareness and information, because many returnees do not know where mines have been laid. In the past, refugees and IDPs have not received equal treatment; the UN is now working to provide equal care. Conflict between local people and returnees is often a problem; this can be partly alleviated by providing assistance to the local population as well.

➤ **Women and children should receive special attention, particularly on land issues.**

Problems often arise when returnees come home and discover that their houses are now occupied; this is an issue that must be negotiated carefully. In particular, displaced women and children – who make up the majority of returnees – face significant obstacles to land and property reclamation, as well as threats to their security. In addition, there is a need to ensure equal participation in reconstruction projects. Introducing gender clauses in reconstruction contracts is one way to achieve more equal participation in reconstruction.

➤ **Human rights issues must be integrated into the reconstruction effort.**

Independent human rights monitoring on the conditions inside Afghanistan and specifically in areas of return is essential. The UNDP has successfully integrated human rights into reconstruction programs in Central America, but has not been as successful elsewhere.

➤ **An expanded international force deployed beyond Kabul is necessary.**

An enlarged international force is needed to ensure security and combat the violence and lawlessness that has broken out and begun to displace people anew. This force could also be assigned a specific role in ensuring the security of displaced persons in areas of return. Precedents for this expanded mission exist, such as the mandate given by the Security Council to the UN Observer Mission in Georgia, which includes a specific responsibility to “contribute to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons.”

Barnett Rubin, Director of Studies at New York University's Center on International Cooperation, gave a talk on the topics of re-establishing civil administration, and aid coordination. His main points follow:

➤ **Projects that support a functioning civil administration are essential.**

The UN and the donor communities have tended to fund highly visible projects such as building schools or police stations, but have often neglected the equally important but less visible task of paying the teachers or training the police. Support for a functioning civil administration means helping to pay salaries and other recurrent costs, and building sustainable capacities.

➤ **The phenomenon of warlordism has important implications for reconstruction.**

Warlordism presents a whole host of obstacles to reconstruction in Afghanistan, thereby differentiating it from other post-conflict societies such as Rwanda or Haiti. For example, administrators and policemen must be paid with notes and bills (there are no electronic transfers), but warlords threaten security on the roads, making it difficult to transport currency. If roads are not secure, it is impossible to re-establish a functioning civil and provincial administration. One possible solution is the creation of legitimate roles (police, etc.) for former warlords.

➤ **An international force is necessary during disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and the transition to national police force.**

Demobilization and disarmament of combatants is one of the things that is most likely to cause a recurrence of conflict. When people's guns are taken away, they feel vulnerable to attack by rival militias. In addition, taking guns away from people who know no other way of life is threatening, and in Afghanistan taking people's guns away is considered "dishonorable."

The Bonn Agreement does not provide for the disarmament and demobilization of combatants, but the issue must eventually be addressed. While the population of Afghanistan cannot be fully disarmed, the prevalence of arms among the public can be reduced. One possible solution is to employ former combatants in areas such as mine clearance and road construction, where they may learn new skills. However, in the interim, an international force will be required throughout key areas of the country (not just Kabul) as part of the transition to a National Police Force.

➤ **Aid must be coordinated so that it does not undermine the national government.**

Because there is such a large number of NGOs and aid agencies (in addition to the UN) presently involved in Afghanistan, there is a danger that each organization will make independent deals with various militias to ensure service delivery. This would also have the deleterious effect of empowering warlords and undermining the national government, and must be considered carefully.

DISCUSSION

- *Donors need to be updated regularly on developments in the field.* Many donors do not have a physical presence in Afghanistan; they need to be given reliable contacts in the field, and focal points at headquarters, from which they can gain information on recent developments.
- *Former combatants and militias can be given material incentives for disarmament.* In Mozambique, equipment and radios were distributed to new police officers in order to induce combatants to join and organize a police force. In addition, the UN may want to buy back weapons from armed factions or have the factions trade arms in for weapons that are more appropriate for public security officers instead (e.g. - pistols instead of automatic machine guns).
- *A strong central state is not feasible in Afghanistan.* While warlordism is the single greatest threat facing Afghanistan at present, a strong central state (as some people might envision) is not the answer. There is no tradition of strong centralized rule; decentralization is the only option.
- *Security, justice, police, and human rights monitoring are very political processes; the bodies that implement each must have independence.* In addition, all these areas must have backward linkages to the justice sector.
- *The penal system in Afghanistan is in terrible condition and must be upgraded.*
- *Aid must be given in such a way that it makes the Government of Afghanistan more accountable to its citizens, instead of to the international community.* Previous governments in Afghanistan derived resources from international donors [and natural resources], but not from the people. Donors and the UN should be aware of this fact when formulating aid policy.
- *The international community generally does not respond quickly enough to the exigencies of government building, and it is not responding adequately now.* The UN institutional structure is not adequate to meet the demands for a quick response to a crisis/rebuilding situation; it is not equipped to fund the crucial first six months of government building. In addition, studies of post-conflict development assistance reveal that donors have only given half of what they pledged for post-conflict reconstruction.
- *In implementing decentralization, the focus [where possible] should be to engage with clan leaders as opposed to warlords.*

END OF DAY 1

XII. MACROECONOMIC REVIVAL AND MANAGEMENT

Khalil Hamdani, of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, began the second day's proceedings with a presentation entitled "Reviving Trade and Investments: Positive and Negative Issues." The following were his main points:

➤ **Trade and investment are essential for economic revival.**

Trade is an integral component of economic revival. Imports can bring in essential goods and services, while exports can restore incomes and livelihoods. Investment can also contribute, but investment cannot be a substitute for ODA. Trade usually revives earlier and more easily than investment. Similarly, imports – which are internally demand-driven – revive earlier than exports, because exports depend on supply capacity, and supply capacity takes time to restore and requires investment. Finally, primary exports and services revive more easily than manufactures.

➤ **Actions to revive trade and investments must begin immediately.**

Steps to revive trade must be taken now, even though positive impacts may not be felt until later. A failure to initiate policy actions can have immediate negative consequences, such as import bottlenecks, rent-seeking behavior among enterprises and a re-entrenchment of corruption. The experience of Mozambique shows that early trade revival can yield positive economic results within a relatively short time period.

➤ **Formulation of trade policies, procedures, and institutions is an immediate priority.**

These policies include decisions about import regimes, a regulatory framework, import and export controls, insurance, payments, customs and transit arrangements. In addition, transit networks should be rebuilt (roads, rail, airports and inland ports.) Medium-term priorities include trade policy negotiations, such as WTO accession, bilateral agreements, and the Integrated Framework for LDCs. In addition, all institutions that affect trade efficiency should be strengthened (these include information, marketing, credit, and SME support).

➤ **Afghanistan's long-term trade strategy should capitalize on its strategic location.**

The handicap of being a land-locked country can be turned into an asset by becoming an efficient transit location between Central Asia, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean. The Trade and Transit Framework Agreement can be activated; this would provide transit fees of as much as \$500 million per year. First-class transit arrangements must be established, and infrastructure needs to be improved (pipeline royalties are estimated at \$300 million.)

➤ **Immediate investment priorities include updating investment laws and regulations.**

In the near-term, the government should evince a welcoming attitude to investors and prepare a policy statement on investment. The Investment Laws of 1967 and 1974 should be updated, and a Mining Act should be considered. The Investment Promotion Department should be re-established. A regulatory framework should be created that allows ease of entry for investors, provides equal treatment, and grants investors legal protection (consider acceding to MIGA).

In addition, privatization should be promoted, and support services should be extended to small enterprises (hundreds of SMEs existed in Afghanistan previously.) Expatriates and former investors should be targeted, particularly in sectors such as hotels, textiles, and energy.

➤ **Risks and keys to success.**

Donor coordination can be difficult due to the conflict between development objectives and commercial interests. One solution is to adopt an Integrated Framework that addresses these issues, and to involve civil society in trade and investment as an added safeguard. In the long-term, linkages between foreign affiliates, local enterprises and public institutions are essential. More linkages mean more spillovers into the local economy (capacity, knowledge-sharing, etc.).

David Lockwood, UNDP Deputy Assistant Administrator and Deputy Director, Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific, gave an "Overview of issues from an operational perspective." His comments follow:

➤ **The UN goal is to have a fully integrated UN mission in Afghanistan.**

Given the fact that there are so many different UN agencies operating within Afghanistan, there is a danger of different agencies implementing overlapping or conflicting programs or policies. The UN has been working to create a fully integrated office for Afghanistan that will oversee all aspects of the reconstruction effort, and to have as few international staff as possible, in order to “tread lightly.”

➤ **The UN must do a better job of promoting dialogue among returnees, locals, and factions.**

There is a large and varied Afghan Diaspora that is returning, or considering returning, to the country. Many of them are educated professionals who fled the country at various times (1973, 1979, and 1992, and 1996). Each of these groups brings specific skills and ideas with them. The UN must concentrate more on promoting a dialogue among these various groups, as well as the local population and the various factional groupings.

➤ **The UN must fill the unmet needs and gaps in assistance that will inevitably emerge.**

Despite the best efforts of donors and the international community, there will inevitably be needs that go unmet and gaps in assistance, apart from the various bilateral and multilateral agreements. The UN must make sure that it identifies these needs and makes a concerted effort to meet them.

➤ **The need for gradual change must be fully understood.**

The “new vision” for Afghanistan must be based on the desires of Afghans themselves, rather than external organizations or outsiders. However, given the long absence of a democratic tradition within the country, as well as successive droughts and inadequate food production, Western expectations of elections within two years may be overly optimistic. It must therefore be recognized that gradual change is the necessary way forward.

➤ **The Joint Trust Fund for Afghanistan will allow for greater flexibility and accountability than singular trust funds have in the past.**

The Joint Trust Fund, to be administered by the UNDP, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank, differs significantly from previous trust fund efforts, such as the World Bank Trust Fund for East Timor, in that it will allow for much greater flexibility and accountability than a singular trust fund. It will act as a means for small donors to contribute through the UN and multilateral aid system. The collaboration between the three agencies provides a much better scope for holistic development, requires them to share their ideas with Afghans, and holds donor signatories accountable to their commitments.

DISCUSSION

- *Markets and market behavior must be incorporated into aid flows and the reconstruction process.*
- *An emphasis must be placed on development as opposed to simply stabilization.*
- *Basic services should be started as soon as possible.*
- *Job creation through various means must be an immediate priority.* In this regard, one possible strategy is the use of Social Funds, which have been utilized with some success in other post-conflict countries. An emphasis should be placed on reviving the small business sector, and immediate revenue sources must be created. One possibility for immediate revenue (which has been used elsewhere) is to register car licenses.
- *A close interrelationship between economic revival and security is essential.*
- *Although it has not been highlighted in this workshop, agriculture must be a centerpiece of revival strategies.* Formulating trade and investment policies is important, but these are likely long-term programs, especially considering that the infrastructure necessary for their revival is virtually nonexistent. The only trade occurring in Afghanistan currently is in narcotics. Agriculture, however, is crucial, because the vast majority (70%) of Afghans is subsistence farmers; a formal economy barely exists. The rural areas must be focused on, and policies such as crop rotation should be considered.
- *Trade and agriculture are not mutually exclusive; each needs to be addressed simultaneously.* It is important to plan for long-term trade strategies, while at the same time understanding that even short-term trade measures, such as import and export regimes, can have profound effects on the majority of Afghans that are small-scale farmers. Markets exert great influence over the agricultural sector, and an integrated strategy for trade and agriculture is thus essential.
- A Joint Social Fund is being considered, to be administered by the Asian Development Bank, World Bank and UNDP.

XIII. SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

Noeleen Heyzer, Executive Director of UNIFEM, gave a presentation entitled "Priorities for Women." Following are her main points:

➤ **Women must be central to any agenda for social transformation.**

Gender inequality is linked to poverty and insecurity. Currently only 3% of Afghan women are literate, a majority of women have no access to clean water, health care, energy and sanitation; many have attempted suicide. Women must be central to the social transformation agenda, because healthy and stable communities cannot be created without them.

➤ **Security sector reform must consider women's protection.**

Many women cannot travel outside their homes currently due to safety conditions (crime, murder, looting, and kidnapping.) In addition, women continue to suffer violence within the home; this must also be addressed. A professional police force must be trained and equipped to address women's special security needs. Alternative policing models, including community based policing and police stations for women, should be explored. Special protection for women in refugee camps and during the repatriation process should also be provided. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration must not be limited to combatants; wives, widows and other dependents of ex-fighters must also be included explicitly as beneficiaries.

➤ **Promoting gender justice is a key priority.**

The creation of a security sector that protects women relies on an independent judiciary based on the rule of law; promoting gender justice is therefore a key priority. Chairman Karzai has signed the Declaration of the Essential Rights of Afghan Women. In practice, this means that violations of women's rights must be monitored, reported, and remedied. Basic human rights education will have to be promoted among Afghan women. As an essential starting point, gender equality should be enshrined in Afghanistan's constitutional, legislative, judicial, and policy frameworks.

➤ **Women must have ownership of the governance process.**

In many countries around the world, women's political participation is associated with lower rates of corruption and increased transparency. There are currently two women in the Afghan Interim Administration, but they need political and financial support. The Minister of Women's Affairs has no staff or money; there is a need for assistance. Women must also be included within other ministries, and their perspectives must be included both within and outside government. Women's community organizations must be strengthened; constituencies must be built and networks fostered. Information should be shared with both rural and urban women, through various media such as radio and print.

➤ **Women's economic security must be improved.**

In Afghanistan, as throughout the world, poverty is feminized. Women must be incorporated into the emerging economy. Their community-level economic empowerment must be supported. Afghan women and girls expend the vast majority of their unpaid labor collecting water and firewood and caring for other household members. Access to basic services, such as water, energy and healthcare, must be seen as fundamental human rights; this will increase women's opportunity to participate in the formal sector. Women need to be trained as teachers, healthcare workers and other skilled workers, and must be fully involved in reconstruction programmes.

➤ **Gender responsive budgeting should be applied.**

The best way to measure a government's commitment to gender equality is to "follow the money." Gender responsive budget analysis is a new tool that assesses how the collection and expenditure of public resources affects women and men differently; it has been endorsed by the European Union, the UN, the OECD and over 40 countries around the world. It should be applied to plans for resource allocation made at international meetings, and to the overall budget process guiding Afghanistan's reconstruction.

Sultan Aziz, UNDP Senior Advisor, gave a presentation entitled “Afghanistan’s Reconstruction Effort: Challenges of Governance between Centre and Periphery.” Following are highlights of his presentation:

➤ **The UN must focus on rural areas as its first priority.**

Throughout the history of Afghanistan, there has been a tremendous distance (socially, economically, etc.) between the center and the periphery, between urban and rural areas. The UN must maintain a focus on the rural areas, where a majority of the Afghan population lives. Returnees will tend to congregate in urban centers – as will UN staff – and services will grow in these areas. The natural tendency to concentrate on urban areas must therefore be mitigated; the UN should see its first and primary role as helping the periphery. Many previous Afghan governments and regimes have been overthrown because they alienated the countryside – this should not be forgotten. The UN, World Bank and private sector should consider allocating 80 percent of investment to the countryside and 20 percent to the cities.

➤ **The fundamental unit of service delivery can only be the district.**

While there are many different clans, sub-clans, and tribes within Afghanistan, people generally identify themselves in relation to their home district. The district system is widely recognized by Afghans as the main territorial and governmental unit of division. For this reason, the fundamental unit of service delivery must be the district; some NGOs have tried to establish distinct relations and service delivery with each individual village; this is neither possible nor cost-effective.

➤ **The UN should focus on process over personalities.**

Afghanistan is a patriarchal society, and personalities play a large role. The UN will inevitably have to engage with personalities as it attempts to strengthen the new government, create new institutions, and promote development. However, the important goal should be to find ways to *help institutions function independently of personalities*. In this regard, the Bonn Agreement was successful because it was about *process*, not personalities.

➤ **International assistance should be used to create political space.**

Each warlord and chief has many people below him who have specific demands that must be met; the challenge for the international community is to find a way to use assistance to create the political space necessary for the government to operate and new institutions to thrive.

DISCUSSION

- *Gender issues must particularly be promoted in rural areas.* Women have been excluded from social and political participation in Afghanistan for decades; the new focus on gender issues, while welcome, must not neglect rural areas. Rural women have been even more marginalized than urban, and the 1969 Constitution really only gave rights to elite women. The international community must ensure that gender issues reach the countryside.
- *Microcredit and debt should be considered as tools for development.*
- *The development community and the political community need to be more closely aligned.* The development community, with its focus on rural districts and its long-term vision for governance and development in Afghanistan, has the ability to underpin the political/peace process. However, it is not clear that the political community is fully aligned with the views and goals of the development community, and this needs to be addressed.
- *In various countries, including Afghanistan, a backlash against women's rights and progressivism vividly illustrates the need to fill the gaps between centre and periphery, urban and rural.* When alienation takes root in the countryside, it often finds an outlet in patriarchy and a backlash against women's rights. However, extreme views about women are *not* the norm in Afghanistan, and people can be educated to change their views.
- *Warlords are currently using the district as a unit to solidify their political base.*
- *The UNDP's promotion of a specific group through aid can often actually contribute to the marginalization of that group; programs that specifically target women often backfire.*
- *Resource allocation is by definition a political act.*

XIV. DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Nicole Ball, Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the University of Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management, gave a presentation on security sector governance. Following are her main points:

➤ **Economic and social transformation requires democratic security sector governance.**

Successful economic and social development and transformation require democratic governance in the security sector. A well-governed security sector is guided by democratic principles and operated by civilians. The necessary characteristics of a democratic security sector include professional security forces, capable and responsible civil authorities, and a high priority to human rights protection. This includes the defense and intelligence bodies, criminal justice organizations, security sector management and oversight bodies, and non-core security institutions.

➤ **Strengthening/protecting the state's monopoly on the use of force is an urgent priority.**

The government clearly faces a difficult task in attempting to unify the nation and create functioning government institutions while not having a monopoly on the use of force. Even in a decentralized state such as Afghanistan, if the government is to begin delivering basic services and exercising some authority, it must find a way to incorporate, co-opt, or neutralize the warlords, roving bands, and tribal militias currently roaming the country.

➤ **Peace enforcement, and the capacity for it, must be urgently addressed.**

For development and governance to take hold, there will first be a need for peace enforcement; the international community has not adequately addressed this issue. Peace enforcement and peace enforcement capacity must extend throughout the country and not be limited only to the capital and main cities.

Ken Menkhaus, Associate Professor of Political Science at Davidson College, gave a presentation on local governance and the provision of social services, using Somalia as an illustrative example. Following are his main points:

➤ **Decentralization is not a panacea, and must be implemented through a critical lens.**

The UN often steps into a political vacuum in post-conflict countries. As a result, it usually takes a decentralized approach because this seems more democratic, easier to deliver services, and more likely to empower local people. However, this can often have negative results: in Somalia, local authorities were often self-declared. Many NGOs in Somalia subcontracted service provision to local NGOs, some of which were fronts for warlords.

This is true as well in many other countries: local authorities often derive their power from the guns they possess, or because they are the largest ethnic group, etc. Critical thought must therefore be given to which groups the international community chooses to work with – and thereby implicitly legitimize and empower – through its decentralized approach to reconstruction.

In addition, for decentralization to be successful, local administrations must be able to operate in the context of an enabling political environment, and in partnership with an effective national administration. Support for local administrations should therefore be designed to strengthen, not undermine the capacity and legitimacy of the national government.

➤ **Warlordism has a strong economic and political dynamic that can be difficult to break.**

When a political vacuum at the center exists, powerful interests arise with an interest in continued crime, plunder, and insecurity. They often have no interest in the rule of law, and there are therefore three options to deal with them: capitulation, confrontation, or co-optation.

The UN at various times tried all three of the above strategies to deal with warlordism in Somalia. Capitulation to the warlords' agenda brought the UN short-term security and facilitated service provision, but in the long-run it doomed the UN agenda for government building, in particular its attempt at the creation of democratic district councils. Confrontation was attempted successfully against one warlord (General Morgan), but disastrously in the case of General Aideed.

The strategy of co-optation was based on the premise that the UN was in a position to shape the overall political and economic environment in ways that recast the interests of combatants from war and lawlessness to peace and rule of law. For militiamen, this meant the provision of demobilization and training programs (as drivers, mechanics, farmers) in order to enable them to find gainful employment in the civilian economy. For war merchants, the strategy would offer them opportunities to shift into more legitimate areas of commerce. And for warlords, there was the possibility that they could make the leap to civilian political leader. Significantly, however, no major militia or factional leader opted for a position in local administrations, which they viewed as beneath their status; each instead aimed to gain seats in a future national administration, which never emerged.

➤ **Social service provision has a country-specific institutional history that must be recognized.**

In Somalia, social services (education, healthcare, water) were never effectively provided by the national government, and in most remote districts these were only provided by international aid agencies. As a result, the newly-formed local administrations and district councils balked at the UN's attempts to empower them to provide these services themselves – they were reluctant to assume ownership of something they did not see as their responsibility.

➤ **Financial capacity in particular must be supported and strengthened.**

The local authorities' right to tax must be clearly defined, and standard accounting and financial rules should be put in place to avoid conflicts and mitigate corruption.

DISCUSSION

- *The psychosocial environment in Afghanistan must be taken into consideration.* People's humanness, their sense of dignity and security, has been degraded for over two decades. It will be difficult to inculcate a new sense of security and trust, and this environment should be kept in mind when considering governance and development.
- *National Social Funds can undermine and deligitimize local bodies.*
- *A participatory national dialogue is one important way to find out what people want and prioritize among the various issue areas.* There are a whole range of needs that need to be met, and the best way to find out what people want and need most is to ask them.
- *District Social Funds (which were used in Sierra Leone) should be considered.*
- *Although decentralization is the only viable option, there must be some minimum level of accountability to the central authorities.* However, decentralization has its own risks and drawbacks, and should not be done out of fear. The only recent example of successful *elective decentralization* is the United Kingdom; in most other places (Kenya, Nigeria) it has been done out of fear [of disintegration or conflict].

XV. CONCLUSION

Hafiz Pasha, RBAP Director, and Khalid Malik, EO Director, concluded each workshop with a review of what was and was not accomplished during the workshops, as well as lessons learned and how those lessons might be operationalized, disseminated to decision-makers, and applied to the field. The following two summaries capture their key points from each workshop.

Summary of First Workshop:

Mr. Pasha concluded the first workshop by warning that the United Nations' strong desire to become involved in Afghanistan's rehabilitation might be causing the process to move too quickly, and he expressed a concern that lessons learned might get lost in the overall operation. Mr. Malik then summarized the key ideas from the workshop with the following points:

- **Tensions in various areas.**

There is a tension between the 'urgent' (immediate basic elements needed to function) and the 'necessary' (institutional development, income generation, and infrastructure development). The necessary must be done in order for the urgent to succeed and be sustainable. Urgent, quick impact interventions are required to establish credibility with people, especially with the beneficiaries (within the first four months). At the same time, it is necessary to invest in infrastructure and institutions. Longer-term development concerns need to be upfront and guide short-term actions.

There is also a tension concerning the role of institutions, and whether they should they have a central or a local focus. Investing at the community level can be a useful approach in Afghanistan. However, while local governance (*shuras*) should be regarded as essential parts of the peace building process, and also in the provision of social services, it cannot substitute for modern central level institutions.

- **Skills development.**

Afghanistan needs a "crash course" program that will teach specific skills needed to advance the economy and society as a whole.

- **How to 'start up' quickly and reduce transaction costs.**

There are at least three dimensions to this point. First, the UN, and specifically UNDP, must quickly set in place a logistics and implementation machinery that works and learns from earlier mistakes. There is no need to "reinvent the wheel" here, because there are identifiable colleagues known for specific expertise (in other reconstruction efforts such as Mozambique, Haiti, etc.) who can quickly be tapped for Afghanistan. It is important to link this expertise to an implementation mechanism that works. While the actual logistics may need to be guaranteed by UNDP, there are good examples of task forces at the national and ground level that sustain stakeholder involvement and support (an essential condition for overall success).

Second, large numbers of outside experts should not overrun a situation. This could result in a recipe for failure in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the involvement of large numbers of NGOs on the ground is likely to raise additional difficulties, as personal and agency agendas are pushed to the forefront.

Finally, some donors have specific interests and complex procedures. In the case of rehabilitation in East Timor and Kosovo, donors experienced excessive competition for sexy projects while technical and cultural constraints limited their range of implementation and influence.

- **Reviving the Economy and Reconstruction**

Institutions have to be locally driven and nationally owned and maintained. District governors in Afghanistan exercise a very powerful role. Reconstruction is about what works best and what does not. It is important to balance donors' desire with local needs.

- **Sustainability dimension.**

Inequity is a major problem [e.g. Refugees often receive more financial support than people who remain in the country.] If the economy does not revive, reintegration will not work. There is a need for up-front components of long-term development considerations.

- **Need for a comprehensive approach.**

All of the above requires a comprehensive approach. Recovery must to be linked to reconstruction and initial investments need to be undertaken with close attention paid to the issue of 'recurrent costs'. Designers of reconstruction programs tend to underestimate the time needed, generally 3-5 years. It is a benefit to involve NGOs, provided they are carefully engaged in terms of roles and responsibilities.

- **Self-confidence is key to ownership.**

Afghans must be in the driver's seat. Among other things, the UN can assist this process by ensuring that small Afghan companies get contracts, especially since large foreign companies are already seeking to win big contracts on the large projects (roads, gas and oil pipelines, construction, etc.)

- **Donors are keeping close watch on UN operations.**

Many donors are watching how well UNDP and the UN perform overall in Afghanistan, as litmus test for the future. Money will flow if performance is good, but may dry up if performance is poor.

- **Find a way of delivering social services immediately, there is no short term.**

Summary of Second Workshop:

Mr. Pasha concluded the second workshop by stating that although there were many important lessons about post-conflict situations that resulted from the workshop, there was not an exact blueprint, or a one-size fits-all approach that would apply to Afghanistan. Each applicable lesson would have to be adapted to the unique conditions in Afghanistan.

Mr. Pasha also warned of an “expectation gap” between donors and implementers (such as the UN). He noted that the process of development and governance building would take years, and expressed his hope that the international community would have the patience to remain committed to this process (both politically and financially).

As a next step forward, Mr. Pasha said that a summary paper of the workshop should be drawn up, and the principles contained therein should be operationalized; UN officers in Afghanistan should receive this report. He also invited Mr. Malik and the Evaluation Office (EO) to participate in a half-day cluster meeting on reconstruction.

Finally, Mr. Pasha emphasized that future meetings on Afghanistan should address the regional aspects of the Afghan situation more than the current workshop had, and he invited the EO to come to Bangladesh for an upcoming RBAP conference.

Khalid Malik then outlined several building blocks for future UN action in Afghanistan. One point he made is that there must be a coherent UN structure for aid flows, and that aid flows must not undermine accountability. Accordingly, the government should not become dependent on aid for its legitimacy.

A second point was that there has to be a coherent government structure in Afghanistan. The Afghan Interim Authority, while certainly in an early stage of development, provided this structure, in Mr. Malik’s view.

A third point was that “the energy for development has to be both locally-owned and locally-driven.” Solutions to Afghanistan’s issues must come from within the country and the government, he noted, and not be overly determined by outside influences. Mr. Malik acknowledged that donors and the UN would of course exert an influence over the reconstruction process, but that ultimately it had to be driven by the government and people of Afghanistan.

Another important point made was that external actors should be cognizant of the fact that “the interaction between Afghans and the external environment [donors, NGOs, the UN] is very much an urban phenomenon.” The international community must recognize that although they may believe they are taking an inclusive approach to reconstruction, a large proportion of the Afghan population, which is rural, may be left out of this process. Mr. Malik noted that there are certain social norms and attitudes associated with rural life, and that efforts at modernization and social transformation should ultimately be an Afghan internal and national matter.

Finally, Mr. Malik mentioned the importance of aligning the micro and macro perspectives (including trade); he restated the importance of a democratic security sector as a precondition to development; and he reiterated the need to operationalize the principles from the workshop.

Summing up, he quoted Joseph Stiglitz on the need to “scan globally, reinvent locally,” and emphasized the importance of involving Afghans locally in the planning and implementation of reconstruction.

ANNEX I – FIRST LESSONS LEARNING WORKSHOP

(A) WORKSHOP AGENDA & SPEAKERS

I. Introduction

Hafiz Pasha
Assistant Administrator and Director, RBAP

Khalid Malik
Director, EO

II. Local Governance

Presenter: Rajeev Pillay
Abacus International

Discussants: Alberic Kacou
Deputy Executive Secretary, UNCDF

Jennifer Topping
Technical Advisor, BDP

III. Rehabilitation

Presenter: Douglas Keh
Evaluation Specialist, EO

Discussant: Peter Schumann
UNMIK/Kosovo

IV. Reintegration

Presenter: Sam Barnes
BCPR

Discussant: Sarah Poole
Reintegration/Rehabilitation, RBEC

V. Vulnerable Groups

Presenter: Jasmine Sherif
UNIFEM

VI. Case study: Mozambique

Jennifer Topping
Technical Advisor, BDP

VII. Conclusion

Hafiz Pasha
Assistant Administrator and Regional Director, RBAP

Khalid Malik
Director, EO

(B) LIST OF PARTICIPANTS:**Learning from Experience for Afghanistan**

First Lessons Learning Workshop

26 November 2001

List of Participants

Name	Affiliation
Alberic, Kacou	UNCDF
Barnes, Sam	BCPR
Bharati, Sadsivan	BRSP
Ehsan, Khaled	EO
Fernandez-Taranco, Oscar	RBAS
Hendra, John	BRSP
Keh, Douglas	EO
Lauzon, Normand	UNCDF
Maguire, Linda	EO
Malik, Khalid	EO
Merlin-Scholtes, Joana	RBAP
Michon, Xavier	RBLAC
Pasha, Hafiz	RBAP
Poole, Sarah	RBEC
Rogivue, Jean-Claude	RBAP
Sawanishi, Mikiko	RBAP
Schmeil, Nadja	EO
Schumann, Peter	UNMIK/Kosovo
Sherif, Yasmine	UNIFEM
Shotton, Roger	UNCDF
Spoerel, Christine	RBAP
Swietering, Johannes	BOM
Tanzer, Charles	EO
Topping, Jennifer	BDP/IDG
Turkoz-Cosslett, Gulden	RBEC
Yulianto, Susan	RBAP
Zaoude, Aster	BDP

(C) MOZAMBIQUE: LESSONS IN TRANSITION?

Profile:

Population: 16 million
Land Area: 699,000 sq km (similar to Pakistan)
HDI rank: low (157), 6' from the bottom
Independence: 1975 from Portugal

THE WAR YEARS: 1980-1992

- 1.7 million refugees to 6 neighboring countries
- 3.5 million internally displaced
- economy paralyzed
- heavily land mined rural areas and infrastructure,
- urban islands, only accessible by air
- some state structures operating (in the capital, food distribution outside through local govt. in govt. areas or ICRC in Renamo areas)
- 60% of rural primary schools and health facilities destroyed

The international community, UN agencies provide constant support of humanitarian emergency nature during these years (avg. 300 million annually). UNDP too, but more so in capacity building of central ministries.

1988-1994: THE GESTATIONAL YEARS OF PEACE

- begin preparing for a multi dimensional transition; war to peace, command to market economy, single party state to multi party democracy, central to local government...
- new constitution (adopted 1990) provided for multiparty elections, freedom of press and association, independent judiciary
- 1992 Peace Accords set out terms for UN monitored settlement (initially 12 months extended to 24). 1992-94: Massive agenda. Withdrawal foreign troops, separation of army's, disarmament, demobilization of 92,000, 1.7 m refugees return, 3.5 m IDPs, design of electoral system and law, registration of parties, organization of elections.
- UN mission: ONUMOZ Oct 92- Feb 95 cost \$565 million from assessed budget.

UNIUNDP and international community: UNSRSG heavily engaged in ONUMOZ, peacekeeping and GPA adherence. UNDP focused on DDR, and coordination and support of election organization. UNHCR and WTP biggest UN operators during this period. UNDP managed electoral trust fund of \$60million, reintegration support scheme of \$95 million, Political Party Trust Fund and Renamo Trust Funds.

THE FIRST PEACEFUL "GENERATION" (1995-1999)

Moving from the humanitarian or "absence of war" concept of peace to building and deepening peace. Beyond a preoccupation with the removal of war things (soldiers, guns etc) to really establishing the instruments, *institutions and processes for peace and development.

For UNDP this involved:

- Assumption of main UN role (SRSG, UNHCR gone, others scaled down)
- Responsibility for continuation of reintegration programmes.
- Economic reform support (macro policy and decentralization policy)
- Political reform portfolio of assistance to:
 - new multiparty parliament ,
 - civilian police,
 - the justice sector (capacity, strategy and prison reform),
 - independent media,
 - elections (local and subsequent),
 - decentralization, local governance and Microfinance
 - -Total \$200 million, UNDP and others
 - Area based programmes in high refugee concentration areas.

Through a jointly chaired UNDP- WB "aid for democracy" group, UNDP negotiated, designed and coordinated assistance to multi-donor programmes in all of the above areas.

THE SECOND "GENERATION" (2001-2006)

Assessment mission carried out in 2000 confirms the continued relevance of the above political reform agenda into the second generation, with added (deepening) elements to:

- strengthen inclusion and national multiparty vision and dialogue
- enrich civil societies' role, citizen voice, anti corruption measures
- representative local government bodies

LESSONS

In addition to the humanitarian/emergency agenda, there is a need for sufficient and sufficiently senior resources dedicated from the outset to the "slow track" (consultation, careful transition planning, cost, sustainability, coordination) in both the humanitarian and the development agencies. UNHCR sees UNDP as the people that are there to take care of the QUIPS after HCR has finished with mission and tends to raise this in the wind-down phase. Similarly UNDP needs to build longer term considerations and political sensitivity into the agenda and design of humanitarian agencies.

Building block approach (largely sequential) needs to inter-relate with, and anticipate more, the systems approach (linkages and simultaneous interventions).

Political analysts and listeners to advise humanitarian side in planning, design and implementation, not just do-ers. Lots of patience and 'informal techniques for the dialogue process, no quick, visible results in political transition.

Constant attention to the need for adjustment in implementation and to changes in temperature and tension

Need strong economic 'incentives for stability (**extended** demobilization and economic reintegration/stimulus, macro economic reform). Seeing the benefits of peace is critical. Local economic stimuli and choices.

Be frugal in approach even when money is in abundance or it will come back to haunt later. Lots of examples here, expensive imported area-based programme distortions create conflict, expensive peace cps and elections can be more destabilizing because of the precedent set. Digging ourselves into holes, those who stay around for the long term. Very difficult to "undo" later.

Longer term staffing promotes interest 'in and accountability for sound initiatives that have greater possibility to be sustainable over time. Short term staff turnover on the other hand...

Invest in rapid, independent baseline 'information. Gives a reliable, consistent source on which to base design assumptions, builds common platform for longer term planning discussions, creates non confrontational activity for local actors. Use existing networks on the ground cheaper and more effective i.e. UNHCR field staff in absence of government structures.

Need to guide (control) more carefully the executing agents (UN and national) vis-à-vis the conflict and governance implications of implementation actions. Especially true for external agents (UNOPS) that might have a delivery agenda and sometimes external (bilateral) financing.

ANNEX II – SECOND LESSONS LEARNING WORKSHOP

(A) WORKSHOP AGENDA AND SPEAKERS

I. Introduction

Hafiz Pasha
UNDP Assistant Administrator and Director, Regional Bureau for Asia
and the Pacific

Khalid Malik
Director, UNDP Evaluation Office

II. Outcomes of the Tokyo Conference

Presenter: Ambassador Motohide Yoshikawa
Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations

III. Frameworks for Relief and Reconstruction

Presenter: Julia Taft
UNDP Assistant Secretary General and Director of the Bureau for Crisis
Prevention and Recovery

IV. Human Security

Presenter: Erin Mooney
Brookings Institute – CUNY Project on Internal Displacement

Presenter: Barnett Rubin
Director of Studies, Center on International Cooperation, New York
University

V. Macro Perspectives on Economic Revival and Management

Presenter: Khalil Hamdani
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

Presenter: David Lockwood
UNDP Deputy Assistant Administrator and Deputy Director, Regional
Bureau for Asia and the Pacific

VI. Social Transformation

Presenter: Noeleen Heyzer
Executive Director, UNIFEM

Presenter: Sultan Aziz
Senior Advisor, UNDP

VII. Democratic Governance

Presenter: Nicole Ball
Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Center for International Development and
Conflict Management, University of Maryland

Presenter: Ken Menkhaus
Associate Professor of Political Science, Davidson College

VIII. Conclusion

Presenter: Hafiz Pasha
UNDP Assistant Administrator and Director, Regional Bureau for Asia

Khalid Malik
Director, UNDP Evaluation Office

(B) LIST OF PARTICIPANTS:

Learning from Experience for Afghanistan
Second Lessons Learning Workshop
4-5 February 2002, Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations

List of Participants

<i>4 February, Day One</i>	
Name	Affiliation
A. Waldvogel	Mission of Switzerland
Alexander Nicklas	German Mission
Anish Pradhan	Evaluation Office
Anna-Maija Korpi	Mission of Finland
Aster Zaoude	UNDP/BDP
Astri Suhrke	Chr. Michelsen Institute
Babacar Cisse	UNDP/ RBA
Badriddin Dbidov	Mission of Uzbekistan
Barnett Rubin	CIC/NYU
Bassim Blazey	Mission of Australia
Bassim Blazey	Mission of Australia
David Haeri	UN/DPKO
David Lockwood	UNDP/ BDP
Erin Mooney	Brookings Institution – CUNY Project on Internal Displacement
Eugeny Stanislavon	PM of Russian Federation
Fumio Iwai	Japan Mission
Guillaume Gaubert	Mission of France
Herbet M'cleod	UNDP
Janet Vaccaleboeuf	US Mission
Jennifer Topping	UNDP/BDP-IDG
Jiang Jiang	Chinese Mission
Jocelyn Mason	UNDP/BDP – IDG
Julius Lijestrom	Mission of Sweden
Katrin Kinzelbach	UNDP/BRSP
Khalil Hamdani	UNCTAD
Luca Renda	UNDP/ RBLAC
Margaret Ford	CIDA Multilateral
Marie Okabe	UN- Spokesman's office
Mary Eliza Kimball	OIC, AMED, OO, DPKO/UN
Masood Khalid	Pakistan Mission
Mehdi Mirafzal	Mission of Iran
Melaria Valucawaga	UNDP/ RBAP
Mesat Yessenbeyer	Mission of Kazakhstan

Mette Fjalland	UNDP/BCPR
Mikiko Sawanishi	UNDP
Morin Karim	UNDP
Murat Smagula	Mission of Kazakhstan
Nadja Schmeil	EO
Nurul Alam	Evaluation Office
Peter Goosbas	WFP
Pia Starbrook	Mission of Denmark
Rameou Rajarpham	UN-OCHA
Riaz Hamdullah	Bangladesh –UN
Richard Ponzio	UNDP HDRO
Sakiko Fukuda-Parr	UNDP/ HDRO
Shakrabanou Tadjbakhsh	NHDR Unite HDRO
Simon Chesterman	International Peace Academy
Simone Whittemore	U.S. State Department
Sultan A. Aziz	UNDP/BCPR/RBAP
Thilo Youler	Federal Foreign Office, Germany
<i>5 February, Day Two</i>	
A. Waldvogel	Swiss Mission
Alper Coskun	Turkish Mission
Aster Zaoude	UNDP/BDP
Christine Roth	UNDP/OCF/BoM
David Lockwood	UNDP/RBAP
Guillaume Gaubert	Mission of France
Hafiz Pasha	UNDP
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Jennifer Topping	UNDP/ BDP
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Julius Liljestrom	Mission of Sweden
Katrin Kinzelbach	UNDP
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Simone Wittemore	U.S. State Department
Sultan Aziz	UNDP/RBAP
Tom Kelly	United Kingdom Mission