Crisis Prevention and Recovery

Conference on Peace through Reconstruction, Columbia University
Issues, Lessons and Policy Guidelines for Effective Reconstruction

Jordan Ryan, Assistant Administrator and Director, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP

23 October 2009, New York

Ladies and gentlemen, dear friends,

First of all, I want to thank Columbia University and, in particular, the Earth Institute and the Center on Capitalism and Society for hosting this important event. This is a timely issue that is currently receiving considerable attention in government circles as well as within the development community.

Reconstruction in all its dimensions is undeniably a critical element of peace-building and I am pleased to have the opportunity to share with you my perspectives on this subject.

Post-Conflict reconstruction is more of a political than a technical exercise. In the immediate aftermath of conflict the peace is usually fragile and most decisions either have an explicit political dimension or are perceived as such. We need to bear this fact in mind as we craft our policy responses. This implies a sensitivity to both implied as well as explicit needs and concerns of conflict-affected societies, a willingness to listen to those least capable of articulating their concerns, and humility to acknowledge mistakes.

In addition, reconstruction must not only focus on rebuilding the hardware of war-torn societies but on mending the software of severed societal relationships, broken trust and perceptions of betrayal. While the former can largely be achieved through financial resources, the latter is more complex and requires substantial investments in time, dialogue and patience. Overall, successful reconstruction requires a shared understanding of the needs of those we are serving, a commitment by stakeholders to a common approach to addressing such needs, and the willingness by everyone engaged to coordinate their efforts to implement that approach.

I will focus on three elements that should anchor the reconstruction process (i) local ingenuity and ownership (ii) conflict-sensitivity in policy design; and (iii) a legitimate and effective state. I will conclude by discussing what is required to operationalize these elements.

Ownership and local ingenuity

Enduring reconstruction must build on existing local capacities and institutions. Our experience shows that the efforts of the local communities are fundamental to the revival of economic activity and the repair of social relationships in the aftermath of conflict. Local actors are the best placed and have the strongest incentives to rebuild the local economy. 

This holds true both for the initial revival of livelihoods as well as the re-establishment of social cohesion. In Colombia, for instance, UNDP has invested through its REDES programme in strengthening the capacities of communities to secure their public spaces against the depredations of both left-and-right-wing militias, and to cooperate with each other in re-establishing livelihoods as well as mutual confidence. In Kenya, the strongest bulwark against potential renewed violence in the near future, especially given leadership failures at the national level, are likely to be the local peace committees in towns such as Naivasha and Nakuru that bore the brunt of the violence in the Rift Valley following last national elections. Such committees had successfully kept the peace in the normally violence-prone Northern and Coast provinces of Kenya during the same elections.

Important as communities and their resources are, equally critical are the capacities and attitudes of the national leadership. Yet, international interventions rarely seek to build the capacities of leaders—through appropriate skills, forums, or processes—for constructive mutual engagement. Individuals and organizations who could serve as “change agents” are also often not identified and systematically supported. It is no surprise that many post-conflict elections lead to logjams, or attempts at manipulation, or one party-domination. Bearing this mind, initial efforts are now being made in countries as diverse as Burundi, Kenya, Liberia and Nepal to build and transform leadership by working through leaders of all sectors—political, civic, and private.

Respect for local capacities and ingenuity also requires “conflict sensitivity.” All interventions in a post-conflict situation can be expected to establish new priorities, modify the allocation of resources, alter past relationships, and empower new actors. Hence, they will inevitably lead to conflict which, if not managed constructively, will generate additional violent tension. All interventions in a post-conflict situation should, therefore, not only be mindful of not exacerbating existing cleavages, but should actively support their beneficiaries in acquiring and applying conflict management skill in their respective areas of activity.

“Conflict sensitivity” also requires that we do not promote or sustain parallel structures that supplant local capacities, stunt the growth of local institutions, and distort local markets.

Policy priorities in post-conflict recovery

At a minimum, post-conflict reconstruction requires the establishment of security and the restoration of basic social services and livelihoods. These must be underpinned by a macroeconomic framework that emphasizes peace even as it promotes growth.

Restoring peace and security require an understanding of the source of continuing conflict; an appreciation of the issues that provoke antagonism; and an ability to find common ground even where protagonists despise and distrust each other.

Building an Infrastructure for Peace

Confidence in a country’s prospects for stability is essential to economic revival. This requires an explicit focus on ensuring that recurring tensions around land, ethnicity, and natural resources do not reignite violence, or that elections and other political milestones do not lead to deadlock or violent political tension. Post-conflict societies therefore need to build “infrastructures for peace,” from local peace committees to national mediation commissions and dialogue platforms, where conflicts can be managed on a recurring basis.

Basic Needs for Peace

Initial recovery efforts should focus on visible confidence building measures like ensuring food security and basic healthcare.  This will require attention to repairing key infrastructure – ports, major roads, electricity to hospitals and clinics – and re-engaging with farmers across the country. Reopening schools provides a means to feed children, get them some basic health care, and allow their parents (for a few hours a day) to get on with the business of repairing/rebuilding and/or re-establishing their livelihoods. These initial measures should be carried out in a way that builds confidence in the local political process rather than being seen as largely derived from external assistance.

Macro-stability for Peace

Macroeconomic policy must give priority to minimizing conflict resurgence, even as it promotes growth. Indeed, the global economic crisis threatens the gains in stability and growth made by developing countries. Burdened by debt and constrained in their revenue mobilization efforts, most post-conflict countries simply do not have the fiscal space to cushion their people from the adverse effects of the crisis.

 What are their options? We know from experience that at least one in four post conflict countries slip back into conflict (figures range from 50%; Collier and Hoeffler 2002, to 25%;Collier et al., 2006 or Suhrke and Samset, 2007). It would therefore be unwise to ignore the plight of the vulnerable groups by adopting a belt tightening approach in times when people are most vulnerable.

Indeed, some post-conflict countries are confronting the crisis head-on. Liberia, for instance, has suffered export price declines, declining remittances and rising job losses as a result of the crisis. But, notwithstanding its modest fiscal position (a small surplus of 1.1 percent of GDP), the country is responding to the crisis by eliminating the consumer tax on rice, removing tariffs on agricultural inputs and increasing spending on its Poverty Reduction Strategy. These measures should be interpreted as pre-emptive strikes against social unrest and possibly conflict resurgence. But like many post-conflict countries, Liberia cannot do it alone; it will need the commitment and financial support from the international community to mitigate the threats posed by the crisis. In this context, recent efforts by the IMF, AfDB and other multilateral agencies to prioritize fragile states in some of their financial instruments are a very welcome initiative.

Jobs for Peace

Reconstruction must prioritize job creation particularly for youth.  Young people and others  should be provided income earning opportunities including through reconstructing infrastructure and participating in  training programmes.

Furthermore, international actors can carry out reconstruction in ways that pro-actively promote domestic employment. For instance, a portion of reconstruction contracts can be set aside for local businesses. These efforts should be undertaken in parallel with training programs aimed at improving the productive capacity of the private sector.

Public works programmes can play an important role in generating employment and incomes in the short-term. However, these initiatives must be linked to a longer term agenda for sustained employment generation. Without a doubt, the private sector must be central to this agenda. The challenge is to create incentives that attract legitimate business investment while taking a hard line on criminal activity. This involves continual dialogue and consultation with businesses, employees and communities to secure their input on workable incentive systems.

Courting private sector investments will require targeted interventions to minimize the risk of operating in post-conflict countries. This is particularly relevant for foreign investors whose lack of familiarity with the local context may render them more wary about their physical security as well as the security of their investments. Improving the business climate will require strengthening the security system and instituting a legal and regulatory framework that lowers transactions costs for businesses. Some countries are establishing guarantee funds to insure businesses against risky investments. Liberia, for instance, is in the process of establishing a $2 million guarantee fund precisely for this purpose.

Recognizing the centrality of employment to post-conflict recovery, the UN has developed a System-wide Policy on Post-Conflict Employment Creation and reintegration as well as an Operational Guidance Note that provides a framework for jobs creation. The approach consists of three tracks that simultaneously address the short, medium and long-term measures required to promote an environment for sustained employment creation. Track 1 focuses on the short-term interventions to provide livelihoods and incomes particularly for ex-combatants and vulnerable groups. Track 2 focuses on strengthening local institutions and capacities for employment creation. Track 3 focuses on ensuring that policies at the national level are supportive of employment creation.

The role of the State

Governments need to reconstruct state structures, and also restore the very attributes of legitimacy, respect, trust, effectiveness, which were wanting or have been destroyed by conflict. Post-conflict governments must work to re-establish legitimacy by including all major stakeholders in social and economic processes. The new state must become effective by restoring its capacity to administer social, political and economic programmes and to assure individual and community security. All of this, however, requires individual and institutional capacity.

All too often, development partners and donors address the capacity gap by creating parallel systems, run by international experts, that tend to undermine the legitimacy of the state. Minimizing the creation of parallel systems requires that efforts to rebuild capacity must start as soon as windows of opportunity present themselves. Furthermore, it requires that efforts to rebuild the government and civic administration should be deliberate rather than rushed.  The operational guide should be that the government keeps its agenda matched to its (financial, human, institutional, organizational, and physical) capacities.  Over-reach undermines progress and weakens the public sector’s ability to respond.

Nevertheless, external capacities will be required to bridge the short-term capacity deficits. What is required is the design of complementary processes to ensure a more sustainable approach to national capacity development. Liberia’s experience is instructive in this respect.

With the support of UNDP, the World Bank and other development partners, the government of Liberia initiated the Senior Executive programme, that identifies qualified Liberians, based at home or abroad, to serve in “high leverage” positions in the civil service. Each of these positions typically involves the management of a significant level of public services with the potential for substantial impact on the well-being of the country as a whole. 

Moving Forward

As development partners our role in ensuring that the pieces of the reconstruction puzzle fit together is vital. We bring to the table of reconstruction table, a rich menu financial and human resources, as well as a wealth of experience. But how and when we deliver these resources is as important as what and how much of it is delivered.

We need to begin the reconstruction process even before there is a formal peace agreement. Given the need for fast action on all fronts (i.e., Political, military, humanitarian and development) all development actors within and outside of the UN system must commit to the same strategy and rules of engagement. This includes the broad principles and modalities for transitioning from humanitarian to development assistance. Bringing the actors together will not be an easy process. It will require a rethinking and restructuring of the incentive structures that govern these institutions.

Finally, expediting the reconstruction process requires the ability to quickly identify and fund countries’ most critical peacebuilding gaps.  As noted in the Secretary-General’s report on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, our financing and planning mechanisms are generally ill-suited to the fluid and often volatile nature of post-conflict settings. Even when aid is committed, the machinery for disbursement is generally slow and inflexible. We certainly need more fast flexible and fast–disbursing aid modalities.

In conclusion, ensuring sustainable peace must be central to policymaking in countries emerging from conflict. For these countries the threat of conflict relapse is real. Under these circumstances our approach to reconstruction is as important as the pace of reconstruction. By credibly coordinating our efforts to fast-track development assistance and tap into the collective wisdom and capacity of local actors and communities, we will be better positioned to initiate and reinforce a sustainable process of recovery.  

Thank you.