

United Nations Development Programme

**Conflict-related
Development Analysis
(CDA)**

Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
(BCPR)

Acknowledgements

UNDP gratefully acknowledges the substantive work done by DFID in this issue and its willingness for making available its methodology of Strategic Conflict Assessment. The Guide was drafted by Tony Vaux of Humanitarian Initiatives UK, under the supervision of BCPR, with input from UNDP staff and other partners from headquarters and in the field.

Comments

The development of the CDA builds on a series of pilot conflict assessments undertaken in selected countries, as well as further consultations with UNDP staff and other UN agencies. The CDA still is at an experimental stage, so that comments and further suggestions are welcome. Please send them to Celine Moyroud, Conflict Prevention Advisor, BCPR, UNDP, New York, e-mail: celine.moyroud@undp.org

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Executive summary

This paper summarises the purpose, key characteristics, assumptions, as well as proposed applications of the Conflict-related Development Analysis (CDA). A summary of the CDA process is also provided at the end of the executive summary.

1. Aims of the CDA

CDA is an analytical tool targeted at UNDP practitioners and other development agencies working in conflict prone and affected situations. In particular, it was designed as a practical tool to better understand the linkages between development and conflict, with a view to increasing the impact of development on conflict.

2. Key Characteristics

The CDA methodology builds on a review of different analytical approaches (as developed by the donor and non-governmental communities), as well as from UNDP's own experience with conflict assessment processes. In particular, it draws on the DFID methodology of Strategic Conflict Assessment and reflects the approach of the Early Warning and Preventive Measures (EWPM) course of the UN System Staff College.

The CDA is an extension of normal development analysis, and has been designed in such a way that it is:

- Development-focused
- Applicable to any type or stage of conflict
- Strategic and focused on structural causes of violent conflict
- Dynamic
- Output-oriented
- Participatory
- Aimed at consensus-building at the country level

3. Assumptions

The CDA methodology is based on a set of key assumptions. They include:

- Each conflict is unique so that analysis needs to be conflict-specific.
- Conflicts arise from sets of interconnected and interconnected causes of violent conflict.
- Some actors may have an interest in promoting and driving conflict.
- Development can be a cause of violent conflict, as well as a part of the response to address it.
- Development agencies should aim at 'doing no harm'.
- Development agencies should maximise their impact on conflict.

4. Possible Applications of the CDA

The CDA has been developed, with a view to contributing to the further mainstreaming of conflict prevention into UNDP's strategy development and programming. In this sense, it aims to integrate conflict assessment into existing programming tools and procedures at all levels, including such planning cycles as the CCA/UNDAF. Alternatively, the CDA can be used in country settings, where there is an opportunity to build a consensus around key


conflict issues. The CDA process will thus require further adapting, depending on the required outputs (see Part 4).

In particular, possible (direct and indirect) outputs of the CDA include:

- Strategic Conflict Analysis
- Conflict-related Programme Planning
- Conflict-related Programme Review
- Early Warning
- Input into the CCA/UNDAF
- Input to the national human development reports (NHDR)
- Input to PRSP processes

5. Summary of the Methodology

An in-depth and full overview of the CDA process is available in Part 3. In particular, it can summarize as follows:



Stage One: Analysis of Conflict

The CDA is concerned with strategic analysis rather than immediate events. It therefore focuses on structural issues rather than 'proximate causes'. The interaction of structural causes is captured visually, using a comprehensive multidimensional matrix:

Table 1: Example of the matrix *(with example)*

	Security	Political	Economic	Social
International	Peace-keeping forces	Superpower interests	Impact of global trade	Rise of fundamentalism
Regional	Incursions from neighbor states	Interests of regional neighbors	Interests in raw materials	Ethnic links
National	Interests of the military	Governance	Political links to organized crime	North-South divide
Sub-national	Militias	Centralized power	Economic activities of provincial leaders	Ethnic tensions
Local	Human rights abuses	Decline of local elites	Youth unemployment	Concerns of displaced people

While conflict analysis often focuses on security and political issues, the CDA balances these with social and economic structural causes. Taking the analysis down to sub-national and local levels also helps to focus attention on development issues. Further discussion of the matrix leads to identification of the key issues which, if unaddressed, would lead to the outbreak of violent conflict, or recurrence thereof.

The next step is to look for the forces that may be driving conflict. A comprehensive mapping of key actors is undertaken in order to identify their key interests as well as the possible impacts and reactions that such interests may create in other groups.

Table 3: Actors Analysis

Actors	Interests	Impacts/Reactions

The most challenging part of the CDA process relates to developing an understanding of conflict dynamics. CDA avoids general models of conflict but leaves open the possibility of modeling the dynamics of a specific conflict. Adding trigger events to the analysis leads to identification of scenarios.

Stage Two: Analysis of Current Responses

The aim of this Stage is to map current responses in a given setting, especially in the development field. In the third Stage, these responses will be compared with the analysis of Conflict undertaken in Stage One.

Stage Two begins by mapping ongoing interventions and related concerns of the main actors operating in a given setting, in relation to the key issues identified in Stage One. It will then examine development work, in relation to its approach to conflict, using the categorization of working ‘around’, ‘in’ and ‘on’ conflict.

Table 3: Development and Conflict (with example)

Actors	Around Conflict	In Conflict	On Conflict
	<i>Area development project in non-conflict area</i>	<i>Immunization project in conflict area</i>	<i>Peace-building project with both sides</i>

The next step is to consider the role of development in relation to formal peace processes and negotiations, especially in contexts where such processes currently take place. Emphasis is thus placed upon mapping development work in relation to:

- Track One: formal peace negotiations
- Track Two: informal support to peace negotiations
- Track Three: development in support of peace

Stage Two concludes by considering whether development organisations are maximising their impact on conflict.

Stage Three: Identification of Ways Forward

The two previous Stages are now drawn together to produce a strategy, in order to identify possible gaps, as well as adequate strategies to address them. The first step thus aims to identify a set of strategic objectives, from which specific conclusions can be derived for UNDP both from a programming and advocacy perspective.

Acronyms

BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP)
CBOs	Community-based Organisations
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CDA	Conflict-related Development Analysis
DFID	Department for International Development
EWPM	Early Warning and Preventive Measures (UNSSC)
ICG	International Crisis Group
IFI	International Finance Institution
IMF	International Monetary Fund
HDI	Human Development Index
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
NHDR	National Human Development Report
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
SCA	Strategic Conflict Assessment (DFID)
TNC	Trans-national Corporations
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	UN Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNSSC	UN System Staff College

Part 1

Conflict and Development: The context for the CDA

International understanding of the relationship between conflict and development has changed rapidly through the last decade. There is nowadays a wider recognition that conflict may not be resolved purely by military and political means and that the process of development is also involved. There is also wider realization that conflict stands directly in the way of achieving development goals.

The CDA has thus been designed a methodology for development organizations, and in particular UNDP, which can help improve their work in conflict situations through a better understanding of the linkages between development and conflict. The purpose of this part is to set the context of the CDA, in terms of recent debates, as well as policies relating to conflict and development.

1. Policy Parameters

The Carnegie Commission's report on Preventing Deadly Conflict¹ and the OECD/DAC Guidelines on Conflict², both published in 1997, marked a major shift towards the understanding that conflict and development are inextricably linked together. Until then, development actors had tended to treat conflict simply as an external obstacle. These reports demonstrated that conflicts might reflect failures of development, and that, without addressing structural problems, they cannot be resolved.

This new understanding opened the way for using development as a preventive measure in relation to conflict and led to the realization that even after a peace settlement, conflict may resume, unless development issues are adequately addressed.

This understanding and its implications have nonetheless only spread slowly through the international community. Studies have repeatedly asserted that development actors still tend to avoid conflict or treat it as a separate issue³. For example, instead of orienting development programmes to tackle the causes of violent conflict, most organizations would tend to adapt their security procedures in order to continue with 'normal' development in conflict areas. Although they may launch specific 'peace-building' projects, they would also often leave their development strategy untouched⁴.

Within the UN, added impetus on these issues has come from the Secretary-General in his Report on Prevention of Armed Conflict⁵ and more recently from the Millennium Declaration. Both these documents require the UN to give the issue of conflict high priority. But as the Secretary-General has noted, progress has been distinctly limited⁶.

2. Increased Opportunities for Response

With the end of the Cold War, there are increased opportunities for military and diplomatic pressures to be used in order to reduce conflict. There are possibilities of concerted and 'coherent' approaches that draw together military, diplomatic and development responses from many actors and at many levels. Such responses could perhaps be substantial enough to prevent or even halt conflict.

¹ Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997)

² OECD/DAC (1997)

³ Goodhand (2001)

⁴ Goodhand and Atkinson (2001)

⁵ UN Security Council (2001)

⁶ UN General Assembly (2003)

In practice such coherence has rarely occurred. In many cases the international response appears muddled and non-strategic. There is thus a need for credible strategic conflict analysis, as well as for development inputs to take a central position in that analysis.

Research has clearly demonstrated that the single most important factor predisposing a country to conflict is a history of conflict in the recent past⁷. In practice, little is done to focus preventive development measures on such countries.

‘Post-conflict recovery’ is also too often based on an assumption that the underlying tensions have disappeared. There has also been too much reliance on imposed military and diplomatic solutions rather than integrated developmental solutions.

3. Limitations of ‘Coherence’

Few development actors are truly independent. Even international human rights organizations and humanitarian NGOs may be affected by domestic, cultural and political considerations. In conflict situations, opinions, tendencies and preferences can become contentious, so that development actors can easily find that they are considered to be on one side or the other.

In order to remain as objective as possible, development actors must be realistic about the internal pressures that influence their behavior as well as form an objective analysis of the external environment. This is especially important if they are to maintain a constructive balance with diplomatic and military organizations.

As a leading representative of the international community, UNDP is deeply involved in the international processes of development and globalization, including trade and the work of the International Finance Institutions. As a partner of the national government, UNDP shares in the challenge to statehood that often underlies conflict. Through its responsibility for addressing poverty, UNDP also has a direct responsibility to poor people.

In conflict situations it is inevitable that tensions will arise among and between these different roles. CDA will thus provide ways of analyzing conflict, as well as understanding how the international community itself fits into the picture.

4. The International community and Conflict

Trade relationships with Western countries often have an impact on conflict issues. The protectionist trade policies of the West severely undermine the economies of poorer countries⁸. A number of studies have pointed to the weakening of the state following market liberalization and structural adjustment policies⁹. Accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) brings many benefits but it obliges countries to open up its domestic markets to competition, possibly causing considerable stress at least in the short term.

The macro-economic policies of the International Finance Institutions (IFIs) are likely to cause short-term shocks that could contribute to tensions and conflict. Privatization, encouraged by the international community, often translates into increased prices and loss of jobs. Critics maintain that World Bank policies prevented the Mozambican government from managing the economy for the benefit of poor people during the war¹⁰. This is not to

⁷ Collier and Hoeffler (2001)

⁸ From a huge literature on this Oxfam (1995) remains a solid base.

⁹ Ibid. Also see Duffield 2001) and Kaldor (1999)

¹⁰ Hanlon (1991)

say that IFI policies are wrong, but that their application in conflict situations can have serious unintended consequences in the development sector. In addition, in the case of post-conflict situations, IFIs have been criticized for focusing too much on macro-economic stability and giving too little attention to issues of equity¹¹.

5. Government and Conflict

Governance is likely to be a major factor in the analysis of potential causes of violent conflict as well as in the formulation of adequate responses. Some observers argue that the world is dividing into secure richer areas and insecure poorer ones and that the transformation of the state under the effects of globalization is the fundamental issue under contention¹². It has also been argued that today's conflicts are fundamentally about the challenge to central authority from a pluralizing society, and at the extreme, may pit the state against civil society¹³. These need not be exclusive possibilities, nor are they the only possible explanations. But it is clear that in many of the poorer areas of the world the state is under extreme pressure.

Because the role of the state will be contentious in conflict situations, the role of UNDP in relation to government is also likely to be contentious. UNDP's support for the principle of nation states may make it difficult to avoid taking sides. In the past, the UN has been castigated for its unquestioning support of oppressive regimes such as that of Mengistu in Ethiopia¹⁴. Clearly, it is extremely difficult to separate a commitment to the notion of nation states from a commitment to a particular regime.

Research indicates that the poor are most likely to suffer from the dismantling of the state, at least in the short term¹⁵. The state is their main protection and so the 'failed' state is not conducive to development. But this is not to say that poor people do not seek maximum advantage out of such situations, and in some cases may be temporarily better off. If they can smuggle diamonds they may even come to favor the conflict situation that perpetuates the weakness of the state. Traditional regulatory mechanisms may play a role in limiting the destruction, as in Somalia, but such 'failed' states are unable to align themselves to the rest of the world and may degenerate into criminal activity.

Most of the processes of development are impossible in such a situation. Schools cannot function and health centers are destroyed. Often it is the staff and assets of the state that become the target for aggression.

For UNDP, such situations represent an enormous challenge and there are no easy answers. CDA offers the possibility of identifying critical areas for intervention and for drawing together development actors around a coherent response.

6. Poverty and Conflict

The link between development and conflict reflects a close correlation between poverty and conflict. War affects the poorest countries, and the poorest people within them. Of the 34 countries furthest from achieving Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 22 are suffering as a result of current or recent conflicts. The proportion of deaths by war in countries rated low on the Human Development Index (HDI) is ten times higher than in the medium

¹¹ Boyce (2002)

¹² Duffield (2001)

¹³ Kaldor (1999)

¹⁴ De Waal (1999)

¹⁵ Collier and Hoeffler (2001)

countries and twenty times higher than in countries with a high HDI rating¹⁶. A quarter of the countries in Africa were at war in 1998¹⁷. It is also widely recognized that the impact of conflict today will typically fall on civilians rather than soldiers. In wars in Africa between 1970 and 1995, civilian deaths were estimated at 95% or more of the total¹⁸.

However it is not necessarily the case that poverty causes conflict. The relationship is far more complex. Conflict is a risky strategy and requires resources to sustain it. Poor people cannot afford to take risks and lack the resources to maintain military action. This is one of the reasons why poor people rarely initiate conflict. Poverty in the form of low levels of education and social exclusion may contribute to weakness in governance and this may open the way for conflict, but the relationship is indirect.

Conflict is often a tool by which specific groups secure advantages for themselves. They may deliberately undermine the institutions of governance and thereby limit the social pressures that would tend towards economic and social equity.

7. Women and Conflict

Gender roles always include a great deal of social construction. In general, women have limited direct participation in violent conflict but undertake an essential economic, logistical and social support role (often coerced). Women are usually excluded from or have a limited role in political decision-making. Conflict tends to further reduce the status of women, and women are often the most affected segments of the population.

This is extremely unfortunate because women's socially constructed roles make them potentially a driving force against conflict, as peace builders during conflict and as leaders in ensuring livelihoods even in the midst of conflict. Therefore women should not be considered only as a vulnerable group. Their capacity of resilience is an important resource in supporting peace processes and rebuilding a more just and equitable society in which women's rights will be protected and gender equality will become the norm in institutional and social frameworks.

In general, the status of women declines in conflict situations, and this further weakens democratic pressures in support of development. By considering conflict from a long-term perspective, and focusing on social and local responses, CDA can bring the issue of women's status and voice into the analysis and make it part of a strategic response.

8. What Does it Mean for Development Policies and Programming?

At the local level, conflict often manifests itself as ethnic, religious or territorial tensions. Development actors seeking to bring benefits to an area, without an understanding of these factors, will find that their actions may easily exacerbate the tensions. Access to development services such as health, education, agricultural extension and micro-finance may be more easily available to some groups than to others. The staffing of development projects may favor one side in conflict rather than the other. A perception can quickly arise that aid is biased towards a particular group.

Agencies may therefore need to examine their staff and beneficiary profiles in relation to ethnicity, religion and class. The special role of women will need to be acknowledged by monitoring numbers and probably by setting targets or quotas. Without a better analysis of

¹⁶ Stewart (2003) p4

¹⁷ Ibid

¹⁸ Ibid p6

the situation that the CDA can provide, agencies may tend to favor elite groups and thereby exacerbate conflict.

Although there has been recognition that development should play a role in conflict prevention and mitigation, universal ways of doing so have not been elucidated. CDA is one attempt at better understanding and operationalizing the linkages between development and conflict.

The CDA is based on the assumptions that tensions exist in all societies and that conflict is not necessarily a negative phenomenon. While conflict tends to be understood as synonymous with violence, a broader approach to conflict can be that it is natural multidimensional phenomenon that is typically indicative of change within society, if managed peacefully. The CDA therefore aims to draw attention to the way in which potential causes of violent conflict become interconnected and in which such interaction may lead to the emergence of violent conflict, or the resumption thereof.

Part 2

Conflict Assessments and Development Programming: Policies, Approaches and Experiences within UNDP

1. UN Policy and Practice

1.1. UN Country Strategy (CCA/UNDAF)

The basis for policy on conflict analysis in the UN is the Secretary-General's report on Prevention of Conflict¹⁹ and subsequent progress reports²⁰, where the need to examine conflict issues in country-level policy documents, notably the Common Country Assessment (CCA) and UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), is emphasized. A Guidance Note from the UN Development Group (currently still in draft form) describes the CCA as '*an essential component of the Country Team's approach to conflict prevention.*'²¹

The Secretary-General invites UN Resident Coordinators to explore '*the setting up of a conflict prevention theme group mechanism at the country level to ensure the joint development and coherence of development strategies to address key risk factors.*' In the case of such a theme group, the Guidance Note indicates that there needs to be a '*comprehensive assessment and analysis.*' A recent Review of CCA/UNDAFs²² suggests that practice is not in line with policy, as '*the analysis of conflict in the assessment of key internal and external risks is not sufficient or systematic in the CCAs under review.*

The Review also notes that, despite the Secretary-General's calls to integrate conflict prevention into development, there is still a tendency to treat conflict as a separate issue and that it has been '*marginalized from other international interventions.*' It concludes that conflict should be mainstreamed into general policy, just as gender and the environment have been. In order to achieve this it may be necessary to have '*a self-contained category of analysis related to conflict and a separate conflict theme group within the CCA process at country level.*'²³

CDA is a response to this call for improved analysis.

1.2. The Millennium Declaration

The Millennium Declaration contains a section on 'Peace, Security and Disarmament', drawing attention to the need for compliance with international law and for action against international terrorism, organized crime and traffic in small arms and light weapons.

The Secretary-General's report to the General Assembly in July 2002 on the implementation of the Millennium Declaration emphasizes capacity building at both local and national level and that:

'This entails the creation and nurturing of civil society and of mechanisms and institutions that allow for public dialogue, the peaceful resolution of tensions, the rule of law and the

¹⁹ Un General Assembly (2001)

²⁰ UN Security Council Agenda Item 10, 7 June 2001 (A/55/985-S/2001/574)

²¹ UNDG (forthcoming) *Prevention of Armed Conflict: Draft Guidance Note*

²² UNDP (2001) *A Review of Common Country Assessment and UN Development Assistance Processes.* Governance and Rule of Law Unit, ERD unpublished

²³ Ibid p8

equitable allocation of resources and opportunity. The management of inequality and diversity is a particular challenge for national governments.'

CDA is a mechanism not only for analysis but also for developing a context-specific strategy reflecting the Secretary-General's emphasis on local capacity.

1.3. Millennium Development Goals

While there is no doubt about the potentially devastating impact of conflict on development gains, there is no Millennium Goal specific to conflict, nor is it referred to in other MDGs. There has nonetheless been some discussion about the possibility of developing a new MDG relating to conflict and humanitarian issues.

In addition, UNDP's approach to conflict prevention typically revolves around support for an environment of peace and development, including facilitating conditions for longer-term governance and poverty-alleviation programs. Such an environment, which can be supported by a strategic conflict analysis, is critical to the achievement of the MDGs.

The CDA may also assist with the achievement of the MDGs at the country level, from the perspective of linking specific programmatic initiatives with issues of distribution, which, if unaddressed, may inadvertently contribute to reinforce social, economic, group, etc inequalities.

1.4. Women, Peace and Security

In October 2000, the United Nations Security Council passed its first ever resolution on the impact of armed conflict on women and women's role in peace building. Resolution 1325 noted the need to consolidate data on women, reaffirmed the important role of women in conflict prevention and requested the Secretary-General to conduct a study, which was submitted in October 2002.²⁴

The report emphasizes the need to include women in peace and security decision-making – from prevention to early warning, through to priorities for landmine clearance, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform. This requirement has been taken into account in the design of CDA by including specific 'prompts' to consider women's perspectives, interests and capacities.

2. UNDP's Experience in Conflict Assessment

2.1. Pilot Phase

From October 2001 until the end of 2002, UNDP piloted an approach to conflict assessment and development programming. The aim of the pilot project was to explore how conflict analysis might best help country offices improve the effectiveness of development strategies and programming.

In order to do so, a number of country assessments were carried out in Guatemala, Nepal, Nigeria (Niger Delta Region), Tajikistan and Guinea-Bissau, in close collaboration with the country offices. In particular, these aim to:

- Conduct strategic conflict analysis, which will support the development of conflict sensitive policies and programs at the country level;

²⁴ United Nations (2002)

- ❑ Contribute to the development and refinement of a UN conflict analysis methodology that can support conflict sensitive programming in other contexts;
- ❑ Where applicable, work with country offices to review and consolidate their peace-building strategies and programs;
- ❑ Where applicable, ensure concrete support and follow-up with the country offices, in particular in relation to the further adaptation of their strategies and programmes.

These conflict assessments were undertaken, on the basis of a conflict analysis capability, which built upon existing methodologies and current practice by donors and non-governmental organisations (for instance, the DFID methodology was used during the pilot phase). In particular, these processes focused on both:

- ❑ Reviewing existing strategies and programming, in terms of their potential to inadvertently fuel social and economic inequalities.
- ❑ Designing new programmes that directly contribute to peace building and conflict prevention.

Each exercise was also combined with a strong training and capacity-building component aimed at both UNDP and local partners.

The integration of conflict sensitive perspective was also tested in relation to other applications than programming, including: country reviews/evaluation (Sudan), inter-agency and joint missions (Nigeria) and internal strategic missions (Somalia).

2.2. Lessons Learnt from the Pilot Phase

A number of key lessons learnt were generated during the pilot phase and have further guided the development of the conflict-related development analysis. These include:

- ❑ Conflict assessment is not a one-off exercise, but a long-term process aimed at integrating conflict prevention into existing mechanisms, procedures and planning tools.
- ❑ Conflict assessment cannot be separated from strategy and programme development.
- ❑ Capacity building targeting UNDP and partner organisations is an essential component of conflict assessment processes.
- ❑ The potential for participation and increased coordination should be fully developed within the framework of conflict assessment processes.
- ❑ A UNDP conflict assessment approach will need to reflect UNDP's specific needs, as well as constraints inherent to its mandate, in particular in relation to governments.
- ❑ A UNDP conflict assessment approach will need to be designed as a user-friendly and practical tool that is accessible to 'non-experts'.

2.3. Programme on Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention and Peace-building into Development Strategies and Programmes

On the basis of the pilot phase, UNDP launched a programme for mainstreaming conflict prevention and peace building into development strategies and programmes. In particular, this programme initiated in 2003 aims to:

- ❑ Support the integration of conflict prevention into development policies, strategies, programming tools and approaches;
- ❑ Strengthen the capacities for conflict analysis and the assessment of opportunities for conflict prevention and peace-building through targeted training;

- ❑ To initiate and/or support country and regional conflict prevention and peace building activities through facilitating strategic and programming assessment exercises;
- ❑ To raise awareness of the linkages between conflict, security and development.

In order to reach the above objectives, emphasis has been placed upon the development of a resource package that will reflect the experiences and lessons learnt from the pilot phase. The CDA methodology, which derives from this process, is described in detail in Part 3.

A number of workshops were also held in June and July 2003 with UNDP staff (HQ and field) and members of the Framework Team, in Sarajevo (CPR Regional Workshop), New York and Geneva. The workshops proved valuable forums for further reviewing the proposed approach and methodology. This process led to the current version of CDA.

In particular, it is important to note that the CDA approach builds on DFID's *Strategic Conflict Assessment* methodology²⁵, while being further adapted and customized to reflect the specific needs and interests of UNDP. For instance, the CDA has been developed as a practical step-by-step approach that can be used for capacity-building and training purposes, through the use of visual aids. It has also been designed as a participatory tool, with a specific emphasis on *process* and the engagement of various stakeholders (e.g. government, civil society, etc) in order to create a long-term constituency and platform for peace and development.

The development of the CDA has also been undertaken in close collaboration with the UNSSC *Early Warning and Preventive Measures*²⁶. In particular, attention has been placed upon ensuring overall consistency between the above two approaches (especially in relation to the analysis of conflict), while the CDA has also sought to take the assessment process further, i.e. to the level of program design and review. In addition, EWPM program staff and trainers have been involved in the development of CDA, as well as its review and consolidation.

²⁵ Goodhand, Vaux, Walker (2002).

²⁶ For more information, please go to: <http://www.unssc.org/unssc1/programme/earlywarning/>

Part 3


Conflict-related Development Analysis (CDA): A User Guide

This part describes the methodology of the CDA, as summarized into key stages and steps. In particular, it is intended as a guide for those involved in conducting the CDA process in a given setting, including both workshops and interviews.

The CDA is an analytical tool targeted at UNDP staff and other development agencies. In particular, it was designed as a practical tool to better understand the linkages between development and conflict, with a view to increasing the impact of development on conflict.

In particular, it is important to note any intervention in conflict prone areas will involve some levels of risk. In this sense, the CDA cannot substitute for management decisions.

The CDA is undertaken in three main stages:



While it is possible to use parts of the methodology separately, the CDA has been designed as a framework for strategic analysis, which can become the basis for other applications (see Part 4).

STAGE 1: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT

The aim of Stage 1 aims to provide an analysis of the situation in a given context, in particular from the perspective of identifying conflict causes and dynamics.

Key steps in conducting an analysis of conflict are summarized below. Although, for the purpose of the analysis, it is useful to divide the process into distinct steps, in reality these are closely interlinked and should be viewed as a whole.

Overview of Stage 1

	Activity	Purpose
Step 1	Table 1: Background Situation	Provides a broad picture of the current situation in a given setting.
Step 2	Table 2: Matrix of Conflict Causes	Helps with the identification of structural causes of violent conflict and their further prioritization.
Step 3	Table 3: Actor Analysis Table	Helps identify key actors in a given setting
Step 4	Fig 4: Conflict dynamics	Helps understand the dynamics of conflict in a given setting
Step 5	Table 5: Conflict Scenarios	Identify conflict trends over time

1.1. Step 1: Background Situation

Objective: Develop a common and comprehensive picture of the current situation in a given setting.

The first step focuses on *the development of a shared picture of the current situation*. In other words, it provides a broad snapshot of the situation in a given setting, which will serve as a basis for the analysis of conflict causes, actors and dynamics (see steps 2 and 4). *In this sense, potential causes of violent conflict are not yet the focus here.*

In particular, this process will help identify:

- Key economic, social, environment and political characteristics (from both an internal and external perspective)
- Relevant physical and demographic features;
- History of conflict to date;
- Typology/stage of conflict

When undertaking this process, it is also important to highlight various human rights/gender aspects that shape the situation, as well as existing capacities for peace. *Capacities for peace* typically refer to structures, mechanisms, processes and institutions for peacefully managing conflict in a society. Examples include: informal approaches to conflict resolution, role of traditional authorities, strong civil society, a culture of tolerance, role of the judiciary, inter-village meetings, traditional courts, truth commissions, etc. It is important to identify such capacities for peace early on, in order to:

- ❑ Better understand conflict dynamics (see step 4)
- ❑ Define entry points for future responses (see Stage 3).

The information for the background situation can be captured in a visual format (see table 1), through brainstorming among participants. It can also be derived from/complemented by various background documents, such as the UNDP Human Development Reports, reports

from policy and research organizations and NGOs, the media, etc. For more information, see Directory of Resources.

Table 1: Background Situation

History	Economic	Social	Political	Environment	Geography	Etc
		CAPACITIES FOR PEACE HUMAN RIGHTS GENDER				

1.2. Step 2: Survey of Conflict Causes

Objective: Map out structural causes of violent conflict and further identify a set of key issues.

On the basis of the background situation (see step 1), this step aims to *identify* causes of conflict and *further differentiate them according to structural and proximate causes*. In pre-conflict situations, given the sensitivity of conflict-related issues, the term ‘causes’ may be replaced by ‘factors’. Within this framework, conflict causes are further categorized according to the following dimensions. Namely:

▪ **Thematic categorization**

Four broad thematic areas – i.e. security, political, economic, and social – are used throughout the CDA process. In particular, they refer to a set of issues that potential causes of violent conflict may reflect.

SECURITY	POLITICAL
<p>Issues relating to the security of the state and people. It includes matters relating to the military, judiciary and police. It includes the protection of human rights and private security systems.</p> <p>E.g. international military involvements, threats from regional powers, role of the national military, rebel forces, corrupt judiciary, biased police, human rights abuses.</p>	<p>Issues relating to governance. This refers primarily to political behavior and leadership. It also includes international relations, political interests of neighboring countries and general processes of democracy including communications and the role of the media. The political status of women should be included.</p> <p>E.g. weakness of administrative systems, failed elections, political corruption, biased media, civil society engagement with the state, national-local political linkages etc.</p>
SOCIAL	ECONOMIC
<p>Issues relating access to social services, such as health and education, cultural factors (ethnicity, religion etc), as well as issues that may be perceived as threatening the well being of certain groups, such as migration and trafficking in drugs. The social status of women should be considered.</p> <p>E.g. support from Diaspora, social status of minorities, unequal access to health and education, etc</p>	<p>Issues relating to livelihoods and resources. This focuses on the flow of resources and the degree of equity in the distribution of economic assets and opportunities through society. It includes economic policy. The economic status of women should be considered.</p> <p>E.g. influence of IFIs, resources shared with regional neighbors, economic inequality, land issues, environmental factors.</p>

▪ **Categorisation by levels**

Causes of conflict may be further divided into *international, regional, national, sub-national and local levels*. The focus on the different levels at which conflict causes operate is essential, as it often brings out the external dimensions of what may be originally be purely internal problems.

Depending on the context and the level on which the analysis will primarily focus, the above levels may need to be further assessed and defined – e.g. leaving out the regional level, or using a simplified approach (internal vs. external), etc. UNDP’s experience suggests that the sub-national level is an important level, which is often neglected in conflict analysis.

The categorisation of conflict causes according to key thematic areas and levels is captured visually, in the form of a *Matrix of Conflict Causes* (see Table 2).

Table 2: Matrix of Conflict Causes

	Security	Political	Economic	Social
International				
Regional				
National				
Sub-national				
Local				

In particular, the Matrix of Conflict Causes aims to map out relevant *structural causes of violent conflict* in a given setting. Given its development focus, the CDA is indeed primarily concerned with the identification of structural causes, as compared to more immediate conflict manifestations or *proximate causes*.

Structural Causes	Proximate Causes
- Long term factors underlying violent conflict - Long-standing differences that have become deep rooted in society E.g. Illegitimate government, lack of political participation, lack of equal economic and social opportunities, unequal access to natural resources, poor governance, etc	- More visible/recent conflict manifestations - Similar to "symptoms" in medical illness E.g. uncontrolled security sector, light weapons proliferation, human rights abuses, destabilizing role of neighboring countries, role of diasporas, etc

Depending on the context and the phase/typology of conflict (see step 1), proximate causes should not be disregarded. For instance, in situations of post-conflict recovery, the emphasis will be two-fold: to address structural causes, while at the same time, working against the relapse into violence, with a particular focus on effectively tackling proximate causes over the short/mid-term.

Using the Matrix of Conflict Causes

- The starting point for the Matrix of Conflict Causes is the background situation (see step 1), from which a list of conflict causes may be distilled for a given setting. In particular, these may be generated through brainstorming and group discussion in a workshop format and/or compiled through interviews with various stakeholders.

- The list of conflict causes is then further mapped out on the Matrix of Conflict Causes (see Table 2, example 1), with a specific focus on identifying *structural causes of violent conflict*.

Table 2 (example 1): Matrix of Conflict Causes, Nepal²⁷

	Security	Political	Economic	Social
International	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ War against terrorism²⁷ ▪ Foreign military aid (UK, USA) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Support from international leftist movements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ International recession ▪ Drop in tourism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Global media
Regional	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Support from India ▪ India-Pakistan tensions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Anti-Indian sentiments ▪ Open borders ▪ Regional political conflicts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Indian economic domination ▪ Smuggling 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Regional disparities
National	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Human rights abuses ▪ Corruption in security forces 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Corruption ▪ Predatory elites ▪ Failures in justice system 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Rural/urban disparities ▪ Discrimination against ethnic minorities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ethnic/caste discrimination ▪ Inequitable service provision
Local	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Criminal elements acting as rebels ▪ Availability of arms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Low level of local participation ▪ Lack of transparency ▪ Lack of access to justice system 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Unemployment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ethnic & caste discrimination

Some key pointers:

- ❑ The value of the Matrix of Conflict Causes is its ability to deconstruct a phenomenon as complex as conflict, by helping think about conflict causes according to both thematic and level-oriented parameters. The Matrix nonetheless provides a static understanding of conflict, and will be further elaborated upon in step 4, when looking at conflict dynamics.
- ❑ While the emphasis is on the identification of structural causes of violent conflict, the process of differentiation between structural and proximate causes may sometimes prove difficult. A proper diagnostic of potential causes of violent conflict is nonetheless critical at this stage in order to ensure that the initiatives, including development-oriented responses, undertaken to address these issues will be effective over the long-term. Useful approaches to support this analytical process include:
 - ✓ Iceberg approach (Early Warning and Preventive Measure method, UNSSC)
 - ✓ Problem Tree Analysis (as used within the framework of the CCA process)

For more information on the above, see annex 1

²⁷ This is a simplified version of the analysis of conflict causes undertaken in Nepal, during a workshop organised in 2002 and attended by UNDP staff and partners.

- Throughout this process, it is important to further assess the extent to which gender and human rights related issues might be identified as structural causes of violent conflict.
- Upon completing the Matrix, the mapping of conflict causes is further examined, from the perspective of possible *linkages and connections between different set of causes identified at various levels*. Conflicts are multi-dimensional phenomena and cannot be understood in terms of one single cause, as they result from a complex interaction and overlap of various factors. It is therefore important to assess such connections at this stage, in order to get an initial sense of possible conflict dynamics in a given setting (see step 4). Key linkages identified through group discussions can be visually represented on the matrix (e.g. use of lines and arrows).
- On the basis of the above, the structural causes highlighted so far in the Matrix of Causes can be further *prioritised* in order to identify a set of key issues, which, if unaddressed, have the biggest potential to contribute to violent conflict, or the resumption thereof.

1.3. Step 3: Actor Analysis

Objective: Identify and analyze key actors, in particular in relation to their interests and capabilities to achieve such interests.

The next step aims to identify and analyze key actors in a given context. It complements Step 2 (which focuses on longer-term structural causes) with an actor-based assessment that focuses on shorter-term interests and motivations.

Within this framework, the term ‘actors’ refers to individuals, groups and institutions engaged in, as well as being affected by conflict. In particular, actors differ in relation to their interests and capabilities to realize their interests.

The actor analysis will be captured visually, in the form of an *Actor Analysis Matrix* (see Table 3).

Table 3: Actor Analysis Matrix

Actors	Interests	Capabilities
Local		
Sub-national		
National		
Regional		
International		
Etc		

Using the Actor Analysis Matrix

- The starting point for the Actor Analysis Matrix is the background situation, from which a list of relevant actors for a given setting can be developed. In particular, these may be generated through brainstorming and group discussion in a workshop format and/or compiled through interviews with various stakeholders.
- The list of actors is then mapped out on the Actor Analysis Matrix, with a view to further assessing their respective interests and capabilities to achieve such interests.

Some key pointers:

- When undertaking the actor analysis, it is important to examine both internal and external actors and the role they play in a given setting. Examples of external actors typically include Diaspora, neighboring governments, donors, trans-national corporations, multilateral and regional organizations, etc. It is also particularly important to include the UN system/UNDP in the picture.
- Upon completing the Matrix, it may be particularly relevant to further assess such actors, and their related interests, from the perspective of:
 - Their working as capacities for peace in a given context (see Step 1 for a definition)
 - Their potential for driving conflict forward, for reasons of self-centered, economic or illegal interests

At this stage, it may be useful to understand better some of the short-term dynamics that may result from self-centered interests openly or covertly expressed by specific actors. Further assessing the impacts or reactions that such self-centered interests may cause in other groups could therefore consolidate the analysis of actors. This is further visualized in Table 3 (consolidated).

Table 3 (consolidated): Actor Analysis Matrix (consolidated)

Actor	Interests	Capabilities	Impacts/Reactions
International:			
Regional			
National			
Sub-national			
Local			
Etc			

1.4 Step 4: Conflict Dynamics

Objective: To better understand the conflict dynamics in a given setting.


Step 4 aims to look at conflict dynamics in a given society, in order to provide a multidimensional understanding of conflict. It helps considerably in identifying where the response should focus and leads more directly to strategic and coherent conclusions. In this sense, it will bring together various elements identified in Steps 1-3 of Stage 1. These include:

- The *set of key issues* identified in Step 2, through an analysis of conflict causes and an understanding of key linkages
- The various *capacities for peace* identified in Steps 1 and 3
- An understanding of some of the impacts/reactions identified in Step 3

In particular, it is important to note that Step 4 primarily looks at the *causal* interaction between the above components, in order to get a sense of the overall conflict dynamics. It is not concerned with scenario building that is focused on time-bound interaction (see Step 5).

Step 4 also aims to visualize such causal interactions, as suggested by Fig 4.

Figure 4: Conflict in Nigeria and its background



Looking at Conflict Dynamics

- The starting point for this step is to go back to Steps 1, 2 and 3 of Stage One, in order to revisit the following components:
 - The *set of key issues* identified in Step 2, through an analysis of conflict causes and an understanding of key linkages.
 - The various *capacities for peace* identified in Steps 1 and 3.
 - An understanding of some of the impacts/reactions identified in Step 3.

Key pointers:

- Conflicts are multi-dimensional phenomena and cannot be understood in terms of one single cause, as they result from a complex interaction and overlap of various factors. For instance, ethnicity in itself may not be a problem unless it is linked to economic inequality. In this sense, the objective of this step is to understand the way in which potential causes of violent conflict become interconnected and in which such interaction may lead or not to the emergence of violent conflict, or the resumption thereof.
- The above components can be visualised into a blank paper, in order to start look at their causal interaction (which can be represented by a series of arrows). In particular, one could start with the initial understanding of key linkages and connections undertaken in Step 2.
- Key questions in this process include:
 - To what extent do key issues reinforce each other?
 - To what extent are key conflict issues neutralised or mitigated by some of the capacities for peace identified in Steps 1 and 3?
 - To what extent do some of the impacts/reactions identified in Step 3 reinforce key conflict issues?
 - To what extent do some of the impacts/reactions identified in Step 3 minimised by the capacities for peace identified in Steps 1 and 3?

1.5. Step 5: Scenario building

Objective: To develop scenarios and better understand possible conflict trends

The final step of Stage One is to look into scenario building, in order to better anticipate possible conflict trends. On the basis of the conflict dynamics identified in Step 4, this step aims to better understand possible conflict developments *over time*.

In particular, this step starts with the identification of more immediate events, or triggers. These can be described as events or processes some of which can, with vigilant monitoring, be anticipated or foreseen (e.g. build up of small arms, growing discontent in the military, increasing civil action, elections). Other refer to more sudden events (e.g. coup attempts, sudden change of government, assassination of key opposition leader, etc) that may not be easily anticipated.

Examples of Triggers
Elections, arrest/assassination of key leader or political figure, drought, sudden collapse of local currency, military coup, rapid change in unemployment, flood, increased price/scarcity of basic commodities, capital flight, etc.

On the basis of the conflict dynamics (see Step 4) and possible triggers identified in the course of Step 5, a number of scenarios are developed for a given setting. These are visually in the following format (see Table 5).

Table 5: Conflict Scenarios

Scenarios	Key Features	Benchmarks/Indicators
<i>Worst-case scenario</i>		
<i>Status quo scenario</i>		
<i>Best-case scenario</i>		

Using Table 5

- The starting point for Step 5 is to identify possible triggers in a given context, through group brainstorming. At this stage, it may be the case that events or processes that can be foreseen or anticipated will be identified. It may be useful to look at the history of a particular setting in order to identify other possible triggers (e.g. tradition of coup d’etat, etc).
- On the basis of the conflict dynamics identified in Stage 4, as well as the above triggers, a number of scenarios can be developed. Traditionally, scenarios focus on three main strands of project over time. They include:
 - Worst-case scenario: describing the worst possible outcome.
 - Status-quo scenario: describing the continued evolution of current trends.
 - Best-case scenario: describing the optimal outcome of the current context

STAGE 2: ANALYSIS OF CURRENT RESPONSES

Stage 2 will now focus on the analysis of current responses in a given setting, in particular from the perspective of development interventions. In particular, the aim of this stage is to build on the conflict analysis (see Stage One) in order to further assess responses of a wide range of actors, including development organizations, and their impact in relation to conflict.

Key steps in undertaking Stage 2 are summarized below. They combine a comprehensive mapping of current responses with a focused assessment of the impact of development work (a) in relation to conflict and (b) in support of peace processes.

Overview of Stage 2

Step	Activity	Purpose
1	Table 4: Current Responses	To map out current responses in a given setting, in particular in relation to the key issues identified in Stage 1.
2	Table 5: Development and Conflict	To assess the extent to which development work seek to address structural causes of violent conflict
3	Table 6 (OPTIONAL): Development and Peace Processes	To assess the extent to which development work positively supports peace processes

2.1. Step 1: Current Responses

Objective: To map out current responses in a given setting, in particular in relation to the key issues identified in Stage 1.

This step will present a comprehensive overview of ongoing responses in a given setting, as undertaken by a wide range of actors, including development organizations.

Step 1 is not limited to development work, as it aims to provide the context within which the role of development and its interaction with conflict can be further assessed. Taking a broader perspective is important at this stage in order to assess the overall impact of current responses (of which development is one part) on the dynamics of conflict, including from the perspective of *coherence* and *complementarity*.

Within this framework, responses have been defined as encompassing both:

- **Current interventions** (e.g. activities, programmes) in relation to a given setting;
- **Specific concerns** that actors may have in relation to a given setting, but which have not necessarily translated into concrete interventions.

The mapping of ongoing responses will be visually captured in the form of the *Current Responses Matrix* (see Table 4). This directly builds on the thematic categories used for analysing causes of violent conflict (see Stage 1, Matrix of Conflict Causes), in order to ensure a direct linkage between conflict assessment and the development of strategic and programmatic responses (see Stage 3). For a definition of the categories used, please refer to Stage 1, step 1.

Table 4: Matrix of Current Responses

	Security	Political	Economic	Social
International				
Regional				
National				
Sub-national				
Local				

Using the Matrix of Current Responses

- A list of current responses is generated through brainstorming among participants. More information may also be collected through background documentation (see Directory of Resources) and consultation with other key stakeholders.
- Responses that have been identified are mapped out on the Matrix, in relation to (a) the range of issues they aim to target and (b) the level at which they are implemented. Further information on the organizations sponsoring as well as implementing such programs and initiatives may also be added to the Matrix. They typically include: donor agencies, regional organizations, targeted sections of national government, local government, civil society, grassroots organizations and local communities. The specific activities and concerns of women should always systematically be considered.
- At this stage, it is also important to further focus on the set of key issues identified in Stage 1, in order to assess the extent to which these are currently addressed through programming. Similarly, emphasis should be placed on identifying the extent to which such programming builds on the capacities for peace identified in Stage 1 (see steps 1 and 3).
- Finally, it may also be useful to further reflect on the level of coherence and complementarity of these responses, across the various sets of issues and levels of implementation, as well as within individual actors and between actors. In particular, it may be relevant to explore these issues from the perspective of the UN overall engagement in a given context.

2.2. Step 2: Development and Conflict

Objective: To assess the extent to which development work explicitly addresses conflict

Within the context of the overall mapping of current responses (see step 1), this step will further focus on development, in order to examine the extent to which *development work* is aligned to conflict. In particular, it will seek to assess:

- Whether development actors recognize conflict as an issue;
- Whether they maximise their impact on conflict.
- Whether there is a potential for a sharper focus on conflict.

Although conflict is generally recognised as an obstacle to development, many organisations may not see a role for development in directly addressing it. It has nonetheless often been found that ignoring conflict may indirectly contribute to further exacerbate conflict dynamics. For instance, development organisations that ignore the ethnic composition of their projects may be further exacerbating ethnic tensions. Similarly, deciding to work in areas away from the conflict zones may be contributing to regional tensions.

It is therefore important to assess the approach of development organisations to conflict, using the following categorisation²⁸.

- **Working around conflict:** Treating conflict as an impediment or negative externality that is to be avoided, so that development programmes continue without being negatively affected by conflict.
- **Working in conflict:** Recognizing the link between development programmes and conflict and making attempts to mitigate conflict-related risks so that development work is not negatively affected by, or have an adverse effect, on conflict dynamics. This is also known as the *Do No Harm approach*²⁹.
- **Working on conflict:** Making deliberate attempts to design development policy and programmes that seek to exploit opportunities to positively affect conflict dynamics and address structural causes of violent conflict.

Further information on the key assumptions and possible strategies associated with these approaches can be found below. In particular, it is important to note that this terminology should be understood less in terms of its geographic relevance (i.e. relationship between the location of development programming and conflict-affected areas), as compared to assessing the stated intention and actual implementation of specific development programs in relation to conflict.

	Working around	Working in	Working on
Assumptions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Conflict is a disruptive factor, over which little influence can be exercised. ▪ Development programmes can continue, without be negatively affected by conflict. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Development programmes can be negatively affected by, or have a negative impact on conflict dynamics. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Development programmes can maximize opportunities to positively affect conflict dynamics
Possible strategies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Withdrawing from or keeping out of conflict affected areas ▪ Continued work in low risk areas on traditional development activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reactive programme adjustments in medium and high risk areas ▪ Minimizing the potential for programs to do harm. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Refocusing programmes onto the structural causes of violent conflict ▪ Design new programmes that focus on addressing structural causes of violent conflict

Table 5 summarizes the approaches of key development actors to conflict in a given setting. In a workshop situation, it may be recommended to integrate the above assessment directly into Table 4 (e.g. through use of color-coding).

²⁸ See Goodhand (2001)

²⁹ Mary Anderson initially developed the Do No Harm terminology. See Anderson (1999).

Table 5: Development and Conflict

Around	In	On

Using the Development and Conflict Table

- The starting point for the *Development and Conflict Table* is the mapping of current responses, where a number of development activities have already been identified. It may also be important to include collaborative processes, such as the CCA/UNDAF and PRSP, which may not have necessarily been mapped in the process of Step 1.
- The various development activities are further assessed in Table 5, in relation to their approach to conflict (i.e. working around/in/on conflict), in order to examine the extent to which the impact of development on addressing conflict is being maximised and whether there is a potential for a sharper focus on conflict.

Key pointers:

- The assumption behind understanding the approach of development programming to conflict is *not that activities identified as working around or in conflict are necessarily inappropriate, irrelevant or harmful*. Step 2 limits itself to understanding the relation between development programming and conflict and does not aim to assess the overall relevance of specific initiatives.
- In order to assess the approach of development programs to conflict, it is important to look both at the stated objectives of specific projects and their actual implementation. Development programs may indeed intend to address conflict (i.e. thereby working on conflict), while a further assessment of their implementation may indicate that, despite the original objectives, they may be contributing to fuel conflict. For further guidance, see Program Review, Chapter 4 on CDA applications.
- At this point, it is also important to consider whether development programs working on conflict focus on the set of key issues (step 2) and conflict dynamics (step 4) identified in Stage 1.

2.3. Step 3: Development and Formal Peace Processes

Objective: Determine whether development positively supports formal peace processes

Within the context of the mapping of current responses (see step 1), this next step also focuses on development activities, with a view to assessing the extent to which they explicitly support peace processes. Please note that **this step should primarily be undertaken in situations where formal peace processes are underway.**

Within this framework, formal peace processes refer to negotiation processes that are recognized by the parties to the conflict and are often carried out by outsider mediators. In particular, the following channels and/or mechanisms typically support peace processes:

- **Track One:** Official negotiation and diplomacy carried out in support of the peace process.

- **Track Two:** Informal and other non-government processes carried out by unofficial third party mediators and facilitators that may feed into or be complementary to Track One diplomacy.
- **Track Three:** Development programming in support of the peace process, as undertaken through Tracks One and Two.

While Tracks One and Two are well-established concepts in the field of conflict resolution, the role that development may play in supporting peace processes (through Track Three) is often overlooked. Examples of Track Three development activities may include:

- Cross-border infrastructure projects that increase communication and co-operation between conflict parties;
- Support to civil society’s role and participation within the framework of Track Two;
- Support to women and other vulnerable groups, in order to ensure that their voice is being heard within the framework of the peace process;
- Local conflict resolution projects.

The main focus will be on Track Three. In particular, it is important to note that Step 3 differs from understanding the approach of development programs to conflict (see step 2), insofar as Track Three development activities will primarily focus on the creation of an enabling environment for peace processes, at all levels. In contrast, development programs working on conflict will aim to explicitly address structural causes of violent conflict.

The various initiatives undertaken in support of the peace process in a given setting will be captured visually in the form of a table (see Table 6), with a particular focus on development activities undertaken within the framework of Track Three. In a workshop situation, it may be recommended to integrate the analysis on development and peace processes directly into Table 4 (e.g. through use of color-coding).

Table 6: Development and Peace Process

Track One	Track Two	Track Three

Using the Development and Peace Processes Table

- The starting point for the *Development and Peace Process Table* is the mapping of current responses, from which initiatives in support of the peace process (within the frameworks of Tracks One to Three) can be identified.
- Activities identified above are further classified according Tracks One, Two and Three with a view to assessing whether:
 - Processes under Track Two could be further strengthened through further development-sponsored programmes;
 - The impact of Track Three on the peace process could be further maximised.

2.4. Conclusion

At this stage, it is recommended to add the analysis undertaken throughout Steps 2 and 3 to Table 4 in order to provide a comprehensive and consolidated analysis of current responses, in anticipation of Stage 3.

Consolidated Table 4: Matrix of Current Responses (completed)

	Security	Political	Economic	Social
International				
Regional				
National				
Sub-national				
Local				

STAGE 3: IDENTIFICATION OF WAYS FORWARD

On the basis of the conflict analysis and the assessment of current responses, the final stage of the CDA aims to identify gaps and to develop strategies, including from the perspective of UNDP. Key steps in undertaking Stage 3 are summarized below.

Overview of Stage 3

Step	Activity	Purpose
1.	Table 7: Identifying what needs to be done	To identify possible gaps and strategies to address them
3	Table 8: UNDP programming strategy	To identify UNDP practical contribution to the strategic objectives identified above, through programming
2	Table 9: UNDP advocacy strategy	To identify an advocacy strategy for UNDP to encourage others to contribute to the strategic objectives identified above

3.1. Step 1: Identifying gaps and related overall strategy

Objective: To identify possible gaps and strategies to address them
--

The first step of Stage 3 aims to match the conflict analysis with the analysis of current responses, in order to identify possible gaps as well as strategies to address them, including from a development perspective.

Step 1 is not limited to development, as it aims to provide a broader strategic understanding of what *needs to be done* in a given context (of which development is one part), on the basis of the conflict analysis and mapping of current responses. In particular, this may include recommendations in relation to:

- The identification of new areas of engagement
- The strengthening of current interventions
- The adjustment of current interventions
- Etc.

This review and related overall strategy formulation will be captured visually, in the form of Table 7 (see Table 7). The Table will provide an overall set of strategic objectives and can be used as a framework from which detailed programming plans could be generated.

Table 7: Identifying what needs to be done (with examples)

	Security	Political	Economic	Social
International	<i>Deploy peace-keeping forces</i>	<i>Balance superpower interests around conflict</i>	<i>Address global trade restrictions</i>	<i>Control external fundamentalist pressure</i>
Regional	<i>Limit incursions</i>	<i>Balance interests of neighbors</i>	<i>Make trade agreements</i>	<i>Provide guarantees to regional minorities</i>
National	<i>Control interests of the military</i>	<i>Improve governance</i>	<i>Control political links to organized crime</i>	<i>Provide guarantees to minorities</i>
Sub-national	<i>Bring warlords into talks</i>	<i>Decentralization</i>	<i>Address regional disparities</i>	<i>Address causes of migration</i>
Local	<i>Address human rights abuses</i>	<i>Limit co-option of local leaders</i>	<i>Micro-finance programmes</i>	<i>Reduce drug-taking</i>

Using Table 7

- The starting point is to link the conflict analysis and the assessment of current responses, i.e. on the one hand, the findings of Stage 1 on key issues, actors, conflict dynamics and capacities for peace (see steps 1-4) and, on the other the consolidated Matrix of Current Responses (see consolidated Table 4).
- In undertaking this process, a number of gaps may be highlighted across Table 7 and serve as a basis for formulating a new strategic framework. In particular, this set of strategic objectives may relate to the need to:
 - Further focus current responses around the set of key issues and conflict dynamics identified
 - Identify new areas of engagement
 - Strengthen selected ongoing responses (e.g. further focus on national capacities for peace, etc)
 - Strengthen coherence and complementarity
 - Etc

3.2. Step 2: Programme and advocacy strategy for UNDP

Objective: Identify key elements of UNDP strategy, from the perspective of both programming and advocacy

Within the context of the overall strategic framework identified in Step 1 (see Table 7), this step will further focus on identifying key elements of UNDP's specific strategy, from a programming and advocacy perspective.

3.2.1 Programming Strategy

The aim of this step is to identify the objectives that UNDP is well suited to take up as programmes. In particular, it is important to define UNDP programming strategy in relation to such issues as:

- Mandate
- Comparative advantage
- Funding and other resources
- Decision-making processes and procedures
- Etc.

This nonetheless does not mean that UNDP's practical contribution to the strategic objectives identified in Step 1 cannot reflect innovative thinking and creative programming. To this end, it may be recommended to undertake a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) type of analysis, in order to establish more clearly what appropriate objectives to take on would be.

UNDP's programming strategy will be summarised in the form of Table 8. In particular, it is important to note that the above strategy may include both:

- The design of new programs
- The review of ongoing programs

For more information on program design and review, please go to Chapter 4 on CDA applications.

Table 8: UNDP Programming Strategy

	Security	Political	Economic	Social
International				
Regional			<i>Development of regional resources</i>	
National	<i>Review Security Sector Reform</i>	<i>Support anti-corruption programme</i>		<i>Work with government on protection of minorities</i>
Sub-national		<i>Decentralization programme</i>	<i>Area-based development programme</i>	
Local			<i>Micro-finance programmes</i>	<i>Strengthen women's leadership</i>

3.2.2. Advocacy Strategy

The aim of this step is to identify a strategy for UNDP aimed at encouraging other actors to take up some of the strategic objectives highlighted in Table 8. In particular, this may involve:

- Identify areas for which specific actors have indicated positive interests, or for which they have a comparative advantage (see Actor Analysis Table and Matrix of Current Responses)
- Consider what mechanisms UNDP may have available to influence others in order to promote the strategic analysis. These might include:
 - Regular meetings with government
 - Donor coordination meetings
 - UN Country Team meetings
 - NHDR
 - PRSP
 - Etc

It is important to note that, if undertaken in a participatory manner, the process itself of undertaking the analysis can help generate a constituency, as well as a platform on which to base the advocacy strategy. The compilation of the findings into a report and its strategic dissemination to selected stakeholders can prove a major advocacy tool.

The advocacy strategy can be summarized visually in the form of Table 9.


Table 9: UNDP Advocacy Strategy

Objective	Who	Mechanism/Activity	Expected Outcome
<i>Protect minorities</i>	<i>Government dept</i>	<i>PRSP</i>	<i>Legislation</i>

ANNEX 1:



EARLY WARNING & PREVENTIVE MEASURES (EWPM), UN SYSTEM STAFF COLLEGE

Within the framework of the EWPM workshop, the iceberg analogy is used in order to further differentiate between proximate and structural causes of violent conflict³⁰. In particular, the iceberg approach will help “dig” deeper and identify the underlying structural causes of conflict.



CCA/UNDAF

In the process of the CCA/UNDAF, emphasis is given to the analysis of the root causes of development challenges³¹. In particular, this step uses the problem tree approach in order to identify and differentiate between different contributing causes and examine the linkages among them. The same model could be used to identify potential causes of violent conflict and their further differentiation between proximate and structural causes.



³⁰ For more information, please go to: <http://www.unssc.org/unssc1/programme/earlywarning/>

³¹ CCA/UNDAF Integrated Guidelines, May 2002.

Part 4

Possible CDA Applications

This part describes possible applications of the CDA, which can be summarized as follows:

- Input into the CCA/UNDAF process
- Conflict-related programme planning
- Conflict-related programme review
- Early warning
- Input into NHDR
- Input into PRSP

It also spells out some further potential applications that could be developed in the future, namely in relation to:

- Regional Conflict Analysis
- Integrated Risk Analysis

1. Proposed Applications of the CDA

1.1. UN Country Strategy: CCA/UNDAF

One of the main reasons for CDA is that, according to UN policy, conflict analysis should be integrated into strategic planning. The Integrated Guidelines³² for the UN Common Country Assessment (CCA) and its implementation document, the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), indeed state at the outset that the purpose is *'to support development and the reduction of extreme poverty, into which peace-building and conflict prevention strategies should be integrated.'* As a minimum, the CCA/UNDAF is required to make a contribution to crisis prevention and to post-conflict recovery and rehabilitation³³.

The need to examine the structural causes of poverty is emphasized throughout the Guidelines and the UNDAF is specifically required to include *'support for peace-building.'* While there is a reference to the need to analyze trends that might result in man-made (as well as natural) disasters, no methodology is specified.

The UN Secretary-General has required the UN Development Group (UNDG) to *'ensure that prevention and peace-building concerns are integrated into those processes'*. The UNDG is now in the process of finalizing a Guidance Note on integrating conflict into the CCA/UNDAF process. It will refer to the difficulty of instituting rigid procedures because so much depends on the attitude of the national authorities and concludes that *'while taking these factors fully into account, the Country Team should discuss with national authorities as appropriate how UN assistance and support could enable national authorities to prevent conflict and ensure sustainable development.'*

UNDP staff have observed that time is a severe constraint in the CCA/UNDAF process. The specific advantages of CDA in relation to CCA/UNDAF are that it is output-oriented process that primarily focuses on development. In this sense, a two-day workshop with knowledgeable participants could provide a valuable input into the country strategy development. Such a process can be organized in a participatory manner, in order to increase the engagement of government and other stakeholders. A longer process may also be necessary in places, where such a basis of consensus does not exist or where a more challenging approach is needed to change stereotypes.

In its current form, the CDA process provides participants with a strategic analysis which focuses on both key issues to be addressed in a given setting, as well as a set of strategic objectives, from which specific programming and advocacy initiatives can be developed from the perspective of UNDP. If CDA was being used explicitly to support the CCA/UNDAF process, there could be greater focus on UN organizations in the analysis of current responses (Stage Two), especially in looking at Table 4. In the concluding section (Stage Three), an intermediary step could be to create a strategic framework that would reflect a wider group of UN organizations.

1.2 Conflict-related Programme Planning

Because it is unlikely that a conflict analysis does not result in the need to identify new ways forward, programme planning has been integrated into the design of CDA.

³² UN (2002)

³³ Ibid p8

After completing the CDA process, practitioners will come to an understanding of key set of objectives, rather than full programme plans. These will need to be elaborated further from objectives into activities, outcomes, indicators etc. If the CDA process is conducted jointly with donors, government and other key stakeholders many of the questions about official approval and funding resources will already have been addressed.

In conflict situations it is usually necessary to address several different areas, notably governance, civil society development and socially-based initiatives, in a framework of responses rather than a single project. UNDP's experience also supports the view that the framework derived from CDA is likely to be an integrated set of interventions at national, sub-national and local levels rather than a single project.

1.3. Conflict-related Programme Review

Another major use of CDA is to review the extent to which development programmes are conflict sensitive, in particular by comparing the outcomes of the CDA with a specific project or programme³⁴.

In particular, the above review will try to focus a set of key questions, such as:

- Is the project relevant to the key causes of violent conflict (as determined in the CDA)?
- Is it focused sharply on key conflict issues?
- Does it have preventive capacity in relation to the dynamics?
- Is it coherent with other?
- Does it maximize the impact of development on conflict?
- Does it 'do no harm'?

In other words, attention will be placed on the following:

Relevance to the causes of conflict: The first step is to see whether the aims and objectives of the project relate to the strategic framework generated by the CDA process (Table 8).

Focus:

- Does the project focus on the key issues (Section 1.2.)
- Does it work 'Around', 'In' or 'On' conflict? (Section 2.2.)
- Could it focus more sharply 'On' conflict?

Preventive capacity:

- Does the project have an impact on the dynamics of conflict?
- More specifically, does it limit the interests (as identified in Stage 1) that may be driving conflict?
- To what extent does the project address the conflict dynamics (identified in Stage 1)?
- Does the project address key scenarios (Section 1.4.)?

Do no harm:

- Does the project 'do no harm'?

³⁴ In accordance with the UNDP Manual, projects are assumed to be part of wider programmes and strategies. Distinctions between the terms are kept to a minimum.

This relates particularly to the processes of the project, and should focus on-

- Area of operation
- Choice of beneficiaries
- Choice of staff
- Other critical issues identified in the CDA

Maximizing Impact:

- Does it make the best use of possible partnerships?
- Does it make best use of local capacities?
- Does it contribute to formal peace processes? Could it do so?

Conclusions:

- In what ways could the project be more strategic in relation to conflict?

Fig 1: Example of Conflict-related Program Review

The review of UNDP projects in Nepal (see Part 5) indicated that UNDP was not active in the most conflict-prone areas. Lack of development aid has nonetheless been identified as one of main causes (or pretexts) for conflict, and it might even be said that UNDP was 'contributing' to conflict. In this sense, it was suggested that UNDP needed to adjust their programmes, by reviewing the geographical spread of projects (using data from the NHDR) and differentiating more clearly between social groups both in relation to beneficiaries and to project staffing.

1.4 Early Warning

Despite the emphasis within the UN on preventive action, the development of Early Warning systems has not been systematic. A Review of the regional Early Warning Systems programme in South-Eastern Europe³⁵ describes '*lack of a developed methodology*' as one of the problems leading to poor performance.

The UN Framework Team has drawn attention to the current deficiency and has made some preliminary proposals for generic indicators grouped around the following clusters³⁶, namely:

- Socio-economic conditions
- State and Institutions
- Regional/international dimension
- Security
- Public discourse, ideological factors and elite behavior
- Human Rights and civil liberties
- Actors

CDA includes all the elements proposed by the Framework Team but converts them into a plan for a particular country, making it possible to generate conflict-specific indicators. In particular, stage 1 of the CDA process leads to the production of conflict scenarios, which can be used for the purpose of early warning and the development of specific indicators.

1.5 Input into National Human Development Reports (NHDR)

³⁵ UNDP (2003a)

³⁶ UN Framework Team (2001) Early Warning Indicators/Methodology

Lack of a methodology for addressing conflict has also been a problem, in relation to the production of NHDRs. A recent review indicates that, even in countries that are obviously dominated by conflict, the issue has not systematically been addressed. Even where conflict has been addressed, the lack of an analytical framework has reduced their effectiveness and consistency³⁷.

There are two ways, not necessarily exclusive, in which CDA can be used to support the NHDR. Namely:

- By integrating conflict throughout the report
- By integrating a conflict theme

Integrating Conflict. This process is similar to the integration of conflict into CCA/UNDAF. A CDA process could be conducted in advance of the NHDR process, so that its main outcomes and findings could be integrated throughout the document.

This could be done in a participatory manner, by means of a workshop with the NHDR team and other stakeholders. Unless it is the specific purpose of the NHDR to offer practical solutions, the third Stage of the CDA (Ways Forward) could be omitted. In countries where conflict is a sensitive issue, the language of the methodology can further be adapted in order to focus on issues of social cohesion, or even a 'Development or Human security Review'.

Conflict theme. Stage One of the CDA process, and in particular the analysis of causes of violent conflict, could form the basis for an NHDR conflict theme. While CDA does not assess the impact of conflict on human development, this would probably need to be added in this particular instance.

1.6. Input into Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP)

The PRSP, led by the World Bank, is an important forum for development but a recent (unpublished) DFID study has indicated that conflict has not been properly integrated into it.

UNDP is well placed to focus attention on conflict within the PRSP process. As the CDA is based on a participatory approach, it could contribute to create a platform to discuss conflict-related issues with those involved in the PRSP, including government and civil society.

Of course, sensitivities about conflict should not be underestimated, especially in the context of PRSPs. Governments are understandably concerned that too overt attention to conflict could weaken their standing in relation to international finance, undermine tourism and deter investment. Mechanisms may thus need to be developed in order to respond to local circumstances. In some cases a separate conflict group might be the appropriate way to take forward the integration of conflict perspectives into the PRSP process. In other cases, conflict might be integrated from the start. The language of CDA may need to be adapted to suit different circumstances (see above).

2. Other Potential Applications

³⁷ The 'NHDR Review on Conflict and Conflict Prevention', undertaken by the NHDR Team for Colombia in January 2003, examines twenty NHDRs published from 1995 to 2001. The quality of these conflict inputs and lack of methodology was stated to be an issue of concern.

This section deals with possibilities that have not yet been explored and may require further development. They include:

- Regional Conflict Analysis
- Integrated Risk Analysis

2.1. Regional Conflict Analysis

Although it may seem straightforward to apply the CDA methodology at the regional level (e.g. South Asia, East Europe, West Africa etc), experience suggests that it is not³⁸. The problem is that government is the central actor and governance is likely to be the key issue. Applying the system to groups of governments causes confusion.

Discussion within UNDP suggests that the way forward may be through a ‘cluster’ approach beginning with the smallest possible grouping of countries and then working upwards towards the regional analysis. The case of Nigeria is instructive (see Paper 8). This process (led by the government) was based on five sub-national studies that were brought together in stages into a national analysis.

The DFID analysis of ‘The Causes of Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa’³⁹ is an interesting example of conflict analysis on an even wider scale. Ultimately there must be a question whether Africa can justify a separate set of causes of conflict compared with the Middle East or Asia. But the common history of colonialism does offer a linking factor and unifying theme. Without any such unifying theme such regional and continental analysis would probably be impossible.

In practice, the need for Regional Conflict Analysis arises from the obvious interconnectedness of conflicts in a group of countries –West Africa and the Great Lakes are particularly striking examples. CDA at the country level takes account of regional factors, but the methodological problem in regional analysis is how to take account of variables at the level of national governance. Further experimentation is needed.

2.2. Integrated Risk Analysis

From the perspective of the affected people, the distinction between natural disasters and conflict is often artificial. If houses have been destroyed, it makes little difference whether the cause is fire or fighting. International organizations are also becoming more aware that these distinctions are artificial.

Conflicts and natural disasters are connected in many ways. In Ethiopia during the 1970s, and again in the 1980s, failure to respond to a natural disaster (famine) caused conflict that led to changes in government. Conflict often causes famine, as has also been the case in Ethiopia.

The connections are also structural. By increasing the general vulnerability of poorer people, conflict may exacerbate the impact of natural disasters. At the national level,

³⁸ The attempt to use CDA for regional analysis at a UNDP workshop in Sarajevo in 2003 demonstrated this problem.

³⁹ DFID (2001)

conflict may undermine the ability of the state to respond to natural disasters⁴⁰. There are therefore many interrelationships between natural disasters and conflict. A response to a natural disaster can be used as a way to address conflict issues, achieving access and dialogue with areas that might previously have been at war⁴¹.

Special attention should therefore be placed upon exploring the extent to which conflict analysis and risk analysis oriented to natural disasters could be integrated. The main difficulty may lie in the separation of these issues within both UN and governmental structures. If a human security perspective⁴² becomes more widely accepted, the way may nonetheless be open for Integrated Risk Analysis. For the time being, the best course may be to take full account of natural disasters in the CDA process, particularly in the analysis of causes and conflict dynamics. In planning responses (see Stage 3), a willingness to address natural disasters in conflict prone areas may be introduced as part of the strategy to address conflict (see Nepal case study in Part 5).

⁴⁰ Or possibly increase capacity: there may be more military around to help in disasters.

⁴¹ This was an issue explored during the UN's multi-agency mission to Nepal. Support to the Nepal Red Cross for disaster mitigation could also be part of a conflict reduction programme.

⁴² This refers to a people-centred approach rather than simply using Human Security categories.

Part 5

Case Studies

This part offers selected examples of the conflict assessment processes conducted during the pilot phase (see Part 2 for background information). In particular, each case will be viewed, in relation to:

- Characteristics
- Outputs
- Process
- Summary of conclusions
- Major learning points

Further case-studies will be developed in the future, reflecting on experiences from the pilot phases as well as new initiatives.

Nigeria

1. Characteristics

- The analysis was led by the government, and in particular the Nigerian Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), which is part of the President's Office.
- The objectives in the Terms of Reference included capacity-building for IPCR
- Multi-donor steering group included DFID, UNDP, USAID and World Bank.
- The methodology was adapted from DFID's Strategic Conflict Analysis methodology.
- Each of six zones of Nigeria was studied separately, while the overall process involved six teams.
- Fourteen reports were produced and consolidated into a report published by the Nigerian Government

2. Outputs

Outputs described in the final report include-

- Equipping IPCR with the capacity to train others in conflict analysis;
- Producing many detailed studies of specific conflicts providing IPCR with a database;
- Advising strong focus on prevention and early warning;
- Including an action plan for IPCR and the Nigerian government.

3. Process

The main steps of the Nigerian process are reproduced below. In particular, Figure 1 showing a model of conflict in Nigeria is particularly interesting and may be used in other contexts in order to understand conflict dynamics in a particular setting.

The Tables showing 'Actors and Interests' and 'Strategies and Options' are variations of the steps presented in the CDA approach (see Part 3), but clearly suited the multi stakeholder conflict analysis process undertaken in Nigeria.

Table 1: Matrix of Conflict Causes, Nigeria

	Security	Political	Economic	Social
International /Regional Level	Small Arms Proliferation Oil company involvement in security Foreign mercenaries in the North-East	TNCs influencing politics	Influence of World Bank and IMF towards 'structural adjustment' TNCs fuel corruption	Transnational religious links Refugee influx from Liberia, Sierra Leone, Niger
National Level	Heavy-handed military response Culture of Impunity in military actions	Power struggles Lack of response to Commissions of Enquiry Civil Society not engaged in policy issues	'Dutch Disease' (oil) Distribution of resources Corruption undermines business	Civil society not engaged in national policy issues
State Level	Low capacity and morale of police Involvement of police in conflict and crime	Succession and Dethronement Politics based on money, ethnicity, region and religion	Corruption Distribution of Resources Failure of development programmes Access to Land	Politicization of religious issues (e.g. Sharia) Indigene/Settler disputes Pastoralist/Farmer tensions Money-driven NGOs
Local Level	Vigilante Groups e.g. Bakassi Boys	Political links to gangsterism (Area Boys etc)	Sense of Inequality Protection rackets	Sense of Injustice Drug-taking Prostitution Acceptance of (domestic) violence

Table 2: Actors and Interests

TYPE	Armed Actors	Likely Conflict Causers	Potential Conflict Managers
Security	Military	Police Ex-servicemen	Police (professionalism)
Political/Governance	Thugs	Judiciary Political Opportunists Media	Govt by implementing Commissions IPCR- preventive action National Orientation Agency Conflict reduction organizations
Economic/Resources	Private Security forces and gangs linked to Companies	Development projects Oil company (damage to environment, political involvement etc)	Development planners in Government and international donors (avoid provoking conflict)
Social/Ethnic	Ethnic Militias: e.g. Egbesu Boys, Area Boys (street gangs)	Ethnic Associations Alienated youth	NGOs (especially Women's Organizations)
Social/Religious	Cross-border militants Almajiris ⁴³ Religious Vigilantes (Hisbola etc)	Politically-motivated religious leaders Alienated youth	NGOs CBOs

⁴³ Islamic vagrants. They often move across borders.

Figure 1: Conflict in Nigeria and its background




Table 3: Strategies and Options

	Issues to be addressed	Examples of macro level intervention	Examples of micro level interventions
Justice / Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lawlessness • Political violence (through armed thugs) • Proliferation of small arms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening rule of law and security sector reform • Capacity building support for IPCR • Strengthen customs and border controls 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community Policing • Informal mechanisms for conflict resolution • Strengthening access to justice at local levels
Political / Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corruption / Patronage • Unaccountable politicians • Political exclusion of minorities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Anti-Corruption efforts • Strengthening of democratic institutions • Strengthening of political parties 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen local governance accountability and performance • Electoral support
Economic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Uneven regional distribution of resources • Reliance on oil industry 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Distribute national resources on more equitable basis • Introduce policies conducive to private sector promotion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve infrastructure (roads, electricity) in rural areas • Employment generating activities
Social	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Militant youth • Poor basic services 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved social services (health and education) • Emphasis on democracy in education curricula 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop community programmes • Constructive engagement with youth

4. Summary of Conclusions

Conclusions from the final consolidated report on Nigeria included:

- There has been a common political experience during the years of military rule.
- This has led to a political crisis in which political actions are often driven by self-interest and money (known as 'prebendal politics').
- The nation's dependence on oil revenues from a relatively small part of the country has exacerbated this crisis.
- Conflict represents a serious threat to democracy.
- Until now, government's response to conflict has been limited, in practice, to suppression by the military.
- Civil society (with support from international donors) has been active in research and local peace building but lacks strategic vision and engagement.
- The media have not yet played a constructive role.
- Business leaders and investors have been ignored.
- The result is that government and civil society work in isolation or even in a spirit of mutual distrust.
- Closer collaboration between the parties, led by the government's strategic vision, could unite significant forces to limit violent conflict.
- The development of democracy appears the best long-term protection against the spread of violence in society.

5. Major Learning Points

1. The President's commitment reflected an interest in finding non-military solutions to conflict and to preserving democratic governance. The process of working with government might have been more difficult otherwise.
2. The study was, in effect, a regional conflict analysis. The approach was to build towards a national analysis from the zonal clusters. A similar approach might prove appropriate for a region, such as West Africa.
3. Nigerian academic experts, appointed by IPCR, tended to dominate the process. While this may have produced an output that was grounded in the literature, it may have limited the involvement of others, and points to the importance of getting a correct balance in conflict assessment teams.

Nepal

1. Characteristics

- The conflict assessment was part of a larger multi-disciplinary team involving representatives from UNDP, UNOCHA and DPA. Although the conflict analysis involved issues of concern to all the team members they had not been mandated to take part, and so the process was not necessarily a collective one from an inter-agency perspective.
- The final report was part of a compendium of different reports. Although it had impact on the work of the UNDP country team in Nepal, the opportunity to influence international strategy as a whole was reduced.
- Perhaps the most successful aspect of the process was the application of a strategic analysis to the review of specific development programmes. This resulted in substantial changes to ensure that UNDP followed the principle of 'Do No Harm' and moved as far as possible towards maximizing the impact of its development work on conflict.

2. Outputs

The main outputs included:

- Positioning UNDP in relation to conflict.
- Providing two training workshops that introduced conflict analysis to nearly 100 practitioners in Nepal.
- Undertaking conflict-related programme review, which led to significant change in program location and the selection process for beneficiaries and staff.
- The appointment of a Peace and Development Adviser in Nepal, in order to take the above work further.

3. Process

As indicated in Part 3, the CDA methodology can assist with program review, as programmes, by comparing them with the overall analysis, focusing on general questions about relevance, focus, etc. In the Nepal case, the conflict analysis was used to generate a set of specific questions-

- Is the programme based on a strategic analysis of conflict?
- Does it deliver resources to marginalized groups and women?
- Is the allocation of resources within the programme proportionate to need?
- Does the programme have flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances?
- Does it monitor ethnicity, caste and gender in all activities?
- Does it enable marginalized groups and women can achieve positions of responsibility?

4. Summary of conclusions

The main conclusions were-

- A sharp focus on deprived areas should be matched by greater transparency.
- Programme portfolios should be aligned to direct delivery instead of indirect support.
- Leverage should be used to establish a limit to corruption.

- Ethnicity, caste and gender should be monitored in all programmes.
- Staff development policies should be devised to offer enhanced opportunities to these excluded groups within their organizations.

5. Major learning points

1. A more integrated approach by the multi-disciplinary team could have added weight and authority to the recommendations.
2. The 'critical questions' were a useful tool for the further development of the conflict-related programme review (see Part 4).

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Le Billon, P (2000) *The Political Economy of War: an annotated bibliography*, HPG Report 1, ODI London

Directory of Resources

1. Relevant Organizations

➤ Multi- and bilateral Organizations

Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID)

<http://www.ausaid.gov.au>

CPR-related: Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, Disaster Preparedness, Landmines

<http://www.ausaid.gov.au/human/default.cfm#disaster>

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)

<http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/index.htm>

CPR-related: Peace-building

<http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/peace>

Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network (CPR network)

The CPR Network is an informal network of donor countries and partner UN Agencies dealing with issues of conflict management.

<http://www.cprnet.net>

Department for International Development (DFID)

<http://www.dfid.gov.uk/>

CPR-related: Conflict reduction

http://www.dfid.gov.uk/AboutDFID/Files/conflict_main.htm

Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)

<http://www.gtz.de>

CPR-related: Crisis prevention

http://www.gtz.de/themen/cross-sectoral/english/crisis_prevention.htm

Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs

<http://www.bz.minbuza.nl/homepage.asp>

CPR-related: Peacebuilding

http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?CMS_ITEM=E4DD1BA9301045EEBA1EABB4B3129233X1X53837X84

European Commission (EC)

CPR-related: Conflict Prevention

http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/cp.htm

Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

<http://www.jica.go.jp>

CPR-related: Peace-building

<http://www.jica.go.jp/english/global/eff.html>

Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Utenriksdepartementet)
<http://odin.dep.no/ud/engelsk/dep/index-b-n-a.html>

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
<http://www.oecd.org/home/>
Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
<http://www.oecd.org/dac>
CPR-related: Conflict & Peace
http://www.oecd.org/department/0,2688,en_2649_34567_1_1_1_1_1,00.html

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
<http://www.osce.org>
High Commissioner on National Minorities
<http://www.osce.org/hcnm/>

Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<http://www.um.dk/english/>

Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)
<http://www.sida.se>
CPR-related: and conflict management
<http://www.sida.se/Sida/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=2323&a=17656>
or <http://www.sida.se/Sida/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=2352>

Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)
<http://www.sdc.admin.ch/mainportal.php?userhash=1508936&nav=1,1,1,1&l=e>
CPR-related: Conflict Prevention and Transformation
http://www.sdc.admin.ch/organisation_detail.php?userhash=1508936&l=e&nav=9,13,198,233

UN System Staff College
<http://www.unssc.org/unssc1/>
CPR-related: Early Warning and Preventive Measures
<http://www.unssc.org/unssc1/programme/earlywarning/>

United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
<http://www.usaid.gov>
CPR-related: Conflict Management and Mitigation
[http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/Transition Initiatives](http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/Transition_Initiatives)
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/

World Bank Group
<http://www.worldbank.org/>
CPR related: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction

<http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/67ByDocName/ConflictPreventionandReconstruction>

➤ **Non-Governmental Organizations and Networks**

Conciliation Resources (CR)

UK

<http://www.c-r.org/>

Conflict, Peace and Development Network (CODEP)

UK

<http://www.codep.org.uk/>

European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO)

Belgium

<http://www.eplo.org/>

European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation

Netherlands

<http://www.euconflict.org/>

Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) (network of NGOs, UN agencies and academic institutions from Asia, Africa, North America, and Europe)

<http://www.fewer.org>

Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict Research (HIIC)

Germany

http://www.hiik.de/en/index_e.htm

Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity (INCORE)

UK

<http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/>

Institute for War & Peace Reporting

UK/USA

http://www.iwpr.net/home_index_new.html

International Alert

UK

<http://www.international-alert.org/>

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

Switzerland

<http://www.icrc.org/>

International Crisis Group (ICG)
Belgium
<http://www.crisisweb.org/>

International Development Research Centre (IDRC)
Canada
<http://www.idrc.ca/>

International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC)
Switzerland
<http://www.ifrc.org/>

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
UK
<http://www.iiss.org.uk/>

International Peace Academy (IPA)
USA
<http://www.ipacademy.org/>

Life & Peace Institute (LPI)
Sweden
<http://www.life-peace.org/>

Netherlands Institute of International Relations (“Clingendael”)
Netherlands
<http://www.clingendael.nl/>

Responding to Conflict (RTC)
UK
<http://www.respond.org/>

Saferworld
UK
<http://www.saferworld.org.uk/>

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Sweden
<http://www.sipri.se/>

Swiss Peace Foundation (Swisspeace)
Switzerland
<http://www.swisspeace.org>

United States Institute of Peace
USA
<http://www.usip.org/>

West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP)
Ghana
<http://www.wanep.org>

2. Other Relevant Sources

Alertnet
(Reuters Foundation)
<http://www.alertnet.org/>

Amnesty International
<http://www.amnesty.org/>

Berghof Centre Handbook for Conflict Transformation
<http://www.berghof-handbook.net/cf.htm>

Better Programming Initiative
IFRC
<http://www.ifrc.org/WHAT/disasters/dp/planning/bpi/>

Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee
<http://www.cpcc.ottawa.on.ca/>

Carnegie Commission
<http://www.ccpdc.org/>

Carter Center
<http://cartercenter.org>

Centre for Defence Studies
King's College, London, UK
<http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/rel/cds/resact.htm>

Compendium of Peacebuilding Tools
CIDA
http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/vLUallDocByIDEn/7F13A61F23C3A94D85256B80006D065E?OpenDocument

Conflict Prevention Web
<http://www.caii-dc.com/ghai/>

Conflict sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peace building:
Tools for peace and conflict impact assessment
FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld
<http://www.fewer.org/pcia/>

ConflictWeb
USAID
<http://www.info.usaid.gov/regions/afr/conflictweb/>

Department of Peace Studies
University of Bradford, UK
<http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/peace/>

"Do No Harm" / Local Capacities for Peace Project
The Collaborative for Development Action, Inc. (CDA)
<http://www.cdainc.com/lcp/index.php>

Early Warning System: FAST
Swisspeace
<http://www.swisspeace.org/fast/default.htm>

EurasiaNet.org
<http://www.eurasianet.org/>

Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET)
USAID
<http://www.fews.net/>

Global IDP Project
Norwegian Refugee Council
<http://www.idpproject.org/>

Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS)
FAO
<http://www.fao.org/WAICENT/faoinfo/economic/giews/english/giewse.htm>

Human Rights Watch
<http://www.hrw.org/>

Humanitarian Policy Group
ODI
<http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/>

Humanitarianism and War Project
Watson Institute, Brown University, USA
<http://hwproject.tufts.edu/>

Minorities at Risk Project
Center for International Development & Conflict Management (CIDCM)
<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/project.asp?id=17>

Minority Rights Group
<http://www.minorityrights.org/>

Refugees International
<http://www.refugeesinternational.org>

Refugee Studies Programme
Oxford, UK
<http://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/rsp/>

Reliefweb
OCHA
<http://www.reliefweb.int/>

SEE Early Warning Web Site
UNDP
<http://earlywarning.undp.sk/Home/>