

Thematic Assessment

Towards Peaceful Development: Rebuilding Social Cohesion and Reconciliation

Central Sulawesi and North Maluku

July 2004

This independent report is based on independent assessments by Konrad Huber, Dr. Christian Tindjabate and Darwis Waru (Central Sulawesi) and Rob Watson, Arifah Rahmawati, Yuliaty Umrah, Rasdiana Amaya and Farida Indriani (North Maluku) and does not necessarily reflect the views of UNDP or BAPPENAS.

Preface

The Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit (CPRU) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Indonesia has been working in North Maluku and Maluku over the last three years with a focus on multi-sectoral recovery initiatives to complement the efforts of the Government of Indonesia to support post-conflict recovery, long-term peace-building and sustainable development. UNDP is also developing a three-year programme in Central Sulawesi aimed at supporting the peace process, providing short-term responses to vulnerable communities and working with local government and civil society in the design of the future programme. In all three provinces, UNDP works with provincial and district level partners including Government, UN agencies, international NGOs and civil society organizations.

In 2004, the CPRU commenced a planning process in cooperation with the National Planning and Development Board (BAPPENAS) to identify the key longer-term challenges and opportunities for crisis prevention and sustainable peace in Indonesia's troubled regions. The outcomes of these processes will lead to programme priorities for the next phase of programming in the provinces, as well as a revised strategy and priorities for the Crisis Prevention and Recovery Programme as a whole. These regional analyses have focused on three provinces – North Maluku, Maluku and Central Sulawesi – provinces where CPRU/UNDP has supported programmes since 2001. Each provincial analysis has consisted of three components, specifically (i) a provincial multi-stakeholder workshop, (ii) research consisting of a literature review, local perception surveys and case studies, and (iii) thematic assessment of key aspects of crisis prevention and peace-building that had been identified. The series of provincial level assessments commissioned by UNDP covered the following thematic issues (a) local economic development and natural resource management, (b) local democratic governance, (c) media and information, (d) social cohesion and youth, and (e) women and gender. The main conclusions of these reports are summarized in a synthesis paper, which along with all the thematic reports are available on the UNDP Indonesia website at www.undp.or.id.

This thematic assessment covers the issue of social cohesion, conflict and peace-building in the Poso region, Central Sulawesi and North Maluku. It is largely based on three assessments and reports completed in July 2004. These reports are *Social Cohesion and Reconciliation in Central Sulawesi* by Konrad Huber, Dr. Christian Tindjabate and Darwis Waru; *Social Cohesion and Reconciliation in North Maluku* by Rob Watson, Arifah Rahmawati, Rasdiana Amaya and Farida Indriani; and *Youth in Post-Conflict North Maluku* by Yuliati Umrah. The authors of these reports would like to thank all who assisted with this assessment and gave their time to talk with the team in Central Sulawesi and North Maluku.

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Executive Summary

Conflict in North Maluku and Poso has resulted in the division of society along lines of religious identity. As a result of communal violence and insecurity, communities became physically segregated, utilizing separate public services as well as markets and transportation services. Moreover, the divisions were not simply between Christians and Muslims but were also driven by ethnic identities, especially in North Maluku. The grassroots and middle level groups also have a strong distrust of local elites and government leaders at both the provincial and district levels. Many people feel that the government does not care about the needs of the people and that government is not willing to involve community-based organisations and their leaders in local problem solving, peace-building and development.

Four years on from the start of the conflict, there have been enormous social, economic and political changes. People are beginning to mix more and there are many positive signs of social and economic recovery as well as improving community relations. The formation of the new districts (*pemekaran wilayah*) in both areas presents special challenges and it is important that government and civil society responds effectively not just to the challenges and opportunities of new government administrations but to the significantly more challenging tasks of post-conflict development and peace-building. Although many of those displaced during the conflict have now returned home, there remains a level of suspicion and tension that must be overcome to secure the peace. It will be important that returning minorities are able to feel secure and enjoy the same services and opportunities in these new districts as the majority residents, and feel part of the wider community in these new districts. The strengthening of social cohesion and fostering of good community relations remains a key issue requiring action in North Maluku and the Poso region. Fortunately, there is a range of emergent organisations and initiatives, especially within civil society and communities themselves, which is leading to the restoration and strengthening of social relations and cohesion across North Maluku and the Poso region.

For different reasons, however, external agencies should not simply rush in to provide support to these processes but should play a limited and circumspect role with local government and civil society actors taking the lead. Localities are experiencing their own “organic” processes of demographic remixing, of developing shared “stories” about the causes and effects of recent violence, and of (re)imagining the basis for living together again. It is not obvious how external agencies can further add to these processes. Although external agencies may be able to provide limited assistance to some of the reconciliation groups and forums that are active, there is the danger of generating perverse or unintended effects, namely by “crowding out” genuine reconciliation efforts through the prospect of special funding for such activities. Moreover, the distribution of aid itself has created social tensions in certain areas. Finally, there appears to be little relationship between the “problem” of violence and the “solution” of promoting reconciliation. The causes and drivers of conflict in both North Maluku and Poso have neither been addressed nor have they remained static over the past five years. A lack of social cohesion at the community level has been only one, and arguably a relatively minor, factor predisposing these areas to communal violence.

If external agencies wish to support social cohesion and reconciliation, they should do so through programming that addresses concrete community needs in ways that also bring together key elements of, and thereby strengthen relations among, different ethno-religious groups. Programming should emphasise local analysis, planning and action that has an impact on broader social and economic recovery. For example, the needs of unemployed youth could be better met through vocational training for ethno-religiously mixed groups of young women and men, perhaps through *Balai Latihan Kerja* (Employment Training Centres) at strategic locations. Such an initiative should be based on a sound analysis of labor-market requirements, phased support for small-scale enterprises linked to the vocational training, and fast-track yet inclusive planning processes that encompass prospective beneficiaries and project partners. Project design and management should be explicitly inclusive and

aim to strengthen inter-group cooperation among local elites, such as government officials, religious figures, and community leaders. In addition, limited focused support to community-level reconciliation efforts grounded in a more in-depth analysis of the needs and capacities of such localities may be an option. On a very low-cost and targeted basis, assistance could help fund the training of community leaders, sponsor participatory planning events, and/or remove or overcome certain material obstacles identified through this process. The impact of such reconciliation efforts on conflict and its attendant violence is likely to be modest. Finally, support for the use of media, both broadcast radio and more “narrow-cast” publications and videos, as a means for prompting interaction and discussion among conflict-affected communities about their needs and aspirations would potentially be useful and cost-effective. It should be emphasized that such media programming is no substitute for addressing communities’ concrete needs but rather a means of supporting and multiplying the impact of successful programming to other realms.

1. Introduction

Conflict and violence have major impacts on society, deepening social divisions and often resulting in the physical segregation of communities. Support for peace in a divided post-conflict society clearly requires not only an understanding of the causes of conflict, but knowledge of what brings people and communities together. In short, agencies aiming to support peace must develop an understanding of what builds social cohesion in a divided society. This assessment considers the issue of social cohesion in Central Sulawesi and North Maluku, two provinces in eastern Indonesia that are recovering from recent social conflict and violence, in order to contribute to the formulation of future strategies to support peace and development in these provinces.

This report sets out the findings and recommendations of these assessments focusing on social cohesion in North Maluku and Central Sulawesi and a third assessment focusing on youth, social cohesion and peace-building in North Maluku.¹ The report presents recommendations to strengthen and rebuild social cohesion in the province through possible projects and crosscutting ideas for social cohesion work within other thematic issues such as governance, economic development and employment.

1.1 Definitions

Social cohesion has been described as the glue that bonds society together, promoting harmony, a sense of community and commitment to promoting the common good.² It is assumed that social cohesion is a basic

prerequisite for any society.³ Conflict, on the other hand, is a dynamic and influential process that revolves around contradicting issues (the underlying conflict situation), negative attitudes (the parties' perception of each other and of themselves) and coercive and violent behaviours (the actions between parties).⁴

There is no universally agreed definition of social cohesion, and policy statements, analytical studies and specific assessments have typically adopted their own definition. For example, the Council of Europe defines social cohesion as "*the capacity of a society to ensure the welfare of all its members, minimizing disparities and avoiding polarization. A cohesive society is a mutually supportive community of free individuals pursuing these common goals by democratic means*".⁵ In contrast, Ritzen et al. (2000) focus more on the social capital aspects of social cohesion, defining it as "*a state of affairs in which a group of people (delineated by a geographical region) demonstrate an aptitude for collaboration that produces a climate for change*".

A review of four policy documents from the French and Canadian governments, OECD and Club of Rome highlights five main dimensions of social cohesion that include (i) *belonging- isolation* (shared values, identity, feelings of commitment), (ii) *inclusion - exclusion* (equal opportunities of access), (iii) *participation - non-involvement* (in political, economic, social and cultural life), (iv) *recognition - rejection* (respecting and tolerating differences in a pluralist society) and (v) *legitimacy - illegitimacy* (with respect to institutions acting as a mediator in conflicts of a pluralist society).⁶ This review identifies two societal goal dimensions of social cohesion.

¹ Konrad Huber, Christian Tindjabate and Darwis Waru conducted the social cohesion assessment in Central Sulawesi (15-22 March 2004); Arifah Rahmawati, Rob Watson, Farida Indriani, Rasdiana Amaya and Ronald Tadubun conducted the social cohesion assessment in North Maluku (12-29 May 2004); Yuliaty Umrah, Siti Barorah Sinay and Joan Do Anas conducted the study on youth in North Maluku (15-22 March 2004).

² Nat J. Colletta, Teck Ghee Lim, Anita Kelles-Viitanen, *Social Cohesion and Conflict Prevention in Asia: Managing Diversity through Development*, (Washington D.C.: The World Bank) 2001, p. 2.

³ Sharon Siddique, "Social Cohesion and Social Conflict in Southeast Asia" in *Ibid.* p. 18.

⁴ Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization* (London: Sage, 1996).

⁵ European Committee for Social Cohesion (2004) *Revised Strategy for Social Cohesion*.

⁶ Berger-Schmitt (2000) *Social Cohesion as an Aspect of the Quality of Societies: Concept and Measurement*. EuReporting Working Paper No 14.

The first concerns the reduction of disparities, inequalities and social exclusion, while the second focuses on the strengthening of social relations, interactions and ties, covering much of the same conceptual ground as that of social capital.⁷

Building social cohesion is an important element of peace-building and development in post-conflict societies, where peace and development initiatives must influence social dynamics to bring about positive change. Such change might include a de-escalation of violence, more positive attitudes of people and groups in society and initiatives aimed at transforming the issues deemed to be at the core of the conflict. An explicit focus on building social cohesion can help develop trust, inter-group association and networks of communication among divided groups in conflict. The results of building social cohesion in an area such as bridges of cooperation and the development of common interests and understanding can themselves potentially serve as the basis for mechanisms for conflict prevention, recovery and sustainable peace.

In particular, young people and youth are arguably the most important group in relation to social cohesion, conflict and peace.⁸ In situations of armed conflict, youth are a prominent group owing to their specific vulnerabilities. *“Perhaps most importantly, adolescents are at a stage in their development when, for the first time, they are actively seeking to attach meaning to their lives. Failure to provide adolescents with a positive and productive sense of purpose during the*

*upheaval of armed conflict leaves them despairing and vulnerable to those who would seek to manipulate them, pulling them into the conflict and exploiting and harming them in other ways.”*⁹ Young people and youth require special consideration in discussions of social cohesion, conflict and peace.

1.2 Objectives and Approach

The primary objective of this assessment is to understand better the community-level dynamics that strengthen or undermine social cohesion and the prospects for peace and reconciliation in North Maluku and the Poso area. This inquiry was also intended to identify concrete opportunities for supporting “pro-peace” dynamics, in particular those that have previously escaped the attention of external agencies. Specifically, this assessment aimed to:

- Identify the current patterns and nature of social segregation and cohesion and to analyse the linkages between these and conflict/peace dynamics in each province
- Map key institutions, issues, networks and individuals who contribute to social cohesion and reconciliation with specific attention being given to women, young people and community leaders
- Identify potential approaches and partners for strengthening social cohesion including capacity building
- Provide recommendations and options (focus, priorities, entry points, strategies, activities and potential partners) for programming to strengthen intra and inter-community/group bonds and informal mechanisms to resolve disputes, build trust and thereby increase community resilience to violent conflict in these provinces.

At the outset, social cohesion was defined by the assessment team as being seen in terms of *trust* and *association* between and among disparate groups. Honesty and fairness were seen as the key aspects of trust. Villagers, village and district leaders, and NGO staff were interviewed about their perceptions of a range of different players with influence on conflict and social cohesion. Associations among and between villages were observed

⁷ Ibid; also see Ritzen et al. On “Good” Politicians and “Bad” Policies: Social Cohesion, Institutions and Growth. World Bank. Jo Ritzen, William Easterly, and Michael Woolcock (September 2000) Policy Research Working Paper 2448.

⁸ The United Nations defines youth as people between the ages of 15 and 24 years, an age group that covers the important years of the transition from adolescence through to adulthood. The United Nations General Assembly defined ‘youth’, as those persons falling between the ages of 15 and 24 years inclusive. However, the operational definition and nuances of the term ‘youth’ often vary from country to country, depending on the specific socio-cultural, institutional, economic and political factors. Within the category of “youth”, it is also important to distinguish between teenagers (13-19) and young adults (20-24), since the sociological, psychological and health problems they face may differ. See www.un.org/youth.

⁹ The Women’s Commission (2000) ‘*Untapped Potential - Adolescents Affected by Armed Conflict*’.

such as the existence of primordial ties (ethnic, religion, family), constructed association (formal and informal organisations, reconciliation efforts) and citizenship (*ikatan warga kampung*, etc.).

North Maluku

In deciding the districts for the study, the assessment team received inputs from the Provincial Peace and Development Analysis Working Group (*Pokja*) in North Maluku. In particular, the *Pokja* raised the issue of social jealousy caused by the current pattern of interventions in the province, which are concentrated in North Halmahera and which has a Christian majority. The *Pokja* was concerned that this would generate suspicion and further tensions within the province. It was suggested that the assessment also covered the south of the province, specifically South Halmahera, which would provide new information and a more balanced picture of post conflict development needs in North Maluku province.

Based on the considerations above, the team selected the following places for the assessment:

- Ternate District is the capital of North Maluku province and was a central focus of conflict in the region. Ternate was one of the places that mass mobilization, on both ethnic and religious grounds, was centered during the conflict in 1999 – 2001. South Ternate and North Ternate sub-districts were visited during the assessment

- North Halmahera District was a major area of conflict with the initial outbreak of conflict in sub-districts Kao and Malifut in August 1999 between the Kao and Makian ethnic groups. By the end of the year, conflict spread up to Tobelo and Galela sub-districts and had transformed into conflict between religious groups. The initial conflict in this district contributed to the conflict in Ternate, which then had a wider influence on the others areas of North Maluku including Tobelo and Galela. Tobelo town, Galela, Kao and Malifut sub-districts were selected for the assessment

- West Halmahera District has also seen a variety of post-conflict recovery and reconciliation interventions targeting youth in the three main sub-districts of Jailolo, Sahu and Ibu. There was significant violent conflict in

this district but not to the same degree as in North Halmahera and Ternate. Of interest in West Halmahera is how reconciliation efforts were initiated by the grassroots in order to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs). People originally from Sahu were the first group who returned to their own village independently. Jailolo and Sahu sub-districts were visited during the assessment

- South Halmahera District experienced only limited violent conflict, although a significant number of IDPs originated from the district, especially Bacan island. There was limited information concerning youth in South Halmahera during the conflict to post conflict period, possibly due to the isolation of the area and the limited impacts of the conflict in comparison to other areas. Central and East Bacan sub-districts were visited

- East Halmahera District was included as a district that did not experience much violent conflict. The analysis here is based on secondary data collected in South Maba sub-district.

The team went to three villages in each sub-district. The villages were selected on their religious composition: Muslim, Christian and mixed religion. The team found only a few religiously mixed villages in Ternate City, Galela, Sahu and Jailolo. In each village the team conducted individual and group interviews with youth, community (including women), and religious leaders, and whenever possible, the team met with the head of village, sub-district and district.

The youth component of the assessment in North Maluku collected information through interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs) and mini-workshops.¹⁰ The FGD's addressed the (i) background to conflict in North Maluku, (ii) the role of youth during the conflict and post-conflict periods including peace-building, and (iii) their hopes for the future. After a series of FGD's had been held, the results were discussed with a range of participants to get some feedback through a mini-workshop. These participatory processes aimed to empower the participants in terms of providing

¹⁰ FGD is the process of collecting information on attitudes and opinions based on full participation by people who are affected by specific problems and issues.

an opportunity for reflection and learning, especially on their involvement in various processes.

Central Sulawesi

In consultation with local stakeholders, the field team selected six sites for an in-depth examination of community-level dynamics and their impact on peace and conflict. These six locations were:

- Tambarana-Trans (Poso Pesisir, Poso District) is a village that has not experienced large-scale violence despite proximity to conflict area and mixed ethno-religious composition

- Saatu (Poso Pesisir, Poso District) experienced violence in 2000-2002, recent attacks in October 2003 and returns of IDPs from both Muslim and Christian groups

- Matako (Tojo Barat, Tojo-Una Una District) village saw residents forced to flee due to nearby and small-scale violence in 2000-2002. Both Muslim and Christian IDPs have now largely returned

- Tentena (Pamona Utara, Poso District) did not directly experience large-scale violence, but it was the principal receiving area for 10,000s of Christian IDPs from Poso Pesisir, Lage and Tojo sub-districts

- Pendolo (Pamona Selatan, Poso District) experienced smaller-scale, largely non-lethal violence

- Beteleme (Lembo, Morowali District), despite its mixed ethno-religious composition, experienced no violence until October 2003.

In each of these locations (and adjoining or nearby locations, where relevant), the team interviewed a broad cross-section of local residents, including government officials, religious leaders, teachers, vendors, young people and IDPs. Interviews - either singly or in larger groups - were carried out without a strictly formal structure but nonetheless sought to identify community-level dynamics related to communal violence and/or social cohesion and reconciliation. A special effort was made to understand the roles and needs of young people. In addition, the team interviewed a number of more prominent leaders who play a broader role, whether formally or informally, in inter-group relations and reconciliation at the district level.

2. The Social and Conflict Contexts of North Maluku and Central Sulawesi

Social cohesion in North Maluku and Poso exists within a specific social context that is distinguished by each region's history, its social diversity and the recent experience of violence and social conflict. The nature of the conflict, the intensity and extent of the violence and associated events will strongly influence the relationship between social cohesion, conflict and peace. This section of the report briefly charts the social and demographic setting of North Maluku and Central Sulawesi and relates this to the experience of conflict and efforts to facilitate reconciliation.

2.1 North Maluku

Social Diversity and Population

North Maluku's 700,000 people comprise over one hundred different indigenous ethnic groups. Prominent ethnic groups for which there is some idea of number include Sula (9.5%), Makian (9.1%) and Galela (7.9%), however, more than half of the population is simply classified as 'other' in officially released data.¹¹

Communities in Halmahera have experienced a long history of resettlement for development, with some of the present-day villages being newly formed over the last hundred years. Local migration, especially by Makian, Bacan, Tidore and Sanana people, has led to communities now being more mixed across the province.

People have also migrated from outside North Maluku in search of new opportunities. Transmigration has brought settling Bugis, Javanese, Sundanese (West Java), Gorontalo, Buton, and Minang communities. As the migration of Javanese and Sudanese was supported and sponsored by the government, they tend to live in specific villages in rural areas whereas migrants from Bugis, Gorontalo and Minang are mostly traders who mainly live in the cities. Meanwhile, people from Buton are mostly farmers who tend to settle in rural areas of Obi and Bacan islands. In 1990,

migrants from Ambon, Manado and Sangir began to settle in North Maluku as they were attracted by economic opportunities, mostly in Southern Ternate. Groups from Ambon were both Christian and Muslim, whereas the groups from Manado and Sangir were mostly Christian.

The people of North Maluku are predominantly Muslim (85%) with almost all of the remainder being Protestant. According to the 2000 Census, most of the Christians are found in the former district of North Maluku, principally in the areas around Tobelo and Kao. The culture of North Maluku reflects a mix of local customs and the influence of the four Islamic Sultanates in the province, namely the Sultanates of Ternate, Tidore, Bacan and Jailolo. Many of the communities in northern Halmahera, including Christian ones, acknowledge the position of the Sultan of Ternate and that their right to use land originated from the Sultan, administered through a local chief or *sangaji*. Before the conflict, ethnic identity was strong, and in many cases, stronger than religious identity, with families sometimes having both Muslim and Christian members.

Conflict Dynamics in North Maluku

The communal conflict in North Maluku spread rapidly from village to village within the space of a few months, although the dynamics underpinning conflict in North Maluku differ from area to area and even, at times, from village to village. The dynamics of the conflict shifted very quickly from ethnic tension over land to an inter-religious conflict, which mobilised more popular support. Aside from the popular view of the conflict, within the elite level of society there was a struggle for political power.

The escalation of the conflicts in North Maluku and the underlying issues can be divided into three main phases as follows:

- August 1999 - Conflict over division of land and the new sub-district of Malifut in Kao. Violent conflict in North Maluku started in August 1999 as a result of ethnic tension, land disputes and the redrawing of local

¹¹ Population of North Maluku, Census 2000, Central Office of Statistics (BPS).

boundaries without any consultation with the people it would affect. The new sub-district, Malifut, was intended to provide a specific sub-district for the Makian people, who were displaced from their previous homes and moved to Kao more than 25 years ago because of the threat of a volcanic eruption. In this case, local Kao people believed that the Makian people were receiving preferential treatment, and five villages that traditionally belonged to the Kao *adat* authority were incorporated into the new Malifut sub-district with fears of a hidden 'Islamisasi' agenda (the Makian are Muslim while Kao are mostly Christian). The Kao people also complained about the naming of the new sub-district as they believed that their local culture and practices would not be respected. The presence of a newly opened Australian-run goldmine caused further resentment as Makian people reportedly gained more employment compared to the local people of Kao, Modole and Jailolo. In August 1999, a fight broke out between youths that resulted in the death of a Makian youth. Makian and Kao youth fought running battles between villages and particularly Makian people and their houses were targeted. The Kao/Malifut conflict was not an inter-religious conflict – mostly Makian houses were targeted, no mosques were destroyed and both Muslims and Christians participated in attacks against the Makian people in Malifut. Violence again flared up in October 1999 leading to the displacement of the majority of the Makianese to Ternate.

- Early November 1999 – 'Yellow' and 'white' forces in Ternate and Tidore fight for political supremacy at the provincial level. With thousands of people fleeing from Kao/Malifut to Ternate in October 1999, the conflict spread to other areas and developed along inter-religious lines. With the backdrop of conflict in Ambon and Kao/Malifut, attacks occurred in Tidore and Ternate.¹² In Ternate, the military and 'yellow forces' loyal to the Sultan of Ternate protected Christians, which led to the outbreak of conflict between the 'white' and 'yellow' Muslim forces. The 'white forces' consisted of ethnic groups of Tidore, Makian, and migrants from Gorontalo in north Sulawesi, while the 'yellow forces'

included supporters of the Sultan of Ternate and Christians from Halmahera. After the Sultan of Ternate surrendered, the lines of battle were drawn between Christian and Muslims. The outbreak of violence in one part of the province directly influenced conflicts in other parts, especially through the recruitment of combatants and the displacement of minority groups from their homes to areas where they were a majority. The 'religious card' was used on both sides to galvanise support, although land disputes, political struggles and other local issues strongly informed the division of communities against each other.

- Late November 1999 onwards - Inter-religious conflicts spread through North Maluku. Village fights against village, IDPs flee and villages are burnt in West, Central and South Halmahera. Violence in the Halmahera area was preceded by the rumour that Jihad forces had arrived in Galela and that an attack on villages in Tobelo was imminent. This led both groups of villagers to prepare to defend their properties. Violence and destruction spread to villages in other parts of North Maluku such as Bacan, Obi, Morotai, Ibu, Sahu and Jailolo. In Jailolo, for example, violent conflict erupted where previously Muslim and Christian villagers lived side by side harmoniously. People here refer to pressure from 'outsiders or provocateurs', who intimidated them to attack other people or villages of different religions. As people prepared to defend or attack other villages, a series of attack and counter-attacks ensued. This pattern of war (attack and counter-attack) and the deference paid to the role of outsiders - without giving details of who, or from where - has been told by people, both Christian and Muslim, in almost each region in North Maluku. East Halmahera district is the only district that did not experience violence despite many villages being a mix of Christian and Muslim residents.

- Creating The Peace: The violence in North Maluku led to a major security operation to restore order in 2000. The army played the lead role primarily through the *Satgas* (Task Force) of mostly Javanese soldiers from outside the province. The *Satgas* played an important role soon after the violence ended including the facilitation of local peace agreements, formation of local reconciliation

¹² This letter is widely believed to be a forgery aimed at inciting violence.

teams and the return of IDPs. The army was supported by the police, in particular the police Mobile Brigade (*Brimob*). The security, emergency and post-conflict recovery responses managed to end the violence, meet the basic needs of many of the displaced, repair part of the destroyed infrastructure and, by 2004, return the majority of the displaced.

Displacement and IDP Returns

The conflict in North Maluku led to the displacement of almost 300,000 people, over one-third of the province's total population of 794,000 people. The process of displacement and return marks a major experience of the conflict for many people in the province and is likely to have had a major influence on attitudes in post-conflict North Maluku. Most displacement in North Maluku occurred in the final quarter of 1999 as the conflict spread across the province. In general, those displaced were minorities in the particular areas where they lived, with Christians fleeing Muslim majority areas such as Ternate and Bacan, and Muslims fleeing Christian majority areas such as Tobelo. This pattern was repeated across all areas of North Maluku affected by the conflict leading to an almost complete segregation of religious communities by mid-2000. Christians from Bacan fled to Bitung, Manado, Seram, Tual, Samlaki and Sorong, while Muslim migrants returned to Java, Buton and other areas from where they had originated.

Roughly two-thirds of the displaced relocated to just four areas – Ternate (Muslim IDPs), North Sulawesi (Christian IDPs), Tobelo (Christian IDPs) and Jailolo (mixed). While the numbers of IDPs in other areas was relatively small, in some sub-districts such as Galela, Gane Timur, Loloda, Kao/Malifut and Sahu, displaced people accounted for more than half the total of the resident population. Although almost all areas of North Maluku were in some way affected by the conflict, in terms of displacement, greater levels of displacement occurred in the northern areas.

Relatively soon after the violence had receded, the first returns of IDPs were initiated by the government working closely with the army and local reconciliation teams at the end of 2000. Return was relatively slow in 2001 and much of 2002, but proceeded much faster in 2003, presumably as a result of both the

improved security conditions as well as the government's policy on IDP returns beginning to show results. The majority of people displaced in North Maluku are likely to have been displaced for a period of about two years or more. Future programmes to build post-return social cohesion in North Maluku should target the three main districts with returning residents – North Halmahera, West Halmahera and South Halmahera.

2.2 Central Sulawesi (Poso)

Social Diversity and Population

The total population of Poso prior to the division of the district in 2003 was 275,974 people in 68,151 households. The district of Tojo-Una Una (113,756 people) was formed from the northeastern portion of Poso, leaving Poso with a population of 162,218. In Poso district, Muslims (57.2%) and Christian Protestants (40.2%) are the two dominant religious groups with small Catholic (2%) and Hindu (0.5%) minorities. Within the district, Poso town has a majority Muslim community and Tentena has a majority Protestant community. While these areas had somewhat mixed communities prior to the conflict, they are now almost entirely religiously segregated. Indeed, there was a significant amount of segregation across the district prior to the conflict with 10 of the 17 sub-districts of the former Poso district in 2002 having a religious majority of either Muslims or Protestants of over 80 percent.

In terms of ethnicity, the population is chiefly made up of Kaili, Pamona, Ta'a, Gorontalo, Bare'e, Bugis, Bada, Togian and Javanese people. Mapping of religious communities has shown that Muslim communities reside in the coastal areas such as Kota town, Poso Pesisir, Ampana town and Ampana Tete. Christian Catholic and Protestant communities live mainly in the mountainous and other areas aside from the coasts. There is also a significant presence of Balinese Hindus because of transmigration schemes in Poso District.

Conflict Dynamics in Central Sulawesi

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A brief overview of the conflict's chronology helps to provide a picture of the conflict's dynamics as well as its proximate and underlying causes. This report adopts the common convention of describing the violence in terms of five phases:

- Phase 1: December 1998 - Outbreak of Violence - On 24 December 1998, a brawl between a Protestant and Muslim youth broke out in Poso that quickly took on religious overtones in the days that followed. Religious leaders from both groups banned alcohol as it was Ramadan, and some Muslim groups began their own vigilante seizures, which led to clashes between Protestant youths defending the Christian Chinese shops selling alcohol. On a wave of rumors of church burnings, the conflict rapidly escalated involving Christian and Muslim youths from several nearby districts, with militia from the Central Sulawesi Youth Movement (*Gerakan Pemuda Sulawesi Tengah*, GPST), armed with machetes and hundreds of Muslims from other parts of Central Sulawesi, arriving by truck and leading to violent clashes that left more than two hundred people injured, approximately four hundred Protestant and Catholic homes burned and scores of Protestant and Catholic stores destroyed.¹⁴

- Phase 2: 16 April - 3 May 2000 - Second Outbreak of Violence. The tensions between Protestants and Muslims were set off once more a year and a half later by another incident between two youths. In response to the knifing of a Muslim youth, a mob of Muslims searched for the Protestant youth and began to destroy Protestant and Chinese homes, causing many to flee to the hills. *Brimob*, the riot control police unit (mobile brigade), was summoned by the Poso police to stop the burning of Protestant homes and churches. In the process of temporarily halting the burnings, *Brimob* shot and killed three Muslims, further incensing Muslims and leading to their recall back to Palu. After the *Brimob* left Poso, house burnings resumed and the violence escalated further. Ultimately, the

violence was stopped by the mobilization of six hundred soldiers from Makassar. The second phase of conflict left at least seven killed, 38 injured, roughly 700 Protestant and Catholic homes destroyed and 4 churches burned. No one was prosecuted during the violence in Phase 2.

- Phase 3: May 23, 2000-July 2000 - Christian Retaliation. The first two successive phases of violence and a perceived lack of effective justice were followed shortly after by the third phase in which many more Muslims were killed. In this phase roughly a dozen Christian 'nijas' attacked Muslims in a targeted raid against those they attributed with much of the previous violence. Three Muslims were killed by the group and the church to which the group fled was burned down. Various episodes of violence broke out between Christians and Muslims, including an incident at a transmigration village near Kilo Sembilan (which was a site of migrant Muslim vs. indigenous Christian tensions from transmigration). In this incident, many Muslim men from the village were killed (even after surrendering) and women subjected to sexual violence and held for several days with the children. Various other attacks on Muslims occurred throughout this period, ultimately leading to the deaths of between 300 and 800, mostly Muslims. The fighting was brought under control after the military sent 1,500 additional soldiers, ten tanks and a combat unit to the area in addition to *Brimob* forces from Java.

- Phase 4: July 2001 - December 2001. The lack of an earnest reconciliation effort contributed to ongoing low levels of violence, until members of the militant Muslim group Laskar Jihad arrived. Fighting became increasingly well organized with more potent weapons involved, reportedly including automatic weapons. In contrast to Phase 3 in which many more Muslims had died, the entrance of Laskar Jihad led to more Christian deaths and many internally displaced persons. In the beginning, the government did nothing to prevent Laskar Jihad from becoming involved in the violence, even meeting with provincial and district officials after arriving. Laskar Jihad coordinated with local Muslims to burn Christian villages to the ground one at a time. The violence was ended by a new infusion of police and military troops. This

¹³ Based on Central Sulawesi PDA Report, UNDP Jakarta.

¹⁴ GPST was revived from a Pamona militia from the 1950s.

phase saw increased violence that pitted the police and military against Laskar Jihad and Muslim fighters. Two incidents in Mapane and Toyado occurred in which the security forces were accused of retaliatory human rights violations, rather than upholding the rule of law. During this phase, at least 141 were left dead, ninety injured and over 2,400 houses razed.

- The Malino Declaration and After. In December 2001, Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono initiated the joint military-police Security Restoration Operation (*Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan*), which had three stages of 1) ending the violence, 2) expelling outsiders, confiscating weapons, and carrying out legal actions, and 3) rehabilitating damaged infrastructure and reconciling communities. At the same time, the National Human Rights Commission (*Komnas HAM*) with top security and cabinet officials began initiating the Malino peace process on December 19-20, 2001. Representatives of both religious communities were quickly chosen by leaders of each side, which reflected the geographic, ethnic, professional and thematic complexity of the conflict. The agreement that emerged from the process consisted of ten key points which were intended to address mostly the proximate causes of the violence by deferring to legal procedures, recognizing pre-conflict rights and ownership, returning IDPs and rehabilitating infrastructure. Following the declaration, a period of weapons confiscation and security deployments, in addition to the overall weariness of the violence, helped to maintain basic security. An emphasis on follow-up led to the creation of the *Pokja Malino*, the working groups that would monitor and help implement various aspects of the Malino Declaration. Working groups were created at the provincial, district and sub-district levels on areas such as in security, law, mental and spiritual rehabilitation, economic rehabilitation, physical rehabilitation, IDP repatriation, and education and health. These were later reduced to the following thematic working groups: peace and reconciliation, economic rehabilitation, education and spiritual welfare. Since the declaration, the greater presence of security forces and conflict fatigue has changed the nature of violence, forcing it underground. Instead of pitched battles among communities,

violence tactics have shifted to targeted terror methods. Many outsiders have left (following the dissolution of Laskar Jihad). However, mysterious bombings and shootings have been ongoing. In October 2003, masked gunmen killed thirteen in Poso and Morowali and in March 2004 an attack on a church left a one person dead.

IDP Returns

Poso and the conflict-affect parts of the new districts of Morowali and Tojo-Una Una have experienced a dramatic improvement in the security situation over the last two years. This improved security situation has facilitated the return of significant numbers of IDPs who had earlier fled their homes. This process of residential segregation has left certain localities religiously homogeneous, for example Tentena, which experienced an influx of Christians and the departure of virtually all of its Muslims. Poso town, by contrast, witnessed the opposite leaving it exclusively Muslim. Other localities have seen greater returns and are now largely mixed. On a day-to-day basis, transport moves freely throughout the area, and individuals, whether vendors, shoppers, or other short-term visitors, generally feel fully comfortable in the “other” area. Though some 40 people have died in targeted attacks since late 2003, local security forces and government officials were successful in capturing most if not all of the alleged perpetrators and preventing retaliatory violence at the community level. IDP returns, which were already slowing down, have more or less halted. In many of these cases, however, remaining IDPs may have decided, or are likely to decide, not to return to their former residences. Though not out of the question, it appears unlikely that large-scale violence and displacement will resume in the short-term.

“Macro” Reconciliation

In many respects, the underlying causes of the conflict were not resolved through the Malino Declaration, although the genuinely more peaceful context appears largely to be robust. Tensions along ethno-religious lines could also arise from ongoing debates about the location of the capital for the new district of Morowali and/or the creation of new province of East Sulawesi encompassing the eastern half, and most violence-affected part, of Central Sulawesi Province. A number of

interlocutors referred to a “latent” potential for renewed conflict. For example, though not currently given much profile, Christian Pamona still perceive themselves as the victims of political and economic marginalization. Though briefly raised during the Malino negotiations, no sustainable solution has been found for the filling of important district government positions, whether through rotations or power-sharing arrangements.

A sense of unfulfilled entitlement, perhaps most significantly among Christian Pamona elites, is further reinforced by the creation of the new district of Tojo-Una Una in early 2004. This now decreases the Christian portion of Poso District’s population to about 30 percent since Morowali was already split off in 2000. Similarly, no significant changes in Poso’s political economy have occurred to offset Christians’ sense of economic marginalization and alienation from what they perceive as their ancestral lands. Government assistance flowing to Poso as a result of Malino is being embezzled by various groups, which at times can be identified along ethnic, religious, and/or regional lines. These grievances are accompanied by complaints from both Muslims and Christians that law enforcement and the administration of justice has been applied leniently toward members of the other group. Both groups feel victimized by the violence and unsatisfied - in certain important respects - by the judicial system.

3. Social Cohesion in North Maluku and Central Sulawesi

It is clear that violent conflict has resulted in the loss of social cohesion among the people and communities of North Maluku and Central Sulawesi. Less obviously, it is apparent that the nature of the impacts on social cohesion and its resilience varies from village to village and is dependent on a range of factors. This section of the report considers how the conflict influenced social cohesion in different parts of North Maluku and Central Sulawesi and how communities are working to restore it. It paints a picture of the diversity of experience and potential for strengthening social cohesion, recovery and reconciliation in the future.

3.1 Social Cohesion and Segregation in North Maluku

Generally, North Maluku is marked by social segregation rather than cohesion. Through the use of religious identity during the conflict, religions have been polarised and religious identity has hardened on both sides. In general, people are confident that violent communal conflict will not re-emerge again in North Maluku in the foreseeable future. Respondents gave the example of the latest violence of April 2004 in Ambon, which did not raise tensions in North Maluku.¹⁵ In particular, the Government of North Maluku held a provincial-level dialogue, an important proactive action that played an important role in reducing tensions and preventing conflict.

In villages in Ternate, where both religious groups lived together before the conflict, they are now divided. In Ternate, there is a strong distrust of the youth, a result of previous conflict where certain youth acted as provocateurs and combatants. In the case of Tobelo and Galela sub-districts, for example, people spoke of high levels of trust, association and joint activities before the conflict, but social relations and trust are no longer as before even though many displaced people have returned to their homes. Sports, for example, soccer in Jailolo and volleyball in Kao / Malifut, were popular forms of cross-community association but unfortunately these

associations were discontinued after the conflict. Interestingly, in villages where adat or traditional customary law remains strong, such as in many *adat* villages in Sahu and Jailolo sub-districts (West Halmahera), trust and inter-group association can still be found and social cohesion has been maintained even after the conflict. Customary (*adat*) mechanisms tend, however, to have their limitations and only work for internal community matters.

Evidence from those met during the assessment in these three districts, indicates that there is a lack of integration upon returning and that the building of social relations between groups involved in the conflict has not received sufficient attention. As one experienced community worker put it, “*things look normalised in most places, but it is not back to normal*”. IDPs have, on the whole, returned to their areas, but often they moved to neighbouring villages of the same religion, and public facilities such as schools are now effectively one religion, where previously they were mixed. Social problems have developed with returning IDPs, which cause tension, particularly if they are of a different ethnic or religious culture.

The variation of the impact of North Maluku’s conflict on social cohesion from one place to another demands a closer examination. The following sections provide a more fine-grained view of social cohesion in each of the areas visited by the assessment team in order to understand better the impacts of the conflict and efforts for recovery and reconciliation.

Ternate City

Relationships between the Ternate and Makian ethnic groups were good before the conflict. During the conflict in Ternate, almost all combatants were youth. Adults, especially those respectful of *adat*, were not really involved. Many Makian people did not support the conflict and regret the Makian involvement. Moreover, they believe that political issues were the main reason for the conflict and that people misused the issue of Makian / non-Makian as well as Muslim-Christian identity. After the conflict, there is increased mistrust of the Makianese in Ternate, although Ternate

¹⁵ The main reasons given were that people are tired and not convinced that violence will help them in any way.

people do have personal relationships with Makian friends and trust them on an individual level. People had various experiences during the conflict that largely inform the level of trust between Muslims and Christians in Ternate city. In Kotabaru village, for example, Muslims protected Christian, while in Sulamadaha, South Ternate, all Christians were moved to the public health centre (*puskesmas*) after their homes were destroyed.

Although people of different ethnic and religious groups may have trust at the personal level, people tend to avoid questions about group identity and the 'other' (for example, Muslim, Christian, white, yellow, red), which indicates that trust and social cohesion is limited at the community or group level. Christians in Ternate tend to be careful to answer questions about social cohesion and conflict as they still feel in a vulnerable situation. Women and elders are afraid to be questioned about their religion and feel insecure and as yet there is no initiative to rebuild places of worship, so that people use public buildings such as the police and military bases. Ternate City government has acted as facilitator for reconciliation in some villages, which has been successful in opening communication. However, people believe that the daily activities of people in Ternate City is the best mediator for a reconciliation process, and that reconciliation should happen naturally within the community instead of being pushed by external actors. Activists and NGOs are concerned that the current situation in Ternate is not sustainable and that the government needs to solve the problem of IDPs, poor governance, lack of economic opportunities and unemployment among youth.

Kao – Malifut Sub-District

There is a high level of mistrust and tension between the people of Kao and Malifut. Internally within the Kao community, the relationship between Muslims and Christians is stronger after the conflict as they view the problem as being with the Makian people in Malifut rather than based on religion. The Kao people do not talk about 'islamisation' any longer but they still complain about the naming of the new Malifut sub-district and its villages. However, the status of the five villages, which are formally in Malifut sub-district, is still unclear and the people of Malifut are starting to

put pressure on the people of the five villages to choose which sub-district they will belong. An indication of this was a case of a woman from one of the five villages who was reportedly discriminated against when seeking health care. One Malifut community leader is concerned with this issue and worries that it can generate more tension within the area.

Access to employment in the local goldmine is another issue where the local Kao people see the Makian newcomers receiving preferential treatment. This has fuelled resentment and influenced social relations in the area. The goldmine has responded by providing development funds for the community, which will be utilised under the auspices of 'Team 13', a group drawn from both Kao and Malifut youth (25 - 38 years old). The team has already received three billion rupiah (approx. US\$350,000) from the company and people now are talking about how they will use the funds. People from Kao hope that the funds can be used to reconstruct the electricity infrastructure, while the Malifut people want to use the funds for the reconstruction of school buildings and their facilities. Fortunately, the team agreed to distribute 2 billion rupiah to Kao sub-district and another 1 billion rupiah to Malifut sub-district.

Access to Employment and Social Cohesion

In Tobelo, more than four hundred people work loading ships at the port. Sixty percent of them are local people from Tobelo, while the remaining forty percent are former IDPs who had fled to Morotai, Tobelo Selatan, Weda, Galela and Loloda. As a result of the conflict, total activity at the port has decreased from a daily average of 250 tonnes of goods per day being loaded and unloaded to just 30 tonnes per day. As a result, the port only employs one hundred workers on a daily basis, while the rest of the workforce work just twice a month. However, those workers who work on a daily basis are mostly local Christians from Tobelo, while many of those working twice a month are Muslim workers, who feel discriminated against. Although the port could be an area where Christians and Muslims work together, fostering friendship and improved community relations, the current state means that the port is a cause of social tensions rather than social cohesion, which should be dealt with by the Port Authority.

The assessment was unable to find many inter-group associations or groups existing within the two communities before conflict

started on 1999. The only association that was mentioned by a youth leader from Kao was an annual volley-ball competition, but this stopped when the conflict started. One of the community leaders who was interviewed said that there was strong reluctance to sit together.

Tobelo – Galela Sub-Districts

Although people can move freely between Galela and Tobelo, there is clearly tension between Muslims and Christians. In Tobelo city, daily activities may cover the underlying mood yet people say they feel the tension when they go out from the city. One Christian leader in Soakonora village of Galela sub-district indicated that although he can go to his fields (*ladang*) and work there in this Muslim village, he does not want to rebuild his house yet as he still feels insecure. In Duma village, a farmer told the assessment team that he felt safe to return to his village although he has only made a few contacts with local farmers, who rarely make contact with him. Another farmer recounted how before the conflict he had been helped by a local organization that introduced him to new methods of agriculture, whereas another farmer from the same village but of a different religion complained that he had not been provided with any support. This perception of support for only one group in the community and not another was a deep source of resentment and tension.

In Galela and Tobelo, the military and local government set up a reconciliation team consisting of community and religious leaders to facilitate reconciliation. The reconciliation team was said to use a top-down reconciliation approach as the leaders met, took decisions and only then did they disseminate these to the villages. The reconciliation team works well to stop the fighting but it is not yet certain if it will generate trust among the people. The reconciliation team also tried to use the symbol of an *adat* house as a medium to unite people, but plans to build an *adat* house representing the unity of the people has yet to be completed. Overall, building social cohesion remains a priority in the Tobelo / Galela area.

Jailolo and Sahu Sub-Districts

The situation in Jailolo and Sahu sub-districts was marked by a certain level of trust and cooperation, which has been regenerating through daily and economic activities. In Sahu,

traditional customary (*adat*) and family ties act as the medium for social cohesion within and between villages. Associations, particularly religious, *adat*, sports and youth associations, do exist. There are some inter-group associations that exist within the villages including those based on religion, *adat* and youth, which continue with routine activities. However, there is a strong anti-Makian feeling amongst local people. The Makian are in a dominant position in the new district government and people demand more opportunity for local people to govern themselves. A key issue for peace-building and reconciliation is the reconstruction of public facilities such as schools and places of worship. Potential actors for peace-building and reconciliation are *adat*, religious (priests and imam), youth and community leaders. *Adat* and control by the Ternate Sultanate is a potential conflict prevention mechanism.

The ethnic identity of Sahu has tied the people of Soakonora village together as one family across religious identities. Soakonora is an *adat* village of people from the Sahu ethnic group, which is allied to the Sultanate of Ternate. It consists of four hamlets (*dusun*), two Christian hamlets (Soakonora and Jati) and two Muslim hamlets (Kusumadehe and Hatibicara). Before the conflict there were a few Christian families in Hatibicara hamlet but after the conflict they moved to Soakonora hamlet. Houses, public buildings and places of worship were destroyed during the conflict and government support has enabled roughly 75% of houses to be rebuilt, although not other community infrastructure such as schools. People are developing trust through daily contact and dissemination of the ideas of the 'one family' and *adat*. Both Christian and Muslim people are aware of the role of the 'outsider' to provoke them to fight during the conflict, and they are confident that they cannot be provoked again in the future, although they have not yet developed any mechanism to support this. Youth are now playing an important role in regenerating trust and friendship through sport and art activities. In Forniti, another *adat* village with a strong Sahu ethnic identity, the *adat* institution (*sabua*) and mechanisms work well to manage and control the village and people are confident that they can prevent conflict or fighting in the future.

In Tacim, an *adat* Muslim village under the Sultanate of Ternate, the people did not feel safe or trust their neighbouring Christian villages at the beginning of the return process as their houses and belongings had been destroyed. But through daily interaction and continuous dissemination of ideas about the 'one family of Sahu', the people began to develop trust between each other. However, there is no single reconciliation process where people can talk freely about their anger, hate, and fear. The head of Tacim village is a woman who has been head of the village for 12 years. She shows that there is no taboo for women to participate in social and political life as long as they have the capacity.

In contrast to Soakonora and Tacim, people from the ethnically mixed transmigration village, Acango, see the village government as the only institution that can solve disputes. Migrants in Acango came from Java, Tondano, Sunda, Palu, Gorontalo as well as other parts of North Maluku. Associations consist of PKK (Family Welfare Programme), *Karang Taruna* youth groups and religious groups. A strong sense of trust exists among people within the village as they have solidarity as migrants. But the Acango people still fear their neighbouring villages as Acango is not an *adat* village and does not have any traditional or family ties with its neighbours. Therefore they can only hope that the government and security forces ensure their safety and security.

South Halmahera District

In South Halmahera, most people have returned to their villages and Muslim and Christian people go about their daily business in mixed areas. In Labuha, there is a new market being built that allows easy access for traders and buyers from both communities, highlighting the importance of spatial planning and public space for social cohesion. It was not clear to what extent market traders from both communities were using this new facility, and it was reported that Christian traders tended to sell goods to Muslim market traders in a single transaction rather than spending time at the market selling direct to consumers. In coastal villages, fisherfolk were still not prepared to travel far from the village when fishing and although they could travel freely around the sub-district, they had limited contact with people from other villages.

Despite this sense of normality on the surface, it is clear that in many areas tensions and trauma are still affecting people as they tend to see the other religious group as "the other side". In Obi, women are afraid to mention the names of those involved with the conflict as they think the police will capture them and bring them to Ternate. Interestingly, the team also found many examples in South Halmahera of where local Muslims and Christians had helped each other during and after the conflict. For example, Muslims in Bacan protected their Christian neighbours during the conflict, facilitated in part because they had made prior agreements not to attack each other. Ultimately, it was pressure from outsider groups that led to the attacks, which caused relatively few deaths but saw much destruction of property and displacement.

Family ties can also have a strong influence on social cohesion. Lata-lata, for example, is an *adat* village where local people live as an 'adat family' of both Muslims and Christians with strong kinship ties that cross religious identity. During the conflict, Christians fled to the forest and some Muslim families fled to Ternate. After about one month, the Christian people returned to the village with the help of a Muslim village leader as they were needed to help with the harvest. On their return they converted to Islam, but the cross symbol and Christianity is not taboo any longer so that some have since reconverted to Christianity, while about 20 families have remained with Islam.

South Maba Sub-District

South Maba is a sub-district of East Halmahera, itself a new district that was previously a sub-district in the former Central Halmahera district. The area is rich with natural resources including mining, forestry and fishing but has poor infrastructure making travel and transportation difficult both by road and sea. Under the control of the Sultanate of Tidore, two ethnic groups, the Maba and Buli, dominate South Maba's population of just 9,215 people. The Maba are predominantly Muslim, while the Buli are Christian. Both use different languages but can understand each other. The sub-district consists of nine villages, seven Muslim villages and two mixed villages. In the mixed villages, the main village (*desa induk*) is Muslim and Christians and Muslims

live in separate hamlets (*dusun*). In Bicoli village live migrants from Papua, descendants of slaves of the Tidore Sultanate, and who are marginalised as the lowest class and excluded from being community leaders.

There was no direct conflict in South Maba sub-district, in part because the area is remote and difficult to reach. At the time of the conflict, Muslims protected Christian areas from outside Jihad forces because of strong adat relations between Christians and Muslims in South Maba. The head of villages are *adat* leaders, who played an effective role to prevent violent conflict in the community as they reminded people that they are one family under the *adat* of the Sultanate of Tidore. Nevertheless, South Maba is not without conflict and tensions. Natural resource issues and disputes over land and compensation payments are an important issue and there is considerable resentment caused by nepotism in civil servant recruitment following the formation of the new district government. Mining is also an important source of employment, providing an estimated 6,400 jobs in a district of just 60,000 people. However, it is thought that only one-third of these jobs are filled by locals with the majority of the mine workers coming from outside the district. There is a need to address these tensions and *adat* and economic associations present the greatest potential for strengthening social cohesion in South Maba.

3.2 Social Cohesion and Segregation in Central Sulawesi

Two years since the Malino Declaration, various forms of day-to-day interaction, associational ties and explicit “reconciliation” efforts have begun restoring social cohesion in conflict-affected communities throughout Poso, Morowali and Tojo-Una Una districts. Nonetheless, a number of localities remain significantly divided along ethno-religious lines. This section illustrates the patterns and nature of social cohesion in the locations visited during the assessment.

Poso Pesisir Sub-District

Tambarana-Trans is a transmigration village situated between Tambarana proper and Tomora along the Trans-Sulawesi highway

along the coast of Poso Pesisir sub-district.¹⁶ It has approximately 1,400 inhabitants, 95 percent of whom are migrants from Java, Bali and Jakarta with the remaining 5 percent being local Keili, who are both Christian and Muslim. Together with two neighboring villages, Tambarana-Trans has successfully resisted large-scale violence since the start of the conflict, which is probably a result of its early history in 1980 as a transmigration site where settlers used *gotong royong* (mutual self-help) to clear land for rice cultivation and to construct the village’s irrigation system.

A key organization in the Tambarana area is the FKAUB (*Forum Komunikasi Antar Umat Beragama* or Inter-Faith Communication Forum). FKAUB has played a crucial role in solidifying local opposition to outside provocation or attacks and in resolving local issues that could lead to internal conflict. A group of 13 prominent local figures, led by the head of Tambarana’s Muhammadiyah chapter, established the Forum. FKAUB has since formalized its structure, which in Tambarana-Trans includes the village head, the *Babinsa* (village non-commissioned officer in the army) and two prominent leaders from each of the three religious communities (Muslim, Hindu and Protestant). Since its inception, FKAUB has had to deal with serious provocation, small-scale disputes and tensions, and has sponsored various activities to facilitate social interaction between residents from different backgrounds in surrounding villages. Many houses in the three villages also feature FKAUB signboards with pro-peace slogans. Impressed by FKAUB’s success in and around Tambarana, the local military commander introduced this structure in other villages around Poso. However, this proliferation of FKAUB used a top-down fashion that did not fully correspond to local requirements elsewhere.

Due to long hours in the rice fields, villagers are not able to spend much time on many organizational or recreational activities that bring the various groups together. Nonetheless, there is an active system of five farmers’ groups (*kelompok tani*), which each comprise about 25 members from different

¹⁶ Together with four other villages, these three villages are to be regrouped in a new kecamatan, Poso Pesisir Barat.

ethno-religious groups. Market days are Wednesday and Saturday, but to date there has been no emergence of a local shopkeepers' or market vendors' organization. There are some *arisan* (informal revolving funds) groups among Muslim women and church groups for Christian women, but secular women's groups such as the government-supported *Program Kesejahteraan Keluarga* (PKK, Family Welfare Programme) or quasi-official youth groups such as *Karang Taruna* have not been active. For young people, the main opportunity for interaction seems to be sports. Every afternoon, local youth play soccer, volleyball and badminton on local fields. According to a teenage girl, there are no real "hang-outs" for young people, and friends meet on the street or at each other houses. The nearby beach, fishing pier, and hot springs are all key recreational sites on Saturday evenings and Sundays.

A contrasting situation to Tambarana can be found in Pinedapa-Saatu-Masamba, a complex of three adjoining villages that also straddles the Trans-Sulawesi Highway in Poso Pesisir sub-district. The three villages comprise Muslim Bugis who settled in Masamba starting in the 1940s, local Christian Pamona (primarily from the Pebato sub-group) and a mix of other groups including Christian Torajans, Muslim Keili and Javanese. Approximately half of the three villages' inhabitants have returned from their places of displacement but others, namely a significant portion of the Pamona Christians and the much less numerous Javanese, have not yet come back.

Despite their close proximity and well-intentioned efforts at informal mixing, these adjoining villages display a striking amount of social distance. People spoke openly of feeling "trauma" due to the lack of security. Collecting cocoa, for example, is reportedly done only in small groups who make a point of returning home well before nightfall. Recent murders have raised fears, caused short-term displacement, delayed further returns and generated suspicions that undermine reconciliation efforts. Through official instigation, a local chapter of FKAUB was established in 2003 to cover the three villages and three other nearby localities. The local FKAUB has largely confined itself to calling general meetings and organizing signboards with peace-oriented slogans for display in front

of houses but has otherwise been inactive since its inception, failing to assume a public role in reassuring residents following the October killings.

Though not deliberately enforced, ethno-religious segregation affects primary schooling. Three Muslim students from the westernmost village, Pinedapa, transverse Saatu to attend the primary school in easternmost Masamba with about 100 other Muslim students. By contrast, Saatu's primary school, a state-run SD-Negeri, has 7 teachers for its 30 students, all of whom are Christian Pamona. When quizzed informally by the team, some 10 Saatu residents, all Christian, could not name a single prominent resident of adjoining Masamba, which is Muslim. Along similar lines, each village has separate farmers' groups. Mutual self-help or collective work projects (known in Indonesian as *gotong royong* and in Pamona as *mesale*) tend to be organized within ethno-religious groups and women's *arisan* groups apparently exist only in Muslim Masamba and Pinedapa. Other potential sources of networking and contact such as PKK are inactive.

Nevertheless, there are some significant arenas for interaction and sources of greater cooperation. Day-to-day relations among the various ethno-religious groups are reportedly sufficient to allow Christians to travel to markets in majority Muslim areas like Kasiguncu or Poso town. Rice harvesting, which occurs twice a year, relies on labor from all three villages, and work groups are organized jointly (though laborers are paid Rp. 30,000 per day). The celebration of a successful rice harvest, known in Pamona as *padungku*, brings everyone together, and families have resumed informal exchange visits on the occasion of the other religion's important holidays like Idul Fitri and Christmas. The irrigation system for the three villages - and including three other nearby villages - requires upgrading that could potentially bring various ethno-religious groups together.

Tojo Barat Sub-District

The mixed village of Matako in Tojo sub-district, east of Poso town toward Ampana, has close relations with a number of nearby villages, namely Malei-Tojo (Muslim) and

Malei-Lage (mixed) to the west toward Poso and Bambalo toward the east and Ampana.¹⁷ Consisting of five adjoining sub-villages along the road from Poso to Ampana, Matako itself is a fully mixed village of Christians and Muslims from various ethnic groups. These include Christian Pamona and Chinese, Muslims of Bugis and Gorontalo origin, and Keili of both religions. Matako presents a striking example of considerable inter-group solidarity that has emerged over time and did not succumb to internal disputes or outside infiltration during the conflict. Impending attacks by outsiders in 2000 and 2001 forced the villagers - of all ethnic groups and religious backgrounds - to flee their homes. Villagers related with pride that they had no internal disputes that caused violence or were used by outsiders to divide the community. In fact, the some 40 houses burned down in 2001 belonged to both Muslims and Christians living in the same *dusun*.

Relations have been extremely positive and villagers feel completely free to move around and interact with those of other backgrounds. Matako's Sunday market is fully functioning and now attracts outside traders including Bugis from Poso. In contrast with earlier periods, Christian fisherman now feel sufficiently safe to take their boats out to sea. Villagers from both religions feel free to participate in *dero*, a contemporary dance based on traditional forms but frowned upon by stricter Muslim groups as too permissive of male-female contact.

A number of factors were cited for this high degree of solidarity, tolerance, and mutual trust. First, the village head, who has served unusually long (four consecutive terms over 19 years), was widely described as an even-handed, responsible, and religiously tolerant leader, who has reportedly used his authority to coordinate effectively with the village's formal religious leaders and military representative and to discipline potential troublemakers, like unruly youth, petty thieves or heavy drinkers. Second, the local *Brimob* detachment was able to remain neutral during tense periods when the threat of outside attacks was looming. Finally, Matako seems to have a variety of

associational and cooperative ties that criss-cross the village's ethnic and religious divisions including (a) eight farmers' groups (*kelompok tani*), which each regroup about 10 farmers from different ethnic and religious backgrounds, (b) mixed schools, (c) joint Muslim and Christian nighttime patrols (*ronda*) together with the security forces, (d) joint work projects for the common good (*kerja bhakti*) such as cleaning the village every Monday and Saturday, (e) small work groups to go to the forest or their cocoa groves together, and (f) informal cooperation among women, for example, a mixed group of about 10 women work together to collect *nipa* leaves and make *toru* hats for sale to their neighbors.¹⁸

Tentena - North Pamona Sub-District

With a pre-conflict population of some 30,000, North Pamona and particularly its main town, Tentena, have become a major receiving area for Christian Pamona IDPs from Muslim-majority areas. In 2000 and again in 2001, Christians fled Poso town and neighboring sub-districts of Poso Pesisir, Lage and Tojo. At the height of displacement, Tentena absorbed some tens of thousands of IDPs, which has now dropped to about 15,000. This massive influx of IDPs has had an enormous impact on Tentena and has solidified Tentena into an almost exclusively Christian and largely Pamona area. This trend was amplified when the onset of the conflict in Poso town and seaside communities in 2000 provoked the departure of almost all of Tentena's former Muslim residents.

To gain a better understanding of issues facing the remaining IDPs, particularly concerning obstacles to their return, the team visited two IDP sites: Posunga (where IDPs from Malei-Lage have constructed semi-permanent houses on land rented from a Pamona landlord) and Later (where IDPs from various seaside villages have also build semi-permanent houses on an airstrip belonging to

¹⁷ Though less than 30 kilometers from Poso town, Matako is situated in the sub-district of Tojo Barat, now part of the new district of Tojo Una-Una.

¹⁸ Efforts to strengthen Matako's intra-community ties including (i) the Tadulako University's peacebuilding centre, P4K, sponsored a recent reconciliation meeting in Matako, conducted by ex-combatants from the Poso area with the participation of youth from Matako and nearby villages, (ii) a mixed state primary school with initial funding from the Jakarta-based NGO Nurani Dunia, which includes a mixed school management committee (BP3) that also regroups Muslim and Christian parents.

Obstacles to IDP Returns

In Posunga, which still contains about 700-800 IDPs from Malei-Lage, residents describe a situation in which they feel caught between various countervailing impulses. On the one hand, they have built serviceable, semi-permanent houses, a church (which doubles as a primary school), and other facilities. They have access to some employment and agricultural plots in and around Tentena, and they continue to visit their homes and cocoa groves in Malei-Lage every month, often twice a month. They view with deep suspicion the continued presence of about 20 former “Laskar Jihad” from Java in Malei-Tojo, next to their home village. Recent incidents in and around their village have heightened their fears that the security situation is still not fully stable. They have become further cynical about the government’s goodwill and capacity as a result of exploitation by local authorities. This includes the apparent embezzlement of significant portions of assistance destined to IDP families for their livelihoods (JADUP, or *jaminan hidup*) and for rebuilding their houses (RTS, or *rumah tinggal sementara*). These developments have made the remaining IDPs in Posunga loathe to want to return to Malei-Lage.

On the other hand, the IDPs do report that whenever they visit Malei-Lage, relations with their Muslim neighbors are genuinely friendly and largely lacking in rancor. Joint Muslim-Christian groups go to the cocoa groves together. The village council (BPD) has a deliberately mixed composition, including both Muslim and Christian returnees. Though not yet fully mixed again, associations like farmers’ groups (*kelompok tani*) and women’s organizations like PKK or *arisan* groups are regarded positively as possible mechanisms for strengthening intra-community ties. Other forms of intra-village cooperation show similar potential, like joint participation in nighttime patrols (*ronda*) and activities like sports, sewing, or singing groups. One of the two primary schools in the village, SD-2, is functioning again with a mixed student body and teaching corps. In the end, however, most of these IDPs believe they will return to Malei-Lage, though perhaps only after the election season passes peacefully.

IDPs living in Later present an even more ambivalent view of their prospects for return. IDPs from Bategencu, a largely Christian village before the conflict, related their frustrations at returning to their village on two separate occasions only to have the houses burned down again for a third time. They are still deeply skeptical about the ability of the security forces to protect them, particularly in a Christian village like Bategencu, which abuts a Muslim area but lies too far away from *Brimob* or TNI posts for a timely response to an incident. In addition, a significant number of these IDPs have now joined together to purchase land in Kajuawu, Tentena, where they plan to resettle permanently. Many are also finding supplemental employment in Tentena more easily than in Lage sub-district, and they will continue to harvest cocoa and other cash crops from their home village, security permitting.

the Protestant church). Many long-term IDPs in the area still feel deeply ambivalent about returning to their seaside villages or settling more or less permanently in Tentena, and feel extremely disappointed, if not outright exploited, by false promises given by the government regarding the security situation and the amount of assistance available to them (see Box). On a more positive note, they remain open to, if somewhat passive about, efforts to encourage greater inter-group interaction and cooperation.

In the main, these IDPs seemed to accept religious homogeneity in their children’s environment as a bearable if somewhat undesirable by-product of staying in Tentena. They report that their children have absorbed a high degree of stereotyping and generalized fears based on the last few years’ experience. During Sunday school activities, reported one teacher, children are making graphic drawings of their houses burning or weapons being used. One farmer recounted that when he announced his plans to visit Bategencu for a few days, his young son spontaneously stated he would not

want to accompany his father for “fear of jihad”. As parents, they acknowledged the need for and expressed their openness towards efforts to expand and intensify contacts between Christians in Tentena and Muslims in and around Poso town.

Pendolo - South Pamona Sub-District

Pendolo town is the centre for South Pamona sub-district, some 40 kilometers due south of Tentena, and has a population of around 25,000 people. Approximately 70 percent are Christian, mainly Pamona but also Manadonese, while the remaining 30 percent are mostly Muslim, namely Bugis from nearby South Sulawesi but also others from Java, Lombok and Gorontalo. Pendolo demonstrates considerable social resilience and cohesion across religious and ethnic lines, but there are still some divisions that could be redressed through stronger associational ties and inter-communal cooperation.

Since the conflict, Muslims have largely returned to the sub-district, namely to Pandajaya, though few have actually moved

back to their former houses in outlying villages or Pendolo. Interviewees report that day-to-day relations between various groups are extremely positive and have largely returned to normal. In contrast to other areas, security concerns are wholly absent, and people move around freely, including late at night. Market activity has largely resumed, though less intensively than before. Muslim traders sell their goods in Pendolo on market days and Christian shoppers have returned to Pandajaya's market. Public schools are mixed again though perhaps less extensively than before. There have also been deliberate efforts to include minority representation in local government. For example, the village council (BPD) in Meko, a Christian village, has a Muslim and a Balinese Hindu member.

According to local informants, a number of potential links between groups has been under-exploited. PKK, women's arisan groups, and farmer groups are either not yet fully operational again or limited to specific villages or sub-villages (*dusun*), therefore not available for strengthening inter-communal bonds. However, a number of these structures and relationships may in fact not be amenable to such bonds. The one major exception to this lack of associational ties is the recently formed *Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Pamona Selatan* (South Pamona Youth Communication Forum), which regroups both Muslims and Christians. Established in October 2002 through the efforts of a number of young professionals, including one of the Malino signatories (Jhonli Pasangka), the *Forum Komunikasi* seems to be a genuinely grassroots initiative. It has about 40 core members and local representatives in each of the 23 villages in the sub-district. It has organized joint meetings, including its inaugural event, which resulted in a 10-point local "agreement." Though considered by Poso district officials as a sort of local FKAUB, the *Forum Komunikasi* has not yet received government funding.

Morowali – Lembo Sub-District

Beteleme, located some 130 kilometers southeast of Tentena in Lembe sub-district, is a bustling commercial center along the main road connecting Poso and Makassar with the larger towns of Kolonedale and Bungku, towns which now lie within Morowali, as a new district established in 2000. With about 5,000

residents, Beteleme is the administrative center for Lembo sub-district and its 16,000 inhabitants. Approximately 90 percent of the sub-district's population is native Mori, who are Christian, with the remainder comprising Protestants from Manado, Catholics from Flores, Balinese Hindu and Muslim migrants from Java, Lombok and other parts of Sulawesi.

Beteleme itself has largely been spared the effects of the conflict in Poso, however arson attacks in October 2003 raised tensions. Life was reportedly "normal" again by the next day, principally because of the effective response from the police and the positive role played by community leaders that led to a peaceful outcome to what could have become a widening spiral of violence. Local officials, religious leaders as well as residents credit the police with a quick and effective response in tracking down and arresting the alleged perpetrators, while prominent Beteleme leaders, both formal and informal, seem to have played an important public role in reaffirming the need for inter-group cooperation and in reassuring residents not to be provoked into vigilantism or indiscriminate retribution against other groups. These initiatives were effective in keeping the town calm and Beteleme's Muslim leadership has also repeatedly rejected attempts by more "hard-line" co-religionists from outside to establish a foothold in the town.¹⁹ The town's Imam and principal priest have met regularly, even before the incident, but local officials and religious leaders also made a pointed effort to celebrate Idul Fitri and Christmas jointly and publicly, especially since the holidays immediately followed the October incident.

This peaceful reaction to a clearly deliberate provocation points to a significant degree of inter-group solidarity within Beteleme. Mutual assistance occurs on a day-to-day basis between residents from different backgrounds. For example, Javanese restaurateurs, who fled from Tentena in 2000 after their parents had settled near Lake Poso in

¹⁹ These efforts have not been 100-percent effective, as underscored by the October incident: the involvement of the "Lombok group" in the attack was preceded by the return to Pa'arawu of the village head's son, who had undergone extensive religious and perhaps paramilitary training in Poso.

the 1950s, reported that Christian neighbors lent them tables, chairs, kitchenware and even dishes to start new businesses. At an informal, person-to-person level, Beteleme residents reportedly made *komitmen kilat*, or “spontaneous commitments,” to each other to counter outside provocation together in a spirit of solidarity. Schooling is mostly mixed in Beteleme’s public primary, junior high and senior high school, and boys and young men play sports freely together. Girls and women, by contrast, have more limited opportunities but are able to interact informally through sewing groups and creative activities. There have been at least two recent events involving youth groups from both the mosque and the main church, and youth and young adults from all groups socialize freely and dance *dero* at parties.

Though small market vendors are almost exclusively Bugis, the vendors’ organization, *Ikatan Keluarga Warga Pasar*, has been openly committed to maintaining inter-group harmony. Furthermore, those with shops adjoining the market stalls are ethnically and religiously mixed and relations among the various traders seemed genuinely positive. This includes reported cooperation via women’s *arisan* groups. There are a variety of other associational ties that help strengthen inter-group relations. The local chapter of the national teachers’ organization, PGRI, and the local PKK and *Dharma Wanita*, reportedly regroup both Christians and Muslims. Depending on the composition of a village’s population, farmer groups (*kelompok tani*) will include farmers from different ethno-religious backgrounds. There is considerable coordination among various *organisasi lembaga adat* (local chapters of traditional leaders) and ethno-cultural organizations.

4. Peace-Building and Strengthening Social Cohesion

The previous section has illustrated the wide variety of forms of interaction, associational life and community-based reconciliation efforts that bring together residents of different ethno-religious backgrounds in North Maluku and Central Sulawesi. For the sake of simplicity, this section uses a number of categories to discuss the issue of social cohesion and also considers the issues that divide communities.^{20,21}

4.1 Markets and Social Relations

A striking variety of economic activity now brings together Muslims and Christians from different ethnic backgrounds in both areas. Local markets serve an important space for such interaction, with both vendors and buyers from all groups returning to markets once considered by one group or another as “unsafe” to visit. In Poso, traders from outside the region have more or less fully resumed normal operations, purchasing cash crops like cocoa and vanilla and selling rice or consumer products. Muslims and Christians in certain localities report going to their cocoa groves in mixed work groups of about 5-10 people (usually men) known as *mapalus*, but in other places such cooperation has not yet resumed. Similarly, informal credit mechanisms or revolving funds like *arisan* groups still appear to be largely a function of pre-established networks, namely ones that are differentiated by ethno-religious or geographic lines. In Labuha town, Bacan island, the new district administration has relocated the market, which was previously deep within a Muslim residential area, and built a new market between the main Christian and Muslim centres, encouraging equal access for both groups.

In general, while a useful indicator of post-conflict recovery, market-based activities present relatively limited opportunities for more robust inter-group cohesion. One exception would be the potential for enhanced

cooperation through vendor associations like *Ikatan Keluarga Warga Pasar* (Association of Family of Market Vendors). This would be true in localities where vendors are mixed or, if primarily from one group (e.g. Bugis), where they can develop partnerships with other interest groups or community-level recovery efforts. Another example would be small- or medium-sized enterprises that encompass producers or partners of different backgrounds whose joint success depends on effective interdependence. Successful programming in this realm would be challenging. It would require careful case-by-case analysis and concrete opportunities for an expansion of benefits for members, e.g. construction of a new market or improvement of an existing one where there are no ethno-religiously defined “losers” or “winners”.

4.2 Sports, Recreation and Creative Activities

Both regions have witnessed a significant expansion of inter-group interaction through sports, recreation and creative activities. Much of this has happened spontaneously, but there have been also been a number of deliberate efforts to use such activities, particularly soccer matches, as a means for promoting informal interaction. The scale of such efforts has been largely limited, in terms of the actual numbers of people involved. Also, these events tend to focus on “male” sports like soccer without giving sufficient attention to activities for girls and women or those that can involve both sexes, such as “team-building” outdoor games. The availability of beaches, lakes, waterfalls, and forests make the region ideal for such outdoors activities and even camping for mixed youth groups. Another under-exploited area is music in general and singing in particular -- as long as the songs are what Indonesians would call “nationalist” and not sectarian.

4.3 Schools and Universities

Schools in the Poso region present a complicated picture of inter-group cooperation. On the one hand, IDP flows and *de facto* ethno-religious segregation has often caused schools to become more homogeneous in composition or to prompt parents or students themselves to want a more explicitly religious

²⁰ This catalogue leaves aside the role of the officially-mandated *Pokjas*, or working groups for promoting the Malino process.

²¹ See also Thematic Assessments on Governance, Women and Peace building and Local Economic Development.

profile for their schooling. Among the localities visited as part of this assessment, ethno-religious segregation was noted in primary schooling in Masamba-Saatu, and homogeneity is striking in other contexts such as Tentena and to a lesser extent in Pendolo-Pandajaya or Beteleme. Similarly, schools in the areas visited in the assessment in North Maluku remain mostly segregated. On the other hand, the integration of schooling provides a significant opportunity for renewing inter-group interaction and cooperation. The most positive example encountered by the team in Poso is the establishment of a mixed SD-Negeri in Matakko. Integration efforts can also include strengthening associational ties, for example, among parents involved in a school's BP3 or within a local chapter of PGRI, the national teachers' organization. In certain specific circumstances, targeted assistance could help with the (re)integration of educational institutions.

Within higher education, community segregation is a problem. Perhaps the most striking being the establishment of a second campus for Poso's university, UNSIMAR, in Tentena to cater to the needs of lecturers and students among the Christian IDP population. Plans were in place for the reunification of UNSIMAR, a sign of the general positive trends in community relations. In North Maluku, staff at Khairun University in Ternate and Padmara Community College in Tobelo expressed interest in developing joint activities including exchanging guest lecturers, which could be an important way of encouraging social interaction between students and staff at these higher education institutions. Furthermore, Khairun University is leading the development of a public discourse about pluralism involving intellectuals and NGO activists, where issues of ethnicity, religion and identity are debated. Khairun University has published about ten books on the issues of pluralism and multiculturalism.

4.4 Youth and Women's Organizations²²

Youth organizations were generally found to be a relatively inactive or weak realm for

social cohesion though their potential is considerable. In the places visited in Poso, *Karang Taruna* youth groups are inactive as are most chapters of PKK (Family Welfare Programme). The PKK's formal composition, which regroups the wives of local officials for social service work, would make it relatively easy to activate and develop further to strengthen inter-group cooperation. The team encountered few examples of joint activities between youth and women's groups organized via mosques and churches, suggesting that these could be intensified. *Arisan*, as mentioned above, tends to be limited to specific residential and/or ethno-religious groups due the neighborhood or kin-friendship networks used to organize these revolving funds.

Youth, like women, are conspicuously not involved in reconciliation processes in North Maluku.²³ The assessment found that youth had a major role in influencing communal tensions and the dynamics of the conflict in North Maluku. Many youth were involved in the conflict playing a variety of roles from combatants to logistical and moral supporters of the conflict. As the situation spiraled out of control in late 1999, a range of factors motivated youth to become involved in the conflict including poor educational background, a lack of positive and balanced information and pressures to join the war within a highly patriarchal society. The conflict provided an opportunity for young men to prove that they were not children anymore in an emotionally unstable situation where solidarity within peer groups and machoism were translated into violence. Youth remain vulnerable to be used again by certain interest groups to promote conflict, and there is significant mistrust amongst youth towards adults in North Maluku. This is not helped by the paternalistic nature of government and other institutions that generally do not pay serious attention to youth.

Youth organisations (KNPI, *Karang Taruna*) are mostly the creation of government and national elites, often have political rather than social objectives and so do not have any significant community-based activities except

²² This section does not focus on the role of women in social cohesion – for a more detailed analysis, see Thematic Assessment on Women and Peace building.

²³ For more details on youth in North Maluku, see Yuliati Umrah (2004) Youth in Post-Conflict North Maluku. Unpublished report.

during national festivals. Women's organisations such as the PKK and *posyandu* (integrated health posts), although also created by the government, have more regular activities. Student organisations are believed by most of the people interviewed not to benefit students except to take their time away from study. In post-conflict North Maluku, this lack of real organizations representing and addressing youth interests and needs has led youth to feel excluded and powerless. Coupled with limited opportunities for employment and recreation, this presents a latent danger. On the other hand, youth have been responsible for a number of informal post-conflict recovery and reconciliation initiatives and the assessment team found a number of locally initiated informal reconciliation processes at a village level. For example, in Soakonora village of Jailolo sub-district, a group of young people has organised to set up a sports field with moral support from the village leaders and financial support from the village people. According to the youth, this sports field is an important medium for social cohesion as people will use it for community activities at the village level.

Young people have the potential to produce fresh ideas for the future of North Maluku and Poso if they are given support and opportunities to do so. Youth should be given opportunities to participate in government planning processes and formal peace-building initiatives, create their own initiatives and have a say in decisions that affect their lives. They need access to information relevant to their needs and a means of expressing their needs within society. Capacity building and the

provision of youth-focused services are required that can ultimately enhance young people's self-esteem, social values and attitudes towards the state that will strengthen the potential for youth to play a positive role in peace-building and the prevention of conflict.

4.5 Residential and Community-Based Cooperation

Inter-group cooperation at the residential or community level seems to be a function of two factors: the demographic make-up of the particular locality and the administrative or organizational framework used to manage it. There were significant examples of such inter-group cooperation in mixed localities where a community-wide framework was used for organizing village cleaning efforts or other *kerja bakti* (community service), nighttime patrols (*ronda*), or more labor-intensive *gotong royong* (mutual self-help) like fixing irrigation sluices or local roads. A number of localities reported very successful efforts by CWS to organize "food-for-peace" efforts on a community-wide basis, helping to overcome the divisive effects of the conflict and/or displacement. Other communities reported *ronda* or *gotong royong* on more exclusive lines if, for example, administrative boundaries between adjoining Muslim and Christian areas are used to establish distinct efforts. This is also true if mosques and churches in the same localities organize parallel but separate initiatives. Similarly, farmers and fisher groups (*kelompok tani / nelayan*), which regroup farmers and fishermen respectively, are only effective in strengthening inter-group cooperation if they themselves are integrated in

Youth in North Maluku: From Reconciliation to Motor Sports

Youth in North Maluku have taken the initiative to reinvigorate the *Baku Dapa* movement, which was initiated by the army in Tobelo and Galela at the end of 2000 to promote reconciliation through community leaders, religious leaders and youth, but lacked significant follow up from its first meetings. Local youth took the initiative of forming a reconciliation team consisting of seven people from Tobelo and Galela to discuss how the extent the sense of the *Baku Dapa* movement into key public places such as the market and streets. As a result of these efforts, the *Baku Dapa* movement was taken up by youth who were fond of sport such as motocross and football as well as cross-community art performances.

Motor sports, in particular, have provided an arena for youths of different backgrounds to come together. In this difficult post-conflict situation, many young men now work as *ojek* and *bentor* (*becak montor*) drivers in district capitals such as Tobelo, Jailolo, Labuha and Ternate. The increasing number of *ojek* and *bentor* drivers led the North Halmahera Social Affairs Office to initiate a program aimed at supporting youth to open motor cycle service workshops. From this, five youth who had opened repair workshops came up with the idea of organizing sub-district motorbike racing teams, which would invite each other to racing competitions. These competitions would involve many participants and spectators from all over the district, which would help promote better community relations.

Last year, the competition was held with the support of the local police and a motorcycle dealer in Tobelo. It was a great success and new racing teams have since been formed. The interest in motorcycle racing has, in turn, had a beneficial impact on the development of motorcycle repair workshops through increased demand for painting, maintenance and spare parts. Moreover, the existence of these racing teams and workshops had influenced the topics of conversation from conflict and revenge to motorcycles and youth issues. Motorcycle workshops are now functioning not just as a place for motorcycles but where youth discuss issues ranging from music and drugs to business opportunities.

their composition. The examples encountered during the assessment were uneven in this regard, but included

positive experiences of integrated groups in Tambarana and Matak.

Women were often seen to initiate community-based interaction and cooperation. In North Maluku women were the first to cross the 'security line' between the two communities in order to find basic goods (*bahan makanan pokok*) such as rice, cooking oil and sugar. Women merchants in the market, who became known as *dibo-dibo*, followed this initiative in crossing between the communities. These women met with other women merchants in market and managed to break down the divisions of religious and ethnic identities.

Many NGOs in North Maluku undertake community-based programmes, although most are based in the towns of Ternate and Tobelo. In general, people's views of NGOs are mixed. Local NGOs have traditionally been limited to acting as implementing partners for international organizations, and some see local NGOs being mostly interested in accessing funds from international and national organizations. The popularity of NGOs amongst villagers is relatively low as a result of their limited skills, experience and capacity. The positive aspects are that several NGOs have good experience with community organisation processes. One significant limitation with local NGOs is that most, if not all, tend to be exclusively composed of one particular religious or ethnic group.

It would probably be cumbersome if not ineffective to promote integrated farmer and fishermen groups. Rather, overarching cooperation could be encouraged through small-to-medium scale infrastructure projects that nonetheless benefit most if not all of the residents of a particular locality. This could include rehabilitation of local recreation sites and/or the (re)construction or improvement of sanitation facilities, irrigation systems, local piers, and the like. Such projects could also serve as a link to the ABD's Community Empowerment and Rural Development Project or the World Bank's through the Kecamatan Development Program and Support for Economic Recovery Program.

4.6 Occupational Groups or Professional Organizations

Aside from the farmers and fishers groups (*kelompok tani / nelayan*) at the village level or the *Ikatan Keluarga Warga Pasar* in the markets, extremely few examples were reported of other occupational or professional organizations that regroup people from various ethno-religious backgrounds. This is a result of the largely rural and/or fishing-based nature of the region's economy, which accounts for more than half of the employment in Poso and North Maluku. Trade, transportation and mining together account for about one-quarter of employment in the province. It is not clear how these private sector businesses, especially extractive resource companies including mines and wood-based industries, manage and promote social cohesion within the workforce, and this could be explored in the future. Among non-religious elites, only the teachers' association (PGRI) was reported as an example of a more inclusive professional organization. It would be worth assessing the level of inclusion within the public sector and other organizations, for example, those for health professionals (doctors, midwives and nurses).

4.7 Community Leaders, Tradition and Inter-Faith Cooperation

Routine contact and local cooperation between Muslim clerics and Protestant pastors (and Hindu PHD and Catholic priests, where relevant) was reported in virtually every community with a mixed composition or with nearby residents of another religion. Less developed is more systematic interaction between church and mosque groups, for example, involving women baking or sewing together or youth organizing joint activities. Among other more educated elites, the Protestant clergy is well organized and ethnically mixed. Al-Khairat has perhaps the most-established network of Muslim clerics in the Poso region. If religious networks worked collaboratively in a parallel fashion, they could be powerful engines for reconciliation due to the widespread respect still accorded to religious authorities. This could be broadened with the inclusion of Catholic as well as Hindu leaders.

In North Maluku, religious and *adat* leaders are the only group of people who are trusted by all communities at the grass-roots level and therefore they have real power to influence people. Although *adat* and religious leaders have reminded people not to attack, certain community leaders were instrumental in mobilizing people to fight during the conflict. It is possible to see tradition and *adat* structures re-emerging strongly in North Maluku, especially in Ternate, Jailolo and Sahu, traditional Sultanate regions. People in Jailolo sub-district believe that *adat* mechanisms, if used effectively, could have prevented the escalation of the conflict in 1999-2000. In Sahu, religious and *adat* leaders have been active disseminating the idea of 'one family of Sahu', and have been involved in informal reconciliation efforts by visiting families and listening to people's daily problems.

In Tobelo and Galela, people have started to think about the role of *adat* (structure of traditional elders) as a connector and its function to reduce tensions and build social cohesion. Village-level leaders hope that *adat* can be used as a mechanism to bring people together and solve problems within, and between, the communities in the future. The problem with resurrecting *adat* in Tobelo and Galela is that there is no clear *adat* institution, leadership or structure. In contrast, the newly resurrected *adat* system in West Halmahera has an impressive level of organisation and often with a newly built *adat* structure for meetings enjoying a centre place in the village.

However, *adat* mechanisms should not be seen as a panacea for building social cohesion. In the past, there have been many cases in the Kao-Malifut area where land disputes between people were presented to the Sultan of Ternate and decisions were taken without due consultation with the people. *Adat* (customary) law is unwritten, known only by (male) elders and not really appreciated by younger generation. It tends to be a conservative way to solve personal rather than social problems, and works principally through charisma and decision-making of the leader alone, whereas social problems require broad participation in decision making for lasting solutions. *Adat* leaders, and therefore decision-makers, tend to be exclusively men, thereby excluding the

voice and aspirations of women in decision-making. Calls for revitalised *adat* institutions and mechanisms for conflict prevention and strengthening social cohesion should be tempered with these considerations.

Clearly, religious and *adat* leaders hold a unique position from which they can use their moral stature and prominence in the service of encouraging mutual understanding and common living within their communities. Religious leaders are the cornerstones of the social order in most, if not all, societies and religious organizations enjoy the most trust from people at community level. While local initiatives by community leaders and their organizations are making a promising start in increasing cross-community interaction, they lack funding and support from government as well as the technical capacity to really make a broad impact at the community level.

4.8 Local Reconciliation Forums

Local forums to support effective communication and coordination on issues relating to reconciliation and future development of particular districts, sub-districts or villages have been established in both Poso and North Maluku.²⁴ Examples include the Poso chapter of the KNPI (district-wide), the government-linked national young adults' organization, which has organized larger-scale meetings including Christians and Muslims from across the region, the newly-established *Ikatan Kekeluargaan Siwagi Lemba Toposo* (district-wide), which recently organized an assembly in Tentena for about 800 "Poso natives" from the various Pamona ethnic sub-groups, including both Muslims and Christians²⁵, *Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Pamona Selatan* (South Pamona sub-district Youth Communication Forum), an independent initiative started in 2002 including both Christian and Muslim young professionals

²⁴ These are aside from the government-sponsored *Pokja* system and the non-governmental *Pokja-RKP*, or Working Group for Conflict Resolution in Poso.

²⁵ Muslim members of this new network were already regrouped within the *Forum Kerukunan Keluarga Muslim Toposo*, which was first conceived of in 2001 and formalized in April 2003. This effort is distinct from the *Forum Silaturahmi Muslim Poso*, which includes Muslims of all ethnic groups but is criticized by some as dominated by "outside" (e.g. non-Poso) Muslims.

and community leaders, and *Forum Komunikasi Antar Umat Beragama* (individual villages or towns), a quasi-official mechanism first established as an inter-ethnic crisis response group in Tambarana, Poso Pesisir, which has since been replicated in a top-down fashion in other communities throughout the region.

Each of these initiatives has largely functioned as a “talk shop” between groups/members from different backgrounds. In this capacity, particularly during tense periods or following the Malino Declaration, they have played a useful role in re-establishing or improving communication and reducing misunderstandings and polarization. It will be important to watch whether the newest and most independent initiatives, namely *Ikatan Kekeluargaan Siwagi Lemba Poso* and *Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Pamona Selatan*, develop a credible plan and capacity to carry out more concrete activities like assisting IDP reintegration or providing skills and services to the communities.

In North Maluku, reconciliation teams were established at a sub-district level in many areas, for example the Team 30 of Jailolo, Team 25 of Sahu and the reconciliation team of Galela/Tobelo. All of the teams have played an important facilitating role in the return of IDPs and reconciliation between villages previously in conflict. They have used information dissemination and meetings of village leaders and residents to promote healing and reduce tensions. These teams are reasonably effective in almost each region in North Maluku as they work closely with the cultural traditions of the community. In general, local villagers respect the process and are willing to listen to the elders and to people with a special position within the community (community, *adat*, religious and youth leaders).

For the purpose of longer-term peace-building, these reconciliation teams can be encouraged to develop into new community-level mechanisms that work to combine democratic participation and respect for elders at the same time. The strength of the teams is that team members are already recognized, have developed trust in the reconciliation process and almost all members are widely respected. They also show good intention and energy to continue to support their

Reconciliation Team 30 of Jailolo sub-district was formed by the army and local government to facilitate a dialogue and reconciliation process and the return of IDPs within Jailolo sub-district. The local government at that time supported the reconciliation teams by providing money and transport costs, while the military supported the process by inviting *adat* and religious leaders to meet and sit together to form the teams. The community and religious leaders themselves then chose the members of the team. They found fifteen respected leaders in each community (Muslim and Christian) consisting of *adat*, religious, community and youth leaders. One weakness is that women were not represented and all members of Team 30 are men.

Several years after the conflict, although the teams still have concerns about sustainable reconciliation and effective social reintegration of returnees and normalisation of inter-group relationships, they lack support from government.

communities and solve outstanding problems including those concerning social cohesion. The weaknesses are that they have limited access to funds (except from their communities) or support from the sub-district and district government and lack participation of women and young people. It is relevant to note that building social cohesion is not part of development plans for Provincial Government for 2005, so it is unlikely that adequate funding will be available in the future.²⁶ Communities need a mechanism to build communication and cooperation between ethnic and religious groups and, at present, few opportunities exist. Such mechanisms could be a good starting point for the development of community level early warning and problem solving groups that could act to prevent conflict, or at least prevent it from spreading or escalating.

²⁶ Outcome of 2005 Provincial Development Planning Consultations for North Maluku.

Malino Working Groups (*Pokjas*) in Central Sulawesi

There were differing views regarding the utility of the Malino process and the Working Groups (*Pokjas*) established to promote reconciliation at the provincial, district, sub-district and village levels. In general, this process has been seen as useful and should be continued, particularly to encourage greater inter-village interaction, contact and trust. It was also noted that the *Pokjas*, which do regroup some prominent citizens in addition to government functionaries, can play an effective monitoring role of official assistance from local government. A major criticism of the *Pokjas*' role is their composition, which seems largely to overlap and compete with existing government structures. According to this view, what is required is not a parallel and potentially confusing system of *Pokjas* but effective leadership from the *bupati* down to the village level. Furthermore, the creation of *Pokjas*, under the Office for National Unity (*Kesbang*), is thought to have created doubts about the continued usefulness of Inter-Faith Communication Forum (FKAUB) under the Office of Religious Affairs. Earlier criticisms of the size of the district *Pokja* has been redressed by cutting it down to some 50 members, but its approach is still faulted for being overly bureaucratic. There is the need for greater clarity about funding procedures and financial transparency, especially since it was widely raised by interlocutors that the *Pokjas* disposed of a reported Rp. 4.5 billion budget in 2002. For example, public accounting and reporting on its procedures and expenditures could help redress the pervasive perception of waste and misuse of these funds.

4.9 Governance Structures and Processes

Governance is generally understood as a “vertical” relationship between governed and governing and not a “horizontal” dimension of social cohesion. Nevertheless, local government and decision-making have had a significant impact on inter-group cooperation, both positive and negative. Local decision-making contributes to perceptions of justice (whether identifiable “winners” or “losers” are generated by specific practices or decisions), and governance that is experienced as partisan or corrupt can create grievances that stoke conflict. The latter danger was underscored by widely reported embezzlement of assistance funds intended for IDPs, both Christian and Muslim.²⁷ Nonetheless, there are positive examples, especially at the village level, where there is generally a high degree of trust and appreciation of the role and commitment of village level leadership. Efforts by village heads to be impartial or for village councils (BPD, or *Badan Perwakilan Desa*) to be inclusive of social diversity in mixed localities is recognized by people as making a significant contribution to social cohesion and peace. Furthermore, some local decision-making has been self-consciously “conflict sensitive” in seeking to redress an ethno-religious imbalance that could reinforce inter-group divisions.

In contrast to village government, people in North Maluku view provincial government as being slow or inactive in responding to ordinary people's needs with programmes that were decided at high level without proper

consultation. Corruption, collusion and nepotism are believed to be widespread and a high level of distrust of government officials was found as they were seen to have paid their way into employment through bribes. This was also found to be generally the case at the district level, where infrastructure is much more limited. Perhaps as a result, district officers from some districts appear to mostly reside in the provincial capital, Ternate. Local residents felt there was a high level of competition between provincial and district governments over the allocation of budgets for IDPs and social development, which in part was fuelled by decentralization.

In general, although this is a difficult area to work in, three aspects merit consideration. First, strengthening community advocacy efforts, particularly if cross-group in nature, can contribute significantly to good governance and social cohesion. Second, conflict-related (or “peace-related”) development planning can increase opportunities for more genuine community participation in decision-making that affects an entire locality. This is particularly important for infrastructure projects where more money and greater development benefits are at stake. Here, there are higher risks of embezzlement or (perceptions of) “winners” and “losers” along ethno-religious lines. Third, there are quasi-official mechanisms for mobilizing community service that can be leveraged for additional inter-group cooperation in the context of community development efforts. PKK is the principal example in this regard.

²⁷ See “*Pelicin Banyak Jadup Terbayarkan*” (“Expeditors Paid a Lot of Jadup”), *Poso Post*, 24-29 February 2004, p. 1.

4.10 Structures, Issues and Dynamics that Divide People

In the Poso area, five factors separating groups were noted in the course of the assessment, which also broadly apply to the situation in North Maluku. These factors are (i) insecurity, (ii) geographic segregation and physical distance, (iii) distinct church/mosque networks, (iv) separate ethnic and cultural organizations and (v) feelings of grievance and injustice. To a great extent, these are factors that donors can do relatively little about, but in certain cases, specific programming can be developed to redress, or reduce, more divisive effects.

Insecurity is the principal source of uncertainty in inter-group relations and was found in a number of 'minority' villages. These fears, especially when stoked by inaccurate rumors, erode a sense of trust regarding both the effectiveness of the security forces and the intentions of the "other" group. Geographic segregation and physical distances compound these fears and the insularity of certain homogeneous "enclaves" poses a significant challenge for (re)constituting greater social cohesion. Such enclaves present few opportunities for sustained or more in-depth contact and interaction between different ethno-religious groups through the mechanisms catalogued above such as schooling, residential organizations, and community service or development. The significant physical distances, for example, between Poso town and Tentena or between more remote villages and the principal urban areas highlight these problems in Poso. In North Maluku, many villages, especially in the south of the province, have limited access to roads and are dependent on sea transportation, which leads to social isolation in homogenous communities.

An obvious but nonetheless noteworthy dynamic is the system of parallel arenas in which residents of the Poso region pray, join youth or women's groups, participate in scriptural study groups, and do other activities based on their mosque or church affiliations. While such distinct realms are necessary, programming could also be developed to increase inter-group contact via these religious

institutions. In both Poso and North Maluku there appears to be real interest in developing inter-faith dialogue. Similarly, ethnic and cultural organisations (for example, those for migrants originating from South Sulawesi, Gorontalo, Toraja, or Manado) tend to operate in parallel realms that are not always systematically bridged.

It is striking how the vast majority of residents of the Poso region and North Maluku, whatever their ethno-religious identity, appear genuinely willing to move forward together in a spirit of cooperation and reconciliation. This is facilitated by a widespread belief, whether true or not, that "outsiders" were responsible for the violence and/or that both Muslims and Christians suffered from the violence, thus making the conflict's negative impacts roughly "equal" across the population. Nonetheless, there still are occasional references to specific grievances or feelings of injustice that accentuate group identity.

Finally, this assessment did not undertake an inventory of specific land disputes or particular areas in which there is significant inter-group competition or conflicts over access to forests, fishing grounds, agricultural plots and markets. These issues, however, are clearly leading to disputes and creating divisions, and should be monitored on an ongoing basis and a more thorough in-depth analysis undertaken. There is a need for effective property swaps – and mechanisms for handling them – in cases where original owners no longer intend to return to land or housing occupied by IDPs who would like to resettle there.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations - A Framework for Support

5.1 Post-Conflict Responses for Strengthening Social Cohesion

As an overall objective in social cohesion work, agencies should consider two approaches: (1) how to build (or restore) effective relationships and (2) how to assist communities redress grievances, injustices or inequalities. The first approach is far more amenable to typical development programming and project modalities, but the second, though challenging and potentially more politically sensitive, is no less important. Within this first approach, relationship-building, there is a tendency to focus on increasing numbers of participants in, or beneficiaries of, activities aimed at strengthening interaction. What is often missed is the need for such programming to (re)build relationships between key players or influential agents or elements - and not just sheer numbers - of the population. Also, the programming can target change at the individual/personal level, but the challenge is to ensure that the more complex change at the social-political level is being pursued at the same time.²⁸ Further, social cohesion programming that aims to change people's attitudes and, ultimately behaviour, requires long-term programming.

In general, external agencies should be extremely circumspect in their selection and elaboration of priorities for strengthening social cohesion. This is not only because of a growing weariness with top-down reconciliation efforts, but also because of the tenuous tie between social cohesion as such and the prevention of any new violence. Greater social cohesion has probably helped stem the spread of violence in certain areas, but other factors, particularly the role of government leadership and the security forces, have probably been more determinant in this regard. Finally, too much "easy money" for reconciliation work risks prompting an oversupply of low-quality initiatives.

The dynamics underpinning conflict and pattern of social cohesion differ from area to area and even, at times, from village to village. This is an important challenge and requires an approach with local decision-making based on a clear understanding of local contexts. The assessment has also shown that both the causes of mistrust of government (structural) and the inter-group relationships between villages of different ethnic and religious groups need to be addressed in order to enhance community resilience to provocation and conflict.

External organisations can best work with local partners to support locally driven social cohesion and reconciliation initiatives at a sub-district and district level. Programming could begin with local analyses of the causes of conflict, identification of capacities to build peace and action to support peace and development. Building social cohesion will require working through partners to support local groups and government build cooperation and trust between different groups, drawing on peacebuilding expertise in Indonesia. Structural causes of tension need to be addressed. This could be enabled through local policy reforms and a process of empowering local groups to identify structural problems that could lead to conflict and so advocate for change.

5.2 Recommended Framework for Programmatic Action²⁹

North Maluku

Support to social cohesion might seek to build on the provincial PDA workshops by supporting local multi-stakeholder conflict and peace analyses at a more local level (district / sub-district), where the potential causes of conflict, and local capacities to work for peace are identified. This could lead to the identification of strategies and potential activities that help prevent violent conflict, strengthen social cohesion and build peace. As one person in North Maluku put it:

²⁸ See Mary B. Anderson and Lara Olson, "Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners," Reflecting on Peace Practices Project, Cambridge, MA: Collaborative for Development Action, Inc., 2002, pp. 55-56 and p. 65 ff.

²⁹ This report is based on two assessments conducted in Central Sulawesi and North Maluku, and the recommendations from each assessment are provided separately, some of which may be mutually relevant to both provinces.

“It is vital to work with the non-physical situation to address the trauma, suspicion and fear which is under the surface, but just as important for building social cohesion”.

External agencies and their partners working to strengthen social cohesion and build peace should follow certain principles and practices:

- Works on a long-term basis, aiming to influence inter-group relations and to solve the issues causing tension and conflict
- Uses a comprehensive approach that focuses on local communities in conflict, or potential conflict, while strategically engaging the middle and top levels of government
- Works in partnerships that emphasize skills transfer and capacity building of local institutions, organizations and community structures for peace-building
- Works through local partners that are representative of local ethnic and religious diversity
- Responds to the causes of violent conflict including ‘vertical’ issues such as governance, inclusion and inequality as well as ‘horizontal’ relationships to build social integration and cohesion
- Involves women and men, as well as youth and other minority or marginalised groups
- Requires a multi-stakeholder analysis that identifies causes of tension and difference and local capacities and actors for building inter-group cooperation and peace

Programme Objectives

The following objectives are proposed for a sub-programme to support strengthening social cohesion:

- (1) Government policies and practices at a provincial and district level that explicitly address social cohesion and are responsive to local needs through supporting equity, participation, fair representation, transparency and accountability
- (2) Build the capacity of local groups to (a) address causes, and potential causes, of conflict (particularly in the areas of land and natural resource management, poor governance, law, order and security, equal access to services and government resources) and (b) build trust and relationships between ethnic and religious

groups by encouraging communication and cooperation for peace and development that challenges prejudice and supports tolerance and associations across traditional social divisions.

Priorities for Programming

Although the above objectives would lead to a relatively broad identification of issues in priority areas for conflict prevention, it is clear that two issues in particular warrant a high priority. These two thematic priorities are:

- Youth - To (a) increase the participation of young people in governance and peace-related activities, (b) engage young people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds in employment creation through training and working together and (c) work with ethnic and religious groups to promote tolerance, anti-discrimination and non-violent strategies for dealing with difference and problems. The development of greater trust between young people and adults is important. Recovery efforts should take a “rights-based programming approach” with a focus on youth awareness of rights and responsibilities. Government should be supported through capacity building to understand its role as a duty bearer and to support the development of improved youth programmes and services. At the community level, youth participation in planning, implementation and evaluation of reconciliation programmes should be increased.

- Displacement and Return - To support the social integration beyond the return of IDPs and the building of mechanisms for communication and problem solving through cooperation and advocacy.

The assessment team identified a number of urgently required responses:

- Support to Kao-Malifut - Current tensions in Kao/Malifut require a local team to work effectively to reduce tensions, prejudice and generate appreciation and understanding between Kao and Malifut-Makian people. Technical assistance could be provided to a team of middle-level leaders.

- Support for Livelihoods in Galela – Tobelo – Support livelihoods including access to markets for local farmers to sell their products including copra or vanilla. Farmers should also diversify their crops as a result of the impact of the conflict on agricultural

markets. Such support would encourage farmer self-confidence and regenerate a sense of 'back to the normal' through new economic activities.

Criteria for Social Cohesion Projects

A set of criteria for social cohesion projects should be developed which could be used to assess and select initiatives. Proposals for international organisations should be prioritised where local partners (government, NGOs or community groups) are included, and clear plans are set out for the transfer of skills and capacity to the partners. Not all the experience and skills required are currently available among local and international organizations, and peace-building organisations in other parts of Indonesia may be able to provide relevant experience and expertise. The criteria for the selection of projects could include some of the following:

- Be based on a multi-stakeholder analysis of the causes and potential causes of conflict
- Identify the roles of other governmental and non-governmental organisations involved in this field of work and demonstrate networking and linkages where appropriate
- Set out how the different ethnic, religious or other groups would be clustered or organised in a joint proposal
- Draw on and complement existing resources and capacity available at a village, sub-district, district and provincial levels
- Include components for training, and where necessary support, for conflict transformation and advocacy skills from training providers
- Have a process of continuous and systematic planning and evaluation of the programmes.

Crosscutting Social Cohesion Issues

Social cohesion is a cross-cutting issue that links with other more tangible aspects of programming that could be implemented by external agencies. In particular, the assessment has identified three programming areas that could be implemented in order to strengthen social cohesion as a cross-cutting issue. These three programming areas are (1) Local Economic Development and Employment, (2) Governance and (3) Media.

1. Economic Development and Employment

Community access to economic opportunities is limited and uncertain. The high level of unemployment among youth was found to be an important factor especially in cities like Tobelo and Galela and the extent of livelihood insecurity is probably hidden in villages. This in itself requires further exploration. Programming in the economic sector has potential for strengthening social cohesion and improving human security.

2. Governance

Good governance is an important force for social cohesion. Key areas include effective representation and participation by different ethnic groups, women and young people, developing more effective responses to community needs, the clear regulation and enforcement of existing policies (including explicit policies in support of social cohesion) and laws and the development of more effective accountability mechanisms for government programmes.

3. Media

Rumours have been an important trigger of the conflicts in North Maluku, and mechanisms to deal with perceived threats among villages need to be established as an important tool in preventing the escalation of conflict. The speed of information and misinformation has considerably increased with the use of handphones. The ability of those who may wish to use rumours as a way of escalating conflict needs to be limited through development of inter-group communication and early response mechanisms.

Central Sulawesi

The assessment team in Central Sulawesi proposed three key sets of recommendations to strengthen social cohesion. These three sets of recommendations are (1) Inclusive Local Economic Recovery, (2) Support for a Limited Number of Local Peace-Building Initiatives, (3) Use of the Media.

Inclusive Local Economic Recovery

To avoid the potential for increased cynicism about "empty" reconciliation

initiatives, efforts to strengthen social cohesion should also attempt to deliver concrete benefits to communities. The principal priority among average people is economic rehabilitation or other concrete improvements in their lives, less so abstract or rhetorical attempts at reconciliation. This is mirrored by concerns that there are some 1,000 un- or under-employed young men in and around Poso town and others, perhaps numbering in the 100s, in quasi-urban centers like Tentena, Beteleme, and Pendolo-Pandajaya. It is debatable whether they constitute a fertile recruiting ground for fighters in any renewed conflict, but popular perceptions certainly posit a strong connection between under or unemployment and violence. Support to women income-earners is thought to increase household welfare significantly.

Given these concerns, a concrete recommendation would be to launch short-term but intensive vocational training for ethno-religiously mixed groups of young men and women, particularly from young families or more vulnerable economic circumstances. Further research would be needed to determine which skills should be prioritized based on labor-market demand and/or potential, and support for small-scale enterprises would also need also need to be included to facilitate job creation. It might be possible to target certain sectors, like wood-carving³⁰ and embroidery (both open to men and women), that were either significant pre-conflict cottage industries or have the potential for growth with proper support in marketing/networking with outside buyers. An explicit - though challenging - aim might be to encourage the establishment or expansion of ethno-religiously mixed enterprises.

One vehicle for this approach would be to (re)construct the Employment Training Centre (*Balai Latihan Kerja* or BLK), managed by the Department of Manpower, in key locations that could act as local magnets for integration such

as in Pendolo-Pandajaya (but also serving Pamona Timur and/or western parts of Morowali District). Rehabilitation of Poso town's BLK could serve a catchment area covering Tentena, Poso town, and nearby areas in Lage, Tojo, and Poso Pesisir. Such an initiative has the potential to reach some hundreds of young adults and support dozens of small-scale enterprises over the course of 2-3 years. Engagement via an institution such as BLK could also be used a vehicle for bring local elites together around a common project that will provide concrete benefits to and across their communities. Obviously, further analysis and consultation with community leaders, local government and other relevant agencies is required to assess the appropriateness and feasibility of such an initiative. Technical assistance could be provided to the Department of Manpower to help ensure that a revitalized BLK does not simply follow "old-style" approaches to training, small-scale entrepreneurship and inter-group cooperation.

Support Local Peace-Building Initiatives in Limited, Concrete Ways

There are a number of community-initiated efforts for (re)integrating certain institutions or localities and for promoting greater inter-group cooperation. Further locally led analyses would be necessary to understand the feasibility and precise requirements in each case, but agencies could potentially provide support for planning or training and/or for overcoming concrete material obstacles involved in implementation. The following are examples of local initiatives that could be considered for support:

- *Integrated Schooling and Education* - Further analysis would be required to understand individual cases sufficiently, but a number of schools could be assisted in reintegrating or founding new but integrated institutions. These proposals include establishing an SMP between the Christian villages of Sepe, Silanca and Bategencu and Muslim areas around Toyado. UNDP has experience in sponsoring the Muhammadiyah-run *Sekolah Rekonsiliasi* in Ambon and World Vision has had encouraging results in supporting integrated schooling in North Maluku through mixed "community education committees." Similarly, the Malukus have seen

³⁰ Given increasing concerns about deforestation in Central Sulawesi and environmental damage more generally in Indonesia, inclusion of wood-carving in such a scheme for training and small-enterprise support should be coupled with efforts aimed at conservation of protected forests and the sustainable use of other timber resources. These are not necessarily incompatible aims, but would require careful planning and perhaps use of woods other than ebony and other high-value hardwoods.

successful examples of computer and creativity centers to provide integrated after-school activities for teenagers.

- *UNSIMAR Reunification* - The Rector is initiating a phased process of reintegrating the two campuses - Poso town's main campus and the informal "satellite" campus established for Christian lecturers and students in Tentena. Reunification is planned to begin on September 2004 and could require material needs or "softer" elements like curriculum reform to assist in this process. Consideration should be given to funding student-led efforts being proposed by the Christian and Muslim students organizations (GMKI, HMI, and KMII) to carry out trainings in conflict resolution and other joint activities.

- *Joint Recreational and Creative Activities* – Support could be provided to local initiatives to use sports, recreation, outdoor team-building activities and arts, especially singing to intensify interaction among children, youth, and adult instructors. This could target ethno-religiously homogeneous "enclaves" in particular, such as Tentena, Poso town, and specific villages (e.g. mono-ethnic transmigrant communities or outlying Christian Mori and Pamona villages which have less day-to-day contact with Muslims in the larger urban centers).

- *Women and Social Cohesion* - For women's activities in particular, the *Foker Perempuan Poso* but also the more or less ready-made (though often inactive) Family Welfare Programme (PKK, or *Program Kesejahteraan Keluarga*). Though the latter have traditionally focused on early-childhood development issues, a number of interlocutors indicated the appropriateness and willingness of PKK to become involved in reconciliation efforts.

- *Inter-Faith Programmes* – Support could be provide to catalyze cooperation between the GKST Synod and Muslim leadership such as through the Al-Khairat network and, if relevant, MUI. If appropriate, such cooperation could lead to a newsletter series on themes in human rights and justice (via a parallel system of *boletin jumatatan* (Friday bulletins) and Sunday bulletins but perhaps supported by a joint editorial team), young-adult discussion groups, and even joint discussion groups between theology students.

Support from institutional leaders would also give further impulse to community-level or village-to-village activities involving youth and/or women's groups from mosques and churches, including recreation and creative activities (see above). Extending this cooperation to encompass Hindus (and Catholics) would further strengthen such an initiative's non-sectarian message and impact. Although it is advisable to proceed carefully in this realm, a first step could be to review the results of a November 2003 meeting on intra- and inter-denominational dialogue organized by the Poso Religious Affairs Office.

- *Other Reconciliation Forums* - It would be premature to recommend any significant support to other, more explicit attempts at inter-group reconciliation, such as the *Ikatan Kekeluargaan Siwagi Lemba Poso*, the *Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Pamona Selatan*, and the KNPI (which has already received government backing). Nonetheless, over the next few months, it may be possible to identify and consider more concrete assistance based on demonstrated needs and potential capacity for effective implementation.

Use the Media to Support Other Peace-Building Efforts

As a complement to the strategies or initiatives above, the media can be used to support peace-building efforts. This could include radio (of which there are a number of FM stations with very limited geographic coverage that could nonetheless be enhanced) or "narrow-cast" media like newsletters and VCD screenings with discussion groups for more targeted audiences. Such media-based efforts would be an important strategy to overcome one of the major obstacles to great social cohesion: the separation of communities due to physical distances between them and/or the homogenizing effects of displacement.³¹ A number of examples are mentioned, not necessarily to endorse specific ideas, but to show the potential for community advocacy and broader dissemination/discussion of relevant themes:

- Greater interaction among youth through sports or creative activities could be

³¹ The media thematic assessment and subsequent programming also refers to some of the broader issues with the media

supplemented with “interactive dialogues” (*dialog interaktif*) on local radio stations as an opportunity for teenagers from all groups to discuss and publicize their problems, fears, and hopes. Similar approaches could be taken with other age/demographic or occupational groups, like local women leaders or market vendors, for example. Similar programming and discussion groups could also be developed for using Common Ground Indonesia’s radio soap opera on multicultural living, “*Menteng Pangkalan*”.

- Community-level or inter-village interaction could be strengthened among various groups by the periodic screening of appropriate VCDs, followed by discussions. All villages visited by the team reported having various households with TVs and VCD players. Alternatively, a media projector could be rotated from place to place. A local NGO or community-driven reconciliation initiative (e.g. *Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Pamona Selatan*) could be engaged to carry this out with a specific geographic area.

- As part of greater church-mosque cooperation, a series of (parallel) newsletters/bulletins on themes related to peace and human rights could be developed for use as “food-for-thought” for routine discussion groups. This could draw from the experiences of the Catholic-run *Bintang Laut* tabloid in Banggai District and similar publications in North Maluku and elsewhere in Indonesia.

Limitations

The thrust of the three sets of recommendations above is in fact to redress 2-3 of the key factors dividing Poso region communities internally or from each other. Such factors most amenable to programmatic responses are physical separation and the existence of parallel religious or ethno-cultural networks, which can be bridged deliberately. There are, however, two areas - insecurity and feelings of grievance and injustice - where the role of external actors is necessarily limited since appropriate action is required of the state. Support can, however, be provided to support community-level advocacy, particularly through efforts such as anti-corruption campaigns that encompass or affect more than one ethno-religious group.

5.3 Areas of Interaction and Synergies with Other Efforts

There are obvious areas for developing synergies with other components of post-conflict programming, namely economic recovery, good governance, and media support but perhaps also gender issues. Seeking to identify and support local women leaders, especially Muslim women, as part of social cohesion programming would be extremely important. In addition, it would be absolutely essential to forge effective inter-agency coordination to support social cohesion with the World Bank’s Kecamatan Development Program and Support for Economic Recovery Program, Asian Development Bank’s Community Empowerment and Rural Development Program and USAID’s Office for Conflict Prevention and Response.

5.4 Frameworks for Monitoring and Evaluation

Developing an effective framework for monitoring and evaluation should be a priority aspect of programme development. The first challenge is to make explicit the underlying “theory of change” on which any program is based. This is the assumed link between achieving programmatic goals and contributing to “peace” in the broader sense. More thinking will have to go into the posited relationship between promoting community-level social cohesion and the prevention of further violence in the Poso region, or the limits to this relationship. It might be that other programmatic components such as governance offer more robust opportunities for strengthening peace directly through supporting the reform or creation of institutions that can redress grievances and injustices. Social cohesion work can then be understood as supporting such peace-building or helping communities overcome the negative effects of conflict, such as segregation and lack of inter-group trust.

External agencies also have a responsibility to anticipate and monitor the potential for negative impacts arising from its own programming including exposing certain individuals or groups to unwarranted risks and ensuring that assistance is provided fairly and evenly across religious and ethnic divisions.

Social change, whether supported by development programming or not, frequently creates “winners” and “losers” as access to or control over productive assets or opportunities for education and employment shift over time. In the relatively charged environment of the Poso region, winners or losers identifiable along ethno-religious lines could become obstacles to sustainable peace if social transformation is perceived as inequitable. In this context, smaller-scale “social cohesion” efforts will be quickly undermined by broader processes that stoke inter-group jealousies or fail to address social injustice.

5.5 Summary

Social cohesion is an outcome of various aspects of life and not simply a project or sub-project. Support to social cohesion must come from the way local people and stakeholders formulate activities together and utilize the resources available to them to fulfill their development needs.

The use of terms such as social cohesion, reconciliation, peace building and other terminologies in programmes should be considered carefully and maybe even avoided. More naturalistic strategies are needed rather than external programmes that local stakeholders could perceive as manipulative. People should be supported to build common interests and to explore their own capacities and resources without necessarily the need to have funding. Key will be finding local champions who act as local facilitators, who can encourage people to contribute to problem-solving and positive change.