

# The PDA: Analytical and Planning Methodology

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## I. About this Booklet

The analytical and planning methodology on which the Peace and Development Analysis (PDA) model is based, has its roots in conflict theory and analytical practice. It is important, therefore, to elucidate the conceptual and comparative basis of the PDA, not only to enable an understanding of how it draws on emerging good practices in the field, but also, and just as importantly, to point out limitations of the approach.

This booklet begins with a look at the five concepts that permeate the PDA:

- Conflict and Development
- Positive Peace
- Conflict Transformation
- Capacities and Vulnerabilities
- Practical and Strategic Needs

There follows, a look at three analytical elements that are common to most available qualitative and quantitative conflict analysis methods, including the PDA: conflict dynamics, peace dynamics and stakeholder dynamics. Then, after looking at PDA within the larger field of conflict analysis and tracing the development of the PDA methodology, readers are shown, step by step, how these three elements can be used to draw out future scenarios – the best-, worst- and status-quo scenarios – and to identify entry-points for response.



Mohamad Yusuf. True Love; linoleum-block, 18 x 11 cm, 2004.

## 2.

# Concepts and Comparative Methods

### 2.1 Concepts

Five concepts underpin the PDA methodology. A brief look at each of them follows.

#### 1. Conflict and Development

The relationship between development and conflict is intricate and synergistic; neither development without peace nor peace without development are sustainable. For good or for bad, development assistance creates incentives and disincentives both for peace and violent conflict. There is now a consensus that development strategies should incorporate measures to counteract the negative impact on conflict as well as to maximise peace-building opportunities.<sup>1)</sup>

#### 2. Positive Peace

Whereas negative peace is defined as the absence of direct violence between individuals and groups (whether it be physical, verbal or psychological) positive peace concerns itself with social justice through equal opportunity, a fair distribution of power and resources, equal protection and impartial law enforcement. The concept of positive peace involves both addressing the root causes of conflict, violence and injustice and supporting conscious efforts to build a society which reflects these commitments.<sup>2)</sup>

#### 3. Conflict Transformation

"Conflict transformation" does not suggest that conflict is eliminated or controlled, but rather recognises and works with its dialectic nature and aims at transforming violent conflict into non-violent forms of resolution.

Social conflict can be seen as a natural product of human relationships. However, once violent conflict occurs, it changes and transforms the people and the relationships

that were the source of conflict in the first instance. Conflicts change relationships in predictable ways, altering patterns of communication and social organisation as well as images of the self and of the other.

Conflict transformation is also a prescriptive concept. It suggests that unattended to, conflict can have destructive consequences. Nonetheless, the consequences can be modified or transformed so that self-images, relationships and social structures improve as a result of conflict instead of being harmed by it. Usually this involves transforming perceptions of issues, actions and other people or groups. Since conflict usually transforms perceptions by accentuating the differences between people and positions, effective conflict transformation can work to improve mutual understanding.<sup>3)</sup>

#### 4. Capacities and Vulnerabilities

Development initiatives are sustainable only if they build on local capacities and tackle deep-rooted vulnerabilities. Traditional capacity and vulnerability analysis (C&V) helps one to understand the type and level of risks that communities face; in particular, "where the risk originates; what and who will be affected; what resources are available to reduce risks; and what conditions need to be strengthened."<sup>4)</sup>

As explained by Cannon et al, "a capacity might include institutional membership, group cohesion, or literacy. Vulnerability can include poverty, house quality, illiteracy or stereotyped perceptions of self and other. The implication is that some capacities are not the opposite of vulnerabilities, and that some low-level vulnerability characteristics are not amenable to being considered capacities when they are at the higher end of the scale."<sup>5)</sup>

In the PDA methodology, C&V concepts have been adapted to the Indonesian post-conflict context, primarily so as to better understand obstacles to peace, lessons learned in the peace-building process and stakeholder dynamics. In each of these, the traditional C&V analytical lenses of physical-material, social-organisational and motivational-attitudinal are reflected.

1. See *Conflict Related Development*; Jakarta: UNDP-BCPR, 2003.

2. See Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. London: Thousand Oaks; and New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 1998.

3. See J.P. Lederach, "In Pressure of Dialogue." *Conciliation Quarterly*, 8:3 (pp. 12-14), 1989.

4. From P. Morgan and S. Taschereau, *Capacity and Institutional Assessment: Frameworks, Methods and Tools for Analysis*. Ottawa: CIDA, 1996.

5. See T. Cannon, J. Twigg and J. Rowell, *Social Vulnerability, Sustainable Livelihoods and Disasters*. London: Department for International Development (n.d.).

## 5. Practical and Strategic Needs

In gender studies, the term “practical gender needs” refers to the daily needs of women and men—food, water, fuel, income, health care and other basic needs. For women, practical gender needs relate to fulfilling their different roles and responsibilities. Just as is stated in *Practical Gender Needs and Strategic Gender Interests*, “where household cooking and fuel collection are women’s responsibilities, more efficient stoves, for example, would address women’s practical gender needs.”<sup>6)</sup>

Strategic gender interests are thus about longer-term issues, addressing, for example, gender gaps or women’s position relative to men. Therefore, the objectives of addressing strategic gender interests are to create gender equity and equality by changing gender roles and responsibilities towards the equitable sharing of resources and benefits between women and men—such things as land rights, access to education, training and technology.

The PDA methodology borrows from gender perspectives by making a distinction between practical and strategic responses to conflict. As one example, a practical response to polarisation and distrust between groups could be initiation of a dialogue process, whereas a strategic response would be more oriented towards the roots of polarisation and distrust, addressing such problems as discrimination or corruption.

## 2.2 Comparative Methods

Over the last ten years, greater recognition has been given by the development community to the need for evidence-based policy in conflict areas. As a result of this trend, several different methods of conflict analysis and strategy formulation have emerged. Largely developed by Western bilateral and multilateral agencies, academic institutions and NGOs, these methods have been designed, primarily, to serve the institutional needs of their creators.

For many of the agencies that have developed such tools, conflict analysis has become a central part of conflict-sensitive practice. It informs conflict-sensitive programming through an understanding of the interaction between the intervention and the context. Conflict analysis tools may be applied to all forms of response to conflicts (development, humanitarian and peace-building) and to all levels of conflict (project, programme and sectoral).<sup>7)</sup>

Where such tools have been developed by civil society organisations in conflict-affected areas—by academic groups and NGOs, for instance—greater emphasis has been placed on multi-stakeholder dialogue for analysis and strategy formulation.<sup>8)</sup>

Alongside project, programme and sectoral interventions, joint analysis and a common understanding of the problem are pre-conditions for a strategy formulation that is able to respond to conflict. Thus, the dialogue activities implemented as part of these processes seek to be transformative.

### Dynamics

**Conflict dynamics** involves looking at structural and proximate causes as well as the expressions of conflict from a sectoral perspective. It also involves understanding linkages at different levels (local, national, regional and international).

**Peace dynamics** seeks out roots of peace in such things as common heritage and trade relationships as well as institutional and traditional mechanisms that are used to manage tensions (e.g. traditional modes of dispute resolution and existing legal systems).

**Stakeholder dynamics** constitute the most difficult aspect of any conflict analysis. Recent qualitative methods, such as those developed by WANEP and Dfid, provide tools for understanding stakeholder dynamics. These include looking at stakeholder agendas, needs, power basis and relationships.

Generating understanding of different perspectives on the causes and dynamics of conflict as well as reaching agreement on how to pro-actively and jointly solve the problems underpins this transformative approach.

From a review of existing qualitative and quantitative conflict analysis methods, several common analytical elements can be identified: conflict dynamics, peace dynamics and stakeholder dynamics.<sup>9)</sup> Each of these elements are used to draw out future scenarios—best-worst- and status quo—and identify entry-points for response.

The available strategy formulation frameworks for response to conflict are often part of a conflict analysis tool and focus on adjusting existing programmes to conflict situations. From them, it is possible to draw out some common ingredients.<sup>10)</sup>

In terms of content, the following elements of strategy formulation emerge from practice:

- **A shared vision of peace.** In this, emphasis is placed on making explicit and agreeing on the desired final outcome of a series of responses.
- **A common understanding of the issues.** Here, a shared problem definition and understanding of strategic considerations (e.g. negotiable and non-negotiable stakeholder agendas) is a prerequisite for concerted action.
- **Understanding who is doing what and who may do what.** This is a capacities and agendas assessment for responding agencies that sets the foundation for effective burden-sharing.
- **Agreement on values and principles.** In this, agreement on the values and principles (e.g. participation and coordination) that should underpin response definition and implementation are important.
- **Agreement on priority responses, approaches and sequencing.** Based on the above, what to do and when to do it are decided.
- **Burden-sharing and follow-up.** Also based on the above, a division of labour is agreed upon and monitoring and coordination mechanisms are established.

From a process perspective, there are a number of considerations. Three are particularly important:

- Strategy formulation is a process, not a project.** Multi-stakeholder strategy formulation processes in conflict areas take time. Invariably, issues emerge that require follow-up. Approaching such processes as one-off projects is likely to lead to frustration among participating stakeholders by raising expectations that cannot be met.
- Design the process with the outcomes in mind.** In addition to the resulting strategy, other outcomes such as common ground between stakeholders, improved relationships, and so on may also be sought. Both the desired content and these other outcomes determine how the strategy formulation process is designed.
- Context appropriateness.** Strategy formulation processes are designed to be culturally and politically feasible. This involves decisions on what content to cover, who to invite where and when, the location of the process and so on.

6. See *Practical Gender Needs and Strategic Gender Interests*. United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) of the Pacific, 2000. See: <http://www.unifempacific.com>

7. See *Conflict-sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peace building: Tools for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment*. London: FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld, 2003.

8. Examples include EAWARN (Early Warning Networks of the Caucasus/Former Soviet Union) and WANEP, the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding.

9. See FEWER, 2003. Also see L. Van de Goor and S. Versteegen, *Conflict Prognosis: Bridging the Gap between Early Warning and Response* (Parts One and Two). The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 1999.

10. See: Gaigals, C. and M. Leonhardt. *Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development: A Review of Practice*, London: FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld, 2001. Also see: Smith, D. *Getting their Act Together: Towards a Strategic Framework for Peace-building*. Oslo: PRIO, 2003.

## 2.3 Methodological Limitations

There are several limitations to the PDA methodology. These relate to underlying assumptions, inherent weaknesses and basic caveats. Users should keep these in mind when applying the methodology.

### 1. Assumptions

A number of basic assumptions underpin the methodology and strategy formulation framework provided here.

- A basic assumption is that peace and development are inextricably linked. Development activities are seen as critical for tackling structural causes of conflict and bolstering the peace fabric of conflict-affected communities.
- As with most conflict analysis tools, the PDA analytical methodology draws heavily on structural and relational theories. The assumption here is that by understanding the issues and actors, one should be able to obtain a fair sense of what a post-conflict situation is about. It is important to accept, therefore, that the responses that are identified may not always be on target and will need further adjustments during implementation.
- The planning framework provided in the PDA strategy formulation methodology is generic in nature and does not reflect the specific needs of any one institution. It is assumed that users of the methodology will either adapt it or draw on parts of it to suit particular institutional needs.
- The analytical and strategy formulation methodology is premised on the assumption that the context should inform responses. This precludes an analysis based on specific agendas and institutional capacities. However, institutional influences in the PDA methodology are visible in the focus on developmental responses to post-conflict situations.

### 2. Weaknesses

The field of conflict analysis and response strategy formulation is evolving and many challenges remain unsolved. These challenges are also visible here:

- Conflict analysis is in essence about making sense of highly complex situations. This implies simplification, which is done not only through a focus on specific aspects of conflict such as the dynamics of conflict or peace and stakeholders, but also by using frameworks, matrices and other statistical charts, none of which can ever fully capture the complexity of conflict.

- Given sensitivities and preferences expressed by different stakeholders in the preparation of this tool, a strong emphasis is placed on peace, obstacles, lessons learned, capacities, vulnerabilities and so on. An effort has been made to ensure that the methodology draws on good conflict analysis but the balance may not quite give a sufficiently full understanding of conflict.
- A critical weakness in many current strategy formulation methods is the limited focus on institutional constraints (e.g. mandates, capacities, agendas, political pressures, etc.). These constraints are manifested in institutional agendas, capacities and procedures. Understanding them is paramount for effective response. The PDA methodology does not provide a framework for understanding these, two reasons being that "the jury is still out" on how to best do this for conflict situations and that the task itself is significant.

### 3. Caveats

Three important caveats should be mentioned in relation to the PDA methodology.

- Although the methodology presented here can be used by an individual to design a PDA strategy for a given context, it was designed for multi-stakeholder processes. As such, it is best used in group and dialogue settings.
- It is important to understand the PDA methodology properly before using it. A text-based methodology invariably leaves room for misunderstanding or may be unclear to certain audiences. Training prior to its use is therefore important.
- The PDA methodology provides a framework for strategy formulation based on analysis. Given that it is simply a framework, a good outcome from its use is dependent both on solid data and good judgement.

## 3. Methodological Overview

### 3.1. Steps in the Methodology

The PDA methodology is designed to ensure that national and sub-national development strategies in Indonesia are conflict sensitive. Emphasis has been placed on ensuring that the methodology can be used in participatory planning exercises involving multiple stakeholders.

The PDA is a tool for designing comprehensive strategic response frameworks that have been agreed upon, through consensus, by key stakeholders in conflict settings. As such, the PDA does not provide the detailed kind of information required for the design of projects. For this purpose, additional information and other forms of data gathering may be required. In Indonesia, UNDP undertook a series of thematic assessments aimed at gaining an understanding of the impact of conflict on priority sectors (e.g. local economic development, social cohesion, gender, etc.) and an assessment of relevant institutions that UNDP would want to impact. In addition, project design often depends upon specific institutional planning frameworks which are not covered in this methodology.

This overview outlines the different elements of the PDA methodology and the strategic planning framework that can be used to summarise the completed analysis.


The methodology itself involves six interlinked steps:

1. Visioning peace and development
2. Identifying obstacles to peace
3. Assessing stakeholder dynamics
4. Drawing lessons from peace building and understanding the roots of peace
5. Developing scenarios
6. Defining preventive development responses.

A flowchart depicting these steps is shown in Figure 1. The steps may be briefly described as follows:

- **Step One** in the process, visioning peace and development, provides the overall goal for preventive development responses in the province. It should reflect the consensus definition, principles and benchmarks of peace and development.
- **Steps Two, Three and Four** provide for the identification of key vulnerabilities and capacities for peace. In other words, what are the key issues or dynamics in the situation that have to be addressed in order to realise the defined vision for peace and development.
- **Step Five** enables an understanding of the possible future operating environment based on current conditions. The scenarios that are built also inform

Figure 1  
Key Steps of the PDA Methodology



pro-active responses for building peace, transforming the status-quo and preventing (or being prepared for) a severe deterioration in the situation.

- **Step Six** covers the efforts required to realise the best-case scenario and vision for peace and development (peace-building), transformation of the status-quo (conflict transformation) and prevention of or preparation for the worst-case scenario (conflict prevention and contingency planning). These are differentiated as either strategic or practical responses.

### 3.2 The Strategic Planning Framework

The PDA Strategic Planning Framework matrix (Matrix 1) serves as an executive summary to a PDA report, providing, at a glance, the analysis and rationale for development programmes in a given conflict area. In the following section, readers will learn, step by step, how this matrix is to be filled out.

By the end of this process—once an analysis has been completed—the developed framework can serve as a guide for the planning of further steps.

**Matrix 1**  
**The PDA Strategic Planning Framework**

Country:	Province:	Date:
Vision for Peace and Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Definition</li> <li>• Principles</li> <li>• Benchmarks</li> </ul>	
Scenarios (12-24 months)	Best-case scenario (likelihood?) Status-quo scenario (likelihood?) Worst-case scenario (likelihood?)	
Vulnerabilities of Peace		Capacities for Peace
1.		1.
2.		2.
3.		3.
Preventive Development Responses		Key Directions
Practical		
Strategic		
Strategic Considerations		

## 4. PDA Methodology

### 4.1 The PDA Development Process

The PDA development process stressed simplicity and accessibility, contextualizing conflict analysis processes, and linking international standards to local needs.

#### 1. Simplicity and Accessibility

Knowing that the levels of familiarity with PDA concepts would vary greatly in the provinces and among stakeholders, a decision was made early on to engage in a methodological development process that involved repeated simplification and constant attention to accessibility. The development process was iterative and, at the outset, involved an extensive review of international good practice by UNDP and CSPS on how to adapt the methodology to the specificities of the Indonesian context. This included reviewing lessons learned from their application by UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) and other institutions.

The design of the methodology process, started with a complex first draft that was jointly designed by UNDP and CSPS over the course of a four-day workshop. The workshop highlighted the need to address differences in perspectives about, as one example, the end user of these processes and the role that facilitators and conveners would play. The workshop proved invaluable for building consensus on the roles of the different participating institutions. Frequent reworking and peer-reviewing following training events and workshops eventually led to a more accessible output.

Of critical importance in the elaboration of the PDA process was: a.) attention to the desired outcomes of the workshop; b.) the context in which the workshops were to be applied; c.) the use of approaches having similarity with ones that had already been developed in the province (e.g., community dialogue activities); and d.) the selection of participants.

These four variables guided not only the development and refining of the methodology and process, but also the facilitation of workshops.

Incorporating the outcomes of field research and consultations into the tool made the PDA methodology more sensitive and responsive to the local context and needs.

### 2. Contextualising Conflict Analysis

Within the Indonesian context, it proved necessary to undertake a substantive level of adaptation and reviewing of the PDA tool. Interviews with stakeholders highlighted a number of issues that required careful attention.

- Language for the PDA needed to be closely linked to development discourse in Indonesia.
- The focus had best be on peace and the future, not on conflict and the past. Talking about conflict would not have lead to consensus.)
- Certain key elements of a conflict analysis—stakeholder analysis, for one—could not be undertaken at the sub-national level. Thus, this step was changed into a review of peace-building lessons learned and capacities and vulnerabilities. These two processes led, indirectly, to an assessment of stakeholders' roles and interests.

The review also determined who should participate in the workshops, how to select participants and how to ensure that those not included would not spoil it from outside. Efforts were also directed towards developing a methodology that could be easily practiced by local partners.

The district-level workshops captured key concerns of local communities and those persons most affected by conflict, including main issues affecting IDPs. As a result, the design team reviewed the workshop process once again to ensure that these issues would be given attention at the provincial and national levels.

### 3. Linking International Standards to Local Needs

Emerging international good practice on conflict analysis involves an understanding of conflict and peace indicators as well as stakeholder dynamics. Such assessments are commonly carried out through one-off assessments by external experts. However, where participation is a guiding principle, discussions on conflict indicators and stakeholder dynamics are sensitive and can easily become politicised. Because of this, marrying international standards in PDA-type exercises with the Indonesian context proved to be challenging. Many of the difficulties faced were rooted in the interventionist and expert-intensive paradigms that characterise work on conflict analysis and strategic planning.

## 4.2 Steps in the PDA Process

In this section we trace each of the key steps in the PDA Methodology. In the process we provide a series of matrices that are linked to the Strategic Planning Framework (Matrix No.1). As the reader will see, these matrices have already been filled in or developed. This has been done to make them more "real" for the reader. While the information found in them represents a synthesis of the outcomes of workshops, they are to be viewed as illustrations only. For the benefit of those persons or institutions who are planning on conducting a PDA workshop we also attach a set of undeveloped matrices in the supplementary PDA CD-ROM. (Please refer to the folder titled "PDF Matrices.")

### Step 1. Visioning Peace and Development

<b>Purpose:</b>	To set the overall goal for development efforts at the national or sub-national level.
<b>Definitions:</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A vision for peace and development refers to local interpretations and perspectives on peace and development. For planning purposes, a useful vision would include definitions, key principles and benchmarks.</li> <li>Sustainable peace requires the deep institutionalization of participatory processes providing civil and political rights to all peoples. The building blocks of sustainable peace and security are well-functioning local, state, regional and international systems of governance, which are responsive to basic human needs. It designates positive peace over the long-term and should include the strengthening of institutions (state, polity, etc) as key for mediating conflict and change.</li> </ul>
<b>Approach:</b>	Defining a vision for peace and development should be a participatory exercise. However, for desk-based exercises (i.e. using the methodology without field-research), the table below may be useful. It is important to ensure that the vision includes a definition, principles, and concrete benchmarks for peace and development.
<b>Key Activities:</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Defining what peace and development and their linkages mean for communities in the province or locality and highlighting the principles that community groups feel should underpin peace and development efforts.</li> <li>Identifying the benchmarks or concrete outcomes that would characterise a situation of peace and development. This means defining what peace and development and their linkages mean for communities in the province or locality.</li> </ol>

## Matrix 2 Visioning Peace and Development (in North Maluku)

Elements	Vision for Peace and Development
<b>Definitions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Defined as where the rule of law is upheld, social and economic conditions are good, relations harmonious, and there is freedom from fear.</li> </ul>
<b>Principles</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Principled development is participatory, equitable, sustainable and empowering. There is accountability in aid activities and decisions are followed up with implementation.</li> </ul>
<b>Benchmarks</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Benchmarks include the reintegration of IDPs, economic growth, harmonious social relations, support for vulnerable groups, protection of political rights and significant reduction in incidences of corruption.</li> </ul>

### a. Defining a Vision for Peace and Development

In elaborating one's vision of peace, consider the following questions:

- Are the political, economic, social and security dimensions adequately considered in the vision?
- Is the vision relevant for vulnerable or marginalised groups, including children, youth, elderly, women and the very poor?

Does the vision reflect key national and international concerns and principles, such as human rights, territorial integrity, rule of law and non-violence?

### b. Identifying Benchmarks and Outcomes

For the purpose of identifying benchmarks and outcomes for peace and development, a sample grid (Matrix 2) and how it might be filled in is shown above. As was already mentioned, the information found in this matrix and the others that follow represents a composite of material gathered from the workshops held in Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi. These are examples only. However, users may find the formats useful for their own exercises.

Benchmarks and principles are best drawn out in working groups but it is also possible to do this exercise through brainstorming and other participatory exercises. For desk-reviews, it is recommended to use relevant institutional policy documents and guidelines to identify the relevant organisational values and principles underpinning mandates

## Step 2. Identifying Obstacles to Peace

**Purpose:** To map the range of barriers in a post-conflict situation as well as key vulnerabilities of peace that need to be addressed.

**Definitions:**

- **Obstacles to peace** are factors preventing the realisation of the identified vision for peace and development or those issues that, if unresolved, may lead to the resurgence of violence and structural causes of conflict that remain unaddressed.
- **Vulnerabilities of peace** are key dynamics in the environment that weaken people's ability to manage, prevent or cope with conflict, and make people more susceptible to its consequences.<sup>11)</sup>

**Approach:** There are several visual approaches that can be used to identify obstacles to peace. Two ways are suggested here: a matrix format and an "Obstacles to Peace Tree (which is similar to a "conflict tree"). Either may be useful in mapping out key obstacles to peace.

In the PDA tool, vulnerabilities to peace are important because: they are related to obstacles to peace; they help us to identify, even if only indirectly, conflict stakeholders and key actors in peace-building lessons learned; and they help us draw scenarios and identify entry-points for response.

**Key Activities:**

- Identifying and making explicit obstacles to peace, including: visible or surface obstacles to peace that may lead to a resurgence of violence (e.g. the activities of provocateurs); immediate or proximate obstacles (e.g. inter-communal distrust); and structural or root causes of conflict (e.g. unemployment and corruption).
- Establishing how the causes of conflict relate to one other to gain an understanding of conflict dynamics.
- Identifying capacities and vulnerabilities.

### a. Identifying and Making Explicit Obstacles to Peace

For the purpose of the PDA, obstacles to peace were divided in separate categories, depending on whether they were economic, cultural-social or security-related. This enabled participants to work on all types of obstacles and made it easier to organise working groups.

Once a fairly complete list of obstacles has been compiled, it is possible, in plenary or in working groups, to map them in the form of a matrix or a tree. The mapping of the causes of conflict may be facilitated by first considering a number of questions:

- Are political, economic, cultural-social and security dimensions adequately considered in the obstacles?

11. Adapted from UNDP-BCPR, *Gender Approaches in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations*.


- Are the obstacles that have been identified relevant to vulnerable or marginalised groups (children, the elderly, women, the very poor)?
- Are the obstacles identified at multiple levels (community, district, provincial and national)?
- Are both the historical and future obstacles to peace considered?
- Are both the factual and the perceived or symbolic obstacles identified?

The reader should keep in mind that in constructing both the matrix and the Obstacles to Peace Tree, it is often useful to start with the most visible surface obstacle, for

example, conflicts between internally displaced persons (IDPs) and host communities, and then ask the question why this might be occurring. The search for an answer to this question might lead one down the trunk of the tree (Figure 2) or the matrix (Matrix 3) to such proximate obstacles as differential treatment between IDPs and host communities or, even further, to the root or structural causes of conflict, for example, misuse or corruption in the distribution of assistance to IDPs.

In drawing or constructing the Obstacles to Peace Tree, examples of surface or proximate obstacles and structural causes of conflict are placed adjacent to the figure.

**Figure 2**  
**The Obstacles to Peace Tree** <sup>12)</sup>



**The Branches:** Surface Obstacles  
These are the multitude of smaller or surface obstacles to peace emerging from the trunk. Examples include conflicts between IDPs and their host communities, growth in prostitution and land disputes.

**The Trunk:** Proximate Obstacles  
The trunk gives onlookers some ideas of the immediate or proximate causes of the obstacles seen at a surface (branch) level. These may include differential treatment between IDPs and communities, social disintegration and resource scarcity.

**The Roots:** Structural Causes of Conflict  
These are the structural causes of conflict. Examples may include injustice, economic deprivation, ignorance, prejudice and intolerance, corruption and poor governance.

12. The concept for the Obstacles to Peace Tree has been adapted from *Developing Capacity for Conflict Analysis and Early Response: A Training Manual*, UNDESA 2003

**Matrix 3  
Obstacles to Peace (from North Maluku)**

Obstacles	Obstacles to Peace
<b>Surface</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IDPs still face significant problems</li> <li>• Uncertain regional boundaries</li> <li>• Unresolved trauma and distrust</li> </ul>
<b>Proximate</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Community and government distrust</li> <li>• Poor communication between groups</li> <li>• Ethnic and religious polarisation</li> <li>• Lack of coordination/disorientation</li> </ul>
<b>Structural Causes</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Corruption, collusion and nepotism</li> <li>• Widespread unemployment and poverty</li> <li>• Lack of trust in (and between) the government and community</li> </ul>

**b. Establishing how Causes of Conflict Relate to One Another**

Once the obstacles have been mapped, it is important to establish how these causes of conflict relate to one another. This exercise serves to give one an understanding of the conflict dynamics of the situation. Remember that obstacles are likely to be linked and reinforce one another through different dynamics. These reinforcing dynamics are the vulnerabilities, examples of which are shown in Figure 3.

To make linkages, it is useful to draw relational webs between both the surface and proximate obstacles to peace, as well as the structural causes of conflict. Such webs connect related obstacles and roots. The more linkages an obstacle or root has, the more important a vulnerability it is. Note that obstacles may be connected both across levels, from surface to proximate, and with root causes.

Once the linkages between obstacles or roots have been drawn and critical clusters identified, these can be moved into a "Vulnerabilities of Peace" table such as the one shown in Matrix 4.

The C&V analysis constitutes an important moment in generating consensus among participants to a PDA process as these are areas where all actors may wish to work on finding common solutions.

**Figure 3  
Reinforcing Dynamics (from North Maluku)**



**Matrix 4  
Vulnerabilities to Peace (from the North Maluku Case)**

Vulnerabilities of Peace	
<b>Key Linkages or Reinforcing Dynamics (in obstacles to peace)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Corruption, collusion and nepotism (linked to lack of coordination and disorientation, IDP problems, ethnic and religious polarisation and lack of trust in government)</li> <li>• IDPs still face significant problems (linked to lack of coordination and disorientation, unresolved trauma, ethnic and religious polarisation and corruption, collusion and nepotism)</li> </ul>

### Step 3. Assessing Stakeholder Dynamics

**Purpose:** The purpose of assessing peace and conflict actors is to understand dynamics of and between key stakeholders. Stakeholder analysis facilitates an understanding of how key parties in the conflict environment determine and relate to the conflict and peace dynamics. A good stakeholder analysis provides an understanding of their agendas and interests, their networks of support and their capacities and vulnerabilities.

- Definitions:**
- **Stakeholders** refer to individuals, groups, institutions or actors who are engaged in or being affected by conflict and peace dynamics. Stakeholders differ in relation to their interests as well as in their ability to realise their interests.
  - **Interests** refer to implicit or explicit needs and agendas of key groups. The ability of these groups to realise them is assessed by looking at their tangible (e.g. human and material) and intangible (e.g. influence, credibility, symbolic) means.
  - **Capacities for peace** refer to, in this step, positive characteristics and dynamics among stakeholders that strengthen their ability to manage, prevent or cope with conflict—as well as to build peace.
  - **Vulnerabilities of peace** are, in this step, the major negative dynamics among stakeholders that weaken people's ability to manage, prevent or cope with conflict and make people more susceptible to its consequences.

**Approach:** There are a range of methods that can be used to analyse stakeholder and actors. However, rapidly changing dynamics in post-conflict situations make stakeholder assessments difficult to conduct. Adaptations of a tool and a matrix developed by BCPR/UNDP—the Conflict Development Analysis (CDA) tool and Stakeholder Analysis Matrix—along with instructions on how to apply them are given below.

- Key Activities:**
- Listing the key stakeholders at different levels and mapping their implicit and explicit interests, i.e., their needs and agendas.
  - Outlining their ability, both the tangible and intangible means they possess, to realise their interests.
  - Drawing out the impacts, both negative and positive, that stakeholders have on each other.
  - Looking at whether stakeholder groups represent capacities or vulnerabilities in peace efforts.

#### a. Listing Key Stakeholders and Mapping their Interests

In mapping the implicit and explicit interests—the needs and agendas—of key stakeholders at the various levels (community, district, provincial and national) the following questions may be helpful:

- Who are the key players or stakeholders with a stake in the conflict?
- Who are the key players with a stake in peace?
- Are the frequently under-represented stakeholders (e.g. young people, women, children, IDPs) included in the process?
- Have all stakeholders been considered (e.g. radical groups, the security apparatus, local elites, etc.)?

#### b. Outlining Stakeholders' Abilities to Realise their Agendas

A matrix for the placement of this information would look like the one shown in Matrix 5. A list of relevant actors or stakeholders for a given area can be generated through brainstorming and group discussions conducted in a workshop format or through interviews with various stakeholders. The actors who are identified—in this case, from the province of Maluku—are then listed in the Stakeholder Analysis Matrix.

**Matrix 5  
Stakeholder Analysis (for Maluku)**

Level	Stakeholders	Interests	Ability to Realise Agenda
Community	IDPs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Need for settlement and relocation</li> <li>• Transparent humanitarian assistance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Limited to advocacy but able to clearly articulate and communicate needs</li> </ul>
	Communities with many IDPs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Relocation of IDPS</li> <li>• Additional development resources</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Limited to local level through leaders and/or acts of violence</li> </ul>
District	Local elites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maintain the status quo to continue benefiting from polarised politics</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use of local militant groups, manipulation of media and others</li> </ul>
	Local NGOS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Well-being for IDPs promote social organisation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Resources to work with targeted constituencies, some convening capacity</li> <li>• Extensive interface with communities and trust</li> </ul>
	Religious leaders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Some focused on peace, other focused on promoting differences and strong "non negotiable positions"</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mobilisation of larger numbers of people for peaceful or violent processes</li> <li>• Convening capacity</li> <li>• Influence in community, local government and public opinion</li> </ul>
Provincial	Provincial government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Move beyond conflict into "normal" development planning</li> <li>• Bring additional resources to the province</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Limited resources, limited coordination and response capacity, lack of trust from civil society, lack of capacities</li> </ul>
	Conflict centres in universities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promote peace-building activities</li> <li>• Capitalise on peace building resources</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ability to influence decision makers</li> <li>• Ability to bring in external resources</li> <li>• Limited interface with communities</li> </ul>
National	National government International donors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Move to reconstruction phase</li> <li>• Limited recognition of conflict as a development issue</li> <li>• Lack of coherence in responses</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A great deal of power derived from direct control of all policies and resources linked to humanitarian response (e.g. IDPs)</li> <li>• Control of all security policy</li> <li>• Financial resources and policy impact</li> </ul>

**Matrix 6**  
**Consolidated Stakeholder Analysis (for Maluku)**

Level	Stakeholders	Interests	Impacts/Reactions	Capacities/ Vulnerabilities
<b>Community</b>	IDPs (Christian and Muslims)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Need for settlement and relocation</li> <li>Transparent humanitarian assistance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Frustration with government and development agencies</li> <li>Distrust in government</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Rights awareness and strong articulation among IDPs of needs</li> <li>Social jealousy and tensions</li> </ul>
<b>District</b>	District government NGOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reputation, power and (control of?) financial resources</li> <li>Engagement and influence on policy making</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>State centred, exclusive and top down policy antagonises IDPs</li> <li>Corruption and policy distortion creates distrust</li> <li>NGO's?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Civil society awareness and increasing organisation</li> <li>Corruption and policy distortion</li> <li>Tensions between government and civil society</li> </ul>
<b>Provincial</b>	Provincial government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reputation, power and financial resources</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Poor coordination, policy distortion and corruption creates distrust</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Poor coordination, policy distortion and corruption</li> <li>Tensions between district and provincial government</li> <li>Tensions between government and civil society</li> </ul>
<b>National</b>	National government and political parties  Umbrella or network NGO's?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reputation, power and financial resources</li> <li>National stability and territorial integrity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>State centred, exclusive and top-down policy, as well as corruption in aid process creates distrust</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Awareness in national government of the need for a broad conflict prevention approach</li> <li>State centred, exclusive and top-down policy, as well as corruption in aid</li> <li>Tensions between government and civil society</li> </ul>

**c. Determining the Impacts Stakeholders have on One Other**

After identifying stakeholders, their interests and their ability to realise agendas, it is then necessary to ask a number of additional questions in order to better assess the stakeholders' respective positions and what the future might bring. Answers to are put into a consolidated stakeholder analysis matrix (Matrix 6). Questions might include:

- Are the political, economic, social and security stakeholders adequately considered in the assessment?
- Are stakeholder dynamics considered in light of their impact on vulnerable or marginalised groups (e.g. children, youth, elderly, women, the very poor?)
- Are both historical and future stakeholders considered? (Historical stakeholders are those who traditionally have been very important but it is also important to recognise actors whose future importance is emerging.)
- Are both factual and perceived or symbolic stakeholders assessed? (Remember, some stakeholders have visible means such as money or weapons to make them seem important but there are often, other, stakeholders who have strong symbolic or perceived importance such as religious leaders.)

Once this mapping is done, stakeholders must be assessed in terms of how their interests and abilities may affect other groups. In doing this, pay particular attention to positive and negative impacts. Positive impacts become stakeholder capacities for peace while negative impacts become vulnerabilities of peace. Refer again to Matrix No. 6, which offers a framework for such a consolidated or developed analysis.

**d. Determining whether Stakeholder Groups Represent Capacities or Vulnerabilities**

Once key stakeholder capacities and vulnerabilities are identified, they can be moved to a Capacities and Vulnerabilities Matrix (Matrix 7).

**Matrix 7**  
**Stakeholders' Capacities & Vulnerabilities**

	Capacities for Peace	Vulnerabilities of Peace
<b>Key Dynamics and Impacts or Reactions among Stakeholders</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Rights awareness and strong articulation among IDPs of needs</li> <li>Civil society awareness and increasing organisation</li> <li>Awareness in national government of the need for a broad conflict prevention approach</li> <li>Decentralisation of development planning and resources</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Social jealousy and tensions between local communities and IDPs</li> <li>Tensions between government and civil society at all levels and within government at provincial and district levels</li> <li>State-centred, exclusive and top-down policy, as well as corruption in aid</li> </ul>

## Step 4. Drawing Lessons from Peace-building and Understanding the Roots of Peace

**Purpose:** The purpose of drawing lessons from past and current peace-building efforts is to ensure that these inform current initiatives. However, such an assessment is incomplete if the roots of peace are not understood. Lessons learned and assessing the roots of peace help identify strategic considerations for future preventive development efforts as well as vulnerabilities and capacities for peace.

**Definitions:**

- **Peace-building** is aimed at creating conditions necessary for positive and sustainable peace by addressing causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. It relates to the functioning of society and the state. Although it is a holistic process, involving broad-based inter-agency cooperation across a wide range of issues, it is clearly targeted at the prevention of the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict and the consolidation of peace.
- **Crisis management** refers to actions undertaken with the main objective to prevent an intensification of vertical violence and an expansion of horizontal (or territorial) spread among existing violent conflicts.
- **Roots of peace** are existing social values (e.g. co-existence, tolerance and mutual support) and institutions (family, community, market, the state, etc.) that positively maintain a state of peace.
- **Capacities for peace** refer to, in this step, successful peace efforts and existing roots of peace that strengthen people's ability to manage, prevent and cope with conflict as well as to build peace.
- **Vulnerabilities of peace** are, in this step, key flaws in peace efforts as well as dynamics that erode the roots of peace, which in turn weaken people's ability to manage, prevent or cope with conflict and make people more susceptible to its consequences.
- **Practical Peace-Building Responses** address the immediate challenges in the post-conflict environment, such as those related to the impact of surface and proximate obstacles to peace.
- **Strategic Peace-Building Responses** tackle the structural causes of these immediate challenges and strengthen the roots of peace.

**Approach:** Peace-building efforts are often diverse in nature. As such, in dealing with a particular situation, one must be able to systematise lessons from different initiatives. This means identifying the peace-building response; identifying problems to be addressed and the aim of response; highlighting factors that contribute to success and to failure; and drawing out strategic considerations for peace-building programmes.

**Key Activities:**

- a. Listing key peace-building responses and identifying strategic and practical responses, including: outlining aims of responses as well as issues and problems they were addressing; assessing the factors that contributed to the failure and success of each response; and summarising overall lessons learnt that should be considered in the design of new responses.
- b. Understanding and unpacking the roots of peace.
- c. Identifying peace capacities and peace vulnerabilities.

### a. Listing Key Peace-building Responses and outlining their Aims

By this stage a review of past efforts might be in order. This may be facilitated by answering the following questions:

- Have peace-building efforts in the political, economic, cultural-social and security domains been adequately considered?
- Have peace-building efforts at the various levels (community, district, provincial and national) been properly identified?
- Is there effective coordination among implementers of the peace effort? If so, how does this coordination (or lack thereof) affect the success or failure of the initiative?
- Are the peace-building efforts focused on crisis management such as stopping violence or on building sustainable peace?
- What are the institutional problems (capacity, decision-making and agendas, for example) that stop peace-building efforts from being implemented?

As indicated by the definition given above for peace-building, efforts towards this goal can be quite diverse in nature. Matrix 8a and Matrix 8b provide two different illustrations of some of the analysis undertaken in Central Sulawesi and North Maluku.

These matrixes contain five columns, each with its own purpose:

- **The first column** is used to identify peace-building responses such as provision of access to legal redress.
- **The second column** is used to identify problems being addressed such as lack of legal redress for IDPs and the aim of response (for example, to compensate IDPs and to facilitate their return).
- **The third column** is used to highlight factors that contributed to success of the programme—for

**Matrix 8a**  
**Peace-building Responses (in Central Sulawesi)**

Peace-building Response	Problem Addressed and Aim of Response	Factors Contributing to Success (if any)	Factors Contributing to Failure (if any)
Malino Peace Agreement	Communal fighting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strong national government commitment</li> <li>• Engagement of key leaders</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Too fast</li> <li>• Negotiations did not involve communities</li> <li>• Follow-up structures not participative and inefficient</li> <li>• Limited resources to implement</li> <li>• No consideration of economic strategy</li> </ul>
	Destruction of infrastructure		
	Rekindle economic activities		
Humanitarian Response to IDPs	Enhance cooperation among stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Substantive resources allocated by national govt. to deal with the IDP situation</li> <li>• Political commitment of local authorities to address the problem</li> <li>• Some communities prepared to identify constructive solutions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A great deal of local-level corruption in the distribution of IDP resources</li> <li>• Lack of coordination between relevant government departments at local level</li> <li>• Lack of consultation and participation of IDPs in defining solutions</li> <li>• Security and humanitarian response not consistent</li> </ul>
	Many IDPs in extreme vulnerable conditions		
	IDP presence could be catalyst for renewed violence		
Key Lessons Learned and Gaps (Strategic Considerations)	Enable the survival of IDPs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Greater attention to process and drawing on lessons learned outside Indonesia for promotion of peace agreements</li> <li>• Greater ownership of "radical" groups is necessary to sustain peace agreements</li> <li>• Representative bodies for implementation of peace agreement require different procedures for selecting participants and appropriating resources to implement solutions</li> <li>• Greater agency and support to IDPs to play a key role in the definition of response strategies and implementation</li> </ul>	
	Ensure the cooperation of IDPs in the response		

instance, recognition of the problems by government, communities and donors. (Please note that there are many ways to assess whether a response was a success or a failure. As simple guidance, successful responses are those that have either largely reached the stated objectives or have had a positive indirect impact on conflict and peace.)

- **The fourth column** is used to highlight factors that contributed to failure of the programme. This might include that IDP humanitarian packages were short-term, the existence of corruption and so on. As simple guidance, a failed response is one that did not, for the most part, reach its stated objective or that had a negative indirect impact on conflict and peace.
- **The fifth column** (or row) in the grid summarises key lessons learned. In systematising lessons learned it is important to provide sufficient time for participants to "unpack" both the problems that the response was suppose to address and the factors that contributed to success or failure. This may entail a sensitive and possibly contentious discussion where very different perspectives may come in.

Lessons Learned will be used at a later stage (Step 6) to draw out strategic considerations for peace-building programmes (e.g., that IDP programmes should be complemented by reconstruction and anti-corruption efforts). Gaps that need addressing—"gaps" being key obstacles to peace not being adequately addressed by current efforts—are also to be brought forward to Step 6.

**Matrix 8b**  
**Peace-building Responses (in North Maluku)**

Peace-building Response	Problem Addressed and Aim of Response	Factors Contributing to Success (if any)	Factors Contributing to Failure (if any)
Short-term humanitarian assistance to IDPs managed by government	Basic needs of IDPs are not being met	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Timely/appropriate/significant resources allocated by a number of organisations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of coordination among agencies with consequent duplication</li> <li>• Lack of reliable data/analytical frameworks for IDPs on which to base programmes</li> <li>• Corruption in relief distribution systems</li> </ul>
	Enable the survival of IDPs		
Reconciliation and mediation by communities at the community level	Polarised/traumatised communities characterised by high levels of distrust	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Community-owned and managed process</li> <li>• Dialogue/healing processes focused on real and pertinent issues</li> <li>• Processes facilitated by accepted third party CBOs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of security in some areas impedes reconciliation</li> <li>• Limited resources allocated for such initiatives which leads to discontinuity</li> </ul>
	Bolster community cohesion and reduce the divide between groups		
Economic development and empowerment by international development agencies	Disrupted and destroyed economic infrastructure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Significant resources allocated to economic development</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of coordination among agencies with consequence inefficiencies</li> <li>• Limited use of participatory planning and implementation methods</li> <li>• Lack of reliable quantitative data on key indicators (unemployment etc.)</li> </ul>
	Rekindle economic activities in post-conflict areas		
<b>Key Lessons Learned and Gaps (Strategic Considerations)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Resources are largely allocated to short-term and "tangible" projects, leaving community-based initiatives under-funded</li> <li>• Lack of coordination, unreliable data and limited participation in planning/implementation leads to inefficiencies in peace-building efforts</li> <li>• Poor security impedes and undermines reconciliation efforts</li> </ul>		

**Matrix 9**  
**Roots of Peace (in North Maluku)**


Sector	Social Values	Institutions
<b>Political</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Emerging democracy at national level and decentralisation</li> <li>• Recognition of the need to safeguard human and civil rights in government</li> <li>• Increasing distrust of government by civil society groups</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• More autonomous district governments with localised decision-making</li> <li>• NGOs and CBOs more effectively engaged on peace and security issues</li> <li>• Government problems in delivering social services at all levels</li> </ul>
<b>Economic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Economic development prioritised at all levels in the province</li> <li>• Economic development serves as a common ground issue among groups</li> <li>• Corruption undermines the economic development progress</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Civil society organisation on economic issues is stronger (e.g. market associations, etc.)</li> <li>• Multi-stakeholder forums (government and civil society) exist on economic issues</li> <li>• Economic infrastructure damaged by conflict and recovery is weak</li> <li>• Limited managerial skills base hampers progress</li> </ul>
<b>Social</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tradition of solidarity, tolerance, mutual help and altruism is strong</li> <li>• Participatory engagement and mobilisation in development is valued</li> <li>• Distrust, polarisation and anger at community level from conflict weakens solidarity and participation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customary (<i>adat</i>) institutions become stronger with local autonomy</li> <li>• Inter-religious forums are emerging to promote tolerance between groups</li> <li>• Extremist groups have become organised and undermine the work of peace constituencies</li> </ul>
<b>Security</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Security is prioritised at all levels in the province</li> <li>• Pervasive conflict fatigue in the population</li> <li>• Scepticism and distrust of state security apparatus</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Community policing is emerging in different areas</li> <li>• Separation of police from TNI and responsiveness of forces to criticism has led to improvement</li> <li>• Emergence of local militias and criminal cartels</li> </ul>

**b. Understanding and Unpacking the Roots of Peace**

Once the lessons learned have been formulated, the next step is conducting a deeper investigation into the roots of peace. In this instance, roots of peace are categorised as either value-based (virtues, traditions, etc.) or institutional-based (judiciary, village level councils, etc.) and are looked at from a sectoral perspective (political, economic, social and security). Matrix 9 offers a means of systematising findings.

As with the structural causes of conflict (covered in Step 2), the roots of peace may also be characterised by reinforcing dynamics. For example, co-existence may be reinforced by inter-marriage, trade relationships, religious tolerance and the rule of law. These reinforcing dynamics become important capacities for peace. However, there may also be roots of peace that might have a withering effect such as the erosion of social cohesion due to displacement, distrust and atrocities. These withered roots of peace are important vulnerabilities (see Figure 4).

**Figure 4**  
**Roots of Peace Reinforcing Dynamics**



**c. Peace Capacities and Peace Vulnerabilities**

Key vulnerabilities and capacities for peace are now moved forward. From the assessment of peace-building responses, one can see that recurrent factors contributing to failure become vulnerabilities and recurrent factors contributing to success become capacities. Similarly, reinforcing peace dynamics and "withered" roots of peace also become capacities and vulnerabilities, respectively. This is shown in Matrix 10.

Lessons learned drawn from peace-building initiatives and key considerations drawn from understanding the roots of peace are systematised in an overall matrix outlining capacities and vulnerabilities of peace efforts. Key considerations identified (i.e., the lessons learned) are then placed in the relevant section of the strategic planning framework in the section on Peace-building Responses.

**Matrix 10**  
**Peace Capacities and Peace Vulnerabilities (in North Maluku)**

Capacities for Peace		Vulnerabilities of Peace
Key Factors (contributing to the success or failure of peace-building efforts)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Significant resources are allocated and available for peace-building efforts</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lacking co-ordination, unreliable data and limited participation in planning/implementation</li> <li>Poor security sustains distrust and communal polarisation</li> </ul>
Key Social Values and Institutions (that serve as the roots of peace)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Values of solidarity (linked to market associations, inter-religious forums, etc.)</li> <li>Emerging democracy (linked to stronger civil society, <i>adat</i>, and district autonomy)</li> <li>Demilitarised security (linked to more trust in police and emerging community policing)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Distrust in government (linked to emerging militias, corruption, delivery of services)</li> <li>Ethnic and religious polarisation (linked to organised extremism, local militias, collusion and nepotism)</li> </ul>

**Step 5. Developing Scenarios**

**Purpose:** The purpose of developing scenarios is two-fold: to enable an understanding of the possible future operating environment based on current conditions and to inform pro-active responses for building peace, transforming the status quo, and preventing (or being prepared for) a severe deterioration in the situation.

**Definitions:**

- A scenario** answers the question of what happens next and is, in essence, a story or narrative outlining outcomes of the current situation for a given timeframe. The scenarios are categorised into the best-case (optimal outcome), status-quo (limited change outcome) and worst-case (severe deteriorating outcome).
- Triggers** refer to single key acts, events or their anticipation which will set off violent conflicts or their escalation. They can occur in situations of high tension as well as during transition periods. They can be deliberate as well as accidental, and generally provoke the use of violence or armed force. Triggers can be identified, but rarely predicted.

**Approach:** Scenario-building can be a complex exercise, especially if the aim is to develop scenarios that are relatively accurate and provide predictions of future events. Emerging good practice suggests that for peace-building purposes, the most valuable scenarios are those that inform pro-active decision-making in terms of: 1) how to realise an optimal outcome of the current situation (best case); 2) how to transform the status-quo towards an optimal outcome; and 3) how to prevent and be prepared for a severe deterioration in current conditions (worst-case).

- Key activities:**
- Determining a timeframe.
  - Selecting key C&V that are important for future developments.
  - Assessing the likely individual and combined outcomes of these over time.
  - Developing best-case, status quo and worst-case scenarios.
  - Identifying potential triggers or drivers that may lead to those outcomes.
  - Based on the above outcomes, writing the scenario in narrative form.

**a. Determining a Timeframe**

Based on the current situation and institutional needs, one must determine what time frame for scenarios is operationally useful. Is it twelve months? Sixteen months? Or possibly longer?

**b. Selecting Key Capacities and Vulnerabilities**

Referring back to the capacities and vulnerabilities identified in Steps 2, 3 and 4, now determine which of them are the most influential, i.e. the "key" vulnerabilities and capacities. Identify the three most important vulnerabilities and the three most important capacities. After this has been done, incorporate them into a consolidated table such as the one shown in Matrix 11.

### c. Assessing Outcomes of Key Capacities and Vulnerabilities

Always keep in mind that identified vulnerabilities or capacities for the various scenarios may differ. A key consideration here is defining the time frame you will use to identify scenarios. It is important to consider the dynamic nature of conflict in each different context. For example, in the case of Maluku, where communal violence was sporadic but intense, the time frame was one year. In Central Sulawesi where there was greater stability and violence was individualised, a time frame of two years was chosen.

### d. Developing Best-Case, Status Quo and Worst-Case scenarios

In thinking about future scenarios, Figure 5 below provides a general overview of trends and how they might be looked at. Please note that these sample trends were drawn from a number of conflict analysis exercises undertaken elsewhere by the authors. Nonetheless, they signal a growing consensus on how to look at conflict trends in scenario building.

To construct each scenario, insert the capacities and vulnerabilities for each possible scenario in this table and work through the possible outcomes for each one.

**Matrix 11**  
**(Undeveloped) Integrated Capacities and Vulnerabilities**

Step	Capacities for Peace	Vulnerabilities of Peace
<b>Step 2</b> (Key linkages or reinforcing dynamics in obstacles to peace and structural causes of conflict)		
<b>Step 3</b> (Key dynamics and impacts or reactions among stakeholders)		
<b>Step 4</b> (Key factors contributing to success or failure of peace-building efforts and roots of peace)		

**Figure 5**  
**Scenario Trends**

Case	Scenario
<b>Best-case</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The trend is that vulnerabilities are reduced (e.g. weapons are handed in) and capacities increase (e.g. community policing becomes more effective). The individual outcomes are each positive (e.g. less weapons, less crime) and combined outcome is positively reinforcing (e.g. greater sense of security at a community level). Key triggers or drivers for this scenario may include a successful peace agreement, effective community leadership, etc.</li> </ul>
<b>Status-quo</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The trend is that vulnerabilities (e.g. weapons stay hidden) and capacities (community policing continues to be ad hoc) remain stable. The individual outcomes may worsen (e.g. still weapons, still crime) and combined outcome may worsen (e.g. still sense of insecurity at community level). Key triggers or drivers for this scenario may include a stalled peace process, limited community leadership, etc.</li> </ul>
<b>Worst-case</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The trend is that vulnerabilities are increased (e.g. more weapons are stockpiled) and capacities decrease (e.g. community policing efforts become ineffective). The individual outcomes are each negative (more weapons, more crime) and combined outcome is negatively reinforcing (e.g. security at the community level deteriorates rapidly). Key triggers or drivers for this scenario may include a collapsed peace process, corrupt community leadership, etc.</li> </ul>

### e. Identifying Potential Triggers

With all the information now at hand, it is possible to combine the predicted outcomes—the aforementioned scenarios—into a synthesis section and identify triggers of change. An example of how this can be done is shown in Matrix 12a.

### f. Preparing Scenarios in Narrative Form

Write up a narrative for each scenario. In doing so, remember that it is important to be as specific as possible and to carefully consider the operationally-relevant outcomes for different agencies. For example, if an outcome in a worst-case scenario is displacement of communities, a humanitarian agency will need to know how many persons are displaced, who they may be, from where they will leave and to where they will go.

If an outcome in a best-case scenario is the re-integration of IDPs, a development agency will need to know what interventions (e.g. job-creation, skills development and reconciliation efforts) will facilitate that process. See Matrix 12b for an illustration of the scenarios compiled at the PDA workshop in North Maluku.

Upon the completion of the three scenarios, decide on which one is most likely, likely, and less likely. As with each and every other step, this will require good judgement and consultation.

**Matrix 12a**  
**Scenario Development Matrix, Part 1**  
**Capacities, Vulnerabilities and Outcomes (in North Maluku)**

Capacities	Individual Outcomes (12–18 mos.)	Combined Outcomes (12–18 mos.)
1. Increased security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The security situation deteriorates</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Tensions increase and the likelihood of violence conflict is significant.</li> </ul>
2. Reconciliation efforts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reconciliation efforts remain weak and fragmented</li> </ul>	
3. Economic recovery efforts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Economic recovery effort falter due to corruption and inefficiency</li> </ul>	
<b>Trigger/Drivers</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provocateurs continue their activities</li> </ul>	
<b>Vulnerabilities</b>		
1. Ethnic and money politics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ethnic and money politics become more entrenched</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Elections are characterised by ethnic and money politics and performance evaluations are politicised. District boundaries are used to mobilise supporters of different political groups</li> </ul>
2. District boundaries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lacking transparency and politicisation of district boundary setting</li> </ul>	
3. Performance evaluation and rotation of district heads	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Politicised performance evaluations</li> </ul>	
<b>Trigger/Drivers</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Election incidents lead to violence</li> <li>Civil servant recruitment is politicised</li> <li>Relocation leads to tensions and violent incidents</li> </ul>	

**Matrix 12b**  
**Scenario Development Matrix, Part 2**  
**Best-Case, Status-Quo and Worst-Case Scenarios (in North Maluku)**

Case/Likelihood	Scenario for a Period of 12–18 Months
<b>Best-case (least likely)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increased trust follows greater security. Provocateurs are arrested. Healing and reconciliation are integrated into development programmes and a push is made to reintegrate IDPs.</li> <li>Efforts (particularly policy reforms) to stimulate the economy are successful. The impact of aid efforts is bolstered through coordination; more sustainable programmes are seen.</li> <li>Anti-corruption initiatives pay off. The election is free of money politics and people vote without fear.</li> </ul>
<b>Status-quo (likely)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Levels of poverty and unemployment rise slowly.</li> <li>Reconciliation programmes continue to be incidental and their impact remain limited. Post-conflict trauma results in tense communal relationships.</li> <li>A feeling of relative safety persists, and most IDPs return to their areas of origin, but there are still tensions and anxieties. Elections lead to deterioration in social relations.</li> <li>Poor coordination leads to limited impact of programmes, tensions between agencies and an increasing sense of distrust at the community level.</li> </ul>
<b>Worst-case (most likely)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The forthcoming elections are characterised by ethnic and money politics and cause new conflicts. Conflicts and tensions are exacerbated by performance evaluations and rotation of (non-elected) district heads.</li> <li>Conflicts also arise around the recruitment of local civil servants, uncertainty about district boundaries, relocation of traditional markets, as well as control over the economy by outsiders.</li> <li>The use of government resources for political purposes (money politics) means that the IDP situation is not fully resolved.</li> </ul>

## Step 6. Defining Preventative Development Responses

<b>Purpose:</b>	Defining preventive development responses is the end goal of a PDA exercise. The purpose is to identify a number of conflict-sensitive responses that contribute to the vision for peace and development, as well as help realise the optimal scenario and avoid the worst case. These should be both practical and strategic.
<b>Definitions:</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Preventive development</b>, comparable to preventive peace-building, refers to development strategies, programmes and projects that are specifically geared towards the prevention of violent conflict by addressing its causes.</li> <li><b>Practical responses</b> address the immediate challenges in the post-conflict environment such as those related to the impact of surface and proximate obstacles to peace.</li> <li><b>Strategic responses</b> tackle the structural causes of these immediate challenges and strengthen the roots of peace.</li> </ul>
<b>Approach:</b>	<p>The purpose of the PDA is to develop a comprehensive framework for action, agreed upon by consensus among key stakeholders. Thus, the focus in this step is to define preventive development responses at the macro-level to give direction to development efforts that address peace through development. Designing programmes to address micro-level or, possibly, sectoral projects is not the aim of the PDA tool.</p> <p>Four issues are important in defining (practical and strategic) preventive development responses: vision for peace and development; scenarios and key C&amp;V (drawn from obstacles, stakeholders, and lessons); gaps in responses; and potential partners.</p>
<b>Key activities:</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Defining priorities and identifying responses.</li> <li>Determining the most important practical and strategic responses and entry-points.</li> <li>Identifying key partners.</li> </ol>

### a. Defining Priorities and Identifying Responses

In defining preventative development responses, the following questions and issues need to be considered:

- What is the overall goal for responses that can be deduced from the vision for peace and development and, following on that, what are the core principles that should underpin those responses?
- What are the key capacities and vulnerabilities in each of the three scenarios?
- Which capacities and vulnerabilities provide the most important practical and strategic responses and entry-points?
- Which practical and strategic preventive development responses would add the most value?
- Which groups or individuals are potential partners for programme elaboration and implementation?

### b. Building a Response Framework

In determining the most important practical and strategic responses and entry-points, do the following:

- Identify the goal for responses. This should be linked to Step 1, "Vision for Peace and Development." It is recommended that this activity be done in plenary to ensure that participants agree on the purpose of development interventions. In defining the purpose, it may be useful to clarify whether development responses will aim at addressing all vulnerabilities or only some (e.g. in the realm of security, economy, social-cultural and political).

For example, it is often the case that development agencies are not prepared to address issues related to the security apparatus or supporting the state. Focus on interventions that, as much as possible, strengthen the best-case scenario, transform the status-quo scenario and prevent the worst-case scenario. Starting points for the definition of a response framework are the C&V identified in Step 5.

- Identify peace-building gaps to determine areas for action.
- Determine comparative advantages, political and other constraints as well as available resources.
- Identify important minority issues particularly as they relate to young men, women and other sectors traditionally more vulnerable in conflict contexts.

There are several ways to design a response framework. One option is to divide the group into three and give each group a scenario to work through. In the case of Indonesia, groups were divided into civil society, government and private sector focus with participants focusing the analysis from the standpoint of those actors.

An example of how to develop a best case scenario is shown in Matrix 13. (The same can be done for status-quo and worst scenarios.)

**Matrix 13**  
**Best-Case Scenario and Capacities and Vulnerabilities**

Goal for responses:			
Case / Likelihood	Scenario for a Period of 12-18 Months	Capacities	Vulnerabilities
<b>Best-case (least likely)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased trust follows greater security. Provocateurs are arrested. Healing and reconciliation are integrated into development programmes and a push is made to re-integrate IDPs.</li> <li>• Efforts (particularly policy reforms) to stimulate the economy are successful. The impact of aid efforts is bolstered through co-ordination and more sustainable programmes are seen.</li> <li>• Anti-corruption initiatives pay off. The election is free of money politics and people vote without fear.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rights awareness and strong articulation among IDPs of needs</li> <li>• Civil society awareness and increasing organisation</li> <li>• Awareness in national government of the need for a broad conflict prevention approach</li> <li>• Decentralisation of development planning and resources?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social jealousy and tensions between local communities and IDPs</li> <li>• Tensions between government and civil society at all levels and within government at provincial and district levels</li> <li>• State-centred, exclusive and top-down policy, as well as corruption in aid</li> </ul>
<b>Triggers</b>	Rumours, media misinformation		
<b>Peace-building Gaps</b>	IDPs, lack of social cohesion		
<b>Practical Responses</b>	SMEs and income question, sports for peace		
<b>Strategic Responses</b>	IDP rights, integrated economic activities, access to justice, community leadership		
<b>Possible Entry Points</b>	Women's groups, youth groups, economic projects		

Once a comprehensive assessment of the response options has taken place, participants will go through a prioritisation exercise to define the strategic responses that would come closer to realise the vision for peace and meet the stated development goal.

With priorities identified, participants will be asked to identify those responsible for implementation. It is very important that analysis of implementing partners considers their capacities and their needs.

Matrix 14, "Conflict Prevention Development Responses," can be used to facilitate the definition of preventive development responses. Once this matrix has been filled in, the preventive development responses that have been identified can be placed in the PDA Strategic Planning Framework.

**Matrix 14.**  
**Conflict Prevention Development Responses**

Overall Goal of Responses	Key Areas for Response Strategic	Partners for Programme Elaboration and/or Implementation	
		Preventive Development Responses	Partners for Programme Elaboration and/or Implementation
Consolidate fragile peace in the Province	<b>Strategic</b> Institutional strengthening for government and civil society	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthen coordination between different parts and levels of government as well as between government NGOs</li> <li>• Link capacity-building with government action on priority post-conflict issues (IDPs, aid management, etc.)</li> <li>• Provide support to CBO co-ordination and engagement in reconciliation efforts</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provincial and district-level government, police, NGOs, and business.</li> <li>• District-level government and local parliament.</li> <li>• Civil society networks, CBOs and NGOs.</li> </ul>
<b>Key Principles</b>	<b>Strategic</b> Development of economic (soft and hard) infrastructure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthen market and natural resources access for local enterprises</li> <li>• Provide support for the creation of mixed community trading associations</li> <li>• Establish small grants funds through a participatory planning process</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Local business, multinational companies, community leaders (<i>adart</i>), government offices (industry and economic empowerment).</li> <li>• Trading associations, local business, district government and police.</li> <li>• Community leaders (subdistrict), banks, donor agencies and district government.</li> </ul>
Coordination will be enhanced	<b>Practical</b> Re-integration and resettlement of IDPs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support IDP self-help groups in development and implementation of sustainable projects</li> <li>• Support mixed reintegration and resettlement projects</li> <li>• Enable access to legal remedy and support compensation schemes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IDP coordination groups, women's groups, community and religious leaders, district government and NGOs.</li> <li>• IDP coordination groups, donors, community and religious leaders, district government and NGOs</li> <li>• IDP coordination groups, district government, judiciary, donors, NGOs, police and community leaders</li> </ul>
Inclusiveness and participation will be promoted	<b>Practical</b> Integrate reconciliation elements in development programmes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthen mixed business associations</li> <li>• Provide support for participatory and mixed peace-building projects</li> <li>• Encourage conflict-sensitive development programming</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Trading associations, business, community and religious leaders.</li> <li>• Donors, NGOs, CBOs and district government.</li> <li>• Donors, BAPPEDA, government offices and NGOs</li> </ul>
Transparency and accountability by government			

# 5.

## Using the Strategic Planning Framework

Once the analysis is completed, findings can be fed into the Strategic Planning Framework shown at the beginning of this section. The Framework below highlights where to put the information.

**Matrix 1 (Revisited)**  
The PDA Strategic Planning Framework, Part 1

Country: ..... Province: ..... Date: .. /.. /...	
<b>Vision for Peace and Development</b> (insert and extrapolate findings from step 1 matrix 2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Definition:</b> Defined as where the rule of law is upheld, social and economic conditions are good, relations harmonious, and there is freedom from fear.</li> <li>• <b>Principles:</b> Principled development is participatory, equitable, sustainable and empowering. There is accountability in aid activities and decisions are followed up with implementation.</li> <li>• <b>Benchmarks:</b> Benchmarks include the reintegration of IDPs, economic growth, harmonious social relations, supported vulnerable groups, protected political rights and corruption significantly reduced.</li> </ul>
<b>Scenarios (12–24 mos.)</b>  (Insert and extrapolate findings from Step 5 Matrix 12b)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Best-case scenario (least likely):</b> Greater security increases trust. Provocateurs are arrested; healing and reconciliation are integrated into development programmes and a push is made to reintegrate IDPs. Efforts to stimulate the economy, particularly policy reforms, are also successful and the impact of financial assistance is bolstered through increased coordination. More sustainable programmes are seen. Anti-corruption initiatives begin to pay off and elections are held free of free of money politics and intimidation. People are able to vote without fear.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Status-quo scenario (likely):</b> Levels of poverty and unemployment rise slowly. Reconciliation programmes continue to be incidental and their impact remain limited. Post-conflict trauma results in tense communal relationships. A feeling of relative safety persists, and most IDPs return to their areas of origin, but there are still tensions and anxieties. Elections in the regencies lead to deterioration in social relations. Poor co-ordination leads to limited impact of programmes, tensions between agencies and an increasing sense of distrust at the community-level.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Worst-case scenario (most likely):</b> Elections are characterised by ethnic and money politics and cause new conflicts. Conflicts and tensions are exacerbated by performance-evaluations and rotation of (non-elected) district heads. Conflicts also arise around the recruitment of local civil servants, uncertainty about district boundaries, relocation of traditional markets, as well as control over the economy by outsiders. The use of government resources for political purposes (money politics) means that the IDP situation is not fully resolved.</li> </ul>

**Matrix 1 (Revisited)**  
The PDA Strategic Planning Framework, Part 2

Vulnerabilities of Peace (Insert and extrapolate findings from Step 5 Matrix 12a)	Capacities for Peace (Insert and extrapolate findings from Step 5 Matrix 12a)
1. Ethnic and money politics 2. District boundaries 3. Performance evaluation and rotation of district heads	1. Increased security 2. Reconciliation efforts 3. Economic recovery efforts
Preventive Development Responses	Key Directions
<b>Strategic</b>  (Insert and extrapolate findings from Step 6, Matrix 13)	1. Institutional strengthening for government and civil society: strengthen co-ordination between different parts and levels of government – as well as between government NGOs; link capacity-building with government action on priority post-conflict issues (IDPs, aid management, etc.); and provide support to CBO co-ordination and engagement in reconciliation efforts. 2. Development of economic (soft and hard) infrastructure: strengthen market and natural resources access for local enterprises; provide support for the creation of mixed community trading associations; and establish small grants funds through a participatory planning process.
<b>Practical</b>  (Insert and extrapolate findings from Step 6, Matrix 13)	1. Reintegration and resettlement of IDPs: support IDP self-help groups in development and implementation of sustainable projects; support mixed reintegration and resettlement projects; and enable access to legal remedy and support compensation schemes. 2. Integrate reconciliation elements in development programmes: strengthen mixed business associations; provide support for participatory and mixed peace-building projects; and encourage conflict-sensitive development programming.
<b>Strategic Considerations</b>  (Insert and extrapolate findings from Step 4, Matrix 10)	Resources are largely allocated to short-term and tangible-type projects, leaving community-based initiatives under-funded. Limited co-ordination, unreliable data and minimal participation in both planning and implementation leads to inefficiencies in peace-building efforts. Poor security impedes and undermines reconciliation efforts.

## Notes

