

**REPORT OF THE JOINT  
OCHA/UNDGO/UNDP MISSION  
TO SRI LANKA, THE MALDIVES AND  
INDONESIA**

**30 May – 08 June 2005**

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## INTRODUCTION

1. The Joint OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) / UNDGO (United Nations Development Group Office) / UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) Mission to Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Indonesia was undertaken to assist in facilitating the transition from relief to recovery and reconstruction. This would be achieved through the identification of gaps, priorities and clarification of respective roles in coordination<sup>1</sup>.

2. The mission was timely in light of the Report of the Secretary-General on *Strengthening emergency relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction recovery and prevention in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster* and was able to directly address the recommendation that the United Nations “*should identify what support is needed to improve coordination of disaster recovery efforts and propose recommendations on how such support should be addressed.*”<sup>2</sup>

## SUMMARY OF REGIONAL FINDINGS

3. The situation on the ground varies greatly from country to country and from district to district within the affected countries. However, there are consistent issues that cut across all of the tsunami-affected areas, some of which are highlighted below.

### **The Balance between Recovery and Humanitarian needs.**

(a) While spontaneous recovery has commenced, critical humanitarian needs remain. With the approaching monsoon season thousands of people, in Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Maldives remain in tents and/or with host families. In Sri Lanka, approximately 20% of transitional shelters are below target and furthermore substandard. Planning of permanent housing is underway, yet physical progress is minimal. An estimated 70,000 people reside in unsatisfactory conditions in Sri Lanka and an estimated 153,000 in tents in Indonesia. Host families in Indonesia have been burdened with an additional 50,000 people because of rains bringing the total to 300,000 and 10,800 in the Maldives.

(b) Outstanding humanitarian needs do remain and will continue to do so for many months to come. However, the focus has now shifted to planning, organizing and initiating recovery. Communities have begun rebuilding their homes. Local NGOs and some international agencies are providing assistance. Households are resuming their original livelihood activities with fishermen bringing fish back into the local retail market.

(c) The remaining humanitarian needs must be addressed in the context of the recovery process, and should be approached in a qualitatively different manner to the emergency phase. Food distribution, for example, should not create potential

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<sup>1</sup> See Annex A. *Terms of Reference Joint OCHA/UNDGO/UNDP Mission to Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Indonesia*, 30 May – 8 June 2005

<sup>2</sup> ECOSOC Report of the Secretary-General, V Implications for future action and recommendations of the Secretary-General, 57 – Enhancing the coordination and capacity of the United Nations System for recovery.

dependency. Humanitarian support must be targeted to stimulate and further support the on-going spontaneous recovery process. Clean drinking water, food-for-work, and building materials, for example, must be provided in those areas where people are choosing to return to.

### **Balance between the roles of the Government and the United Nations.**

(d) Coordination has suffered as the recovery process moves forward; we are losing momentum. During the initial emergency there was a willingness amongst all actors to work together in a coordinated manner, however budgets now dictate progress and the incentives to work in a coordinated approach is much weaker in this recovery phase. Moreover coordination mechanisms in place are focusing on longer-term recovery planning without fully addressing current humanitarian needs. Assistance actors have established individual bilateral relations with government ministries and implementing partners and proceed out of a much needed strategic/policy framework.

(e) It should be noted that as the recovery process has moved forward, all governments have set up high-level institutional mechanisms with mandates for inter-sectoral coordination. However, due to an unprecedented complexity (e.g. equity, land tenure, sustainable livelihoods, conflict resolution, planning and local administration) and the scale of operations, these arrangements are still evolving and stabilizing. It is therefore necessary that the United Nations play a catalytic role, with the full partnership of the IFIs (International Financial Institutions), bilateral donors and NGOs, in support of the governments. Given the role of the governments, the overwhelming volume of resources available to the NGO sector and their presence on the ground, as well as the resources provided by IFIs, the principle comparative advantage of the UN would be in support of strategic planning, policy and coordination, rather than direct project implementation. In addition, all efforts should help to build local/national capacity and reduce dependency at all levels as quickly as possible.

(f) In Aceh, Indonesia, coordination efforts of the international community have deteriorated. As the Government of Indonesia assumes a stronger role in coordination with the establishment of the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR) in this post-emergency phase, it is nevertheless imperative that the United Nations continues to facilitate strong coordination amongst its members and the NGO community in full and timely support of Government efforts.

(g) In Sri Lanka, support of the Government has been central to the efforts of the United Nations to date. We now see a restructuring of coordination mechanisms as Government-managed and led processes focus on longer-term reconstruction. This is both timely and commendable. It is important that the international community now ensures that the remaining humanitarian needs do not fall between the gaps during this shift. Furthermore, coordination at the local level must be enhanced to provide greater support to the government at a time when district to central level government mechanisms are evolving.

(h) In the Maldives, coordination mechanisms work well, while there is a strong need for capacity building and technical expertise within the government set-up.

### **Capacity challenges.**

(i) Capacity challenges within the UN and the government has hampered efforts to move ahead. The loss of institutional memory, with high staff turnover has weakened international agencies' coordination mechanisms at a time when capacity building in areas such as governance and information systems are needed to support government efforts. This too has contributed to a loss of momentum and the lack of strategic/policy discussions as actors often revert to traditional attitudes.

### **Engagement of Non-Governmental Organisations.**

(j) This unprecedented situation, where NGOs have vast resources at their disposal, has increased the need for coordination amongst NGOs, both national and international, as never before. While INGOs participate in information sharing meetings and sectoral working groups, national NGOs are not well represented. Furthermore national NGO consortia lack capacity at the central and, most importantly, the district level. In addition, donor timeframes for the disbursement of funds further hampers a coordinated approach and limits the flexibility of operations. Thus many NGOs work in an ad hoc and isolated manner. As a result, there is no holistic approach to assisting the people in need, as seen with the building of transitional shelters without water and sanitation.

### **Information Management in support of the Government.**

(k) The lack of accurate base line data at the local level has severely hampered our ability to work closely with Governments and local authorities in assisting local communities with their planning, and also ensure that central level strategic coordination is well informed by accurate information from the field. The provision of well-designed information management tools and capacity building targeted at local authorities for data collection and management is one way the UN system can serve the coordination needs of the government and the humanitarian community in this delicate recovery phase. This effort, part of which is already underway, needs to be reinforced with the active participation of all humanitarian and recovery actors, so that gaps and additional requirements can be identified and met as soon as possible. Once information has been obtained it must then be shared amongst all stakeholders, and most importantly, beneficiaries. Affected communities have not been adequately informed of recovery plans and assistance entitlements, neither are they fully integrated into decision-making processes.

(l) The weakening of coordination structures indicates a clear role for the UN. The UN system must strengthen its ability to coordinate, advocate and address the above concerns to better support the process of recovery and the delivery of recovery assets. In this process, it must also provide support to the affected governments to allow them to carry out their lead coordination role in an effective manner. In this regard there is a need to work towards a 'one UN' model in the field that would combine all aspects of humanitarian and recovery work under a single umbrella in line with the Secretary-General's reform proposals.

## OVERALL RECOMMENDATIONS

**1. The UN system should be represented by a single UN Resident / Humanitarian Coordinator, with adequate support for both the RC and HC functions, to bridge the gap of relief to recovery and provide coherent representation of ‘one UN’ at the country level, in line with reform proposals of the Secretary-General.**

(a) The implementation of the recovery plans must be monitored and advocated for by a strong and united UN presence, which draws on the active participation of all major international stakeholders, including the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, in support of the Government. This should be led by a strengthened office of the UN Resident / Humanitarian Coordinator (or in the case of Aceh, a UN Coordinator for Sumatra) representing relief, recovery actors, and reconstruction agencies. UN agencies would be invited again to second staff to support the coordination function, and to assist in the development and implementation of the UN strategy thus ensuring agency ‘buy-in’. The Office would also be vested with a capacity to provide common services (e.g. logistics and security), and a strong NGO liaison, external relations, public information/advocacy component.

**2. Strategic Frameworks should be drafted for the transition period.**

(a) The mission recognized the importance of UN Recovery Plans for the transition period which would provide a strategic framework on where the UN system could support the government in the coming 2-4 year recovery/reconstruction period. The Recovery Plan should tie into the governments’ blueprint for reconstruction and, if necessary, could be used as a resource mobilization tool. The UNCT (United Nations Country Team) in the Maldives has finalised its Transitional Strategy, which is linked to the UNDAF (United Nations Disaster Assistance Framework), and the UNCT in Sri Lanka is in the final stages of preparing a strategy document. A strategic document for the UN is being considered for development for Indonesia.

**3. One information and tracking system should serve as a credible UN tool to support the government led recovery process. There is an urgent need for OCHA and UNDP to develop greater compatibility between the HIC (humanitarian Information Centre) and the DAD (Development Assistance Database), in order to facilitate the governments’ transition to recovery; DGO could support this effort.**

(a) There are a number of UN financial tracking and information tools and mechanisms, e.g. HIC, DAD, FTS (Financial Tracking System), etc. On the basis of observations in the context of the tsunami, there is a clear and urgent need to rationalize information capacity and systems, so that the UN’s financial tracking, data collection, analysis and dissemination reflect the stated objective of harmonizing United Nations response to disasters across the humanitarian, recovery and reconstruction phases.

(b) As the Development Assistance Database (DAD) takes a lead role in tracking aid flows it is important that other information tools be streamlined to support this government - owned system. The UN HIC is a tool that is usually

deployed at the outset of an emergency to gather base-line information as a foundation for strategic recovery planning, and the mapping of humanitarian assistance, gaps analysis and needs assessments. With government ownership of recovery co-ordination, the HIC should seek to build capacity within national and local government institutions so as to become sustainable and be handed over to the government in support of the DAD. Hence forth, the emphasis should be on training personnel in appropriate government institutions within district and provincial administration to perform the functions of gathering and maintaining appropriate databases relevant for the overall government recovery planning framework. The HIC as a stand-alone institution is not feasible over the long run.

**4. Urgent attention to deployment of personnel is needed to address the loss of institutional memory that has weakened coordination to date.**

(a) The high turnover and shortage of staff, in both Sri Lanka and Aceh, has had a detrimental impact on information gathering and coordination efforts at all levels.

(b) Renewed attention to staffing is required with closer collaboration between OCHA/UNDGO/UNDP and UNV. The somewhat artificial division that exists between relief and recovery has led to a phase-down of humanitarian-focused staff, even as recovery-focused staff arrive. In fact, there is a need for considerable overlap between the two, as humanitarian needs continue while the recovery process advances. Staff deployment procedures and practices must be modified so that they are responsive to the realities on the ground. There is over-reliance on stand-by arrangements and other forms of surge capacity. These are no more than stop gap measures, and should be recognized as such, in the face of the required medium-term response.

(c) High turnover is also a result of a large number of international staff seeking short tenures. It is recommended that attention should be given to recruiting nationals or candidates from the region. Maximising use of local, national and regional expertise is a sustainable way of providing support over the long-term. As recovery ensues, the number of UN staff and their technical profiles should be determined by government capacity gaps.

**5. Active harnessing of both national and international NGOs in mainstream information sharing is crucial to strengthening overall coordination and effective strategic planning in support of the government.**

(a) While six months after the tsunami there is a realization amongst international NGOs of the added value found in strong coordination with all stakeholders in country, some NGOs still work outside existing coordination structures. Several government representatives stressed that they would welcome UN support in coordinating the broader NGO community. UN Agencies should be more comprehensively engaged in supporting the government in coordinating NGOs, both sectorally and geographically. The replication of the Global Consortium forum at the country and /or provincial level (in the case of Aceh) is one step towards ensuring greater NGO involvement in recovery coordination mechanisms. Much more could be done to facilitate NGO participation in government-led coordination mechanisms, particularly sectorally.

(b) It is important to strengthen capacities of NGO consortia, especially in terms of information management, in order to enable more effective and wider engagement amongst the local NGO communities at all levels. Close partnership with the HIC and integration of NGO liaison apparatus into governance capacity building programmes are important. NGO liaison/focal points should be factored into and developed as an integral part of the proposed disaster response tool. An NGO liaison component should be considered to be part of the Office of the UN Resident / Humanitarian Coordinator, who could facilitate contact with NGOs.

**6. Capacity building of the Government is a key element in the recovery phase and should be a priority activity of UN agencies.**

(a) Capacity building is fundamental to ensuring the sustainability of the recovery process. The affected region tends to have local governments that are much weaker than their national-level counterparts. National level line ministries function relatively well; yet encounter difficulties when cross-sector activities must be coordinated for recovery to take place. This coordination must take place at the local level and involve participation from affected communities and the local governments. Considerable capacity building efforts involving the use of on-the-job-training, secondment of technical expertise to line ministries, and substantive national UNDP/UNV (United Nations Volunteers) governance take place to facilitate this essential local level participation/coordination.

(b) A system-wide support for the deployment of UN staff members, originally from the affected countries, who have the added advantage of local knowledge coupled with the requisite language skills, to assist governments with the recovery phase should be actively encouraged.

**7. Management of various Risk Management and Early Warning Systems is essential to a coherent preparedness strategy and effective use of funding.**

(a) The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) is coordinating support for upgrading national and regional capacities for early warning, in collaboration with UNDP, IFRC (International Federation of the Red Cross), UNESCO (United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation) and others. These capacities need to embrace a multi hazard approach and target, in the final analysis, community based disaster preparedness. This will shorten the chain of communication between the instrument based warnings and communities response resulting in reduced human losses. In each country, the UN Resident / Humanitarian Coordinator and the respective national government should determine appropriate co-ordination modalities both within national institutions as well as within the UN system that can allow the different technical and financial resources available to be brought to bear effectively.

**8. Application of International Best Practices and Experiences is our collective responsibility.**

(a) The development of relevant and effective recovery policies in key areas such as housing, livelihoods and governance could be facilitated by a sharing of experiences between the tsunami affected countries and between other countries that

had experienced similar natural disasters. The International Recovery Platform, a network of UN, Governments, INGOs and the World Bank should rapidly promote regional lessons learnt exercises. This should be carried out as a priority before the recovery process gathers too much momentum.

**9. The balance between accountability to donors and accountability to beneficiaries needs to be maintained.**

(a) Financial tracking services serve as accountability mechanisms primarily to donors who enforce control over funds through stringent spending timeframes. As a result some agencies struggle to implement projects within restrictive deadlines in an uncoordinated manner.

(b) Flexibility in funding should be advocated at the highest levels, thus supporting strategic coordination efforts. Donor roundtables should be convened in the tsunami-affected countries to specifically discuss this issue. Similarly, at HQ level, the good humanitarian donorship initiative should be encouraged to advocate along these lines.

(c) There is a need for strengthened planning and delivery mechanisms at the local and national levels, including coordination of donor assistance (under government leadership) as well as beneficiary tracking (database of affected people, their entitlements, status of assistance delivered etc.). This will ensure that the funds are utilized for optimal impact in the affected areas. This will also help in making a case for revising the timelines to a realistic level for the implementation of recovery projects.

**10. A unified coordination response structure / mechanism incorporating both humanitarian and recovery aspects of an emergency is needed.**

(a) There are no established UN coordination mechanisms for post-disaster recovery as exist during the humanitarian phase. In the post-disaster period, the humanitarian and recovery elements of the response need to work closely together and be properly supported. Planning for recovery should occur concurrently with the humanitarian response. In this regard, the inclusion of recovery projects in the Flash Appeal was appropriate and facilitated coordination and continuity. -UNDP, DGO (Development Group Office) and OCHA should take the lead to initiate proposals covering roles and responsibilities for coordinating disaster response (including damage and needs assessment tools and methodologies, and information systems) and for linking the humanitarian and recovery phases into a unified coordination response structure / mechanism. In the future, General Assembly endorsement should be sought on the establishment of a unified response structure / mechanism, as was the case for General Assembly Resolution 46/182<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations

## **REPORT OF JOINT MISSION TO SRI LANKA**

**30 MAY – 02 JUNE 2005**

### **INTRODUCTION**

1. The Government of Sri Lanka is providing solid, commendable leadership of the recovery process, with coordination mechanisms that are evolving between the various Government bodies, line ministries and district offices. As processes become firmed up, the links between the district and center should be strengthened in order to ensure coordination and planning at the local level, and support given to national capacities to assist with the speedy formalization of these processes.

2. After the tsunami, the Government created the Centre for National Operations (CNO), followed by the establishment of the Task Force for Relief (TAFOR) responsible for food assistance, cash transfers and temporary shelter and the Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN) leading the larger infrastructure and housing efforts. TAFREN has engaged external consultants, to analyze how the recovery process can be better managed<sup>4</sup>. A project effort in Mattara district will serve as a pilot for decentralization of recovery efforts, and should guide coordination and recovery plans at the local level. TAFREN is working closely with the Sri Lankan Human Rights Commission and is starting specialized committees for issues such as child protection, care for the handicapped and other vulnerable groups, and restoration/creation of legal documents. UNDP is committed to supporting TAFREN through the establishment of the Development Assistance Database (DAD) to facilitate tracking of project implementation and monitoring of funds in an effort to enhance coordination efforts. TAFREN is also establishing mechanisms to receive independent feedback from beneficiaries, including missions to affected districts in June.

3. There is some hope that tsunami aid-related agreements could build trust among the parties that have not engaged in peace talks for 2.5 years.

4. As structures evolve, it is important that the United Nations take a lead role in advocacy to ensure that the needs of all beneficiaries are met in a timely and effective manner.

### **COUNTRY ANALYSIS**

5. Humanitarian needs remain, particularly in the shelter area where poor water and sanitation conditions exist and thousands of sub-standard transitional shelters require immediate attention. (The wait for permanent housing could result in transitional shelters being used for the next two to three years or beyond.) Food coupons will cease to be distributed in the next weeks, yet there are insufficient livelihood recovery programmes to cater to all affected communities. The lack of decisions on settlement policy and lack of access to information on entitlements including the process for receiving livelihood recovery assistance and permanent shelter is also negatively impacting the speed and quality of the recovery.

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<sup>4</sup> The McKinsey Report will be released soon

6. Coordination at the national level is being strengthened, with TAFREN receiving support from UNDP and others. However, the government requires support in terms of cross-sectoral coordination and strategic planning. It is the responsibility of the international community to provide the appropriate levels of assistance, to provide a 'finished product' – i.e. transitional shelters with water, sanitation and electricity to the beneficiaries.

7. Information management / sharing is a key component to assisting national level planning, policy implementation, strategic cross-sectoral coordination and planning at the local level. The Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC) was well placed to support this gap and build national capacities and facilitate coordination. The HIC did not, unfortunately, reach its full potential at the outset of the disaster, principally due to planning and budget constraints. The HIC is currently strengthening its field presence, and it is therefore important that it be realigned to provide full support to Government efforts through enhancing national capacities at the central and local levels as part of an integrated UN response. There is potential duplication of work as UNDP moves ahead in providing capacity building support to the government at the district level, that includes an information management component.

8. Whilst citing information management as a support tool, it is important to recognise that the tool is inadequate unless fed with relevant, timely and up to date data. In this regard, it must be acknowledged that the NGO community, which has provided the bulk of assistance, has not been successfully integrated into coordination/information sharing mechanisms. Furthermore, the base line data required for strategic planning and identification of gaps is not available. Whilst the government has provided useful data, it has not been supported by continuous updating and confirmation from actors at the local level and passed to a consolidated information management section supporting the District Secretariat.

9. Coordination varies across regions, with relatively stable coordination mechanisms in place in conflict areas where humanitarian actors are fewer and have a pre-tsunami experience. In contrast, the UN had little presence in the south prior to the tsunami, and the subsequent rapid influx of new humanitarian actors after the tsunami has generated serious coordination challenges.

10. While there is no recommendation for another appeal, the newly drafted **UN Transitional Strategy** provides a basis for resource mobilisation. It is important however that the Transitional Strategy be taken a step further and linked into the forthcoming District Plans to enhance collaboration between the government and the international community and provide a strategic framework for planning at the district level. The TS should also present a realistic picture of the role of the UN in implementing activities, while also focusing on the necessary support it must provide to the government to ensure a concerted and coherent approach.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

11. **Strengthening the Office of the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator to ensure a single approach to humanitarian, recovery and coordination efforts.**

(a) Enhanced coordination and strategic planning is essential for a seamless transition from relief to recovery. It is therefore proposed that a single Office of the UN addressing humanitarian and recovery issues be established. This office would facilitate a unified system approach in support of the Government, ensuring that there are no gaps in the response, that cross sectoral linkages are in line with strategic policy guidance.

(b) It is proposed that the current OCHA Office be integrated into the Office of the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator along with other staff who have coordination functions and who are not already integrated. The Office should include an NGO coordination/focal point component, public information, UN Focal Point management, relief coordination, recovery coordination, reporting and of course information management/HIC etc. The Office of the RC/HC would also include a Donor Relations component that would focus on strengthening links and information sharing with the donor community.

(c) It is further suggested that some staff be seconded from agencies to the RC/HC's office to strengthen coordination capacity, not as representatives of their agencies but as part of the central structure.

## **12. Supporting the Government's Recovery Co-ordination Mechanism: Information Management.**

(a) The government's coordination mechanisms are being supported the integration of the Government-owned Development Assistance Database. The database, which aims to provide project breakdowns of expenditures at the district level will help to further strengthen accountability as well as coordination. In the longer term it is also envisaged that the database would provide more detailed information from the local level that would facilitate strategic planning, needs assessments and gaps analysis. Whilst such results are expected at a later stage, it is important to consider alternative information management tools that could provide a similar service and that is readily available in country.

(b) In this regard, the role of the Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC) must be carefully investigated, and its output evaluated in terms of value added to government-led processes. The HIC is seen as a vehicle for the collection and dissemination of this data. However, it has not, to date, been a tool fully accessible to the government. There is a strong need to transform or reorient the HIC toolbox, under the guidance of the Resident / Humanitarian Coordinator, to meet the needs of the UNCT and support the government's coordination efforts, in particular the DAD where appropriate, with eventual transfer to the government. The strategy should also facilitate the linkage between various information management programmes under a single umbrella, such as the UNDP Capacity Building Programmes.

## **13. Ensuring accountability of the international community to the beneficiaries through a strengthened advocacy strategy utilising UN's comparative advantage as a neutral and impartial entity.**

(a) The recovery process takes time and requires a great deal of patience among affected communities. Stabilizing humanitarian needs is essential, and beyond that, affected communities must have consistent access to information to ensure they

understand their entitlements and what can be expected in the months ahead. There are some programmes on radio, but these do not reach all affected communities and radio is not the most suitable medium of outreach. A more concerted effort must be undertaken through the office of the RC/HC, to include all Public Information/External Relations Agency personnel. An advocacy strategy should be developed in close cooperation with the UNDP (and HIC supported) Information Management package to the districts. Not only would data collection feed into advocacy messages, but also the location of the teams within the District secretariat would facilitate information dissemination/sharing at the local level.

**14. Supporting the Government's Recovery Co-ordination Mechanism: UN Focal Point System.**

(a) The Current UN Focal Point system whereby one UN agency head is designated as Focal Point for coordination, generally supported by OCHA staff, is proving to be successful in the districts, providing a sound support to the District Secretaries and strong link between the international community and the Government. The strength of the Focal Point lies in his/her seniority and tenure as a basis for gaining the trust of the local administration and actors.

(b) It is recommended that the Focal Point be assisted by an additional agency staff member to relieve day-to-day programming work in order to facilitate increased coordination and strategic planning in the recovery phase. It is also recommended that relevant agencies provide additional staff to alleviate the burden of day-to-day programme work of the Focal Points enabling them to focus on their 'Focal Point' responsibilities and support to the District Secretariat. It is important that each district be reviewed individually, with special attention being paid to the north of the island. Furthermore it is important to ensure that the UN Focal Point be at a minimum of L4 level in order to provide a suitable interlocutor for the District Secretary and direct reporting to the Resident / Humanitarian Coordinator.

(c) It is therefore recommended that the UN Focal Point system be leveraged, by appointing these focal points as full time UN District Coordinators. Furthermore, it is recommended that OCHA strengthen its support to the UN Focal Points by deploying additional staff where required, as in the case of Trincomalee. In Sri Lanka it is recommended that OCHA officers be deployed to all key districts (Trincomalee, Batticaloa, and Ampara) to support the work of the UN Focal Points.

**15. Ensuring NGO and civil society participation in current coordination mechanism in support of national recovery strategies.**

(a) There is a clear need for increased NGO and civil society participation in both programming and the decision making process. Greater information sharing among and between local and international NGOs and the wider assistance community is crucial to a recovery planning. It is proposed that the United Nations take the lead in supporting NGO coordination. Support to the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies (CHA) with information tools, via the HIC, in particular at the district level would be a proposed first step. While the CHA seems to be the most appropriate channel to reach local NGOs, it is not the only forum in the districts. It is therefore important that information gathering be addressed district by district with a view to consolidation taking place within the District Secretariat. It is

acknowledged that many NGOs do not wish to participate in formal coordination structures, however, it is important that information sharing between all groups be enhanced, and the participation of NGOs in mainstream information sharing platforms be harnessed both at the central and local levels.

(b) It is envisaged that the placement of a senior NGO liaison officer within the Office of the RC/HC would help improve outreach with NGOs and support information sharing and coordination. The participation of some NGO representatives in the Country Team meetings is a useful development.

**16. Boosting Capacity of the Government at Central and Local Levels: Supporting the UNDP/UNV Governance Programmes.**

(a) The affected regions tend to have local Government structures that are weaker than their national-level counterparts. The national level line ministries are able to function well, but can run into problems where cross-sector activities must be coordinated for recovery to take place. This coordination should take place at the local level and involve participation of affected communities and the local governments. Considerable capacity building must take place to facilitate this essential local level coordination, and the UNDP/UNV governance programmes are a suitable vehicle for such efforts.

(b) It is recommended that a return of expatriate staff be promoted through a programme similar to the IOM Afghanistan Returns programme. It is also recommended that UN staff of Sri Lankan origin be supported by UN management to return, under secondment, sabbatical, 'leave without pay' or a similar system, to contribute to the recovery process in Sri Lanka. Support from the ERC and wider UN system should be sought and supported through internal UN information networks.

**17. Multi-hazard Assessment.**

(a) To help guide the recovery and reconstruction efforts, there is a need to quickly develop multi-hazard risk assessment tools, including maps and disaster inventories, to inform both transitional shelter and more permanent reconstruction efforts. There have already been cases of shelters being built in floodplains. Some humanitarian actors are taking these issues into consideration where possible, but the lack of information tools is making it difficult.

**18. Early Warning Systems.**

(a) The need for an effective early warning system has been clearly identified by the government. An opposition-led, cross-party Parliamentary Select Committee has been reviewing early warning systems in Sri Lanka, and UNDP has provided technical assistance to the committee. The government recognizes that EWS efforts are dominated by technical agencies, and not well-linked to broader risk reduction issues. Government recognition and action should facilitate a reasonable approach to early warning that would not be dominated by technology, but would instead be linked to the realities, including predictable hazards faced by communities, and the existing institutional structures and capacities. The UN should continue to facilitate this Government-led process, and help link the multitude of

internationally supported disaster preparedness and early warning activities to promote the development of a coherent EWS and preparedness system in the country.

# **REPORT OF THE JOINT MISSION TO THE MALDIVES**

**02 JUNE 2005**

## **INTRODUCTION**

1. Unlike the other affected countries, the tsunami's impact on the Maldives was nation-wide, with economic losses totaling 62% of GDP (Gross Domestic Product), affecting one-third, or 100,000 of the total population of 290,000 severely, and rendering 10% of the total population (29,000) homeless. There have been impressive achievements in the months following the tsunami, with humanitarian needs largely met in terms of shelter, food, health, water, sanitation, and education. There are strong coordination between Government, UN agencies, IFRC, NGOs, and IFIs, facilitated by the relatively fewer number of actors as compared with Indonesia and Sri Lanka.

2. Notwithstanding the progress made, a number of challenges remain, not dissimilar to those of the other affected countries. They include: IDPs who remain in temporary shelter or with relatives (11,568 or over one-third of those originally displaced), 60% of them displaced on their own islands and 40% hosted on other islands, problems of crowding, a growing problem of ground water pollution (with the accompanying health risks), loss of livelihoods, protection concerns, poor waste management, lack of information on or participation in decision making on when and where they will move to more permanent shelter, coordination, transport and logistics, capacity challenges,

3. What makes populations in the Maldives especially vulnerable is the isolation (200 inhabited, miniscule islands scattered over a 900 km stretch of water), the tremendous transport and logistical constraints, the heavy dependence on tourism and on imports (including reconstruction materials), the extreme exposure to natural disasters the inherent difficulty in managing environmental waste, the drain of educated human resources among an already small population.

## **COUNTRY ANALYSIS**

4. Existing UN coordination mechanisms in the Maldives function well. It is important, however, that the Maldives be "brought into the mainstream" of UNHQ-field dialogue and support. There is a tendency to focus on Sri Lanka and Indonesia only; yet the Maldives also requires support, both technical and financial, surge capacity (especially at Government level) to manage the reconstruction process, contracts, etc., private sector initiatives (e.g. the Banyan Tree success story), and lessons learned from elsewhere. The risk and consequences of losing momentum is as high in the Maldives as it is elsewhere.

5. The concept of "a unified UN coordination structure" is as important in the Maldives as it is in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, and should be relatively easy to implement. OCHA, UNDP and DGO, through its recovery adviser, in the Maldives should focus on pooling the existing capacities (including those of other agencies, where appropriate) under one roof, i.e. the Office of the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator, to ensure that effective coordination is maintained, strengthening Government capacities to manage the recovery process, including the IDP situation.

6. Compared to the initial emergency phase when the government set up a National Disaster Management Center (under Ministry of Defence) to coordinate the work of all line departments, the coordination between various ministries, departments and agencies in the recovery phase is turning out to be a bigger challenge characterized by lack of adequate communication between various ministries. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for Aid Coordination and the Ministry of Planning is responsible for coordinating the implementation of recovery programmes on the ground with the sectoral line departments. The government has come up with its National Reconstruction and Recovery Programme (NRRP). The UN efforts will support the NRRP. The government has identified aid coordination (how much resources are coming from where and for what purpose) as an important issue. The scale and complexity of the projects to be implemented under the NRRP is unprecedented for the country. Garnering enough project management skills from within the country and the region is identified as a big challenge. Government functionaries are extremely overstretched and express the need for some sort of surge capacity to ease the workload and prevent burn out. The NGO sector is very limited in Maldives, which poses unique challenges in terms of close engagement with a large number of affected communities and facilitation of participatory processes at the local level. The country has only three major national NGOs, largely based in Male. There is no national Red Crescent Society. IFRC is in the process of setting up a National Society.

7. Capacity is a serious obstacle to speedy recovery. One key challenge in Maldives is inadequate local capacity in almost all aspects of recovery – project management, engineering skills and community facilitation. All the stakeholders – government, the UNCT, national and international NGOs -- that the mission met in Male highlighted this challenge at all levels. The NGOs and the various Red Cross Societies working in Maldives highlighted the need for boosting capacities at the local level to enhance community participation in decision-making, and to set up mechanisms to redress grievances.

8. This has been a particularly bad year for tourism in the country, which is the mainstay of Maldivian economy. Tourism directly accounts for 1/3 of GDP, is estimated to indirectly account for 70% of GDP and is now down to 40% of normal. The tourism sector, with government support is making efforts to project a positive image of the situation in Maldives as a safe destination in the major tourism markets. UNDP is assisting the government in coming up with a disaster risk management plan for the tourism sector.

9. The UN Country Team, with the assistance of UNDP is developing a UN strategy in support of the government's recovery efforts modelled on a Transitional Results Matrix. The strategy, in its very initial draft, places the entire recovery effort in the overall development context of the country. It endeavours to use post-tsunami recovery to not only meet the immediate needs but also as an opportunity to pursue policy reforms in the country to meet broader sustainable development goals. Although the strategy is based on inputs drawn from the government and other stakeholders at different points, at the time of the mission it had not been formally shared with the government. Once finalized, this will form a solid basis for UN's recovery efforts. Both OCHA and UNDG have placed staff in the country to assist the RC in the coordination function. This will further reinforce the development and implementation of the UN Recovery Strategy. The UNDP assisted Development Assistance Database is expected to provide added impetus to aid coordination efforts.

10. Although the response to the Flash Appeal has been extremely good (92%), it does not mean that there is no funding gap for medium and long-term recovery. The resources

available to Maldives for initial emergency assistance and long-term recovery have been highly disproportionate. It will be a continuing challenge for the government as well as the UN Country Team to keep the international focus on Maldives and garner additional resources to meet the recovery needs.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **11. Address the immediate and medium-term needs of IDPs and strengthen information management systems.**

(a) While the UN system has already made excellent progress in developing a transitional strategy, that identifies and addresses the key challenges in a comprehensive manner, it is critical that the immediate and medium-term needs of the remaining 11,568 IDPs be given special attention. As the monsoon season approaches, many risk not having adequate shelter, water and sanitation, and not knowing where they are going and when, which may also fuel tension on the already crowded islands. At the time of the mission, there were options being considered, such as consolidation of some populations on a limited number “safe islands”, but a lot of unanswered basic questions of where the remaining IDPs will move to and no evidence of a permanent shelter plan. The need for mapping IDP locations, needs and plans was identified as a high priority, as well as forming IDP committees to improve consultation and information sharing.

### **12. Ensure there are no humanitarian gaps.**

(a) As part of the transitional strategy, ensure that immediate attention is given to the most urgent priorities, including protection of women and children, shelter, helping to address bottlenecks in reconstruction, health and environmental related concerns including ground water pollution and waste management, and disaster preparedness. Improving water and sanitation conditions is a high priority.

### **13. Bring the Maldives “into the mainstream” of HQ-field dialogue.**

(a) Existing UN coordination mechanisms in the Maldives function well. It is important, however, that the Maldives be “brought into the mainstream” of UNHQ-field dialogue and support.

### **14. Establish one Coordination Unit within the Office of the UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator.**

(a) The concept of “a unified UN coordination structure” is as important in the Maldives as it is in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, and should be relatively easy to implement. UN-NGO coordination mechanisms should be strengthened.

### **15. Enhance capacities in the short, medium and long term.**

(a) It appears that planning for recovery is at an advanced stage in Maldives. However, it is clear that implementation of these plans will face severe capacity constraints. At this stage, the UNCT can assist the government in undertaking a systematic assessment of the capacity needs of the country and devise strategies to

meet these needs. In the short and medium term, these needs can be met by a combination of human resources from other countries in the region (mainly India and Sri Lanka), such as national and international UN volunteers and the surge capacity provided by the UN agencies. In the longer term, it will require systematic efforts to build local capacities in all sectors.

**16. Strengthen the Government's Recovery Co-ordination Mechanisms.**

(a) It appears that the government's own institutional architecture to coordinate recovery is still evolving. While the coordination of initial relief activities was well coordinated under the aegis of the newly established National Disaster Management Centre, an appropriate arrangement for coordinating recovery is still being discussed within the government at the time of the mission. The UN system was well positioned to inform the government's decision making process by bringing in experience from past recovery programmes to share insights on different institutional models that have been used for coordinating recovery in other countries.

**17. Link Multi-hazard and Environmental Assessments.**

(a) The recovery process needs to be informed by a multi-hazard risk assessment. Under the Disaster Risk Management Project, the government is undertaking a multi-hazard risk assessment. It is important that this assessment is closely linked with decision making in other sectors of recovery from an early stage. This multi-hazard risk assessment should also build synergies with the environmental assessments carried out under the National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process.

**18. Promote Public Information on the Recovery Process and Entitlements.**

(a) Interaction with local NGOs and the various national Red Cross Societies operating in Maldives indicates that there is a need to strengthen the information flow to the affected communities on government's recovery plans and the entitlements of the affected communities. Drawing upon the experience of past recovery programmes, the UN system could assist the government in a public information campaign to inform the population on planning for recovery, including entitlements of each household, likely timelines and services.

**19. Early Warning Systems.**

(a) Under the Disaster Risk Management project, the Government of Maldives is undertaking an assessment of the existing Early Warning Systems, which will form the basis for a programme of strengthening these systems. It is important that this exercise is closely linked with the UNESCO/ IOC led process towards the establishment of a Tsunami Early Warning System in the Indian Ocean. In addition, the key issues that need to be addressed are:

- (1) The efforts towards establishment of an observation network, data analysis and tsunami prediction in the Indian Ocean should be matched with equal (if not greater) emphasis on strengthening national and local disaster preparedness

systems to make use of those warnings and take risk reduction actions at the community level.

(2) To address the needs on the downstream end (described in the first point), it will not be enough to carry out pilot projects in a few communities. There needs to be greater coverage in terms of basic disaster preparedness systems across the board.

(3) While tsunami is a low frequency, (potentially) high impact event, Maldives is exposed to a range of other natural hazards that occur with greater frequency. Therefore, it is important to look at the issue of early warning systems in a multi-hazard context.

# **REPORT OF THE JOINT MISSION TO INDONESIA**

**03 - 08 JUNE 2005**

## **INTRODUCTION**

1. Major humanitarian needs remain in Aceh as the majority of the affected population live in tents, barracks, temporary shelter, or in lodging with relatives and host families. Currently the total tsunami affected IDP population in Aceh is approximately 475,000 people, all of whom will continue to require appropriate humanitarian assistance for some time. The IDP population continues to be highly mobile with individuals and households making their own decisions on where they would like to temporarily settle. This migration further complicates efforts to gather information on the exact location of settlements, and the number and humanitarian needs of IDPs in each settlement. A vibrant process of spontaneous recovery has commenced with many people returning to their own plots of land and beginning the reconstruction of their homes and restarting their livelihoods. Furthermore, people are now taking the situation into their own hands by slowly and sporadically rebuilding their homes. It is expected that this process will gain momentum in the coming months leading to active reconstruction at the local level, which will also provide employment opportunities. Therefore humanitarian support would need to be tailored to further stimulate spontaneous recovery.

2. The creation of the Agency for Recovery and Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias (BRR), puts the Government firmly in the driving seat for the recovery process. BRR has established direct relationships with UNDP and other UN agencies, major international NGOs and IFIs working on recovery on a sectoral basis. The process for approving recovery projects (a first tranche of approximately US \$700m of projects) has begun. In contrast to the humanitarian phase, there is, therefore, national ownership with respect to the overall coordination of the recovery process. The implementation of recovery strategies remains primarily at the provincial level with little decentralization, although as the process evolves there will be a growing level of involvement and ownership of the local authorities at the district and sub-district levels.

## **COUNTRY ANALYSIS**

3. While there has been growing Government ownership of national and provincial recovery and reconstruction process, coordination of the humanitarian response has suffered. As the movement to recovery accelerates, continued coordination of humanitarian needs will be required for the next 6 – 12 months at least, and must be enhanced both cross-sector, as well as from the central to local, operational levels, in order to provide much needed strategic planning and targeted assistance. Humanitarian coordination concerns are addressed principally by the OCHA and HIC team in Aceh, headed by a Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator post (vacant since May), currently filled on a short-term rotating basis by deployment of senior staff from the UN Office in Jakarta. Whilst BRR maintains bilateral relationships with various UN agencies, there is at present no overall UN coordinator for recovery in Aceh, who could act as counterpart to the head of BRR.

4. Coordination mechanisms exist for both humanitarian (OCHA) and recovery (GOI-BRR) concerns, yet there is no clear mechanism for linking the two, leading to the risk that continued humanitarian actions are marginalized and run parallel to the development of

recovery strategies, instead of being a critical element of recovery. In addition, neither coordination nor planning mechanisms have been developed at the local (i.e. district and sub-district<sup>5</sup>) level amongst the large number of national and international NGOs present throughout the affected region. The major gap identified is that of shelter. The current focus on permanent shelter should include transitional shelter solutions with adequate water sanitation, schooling, transport firmly based on consultations with the affected communities. The UN must maintain a holistic approach to effectively coordinate humanitarian and early recovery needs.

5. UN agencies are currently executing projects using the resources provided by the Flash Appeal. These resources, however, are only a small proportion of the total resources available for Aceh/Nias recovery through INGOs, bilateral aid, IFIs and the Government itself. A World Bank administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) has been established with a target resource base of USD\$500 million. The co-ordination function of the MDTF itself may not be sufficient, as the UN, most bilateral agencies and NGOs are implementing projects outside MDTF, which is where the majority of the resources lie.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **6. Establish an Aceh-based Office of the UN Coordinator for Aceh and Nias**

(a) A single UN Office for the coordination of humanitarian/recovery assistance should be established in Aceh, headed by a UN Coordinator for Aceh and Nias, reporting to the Resident / Humanitarian Coordinator for Indonesia. The UN Office would facilitate a unified United Nations system approach, put into place structures for coordination at all levels, ensure that there are no gaps in the response, and provide cross sectoral linkages and strategic policy guidance.

(b) It is recommended that two senior staff members, The Deputy UN Coordinator and the Senior Recovery Officer to support the UN Coordinator for Aceh and Nias. Essentially, the two positions should collaborate to ensure that both immediate humanitarian and long-term recovery needs are addressed in a concerted and integrated manner.

(c) The Deputy UN Coordinator's responsibility will address immediate concerns related to coordination of ongoing humanitarian needs, early recovery activities, and disaster preparedness. The Deputy will address both the strategic and operational aspects of these areas, and will report directly to the UN Recovery Coordinator. The Deputy will also be responsible for the day to day operations and management of the OCHA Banda Aceh office. In regards to the disaster preparedness activities, the Deputy will work closely with the OCHA Jakarta office, which will retain the primary responsibility for these activities throughout Indonesia.

(d) The Senior Recovery Officer's responsibilities will focus on the longer-term reconstruction and rehabilitation activities. In this regard, the SRO will act as a liaison between the UN and BRR to ensure that appropriate cooperation and joint planning are taking place between the Government, the international community,

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<sup>5</sup> To contextualise: there are 12 tsunami-affected districts in Aceh and 51 affected sub-districts.

NGOs, and civil society. He/she will thus be more focused on strategic and policy aspects related to longer-term program planning, reporting directly and acting as an advisor to the UN Recovery Coordinator. The SRO will also maintain a collaborative relationship with the UNDP Senior Recovery Advisor in Jakarta.

(e) The Office would be the point of contact between the UN system and the international community in Aceh and Nias, the BRR and provincial/local Government authorities. Functions would include:

(1) Supporting BRR and the national and local authorities in overall coordination with the international community, adding value to and not substituting for the existing relations between BRR and specific UN agencies and INGOs.

(2) Facilitating the design of a UN strategic plan that would establish the key roles, deliverables and accountability of the UN system in the recovery process over the next 5 years.

(3) Supporting strategic planning at the sectoral level as well as detailed cross-sectoral recovery planning at the district and sub-district levels.

(4) Continuing the coordination of outstanding humanitarian requirements and in particular ensuring the concatenation of humanitarian and recovery concerns.

(5) Ensuring that both disaster risk and conflict concerns are fully mainstreamed into the recovery process and that preparedness and early warning capacities are strengthened.

(6) Enhancing information management and sharing at all levels through the gleaning and analysis of base line data that would inform strategic planning.

(7) Incorporating an NGO liaison component, based upon the ICVA proposal that would improve information sharing with and amongst the NGO community at all levels, and pro-actively invite the NGO community in Aceh/Nias to participate in strategic planning and coordinated implementation for recovery.

(f) **Given these functions the UN Office would be characterized by:**

(1) A medium term life span, appropriate to the duration of the recovery process, matching the existence of the Reconstruction Agency (currently mandated for 4 years).

(2) A developmental focus with the capacity to add value to government policy making in areas such as housing; livelihoods; and governance.

(3) A close engagement with BRR and the local authorities with an emphasis on supporting and building the capacity of the national and local government at different levels and thus engendering local ownership rather

than establishing stand-alone UN functions. Capacity building is fundamental to ensuring the sustainability of the recovery process.

(4) A close relationship with the key UN development agencies, the IFIs and INGOs

(g) **The UN Office would be based on the foundation of existing functions:**

(1) The UNDP Governance Project that is already working to strengthen the planning and coordination capacity of BRR and the local authorities.

(2) The HIC, which could be transformed into an Information Centre covering both humanitarian and recovery needs, to provide a GIS based monitoring and base line data information function to support recovery planning and programming at the District and Sub-District level.

(3) The existing OCHA Office in Aceh could provide a third pillar of the proposed UN Office ensuring the co-ordination of outstanding humanitarian issues.

7. **Strengthen the Resident / Humanitarian Coordinator's Office in Jakarta.**

(a) The Resident / Humanitarian Coordinator has been supported by an active OCHA office over the last four years. The OCHA office was due to close in June 2005. Given the increased requirements for humanitarian support to the RC/HC at the Jakarta level the OCHA Office remains open. At the same time, efforts have been made to enhance the recovery coordination function of the RC/HC's Office. It is proposed that the current OCHA Office be integrated into the Office of the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator. The Office would continue to undertake coordination functions currently run by OCHA and the RC's Office and would also ensure adequate backstopping and support to the Office of the Coordinator in Aceh.

8. **Enhance Support for Planning, Policy, Coordination and Monitoring.**

(a) In the given context, where a majority of the resources available for recovery and reconstruction in Aceh are in the hands of the Government, INGOs and bilaterals, it is recommended that a priority role for the UN in terms of support to the Government would be in strategic planning, substantive policy, coordination, advice and monitoring.

(b) Support to Government would range from regular interaction with BRR and provincial technical departments (DINAS) to district and sub-district support.

9. **UN Strategic Plan in Support of Recovery and Resource Mobilisation.**

(a) A UN Strategic Plan in support of the recovery of Aceh should be prepared, which would provide a basis for further resource mobilization efforts beyond the duration of the Flash Appeal, as necessary. In principle, the Multi Donor Trust Fund could be used as a possible source of funding for UN led activities.

(b) N.B. The general perception among INGOS, GOI, WB and ADB is that Aceh is adequately funded at a pledged USD 5 billion. Hence possibilities of raising large volumes of additional resources may not be high. The UN strategy should identify gaps and unmet recovery needs that the UN has the capacity to address.

10. **Reinvigorate/Reformulate Sectoral Working Groups.**

(a) Existing sectoral working groups should be reinvigorated in the recovery phase, led by BRR and/or local government with UN support. Strong UN support, provided by the newly proposed structure would ensure that humanitarian needs are addressed alongside recovery programming. The functions of the working groups should henceforth be focused on strategic planning and implementation rather than simply on information exchange.

11. **Advocacy/Public Information Strategy.**

(a) The mission observed that many beneficiaries were unaware of Government policy and plans, which is a critical component of humanitarian assistance. It is recommended that the UN assist BRR in ongoing public information campaigns to inform the population on planning for recovery, including entitlements of each household established by the BRR, likely timelines and services.

12. **Extension of the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (JLC).**

(a) There is a clear need for the provision of logistics planning support for supply chain management for the Government, UN and NGO community in this phase of early recovery overlapping with humanitarian assistance. Such support would include the provision of technical advice to BRR to assist with standardisation, indicative procurement, pricing policies, and transport. The proposed Joint Logistics Coordination Centre (JLCC) would build upon the UNJLC to facilitate the distribution supply of materials and provide guidance on procurement. A proposal for the development of the JLCC concept was being prepared during the mission's visit.

13. **Early Warning Systems, Multi Hazard Risk Assessments and Surge Capacity.**

(a) The proposed new UN office of the Coordinator for Aceh and Nias should ensure that Early Warning Systems and multi-hazard risk assessments are in place. These plans and efforts must be implemented and integrated in all levels from provincial to the community level.

14. **Rationalize Reporting and Monitoring Requirements**

(a) A dialogue should be held with donors at headquarters level noting that frequent donor/agency-specific evaluation missions and reporting poses a heavy burden for some agencies and the Government of Indonesia in Aceh. Similarly, the ongoing series of lessons learned exercises (both internal and external to the UN) should be rationalised.

15. **Field Security Officer (FSO).**

(a) To date security and safety support for Banda Aceh has been relatively weak due to the high turnover of field security officers. The inability to maintain relationships and follow-up on security concerns has resulted in inadequate operating (work place) and living environments for UN staff – despite ongoing earthquakes and aftershocks, which must be urgently addressed. The deployment of a longer-term FSO is crucial to addressing staff security.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

**Joint OCHA/UNDGO/UNDP Mission to Sri Lanka, the Maldives and  
Indonesia**

**30 May – 8 June 2005**

**Background**

**The mission will travel firstly to Sri Lanka and then to Indonesia. 3-4 members of the group will also visit the Maldives, and rejoin the team in Indonesia. Field trips in both Sri Lanka (Gale) and Indonesia (Clang, Malabo) are under discussion.**

**While continued humanitarian assistance will be required for the coming months in the most severely affected countries, the transition from relief to recovery and reconstruction has already begun. During the post-emergency phase, it is important to strengthen collective efforts to ensure effective coordination in supporting the Governments concerned in addressing the needs of affected populations, and identify gaps in the UN response. The joint OCHA/UNDGO/UNDP (BCPR) mission that brings together humanitarian and development actors should contribute towards the overall objective of facilitating a smooth transition from relief to recovery and reconstruction, by identifying gaps, priorities and clarifying respective roles in coordination.**

**Principal Tasks to be undertaken during the mission:**

**Humanitarian /Development**

- To conduct a rapid assessment of the overall situation during the post-emergency phase, to review current humanitarian challenges and to make recommendations to strengthen the UN response.
- To review the work of the international community as a whole, and assess how they work together, in particular the UN, WB, ADB and the IFRC.
- To review the current coordination arrangements in support of the RC/HC, identify gaps, and make recommendations on support requirements covering the next 12 months, determining the respective roles of OCHA, DGO and UNDP;
- To formulate OCHA's exit strategy and associated plan of actions in terms of progress in implementation of transition/handover to UNDP. This would assume discussions with OCHA Management to review current level of coordination staff (collective) and make recommendations on future levels.
- To assess the UN role during the post-emergency/recovery phase, in relation to other actors, and how to integrate the tsunami response efforts into the broader development agenda.

- To assess the need for additional UN resource mobilization instruments (beyond the flash appeal).

### **Administrative/Budget Issues**

- To review any budgetary/assets implications of the above discussions (i.e. cost sharing arrangements etc...)
- Identify OCHA international / local staff who may be transferred to other structures and resulting deadlines and admin issues.
- To review national staffing with regards to the transition.

**To the extent possible, the mission will follow-up on recommendations/findings of the visit of the Special Envoy to the tsunami affected regions.**