



Knowing Peace When You See It: Setting Standards for Peacebuilding Success

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Executive Summary

How do we know a successful peacebuilding outcome when we see it? When is peace sufficiently consolidated to declare success? How should development agencies' programs respond to these standards of success? In seeking to answer these questions, this paper identifies four common standards for peacebuilding success as found in scholarship and among international peacebuilding agencies:

- (1) whether war recurs (a security perspective)
- (2) whether the root causes of the armed conflict have found redress (a social perspective)
- (3) whether a legitimate regime and/or effective state exists (a political perspective)
- (4) whether economic recovery has transpired (an economic perspective)

Because the recurrence of war is the single most prominent and widely shared marker of peacebuilding failure, the paper examines the data on this concept in some detail. It finds that sources are in dispute over war recurrence rates, varying between 21% and 39% of terminated civil wars within four to five years (with rates up to 50% in earlier research now questioned).

Although war recurrence does not alone satisfactorily capture peacebuilding outcomes, other standards are also problematic. Some are difficult to measure across large numbers of countries, while others do not sufficiently discriminate between moderate success and abject failure. Standards of peacebuilding success are based on values and (often) institutional interests of international organisations, and they often

measure different things. Although each standard carries its own advantages and disadvantages, both conceptually and operationally, the paper argues for a standard that includes (a) the recurrence of organised violence, plus (b) political and institutional elements that minimally indicate a state capacity for resolving social conflicts peaceably.

The main policy findings and implications of this paper are as follows:

- Increasingly, U.N. agencies and donors draw upon some aspects of legitimate rule, state institutions, low levels of violence, and economic performance in assessing success. Although the mandate ultimately specifies the standards for each U.N. peace operation, generally different organisations and concepts produce a nebulous standard for planners, one that is rarely specified beyond the holding of elections and the aversion of noticeably bad economic or political or security performance.
- War recurrence is a necessary but insufficient indicator of peacebuilding success.
- Useful peacebuilding standards should include political and institutional indicators of a state's capacity to resolve social conflicts peaceably, but not overburden success with multiple or unreasonable goals.
- Beyond the resumption of growth and achievement of pre-war basic indicators, the economic standards for post-conflict recovery are rarely specified.
- More important, economic performance or outcomes should not be part of the standard of assessing peacebuilding success or failure. As shown by recent research, economic variables are certainly risk factors shaping the chances of peace, but not themselves indicators of the presence of peace or war.
- Recognition of such peacebuilding standards has several implications for development agencies:
 - Development agencies should enhance their focus on known risk factors for the occurrence and recurrence of armed conflict in their prioritisation and programming.
 - The interaction of these factors with factors of violence and political engineering is what converts economic risk factors into warfare. Hence, identifying and then acting upon an analysis of peacebuilding risk factors still requires developing context-sensitive strategies that can address particular concerns of war-affected families.
 - Above all, the analysis here points beyond risk factors to the need for more context-specific orientation of development programs to preventing war recurrence and institutionalising conflict-resolution mechanisms. This means deepening the extent trend toward conflict-sensitive development.

- In this vein, three negative tendencies should be transformed: a lack of prioritisation; a reluctance to focus on spoilers and other threats to peace; and excessive weight lent to state authorities rather than non-state voices.
- These three negative tendencies should be replaced by strategic prioritisation in programming focused on context-specific threats to peace, drawing on the voices of the population (especially those affected by the war) without assuming that an interim or elected government faithfully represents all those voices. Achieving these ends will likely require deft handling of trade-offs.

Introduction

Scholars and international policymakers have long sought to find ways to end armed conflicts. Recently, however, they have devoted new effort to going beyond a simple ceasefire to consolidating self-sustaining peace. Several countries embody the challenge of moving beyond apparent success in ending war to confused and disputed success in achieving peace.

Consider the experiences of Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, and East Timor in the 1990s. In each case, analysts considered these countries success stories: Wars had concluded; elected governments had taken office; the international press had moved on. Yet within a few years, the sustainability of peace was questionable in each case. In Liberia, Haiti, and East Timor, serious political violence returned to threaten or topple the very elected regimes that signified earlier success. In Bosnia and Kosovo, the presence of international troops still seems indispensable to prevent renewed warfare. Were these cases of successful peacebuilding? Were they complete failures? How do we know?

At the root of these difficult judgments are divergent standards of success. War recurrence – the outbreak of full armed hostilities with widespread loss of human life – is a clear sign of failure. The failure of the 1991 Bicesse accord in Angola and of the 1993

Arusha peace accords in Rwanda are clear examples; the subsequent violence exceeded the pre-accord levels of war dead.

However, short of war recurrence, the standards of success remain murky. Do the levels of post-war political violence experienced by Nicaragua and Cambodia in the early 1990s, or by East Timor and Haiti in 2006, constitute failed peacebuilding? Should failure be declared when a civilian government elected amid international acclaim turns toward one-party authoritarianism (consider Haiti's earlier Preval and Aristide governments, Rwanda's Kagame administration, Liberia's Taylor government, and perhaps Joseph Kabila's current administration)?

Does the persistent inability of the state to provide basic services, as in present-day Afghanistan and Sierra Leone, constitute failed peace consolidation? And where does economic recovery fit in? Are low levels of growth, high levels of unemployment, or inconformity with IFI policy guidelines themselves indicators of failed peace consolidation, or are they explanatory variables that may help account for the return of violence?

This paper examines four common approaches to evaluating peacebuilding outcomes. The term "peacebuilding" is defined on the national level, rather than the local level, and refers generally to post-conflict societies, a term whose defects will be described shortly. Each of the four broad standards corresponds to a disciplinary tradition: security, society, politics, or economics. Each standard has its own conceptual or operational deficiencies, including difficulty of measurement.

In the conclusion, I argue that economic variables like growth and unemployment are risk factors that shape outcomes, but not themselves indicators of peacebuilding

success or failure. The most realistic and useful standards combine the absence of high levels of political violence with minimal political institutions to resolve social conflicts peaceably. International development actors, therefore, need to focus on these risk factors that indirectly shape the chances for peace. However, the primacy of security and institutional standards of peacebuilding success require processes designed to confront the primary and immediate threats to peace in a given context, not solely risk factors.

1. The four common standards of peacebuilding success

“Peacebuilding” is a term that has multiple and confused meanings. It may refer to local-level or discrete efforts to heal divisions over ethnic or other differences. It may refer to reorienting economic development efforts so as to ameliorate social conflicts that never become violent. Here the term refers to the efforts to address societies that have experienced civil wars or other significant armed conflicts.

The term “peacebuilding” entered public usage through the United Nations.¹ Drawing on the work of Johan Galtung, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali’s *Agenda for Peace* in 1992 defined “peacebuilding” largely in relation to a conflict continuum.² Passing from pre-conflict prevention to peacemaking and then peacekeeping, the *Agenda for Peace* associated peacebuilding with post-conflict societies, defining it as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”³

The term “post-conflict” can be as misleading and confusing as “peacebuilding,” but is useful when properly defined. It is used in three main ways. First, “post-conflict” refers most usefully to the period when one form of high-profile political violence comes to a virtual end, either through a negotiated settlement by the main protagonists or

through military defeat. This usage applies to the Axis powers after 1945, El Salvador after 1991, Bosnia after 1995, Guatemala after 1996, and Mozambique after 1992, inter alia.

The concept is useful in such circumstances because the termination of political violence implies certain features or challenges that tend to be quite common. These include the formation or reinforcing of political rules that were previously contested by the armed groups; a need to demobilise one or more parties to the armed conflict; the potential return of displaced populations; renegotiating the institutions of security to alleviate the fears of former combatants and their constituents; demands to remedy injustices committed in the context of political violence; and certain opportunities to rebuild economic infrastructure damaged by war.

Although not all societies emerging from political violence share all these challenges, enough do so as to justify the cluster of characteristics of “post-conflict” societies. Poor countries or weak states that are not emerging from political violence do not share this bundle of challenges in the same way; hence, the term “post-conflict” is useful. Exactly which factors operate differently in post-conflict versus non-postconflict countries, and to what extent, remains the subject of research.

Two other meanings have undermined the utility of the term “post-conflict.” Both reflect the mistaken conflation of apparent changes with the actual significant reduction of one form of political violence – i.e., they confuse form with substance. Some use the term to refer to societies that have signed a formal peace agreement, even where the political violence that the peace agreement was designed to end has not been significantly diminished. In this second usage, post-conflict really means post-accord,

and where the violence is not reduced, then the use of the term “post-conflict” can inspire anger and resentment. Nevertheless, the implementation of certain provisions of a not-yet-successful peace accord may warrant the use of “post-conflict,” even where the same form of political violence persists.

Third, “post-conflict” is used to refer to the apparent military defeat of one side in an armed conflict, but more particularly the fall of a regime associated with that army. The fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq conform to this definition. However, the continuance of organised political violence, especially when the defeated regime persists in the same political violence from outside the halls of power, may also inspire resentment and confusion at use of the term “post-conflict.”

Again, the challenges of addressing society and state in the wake of regimes that have been driven from power tend to share certain features. These features include: the formation of a new political basis for governing (at least among the victors); the need to reformulate former insurgent armies into a new legitimate and effective state security force responsible for the entire territory; the challenges of either confronting or welcoming the constituent population identified with the defeated regime; and the challenges of confronting the international post-conflict machinery.

In this sense, the challenges of defeated regimes overlap with, but are not coterminous with, the challenges of post-conflict societies as described in the first definition given above. Obviously, the simultaneous use of these three definitions of “post-conflict” can be misleading, especially when other forms of violence – social,

economic, or even new forms of political violence – emerge alongside the prior political violence.

Finally, the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding is confusing, as it overlaps with, but does not precisely coincide with, alternative terms used by international organisations and academic analysis. Overlapping terms and concepts include “post-conflict reconstruction” (used by the World Bank), “reconstruction and stabilisation” (used by the U.S. government), “transitions” (used by the U.N. Development Group and USAID), “conflict recovery” (used by U.N. Development Programme), “nation-building” (used in popular U.S. discourse), “state-building” (used especially by U.S. and European academics), and “civilian crisis management” (used by the European Union).

I. No war recurrence (a security perspective)

The signal indicator of peacebuilding failure is the reversion to armed conflict. Virtually all international and national agencies who work in post-conflict peacebuilding find agreement on this indicator of failure. Initial discussions of the U.N. Peacebuilding Commission, formed in 2006, reflected a concern about preventing reversion to war as the top priority.

An emphasis on preventing civil war recurrence reflects an emphasis on order and stability, as opposed to privileging poverty or development, justice, human freedom, empowerment, or equity. As such, war recurrence represents a conservative, or minimalist, standard, one which subordinates other values to the preservation of internal order. Of the standards examined here, it is closest to Galtung’s “negative” peace, which sees peace as the absence of warfare rather than the presence of other values that support and sustain an absence of violence.⁴

Scholars have devoted increasing attention to the topic of war recurrence, though less than the issue of civil war onset. Nevertheless, what we know about war recurrence remains inadequate and contested. First is the issue of the rate of recurrence. Several quantitative studies have sought to identify the risk of failure and the universe of cases of civil war recurrence.

However, these studies use different criteria for inclusion in their lists of civil wars (extending to complex combinations of specified levels of combat deaths over a certain time span, involving certain types of actors in specified territories, etc.), cover different time-spans (ranging from a dozen years to almost 60 years), and use divergent lapses for gauging war recurrence (ranging from two years to any time in the period covered).

Probably the most influential scholar, economist Paul Collier, directly shaped estimates of civil war recurrence that were higher than now considered to be accurate. In 2002, Collier and Hoeffler stated that “shortly after a conflict, on average, countries face a 50% risk of renewed conflict during the next five years.”⁵

Their more influential work, with others, for the World Bank in 2003 used a lower figure: Countries face a 44% chance of civil war recurrence within five years.⁶ By 2006, two studies by Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Mans Soderbom reflected even lower estimates. The studies find the chance of war recurrence within four years to be 21% and 23%, respectively, and chances of recurrence within ten years to be 34% and 40%, respectively.⁷

It is fair to say that the research to date reveals a high variation in predicted rates of war recurrence. Over the past few years, scholars have increasingly converged upon a

five-year lapse for gauging war recurrence. Part of the logic here is that two years seems too short a time period to declare success, and ten or more years seems too long to be sure that any new war actually reflects the factors associated with a prior peacebuilding effort. Several quantitative studies' findings with regard to war recurrence are found in the table below.

By "war recurrence," here I refer to the chances that a country that has already experienced a civil war (internationalised or not) will experience another in a given time period.⁸ Collier and his colleagues' work alone show a variation between 21% and 50% for war recurrence rates, though the later analysis would presumably be more reliable. Suhrke and Samset charge Collier and his colleagues of inflating the war recurrence rate, finding a five-year recurrence rate of 26% using only a simple method on Collier and Hoeffler's own 2002 dataset.⁹

Two other scholars find higher rates of war recurrence, but both examine whether civil wars ever recur over the time span covered, in both cases around 50 years (from the mid-1940s to the mid-1990s). Walter finds a 36% relapse rate for civil wars for the entire period covered,¹⁰ and Fortna finds a 41% rate of recurrence.¹¹ The various studies (see Table 1, below) indicate that a country that has experienced civil war faces a 21% to 26% chance of recurrent civil war within five years, and a 35% to 40% chance of relapse within 50 years.¹²

Other recent research analyzes the recurrence of war under specific circumstances: after a negotiated agreement to end the war. By focusing exclusively on ceasefires or broader peace agreements addressing some of the perceived causes of

warfare, these scholars provide a subset of knowledge pertinent to the many wars that end in such agreements, rather than in outright military victories or by petering out.

Licklider, Fortna, and Mack, drawing on different datasets, have all found that negotiated settlements have a higher resurgence rate than outright victories in conflict.¹³ Licklider finds war recurrence within five years in only 15% of cases of outright victory by either side, whereas Mack found recurrence in even fewer cases: 9%. In cases of negotiated agreements ending civil wars, however, Licklider found a 50% recurrence rate, and Mack a 44% recurrence rate. Some speculate that the defeat of an enemy force undermines both the incentive and the capacity for relaunching military operations. By contrast, negotiated agreements may be tactical moves in preparation for renewed offensives, where actors have not suffered the loss of legitimacy brought about by defeat.

These scholarly sources contrast with what is arguably an important security-oriented measure of peacebuilding success: whether the international community must launch a new military deployment to restore order in a purportedly post-war society. For Western military establishments and for U.N. peacekeeping planners, this measure is an implicit, but important, standard of peacebuilding failure.

The political significance of inadequate governance and the expense of U.N. peacekeeping operations (more than US\$5 billion globally in 2006, not counting regional organisations' operations, such as in Kosovo¹⁴) make the need to deploy troops one of the most important decisions faced by policymakers in the realm of international peace and security. The recurrence of civil war in Liberia in 2003, after the U.N. Operation in Liberia (UNOMIL, 1993-97) had successfully helped make and build peace after the 1990-97 war, epitomises this failure.

The table below lists countries that experienced repeat U.N. peacekeeping deployments, including those where civil war might not have recurred.¹⁵

Table 2. Peacebuilding Successes & Failures, rated by whether renewed U.N. Peacekeeping Missions were required within five years¹⁶

Peacekeeping Failures (N = 5)	Peacebuilding Failures (N=3, or 18%)	Peacebuilding Successes (N=14, or 82%)	Ongoing Missions (@) 30 July 2007)
UNAVEM II (Angola)	UNMISSET (East Timor)	UNMIBH (Bosnia)	MONUC (DRC)
UNAVEM III (Angola)	MIPONUH (Haiti)	MINUGUA (Guatemala)	UNMIK (Kosovo)
UNOMSIL (Sierra Leone)	UNOMIL (Liberia)	ONUB (Burundi)	UNMIL (Liberia)
UNOSOM I (Somalia)		ONUMOZ (Mozambique)	UNMIS (Sudan)
UNPROFOR (FRY)		UNTAC (Cambodia)	UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire)
		UNTAG (Namibia)	UNFICYP (Cyprus)
		MINURCA (C.A.R.)	UNMIT (Timor-Leste)
		UNAMIR (Rwanda)	UNOMIG (Georgia)
		ONUCA (Nicaragua)	MINUSTAH (Haiti)
		UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone)	
		UNMOP (Croatia)	
		UNTAES (E. Slavonia)	
		ONUSAL (El Salvador)	
		UNMOT (Tajikistan)	

A review of all U.N. peacekeeping operations deployed after 1987 to civil wars shows a remarkably high rate of non-recurrent U.N. troop deployments: 82% success (14 of 17). Three cases (18%) illustrate the blatant failure of a peacebuilding process: East Timor, Liberia, and Haiti.

In each case, the international community closed peacekeeping operations convinced that it had achieved some degree of success in ending a war and helping install a legitimately elected government, only to have armed conflict break out within five years. Of course, the 82% success figure excludes five peacekeeping operations that never were able to establish peace in the first place, rendering war recurrence null. It also does not pick up the dramatic peacekeeping failure represented by Rwanda's 1994 genocide. In addition, two peace operations – Somalia in 1995 and Angola in 1999 – ended without redeployments even though peace had not yet been achieved (perhaps out of international exhaustion after glaring failures, and certainly U.S. refusal to risk further lives).¹⁷.

Clearly, using the lack of a need to deploy a new U.N. peacekeeping mission as a standard of success is not only minimalist, but highly imperfect. Methodologically, analyzing only U.N. operations selects only those cases which might have greater chance of success, and where international resources arguably made success more likely.

Table 3, below, represents an attempt to refine this approach slightly. The table examines whether the Uppsala Conflict Data Project shows a recurrence of armed conflict within five years of the termination of a U.N. peacekeeping operation. The U.N. operation had to have pertained to a civil war and have ended amidst a perception of success (i.e., a lack of both active warfare and of an expectation of imminent warfare).

“Rollover” missions, where a renamed mission’s mandate changed not due to failure (a security crisis or war recurrence), are excluded, counted only through the final incarnation of the U.N. operation.

Table 3. Peacebuilding Successes & Failures, rated by whether U.N. Peacekeeping Missions ended with peace but saw renewed armed conflict within five years¹⁸

Peacekeeping Failures (N = 5)	Peacebuilding Failures (N=6, or 40%)	Peacebuilding Successes (N=9, or 60%)	Too Soon to Say (Less than 5 yrs passed @ July 2007)
U.N.AVEM I % II (Angola)	U.N.TAET- U.N.MISET (East Timor)	U.N.MIBH (Bosnia) MINUGUA (Guatemala)	MONUC (DRC) U.N.MIK (Kosovo)
U.N.AVEM III- MONUA (Angola)	U.N.MIH- MIPONUH (Haiti)	U.N.TAG (Namibia) ONUMAZ (Mozambique)	U.N.MIL (Liberia) U.N.MIS (Sudan)
U.N.OMSIL (Sierra Leone)	U.N.OMIL (Liberia)	ONUCA (Nicaragua) ONUSAL (El Salvador)	U.N.FICYP (Cyprus) ONUB (Burundi)
U.N.OSOM I % II (Somalia)	U.N.TAC (Cambodia)	U.N.MOP (Croatia) U.N.TAES (E. Slavonia)	U.N.OCI (Côte d’Ivoire) U.N.MIT (E. Timor)
U.N.PROFOR (FRY)	MINURCA (C.A.R.) U.N.AMIR (Rwanda)	U.N.MOT (Tajikistan)	U.N.OMIG (Georgia) MINUSTAH (Haiti) U.N.AMSIL (Sierra Leone)

Table 3 demonstrates an impressive success rate from the narrow standard of recurrence of armed conflict. Sixty percent of U.N. peacekeeping operations that ended

their missions claiming to have fulfilled their mandate experienced no recurrence of even minor armed conflict within five years.

These successes include operations generally considered successful within the U.N. Secretariat – Namibia, Mozambique, El Salvador, Guatemala, Tajikistan, Croatia, and Eastern Slavonia. Forty percent (6 of 15) experienced recurrent warfare, usually on a minor scale. These peacebuilding failures include cases considered mixed outcomes, such as Cambodia and East Timor,¹⁹ but also new warfare in Rwanda and Liberia in the late 1990s.²⁰

Perhaps surprisingly, even selecting only cases where the Security Council committed troops for an international operation, the recurrence of armed conflict occurred at a higher rate (40%) than found in the civil war datasets analyzed above (21% to 34%). Part of this discrepancy lies in the low threshold used for armed conflicts in Table 3: twenty-five battle deaths, versus the 1,000 battle deaths used in the wider civil war datasets. Only one peacebuilding failure (Rwanda) would have been recorded using the standard of 1,000 annual battle deaths within five years of successful mission completion – for a peacebuilding success rate of 94%.

However, it would be misleading to lump the disappointing missions in East Timor, Haiti, Liberia, and the Central African Republic with successes like El Salvador and Mozambique just because the casualties of war recurrence did not reach 1,000 in a single year.

In general, the security perspective emphasising the absence of war recurrence yields relatively high success rates. The full literature shows rates of war recurrence within five years ranging from 18% (Table 2, above) to 50% (Collier et al 2002) –

equivalent to success rates of 50% to 82%. If we draw only on more recent studies by Collier and colleagues, and use the more rigorous war recurrence standard (see Table 3) rather than new U.N. deployments (Table 2), then the success rates range from 60% (Table 3) to 77% (see Collier et al 2006b), depending on the standard adopted and the units of analysis chosen (countries, wars, or U.N. operations).

Consideration of some of the “successes” under these criteria permits a basic security calculation, but does not necessarily get at the factors underlying the war and whether these have been addressed. The next standard moves to the opposite extreme in considering such factors.

II. Root causes (a social perspective)

If short-term war recurrence represents the minimal standard for peacebuilding success, then addressing the “root causes” of conflict stand at the opposite extreme. Over time, U.N. Security Council statements and other U.N. documents have increasingly embraced some form of the root-cause standard for peacebuilding outcomes. This statement by the President of the Security Council in February 2001 illustrates the expansion of the concept:

“The Security Council recognises that peace-building is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence, or continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, development, humanitarian, and human rights programmes and mechanisms. This requires short- and long-term actions tailored to address the particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or emerging from it. These actions should focus on fostering sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent

and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and rule of law, and the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence.”²¹

This concept is generally broader than addressing the underlying causes of any particular conflict; however, it is consonant with an approach that seeks to identify both proximate and potential root causes of armed conflict. In addition, this standard reflects more of an emphasis on the social level, on the relations among social groups and their relationship to power and economic opportunity.

One recent scholarly analysis represents a good example of the root-causes approach: Roland Paris’s *After Wars End*. Paris’s standard for peacebuilding success is the “achievement of a stable and lasting peace,”²² a goal he sees as reflecting U.N. practice.²³ He explicitly rejects a focus on short-term war recurrence in favor of one that addresses the underlying causes of armed conflict. He criticises the work of George Downs and Stephen Stedman, whose work falls in the security approach of focusing on preventing a reversion to war:

...by focusing solely on whether fighting recurs in the short run, the Downs-Stedman formula deflects attention from the question of whether or not peacebuilders successfully address the underlying sources of conflict, which the U.N. also views as essential to the establishment of a self-sustaining peace.²⁴

Paris makes the case for the advantages of this more ambitious standard. It makes little sense to expend hundreds of millions of dollars so that renewed warfare will follow the withdrawal of international troops or other personnel. He writes that “any serious evaluation of the effectiveness of peacebuilding should include a consideration of why civil violence erupted in the first place, and whether the conditions that gave rise to this violence have been ameliorated through peacebuilding.”²⁵

Nevertheless, the disadvantages of the root-causes approach are serious. Paris's own work reflects the blunt instrument that evaluation becomes when so few cases make the mark. Paris only finds that Namibia and Croatia rate as qualified successes in post-conflict peacebuilding, and that the other nine major U.N. peacebuilding operations all fall short of creating stable and lasting peace.²⁶ Based on his 11 selected cases, the success rate amounts to only 22%, much lower than the 60% to 80% success rate for non-war recurrence.

Yet how useful is a standard that lumps together clear failures such as Liberia, moderate successes like Cambodia and Bosnia, and widely accepted successes like El Salvador and Guatemala?²⁷ Given the ongoing constraints confronting international agencies engaged in peacebuilding, does it make sense to hold a standard that will very rarely be met? Other problems exist with the root causes approach.

Conceptually, we know that many post-conflict countries (e.g., Guatemala) have failed to address the root causes of war, but have not experienced a reversion, nor is there one on the horizon. Furthermore, the difficulty of successfully diagnosing the “underlying causes” is one which, despite improvements in conflict analysis, remains a tricky business. And how realistic is it to expect peacebuilders to address root causes of armed conflict that exist outside the state, whether in predatory neighbors, neoliberal economic policies that exacerbate inequalities, or Western-driven natural resource markets that elicit violent competition?

III. Legitimate regimes, effective states (a political perspective)

A third perspective on peacebuilding success has gained traction in recent years: one focused on the character of the regime or the state, rather than on the security

situation or particular characteristics of the conflict or economy. A recent book on peacebuilding states, “Just as civil war is about failures of legitimate state authority, civil peace is about its successful reconstruction.”²⁸ This approach emphasises the primacy of politics.

(a) Peacebuilding as participation or democratisation

This political paradigm takes two main forms. The first focuses on the legitimacy of the post-conflict regime: Is it reasonably participatory? Is it a democracy? One of the assumptions of peacekeeping policy during the early 1990s was that elections could serve as a conflict-management tool, ending civil wars by peacefully settling the question of who should rule. By this thinking, elections dissuade losers from taking up arms while undermining any popular support for the losing party once a free and fair election transpires. Although this approach seemed to reflect the peace process in Nicaragua in 1990,²⁹ the return to war by Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA forces in Angola once he lost the 1991 presidential election exposed the flaws of seeing elections as the culmination of a successful peace process.

Nevertheless, legitimacy remains an important marker of peacebuilding success both conceptually and operationally. One U.N. report explicitly includes participatory governance as a condition of sustainable peace:

“A sustainable domestic peace ... becomes sustainable, not when all conflicts are removed from society, but when the natural conflicts of society can be resolved peacefully through the exercise of State sovereignty and, generally, participatory governance.”³⁰

Present-day international peace operations require, as a *sine qua non* for conclusion and withdrawal, some form of participation in the selection of an interim

administration and/or a permanent government. Despite widespread agreement that elections can be harmful and fall short of constituting a legitimate regime, the salient marker of legitimacy remains the election of a constitutionally empowered national government. The sequencing of this process has become subject to flexibility, as has its form. Thus regional consultations might precede the selection of an interim government (as in Afghanistan in 2002), as may local elections, as occurred in East Timor.

Conceptually, a standard that emphasises participation explicitly links the degree to which the state represents disparate social groups and is seen as holding legitimacy. Operationally, the standard has the advantage of being visible: Whether it be a national consultation or a national election, everyone inside and outside the country knows when such an event has taken place.

Its disadvantages include its reliance on a blunt instrument: a single national participatory event, usually an election. As we know from cases such as Angola in 1991, elections can also spark renewed conflict.³¹ They can also convey internal and external legitimacy on spoilers, those who actively undermine political or social reconciliation, or who exclude or repress former enemies. Bosnia's first post-Dayton elections, Haiti's elections of 2000 and 1995, Cambodia's elections, and Liberia's elections of 1997 all provide examples of internationally recognised elections whose outcomes complicated or undermined peace.

One recent book, Doyle and Sambanis's *Making War, Building Peace*, represents the most serious quantitative effort yet to measure peacebuilding successes beyond war recurrence.³² Doyle and Sambanis examined all 121 civil wars that had begun and ended between 1945 and 1999, assessing peacebuilding success using a more ambitious

definition of peace, since “higher-order peace cannot be based on the complete exclusion or repression of a group of citizens.”³³

Peacebuilding “failed” if war or significant violence occurred within two years, if sovereignty was divided, or if independent Polity dataset scored a regime as extremely authoritarian or repressive. By including a minimal measure of participation, Doyle and Sambanis found a failure rate of 69%, understandably higher than more simple war recurrence measures, but lower than Paris’ “root causes” standard. A higher standard, such as a fully democratic regime or a certain level of regime legitimacy or support as expressed in public opinion surveys, would presumably yield an even higher failure rate for peacebuilding efforts.

(b) Peacebuilding as state-building

The second form of this political approach focuses on capacity of the state: Is the post-conflict state capable of carrying out its minimal functions? In recent years, especially since the events of 9/11 brought “state failure” to the fore of international security, the concept of state-building has become intertwined with peacebuilding. Fukuyama stated in 2004 that “state-building is one of the most important issues for the world community because weak or failed states are the source of many of the world’s most serious problems.”³⁴ In reacting against the neglect of state institutions, intergovernmental agencies embraced state-building as a central feature of post-conflict peacebuilding.³⁵

In practical terms, peacebuilders increasingly defined success in terms of leaving behind a sustainable state or self-sustaining state institutions. One senior DPKO official, for example, stated,

“The exit strategy used to be elections, but now is really the capacity of new legitimate authorities. ... It is linked to the establishment of credible, professional, and loyal army, police, extension of state authority throughout the country, and the capacity to develop basic services, DDR, and resettlement of refugees and IDPs.”³⁶

A legitimate, effective state is an attractive standard because it values sustainability more than simple elections or the absence of mass-level violence. To the extent that effective and legitimate states exist, then they are indeed likely to be able to mediate conflict in ways that mitigate violence. At the same time, this standard has two flaws. First, it is hard for international or national actors to know an effective and legitimate state when they see it, much less to agree upon it.

Most analysts agree that a full Weberian state, with formal ministries that carry out their functions transparently, efficiently, and accountably with reasonable equality across social groups, which is not supplanted by NGOs or informal institutions, is not the appropriate standard. But if this standard is not appropriate, then what level of efficacy and legitimacy is? Aside from the holding of elections and a sense that violence is unlikely to break out upon withdrawal of international troops, international actors bring remarkably little clarity to this question.

One oft-used state-building standard is the “restoration of state authority.” Yet even here, what that restoration looks like is either unclear or unsatisfying. In Liberia, for instance, restoring state authority to the rural areas was a key indicator of U.N. mission success. Helping the state recover its pre-war ability to deliver services may not be very useful, since state performance was likely to have been inadequate and possibly an initial causal factor in the war.

In Liberia, the actual U.N. standards fell short even of pre-war capacity. Three things constituted successful state restoration in a given locale: the reconstruction of the village building; ensuring that the police had some presence in the village; and the physical return of the mayor to abide in the municipal seat.³⁷ The U.N. did not inquire into the capacity to deliver services or the legitimacy or representativity of the restored mayor. This operational standard clearly falls short of an effective and legitimate state.

Where does that leave the standard for state-building as peacebuilding? The World Bank and some U.N. missions are seeking to develop manageable checklists for minimal state capacities in particular contexts. Former Afghan Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani and associates have proposed 10 core state functions.³⁸ Yet the challenges are manifold. We still have neither an agreed-upon template to measure overall state effectiveness, and insufficient data on the long list of core state functions to assess relative state strength with reliability. Thus no statistics on successful or failed state-building are available.

Furthermore, context is important, and some state functions (e.g., security or public finance) may be more crucial for peace in some countries than others. Western agencies also face a conundrum politically. Although international agencies must adopt moderate, non-Western standards of state authority to be realistic, they cannot enunciate such lower standards without undermining their legitimacy or their ability to amass resources for peacebuilding.

IV. Economic recovery (an economic perspective)

A number of international actors cite economic recovery as their goal in post-conflict settings. It is not clear whether they believe that economic recovery constitutes

successful, sustainable peace. However, the concept of economic recovery or reconstruction remains the highest order objective of these programs and thus merits mention here.

Should economic recovery be a singular indicator of peace? Is peace realised once a certain level of economic recovery is reached? Even the most economic analysts would say probably not. Poverty and other socio-economic indicators are clearly correlated with the occurrence of civil war. Research indicates that some economic variables are stronger risk factors than certain political, cultural, or social variables. Yet because these risk factors often fail to translate into armed conflict, they do not serve as an adequate indicator of the presence of peace. Peace is simply not the same thing as wealth or infrastructure or industrialisation or a healthy population.

It makes much more sense for international development and financial institutions to plan and implement programs in function of standards of peace that reflect the defining elements of peace: levels of organised violence and perhaps the stability of political authority. In fact, most development and economic literature on post-conflict economic recovery implicitly or explicitly does so. Collier et al's *Breaking the Conflict Trap* examines the correlations between social, economic, and political factors on the one hand, with rates of civil war occurrence as the dependent variable.³⁹

Their critics do likewise. They argue that international development actors design and implement their programs with insufficient attention to their impact on war recurrence, levels of potential organised violence, or the legitimacy and institutionality of the state. In recent years, much of the efforts of development and humanitarian

international organisations has focused on getting these same organisations to revise their programs more toward peacebuilding and state-building.

Even if the assumption that general levels of economic recovery are healthy for preventing renewed mass-level violence or political legitimacy (a questionable assumption for any given program in a given society), the standards for success of achieving this intermediate or correlative peacebuilding goal are underspecified. International agencies say little about what levels of economic recovery are sufficient for them to declare their programs successful.

One tacit measure would be the levels of economic performance seen before the war. However, most international development actors believe such a standard to be either too elusive or inappropriate. Furthermore, agencies fail to specify which indicators would be most appropriate: GDP, infrastructure reconstruction, employment rates, productivity, wage levels, or basic health and social indicators?

Conclusions

What can we conclude from these diverse standards of peacebuilding success? What implications do they hold for policymakers, especially within the U.N. system?

The four “common” standards of success for post-war peacebuilding each yield different rates of failure and success. The most common standard – war recurrence – shows disparate rates of success, many of them based on the same cluster of economists’ changing analysis over the past five years. That standard – recently ranging from 23% to 26% within five years to 39% (and thus a roughly 61% to 75% success rate) – derives from various quantitative methods analyzing the entire pool (not just a sample) of civil

wars over five decades. Examining U.N. missions only yields slightly lower success rates (60%).

On the other hand, the political standard of state institutionalization is still in its infancy. We have no widely shared standard by which to measure “successful state-building” across cases of post-war countries, and thus no reliable success rate (see Table 4 for summary of rates based on distinct standards).

In addition, we have isolated studies that provide success rates reflecting either a “root-causes” approach (Paris’s 22%) or a political approach that combines war recurrence and other organised violence with a non-autocratic regime (Doyle and Sambanis’s 31%). When we consider only negotiated settlements, the success rate for non-war recurrence is only 59% to 65%, as opposed to outright victories, for which evidence points to much higher success rates of 85% to 91%. Finally, the outcomes for economic recovery are unclear.

Table 4. Peacebuilding Standards and Success Rates

Peacebuilding Standard Adopted	Success Rates	Sources
Security Standard		
No Civil War Recurrence within Four/Five Years	61-77% (earlier estimates, now revised: 50-66%)	Collier & Hoeffler & Soderbom (Jun 2006, Aug 2006) Collier et al 2003 Collier & Hoeffler 2002 Suhrke and Samset 2006
No Civil War Recurrence Ever (50+ years)	59-65%	Walter 2004 Fortna 2004
No Armed Conflict for 5 years after ‘successful’ Security Council-mandated U.N. peace operation	60%	This piece (See Annex A)
Political Standard		
Neither Large-scale Violence nor rise of Outright Autocratic Regime within 2 years	31%	Doyle & Sambanis 2006
Creation of Effective & Legitimate State	NA	Ghani, Lockhart, & Carnahan 2006
Social Standard		
Root Causes addressed (of 11 major U.N. peacebuilding operations).	22%	Paris 2004

How are we to assess these standards? War recurrence, or its absence, must be part of any standard of peace, including any broader “positive” peace standard. Any notion of peace means little if persistent combat exists. Thus, the outbreak of armed conflict is now and should remain the signal failure of any peacebuilding process.⁴⁰

This claim raises two questions. First, are our knowledge of and tools for analyzing war recurrence adequate? The answer is no, they are not. Serious problems plague both quantitative and qualitative research on war recurrence. Problems of method

and measurement lead to the diverse rates of war recurrence seen above, ranging from 20.6% to 50%.

How reliable can quantitative studies be if the same group of scholars report such variation in the rates of civil war recurrence? Part of this difference relates to the divergent methods used to calculate war recurrence rates. In addition, datasets reflect very different criteria for inclusion. Of 141 civil wars that began between 1944 and 1996 listed by Sambanis, for example, Fearon and Laitin include only 101 of these wars, while Walter includes only 64.⁴¹ Rates of success and failure are less compelling when specialists disagree so seriously on what constitutes a civil war at all.

Related to the problem of divergent methods and datasets is the lack of more discrete sets of generalisations based on similar sorts of civil wars. Large-N quantitative studies have the benefit of using methods that control for systematic differences among diverse social phenomena. Hence, risk factors for warfare derive from analyzing more than 100 civil wars with very different scales of affected territory (e.g., from Russia's relatively contained war in Chechnya to Liberia's 1990-97 civil war), different degrees of intensity (e.g., from 144 battle deaths in Chiapas to an estimated half a million direct and indirect deaths in Angola⁴²); different levels of involvement by external actors (e.g., from Cuba's relatively home-grown revolution to the U.S.-funded war against Cuban-backed Nicaragua in the 1980s), etc.

Despite the utility of such analyses, international peacebuilding efforts would also benefit from research on the factors that shape similarly situated post-war situations. Such research necessarily would require more attention to similar cases, which points to the utility of qualitative research.

Yet our qualitative research is also deficient. We have numerous case-based comparative studies of post-war societies, but few focused specifically on war recurrence or the failure of peacebuilding. Stedman, Cousens, and Rothchild examine cases in a rigorous framework, but focus only on cases of implementation of peace agreements.⁴³ Paris includes 14 case studies of peacebuilding efforts, but only cases with major U.N. peacekeeping presence. Like Doyle and Sambanis and most case studies, neither of these books examined cases like Burma, Peru, Russia/Chechnya, or the Philippines, where the U.N. and international actors had little or no involvement in post-war activities. Other comparative studies, including Collier et al's *Understanding Civil Wars* and Chesterman et al's *Making States Work*, have looked at cases without major U.N. or intergovernmental involvement, but neither has focused exclusively on war recurrence.⁴⁴ We have little rigorous comparative work on civil war recurrence.

The second obvious question is: What standards beyond war recurrence should be part of assessing success and failure in post-war peacebuilding? Values underlie our choices about standards for peacebuilding success. The least ambitious standard – war recurrence – reflects a privileging of order over equality, justice, empowerment, or prosperity, at least in the short run. The other common standards – root causes, sound governance, or economic well-being – reflect assumptions about how certain factors – e.g., inequality, political exclusion, weak institutions or poverty – relate to peace.

Most standards for post-conflict success reflect a standard that is either explicit, or, more often, implicit: that a society has consolidated peace once it demonstrates the ability to resolve social conflicts without large-scale violence. The difficulty lies in markers. How do we know when a society or country can sustainably resolve conflicts

without armed conflict? All of the standards in use – democratic regimes, a viable state, and even sound economic policies that produce growth – reflect different proxies for a society’s conflict-resolving capability. Ideally, we would specify more discrete measures of a society’s capacity for resolving conflicts.

What seems to make some sense is to build in minimal indicators of a capacity to resolve conflicts peacefully. Ideally, such a standard would include the extent to which institutions are actually capable of resolving social conflicts, as well as the extent to which governance is structured so as not to fuel renewed conflict. In other words, war recurrence plus some indicators of minimal state institutionalization and minimal participation by salient social groups.

When it comes to participation and state institutions, the problem remains the lack of discriminating and universal markers gauging the capacity for conflict resolution. Widely used scales of freedom or regime type, such as the Polity dataset or Freedom House, are helpful and cover virtually all the world’s countries; however, they are not fully satisfying in measuring the extent to which salient social groups feel sufficiently invested in the polity to not take up arms.

The deficiencies of measures of states and their institutions are more egregious. Although a plethora of indices exist for measuring governance, economic risk, democracy, and freedom, fewer indices measure state institutions.⁴⁵ Of these, most measure things that go beyond state institutional capacity, aggregating indicators of legitimacy and governance or of the adoption of neoliberal economic policies (e.g., the World Bank’s CPIA). While such aggregation is not intrinsically bad, more narrow indicators of state capacity for conflict resolution (including core state functions, such as

ensuring security guarantees, managing public finance, and administering justice) would prove more useful. Furthermore, such indicators of state institutional capacity would best be standardised in ways that permit coverage of most of the countries of the world.

At the end of the day, measuring peacebuilding success by any standard beyond war recurrence requires identifying and validating the relevant specific types of participatory provisions in governance, as well as specifying which state capacities are generally most essential for peace. Although the literature offers some hypotheses along these lines, here is where future research could improve the confidence level in the standards used by international actors in evaluating peacebuilding efforts.

Where does economic recovery fit into these standards of post-war peacebuilding? An examination of the root-causes standard is helpful in answering this question. This analysis mitigates against the adoption of a broad “root causes” standard. Root causes can be understood as either particular to a society’s conflict or as generalised risk factors. To the extent that root causes are specific to a society, then by all means, taking measures to address them is positive, and this standard is laudable. However, it is not generalisable across large numbers of countries, and thus will not lend itself to standardised policy approaches.

To the extent root causes are generalised risk factors, they are not indicators of successful or unsuccessful outcomes, but rather independent variables that influence outcomes. Reducing risk factors for war recurrence or other indicators of sustainable peace is always good, all other factors being equal. However, all things are rarely equal, and measures to reduce risk factors, such as reducing poverty or addressing a youth

bulge, may prove harmful and thus should be weighed against their potential adverse effects.

The point here is that a generalised “root causes” standard is not meaningful. It translates to: Has poverty been reduced by a certain margin? Have youth been employed at a certain rate? Taking measures to reduce risk factors is certainly an important means of reducing the likelihood of war recurrence. Reducing risk factors (and we should call them this rather than the confusing “root causes”) is an important role for economic development agencies to play in post-war societies, as suggested most prominently in Collier et al’s *Breaking the Conflict Trap*.⁴⁶ Other papers in this project address these risk factors.

For development agencies, this review of peacebuilding standards points not only to consideration of risk factors, but to an emphasis on conflict-sensitive programming. If post-war success is measured in terms of staving off war recurrence and incorporating minimal elements of participation and institutionalisation, then orienting development projects toward those goals is imperative. Although orienting programming toward policies that reduce risk factors, orienting assistance toward each country’s strategic needs to avoid war recurrence and build the needed mechanisms for conflict resolution should have a more direct and significant impact.

Conflict-sensitive development is a well-established principle, and UNDP, international financial institutions, and bilateral donors have taken a number of steps toward incorporating conflict into design and implementation.⁴⁷ These include the creation of offices within development agencies focused on conflict mitigation of prevention and recovery; the assignment of field officers to the conflict issues; training

personnel in issues of conflict and development; explicit focus in programming on conflict and post-conflict dynamics; and a new regard for experience in war-torn societies in hiring and promotions.

Nevertheless, practice still lags behind principle. Programming still reflects three characteristics generally antithetical to peacebuilding. These are briefly described below:

(a) Lack of prioritisation

Recently the United Nations and other donors have improved coordination and coherence in drafting Joint Needs Assessments, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, U.N. Development Assistance Frameworks, and contributing to transitional post-conflict strategic plans. Nevertheless, these continue to reflect too much of a laundry-list approach, with resources divided among agencies as a result of a bureaucratic compromise. Those programs are increasingly framed in terms of conflict prevention and the risk factors identified by some research, and they reflect compromises with U.N. departments focused on peace and security. Although the U.N. Peacebuilding Support Office may eventually contribute to strategic approaches through their Interim Peacebuilding Strategies, strategic prioritisation remains wanting. Instead, achieving peacebuilding success requires hard choices based on what factors will advance the goals of preventing armed conflict recurrence and strengthening participation and state institutionalisation.

(b) Insufficient focus on region- and nation-specific threats to peace

The discourse of development actors tends not to emphasise positive goods that collaboration with governments can achieve. Plans for post-conflict societies reflect the

host of needs, many of them urgent. Related to the lack of setting clear priorities (that identify which programs are not a priority), development agencies also tend not to develop projects in conjunction with coherent strategies to bring potential spoilers into a process, or to confront corrupt elites.

The standards discussed here point toward greater emphasis on conflict-sensitive development oriented to addressing nation-specific and region-specific threats to sustained peace. Again, contextualised strategies to prevent war recurrence is the same as projects aimed at general risk factors.

(c) Excessive weight lent to state authorities rather than non-state voices

The system of sovereign states upon which the United Nations was founded assumes that states have the legitimacy and capacity to deliver essential services, including the peaceful resolution of social conflicts. However, this is not true in many states, especially war-torn states, which tend to have low levels of legitimacy and of capacity. The international system tends to endow, often artificially, newly elected post-war governments with these attributes of capacity and legitimacy. However, war-torn societies usually include large social groups – based on identity, class, or territory – that rightly or wrongly feel more represented by former insurgents (or a former government’s troops) than by a newly elected government.

Because development agencies generally partner with governments, especially in peacetime, they tend to see governments in this same light, viewing them with legitimacy that the populace may not share. Orienting development toward preventing war recurrence means ensuring that these social groups have a voice in the design and execution of programs in addition to the post-war governmental role.

Too often development actors programmatically assume that a post-conflict elected government is the sole legitimate voice for the population, when numerous non-governmental organisations, political parties and other social entities may usefully provide input into planning and execution of projects in ways that strengthen peace. Certainly the government must have an important voice in all such decisions. And international actors necessarily exercise power when they grant voice to certain non-state actors and not others.

Yet the benefits of preventing future warfare likely outweigh the hazards posed by these difficult choices. Finding ways to give voice to marginalised or potentially excluded social groups, as well as civil society, remains part of the challenge for insuring that development planning and execution helps prevent war recurrence and builds the capacity and legitimacy of national conflict-resolution capacities.

In sum, these three characteristics should be replaced by strategic prioritisation in programming focused on context-specific threats to peace, drawing on the voices of the population (especially those affected by the war) without assuming that an interim or elected government faithfully represents all those voices.

Such an approach is not without difficult tradeoffs and choices. Moreover, to the extent that minimal participation and minimal state institutionalisation are conceived as part of a standard of peacebuilding success, development programming is complicated. Buying off spoilers does not necessarily build legitimacy for a new government. Similarly, incorporating former enemies into state institutions may undermine their overall capacity to deliver services efficiently. Choices to enhance legitimacy may

undermine capacity, and directly preventing the chances of spoilers from taking up arms may wreak costs on a regime's legitimacy.

Most tricky is the task of enhancing state institutions when the state is corrupt or illegitimate. Bypassing the state may undermine the institutionalisation of state conflict-resolution capacities. On the other hand, blind support for state authorities in such circumstances may risk converting opposition parties into spoilers or building up an illegitimate state that sows the seeds for future armed conflict. International actors can help under these circumstances by supporting such states in ways that build accountability, transparency, and broad participation in decision-making and implementation.

Setting clear and sensible standards of peacebuilding success is essential for international actors engaged in peacebuilding. The present plethora of ill-defined and conflicting standards requires clearer thinking and clearer programming in response to clarified standards. This paper has sought to not only review various standards, but to provide an understanding of their intellectual underpinnings and their practical implications. Although values shape the standards institutions adopt, values are not alone.

The preferences of powerful states, the mandates of U.N. and other peacekeeping missions, and the bureaucratic interests of development and diplomatic agencies also shape peacebuilding standards adopted. Nevertheless, informed choices by those agencies and the disciplinary frameworks and methods of scholars have also usefully shaped standards of success. This important choice, of course, means little unless plans and programs are adapted and rigorously examined in light of the standards adopted.

Appendix A
U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, 1988-2006, Color-Coded by Outcome

Country	Mission	Start	End
Angola	UNAVEM I United Nations Angola Verification Mission I	January 1989	June 1991
Angola	UNAVEM II United Nations Angola Verification Mission II	June 1991	February 1995
Angola	UNAVEM III United Nations Angola Verification Mission III	February 1995	June 1997
Angola	MONUA United Nations Observer Mission in Angola	June 1997	February 1999
Afghanistan and Pakistan	UNGOMAP U.N. Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	May 1988	March 1990
Bosnia and Herzegovina	UNMIBH United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina	December 1995	December 2002
Burundi	ONUB United Nations Operation in Burundi	June 2004	December 2006
Cambodia	UNAMIC United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia	October 1991	March 1992
Cambodia	UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia	March 1992	September 1993
Central African Republic	MINURCA United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic	April 1998	February 2000
Central America	ONUCA United Nations Observer Group in Central America	November 1989	January 1992
Chad	UNASOG United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group	May 1994	June 1994
Congo	MONUC U.N. Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	November 1999	present
Cote d'Ivoire	UNOCI United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	April 2004	present
Croatia	UNCRO U.N. Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia	May 1995	January 1996
Croatia	UNPSG	January	October

	UN Civilian Police Support Group	1998	1998
Croatia	UNMOP United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka	January 1996	December 2002
Cyprus	UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	March 1964	present
East Timor	UNTAET United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor	October 1999	May 2002
East Timor	UNMISET United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor	May 2002	May 2005
East Timor	UNMIT United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste	August 2006	Present
El Salvador	ONUSAL United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador	July 1991	April 1995
Ethiopia and Eritrea	UNMEE United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	July 2000	Present
Georgia	UNOMIG United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia	August 1993	Present
Guatemala	MINUGUA United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala	January 1997	May 1997
Haiti	UNMIH United Nations Mission in Haiti	September 1993	June 1996
Haiti	UNSMIH United Nations Support Mission in Haiti	July 1996	July 1997
Haiti	UNTMIH United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti	August 1997	November 1997
Haiti	MIPONUH U.N. Civilian Police Mission in Haiti	December 1997	March 2000
Haiti	MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti	June 2004	Present
Iraq and Kuwait	UNIKOM United Nations Iraq - Kuwait Observation Mission	April 1991	October 2003
Kosovo	UNMIK U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	June 1999	present
Liberia	UNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia	September 1993	September 1997

Liberia	UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia	September 2003	present
Mozambique	ONUMOZ United Nations Operation in Mozambique	December 1992	December 1994
Namibia	UNTAG United Nations Transition Assistance Group	April 1989	March 1990
Rwanda	UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda	October 1993	March 1996
Sierra Leone	UNOMSIL United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone	July 1998	October 1999
Sierra Leone	UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone	October 1999	December 2005
Slavonia, Baranja, and Sirmium	UNTAES United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium	January 1996	January 1998
Somalia	UNOSOM I United Nations Operation in Somalia I	April 1992	March 1993
Somalia	UNOSOM II United Nations Operation in Somalia II	March 1993	March 1995
Sudan	UNMIS United Nations Mission in the Sudan	March 2005	Present
Uganda and Rwanda	UNOMUR United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda	June 1993	September 1994
Tajikistan	UNMOT United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan	December 1994	May 2000
Yugoslavia (Former)	UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force	February 1992	December 1995
Macedonia	UNPREDEP United Nations Preventive Deployment Force	March 1995	February 1999

Total: 47 U.N.SC-mandated DPKO Missions begun between Jan 1988 and Dec 2006.

5 Border/Interstate PK Missions. Removed from Calculations. Of these 47 DPKO Missions, 5 (Afghanistan/Pakistan, Chad/Libya, Uganda/Rwanda, Iraq/Kuwait, Ethiopia/Eritrea) were for border issues/ interstate wars (we count UNAMIR, not

UNOMUR, as primarily directed at Rwanda's civil war), and 42 for internal wars, usually internationalised.

The 42 missions for internal wars occurred in 26 countries or territories. We consider ONUCA's activities and impact in Central America to have centered around Nicaragua. Because each mission had its own territory and logic (and often sovereignty by the time of mission deployment) in the former Yugoslavia, we count the FRY, Croatia, Eastern Slavonia, Macedonia, and Kosovo each as its own territory. Because most of the U.N. mission in the FRY centered on Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the U.N. Mission in BiH is counted as successor to the U.N. Mission in the FRY.

Calculating Peacebuilding Failure: Of these 42 missions for internal wars, 16 were second or subsequent missions deployed to the same territory, thus signifying possible prior failures of peacebuilding.

The creation of a second (or subsequent) mission in the same territory can derive from three reasons: (a) a prior mission was withdrawn based on perceived success, meaning a new mission signifies peacebuilding failure; (b) a prior mission was renewed in response to peacekeeping failure; (c) a prior mission was renewed in response to neither success nor failure, but in support of a continued peace process.

3 Peacebuilding Failures. When a PK operation concluded with perceived success, but a new PK deployment occurred, the earlier mission is counted as a peacebuilding failure. These PB failures are UNMISET (East Timor); MIPONUH (Haiti); and UNOMIL (Liberia).

5 Peacekeeping Failures. These are PK operations supplanted by new PK missions in response to prior peacekeeping failures. Where a PK mission was not

considered successful, and a new mission created in the same territory, the earlier mission is considered not a peacebuilding failure, but a failure of peacekeeping (i.e., the war never ended, so it could not recur): UNAVEM II (Angola); UNAVEM III (Angola); UNPROFOR (FRY); UNOMSIL (Sierra Leone); UNOSOM I (Somalia).

8 Rollover Missions. These are new PK missions created in response to neither success nor failure, but in support of a continued peace process. In order to prevent double-counting success/failure, these missions are not counted in the pool of cases: UNAVEM I (Angola); UNAMIC (Cambodia); UNCRO (Croatia); UNPSG (Croatia); UNTAET (East Timor); UNMIH, UNSMIH & UNTMIH (Haiti).

Calculating Peacebuilding Success: Peacebuilding success, by the measure of whether U.N. troops had to be deployed once again, requires not only that the mission be concluded, but also that the reason for conclusion and non-renewal not be that the international community has given up on resolving an ongoing war.

9 Ongoing Missions. Of the 42 missions for internal wars, nine are still deployed as of this writing. These cannot be counted as successes and are removed from the pool, leaving 33 concluded missions. Removing the 16 cases of renewed missions above leaves 17 possible successes.

3 Missions Concluded in Exasperation or Prematurely. UNOSOM II (Somalia, withdrawn amidst hostilities in 1995), MONUA (Angola, withdrawn amidst hostilities in 1999) and UNPREDEP (Macedonia, where hostilities broke out within two years of China's premature closure of the mission in 1999 for political reasons) are removed from successes. When assessing for success based on recurrence of armed conflict within five years, UNPREDEP is excluded as a preventive (not post-conflict) mission; MONUA and

UNOSOM II are counted as successors to rollover missions, resulting in no net change of failures or successes.

14 Peacebuilding Successes. The remainder of the missions were concluded without re-introduction of a new U.N. peacekeeping operation. In several cases regional organisations deployed peacekeeping operations with similar responsibilities, or the U.N. Department of Political Affairs deployed a peacebuilding mission. These are not taken into account in this analysis. The missions counted as successes are: UNMIBH (BiH); ONUB (Burundi), UNTAC (Cambodia); MINURCA (Central African Republic); ONUCA (Central America/Nicaragua); UNMOP (Croatia); ONUSAL (El Salvador); MINUGUA (Guatemala); ONUMOZ (Mozambique); UNTAG (Namibia); UNAMIR (Rwanda); UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone); UNTAES (Eastern Slavonia); UNMOT (Tajikistan).

** Includes all U.N. Missions mandated by the U.N. Security Council and overseen by U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), initiated after 1987. Source: U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations website, accessed 22 July 2007. Several U.N. operations – among them UNAMI (Iraq), UNMIN (Nepal), and UNPOS (Somalia) – are absent because they are managed by the U.N. Department of Political Affairs (DPA) rather than DPKO. DPKO's political missions, including UNAMA (Afghanistan), are not included. Thanks to Yolande Bouka for research assistance.*

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¹ Until recently, the term “peace-building” was hyphenated in virtually all UN documents. The term’s widespread use, approaching that of “peacekeeping” and “peacemaking,” suggest that hyphenation is not necessary (the report of the High-Level Panel drops the hyphen).

² Johan Galtung, “Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding,” in his *Peace, War and Defense – Essays in Peace Research*, Vol. 2 (Copenhagen: Christian Eljers, 1975), pp. 282-304.

³ Boutros Boutros Ghali. “An Agenda for Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping.” Report to United Nations Security Council. June 17, 1992. <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>.

⁴ Galtung, “Three Approaches to Peace.” . [need page #](#)

⁵ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “The Incidence of Civil War in Africa,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, 1 (Feb 2002), p. 17.

⁶ Paul Collier et al, *Breaking the Conflict Trap* (Oxford: Oxford University Press and the World Bank, 2003).

⁷ Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Mans Soderbom, *Aid, Policies and Risks in Post-Conflict Societies*, Working Paper, Oxford Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University (June 2006); Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Mans Soderbom, *Post-Conflict Societies*, Working Paper (CSAE WPS 2006-12), Oxford Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University (August 2006). See Suhrke and Samset 2007:198.

Suhrke, Astri and Ingrid Samset, “What’s in a Figure: Estimating Recurrence of Civil War.” *International Peacekeeping* 14,2 (April 2007), p. 198.

⁸ As Suhrke and Samset (2007:197) point out, the term also refers to whether a particular conflict (not country) will recur; to the risk of civil war in countries that have already experienced such conflicts versus those that have not; or to the risk of civil war recurrence within a subset of countries that have already experienced such wars.

⁹ Suhrke, Astri and Ingrid Samset, “What’s in a Figure: Estimating Recurrence of Civil War.” *International Peacekeeping* 14,2 (April 2007), p. 198.

¹⁰ Walter, Barbara F. “Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War.” *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004): 371

¹¹ Fortna, Virginia Page. “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?” *International Studies Quarterly* (2004), Vol. 2 pp. 269-292.

¹² After several UN documents reported that “half” or “nearly half” of ended civil wars revert to warfare within five years, several scholars sought to refine their analysis, resulting in lower estimations by 2007. See Kofi Annan, speech in Derry, Fall 2004. [I was unable to find the speech.](#)

¹³ Licklider, Roy L., 1995. “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars 1945-93”, *American Political Science Review* 89(3): 681-90, p. 687; Fortna, Virginia Page. “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?,” p. 288; Mack, Andrew, “Global Political Violence: Explaining the Post-Cold War Decline,” Working Paper for International Peace Academy (New York: International Peace Academy, March 2007), p. 5.

¹⁴ Figure from UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations website, accessed 17 September 2007, See <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q9.htm>.

¹⁵ For example, Haiti’s UN-sanctioned peacekeeping deployment and peacebuilding effort from 1994 to 2000, is considered a peacebuilding failure, even though the 1991-94 human rights atrocities and refugee crisis in Haiti was not necessarily a civil war. Nor did East Timor’s violence in March 2006 amount to full-scale war.

¹⁶ See Appendix A for categorisation of all 47 UN peacekeeping operations deployed from 1987 to 2006.

¹⁷ See International Peace Research Institute’s (PRIO) case summaries of armed conflicts, Angola section, para. 2; and Somalia section, yearly summaries which show no change from late 1994 through 1996. See also Uppsala Conflict Data Project classifications of each country.

¹⁸ Includes all peacekeeping operations mandated by the UN Security Council and overseen by UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, initiated after 1987, excluding the five missions deployed for interstate/border disputes; excluding UNPREDEP in Macedonia as a preventive rather than post-conflict mission; and excluding eight immediately prior “rolled over” missions, whose outcomes are thus assessed jointly with the successors listed above (e.g., UNMIH-UNSMIH-UNTMIH-MIPONUH). See Annex A for details. Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping operations website, accessed 22 July 2007.

We used the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset to verify whether armed conflict recurred within five years of the year of mission termination. “Minor” armed conflict = 25 - 999 battle deaths. “Civil War” = 1000+ battle deaths, *inter alia*.

Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP)/International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset, Oslo, Version 4-2006, UCDP website, <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/> accessed 30 July 2007. Thanks much to Yolande Bouka for research assistance on the tables.

¹⁹ See, e.g., Roland Paris 2004, and Tanja Chopra and Edith Bowles, “State-building after Independence: East Timor,” forthcoming in Charles T. Call with Vanessa Wyeth, *Building States to Build Peace* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner) [no specific page, and no pages yet for volume].

²⁰ Again, these peacebuilding failures exclude *peacekeeping* failures where missions ended amidst ongoing warfare like Angola in 1999; Somalia in 1995; and the former Yugoslavia in 1995.

²¹ Statement by the President of the Security Council, 20 February 2001, S/PRST/2001/5.

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/256/24/PDF/N0125624.pdf?OpenElement>

²² Paris, Roland. “At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. p. 56

²³ Paris distinguishes his standard from one that seeks to solve “all the country’s ills” such as Galtung’s call to create “positive peace” by addressing structural violence. Paris’ is a closer approximation to a root causes approach.

Paris 2004. p. 57

²⁴ Paris 2004, p. 56.

²⁵ Paris 2004. pp. 56-57

²⁶ See: Paris 2004. p. 151 & 155 who at times seems to conflate evaluating national-level post-war peacebuilding processes with assessment of major UN peacebuilding operations, says that ‘some missions were clear successes (Namibia and Croatia); others were obvious failures. (Angola and Rwanda). The remaining operations fell between these two extremes.’ Yet his implications of the outcomes of the remaining seven missions – Bosnia, Cambodia, Liberia, El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua – reveal a negative assessment. He says, “...the case studies do suggest that the liberalisation process either contributed to a rekindling of violence or helped to recreate the historic sources of violence in many of the countries that have hosted these missions – a conclusion that casts doubt on the reliability of the peace-through-liberalisation strategy as it has been practiced to date” Paris discusses but declines to assess then-recently initiated UN missions in East Timor, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.

²⁷ See also Stedman, Stephen John, Rothchild, Donald, and Cousens, Elisabeth (eds.) “Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements.” Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002. Introduction.

²⁸ Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “Making War, Building Peace” (Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 69.

²⁹ Pastor, Robert A. “Not Condemned to Repetition.” 2nd edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 2002.

³⁰ Secretary-General of the United Nations, “No Exit without Strategy: Security Council Decision-making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” S/2001/394, 20 April 2001, para. 10. <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/343/62/PDF/N0134362.pdf?OpenElement>

³¹ Snyder, Jack. 2000. *From Voting to Violence*. New York: W.W. Norton.

³² Doyle, Michael W. and Sambanis, Nicholas. *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.

³³ See Doyle. 2006. p. 73. They actually use two measures, one of which focuses on the renewal of large-scale organised violence only (closer to war recurrence). The other includes participation

³⁴ Francis Fukuyama, “State-building” (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 1.

³⁵ One project at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation was called “Peacebuilding as State-building.” <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacebuilding/index.html>. accessed 9/14/07.

³⁶ Personal interview, UNHQ, December 2004.

³⁷ Personal interviews with Gen. Jacques Paul Klein, Special Representative of the Secretary General, UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), and with officials of the UNMIL Civil Affairs Unit, charged with restoration of state authorities, Monrovia, August 2004.

³⁸ Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart and Michael Carnahan, “An Agenda for State-Building in the twenty-first Century,” *Fletcher Forum for World Affairs*, 30,1 (Winter 2006), p. 111.

³⁹ Collier, Paul, Lani Elliott, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis, "Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy" (Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003).

⁴⁰ This is not to claim that war is never morally or politically justified. Without entering into theories of just war, injustices of various sorts, including where international actors aggravate the inadequacy of local and national conflict resolution mechanisms, sometimes warrant taking up arms.

⁴¹ Sambanis, Nicholas. What is a Civil War? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 6 (2004): 814-858. Fearon, James D, and Laitin, David D. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1. 2003. 76-90. Walter. Barbara F. "Does Conflict Beget Conflict?" 2004.

⁴² On Chiapas, see comparison of statistics in Centre for the Study of Civil War, "The Battle Deaths Dataset, 1946-2005, Version 2.0: Documentation of Coding Decisions," updated September 2006 by Bethany Lacima, accessed at http://www.prio.no/cscw/battle_deaths/Documentation_PRIO-UCDP.pdf. On Angola, see Ploughshares, *Armed Conflict Reports: Angola*, September 2003, p. 4.

⁴³ Stedman et. al. "Ending Civil Wars." 2003; Paris. Roland. "At War's End." 2004. Doyle and Sambanis. "Making War and Building Peace." 2006.

⁴⁴ Collier, Paul, and Sambanis, Nicholas. "Understanding Civil War." (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005). Volumes I and II. Chesterman, Simon, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur. *Making States Work* (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2005).

⁴⁵ For a description of dozens of governance indicators, see Marie Besancon, "Good Governance Rankings: The Art of Measurement," World Peace Foundation Report No. 36 (2003), Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation.

⁴⁶ Paul Collier, Lani Elliott, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis, "Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy" (Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003).

⁴⁷ E.g., Bernard Wood, "Development Dimensions of Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building: An Independent Study prepared for BCPR," Ottawa, June 2001; World Bank, "Toward a Conflict-Sensitive Poverty Reduction Strategy," Report #32587, Washington, DC: World bank, 30 June 2005; and Cynthia Gaigals and Manuela Leonhardt, "Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development: A Review of Practice," (International Alert, Safer World, International Development Resources Centre, 2001).