DISASTER-CONFLICT INTERFACE
Comparative experiences
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Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
United Nations Development Programme
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# Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASALs</td>
<td>Arid and semi-arid lands</td>
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<td>BCPR</td>
<td>Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere</td>
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<td>CCA</td>
<td>UN Common Country Assessment</td>
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<td>CDA</td>
<td>Conflict-related development analysis</td>
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<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office</td>
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<td>CPAP</td>
<td>Country programme action plan</td>
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<td>CPD</td>
<td>Country programme document</td>
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<td>CPR</td>
<td>Crisis prevention and recovery</td>
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<td>CPRU</td>
<td>Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRED</td>
<td>Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEX</td>
<td>Direct execution</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>Disaster management</td>
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<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster risk reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of political affairs</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENVSEC</td>
<td>Environment and Security Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign direct investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAM</td>
<td>Free Aceh Movement</td>
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<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-based violence</td>
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<td>GEF</td>
<td>Global Environment Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>GLOF</td>
<td>Glacial lake outburst flood</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDR</td>
<td>Human Development Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced people</td>
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<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<td>IISD</td>
<td>International Institute for Sustainable Development</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labor Organization</td>
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INGO  International nongovernmental organization
IOM  International Organization for Migration
ISDR  International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
LPACs  Local project approval committees
LTTE  Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
M&E  Monitoring and evaluation
MINUSTAH  United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEX  National execution
NGO  Nongovernmental Organization
OCHA  Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
ODI/HPG  Overseas Development Institute/Humanitarian Policy Group
PAPEP  Short-term Political Analysis and Prospective Scenarios for Improved Governance in Latin America
PCNA  Post-conflict needs assessment
PDA  Peace and development analysis
PDNA  Post-disaster needs assessment
PNG  Papua New Guinea
SALW  Small arms and light weapons
UNCT  United Nations Country Team
UNDAF  United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNEP  United Nations Environment Programme
UN HABITAT  United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR  United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIFEM  United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNMIS  UN Mission in Sudan
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
WFP  World Food Programme
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Many developing countries experience both disasters and conflict at the same time. The interaction between the two creates and perpetuates vulnerabilities that place communities at risk, further entrenching poverty and inequality. Development trends such as climate change and unsustainable urbanization likely will make these issues worse.

It makes intuitive sense to assume that the geographical overlap of both disaster and conflict worsens the impact of crises, but evidence for this is limited. Analyses of concrete case study observations are also limited, and those that do exist come from different unconnected disciplines.

However, contexts in which conflicts and disasters overlap are daily realities for people who are affected, as well as for many humanitarian and development practitioners. Effective programmes to manage crisis interventions need to reflect conflict-disaster complexities and respond to them in a holistic and integrative manner. Experience has also shown that development interventions that do not recognize the link between disasters and conflict in at-risk countries can worsen tensions and increase risk.

UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) initiated this study with a strong empirical focus on exploring the interface between conflicts and disasters. Disaster-conflict interface contexts are defined as those settings where disasters (risks, events and recovery) have a relationship with conflicts (risks, events and recovery) and/or vice versa, beyond simple geographic/demographic co-location.

The study aims to achieve a comparative analysis of tendencies and experiences that stem from the relationship between disasters and conflict. It also analyses the relative success of existing relevant programming approaches adopted in-country. This comparative analysis aims to: contribute to the body of knowledge on the interactions between disaster and conflict; better understand the importance of these interactions for development programming in crisis contexts; and create improved programming that responds to the relationships between disasters and conflict. The intention is to help identify practical approaches and disseminate good practice – thereby helping to better equip UNDP Country Office staff who operate in complex environments in which disaster and conflict overlap.

The study is based on experiences from nine selected case-study countries to try and capture the broad spectrum of possible relationships between disasters and conflicts. The country case studies included: Bolivia, Haiti, Indonesia (Aceh), Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Sri Lanka, Sudan and Zimbabwe. Each case study analyses the dynamics of the interface, as well as strategies and interventions across agencies, and particularly focuses on UNDP approaches and good practices.

The main target audience is UNDP staff, particularly policy advisors. In addition, the findings of the report may be relevant for UNDP programme officers, staff from other UN agencies, UNDP development partners and other stakeholders including nongovernmental (NGO) and academic communities involved in crisis prevention and recovery.
Findings

Disasters and conflicts do not follow a simple logic of “disaster X leads to conflict Y” or vice versa. Each interface is a complex phenomenon in its own right. At any given time, individual countries may experience several different and potentially contradictory relationships between conflict and disasters. The comparison of two very similar cases – Sri Lanka and Aceh in Indonesia – demonstrates this strikingly. Both countries faced protracted conflicts, and were affected by the 2004 tsunami and the overwhelming international response to cope with it. In fact, the disaster response in Aceh contributed to resolving the long conflict between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the national Government. In Sri Lanka, the response made tensions worse between the Tamil Tigers and the national Government.

Common tendencies reoccur across the cases examined in this study however. In all case studies, conflict had an overall adverse impact on disaster impact or risk. In most instances, the disaster-conflict interface increased the risk of future crises and hampered crisis recovery efforts. This was particularly obvious at the local level, with widespread examples of problematic interactions between disasters and conflict.

Common tendencies include:

- Disasters and conflict that happen at the same time intensify risk of future crises and damage people’s lives which further undermines their coping capacities and increases their poverty levels.
- Disasters – particularly those associated with drought and desertification, and rapid-onset disasters – are more likely to contribute to conflicts over limited natural resources than any other type of conflict.
- Small-scale rapid onset disasters are less likely to contribute to national level/widespread conflict, but can have a significant impact on local-level conflict, particularly when they (re)-occur in highly vulnerable and resource-scarce contexts.
- Slow onset protracted disasters such as those involving drought can deepen conflict over resources across large areas when they occur in places where people face high levels of poverty and competition over limited natural resources.
- Conflicts almost always increase the risk of disasters. Conflicts that are more intractable bring a greater risk of disaster through increased environmental degradation due to distressed coping strategies, and the government’s decreasing capacity and/or willingness to reduce disaster risk.
- Violent conflict (or the risk of it) or related political tensions can hinder disaster risk reduction (DRR) and recovery activities across all levels, and can divert political attention away from the importance of disaster issues.
- Inappropriate/unsustainable national and international conflict or disaster assistance can increase overall crisis risk and community vulnerabilities.
- The overlap of disaster and conflict worsens gender-related vulnerabilities and violence. The case studies showed cumulative and long lasting impacts that occurred in contexts with significant differences between how women and men gain access to and control social, economic and political resources.

The damaging cumulative effect of conflict and disaster, ironically, can create positive spin-offs particularly in the aftermath/recovery process (for example, by providing opportunities to transform gender relations) or through building capacity through pre- or post-crisis prevention/reduction interventions. These positive tendencies include the following possibilities:
Large-scale (generally rapid onset) disasters can provide more dramatic windows of opportunity to reduce conflict and build peace. However, these windows of opportunity alone do not ‘automatically’ override existing dynamics.

Small-scale disasters can provide opportunities to build capacity and trust and reduce local tensions. However, they are unlikely to generate any impetus to build peace and or to reduce national-level conflict.

In a few post-conflict cases, disaster risk reduction activities were actively used to promote reducing conflicts. For example, agencies supported community cooperation and capacity development that yielded benefits since these actions were less contentious than attempts at outright conflict reduction.

Furthermore, the case studies showed that in specific contexts disasters and conflicts were linked through common causes including poor governance, environmental mismanagement, migration/displacement and disaster/conflict-blind crisis responses. The studies also showed that in many countries the important issues of gender, livelihoods and violence cut across situations in which disasters and conflicts happened at the same time.

These findings provide considerable incentives for UNDP and other development and crisis partners to create programming and approaches that are more sensitive to the links between disasters and conflicts. At a minimum, this is necessary to ensure future programmes do no harm and do not impede disaster or conflict resolution. However, in positive terms, adopting this more sensitive approach provides many opportunities to go above and beyond individual project achievements towards strategies and programming that have the potential for wider socioeconomic transformation.

This study is divided into two main components. In the main body of the text:

- Part I gives a brief background to the study;
- Part II provides a comparative analysis across the different case studies;
- Part III elaborates the implications of these findings for UNDP programming, and includes a detailed set of recommendations.

The annexes include detailed country case studies that form the basis of the analysis.
1.1. Rationale for the study

Disasters caused by natural hazards and violent conflicts affect many people worldwide. These separate crises have significant political, economic and social implications that can reverse development gains, further entrench poverty and inequality, and thereby increase the risk of future crises.

In recent decades, there has been a growing recognition, particularly in affected countries, that disasters and conflicts do not exist in vacuums, but rather are integrally linked to the broader national development context in which they occur. Concurrently, there is increasing awareness that geographically overlapping disasters and conflicts can have a serious impact on already highly vulnerable populations. The Overseas Development Institute’s Humanitarian Policy Group (ODI/HPG) states that between 1999 and 2004 at least 140 disasters happened in contexts that were also experiencing conflict.

The exact nature of the relationship between disaster and conflict has not been comprehensively examined, although over the last 10 years there has been an increasing amount of interesting work on this topic. This is partly because conceptually and operationally, managing and preventing disaster and violent conflict have emerged as separate disciplines. This has led development organizations to adopt a compartmentalized approach to tackling each crisis and resulting programming rarely takes account of the potential links. At a minimum, this means opportunities are lost to achieve solutions that capitalize on resources and entry points. At worst, the failure to consider how conflict-related programming may increase disaster risk has resulted in potentially harmful crisis and development programming.

This interrelationship needs to be better understood to more effectively reduce disaster risk and to prevent the emergence or recurrence of violent conflict. This means ensuring that disaster and/or conflict-related interventions do not create greater levels of risk and vulnerability.

1.2. Purpose of the study

Within this context, UNDP BCPR commissioned this comparative analysis to help better understand and respond to the challenges and opportunities experienced in situations in which disaster and conflict coexist. The purpose of the analysis is: to contribute to the body of knowledge on the interactions between disaster and conflict; to better understand the importance of these interactions for development programming in crisis contexts; and to create improved programming that responds to the relationships between disasters and conflict.

Specifically, the study aims to:

- identify common characteristics and linkages between the two types of crisis;
- present a comparative analysis of identified tendencies and emerging issues by examining the range of contexts in which disasters and conflicts coexist;
- capture and analyse existing programming approaches including good practice from UNDP and, where possible, other stakeholders that operate in these contexts.

The goal of this work is to help UNDP to develop improved programming that responds more adequately to the consequences of overlapping disaster and conflicts.
This study considers the relationship between disasters and conflict and seeks to move beyond considerations of ‘do no harm’ – when programming focuses on not making an existing crisis context worse. It also seeks to explore how programming can provide an opportunity to address both disaster and conflict risk when they occur in the same context.

The study’s primary target audience is UNDP. However, the findings presented may interest a broader audience including other UN agencies and partners that operate in these contexts.

1.3. Methodology

The primary approach of this study is field-based analysis.

The case study countries reviewed as part of this analysis included Bolivia (mini-case study); Haiti; Indonesia (focused on Aceh); Kenya; Kyrgyzstan (the only desk review); Papua New Guinea; Sri Lanka; Sudan (focused on North-South dynamics); and Zimbabwe.

The study included:

- a short literature review of current relevant UN and non-UN work that was carried out prior to each of the country visits;
- field and desk-based research in eight of the nine countries. All nine countries were examined between June and November 2007. Country visits lasted approximately two weeks, with time in the capital city and in the field (except in Haiti and Zimbabwe). Research on Kyrgyzstan is based on a desk review and interviews with key participants;
- developing a comparative analysis that examined tendencies across the nine case studies;
- review of the process and outputs by a project steering committee of UNDP BCPR and Country Office (CO) crisis prevention and recovery specialists and external experts.

Countries were selected based on the following criteria:

- a cross-section of different types of disaster-conflict contexts covering varying types of conflict (violent to latent) and disaster risk (rapid to slow onset);
- a spread of geographic regions;
- interest/demand from UNDP COs.

The case studies focused on UNDP CO programming experiences. The study team also considered relevant programmes of other organizations. The visiting team included a conflict and disaster advisor each. The team used a standard methodology developed specifically for this study that included reviewing primary and secondary data. Initial meetings were held with UNDP CO staff who worked on different thematic and geographic focus areas. The team then met with key external partners and other stakeholders.

The case study research sought to identify:

- the characteristics of recent crisis events;
- if and how disaster and conflict had an impact on each other within these events;
- which factors influenced the relationship between disaster and conflict;
- how UNDP and non-UNDP programming took account of/sought to address the relationship between the two, and whether the programming had a positive or harmful effect on the relationship between conflict and disaster.

In studying the interfaces between disaster and conflict in the selected country events and situations, the study team did not just analyse how disasters and conflicts affected each other. It also sought to understand how, in a given setting, disaster and conflict risk can increase or reduce overall crisis risk and vulnerability. The case study work was complemented by a comprehensive review of how women and men are affected by these situations.

1.4. Constraints

The study has several limitations:

- It covers a range of different interface contexts: The country case studies do not represent the full spectrum of possible relationships between disasters and conflicts. However, the study attempts to include a wide range of
certain contexts in which different types of disasters and conflicts geographically overlapped.

• The findings are a ‘snapshot’: The case studies analyse events and programming at the time of the visits and, as such, reflect a ‘snapshot’ of the context. In some countries, significant events have subsequently occurred and are not reflected in this analysis.

• There was limited availability of analysis and data on the national level interface: The relationship between disasters and conflicts is a relatively new topic, and most national data and analysis does not examine how disasters and conflict relate to and affect each other. At the same time, in many conflict countries humanitarian assistance is often politicized. This means that statistics are often open to manipulation, including by national authorities. As a result, in many cases the study was forced to rely on anecdotal instead of quantitative evidence.

This is not an exhaustive analysis of either interface dynamics or all relevant programmatic interventions in-country. However, it does provide an indication of general tendencies in disaster-conflict interface settings, and of associated UNDP programming. It will be useful in providing a basis for future national and local analysis and programming in similar contexts.

1.5. Definitions of key terms

This study defines disaster-conflict interfaces as contexts in which disaster has some relationship to conflict, or vice versa, other than happening at the same place and time and affecting the same population. The term ‘crisis’ describes both disasters and/or conflicts.

Disasters are ‘a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources’. Disasters are caused by exposure of a vulnerable societal asset to a natural hazard such as earthquakes, tsunami, windstorms and floods — traditionally seen as inevitable events man could not control. Today, experts accept that human action has a huge impact on the root causes of hazards.

A natural hazard will only cause a disaster if, a) a community or societal asset is exposed to it; and, b) if the societal community/asset is vulnerable. For example, an earthquake in an uninhabited area may have no impact on a society and therefore is not a disaster. Vulnerability describes the degree to which a community is susceptible to a hazard’s impact. It is determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors and processes. A community will be less vulnerable to disaster risk if it has coping capacity, i.e. resources and abilities.

Disasters can be either slow onset (e.g. drought) when the hazard exposure lasts for months; or rapid onset (e.g. earthquakes) when exposure lasts for minutes.

Conflict is a natural part of human interaction and is necessary for social change. However, if societies have no effective ways to manage disputes, conflict may become violent and destructive. The human development process is complex and generates conflicts, resource reallocation, new priorities and changing coalitions of participants. Countries need capacities to manage these changes.

Understanding conflict dynamics involves analysing a conflict’s causes, participants and mitigating factors (also known as ‘capacities for peace’). Categories of conflict causes include:

• manifestations (i.e. easily identifiable occurrences that indicate social unrest);
• proximate causes (i.e. factors that heighten the underlying causes of conflict and create conditions for violent conflict);
• root-causes (i.e. structural problems that create conflict but alone are not enough to cause violence).

Capacities for peace can: contribute to a sustained peace, reduce violence or prevent its outbreak. Lasting peace and sustainable development depend on key participants and groups being able to: reach national and local consensus on priorities; negotiate mutual solutions to emerging disputes before they turn violent; and accommodate diversity in planning and implementing social development.

Conflict is a dynamic phenomenon with many causes, no a linear path, and various stages, from a situation of latent conflict to one of open violence.

A detailed glossary can be found in Annex 2.
2.1. Identifying common tendencies across different interfaces

The case studies showed that disasters and conflicts have visible tendencies. However, it is important to note certain observations that show each interface context is unique and very complex:

- **Importance of the local context.** Each interface is determined by the types of disaster and conflict present and also by the national development context. Disasters and conflicts in various contexts may look similar, but may result in very different impacts and relationships. For example, in 2004, both Sri Lanka and the region of Aceh in Indonesia experienced the same large-scale rapid onset disaster (a huge earthquake and tsunami). The affected areas in each country were experiencing protracted conflict, but the addition of the disaster produced a different outcome in each. In both countries, the tsunami’s impact potentially could have been a positive driver of peace. This happened in Indonesia. In Sri Lanka, the disaster response provided an initial peace opportunity, but it collapsed due to negative political security factors.

- **Subnational variation.** Several case studies showed significant regional differences within the same country. This was partly due to the fact that different regions experienced disaster and conflict risk in different ways. For example, in parts of Bougainville, PNG, post-conflict recovery overlapped with natural hazards including storm risk, floods, tsunamis, earthquakes and volcano eruptions. Meanwhile, the southern highlands experienced high levels of criminality and ongoing tribal fighting that coincided with landslides, drought, floods, earthquakes, lightning and frost.

- **Diversity of relationships/interfaces in the same disaster-conflict context.** In many cases, the relationships between disasters and conflicts were found to be diverse and inconsistent. For example, in Indonesia the tsunami was devastating, but its overall impact on the conflict in Aceh was positive. However, many case study examples from other countries showed that local relief/recovery interventions actually did harm.

Each disaster-conflict interface is unique, but common tendencies surfaced across the nine interface contexts analysed and are presented in Tables 1 and 2.

**Negative tendencies**

In most case studies examined, the interface of disasters and conflicts was overwhelmingly harmful, worsening the risk of future crises and hampering crisis recovery efforts. In all case studies, conflict was found to have an adverse impact on disasters. This was particularly true at the local level where there were widespread examples of harmful interactions between disasters and conflict.

Findings on negative tendencies included:

- **The coexistence of disaster and conflict worsened the risk of future crises and had a cumulative mostly negative effect on people’s lives that further undermined their coping capacities and increased their poverty levels.**

*Example: In Haiti, the impacts of violence and disasters together contributed to entrenching chronic poverty. At the time of the study, 54% of the population lived on less than one US dollar a day and almost half of the people were malnourished. Disasters and*
outbreaks of violence that occur regularly impede a state’s ability to increase its own capacity and outreach. The resulting lack of basic services, particularly education and health, only serves to increase the population’s crisis risk. In Haiti, this meant that people had limited resilience to shocks, and the case study noted that Haitians often engaged in high-risk coping strategies.

- **Disasters**, particularly including drought and desertification, but also rapid-onset disasters, are more likely to contribute to conflicts over limited natural resources than any other type of conflict.

  Example 1: In Sudan, desertification and drought reduced the availability of key land and water resources and heightened competition between settled cultivators and nomadic pastoralists over access to them. In some cases, settled farmers deliberately set fire to pasturage and destroyed water points to deter pastoralists from grazing their livestock, which worsened the drought and food insecurity.

  Example 2: In PNG, population displacements after volcanic eruptions or flooding are often characterized by poorly planned temporary settlement processes that sometimes result in localized conflict between resettled populations and local communities over access to land and water resources.

- **Small-scale rapid onset disasters** are less likely to contribute to national widespread conflict, but they can have significant impact on local conflict, particularly when they occur or reoccur in highly vulnerable and resource-scarce contexts.

  Example: In PNG, small-scale flooding and related population displacement (that raises issues relating to land tenure and resource competition) reportedly has had a harmful impact on local conflict dynamics in some areas. However, this has not been observed to affect wider conflict dynamics in the rest of the country.

- **Slow onset protracted disasters** (e.g. involving drought) can worsen conflict over resources across a much larger area when they occur within contexts in which people face high levels of poverty and competition over limited natural resources.

  Example: In the arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) of Kenya, drought has led to spikes in violent livestock raids. This is happening either as a coping strategy to replace dead/diseased stock, or as an opportunistic way to increase tribal influence at a time when some groups do not have the capacity to protect themselves.

- **Conflict** almost always has a harmful impact on disaster risk. The more intractable the conflict, the greater risk of disaster caused by increased environmental degradation due to people’s ‘distress coping’ behaviour and the decreasing capacity and/or willingness of the government to reduce disaster risk.

  Example: In Haiti, the countryside is blighted by widespread unmanaged deforestation, both for timber as a ‘cash crop’ and to make way for people to engage in subsistence agriculture to cope with decades of chronic poverty. Successive unstable governments were unwilling and unable to effectively manage the economy in order to stimulate employment and markets or provide social safety nets. In turn, deforestation led to severe soil erosion and heightened risk of landslides and flash flooding.

- **Violent conflict** (and related political tensions/risk of violent conflict) can hinder disaster risk reduction and recovery activities across all levels and can divert political attention away from the importance of disaster issues.

  Example 1: In Haiti, at the time of the study, politicians – from both the Government or its UN partners – paid little attention to disaster (and particularly earthquake) risk reduction. They felt that violence reduction issues were more urgent and important.

  Example 2: In 2004 in the isolated region of Aceh in Indonesia there was limited access, and population movements were restricted. Before a huge earthquake and tsunami struck the area, this situation had already seriously compromised effective disaster early warning communications. After the tsunami, political tensions hindered the disaster response and prevented effective capacity development of civil society participants so they could carry out disaster risk reduction and mitigation measures.

- **Inappropriate/unsustainable national and international assistance** in response to conflict or disaster can increase the overall crisis risk and vulnerabilities of communities.

  Example 1: In Aceh, tsunami survivors typically received US$ 5000 - US$ 6000 to rebuild their housing. People recovering from conflict received just under half this amount. Therefore, conflict-insensitive intervention generated tensions between different beneficiaries.
Example 2: In Sudan’s Darfur conflict, the establishment and growth of camps of internally displaced people (IDPs), and the presence of the UN/African Union Mission led to an overexploitation of scarce resources such as wood and water, increasing the environmental stress in this fragile context.

- The overlap of disaster and conflict worsens gender-related vulnerabilities and gender-based violence. The case studies revealed cumulative and long lasting impacts that occur in contexts in which there are significant differences in how women and men gain access to and control social, economic and political resources.

Example 1: In Kenya, slow onset drought occurs in a context of ongoing pastoralist conflicts that have a severe impact on women’s economic roles and freedom of movement. Many of them become displaced and the drought significantly increases their workload (water and fuel fetching) to the point that it becomes a seven to eight hour-a-day activity with very negative effects on their precarious health. Women also first lose their limited assets (such as jewellery), girls and women are forced into marriages, and many resort to prostitution to survive.

Example 2: In Haiti, protracted political instability has worsened the country’s culture of tolerating and failing to punish gender-based violence. The chaotic aftermath of disasters makes this problem even worse. For example, when tropical storm Jeanne hit Haiti in 2004 the scramble to meet basic survival needs reinforced gender-based violence in Haitian society, and unarmed women and girls were marginalized and subjected to extensive abuse.

Positive tendencies

Conflicts and disasters impose extremely adverse cumulative effects on societies. However, there can be positive spin-offs that emerge, particularly in the aftermath/recovery process by providing opportunities to transform gender relations or through capacity that is built through crisis prevention and pre-crisis disaster reduction interventions. The following positive tendencies were noted.

- Large-scale (generally rapid onset) disasters can provide more dramatic opportunities to reduce conflict and build peace. However, these ‘windows of opportunity’ alone do not ‘automatically’ override existing dynamics.

Example: Following the 2004 tsunami that struck Sri Lanka causing widespread devastation, discussions took place between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to try and find ways to cooperate in the disaster response. However, neither side was willing to put aside their conflict dynamics and a lasting peace did not materialize.

- Small-scale disasters can create opportunities to build capacity and trust, and to reduce tensions at local level, but they are unlikely to generate momentum for national peace-building and conflict reduction.

Example: In 2007, serious floods hit the central highlands area of Gayo Lues in the province of Aceh, Indonesia. Flood relief disaster interventions were supported by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Government and former separatists, and reportedly built trust at community level. However, these positive actions did not filter upwards to regional-level peacebuilding processes elsewhere in Aceh.

- In a few post-conflict cases, disaster risk reduction activities actively promoted conflict reduction, for example by supporting community cooperation and capacity development. These were regarded as less contentious than attempting outright conflict reduction.

Example: In Sri Lanka, UNDP’s transition programme embedded elements of disaster risk reduction such as drainage clearance into some of its recovery activities in conflict-affected areas. These activities helped to strengthen community cohesion, reduce overall vulnerability, increase community capacity (including in the face of conflict) and bolster linkages between communities and local authorities. These activities were not primarily concerned with conflict reduction and therefore the national Government regarded them as less contentious.

- In some isolated instances, the impact of conflict was seen as helping to reduce disaster risk, particularly because it decreased the combatants’ access to natural resources. This was regarded as a ‘positive’ benefit because it slowed environmental degradation. However, it is generally a very perverse benefit. The challenge is to determine whether countries emerging from conflict can actually benefit from this spin-off.

Example: In Indonesia, prolonged violent conflict in forested areas and people being excluded from associated military zones by the Government, reportedly aided forest protection. These two factors reduced the widespread deforestation caused by legal and illegal logging, and have been linked to reducing flood risk in some areas.
Table 1. Potential impact of disaster events and interventions on conflict risks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interface dynamics</th>
<th>Factors Identified</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disaster impact reduces conflict risk</strong></td>
<td><strong>Potential positive consequences:</strong></td>
<td>In <em>Aceh, Indonesia</em>, the 2004 tsunami provided the political impetus to reenergize ongoing peace talks since opposing factions had less capacity to engage in conflict (e.g. a high death toll), as well as increased political opportunities to negotiate (e.g. due to the solidarity generated by the humanitarian crisis, increased international attention on the area including for peacebuilding, and donor funding that provided a financial incentive).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Disaster impact may deplete capacities to engage in conflict due to its impact on human resources and funding (Indonesia)</td>
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<td>• The impact may increase political and social opportunities (including potentially for women) due to the humanitarian context, increased international attention and funding incentives (e.g. Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan and Sudan)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Disaster intervention reduces conflict risk</strong></td>
<td><strong>Potential positive consequences:</strong></td>
<td>In <em>PNG</em>, pre-disaster planning that included negotiations on land acquisition by the Government ahead of disaster resettlement, resulted in more effective management of resettlement caused by volcanic eruptions. Pre-disaster planning focused on community engagement/consultation, information sharing and mediation. This stimulated links between IDPs and host populations and spread the benefits of resettlement between both caseloads – building trust and community cohesion.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Increased financial capacity to further peacebuilding activities due to the inflow of significant disaster response/recovery funding (e.g. Indonesia)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Equitable, well planned and/or culturally appropriate responses and participatory processes across communities can lead to increased social cohesion (e.g. Sri Lanka and PNG)</td>
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<td>• Strong government responses involving key stakeholders and communities can lead to increased trust in governance structures and a restored community-government compact. (e.g. Kyrgyzstan)</td>
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<td>• Community-based response can increase inter- and intra-community cohesion (e.g. Sri Lanka, Kenya and Kyrgyzstan)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Appropriate disaster responses can reduce community tensions related to water provision, avoid drought-related conflict, and strengthen local coping capacities (e.g. Kyrgyzstan, Kenya, Haiti and PNG)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• An increased disaster-related humanitarian presence in conflict-affected areas results in increased transparency or ‘witnessing’ presence (e.g. Indonesia)</td>
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<td>• Disaster recovery efforts can facilitate dialogue between opposing political parties and can be used as entry points for wider conflict recovery and/or peacebuilding activities (e.g. Indonesia and Bolivia)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Disaster impact intensifies conflict risk</strong></td>
<td><strong>Potential negative consequences:</strong></td>
<td>In <em>Kyrgyzstan</em>, most evidence illustrates that disaster risk or events (often made worse by poor management of natural resources) had a harmful impact on local and regional social cohesion. For example, flooding struck some groups of people who could not move from disaster-prone areas due to lack of alternative livelihood options and resources This generated grievances against domestic authorities and the Government.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Following disasters, loss of livelihoods and assets can increase natural resource competition, demographic changes and migration that can reinforce vulnerabilities and increase tension between communities (e.g. Sri Lanka, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Bolivia, Kenya, Indonesia and PNG)</td>
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<td>• Disaster and climate-induced population movements can lead to tensions/conflict between IDPs and host communities, e.g. due to the pressure of sharing scarce resources (land, water, etc.), unplanned settlements; land tenure disputes; ethnic/tribal tensions and loss of livelihoods (e.g. Sudan, Kenya and PNG)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Disaster intervention intensifies conflict risk</strong></td>
<td><strong>Potential negative consequences:</strong></td>
<td>In <em>Sri Lanka</em>, after the 2004 tsunami, the installation of a buffer zone and subsequent resettlement took people from their livelihoods, thereby increasing their vulnerability. Furthermore, in some cases, resettlement moved ethnic groups inland to live among different community/ethnic populations. This changed power dynamics and raised the potential for conflict.</td>
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<td>• Poorly planned post-disaster resettlement (including forced resettlement) can lead to increased tensions between IDPs and/or between IDPs and host communities and/or authorities (e.g. PNG and Sri Lanka)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Inadequate, poorly planned, non-participatory, culturally inappropriate and [perceived] politically motivated responses can lead to increased tensions between populations and authorities, or within communities (e.g. Bolivia, Kenya, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Indonesia and PNG)</td>
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### Table 2. Potential impact of conflict events and interventions on disaster risks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interface dynamics</th>
<th>Factors identified</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict impact reduces disaster risk</strong></td>
<td><strong>Potential positive consequences:</strong></td>
<td>In <em>Indonesia</em>, a 30-year prolonged violent conflict in forested areas, and the people being excluded from associated military zones, reportedly helped forest protection. This reduced deforestation from legal and illegal logging, and was reported to reduce flood risk in some areas.</td>
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<td>• Reduced access to areas due to conflict can lead to environmental recovery/reduced disaster risk (e.g. Indonesia and Sudan)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict intervention reduces disaster risk</strong></td>
<td><strong>Potential positive consequences:</strong></td>
<td>In <em>Haiti</em>, the presence of the UN Peacekeeping Mission provides superior logistical capacity to respond quickly and effectively to disasters, thereby reducing the impact of the disaster on people’s lives and livelihoods.</td>
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<td>• Increased security can provide access to help disaster-affected communities engage in risk reduction, and allows increased political opportunities to focus and fund DRR interventions (e.g. Indonesia, PNG and Sri Lanka)</td>
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<td>• Bolstered government structures and the presence of humanitarian participants and infrastructure lead to strengthened disaster response activities (e.g. Sudan and Haiti)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Disaster-sensitive approaches that are part of conflict strategies can increase opportunities for integrated DRR activities and techniques (e.g. Sri Lanka, Kyrgyzstan and Kenya)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict impact exacerbates disaster risk and recovery</strong></td>
<td><strong>Potential negative consequences:</strong></td>
<td>In <em>Sri Lanka</em>, conflict had a serious impact on State capacity and political will to engage in disaster risk reduction and recovery in conflict-affected areas. For example, at the time of the case study, an outbreak of local hostilities in the north of the country ended tsunami recovery activities there.</td>
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<td>• Conflict weakens local coping capacity, including the ability to deal with disaster risk (e.g. Kyrgyzstan, PNG, Bolivia and Indonesia)</td>
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<td>• Reduced/limited access to populations, heightened security risks, limited freedom of movement and access to resources caused by conflict-affected populations reinforces vulnerability (e.g. Indonesia, Haiti, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, PNG and Sri Lanka)</td>
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<td>• Weakened or unsuccessful governance structures undermine disaster reduction and response capacity, as well as the quality of related social services (including health, disease surveillance, etc.) which increases disaster vulnerability (e.g. Haiti, Zimbabwe)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Environmental degradation (exploitation of resources) and unplanned settlements in at-risk areas that are caused by conflict-related displacement, result in reinforced disaster risk (e.g. Sudan, Zimbabwe)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• A war economy and related criminality can lead to specific aid agency responses that hamper recovery efforts (e.g. Indonesia)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict intervention exacerbates disaster risk</strong></td>
<td><strong>Potential negative consequences:</strong></td>
<td>In <em>Sudan</em>, insecurity in conflict-affected regions (e.g. Darfur), and the resulting creation and growth of IDP camps, put pressure on limited resources such as wood and water. Furthermore, recovery efforts (e.g. by the UN/African Union mission) resulted in overexploitation of scarce materials.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Strong focus on conflict issues can reduce the attention focused on DRR (e.g. Sri Lanka, PNG, Kyrgyzstan and Bolivia)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Disaster-blind conflict interventions, such as poorly planned resettlement, can reinforce disaster risk (e.g. Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Sudan)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reduced conflict can increase risks of unsustainable/disaster-blind livelihood options such as logging which can increase levels of flood risk (e.g. Sudan and Indonesia)</td>
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2.2. Cross-cutting factors

The case studies identified several critical driving factors or cross cutting issues in the interface between disaster and conflict. These factors link disasters and conflicts in a given context, partly because they cause both conflict and disaster risk. They also cut across the interface since disasters and conflict/political violence combine to undermine or support progress on these issues. The most important driving factors identified included governance, environmental and natural resources, migration, and the response to crisis. In addition, in many countries gender, livelihoods and violence were important issues that cut across the interface.

2.2.1. Governance

The interface affects, and is affected by, a wide range of governance factors. The role of the state and its institutions has a major impact on creating both conflicts and disasters. Conversely, conflicts and disasters sometimes can either have an adverse or a positive effect on the functioning and legitimacy of state institutions. For example, effective disaster management and response can help build trust between conflict-affected populations and the government. Weak/biased responses or poor disaster risk reduction (e.g. critical infrastructure maintenance and location) can undermine citizen-state relations (e.g. Kyrgyzstan).

The case studies showed that political will and capacity to deal with the disaster-conflict interface varied across countries. In some, leaders expressed a willingness to engage in crisis-related issues, but they did not have the necessary capacity. For example, in Kenya, the Government showed increasing commitment to dealing with the issue of arid and semi-arid lands by developing a relevant policy. However, at the time of the study the policy still had not become law. In other countries, there is no political will or capacity to resolve disaster-conflict issues. In Zimbabwe, crisis vulnerability was caused by disputed land reform and macroeconomic mismanagement, as well as by food aid given to reward party loyalists and to weaken the opposition.

In general, political will is frequently higher during the immediate aftermath of a crisis, but in these circumstances capacity is often lower. Lack of will and the capacity to take preventive measures such as disaster risk reduction are often a common challenge in ‘normal’ development contexts. However, in countries in which disasters and conflict frequently coexist, the impact was found to be even more severe. For example, in Haiti the interplay of chronic mismanagement of the economy and environmental resources and frequent disasters combined with violence and criminal activities to cumulatively undermine the capacity of the State to provide basic goods and services, including those needed to prevent and respond to a crisis.

Politics can also play an important role in dictating how the interface is addressed and they also determine the degree that conflict, disasters and their aftermath can harmfully affect future crisis risk. In Bolivia, polarization between national and opposition government departments undermined the Government’s ability to react to flooding in a way that would reduce societal tensions.

Social structures determine how power and influence affect society and play a major role in the disaster-conflict interface. Systems of patronage, domination by political elites, and the social, political and/or economic marginalization of sections of society were all found to harm the interface, in some cases, by undermining government legitimacy and capacity. For example, in Kenya, issues of marginalization of pastoralists caused societal tension and reduced capacity to deal with the onset of disasters (drought).

Degradation of traditional coping mechanisms. Several case studies showed that population growth, modernization and other development challenged these mechanisms. For example, in Kenya, in the past, limited water supply during drought has acted to naturally regulate livestock herd size. However, in pre-disaster times the size of a farmer’s livestock herd increasingly reflected his social status and thereby encouraged farmers to keep larger herds. This meant they were not willing to sell their animals ahead of drought, thereby increasing competition for natural resources, particularly water, in times of shortages. Meanwhile, development had increased the number of water projects in the area and was also linked to an increase in herd sizes. This compounded competition for pastureland and, to some extent, degraded the environment, contributing further to people’s vulnerability and the potential for future conflict.

In Sudan, the relationship between nomadic herders and settled farmers has become increasingly tense, in some instances leading to violent conflict, despite the fact that in the past these two groups were able to coexist. Population density and climatic variations seemed to directly contribute to this change in circumstance. Another important influence on traditional coping mechanisms is the influx of modern weaponry. This can challenge traditional sources of authority and
escalate the impact and lethal nature of tribal disputes, including over the shortage of natural resources during disasters (particularly prominent in Kenya, PNG and Sudan).

In virtually all contexts, civil society can potentially have significant adverse and/or positive influence. In some case study countries, civil society understood the relationships between disaster and conflict risk, and sought to develop targeted interventions to comprehensively reduce crisis risk. In other cases, civil society’s impact remained localized and peripheral to the broader activities of the state. The role of civil society was shown to be particularly important in countries where the presence and legitimacy of the state was limited, as in PNG and Kenya.

2.2.2. Environment, natural resources and the impact of climate change

Across almost all of the case studies, environmental degradation, lack of natural resources, mismanagement and environmental stress emerged as the most influential critical drivers of the disaster-conflict interface.

The issue of whether people had access to natural resources was both a cause and a consequence of the interface. For example, disaster can lead to a shortage of resources, including water or land, that can generate tensions and conflict between communities in the general population, or between IDPs and host communities. In the case of Kenya, disaster (drought) can reduce the availability of pastureland and water. This leads community members to act violently (e.g. cattle raiding) as a way to manage access to these resources – thereby increasing levels of violence.

Lack of security or conflict can also reduce access to some traditional pastures and water points. This causes environmental stress in certain settlement areas and, in severe cases, leads to pastoral households being resettled with few alternative income sources and often not enough food. In other cases, climate change that causes desertification can potentially make this situation worse. However, lack of natural resources can also be an incentive for cooperation. This was demonstrated in Kenya when, during drought periods, community leaders proactively convinced neighbouring pastoralist tribes to house and protect weak and vulnerable people and animals during drought periods. In Sudan’s Abeyi region, lack of natural resources worsened during drought and led to tribal communities cooperating over livestock grazing routes and access to water.

Almost all case studies found that natural resource and land use management, including traditional and communal land management systems, were critical issues in the conflict-disaster interface. They showed that inadequate legislation and enforcement contributed to heightened crisis risk, and were directly linked to weak governance structures and poor environmental resource management, including lack of cooperation over shared resources. For example, in both Aceh, Indonesia and PNG, unsustainable logging practices were either linked to a poorly regulated private sector or to illegal activities. These practices caused environmental degradation to increase disaster risk. At the same time, they contributed to a war economy or to sustaining systems of patronage, thereby prolonging protracted conflicts.

Climate change has the potential to further intensify this vicious circle of environmental degradation, resource scarcity and increased crisis risk. In two-thirds of case study countries, climate-induced environmental trends – from the glacial lake outburst floods (GLOF) in Kyrgyzstan to accelerated desertification/increased levels of drought in Kenya and Sudan – were found to play a major role in interface settings. In some areas, existing coping capacities are being stretched, or are no longer adequate to manage the impacts of some climate-induced environmental trends such as worsening storm cycles. In several contexts these capacity problems can potentially lead to an increase in violence, overall vulnerability and disaster risk.

In some case study countries, the private sector was observed to have the potential to play both a positive and/or negative role in national resource management/exploitation. In some instances, it was a positive influence, for example in reducing risk by stimulating economic growth and livelihood opportunities. However, in most case study countries, private-sector activities had mainly harmful impacts on crisis dynamics (Kenya, Sudan and PNG). For instance, in PNG, many case study participants said the country’s private logging and mining sectors degraded the environment, increased disaster risk and generated societal tensions.

2.2.3. Migration and displacement

Migration and population displacement are other critical driving factors in disaster-conflict interface situations. In fact, they can be both a cause and an effect of disasters and conflict. For example, this occurs when people displaced by conflict or disaster settle in dangerous locations – the only places where they can find shelter. In Haiti,
the poor tend to inhabit marginal, low-lying city areas that are prone to flooding, storm damage and broader public health risks. In other cases, internally displaced people and refugees are often forced to degrade their immediate environment to obtain resources such as firewood, even though this may increase the risk of landslides, fire or flooding. In PNG, population displacements due to volcanic eruptions and related land ownership issues, and poorly planned assistance and resettlement led to conflict over scarce resources between IDPs and host populations, as well as within combined IDP populations of different groups.

However, the relationship between conflict–disaster interface and migration is not always harmful. Migration can be part of a creative strategy to improve livelihood opportunities. Also, as in the case of Haiti, funds invested in the country by people who have emigrated abroad can be a major coping strategy after disasters and/or conflict.

2.2.4. Response to crisis

The conflict-disaster interface was also influenced by the way critical stakeholders, i.e. government and the international community, responded to conflict and/or disaster and the relationship between them. The approach, scale and flexibility of national and international interventions to a crisis had both positive and adverse effects on the level of disaster and/or conflict risk.

In many cases, approaches that were insensitive to potential conflicts and disasters raised crisis risk (i.e. in Aceh in Indonesia, Kenya, PNG and Sri Lanka). For example, these included post-conflict interventions such as setting up IDP/ refugee camps in inappropriate areas such as flood plains. Post-disaster response strategies can also increase tensions. This was the case in Aceh, Indonesia when tensions arose over support targeted to conflict and tsunami-affected populations. In some cases, this resulted in unfair relief distribution between disaster- and conflict-affected populations which generated societal tensions. This inappropriate targeting was caused by concepts and operations that separated conflict and disasters; lack of consultation with and participation by affected groups in recovery planning; poor management; donor funding patterns; and inequitable access to construction contracts (e.g. in Indonesia). The impact of a biased or poorly planned response can undermine citizen-state relations and have a negative influence on social cohesion.

Conflict or political crisis both particularly tend to influence the ways the international community and governments engage in disaster risk reduction and response. In Sudan and Zimbabwe, the international community took an inherently politicized approach to humanitarian issues that prevented it from using disaster management as key way to reduce conflict. In several contexts, existing conflict overshadowed concerns about the risk of disasters, and led to reduced international support for disaster risk reduction activities. Conversely, particularly in situations where an international military intervention takes place, e.g. in Haiti, disaster response/preparedness can be a key way for the military to engage in ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns. However, this often leads to less emphasis on building local capacity to reduce disaster risk.

In some contexts, conflict and insecurity resulted in the state manipulating a disaster response. This was most obvious in Zimbabwe when the country’s political crisis resulted in a highly predatory state and widespread mismanagement of the country’s resources. For example, the Government was accused of manipulating food aid to reward party loyalists and weaken political opposition. This had a direct impact on people’s vulnerability, particularly to drought.

However, in some cases the issue was not that the state actually manipulated the situation, but rather that its lack of transparency led to a public perception of distrust in its intentions. This has tended to be a particular problem in post-disaster contexts. In these situations, the state’s lack of communication and transparency can act to add to societal tensions regardless of its actual intentions. That said, lack of transparency can also be linked to corruption. In Sri Lanka, following the tsunami people doubted the Government’s intentions because the lack of state capacity was coupled with high levels of corruption. As a result, more than 20% of monitored conflict events were linked to tensions caused by the way recovery assistance was handled. Lack of transparency and accountability is often also linked to issues related to political exclusion and representation. This was observed in Kyrgyzstan when tension arose due to unequal distribution of disaster assistance across ethnic communities/regions.

The case studies revealed many examples of national or international disaster responses that harmed the conflict-disaster interface. However, there were also some positive examples of proactive efforts to ensure that disaster response and recovery activities incorporated the approach of ‘do no harm’ that provided positive entry points to strengthen community social cohesion. These included IOM’s work in Indonesia that helped to build trust between the parties in conflict and between the authorities and the local population.
Positive spin-offs of a disaster response can sometime be unintentional. For example, 2004 post-tsunami activities in Indonesia showed that large-scale humanitarian disaster responses can provide more witnesses to events in conflict-affected areas.

### 2.2.5. Gender, livelihoods and violence

During the case studies, it was not easy to determine evidence on the gender dimension of the conflict-disaster interface. Many studies showed that gender-based violence tends to significantly increase as a result of violent conflict and is compounded in the aftermath of disasters. For example, in Sir Lanka, decades of war had undermined gender relations and women faced a greater risk of gender-based violence (GBV) in post-tsunami IDP camps. In positive terms, women's groups can provide a useful mechanism to help address the complex challenges of combined disaster and conflict risk. In PNG, a women's group was established to initiate a local peace process and took part in disaster risk reduction interventions to help build community cohesion.

The impact of combined conflict and disaster on people's livelihoods is an important factor in considering how the interface affects their vulnerability. In many case studies, the combination had a direct impact on livelihoods. For example, disasters can damage livelihoods, thereby indirectly increasing levels of conflict risk. In Kenya, drought restricts access to essential resources required to support traditional livelihoods. When drought reduces the availability of pasture and water, violence increases. Conversely, insecurity can also reduce access to some traditional pastures and water sources. This puts pressure on other areas, and in severe cases the settlement of pastoral households that offers few alternative sources for people to gain their livelihood leads to their feeling very insecure about obtaining food.

Conflict often directly contributed to reducing community capacities to cope with disaster risk. To a large extent, this is due to the impact of violence and insecurity on mobility, access to assistance, and community cohesion. For instance, in Haiti, during the hurricane season people were so afraid of criminality and violence that it reportedly discouraged them from following orders to evacuate their homes and go to public storm shelters, thereby increasing their exposure to risk. Conversely, when conflict lessened in Aceh, Indonesia, there was a related rapid improvement in the overall security environment that directly contributed to freedom of movement and access. This bolstered tsunami aid delivery and created opportunities for disaster risk reduction.

### 2.3. Key conclusions

In summary, disaster-conflict interfaces are defined as contexts in which disaster has some relationship with conflict, or vice versa, beyond simply occurring at the same time and place and affecting the same population. The case studies and analysis in this section clearly demonstrate there were important relationships or links – or the potential for relationships – between disasters and conflict in almost all of the countries studied. Almost all cases clearly demonstrated that conflicts and disasters either already do – or have the potential to – contribute to each other, either by making a situation better or worse.

The case studies showed that the degree to which conflict and disasters relate to each other varied widely between countries. In some countries such as Bolivia, the interface was viewed as weak. However, in others it was far stronger as shown in Aceh, Indonesia where the tsunami was seen as a contributing factor or driver that ended hostilities. Therefore, the lessons from one country about the disaster-conflict interface cannot be automatically ‘applied’ to every other interface context.

The foregoing analysis reveals several important tendencies that show up across different interface settings, and that have important implications for work and programming in existing and future interface contexts.

The case studies highlighted a few limited examples of positive spin-offs that can result from the relationship between disasters and conflict. One example is that occasionally disasters can provide opportunities to recreate trust among conflict-affected communities. However, generally, when disasters and conflict overlap the result was harmful. This is particularly due to a combined overall effect that further entrenches people's vulnerability and poverty and blocks recovery efforts. In many case studies, the interface was worsened by how national and international agencies responded to a crisis; in ways that were often blind to the disaster or insensitive to the conflict. These agencies had good intentions, but their approaches created new risks. However, in a few cases disaster risk reduction activities were less politicized and were very actively used to promote conflict reduction.
Furthermore, the case studies clearly demonstrated the way that disasters and conflict have a harmful and/or a positive impact on each other is largely influenced by key factors that are inherently interwoven with the interface. In the case study countries, the most critical factors include: governance; environmental issues, particularly access to natural resources; climate change; and population migration/displacement. The complex interplay between disasters, conflicts and these contextual drivers means that examining the links between disasters and conflicts in isolation is not good enough. Instead, it is crucial to clearly understand what these drivers are in a specific interface context and how they influence it.

In many case studies, the interface either was, or had the potential to be, aggravated by the ways national and international agencies responded to a crisis (e.g. Indonesia and Sudan). In a few cases, their actions had a positive impact (e.g. Kyrgyzstan). However, in most cases the impact was overwhelmingly harmful. Therefore, interventions will do harm if this complex interplay is not considered when designing or implementing development or crisis prevention, humanitarian or recovery programming in interface settings. In these contexts, it is not enough to consider only individual parallel impacts of disaster and conflict programming interventions. Instead, interventions and analysis need to take into account their combined effects.

It is critical that development agencies understand the interface and the context that creates it in order to reduce crisis risk and improve agency response. This understanding helps agencies to capitalize on and foster opportunities to use integrated programming in conflict-disaster interface contexts.

In its activities UNDP particularly needs to focus on one key cross-cutting issue: the role that a crisis response plays in achieving either a positive or harmful influence on the disaster-conflict interface. In the final analysis, it is critically important for UNDP to ensure that its programming has a positive influence on the interface.
3.1. Implications for UNDP programming

Evidence from the case studies offers many reasons why UNDP’s programming should focus on the disaster-conflict interface:

• The case studies identified several cross-cutting factors that are critical to the interface including governance, environmental/natural resource management, livelihoods and gender. These have either a positive or harmful impact and/or are affected by the interplay between conflict and disasters. Many of these factors form the core of UNDP’s global mandate to ‘add value’ and therefore strategically position the organization to address the factors that drive the relationship between disasters and conflict.

• It is clear from the country case studies that national authorities and their country-based and international partners need to respond to crises in ways that ensure one type of crisis does not compound or result in another. If appropriate steps are taken, integrated approaches can help guarantee significant positive spin-offs for disaster risk reduction and conflict prevention, as well as for other areas of development programming.

• UNDP has a global mandate to carry out crisis prevention and recovery. As a result, principles of crisis sensitivity, ‘do no harm’ and ‘building back better’ should be critical elements of its programming across all areas, particularly in contexts that are prone to both disaster and conflict risk. If UNDP fails to better understand and effectively address the interface between disasters and conflict, the overall quality and value of its programming could be undermined.

• Conflict and disaster recovery presents a window of opportunity to reduce overall risk levels and to address people’s vulnerability in these contexts. UNDP is strategically placed to handle these issues in the framework of its own programming, and to promote crisis-sensitive approaches within early and longer term recovery.

• It is important to note that addressing the interface does not imply that specific individual and targeted programming approaches to disaster risk reduction, conflict prevention and other areas of development are not relevant. Clearly, it is important to achieve the correct balance between integrated programming and approaches, and the need to create realistic and achievable projects on specific issues.

3.1.1. Overview of UNDP responses to date

The case studies demonstrate that recognizing the importance of the disaster-conflict interface is a recent development. The research for this study identified a significant variation in the capacities, approaches, and prioritization of these issues across the nine UNDP COs. In most cases, staff were in the initial stages of learning about these issues and related programming approaches.

The country case studies point to three main types of programming in Country Office settings that can respond to the challenges posed by the disaster-conflict interface (see Table 3). Programme approaches often varied in relation...
to the stage and severity of crisis, and have been applied in areas such as strategy development, multisectoral area-based programming, as well as recovery, governance and environment programmes. At the time of the studies, many UNDP Country Office programmes were in initial stages of planning or implementation.

Table 3: Programming approaches to the disaster-conflict interface

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Approaches</th>
<th>Key elements</th>
<th>Opportunities</th>
<th>Challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **1. Integrate interface issues into common strategic frameworks and across major UNDP programmes** | • Advocacy with senior management both within UNDP and the wider United Nations Country Teams (UNCTs)  
• Include integrated analysis and approaches in strategic frameworks and related programmes  
• Explicitly identify linkages between disasters and conflicts  
• Use governance, poverty and environment portfolios to address cross-cutting issues that drive and/or are affected by the disaster-conflict interface | • Cost-effective  
• Makes use of existing UNDP (and potentially UNCT) expertise and experience  
• Reflects interface issues across programmes and projects  
• Particularly suited to long-term prevention and recovery | • Requires senior-level commitment and leadership to ensure a mainstreaming approach that does not dilute issues  
• Requires UNDP staff to have baseline awareness of disaster, conflict and crisis interface issues  
This will often require specialist technical capacity at CO level to translate into actual impact  
• Requires systematic monitoring and evaluation to ensure the impact on crisis is continuously analysed |
| **2. Strengthen linkages and synergies between stand-alone disaster and conflict programmes** | • Include integrated analysis and approaches in strategic frameworks including UNDAF, and Country programme documents (CPDs), etc.)  
• Conduct analysis and programme development across programme teams/units  
• Modify existing or create separate programmes on conflict and disasters that recognize the interlinkages, share analysis and take advantage of shared entry points | • Cost-effective  
• Makes use of specialist UNDP funds and expertise  
• Reflects interface issues across conflict and disaster programmes | • Requires that dedicated staff follow up on interface issues  
• Requires creative approaches to monitoring and evaluation to ensure that impact on the interface is measured  
• May miss opportunities to integrate with non-crisis prevention and recovery (CPR) programmes, such as governance, environment |
| **3. Design programmes or projects which explicitly address the conflict-disaster interface** | • Include integrated analysis and approaches in strategic frameworks (UNDAF, CPD, etc.)  
• Design and implement interventions to address the interface in a more integrated fashion | • Has the potential to address the interface dynamics holistically  
• Suited to short-term and/or more protracted crises  
• Makes use of specialist funds/expertise  
• Can be a launch pad for integration with other programme areas (e.g. governance, livelihoods, gender and environment) | • Resource intensive  
• Ring-fenced support may initially discourage efforts to achieve broader mainstreaming (e.g. governance, environment) |
Integrated or complementary programming was more likely to be identified in COs that promoted shared analysis and understanding of disasters and conflict. However, even in countries where this analysis took place, it did not necessarily extend to the entire CO, for example to the teams responsible for the CPR, environment, governance and poverty portfolios. Cross-cutting factors such as governance, environmental management and gender are important in determining the type of interface between disasters and conflict. This was identified as a missed opportunity to maximize UNDP’s impact and to minimize harm. Therefore, there is a need to promote CO multidisciplinary and cross-practice engagement to develop and implement appropriate responses to disaster-conflict contexts.

The case studies also showed it is often the approach – as compared with the specific technical and substantive content of programmes – that has the most positive impact on addressing the particular interface between disasters and conflict in selected settings. In this sense, an approach based on crisis sensitivity, including ‘do no harm’ and ‘build back better’ principles, should underpin UNDP programming in these situations. Staff need to adopt principled and transparent criteria for selecting areas of intervention, prioritization and participation. This should help create shared understanding and identify areas of common interest among stakeholders. Staff who work through locally accepted institutions and mechanisms can create opportunities for trust and confidence building, and can develop the capacity to address future crises.

The research also found that many of the tools UNDP has developed to address disaster and conflict situations did not explicitly analyse the relationships between disasters and conflicts. However, a number of existing tools were identified, including the Conflict-related Development Analysis, the Peace and Development Analysis, the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment and the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment. If these tools are combined with broader awareness of the interface, they could assist UNDP, the UN Country Team and national partners in developing more appropriate integrated crisis responses.

In this respect, further adaptation of these tools should build on initial efforts by COs (for example in Sri Lanka and Indonesia) to develop more adequate analytical and programmatic frameworks. The development of adapted tools is a welcome step, but it may not be a sufficient strategy, as capacity gaps and compartmentalized approaches were identified as the main impediments to holistic analysis and integrated programming in interface contexts. A new way of organizing response design within the UNDP COs may be required to link different practice areas from the outset, and to engage them in comprehensive area-based responses. This integration can be strengthened by ensuring common assessment processes; joint selection of target and priority areas, and agreement of the sequencing of interventions and management approaches.

In situations in which awareness and commitment to a holistic and integrated crisis analysis exist, it is notable that the programme cycle processes UNDP traditionally uses were able to capture and integrate this approach. This suggests that new processes are not required. Instead, the key factors are awareness and enhanced understanding of the interface, and how each step in the process integrates relevant elements. CO skills and capacities also need to be organized in ways that bring together and design responses for all relevant issues.

### 3.1.2. Factors that contribute to success

In the case study countries, several common success factors were identified that can improve responses to the disaster-conflict interface (Figure 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key benefits to applying an integrated analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Improved understanding of the linkages between conflict and disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increased impact of UNDP programming at country level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Maximized linkages between crisis-specific interventions and broader UNDP programming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Avoidance of unintended negative consequences of UNDP programming</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.1.4. Key challenges in taking this agenda forward

UNDP COs face several external and internal challenges that may limit their ability and that of their partners to promote a holistic crisis analysis, and to develop appropriate programming in situations characterized by significant disaster-conflict interface.

The external challenges that affect UNDP CO ability to effectively address the relationships between disasters and conflict include: the capacities and will of national governments to respond to disasters and conflict; their openness to tackle these issues; the availability of funds; and donors’ and other partners’ understanding of these issues. The prevailing security situation can also be a contributing factor, particularly if it limits UNDP access.

UNDP Country Offices also face a range of internal challenges. They are not unique to these situations, but can limit the organization’s ability to respond adequately to these dynamics. These internal challenges include:

- existing commitments that present challenges to adjusting programmes as the interface between disaster and conflict evolves;
- structural organization within COs, particularly in cases when working in a compartmentalized manner discourage intra-office knowledge sharing and cross practice engagement on issues that concern the disaster-conflict interface;
- limited in-country expertise and capacity to frame and articulate these issues;
- the limited flexibility of some of UNDP mechanisms, including procurement or contracting, that may limit the organization’s ability to effectively respond to dynamic crisis contexts.
3.2. Key recommendations for UNDP

Awareness raising and advocacy

- UNDP/BCPR needs to raise awareness within the organization on the implications of disaster-conflict interface for recovery and development programming in crisis contexts. In doing so, UNDP/BCPR should work closely with Regional Bureaus and Country Offices that are particularly affected and/or are championing innovative work in this area.

- UNDP should use its strategic positioning as the early recovery lead agency to promote disseminating these findings globally, and to encourage developing integrated responses in countries where the cluster approach is active.

- In order to raise awareness of the programming implications of the disaster-conflict interface – where applicable – UNDP should also mobilize other inter-agency platforms in which the organization plays a lead role. For example, these include the UNDG/Development Operations Coordination Office, the UN Framework Team for the Prevention of Armed Conflict ('Framework Team') and the Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.

Deepening the evidence base and learning

- UNDP should continue to deepen the evidence base on the disaster-conflict interface, as well as emerging good programmatic practice to respond to the specific challenges posed by these contexts. This process will need to engage UNDP/BCPR, and UNDP/BDP because of the importance of factors such as governance and environment in determining the nature of the interface.

- Specifically, UNDP/BCPR should work closely with selected Regional Service Centres and Country Offices to support innovative programmatic approaches and strategies, and to document learning from these pilot initiatives. This support should focus on countries that are either already in crisis, where needs are most acute, or those emerging from crisis where opportunities to reduce risk are greatest.

- Evidence from this report should also form the basis of UNDP’s efforts to effectively respond to the security/conflict implications of climate change.

- Gender emerges as an important theme in this study. However, further work is required to analyse the role of gender in interface contexts, in particular the role of gender programming as a positive driver to reduce conflict-disaster risk. The case studies identified only one example of women’s groups that addressed the interface.

Strategic planning and programming

- The disaster-conflict interface is a multidisciplinary issue which means that the greatest potential for success lies in addressing it through a strategic instead of a project-based approach. UNDP needs to engage with other parts of the UNCT to identify how the interface can be addressed in the UNDAF. UNDP/BCPR has a role to support this by ensuring that relevant UNDAF support packages reflect the interface (e.g. in UNDAF training programmes, regional workshops and country level reviews).

- Factors such as governance, environmental management, gender and poverty are key to addressing the disaster-conflict interface. Therefore, UNDP should support a cross-practice multidisciplinary approach to develop appropriate and crisis-sensitive responses. This should include cross-disciplinary analysis of the implications of UNDP interventions (i.e. how governance programmes may impact disaster or conflict risk, and vice versa).

- In these contexts, UNDP should review programme designs to identify linkages to, and opportunities for, building on other aspects of UNDP programming (e.g. governance, environment, gender and poverty reduction).

- It may be useful for UNDP to consider looking at how to use other programmatic/analytical frameworks that already exist, to help adopt a more holistic approach to the interface. A good example of this is a human-rights based approach. If this approach is used correctly, an analysis of the rights holders and duty bearers can help provide a useful framework to identify people who are most vulnerable to the combined risk of disasters and conflict.
• Recovery from either conflicts or disasters, presents a critical window of opportunity to engage in innovative approaches and strategies to address risk factors associated with the disaster-conflict interface. UNDP should make use of and adapt existing recovery frameworks such as the Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNA) and the Post-Disaster Needs Assessments (PDNA), to take into account the specific characteristics of the interface, and to create linked strategies and programmes.

• UNDP needs to build on the experiences of selected Country Offices, and should develop some practical guidance that will help ensure tools that UNDP traditionally uses in CPR contexts (e.g. CDA, PDA, PCNA, PDNA, ongoing context analysis, etc.) provide the basis for a more holistic crisis analysis, as well as for a more integrated response.

• When possible, UNDP should build mechanisms into existing systems to monitor the combined and cumulative programme impacts of conflict and disasters. This should also capture unintended consequences of programme activities.

• There should be concrete efforts to achieve strategic planning and joint programme development between Country Office programming units, for example immediately before the annual workplanning exercise. These will help ensure that efforts to integrate disaster and conflict interface issues are translated into practical programming action.

• Gender-based violence emerged as an important issue in both disaster and conflict contexts. However, it is fair to say that so far GBV programming has largely been confined to conflict programming. Therefore, any future GBV agenda needs to address the issue across both disaster and conflict programming.

Capacity development

• UNDP should develop a pool of global, regional and country office technical staff with the capacity to support integrated analysis and programming. This pool of technical staff should not be limited to conflict and disaster specialists, but also integrate governance, environment and poverty practitioners.

• UNDP should also strengthen the disaster-conflict interface awareness and skills of UNDP Country Office staff through targeted capacity development workshops, particularly in countries most at risk. This would involve: (a) organizing experience sharing and learning workshops that will target countries particularly affected by the disaster-conflict interface, and (b) using ongoing CPR training and community-of-practice workshops (disaster or conflict) to promote improved understanding of the linkages and implications for UNDP and its partners.
1. Bolivia

Bolivia was agreed as an additional case study in the course of the research, and therefore was given less time and resources than other full country visits. However, it was useful to include it as it provides some interesting perspectives. The case study examined the general disaster-conflict relationship and particularly focused on the interface in the context of flooding in 2007.

**Disaster context**

Over the years, the people of Bolivia have endured a wide range of disasters. Floods and hailstorms affect most of the country; the eastern plains and the Amazon basin are hardest hit by annual flooding. In the higher altitude regions of the Andean mountains, flash floods are commonly accompanied by landslides. The February 2007 floods affected some 380,000 women and children, most of whom were in the northern department of Beni\(^\text{10}\). Drought is common in the southern part of the country, in particular the Chaco region along the borders with Paraguay and Argentina. Bolivia also endures sporadic earthquakes and tremors, usually associated with larger geological events that affect southern Peru and Northern Chile.

At the time of the study, environmental degradation, specifically along watershed areas, was increasingly deepening the damage caused during flooding. Erosion and deforestation (there was an average decrease of 0.5% of forest cover each year between 1990 and 2000)\(^\text{11}\) further compounded the risk from natural hazards.

**Conflict context**

Bolivia’s people have also faced devastation from a history of conflict, often violent. At the time of the study, it was estimated that, on average, 26 violent protests occurred in the country every month. A variety of groups used them to advance political and social agendas. High levels of inequality exist among the population. The Bolivian economy is largely based on exporting raw materials, and conflicts are associated with access to, control, use and distribution of the wealth generated by natural resources.

The governance of natural resources such as the privatization of water is a particularly important conflict inducing driver\(^\text{12}\). Rural peasants’ lack of access to land has also been an ongoing source of conflict, along with the tension between collective and private management approaches to natural resource use. Bolivia’s indigenous population – which makes up 70% of the country’s people – champions the collective approach. At the time of the study, the country was increasingly polarized over the issue of departmental autonomy, with the central Government facing opposition from the conservative, pro-business departments of Tarija, Santa Cruz, Beni and Pando.

**The interface between disaster and conflict**

Extreme climate events and highly vulnerable conditions have caused successive disasters. These have combined with serious social crises and weak government capacity to seriously hamper Bolivia’s social and productive systems, deepening social inequalities and poverty.

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**ANNEX 1: CASE STUDY FINDINGS**
The country’s context is one of increasing polarization between the national Government and a number of subnational departments controlled by the opposition. In this study, this polarization forms the basis the relationship between disasters and conflict. Matters were very tense between large landowners who represented business interests, the largely populist central Government, and landless peasants and indigenous groups that claim rights over much of the land.

During the 2007 floods in Beni, tension resulted in a polarized disaster response because the central Government ignored established law and created a ‘Transitory Command Unit’ that allowed it to control all decision-making. This marginalized departmental authorities and their recovery plans that had been developed with municipalities and affected communities. Disaster response operations often demonstrate that these natural hazards can bring opposing groups together, especially at municipal levels, and provide limited opportunities for dialogue between different levels of government. However, in Bolivia this tended to be short-term and event-specific. Polarization became more evident when international disaster aid was given to local governments instead of the national Government that insisted on coordinating the flow of resources into the country. This hampered the flow of humanitarian and early recovery aid to the most at-need communities.

Furthermore, disasters and conflict situations have resulted in weak government institutions overstretching their capacities to prevent and manage disasters, conflicts and the transition between relief and development. This, coupled with high levels of corruption, has contributed to a general lack of Government credibility in the eyes of the general population. This lack of credibility has also impeded the Bolivian government’s capacity to respond to and deal with the long-term impacts of disasters.

Increasing environmental and ecosystem degradation (including deforestation, erosion, illegal cutting of trees and pollution) have led to heightened competition for limited resources, at a time when people were making increased demands for greater social and economic equity and for better access and control over natural resources (such as water).

At the time of the study, land distribution and access was another important factor in the interface between disaster and conflict in Bolivia. The Government required that all privately owned land be productive or it would be confiscated and redistributed. This was a particular issue during major disasters such as flooding and drought when large tracts of land were damaged and much livestock lost. Large landowners claimed they could recover the land quickly if they were given compensation; however the Government provided nothing. These emerging tensions have always had the potential to develop into increased conflict between large landowners who represent business interests, the largely populist central Government, and landless peasants and indigenous groups. After being displaced by the floods, when water levels drop affected communities have tended to establish themselves in high-risk areas of land, mostly on river banks. These families are again at risk of losing their lives and their livelihoods since the Government did not help relocate them to land with fewer risks of disasters.

**Programming that responds to the interface**

At the time of the study, there were no explicit efforts to link disaster and conflict programming. International organizations operating in Bolivia primarily have usually focused their aid programme responses on building and strengthening democratic institutions within both government and civil society. Their aim has been to reduce political tension in order to address broader development issues including disaster risk reduction.

In reality, Bolivia’s political climate has always meant that the disaster-conflict interface relationship was not a priority. All stakeholders have shown only limited willingness to enter into dialogue, and there were few entry points to address the interface. At the time of the study, UNDP did not have any specific programming that concentrated on interface-related issues. Its programming mirrored that of other international development participants. International agencies only addressed concerns about conflict or violence when they were carrying out disaster relief operations. Generally, their programmes focused on institutional development and creating opportunities for dialogue at different levels of government.

However, in areas more severely affected by disasters there are potential entry points to address the disaster-conflict interface through community-based programming. There are examples in Bolivia of international and national NGO-led programmes that take gender dimensions as the starting point, and focus on both strengthening community capacity for disaster risk reduction and for conflict mediation. Programmes that focus on women and children from indigenous communities in poor rural areas could be expanded to use gender, intercultural and ethnic-sensitive approaches to design land distribution and land-use planning proposals for each of the territorial levels.
Conclusions and implications

Cross-cutting elements that most affect the interface include:

- **Governance.** Bolivia’s Government had had limited capacity and legitimacy or credibility, and few state resources. The impact of disasters and the responses to them were influenced by *general levels of political polarization in the country* that increased people’s vulnerability to crisis and the risk of conflict and disaster.

- **Environmental degradation.** This has increased Bolivia’s risk of disaster and could exacerbate conflict over limited resources in times of disaster in the future.

At the time of the study, the political climate and the setting were less than ideal for addressing integrated conflict and disaster issues.

Table 4. Examples of interface interactions in Bolivia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISASTER</th>
<th>Conflict impact intensifies disaster risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disaster intensifies conflict risk</td>
<td>• Disasters affect agricultural production, leading to increased tension over land tenure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster intervention intensifies conflict risk</td>
<td>• The central Government’s decision to take over responsibility in response to the 2007 floods increased polarization with departments controlled by the opposition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Conflict impact intensifies disaster risk | • Failure to distribute central Government funds to opposition-controlled departmental authorities hindered local preparedness, prevention and mitigation initiatives |

| Conflict intervention intensifies disaster risk | • Due to the political situation, the Government did not prioritize disaster risk reduction, thereby weakening the country’s overall capacity to manage disasters |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONFLICT</th>
<th>Conflict impact reduces disaster risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disaster impact reduces conflict risk</td>
<td>Not observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster intervention reduces conflict risk</td>
<td>• Opportunities to facilitate dialogue between opposing political parties may have been increased during disaster periods when energies were focused on a defined goal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Conflict impact reduces disaster risk | Not observed |
| Conflict intervention reduces disaster risk | Not observed |
2. Haiti

This case study took place in 2007 and therefore does not reflect the impact of the 2010 earthquake that devastated the country. People working in Haiti prior to the earthquake gave anecdotal evidence revealing that national levels of insecurity distracted attention from levels of earthquake risk. Authorities felt it was far less urgent to address this risk than the ‘immediate’ threat of conflict risk/security.

It is interesting to note that many of the observations (for example on gender-based violence in the aftermath of disasters) were considered equally true in the aftermath of 12th January 2010 earthquake. Following the disaster, there were increased levels of violence. However, considering the scale of the event, tensions and violence were somewhat understandable in Haiti’s chaotic context.

Disaster context

Haiti is prone to countless slow and rapid onset disasters. According to UNDP’s 2004 Human Development Report, Haiti is the most disaster-prone of all small island developing countries. At the time of the case study, on average Haiti had experienced a disaster every other year, and one major disaster every five years. Haiti also sits on a major geological fault line. Drought and chronic water scarcity affect many parts of the country. The southern area is in the hurricane corridor and frequently suffers the effect of wind damage and flooding from the many hurricanes and tropical storms that pass through the Caribbean. In 2004, Hurricane Jeanne killed an estimated 3000 people in Haiti and affected another 298,000 (4% of the population). The economic cost was estimated to be equivalent to 7% of GDP. In the two decades prior to this study, disasters were more frequent and severe and resulted in extensive environmental degradation and various climate-based impacts.

Conflict context

Haiti has experienced decades of political turmoil and high levels of violence. The country has a long history of politically motivated violence, but criminal violence has also increased and is mainly linked to drug trafficking. Violence is most visible in the urban areas, especially in the capital city, Port-au-Prince. By 2006, up to 32 separate youth gangs were believed to be operating in Cité Soleil, a densely populated impoverished district of Port-au-Prince. In the same year, the situation was so serious that the United Nations sent its UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to the country to address the increasing levels of violence. Meanwhile, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reported in December 2006 that over 200 gunshot victims were treated in Saint Catherine’s Hospital. In rural areas, issues such as land tenure, fishing and water rights were also identified as potential sources of local tensions. Violence in Haiti also has strong gender dimensions. For example, gang thugs break into homes and rape and beat women. This started as a form of political pressure, but has evolved into a common practice of criminal gangs.

The historically predatory nature of the State and the dominance of Haiti’s elite has resulted in chronic mismanagement of the economy and environmental resources. Consequently, agriculture has remained largely uncompetitive. At the same time, massive unmanaged deforestation has increased the likelihood of flooding and landslides. Soil degradation and erosion have also limited the potential of agriculture to provide livelihoods in rural areas, resulting in many people migrating to urban areas and other countries. The State has had a limited role in providing basic goods and services, which has further undermined livelihood opportunities and contributed to very serious and entrenched poverty.

Poor people tend to inhabit marginal low-lying areas of the cities that are prone to flooding, storm damage and broader public health risks. In these urban areas, population density, lack of employment opportunities and scarcity of basic services contribute to growing grievances. These grievances are often manipulated for political purposes, sometimes cause violence, and become the reason for criminal activity. During the hurricane season, fear of criminality and violence has also reportedly discouraged people from complying with orders to evacuate their homes and go to public storm shelters, thereby increasing their exposure and risk.

This protracted political instability has aggravated the general culture of tolerating rather than punishing gender-based violence. The National Coalition for Haitian Rights has stated that “violence against women is not considered a serious offence by many Haitian women and men”. This attitude means that women face increased risk following disasters. When...
tropical storm Jeanne hit Haiti in 2004, the scramble to meet basic survival needs reinforced the violence in Haitian society, and unarmed women and girls were marginalized and subjected to extensive abuse. This followed the violent protests and instability of early 2004 when the World Food Programme (WFP) reported that blockades and general insecurity prevented it from delivering vital food aid designated for pregnant women and their children.

Haiti’s protracted political crisis has meant that even relatively small-scale or short-lived disasters have had significant economic and social impacts. At the time of the case study, 54% of people lived on less than one US dollar a day and almost half of the population was malnourished. Following decades of political unrest, extreme social violence, and impoverishment, many Haitians decided to emigrate to other countries as the only option for improving their lives. In 2007, an estimated 3 million Haitians were living abroad. The end result is that emigration and money that emigrants send home are the key coping strategies of Haiti’s people, as are participating in gangs, criminal behaviour and prostitution. High levels of corruption are a major challenge for stakeholders that seek to support the Government of Haiti and strengthen governance capacity. As a result, capacity (at household, community and State levels) to cope with disasters is seriously eroded, and Haiti’s social resilience remains extremely weak.

The international response to Haiti’s disasters and conflict is also a key element of the disaster-conflict interface. MINUSTAH supported disaster relief efforts in order to deliver assistance in an insecure context. But the Mission also aimed to win over hearts and minds. This certainly helped to save lives and reduce suffering, but it may have resulted in the State facing less pressure to build its own capacity to respond to disasters in the medium- and long-term.

Programming in response to the interface

At the time of this study, UNDP programming to address the causes and impacts of disasters and conflict tended to be locked into separate programme themes. Work on disasters was considered a subset of environmental issues, while conflict-related programming was integrated within the governance framework programme area. In 2007, a few initial efforts addressed risks in a more integrated fashion, i.e. the environmental small grants scheme, and these experiences could serve as a basis to copy this approach in other programmes.

At the same time, considerable ongoing work was addressing security risks by enhancing community security and strengthening the capacity of the State to manage disasters. UNDP is currently one of several agencies working with the Government of Haiti to strengthen national systems for disaster-risk management, particularly the Ministry of Interior’s Directorate of Civil Protection. The programme started in 1999, and focused on disaster management, but it gradually transformed into a proactive risk management approach. The relative success of the programme’s departmental and local disaster management committees led other organizations (notably USAID) to suggest these should become a platform for other local governance issues, including conflict management. As part of this approach, USAID’s partners trained the disaster management committees in conflict management and dispute resolution.

Some important efforts have addressed vulnerabilities and gender issues (e.g. by international NGOs, the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and MINUSTAH), but little work was underway on the gender-based violence dimensions of post-disaster contexts. However, some disaster response programming did have positive spin-offs for reducing gender-based violence. For example, supplies of clean water provided as part of hurricane response programming reduced incidences of violence against women who previously faced physical and sexual assaults when collecting water.

**UNDP Global Environment Fund (GEF) Small Grants Scheme**

Several small projects funded by GEF had simultaneous impacts on disaster and conflict risk. For example, in the wake of Hurricane Jeanne in 2004, Gonaives, a city in northern Haiti, was badly affected by political violence and flooding, and UNDP supported a project to rehabilitate water infrastructure.

The explicit aim was to improve irrigation for agricultural land that had been degraded by deforestation, and to reduce the increased risk of flooding. The project’s secondary aim was to reduce the risk of violence in urban areas. Lack of viable rural livelihood opportunities drove rural-urban migration and increased pressure on the job market and social services in urban slums where such grievances caused gang violence and violent crime. The project improved agriculture in rural areas and created opportunities for sustained livelihoods, thereby bolstering efforts to reduce migration to urban areas.
Disaster-Conflict Interface

Conclusions and implications

Haiti represents a situation of political and social violence that has combined with both slow and rapid onset disasters. Their effects on the disaster-conflict interface have led to a downward spiral of vulnerability, gender-based violence and decreased resilience.

In particular, three main cross-cutting issues – governance, environmental degradation and poverty – appeared to be at the centre of these dynamics.

- **Governance and environmental degradation.** Recurrent disasters and protracted political and social crises serve to undermine the capacity of the State to govern effectively. Historically, weak governance led to widespread and environmental destruction that was partly a coping strategy for the chronically poor. This environmental degradation has made natural hazards worse and caused rural-urban migration. In urban slums, population density, the lack of employment opportunities, scarcity of basic services and the availability of weapons contribute to grievances and, in some cases, violence.

- **Poverty.** Frequent small and large-scale disasters have a severe effect on an already structurally weak economy and widespread poverty, undermining the ability of the State to consolidate and govern effectively. This has been compounded by the fact that elite groups control Haiti’s economic resources and power. The impacts of conflict and disasters are revealed in similar ways: they both further undermine public investment and employment opportunities, entrench chronic poverty and encourage rural-urban migration or emigration.

In Haiti, governance and the environment are the key issues to address in the interface between disasters and conflict. Therefore, related programmes need to place greater explicit emphasis on disaster risk reduction and conflict-sensitivity. In the past, shared analysis among agencies could have been strengthened in both disaster- and conflict-related activities (i.e. disaster-risk mapping and research on the causes of conflict) in order to facilitate this process.

At the time of the study, UNDP programming implicitly rather than explicitly addressed the interface between disasters and conflict. Current and future programmes need to develop more systematic shared approaches as these have the potential to build bridges through encouraging economic empowerment and environmental rehabilitation.

### Table 5. Examples of interface interactions in Haiti

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>CONFLICT</strong></th>
<th><strong>DISASTER</strong></th>
<th><strong>NEGATIVE</strong></th>
<th><strong>POSITIVE</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disaster impact intensifies conflict risk</strong></td>
<td>Repeated exposure to disasters (including environmental degradation) causes rural-urban migration and makes underserved urban populations more vulnerable to criminal and organized violence</td>
<td>None observed</td>
<td>Providing supplies of clean water reduced violence against women who previously faced physical and sexual assault while collecting water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disaster intervention intensifies conflict risk</strong></td>
<td>In 2004, inadequate supply of cyclone relief items in politically violent Gonaïves worsened tensions, and aid convoys and aid agencies were violently attacked</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict impact intensifies disaster risk</strong></td>
<td>Violence in urban slums reduces access to humanitarian aid and cuts off external assistance in times of disaster, seriously affecting women – the most vulnerable group</td>
<td>None observed</td>
<td>The presence of MINUSTAH and international humanitarian partners provided the logistical capacity to respond quickly and effectively to disasters, thereby reducing their impact on lives and livelihoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Violence contributed to added infrastructure degradation, a lack of basic services, and consolidation of a culture of violence including GBV. This made communities more vulnerable to health and environmental hazards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People ignore warnings to evacuate ahead of storms and hurricanes because they fear looting and theft, thereby increasing the likelihood they will be affected by the disaster</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The protracted crisis in Haiti decreases capacity at all levels, resulting in the State and its people having limited resilience to external shocks, including disasters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict intervention intensifies disaster risk</strong></td>
<td>The willingness and ability of MINUSTAH to respond comprehensively to disasters reduces the pressure on the Government to provide an adequate national disaster response. This may undermine the long-term development of national capacities for disaster reduction and mitigation</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
3. Indonesia (Aceh)

This case study was undertaken in 2007. It primarily examined the interaction between the 2004 earthquake and tsunami and the Aceh conflict, particularly focusing on the post-disaster period. It also examined the interaction between disaster and conflict during post-conflict floods that affected the Aceh district of Guyo Lues in 2006.

Disaster context

The Indonesian region of Aceh faces many types of disaster risk including both large- and small-scale and rapid and slow onset hazards. The main hazards include tsunamis, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, storms, tornadoes, floods, landslides, drought and forest fires. The 2004 earthquake and tsunami triggered an unprecedented disaster, killing over 170,000 people and displacing 500,000 in Aceh alone. There was massive impact on infrastructure, and a change in topography along the 800km coastal belt and in some inland areas. The tsunami had a disproportionate impact on women - it is estimated that 70% of people who died were women; particularly young women.

Risk from large-scale earthquake and tsunami events remains high. Recent landslides and flooding, including in December 2006, were linked to reconstruction-related forest clearance. Gravel and sand extraction to be used in reconstruction materials also increased environmental risks. Furthermore, large-scale home rebuilding in the immediate coastal belt presents an ongoing risk from tidal surges and tsunamis.

Conflict context

At the time of the case study, Aceh was characterized as a post-conflict context. In 2005, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for a comprehensive peace agreement was signed between the Government of Indonesia and the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM), marking a formal end of the 30-year armed conflict. GAM was founded with the express goal of seceding from Indonesia, but its conflict with the Government was also influenced by natural resource considerations. Up to 15,000 people died in fighting; around 1.4 million men, women and children were displaced; human rights abuses led to widespread trauma in the civilian population; homes and livelihoods were destroyed; and Government services broke down.

People who were displaced experienced and/or witnessed high levels of violence, torture, human rights abuses and loss of livelihoods. Women suffered disproportionately. When they lost their husbands, they became widows, heads of households, and single parents. In doing so, they experienced more acute and perverse forms of sexual violence and torture, and risked daily gender-based violence in camps and households. During the conflict, Aceh was largely isolated from external development assistance and a significant war economy developed, in which the Indonesian army was one of several important participants.

The interface between disaster and conflict

In Aceh, there was a direct overlap of geographic areas and populations affected by both the tsunami disaster and the conflict. The tsunami hit locations that were either already directly involved in the conflict, or which had been indirectly affected by the conflict's economic repercussions or through hosting IDPs. Conversely, there were also several areas affected by both the conflict and the tsunami. The conflict brought an influx of tsunami IDPs, and essential access to infrastructure such as roads was restricted, which curtailed movement in and out of the area. Overall, the combined impacts of both the conflict/peace process and the tsunami impact/recovery had a huge effect on Aceh's wider social, economic, political and security context.

The tsunami and the response to it had significant positive effects on peace dynamics in Aceh. Prior to the tsunami, low-key peace moves were underway and there were growing levels of political will and capacity to support this process. The tsunami contributed to these existing positive trends by providing a critical opening for political dialogue and peace-related opportunities. For example, massive international tsunami aid to Aceh provided political ‘breathing space’ for the national Government to make peace concessions without political repercussions that would have come if it had used funds from its own budget. In August 2005, this opportunity helped to achieve a negotiated end to the protracted conflict.

The tsunami was not responsible for peace, but it was an important contributing factor. Specifically, the overwhelming scale of the disaster and the domestic and international response to it, were instrumental in intensifying peace efforts and in achieving the subsequent peace agreement. For example, the reconstruction ‘bubble’ economy acted as a peace dividend,
while the international relief/recovery presence gave both sides an incentive to remain engaged in the peace process. Equally, international attention and support helped influence Government efforts to broker peace. Several donors made it clear to the Government that they expected progress on settling the conflict so reconstruction efforts could move ahead30.

In addition, the disaster and conflict/peace dynamics were seen to be positively mutually reinforcing. The tsunami disaster had a positive impact on peace; in turn reduced conflict and contributed to reduced disaster risk. For instance, the overall security environment improved quickly (including freedom of movement). This greatly facilitated delivering tsunami assistance and created opportunities for the Government to make disaster-risk reduction a higher priority. Conversely, the scale of the humanitarian response and related media interest in the tsunami brought many international ‘witnesses’ to Aceh. This created opportunities for greater transparency in Aceh’s conflict-affected areas that had previously been less accessible31.

At the national level, there were some specific (although limited) examples of proactive efforts to ensure that disaster response and recovery activities incorporated tenets of ‘do no harm’. These efforts provided positive entry points to strengthen community social cohesion. For example, IOM sought to actively engage both former GAM members and recovery staff had limited understanding of the conflict. At the same time, national and international agencies and donors felt they needed to deal separately with people affected by the tsunami or by the conflict. The caused many problems. Some donor funding resulted in unfair relief distribution between disaster- and conflict-affected populations, which generated tension. These artificial distinctions particularly prevented the Government and the international community from developing an integrated disaster-conflict response. Therefore, the stakeholders did not always take advantage of opportunities to extend tsunami funding to support conflict-affected populations or the Aceh-wide reintegration processes.

In some instances, the international community’s conflict-insensitive and disaster-blind approaches reportedly increased disaster risk. According to the World Bank, for home rebuilding, tsunami survivors typically received twice the amount of aid that people recovering from conflict received. This was due to the fact that many international tsunami relief/recovery staff had limited understanding of the conflict. At the same time, national and international agencies and donors felt they needed to deal separately with people affected by the tsunami or by the conflict. The caused many problems. Some donor funding resulted in unfair relief distribution between disaster- and conflict-affected populations, which generated tension. These artificial distinctions particularly prevented the Government and the international community from developing an integrated disaster-conflict response. Therefore, the stakeholders did not always take advantage of opportunities to extend tsunami funding to support conflict-affected populations or the Aceh-wide reintegration processes.

Other disputes and tensions arose due to Indonesia’s national politics; the National and provincial governments could not agree on which level was to distribute aid. In addition, the scale and often poorly managed response of the aid effort created more unfair treatment of people. In particular, the lack of appropriate checks and balances between government levels created more aid-related problems. In some cases, this resulted in criminal activity and corruption that had a direct impact on conflict. The World Bank estimated that during this period, 20% of total tracked conflict events were linked to tensions generated over recovery assistance.

Prior to the tsunami, the impact of the conflict was seen to contribute to disaster risk largely because it deepened levels of vulnerability among at-risk populations. For instance, conflict resulted in widespread displacement of people; destruction of their key infrastructure and social services; and a breakdown in trust between communities and local authorities. Conflict also affected governance because it resulted in a ‘war economy’. This increased levels of disaster risk because the region’s natural resources were depleted by unregulated or illegal logging and other activities.

When peace was achieved, it had both a harmful and positive impact on levels of disaster risk. In fact, stabilizing the security situation actually increased disaster risk because it made access to forests for illegal timber extraction easier which directly heightened the risk of flooding. Conversely, the rapid improvement in overall security, including freedom of movement, significantly eased delivery of tsunami assistance, and created more political opportunities to achieve disaster-risk reduction.

At the time of the tsunami, many factors made the women of Aceh disadvantaged and more vulnerable in the event of a disaster. The protracted conflict resulted in loss of economic, social and cultural power that women had previously enjoyed. They became increasingly and systematically marginalized since they had few skills and poor educational levels. Access to decision-making was also limited as women did not take part in local level governance structures32. Furthermore, decades of conflict had profoundly changed norms, gender roles and expectations of men’s and women’s places in society. High levels of socialized violence and the availability of weapons constantly presented major challenges to social cohesion.
When the tsunami hit, poverty, loss of livelihoods, and land and property issues were acute. These had different impacts on men and women according to their marital and socioeconomic status. Valuable personal assets, such as jewellery that usually belonged to women, were the first things to be sold as a coping strategy. Women faced even more discrimination in land and property claim issues due to the loss of papers and documentation during the conflict and violence. This made insecurity and poverty worse.

**Programming in response to the interface**

Meanwhile, several positive examples of integrated and complementary approaches to dealing with the disaster-conflict interface were identified, including:

- IOM’s response to the 2006 Gayo Lues floods that acted as a springboard to build trust between the community and local authorities for ongoing peacebuilding work;
- USAID’s programmes on community-based recovery integration and its Aceh community engagement and ownership activities supported community empowerment training (that included conflict mitigation approaches) and were a prerequisite for its recovery activities;
- World Bank’s support for integrated governance and poverty reduction programmes across Aceh that targeted both conflict and Tsunami-affected populations.

Another positive development was that UNDP’s Country Office had a dedicated, well resourced Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit (CPRU) that provided an opportunity to promote holistic approaches to crisis prevention and recovery. The agency’s Aceh programme provided a platform to develop activities across virtually all key UNDP thematic areas, and provided a strong basis to integrate thinking on disaster, conflict and other development challenges. A mixture of analysis, physical infrastructure programme implementation and technical assistance (including through staff secondments) proved to be a positive mix on which to base programme development. At the time of the case study, the potential existed for cross-learning and complementary approaches between different programmes already underway on issues such as disaster risk reduction, livelihoods, the emerging Aceh programme to strengthen sustainable peace and development, and the Ministry for Social Welfare-UNDP’s post-disaster recovery assessment. However, at the time of the country visit, many complex factors meant that staff were only beginning to address opportunities to translate this integrated approach into practical action.

From a gender perspective, there was a mixed response from nearly all participants in both the conflict and disaster crises. There were pockets of success and good practice including women’s leadership programmes and support for women’s human rights groups. However, these were not mainstreamed into provincial policy or sufficiently reflected in the practice of multilateral agencies including the UN. It is now well documented that in the humanitarian response to any disaster, women and men have different needs in terms of shelter, health, livelihoods protection, etc. but these were not adequately addressed. Women had only limited participation in decision-making over relief allocation at community level. In addition, unequal distribution of recovery aid to tsunami and conflict IDPs further aggravated existing inequities and tensions between people and communities.

**Box 4: Emerging Good Practice**

**Strengthening Sustainable Peace and Development in Aceh Programme (SSPDA)**

UNDP’s SSPDA programme (2005-2008) was created to support implementing the peace agreement’s MoU. The programme covered: advisory and technical support for national, district and local governments; support for reintegrating ex-combatants; livelihood support for conflict-affected communities; socialization that included public awareness raising and engagement in implementing the MoU; and support for civil society. The programme especially focused on strengthening the capacity of women’s NGO networks to participate in the reconstruction process.

The programme document’s situation analysis highlighted the need to provide ‘a comprehensive response to the conflict and the tsunami in a way that sustains both peace and development.’ Districts experiencing both conflict and disaster were key focus points. The programme proposed to maximize linkages between UNDP’s post-tsunami disaster recovery activities and its justice projects that focus on conflict and tsunami-affected populations.

At the time of the case study, the programme had only recently begun implementation, but it had the potential to strengthen links with other UNDP programmes in addition to justice and civil society organization activities. These covered issues relating to DRR, knowledge management, livelihoods, and governance, all of which would have had a beneficial impact on the interface.
Disaster-Confl ict Interface

Conclusions and implications

The most important dimension of the interface in Aceh was that the tsunami disaster made a positive contribution to ending conflict. However, the disaster was only one of several factors that led to achieving peace. The tsunami accelerated a peace process that had already been underway for some years. It also provided a ‘window’ of opportunity for people on both sides to take action to achieve peace. Furthermore, massive international support to rebuild Aceh generated substantial peace dividends that were useful to all participants.

Any number of important cross-cutting elements contributed to the overall levels of vulnerability and risk. However, the situation was extremely complex and almost every cross-cutting element had both positive and harmful dimensions. The following aspects were the most important cross-cutting elements.

Table 6. Examples of interface interactions in Aceh, Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISASTER</th>
<th>POSITIVE</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| **Disaster impact intensifies conflict risk** | • The tsunami destroyed property (e.g. housing and voter registration records) and livelihoods, and damaged basic communications infrastructure, as well as blocking post-conflict recovery, socialization, peace agreement implementation and elections
• Disaster-related displacement contributed to social tensions by creating pressure on natural resources e.g. through environmental degradation (deforestation), and created increased personal vulnerability (e.g. to HIV/AIDS)
• Disaster-related flooding, and deforestation caused by illegal or legal logging (combined with an inadequate response) fuelled tensions between communities and local government |
| **Disaster intervention intensifies conflict risk** | • An inadequate and/or poorly planned/executed disaster response led to tensions between the National and provincial governments and between tsunami-affected communities and local authorities.
• The massive and rapid influx of emergency aid brought agency staff and resources that were often blind to the potential of aid to cause conflict. For example, people felt resentful due to lack of consultation with beneficiaries; inappropriate and poor quality housing provision; and oversupply of aid to some targeted locations, etc
• Perceptions of inequity over discrepancies between tsunami and conflict assistance created tensions that resulted in instances of tsunami aid being stopped as it moved through conflict-affected areas
• Social tensions were caused by disaster responses (particularly support for rebuilding village structures) that did not take account of demographic changes and new vulnerabilities caused by the tsunami and conflict
• The market for reconstruction materials (including illicit timber) and lucrative reconstruction contracts led to economically-motivated violence between interest groups (e.g. between GAM factions)
• Poor quality recovery construction and the slow pace of assistance created conflict between the affected population and Government. People were frustrated by the different housing reconstruction standards of the Government and international agencies such as IOM |
| **Disaster impact reduces conflict risk** | • The 2004 tsunami provided political impetus to reenergize ongoing peace talks (e.g. a large number of GAM deaths; increased international attention and donor funding that provided a peace dividend). Local public and international expectations about tsunami recovery and effective use of funds encouraged cooperation between GAM and Indonesia’s Government
• Mass external extra-budgetary resources for Aceh (international tsunami aid) provided political breathing space for the national Government to make peace concessions without political repercussions related to budget allocations
• Tsunami assistance provided opportunities for good governance approaches (e.g. participatory planning used by IOM, USAID), and opened new political opportunities (potentially also for women)
• The international presence in Aceh resulted in improved protection for people and the presence of ‘witnesses’
• In some instances, tsunami recovery programmes took an integrated/conflict-sensitive approach in addressing existing conflict-related issues (e.g. psychological trauma) and merged conflict and disaster caseloads to avoid discrepancies
• Immediate disaster recovery activities (cash for work and government capacity development) were used as an entry point for wider conflict recovery and/or peacebuilding activities (e.g. the IOM project) |
The scale of the disaster response. The scale of the recovery effort created a positive momentum for peace. It provided an increased number of international ‘witnesses’ in Aceh, and the level of international assistance provided a positive incentive to end hostilities. There were also interesting examples of programming/operational approaches that sought to directly address the conflict-disaster interface. However, conversely there were also many instances in which interventions marred the interface.

Governance. Governance issues caused both negative and harmful effects on the interface. Some 30 years of conflict had a very negative effect on Aceh’s quality of governance, including lack of transparency in decision-making and weak local government capacity. In turn, this had a negative impact on disaster risk. The war economy and lack of a regulatory/enforcement framework affected natural resources and the risk of hazards. Conversely, in some instances the tsunami response caused tensions within communities (uneven access, transparency and accountability), and between local and national governments. In positive terms, the tsunami’s massive impact made it possible to capitalize on proactive government efforts for peace and dialogue.

Population displacement. The conflict and the tsunami caused huge population movements that extended the geographic impact of both types of crisis and increased geographic/demographic overlap. The approach to managing IDP caseloads was both positive (e.g. integrated programming) and negative (e.g. discrepancies in ways of handling different caseloads) and affected community cohesion.

Gender: Overall, gender issues could have been a critical entry point for more effective and coherent interface programming, and an opportunity to designed targeted responses to address various community needs. Analysis of the post-tsunami and post-conflict situation in Aceh states that gender-related recovery was a serious problem and that single parents and widows were the poorest and most marginalized groups. Both the conflict and disaster aid communities showed only limited gender sensitivity. That issue and the artificial separation of responses did little to create a more sophisticated understanding of the complex context, or to sufficiently address vulnerabilities. On the positive side, many lessons emerged on how best to support women’s practical and strategic needs, as well as on initiatives that can be scaled up and used as platforms for longer term programming across the interface.

The case study identified existing work targeted at addressing the interface, and also pinpointed opportunities to create integrated programmes and complementary activities within both disaster and conflict recovery programmes. For example, the case study showed it was possible to created more aligned approaches that integrated conflict sensitivity and, where relevant, DRR considerations into some recovery programming, including livelihood and small grant projects. National and international interventions had critical impacts on the interface which meant it was vital to make all participants aware of the importance of linked conflict-sensitive and disaster-risk reduction programming. There was also scope to strengthen linkages between national and local governance, disaster and conflict programming. These activities could potentially generate useful local impacts, while continued national engagement could yield benefits within Indonesia’s Government policy and approaches.
4. Kenya

The Kenya case study took place in 2007 and focused on analysing the general situation at the time, rather than examining a specific conflict or disaster event.

Disaster context

Kenya is prone to a diverse range of natural hazards; 80% of the country consists of arid or semi-arid lands (ASALs) where drought frequently threatens the sustainability of pastoralist livelihoods. The UK-based international development charity, Christian Aid, estimates that over one third of pastoralists in Kenya have been forced to abandon their traditional lifestyle because of the adverse effects of drought. The western districts, and increasingly the northern and coastal districts, are also prone to severe flooding that is intensified by the impacts of drought and deforestation. Climate change means that the rainy seasons are more difficult to predict, leaving less time for natural resources such as pasture and water to recover, and eroding coping capacities. Outbreaks of malaria, cholera and rift valley fever are common in the aftermath of flooding. Managing diseases associated with flooding is particularly challenging in the region bordering Somalia because there are few health and veterinary services there, and animals and people frequently cross the border in both directions.

Conflict context

Low intensity conflict is common among the pastoralist communities that live primarily in north and northeastern parts of the country. Elections have also been a historical flashpoint for violence nationwide since political parties mobilize support along tribal lines. Kenya’s proximity to conflict in neighbouring countries such as Sudan and Uganda has led to a sharp increase in the availability of small arms and light weapons in the country. This has contributed to rising levels of violent crime and to transforming traditional livestock raiding activities into tribal conflicts. Girls and women are particularly vulnerable in these contexts. Their traditional roles of housewives and homemakers mean they are often left alone to take care of homesteads when the men go out to search for pastures and water for animals.

In addition, unresolved land distribution and use issues have led to prolonged conflict between the Government and ethnic groups. This type of conflict was ongoing in the Mount Elgon region at the time of the case study.

The interface between disaster and conflict

Resource scarcity that is made worse by rapid and slow onset disasters and low intensity conflicts are key components of the disaster-conflict interface in Kenya’s arid and semi-arid lands. These factors are further compounded by the increasingly unsustainable nature of pastoralism and the influence of regional conflict dynamics, particularly from Uganda, Sudan and Somalia.

These lands are characterized by historical marginalization dating back to colonial times, scarcity of resources, and huge infrastructure and social service provision inequalities. In these areas, there appears to be a strong relationship between the physical environment, conflict and disaster. For example, a violent raid on livestock in one area may be a response to the impact of drought on another community’s herd.

Pastoralism is a way of life, not just an economic means of survival. In the past, the limited supply of water acted as a natural regulator on herd size. However, the size of a herd of cattle has become a symbol of social status, as well as a valuable economic asset. This means pastoralists are increasingly resistant to selling animals ahead of drought, thereby increasing competition for water in times of scarcity. As a result, additional water projects are being implemented in these areas, compounding the already fierce competition for pastureland. To some extent, this also led to further degradation of the environment in a setting characterized by limited natural resources.

Many of Kenya’s local conflicts have been influenced by patterns of violence in neighbouring countries. Progress has been made in bringing peace to Uganda and Sudan, but issues of disarmament and reintegration still have not been addressed. There is still a continuing demand for weapons due to the prevailing poor security situation. This has implications for Kenya since the Government has only limited ability and reach to provide security in pastoralist areas because borders are so easy to cross. Increased drought conditions and cross-border movement of people has brought new groups into competition for limited resources. For example, in Kenya’s isolated border areas next to Somalia, Uganda and Sudan, conflict increases during drought and famine seasons due to attacks on neighbouring communities to steal animals and other livestock, and competition to gain access to pastureland.
In north and northeastern Kenya, the recovery periods between episodes of drought have diminished to months instead of years. This has resulted in humanitarian indicators that are lower than in southern Somalia. For example, the World Health Organization’s Global Acute Malnutrition Index states that 20% of people in Kenya’s Wajir District and 15% of people in its Garissa District suffer from malnutrition. This has resulted in disease upsurge and the risk of epidemics. During drought peak periods, the people of Kenya’s arid and semi-arid lands are particularly prone to outbreaks of meningitis, acute malnutrition, and the infectious eye disease of trachoma, as well as schistosomiasis in areas that surround communal ponds. In this context, these diseases and conditions have eroded community capacity and resilience to cyclical external shocks and disasters. As a result, people often find themselves in a downward spiral of vulnerability and their livelihood assets diminish.

**Programming in response to the interface**

In Kenya, both national and international stakeholders recognize the links between disasters and conflict. However, delivering effective integrated programmes to address these issues needs further sharing of technical understanding and approaches, particularly within government agencies responsible for basic services in these lands. One example of an emerging initiative is a project by Saferworld, a UK-based NGO that works to prevent violent conflict and encourages cooperative approaches to security. It is providing conflict-sensitivity training to Kenyan Government staff through its Arid Lands Resource Management Project.

Many agencies prioritized work in these lands because of their low development indicators. However, few agencies explicitly built conflict sensitivity and disaster risk reduction into their interventions. The 2007 UN Country Team’s Humanitarian Strategy recognized the links between disasters and conflicts in Kenya. The Strategy sought to address the shared impacts of disaster and conflict, including food and livelihood insecurity, displacement of people, disease and insecurity. The Strategy also analysed common causes that ranged from disasters and climatic shocks, political and socioeconomic marginalization, to conflict and insecurity. These issues were also linked in the UN’s Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) that identified components of disaster management including peacebuilding capacity, conflict resolution and reduction in small arms and light weapons proliferation.

During this period, several UNDP projects attempted to address disasters and conflict in a holistic manner, including the Host Communities Project and the Garissa Armed Violence Project (see box below).

**Conclusions and implications**

There are several cross-cutting elements that have the greatest effect the interface between disaster and conflict.

- **Natural resource scarcity.** In the arid or semi-arid lands, natural resource scarcity can be a cause and a consequence of both disasters and conflict. Acts of violence, particularly cattle raiding, has been a means of managing access to key resources such as pastures and water. As drought reduces the availability of these resources, violence increases. At the same time, the prevailing insecurity reduced access to some traditional pastures and water points, thereby causing pressure in other areas. In some severe cases, this has led to the resettlement of pastoral households that then suffered food insecurity and had few alternative sources of income.

- **Governance.** This has also been identified as a cross-cutting issue influencing the interface, given the inadequate management of the land tenure system, the historical marginalization of the pastoralist areas, and persistent corruption among the police.
Overall programme effectiveness could have been improved in Kenya through additional investment in monitoring and evaluation to examine and analyse the cumulative impacts of project activities on disasters and conflict.

Table 7. Examples of interactions of the interface in Kenya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISASTER</th>
<th>CONFLICT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disaster impact intensifies conflict risk</strong></td>
<td><strong>Conflict impact intensifies disaster risk</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Risk of drought has led to population movements that resulted in livestock raiding and competition for pastures. For example, signs of impending drought led pastoralist groups in Uganda’s Karamoja region to attack other pastoralists to secure access to pastures and water during times of scarcity. These attacks carry the risk of abuse and rape of women</td>
<td>• Outbreaks of violence between different ethnic and tribal groups has made prime grazing land inaccessible, thus reducing resources for livestock and undermining pastoralist livelihoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disaster intervention intensifies conflict risk</strong></td>
<td><strong>Conflict intervention intensifies disaster risk</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Water management around rivers in Ethiopia has caused the waters of Kenya’s Lake Turkana to recede, exposing new and fertile lands. This has led to violent competition for access</td>
<td>• Counter-terrorist measures following the massive September 11, 2001 suicide air attacks in the United States, included new anti-money laundering laws. These increased the vulnerability of Somali refugees and other communities that were reliant on payments made by people who emigrated and then sent money home to their families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The establishment of conservation areas between the Samburu and Lake Baringo regions in northern Kenya led to protracted conflict between tribes over who would benefit, and how traditional patterns of grazing would be affected</td>
<td><strong>Conflict intervention reduces disaster risk</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cattle raiding is a coping response to drought or disease and has resulted in violence and triggered revenge raids</td>
<td>None observed</td>
</tr>
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| **Disaster impact reduces conflict risk**                               | **Conflict impact reduces disaster risk**                                |
| None observed                                                           | None observed                                                            |

| **Disaster intervention reduces conflict risk**                         | **Conflict intervention reduces disaster risk**                         |
| • As water sources become potential conflict flash points during drought, the Government of Kenya’s Arid Lands Resource Management Project has provided tank water to pastoralists in Garissa to avoid overgrazing and potential conflict over water and pastures | None observed |
| • During drought, community leaders proactively negotiate with neighbouring pastoralist tribes to seek housing and protection for weak and vulnerable people and animals | None observed |
5. Kyrgyzstan

This case study was undertaken in 2006 and is based on a desk review and interviews with key respondents.

Disaster context

Kyrgyzstan faces significant impacts from a wide range of natural hazards including floods, mudslides, avalanches, snowfalls, glacial lake outburst flooding and constant earthquakes. Some 3000 tremors have been recorded annually as much of the country is located in seismic areas scaled at eight to nine according to the MSK-64 earthquake scale. Mudflows and floods occur all over the country, more than 3000 rivers pose mudflow threats, and more than 1000 settlements are exposed to potential mudflow damage. Around 7.5% of the population (509 settlements) faces landslide risk since avalanches occur in all mountainous areas and along main highways. In total, there are 772 avalanche danger zones in which avalanches regularly cause major damage and cut off main motorways.

Disaster risk is compounded by: poor infrastructure maintenance; nuclear and industrial waste sites in high-risk areas (e.g. toxic mine tailings); and high levels of ground and surface water pollution. Disasters in Kyrgyzstan do not kill many people, but they are numerous and recurring and cause substantial economic hardship.

Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Emergency Situations (MoES) states that vulnerability to disasters is compounded by deforestation and overgrazing, combined with inadequate legislation, inappropriate approaches to land use and poor environmental management. Water loss is high (due poor water management, overwatering of gardens and poor infrastructure). This, combined with continued retreating of the country’s glaciers (which has reduced surface water levels), creates concerns over long-term water resources. Approximately two-thirds of the population (about 3.5 million people) reportedly lived in disaster-prone areas, with the highest risk in the southern provinces/Ferghana Valley region. Mud brick housing construction techniques also worsen the risk.

Research on seismic risk has indicated that during and after seismic events, women are more likely to die than men. They are also at increased risk of physical violence and domestic abuse following an earthquake, and do not have access to equal levels of healthcare. They also may be denied aid or compensation for losses if male family members are not present to help them deal with aid agencies. In the political process of recovery and reconstruction, women’s participation is limited or non-existent. Widespread poverty and a highly patriarchal social structure have placed severe constraints on women’s lives and mobility. Prior to an earthquake, their position and condition makes them more vulnerable because they lack access to information and early warning communications. For the same reasons, women are the least likely to have a place to go in case of an evacuation, or have the means to reach evacuation centres.

Conflict context

In March 2005 allegations of Government interference in elections sparked a popular revolt that led to its overthrow. These events revealed a wide range of political and social problems caused by persistent poverty, widespread unemployment and weak governance structures. Continued protests throughout 2006 and 2007 showed that the issues were far from resolved. Constitutional and electoral code referendums and parliamentary elections which took place in 2007 contributed to consolidating Presidential authority. The political situation seems to have stabilized, but many of the underlying issues have not been addressed, and some mechanisms for addressing violence have weakened, thereby increasing the potential for conflict to escalate.

Kyrgyzstan is a multi-ethnic country with strong minority groups. Nationalism and the surging emphasis on ethnic ‘belonging’ tend to lead groups to analyse situations in the terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Other ethnic groups’ shortcomings are often blamed for creating conflict, rather than being seen as common development challenges that could be addressed through joint efforts. This often leads to sudden eruptions of local violence. Religion, especially in the south, is also a potential source of conflict, and the Ferghana Valley is frequently described as a fertile ground to recruit Islamic extremists.

The Kyrgyz Republic is a young democracy and faces considerable challenges in its efforts to promote long-term stability and peace. Sources of discontent include allegations of corruption, unequal power-relations, and lack of dialogue and trust between the population and the authorities, as well as between the opposition and the authorities. Relations between local self-governments and higher levels of authority were often poor. This limited the scope for authorities to intervene in local conflicts, and demonstrated a lack of structural connections that existed all the way up to central Government
and Parliament. Some people – particularly youth and women – also continued to be marginalized. Despite recent improvements at the time of the study, women were underrepresented in all levels and branches of government. Kyrgyz women also face a high risk of gender-based violence. Conversely, women have the potential to play an important role in peacebuilding. National studies have noted that women prefer unarmed means of conflict resolution. However, at the same time they lack power or opportunity to control the use or non-use of weapons.

Kyrgyzstan also has significant inter-state sovereignty tensions. Poorly delineated and disputed borders, especially in the Ferghana Valley which spreads over three countries (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), have been a source of tension at both community and inter-state levels. This results in recurring disputes and tensions, especially over natural resources.

All of the above conflict areas are interrelated, and are influenced by other local, national and interregional factors. Among other issues, border conflicts are linked to disputes over resources; ethnic tensions increase over the lack of access to governance structures; lack of capacity of local and national authorities perpetuates existing tensions; and women’s poor access to discussions and decision-making processes on peace and development issues potentially worsens the overall situation.

The interface between disaster and conflict

The link between disaster and conflict is most pronounced in the Ferghana Valley that runs through eastern Kyrgyzstan. This is the country’s primary area of geographic overlap between conflict and disaster risk, both of which also have a cross-border dynamic. Socioeconomic, ethnic and political tensions were driven by natural resource conflict and, somewhat more indirectly, by disaster-related insecurity. Evidence demonstrated that disasters and disaster risk were often made worse by poor management of natural resources, and their harmful impact on local and regional social cohesion. For example, flooding hit some populations that were not able to move from at-risk areas because the new areas offered no alternative livelihoods to cotton growing; their traditional income source. This generated grievances against their domestic authorities and the Government of Kyrgyzstan. Poor water management also made the area vulnerable to drought, flooding and mudslides.

Governance is an overriding factor that drives both conflict and disaster risk. This is related to local government’s limited capacity and ability to deliver services, little transparency and accountability, as well as almost no political inclusion and representation. This capacity gap also existed in relation to planning and responding to crises. For example, Kyrgyzstan’s closed and non-transparent Government decision-making, combined with weak public information systems reportedly contribute to social tensions including unfair disaster assistance and general disaster-related vulnerability. Actual or perceived unequal distribution of Government disaster assistance across regions and between different ethnic communities can become a source of conflict, as was the case in the 2006 earthquake response.

National agendas developed after the Central Asian Republics gained independence from Russia made defense of perceived national interest a reflex response when dealing with regional issues. Therefore, low inter-state cooperation was an important factor that created insecurities, and impeded development prospects and multilateral disaster risk reduction. Many rivers in the region originate in Kyrgyzstan, and the country’s position as a regional upstream ‘water power’, is a continuing source of tension. Water issues have taken on an inter-state strategic security dimension, with disputes over upstream water extraction for irrigation, withholding of water needed for national hydro-electric generation, waterborne pollution, and general water management. For example, national hydropower requirements are met by damming upland rivers which often conflicts with downstream irrigation requirements. This results in downstream flooding that causes tensions, both within Kyrgyzstan and with its regional neighbour states. For instance, in 2002 large amounts of water released by Kyrgyzstan for power generation purposes, resulted in large-scale flooding downstream in Uzbekistan. Uzbek authorities said the water release caused US$ 770 million in damage.

Drought added to tensions that already existed over water management issues. For example, drought periods in 2000 and 2001 considerably strained relations between Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Drought also had an impact on community social cohesion within Kyrgyzstan and created local animosity in neighbouring communities over the border in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. In 1997, serious drought further reduced water flow that Kyrgyzstan had already cut substantially by using it for power generation purposes. This led to serious cross-border tensions.

Related issues such as poor environmental management and land use, as well as inadequate legislation and enforcement were found to be potential causes of both disaster and conflict risk. Environmental impacts from climate change, unsustainable land management practices, and degraded physical infrastructure of natural resource management have an ongoing potential to generate conflict risk. For instance, water-related insecurity (mainly rising groundwater, floods and
water scarcity) and poor water management led to inter- and intra-community tensions, as well as strained inter-state relations. However, disagreements over environmental resources were often described as inter-ethnic conflicts.

Some case study respondents noted that disasters and disaster-risk reduction efforts offered opportunities for enhanced cooperation. However, the country’s experience shows that disaster risk or events (often intensified through poor management of natural resources) mainly have the potential to impose a harmful impact on local and regional social cohesion.

Programming in response to the interface

Regional issues, including security and anti-terrorism, reportedly divert some participants from focusing explicitly on the connections between disasters and conflicts. Several environmental management programmes and related efforts designed to stimulate community and regional cooperation implicitly seek to address conflict issues. One example was the Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC) – a partnership between UNDP, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) that sought to identify and map situations in which environmental problems threaten to generate tensions between communities, countries or regions, and to provide a cooperation framework to address these challenges.

Conversely, the role of the international community in Kyrgyzstan was described as positive in raising awareness on potential social and environmental flash points and in directing funds to related conflict prevention initiatives and, to a more limited degree, environmental security.

At the time of the case study, in terms of dealing with conflict, disaster and environment issues, UNDP’s Kyrgyzstan Country Office appeared to be well placed within the UN Country Team and was also able to gain access to key entry points within the Government of Kyrgyzstan. The UNDP Country Programme developed several interventions in these areas, basing its efforts on the long running Peace and Development Programme (PDP), governance activities and emerging disaster management and environment portfolios. In 2007, many of these activities were in initial development stages, or were limited in scale. These interventions ranged from small grants aimed at addressing elements of both conflict and disaster risk, cross-border programmes (see box below), as well as a proposed Area Based Development project that integrates livelihoods, conflict prevention, strengthened governance, disaster risk reduction and environmental analysis.

Conclusions and implications

In Kyrgyzstan, the links between disasters and conflict were found to be indirect. Kyrgyzstan was not a state in conflict, but there were a number of cross-cutting issues that link disaster and conflict risk in the country. These were most significant in the region of the Ferghana valley.

- Environmental resource management. This had a strong impact, both on local and trans-border levels of disaster risk, and also on conflict/political tensions. One of the most important aspects of this is the potential of environmental...
resource management to improve water resource management, set against the potential of disaster risk caused by environmental issues to create conflict.

- **Migration.** This included migration due to insecurity/conflict risk and/or the impact of disasters, and is also a critical cross-cutting element that potentially creates increased crisis risk.

- **Governance.** This included the harmful impacts that limited capacity, and lack of transparency and accountability can have on escalating the effects of disaster and conflict on each other. For example, the Government’s approach to disaster response can possibly generate tensions within society and thereby undermine social cohesion.

The case study showed that disasters, conflict, environment and governance are definitely related in Kyrgyzstan. UNDP Country Office staff said that more could be done with minimal effort to maximize impact across programmes. At the time of the case study, initial efforts to mainstream and develop complementary approaches were already underway, with reportedly positive results.

In Kyrgyzstan, disaster-related activities present opportunities for enhanced cooperation, and some conflict prevention activities may provide entry points for disaster risk reduction undertakings. Other beneficial approaches include greater integration of conflict sensitivity into wider governance, environment and disaster programmes, as well as those that achieve broader awareness of the need to instill disaster risk reduction considerations into conflict reduction and early warning systems. There may also be national opportunities to influence government, while supporting decentralized activities which affect local government structures and affected communities, both in Kyrgyzstan and regionally. Many respondents identified local administration planning processes as key entry points.

### Table 8. Examples of interactions of the interface in Kyrgyzstan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISASTER</th>
<th>CONFLICT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disaster impact intensifies conflict risk</strong></td>
<td><strong>Conflict impact intensifies disaster risk</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Flood-affected populations that cannot move from risk areas (e.g. due to lack of alternatives to their cotton-growing livelihoods), generate grievances against domestic authorities and/or the Government of Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>None observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Forced relocation of populations from unsafe locations such as landslide areas creates social tensions</td>
<td>None observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disaster intervention intensifies conflict risk</strong></td>
<td><strong>Conflict intervention reduces disaster risk</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Unequal distribution of disaster assistance across regions and different ethnic communities had been a source of conflict</td>
<td>None observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Inadequate government response to disasters was identified as source of potential conflict between populations and authorities (especially in event of significant event such as a major earthquake), and between neighbouring countries and the Government of Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>None observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict intervention intensifies disaster risk</strong></td>
<td>None observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Local, interregional, national and inter-state tensions distract or hinder authorities from cooperating on disaster risk reduction and resolving natural resource management issues (including baseline information exchange), thereby increasing disaster risk</td>
<td>None observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Tensions in border areas have led to population displacement to locations people will not accept, as well as land use practices which increase local disaster risk</td>
<td>Conflict prevention activities (e.g. PDA-facilitated dialogue, small grant-funded projects, etc.) strengthen confidence and cooperation mechanisms and in future could provide the basis for disaster risk reduction and response dialogue, planning, and community participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict intervention intensifies disaster risk</strong></td>
<td>Conflict prevention activities (e.g. governance capacity building, small grants) could use disaster risk reduction activities as a thematic issue to base common interest confidence-building initiatives (the priority being where disaster risk is also a cause of conflict)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Papua New Guinea

Disaster context

Papua New Guinea (PNG) faces a mix of relatively localized recurrent slow hazards and rapid onset disasters with periodic large-scale events. For example, the 1998 Aitape tsunami killed an estimated 2200 men, women and children, and the 1994 and 2006 volcanic eruptions devastated the city of Rabaul. Climate-related impacts including disasters are emerging as critical hazards. Disasters, coupled with other factors, mean that atolls such as the Cartarets may soon become unfit for habitation, and the islands’ population of about 1000 people will need to be relocated to other parts of the country.

Conflict context

Papua New Guinea is characterized by an overlap of tribal and clan-related conflict dynamics, as well as increasing violence and criminality that result in high rates of victimization. These patterns also have been further compounded by high rates of domestic and gender-based violence. The role of private sector activities, especially in logging and mining, has also been highlighted as a problematic issue. The work of some logging and mining interests has been associated with tensions and conflict that result from disputed land tenure arrangements, environmental degradation, as well as inadequate distribution of benefits to local communities.

At the time of the study, the post-conflict environment in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, remained uncertain in the wake of a 2001 peace agreement that ended a long civil war over mining disputes. A contentious issue still existed over the continuation of a no-go zone surrounding the abandoned Rio Tinto copper mine. On the mainland, insecurity in the southern highlands resulted in plans to create a new province in Hela by 2012; this is where much of PNG’s natural gas resources are located.

PNG faces exceptionally high levels of gender-based violence. It is difficult to ascertain categorically whether this violence has intensified directly due to conflicts. Many commentators agree that major contributing factors include the legacy of war, violent men who disrupt communities in crisis, widespread availability of weapons, and visible abuse by security and non State armed groups, etc.). Today, PNG suffers from some of the highest rates of domestic violence per capita in the world, including physical assault by a male partner, family violence and rape. In a study by the country’s Institute of Medical Research, 60% of participating men admitted to having gang raped a woman or girl.

The interface between disaster and conflict

Interactions between disasters and conflict vary across different regions of PNG, and form a series of distinct and recurrent ‘micro-interfaces’. Population displacements caused by volcanic eruptions and other hazards, including small-scale flooding, were the most visible interface, as they were often characterized by poorly planned and managed resettlement or temporary settlement processes. These had the potential to create conflict over access to land and water resources and livelihood opportunities. Tensions and localized conflicts also result from perceived unfair distribution of humanitarian and recovery resources between resettled populations and the local communities, as well as the lack of participatory approaches. High levels of GBV also mean that women are exceptionally vulnerable in post-disaster settings.

Disaster impacts, particularly population displacements, generate a combination of land use disputes and environmental degradation with the potential to contribute to often localized conflict dynamics. This is particularly true in PNG’s context where land is very important to aspects of social identity, and religious, spiritual and economic values.

In this context, the Wantok system – a traditional ‘social security’ system – proved important to assist communities in times of disaster and/or conflict-related displacements, and played a key role in local conflict mediation. There has been increasing tension between traditional coping mechanisms and so-called ‘western’ approaches and systems of governance, particularly over managing conflict. This has happened at a time when relatively new formal governance structures remain weak and their geographic coverage has been relatively limited. Intensification of the impacts of both disasters (especially linked to climate-induced changes) and conflict (due to the increased use of high powered weapons) means that PNG’s coping mechanisms undoubtedly will be increasingly tested over trying to ease local tensions.

In PNG, conflict has contributed to disaster risk largely through lack of community social cohesion, for example, due to destruction of community assets following tribal fighting. This has also affected security matters and the ability of national and international organizations to assist in mitigation, relief and recovery. Conversely, in some cases, post-disaster interventions have placed additional pressure on communities – thereby increasing local conflict. This was highly visible in the case of the post-disaster relocation of Manam islanders following a volcanic eruption in 2004 and 2005.
The relocation resulted in continuous tension between the resettled and local landowner populations over the use of resources (land, water and building materials).49

**Programming in response to the interface**

PNG’s security issues, geographic constraints, inadequate capacity and limited donor funding mean that the international assistance presence outside the capital is minimal. This factor has slowed down both the effective implementation of development activities and the aid response in areas prone to conflict and disaster risk. As a result, UNDP has strengthened its Crisis Prevention and Recovery Programme in post-conflict Bougainville, and the UN presence in the eastern highlands has been widened to include a community security programme. Furthermore, in 2007 after cyclone Guba killed 150 people and caused severe damage in Oro Province, an early recovery office was established there.

At the time of the study, there appeared to be minimal links between conflict and disaster analysis and programming of many of the international agencies that operated in PNG. However, the UN Country Team did undertake some work on contingency planning that included considering conflict and disaster issues.

The **UNDP PNG Country Programme** was created around the theme of ‘nation building’ and cuts across all programme activities including disaster, conflict and the environment. The Country Office was just starting up at the time of the study, but even then its approach combined mainstreaming relevant activities with stand-alone or integrated programming. In addition, wide participation in local project approval committees, weekly programme meetings and senior management involvement resulted in positive cross-fertilization of ideas on disasters, conflict and the environment within the Country Office.

**Box 7**

**EMERGING GOOD PRACTICE**

**PNG UNDP nation building programme**

At the time of the field visit, UNDP’s nation building team was busy with a 12-month Preparatory Assistance Programme to develop its future Nation Building Programme. Plans included focusing on disaster preparedness and early warning and provided a unique opportunity for UNDP PNG to examine opportunities and the potential added value of an integrated approach to crisis. The team took a pragmatic approach, as it recognized that integration is not always relevant or appropriate. By the time of the case study, the concept notes and ideas developed outlined possible integrated projects with explicit objectives on both disaster risk reduction and conflict prevention/social cohesion. In addition, the proposal had a strong gender dimension to address those issues. Challenges included balancing national level interventions with targeted community interventions. These pilot approaches were forward-thinking in their crisis prevention and recovery ideas, and provided a useful evidence base for future integrated programming.

**Conclusions and implications**

In Papua New Guinea, the interface between disaster and conflict primarily shows up at the local level and is based on the following cross-cutting issues.

- **Population displacement and relocation**: The impacts of climate change and other disasters such as volcanic eruptions will continue to result in people being displaced or needing long-term resettlement. This puts pressure on PNG’s limited natural resources, particularly land. At the same time, population displacement that results from tribal fighting often increases the vulnerability of people relocated to disaster risk areas.

- **Governance**: Traditional governance systems have played a critical role in reducing small-scale tension that emerges from disaster and conflict. However, these systems may not have the capacity to mitigate future disputes as the effects of disaster and conflict intensify and the modernization of PNG’s traditional rural society gains momentum.

- **Natural resource management**: Land is vitally important to communities in PNG for a variety of reasons, ranging from its connection to social identity and status, to being necessary for economic survival. Land disputes stem from a mixture of weak governance, unequal access to resources, demographic pressure, moves towards land privatization, and opportunistic land claims following moves to change compensation rules in the traditional system of land ownership. Land issues cause many local conflicts that intensify during disaster periods, and will most likely continue to do so in the context of climate change.

- **Gender**: Gender is also a key issue in PNG’s disaster-conflict interface. High levels of GBV in ‘normal’ times mean that women are even more vulnerable to violence in post-disaster contexts. However, PNG also has interesting examples of women’s programmes contributing to addressing the specific interface challenges they face.
In most areas of PNG, disasters are small in scale, but the countries leaders will likely face a continuing challenge in trying to prioritize disaster mitigation activities and integrate DRR into conflict responses. However, over time integrating conflict sensitivity and gender empowerment into disaster responses and strengthening community capacity may become more feasible and may result in greater potential gains in the short to medium term.

The prominence of local tribal structures and the lack of a decentralized government presence mean that ‘community entry’ is important. Targeted support to strengthen local community or traditional responses to disasters and conflict may provide more sustainable risk-reduction opportunities. These could be coupled with a parallel focus on building central Government capacity in areas such as disaster contingency and response planning, as well as policy development (particularly related to population displacement and relocation activities).

Table 9. Examples of interface interactions in New Guinea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISASTER</th>
<th>CONFLICT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disaster impact intensifies conflict risk</strong></td>
<td><strong>Disaster impact reduces conflict risk</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Drought/flood conditions exceed individual and immediate community coping capacities, creating pressures and tensions within groups, and competition for access to land ‘owned’ by other groups</td>
<td>None observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Small-scale flooding and related displacement create local conflicts over land and competition for resources</td>
<td><strong>Disaster intervention reduces conflict risk</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Disasters intensify rural-urban migration and increase rule-of-law issues and social tensions in urban centres – by importing tribal fighting/ethnic tensions from rural areas that increase criminality and gang crime</td>
<td>• Conflictsensitive and effective planning and management of resettlement caused by volcanic activity incorporated community consultation, information sharing and mediation, as well as negotiation of land acquisition by the Government ahead of disaster resettlement. As a result, previously non-existent connections between IDPs and host populations were established and strengthened, and expanded the benefits of the resettlement response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Private-sector exploitation of mineral and logging resources contributed to flooding, landslides, contaminated water supplies and general environmental degradation. This led to conflict with local communities and fed into wider grievances</td>
<td>• Community risk-reduction activities provided entry points for wider social cohesion objectives based around a common threat/interest. For example, UNDP’s disaster risk-reduction project provided training in area-based clusters that created links across communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disaster intervention intensifies conflict risk</strong></td>
<td>• Disaster risk reduction activities (promoting dry food storage and stockpiling) can also benefit communities during conflict displacement and/or destruction of crops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Poorly planned and managed resettlement of populations displaced by disasters generated tensions over perceptions of unfair distribution of humanitarian and recovery aid and lack of participatory approaches. Sometimes this led to localized conflict</td>
<td>None observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Volcanic and climate-related population displacement, coupled with land ownership issues, created the potential for conflict between IDPs and host populations, and within combined IDP populations made up of different groups</td>
<td><strong>Conflict intervention reduces disaster risk</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Inadequate and/or poorly planned and executed disaster responses led to tensions between the central Government and provinces, and between communities and local authorities</td>
<td>• Some reconciliation agreements (e.g. Bougainville) provided for migration away from land in the foothills of flood zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict impact intensifies disaster risk</strong></td>
<td>• PNG’s National Agricultural Research Institute (NARI) was hesitant to initiate pilot Information Resource Centres for Drought in high-security risk areas such as the southern highlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Inter-and intra-community conflicts led to destruction of property, food stores, trees, etc. which contributed to overall vulnerability of communities, as well as physical disaster risk from landslides, etc</td>
<td>• PNG’s Customary Land Dispute Settlement Act provides opportunities for risk-reduction awareness through village courts and offers practical benefits in terms of increased access to land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tribal fighting led to some populations being displaced to areas of disaster risk (marginal lands, unplanned urban settlements, riverbanks and flood plains, hillsides, etc.)</td>
<td><strong>Conflict intervention intensifies disaster risk</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Poor access to disaster zones due to the country’s security situation had a negative impact on the speed and effectiveness of the disaster response</td>
<td>• Bougainville’s autonomy arrangements created interim uncertainty over disaster response responsibilities. Tensions over central Government access to the area had a tendency to impede timely assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Sri Lanka

This case study was undertaken in 2007 and primarily examined the links between disaster and conflict in the context of the same 2004 earthquake and tsunami that devastated other countries in the region. The study focused mainly on the post-disaster recovery period.

Disaster context

Sri Lanka faces a number of natural hazards that range from high-impact rapid-onset events such as tsunamis and cyclones, to low- or medium-impact seasonal disasters, including localized drought and flooding. Environmental problems including soil erosion, deforestation, water scarcity, coastal degradation and urban or industrial pollution have all contributed to disaster risk. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami had a major effect on the country; it killed 30,000 people in 13 districts and displaced over 1 million men, women and children. Women were disproportionately affected by the tsunami’s impact. For example, in Ampara district in eastern Sri Lanka, approximately 66% of people killed were women.

Conflict context

At the time of the case study, Sri Lanka was experiencing a 20-year violent intra-state conflict. The conflict had a strong ethnic dimension, but it was mainly rooted in a political and economic power struggle between the secessionist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the national Government, supported by Sinhalese nationalists – the country’s largest ethnic group. The conflict had a huge impact on the population; over 60,000 people died and more than 300,000 were displaced, livelihoods were destroyed and the fighting restricted freedom of movement and access to basic services including food. In pre-tsunami years, a 2002 ceasefire between the Government and the LTTE brought hopeful signs of progress in building peace. However, the process encountered major problems and the two sides failed to negotiate an ‘Interim Self-Governing Authority’ for the northeast part of the country. By the time the 2004 tsunami struck, several rounds of peace talks had failed and the LTTE had pulled out of negotiations.

Sri Lanka’s women were particularly and seriously affected by conflict-caused destruction, deterioration in infrastructure facilities, basic services, livelihoods and population displacement. Many impoverished women who remained in conflict-affected areas were killed. Other women were traumatized, community networks broke down, and ethnic relations were polarized.

The interface between disaster and conflict

In the context of the tsunami, the interface was characterized by a geographic overlap of disaster risk, disaster events and conflict, particularly in the coastal land belt. Displacement meant there was also a significant overlap of people affected by both the tsunami and the conflict, even outside the coastal provinces that the tsunami directly affected.

In any case, the tsunami provided a significant opportunity for peace. The scale of the event and its related death toll generated major national solidarity. For example, factories in the country’s capital city, Colombo, closed so their employees could participate in the relief effort. However, these initial signs of peace did not offset the existing political and security factors that contribute to continued conflict in Sri Lanka. This was partly attributed to a failure of national stakeholders (the Government and the LTTE) to reinforce local solidarity activities. For instance, long-standing political tensions over LTTE aspirations for independence affected efforts to efficiently deliver tsunami relief and related opportunities for peacebuilding.

The failure of the Post-Tsunami Operational Management System (P-TOMs) illustrated this point. The System was an aid sharing agreement negotiated between the LTTE and the Government to facilitate fair distribution of aid assistance. Observers felt the agreement was an important opportunity to achieve national unity, and international donors hoped it would provide a way to kick-start the stalled peace process. However, the System did not serve peacebuilding at all; instead it was highly controversial. It was denounced by the Sinhalese nationalists as a means of legitimizing LTTE separatist ambitions. Ultimately, P-TOMs collapsed and the country continued to be mired in a legacy of civil war that not even the impact of a tsunami could override.

The international community’s and the Government’s scale, approach and positioning of the tsunami response had a defining impact on the interface. The event produced both helpful and adverse local impacts. However, most people felt it had a mainly harmful effect on local conflict dynamics in terms of disaster response and recovery interventions. This was partly due to the response’s lack of transparency and its perceived and real lack of fairness. This perception was caused by political patronage systems on both sides of the political divide. In areas the LTTE controlled, its leaders forced aid...
to be disbursed through its own aid body. This move apparently distributed the aid efficiently, but in a way that was non-transparent and that undermined government structures\(^6\). Meanwhile, there were reports the Government directed aid away from Tamil communities. The overall result was that access to tsunami reconstruction assistance reinforced the country’s divisions and ultimately contributed to renewed hostilities.

Violent conflict and insecurity had a substantial impact on the vulnerability, coping capacity and livelihoods of all Sri Lankan people affected by the tsunami disaster. These issues affected the immediate response to the disaster and the longer term recovery. By 2007, insecurity in northern Sri Lanka had effectively ended disaster recovery programmes. Other escalating violence put pressure on housing reconstruction on the north and east coasts. This meant that by December 2006 only 15% of housing in the north, and 25% in the east, had been rebuilt, compared with 51% in the rest of the country\(^7\). At the time of the case study, activities were beginning to restart in the east as a Government-led military offensive regained control of the area. However, even then, food, material and fuel transport remained disrupted in various northeastern districts, and there were petrol shortages in some areas. This disrupted national and international recovery programming of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the United Nations\(^8\), and also restricted people’s livelihood options, thereby reducing their recovery capacity.

Response to the overlapping IDP caseloads created by the tsunami and the conflict demonstrated the potential of both Government and/or international community disaster responses to increase risk levels, including for conflict. Tsunami responses that included installing a buffer zone along the coast and resettling people took away their livelihoods and thereby increased their vulnerability. Furthermore, in some cases, resettlement moved some ethnic groups inland among other community/ethnic groups; this changed power dynamics and raised the potential for conflict.

On top of war, the tsunami’s impact led to a rise in the number of female-headed households, and increased women’s poverty and the incidence of abuse and GBV in IDP camps. Women were up to three times more likely to have died in the tsunami than men\(^9\). This was so dramatic that the UK-based global aid charity, Oxfam International, called it a ‘gender breakdown’. The intersection of conflict with the devastation of the tsunami created intense insecurity for unmarried women. Many were forced to marry very young as a way of ensuring they had a male protector. The phenomenon was so widespread it was called “tsunami marriages”\(^10\).

**Programming in response to the Interface**

At the time of the study, the international response focused on helping the conflict-affected population, as most tsunami-related programming was still being finalized. However, in some places, caseloads were difficult to separate. Intervention strategies differed according to the agency involved, its geographic area of operation and the type of interface dynamic that existed. Most agencies noted the complexity of working in the Sri Lankan context, particularly given tsunami and conflict overlap, and only a few agencies explicitly addressed the interactions between disasters and conflict.

Following the tsunami, most stakeholders became increasingly aware of the need to include basic ‘do no harm’ approaches in disaster response and recovery programmes; however, only a few practical examples could be identified. These included Sri Lankan Red Cross activities to build a ‘culture of preparedness’ that focused on both disaster and conflict; and CARE’s activities to integrate conflict preparedness and contingency planning into its community-based disaster preparedness programme. These small stand-alone programmes illustrated the potential for further community-level integration.

However, there has been a more proactive effort to integrate gender issues into conflict and disaster crisis responses. In the aftermath of conflict and the tsunami, UNFPA, UNIFEM and UNICEF made it a priority to reduce gender-based violence and to protect women and girls. Programming efforts bolstered the capacity of relevant stakeholders, especially communities, to prevent and respond to GBV\(^11\); establish related women’s and children’s committees in IDP camps, and support existing women’s and children’s desks in police stations. The agencies considered it vital to strengthen women’s leadership capacities\(^12\) and to mobilize their networks in order to give them a voice in relief, recovery and reconstruction efforts\(^13\).

For instance, the World Bank made efforts to give preference to female-headed households when rebuilding houses and regularizing land titles for war-displaced people. The World Food Programme’s food-for-work project had men and women work together on rehabilitating tanks which provided them with a successful experience in combining their skills and efforts\(^14\). UNIFEM’s programme on livelihoods provided funding to women’s organizations that helped them to quickly respond to women’s needs, and also provided grants to restore their productive assets. However, there was no evidence that any of these projects attempted to address disaster and conflict response/risk in an integrated manner.
At the time, some Sri Lankan women’s organizations criticized the international effort on livelihood responses to the tsunami, and to a lesser extent, the conflict, as being too focused on female-headed households as the targeted beneficiaries. They said that this approach resulted in excluding other women who contributed to their household’s economy while still carrying out their domestic chores. Concerns were also raised about skills training offered to women so they could generate an income for their families. Critics charged that the training reinforced traditional gender roles and resulted in women earning lower incomes than men.

At the time of the case study, UNDP activities in Sri Lanka mainly focused on conflict recovery and disaster-risk reduction (with a few residual tsunami recovery interventions). This work was rooted in UNDP’s overall focus on helping to achieve the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, and to reduce poverty and promote good governance. Its Sri Lanka Country Office faced many internal challenges that hampered developing integrated programming to deal explicitly with disaster and conflict risk. In 2007, its different teams, particularly those that worked in governance and disaster and conflict, were only in initial stages of development, but appeared to be gathering some momentum.

**UNDP’s Sri Lanka Transition Programme**

The UNDP’s Sri Lanka Transition Programme was a positive example of one that merged recovery with social rehabilitation/peacebuilding targets in eight Districts. It highlighted the linkages between disaster recovery and conflict-related activities and the benefits of complementary approaches. Initial examples of cooperation between transition and disaster management units in the city of Trincomalee in Eastern Province had had significant DRR impacts through its small grant activities.

Its successful programme approach mixed concrete project implementation (e.g. housing, infrastructure and employment generation) with technical advice and training of beneficiaries. The Programme also mixed direct execution (DEX) methods with close liaison with donors which generated flexibility in a highly productive programming approach. This facilitated operations, particularly in LTTE-managed areas. The Transition team considered this flexibility was essential to adjust its targets in response to the evolving conflict situation.

The Programme attempted to work with all sides of the conflict (including IDPs and host communities). It also provided balanced support to both tsunami and conflict-affected populations (sometimes within a single project). This approach reportedly reduced tensions between communities. The Programme also promoted impartial assistance through targeted efforts to communicate its criteria and activities to groups that would benefit. It also established district project review boards that reportedly encouraged community cohesion and strengthened accountability links with Government structures.

As part of medium-term recovery interventions to address impacts of war and the 2004 tsunami, the Programme has been strengthened to comprehensively and systematically address gender and social cohesion considerations. Furthermore, an extensive Transition Programme Manual has provided helpful guidance on the importance of cross-cutting issues such as gender and conflict sensitivity. As a part of its project activities, the Programme identified gender focal points to integrate relevant training of target groups.

**Conclusions and implications**

The case of Sri Lanka demonstrates that large-scale disasters that affect both sides of a political divide do not always provide adequate opportunities to create peace. Ultimately, despite initial positive local signs of opportunities for peace, the tsunami and the disaster relief responses that followed it failed to override national level political and security factors. Other critical cross-cutting issues emerged from the Sri Lanka case study.

- **Conflict:** had an overwhelmingly harmful impact on people’s vulnerability and capacity and also on disaster risk. During the tsunami recovery, prevailing insecurity continued to degrade coping capacities and reduced the scope for disaster interventions.

- **Migration:** Both the conflict and the tsunami forced major migration, created overlapping IDP caseloads and generating the potential for increased levels of societal tension when related conflict- and disaster-sensitive programming was not developed.

- **The tsunami response:** The approach of many international tsunami-related interventions often served to aggravate existing tensions between communities, among IDPs and host communities, and between communities and governing structures.
• Gender: The Sri Lanka case study highlighted the particular problem of GBV in interface contexts. It also noted that donor institutions needed to prioritize substantive efforts to transform their own capacities, and to enhance their gender sensitivity and commitment to promoting gender equality as a part of recovery processes. Case study respondents said that, otherwise programme impacts would be limited and uneven, including post-disaster needs assessment and subsequent response and recovery plans.

At the time of the case study, international programming to address the interface was undermined by the Sri Lankan Government’s weak capacity and will, as well as its sensitivity to any overt references to conflict. However, entry points did appear to exist. For example, there were concrete opportunities for disaster risk reduction and recovery activities (that the Government regarded as less contentious) to strengthen community cohesion, reduce people’s overall vulnerability, increase community capacity, as well as to foster linkages between communities and relevant authorities. There was also potential to integrate improved disaster risk reduction approaches into conflict-related interventions.

The case study also showed that integrating participatory and conflict-sensitive approaches into wider programmes, including disaster risk reduction and recovery, could yield major local benefits. In addition, gender can provide an entry point for programming. However, the country’s experience demonstrated that positive impacts were unlikely to extend upwards to the national level of the conflict. Achieving a positive national impact would have required agencies to work concurrently at the national Government level on relevant governance, disaster management and poverty-related issues. Possible ongoing approaches could include a combination of continued advocacy, including conflict and disaster sensitivity in wider programmes, continued focus on community resilience, as well as strengthening the relevant capacities of civil society.

Table 10. Examples of interface interactions in Sri Lanka

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISASTER</th>
<th>POSITIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disaster impact intensifies conflict risk</strong></td>
<td><strong>Disaster intervention reduces conflict risk</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tsunami impacts (e.g. population displacement, destruction of people’s livelihoods) created additional pressure on scarce resources (e.g. land, water, food and fuel), leading to heightened conflict risk</td>
<td>None observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The tsunami destroyed land records, undermined communal land rights (particularly of women), and produced tensions over land ownership registration/allocation in the recovery process</td>
<td><strong>Disaster intervention reduces conflict risk</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disaster intervention intensifies conflict risk</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Real or perceived inequality in finance and content of tsunami-related response and recovery activities created tensions between state-controlled areas and those controlled by non-State armed groups</td>
<td><strong>Disaster intervention reduces conflict risk</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Installation of a tsunami buffer zone and population resettlement resulted in increased social tension because of the impact on livelihoods of resettled populations and, in some cases, inter-ethnic tension between host and IDP populations</td>
<td><strong>Disaster intervention reduces conflict risk</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Failure to implement Government post-tsunami management structures (P-TOMs) provided added legitimacy to LTTE’s recourse to violence</td>
<td><strong>Disaster intervention reduces conflict risk</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tsunami funding allowed both the Government and the LTTE to strengthen their military resources (e.g. rise in the value of Sri Lanka’s rupee, influx of aid-worker ‘tourist’ money)</td>
<td><strong>Disaster intervention reduces conflict risk</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tsunami aid bypassed district and division structures thereby, in the eyes of population, undermining local government including its accountability, legitimacy and institutional capacity</td>
<td><strong>Disaster intervention reduces conflict risk</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disaster impact reduces conflict risk</strong></td>
<td><strong>Disaster intervention reduces conflict risk</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Recovery programmes that included all ethnic groups highlighted community participation and led to enhanced community cohesion and reduced tensions</td>
<td><strong>Disaster intervention reduces conflict risk</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Close attention to consultation and information dissemination reassured beneficiaries that equity and needs-based assistance was being maintained (but there were limited examples of this)</td>
<td><strong>Disaster intervention reduces conflict risk</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The massive aid in support for the victims of the tsunami allowed many agencies to simultaneously cover existing caseloads of conflict affected communities (who had not been directly impacted by the tsunami) under the banner of ‘host communities’. Ongoing post-tsunami recovery funding meant that adequate agency resources and relationships existed to cover renewed conflict when it broke out</td>
<td><strong>Disaster intervention reduces conflict risk</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The result was improved adherence to building codes and standards developed during the tsunami, including in conflict-affected areas This fostered a rule of law/justice culture and capacity and challenged vested interests</td>
<td><strong>Disaster intervention reduces conflict risk</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strengthened community/individual resilience reduced local disaster risk and/or impact of conflicts</td>
<td><strong>Disaster intervention reduces conflict risk</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Disaster-Conflict Interface**

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**Conflict impact intensifies disaster risk**
- **Conflict prevented access** to communities vulnerable to/affected by disasters. Restricted access to deliver construction and aid assistance to the country’s north and some areas in the east impeded recovery programming.

**Conflict intervention intensifies disaster risk**
- **Conflict response was insensitive to natural hazards**. This included building and resettling people in vulnerable locations (e.g., sites on flood plains), as well as deliberate degradation of the environment (e.g., clearance of jungle alongside roads), thereby increasing the risk of disaster (e.g., drought).

**Conflict impact reduces disaster risk**
- None observed.

**Conflict intervention reduces disaster risk**
- Pre-tsunami humanitarian conflict responses already in place created international capacity and local knowledge that could be used for the tsunami (and other disaster) responses. However, these benefits were eventually overshadowed by the sheer number of new participants with no prior experience of the context.
- Confidence-building and stabilization plans provided entry points for disaster risk management and strengthening of regional resilience (e.g., economic infrastructure and civil-military relationship building).

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**CONFLICT**

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**8. Sudan**

This case study was carried out in 2007 and focuses primarily on the interface of the North-South conflict that formally concluded with the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). However, the case study also draws on other relevant examples of the interface in other regions of the country at the time of the country visit.

**Disaster context**

Sudan is the largest and one of the most diverse countries in Africa and lies entirely in the Sahel zone of the continent – an area threatened by massive desertification. All of Sudan’s regions experience either slow (drought) and/or rapid onset (e.g., flooding), and large- and small-scale disasters. The creeping encroachment of the Sahara desert into the Sahel zone means that desertification is increasingly affecting Sudan’s pastures and farmland, resulting in drought. Furthermore, intense and frequent flooding has increased in central, northern and eastern parts of the country. Changes in climate are thought to be affecting the incidence of both drought and flooding due to a dramatic increase in the variability of annual rainfall. For example, the frequency of severe Nile flooding dramatically increased in the 20 years preceding the case study. In 2007, severe floods occurred in 16 of 26 states of Sudan and affected approximately 410,000 people.

Pests such as locusts, and outbreaks of epidemic diseases are common and add to levels of vulnerability, particularly in the South. These are intensified by the frequent movement of populations internally and across borders. Expanding oil exploration in various parts of Sudan, particularly in the South, has resulted in rapid poorly planned construction undertaken with minimal consultation with either local governments or communities. In some instances, this has damaged livelihoods, worsened flooding and degraded the environment.

It should be noted that seasonal flooding in particular is not always perceived as a disaster, but rather an essential part of an ecosystem that people rely on for their livelihoods. In addressing these natural hazards, it is important to tone down the negative impacts without undermining the positive benefits.

In Sudan, historical centralization of the state had undermined the development of local systems of disaster management, and political patronage governs people’s or groups’ ability to request assistance from the centre. When colonialization ended, tribal governance structures were dismantled and this weakened local capacity to manage natural resources and natural hazards, including drought and floods.

**Conflict context**

Sudan has been torn by conflicts and civil war for all but 10 years of its post-colonial history. The country was affected for nearly two decades by civil war between the North and South which ended with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 that, among other things, set up three Protocol Areas – Abyei, Blue Nile State and Southern Kordofan State – where it was agreed that resources would be shared in a balance manner. At the time of the case study, most of Sudan was characterized as a post-conflict context. The exception was Darfur where fighting broke out in the western region in early
Across Sudan, localized conflicts based on natural resource issues were frequently manipulated or escalated for national/political purposes. For example, localized resource-based conflicts in the Protocol Areas have been manipulated in order to undermine the CPA's political progress and implementation. Resource-based conflict is widespread and inextricably linked to population growth, governance systems, competition over increasingly scarce natural resources (such as pasture and water), and lack of economic alternatives to pastoralism. Oil and mineral wealth were among other aspects of political and economic marginalization that drove the North-South conflict, and remain highly contentious issues.

Violent conflict in Sudan has clear cross-border dimensions. In Darfur, armed groups move across the borders between Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic, creating instability on either side. In East Sudan, Eritrean involvement in the peace negotiations and agreement with the Eastern Front rebel groups are a reflection of cross border inter-relations. Finally, in the South, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) moves across the border from northern Uganda.

Conflict has profoundly affected gender roles of men, women, elders, youth and children. Productive roles within the household have changed, with women assuming what were once typical men's roles, as well as their own. "Living is expensive; men alone cannot afford managing a family especially with children and dependants. Some men resort to drinking too much beer, leaving the entire responsibility of the family to women. As such, women are doing any work to help them manage the family. Women have been forced to learn a lot about other business." Poverty and the need for protection and security force women and girls into survival strategies that increase their exposure to sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS. This also has long-term social consequences that include the breakdown of families and the spread of diseases.

The interface between disaster and conflict

Sudan clearly demonstrates the stress that environmental pressures including natural hazards can exert on social cohesion in contexts of weak governance. This was clearly highlighted in Darfur where a severe drought in 1984 triggered major migrations and changes to livelihoods. These pressures occurred in a context where there was no tribal governance, and where an increase in the availability of weapons escalated regional ethnic tensions. This contributed to a significant tribal war between the Fur and Arab tribes from 1987 to 1989.

The environment, particularly environmental stress and competition over scarce natural resources, is a key factor that influences both conflict and disaster. For example, according to UNEP, there have been over 27 conflicts in Darfur since 1975 in which the environment and natural hazards have been a component. Conflicts over pasture and water – between pastoralists and settled farmers, among settled farmer groups, and between farmers/pastoralists and government – have been fuelled by expanding modern large-scale agriculture, as well as by drought and the encroachment of the desert on pastureland. With no effective environmental governance, environmental degradation leads to competition over natural resources (including water and land), increasing the potential for local tensions. Desertification has driven tensions, but periodic drought has increased competition between settled cultivators and nomadic pastoralists over productive land, and has triggered conflict in this vulnerable environment. In some cases, settled farmers deliberately set fire to pastureland and destroyed water points to deter pastoralists from coming to graze their livestock near agricultural land.

These sorts of tensions have also placed pressure on gender relations. Men once had access to and controlled land, animals and jobs – the economic resources that formed the source of their position and power. Today, disasters and war means these resources are no longer available, and men are often unable to fulfil their traditional roles. This has contributed to violence as a coping strategy and means of maintaining control and power.

In many instances, natural resource scarcity does not specifically cause conflict. Instead, the cause is governance structures and related management, mismanagement and allocation of those resources. For example, allocation and access to land has long caused tensions between community groups. Government allocations of large land areas to mechanized farming or other enterprises had increased, with little reference to local livelihood systems or customary rights or procedures. The number of livestock routes in Sudan is shrinking, but the smaller number of routes are used by growing numbers of animals. Communities are further burdened by the impact of oil development and its associated oil road infrastructure.

When resources are constrained, for example, by drought people can become violent. Another important factor that drove conflict and disaster risk was the lack of local government capacity in many areas of Sudan. For example, indigenous tribal governance structures have gradually declined and been dismantled, increasing both disaster and conflict risk. These structures previously addressed both community tensions and inter-communal environmental management.
**Disaster-Conflict Interface**

**International community** engagement on these issues has remained inherently politicized, and has restricted the possibility of using disaster management as an entry point to reduce conflict. Furthermore, conflict over natural resources has also had a potentially **supra-national dimension** on top of existing regional dimensions. For example, water resource management schemes in Ethiopia have threatened to increase water scarcity and consequent tensions in parts of neighbouring Sudan.

**Conflict** can in turn **worsen the risk of disaster** and food insecurity. For example, in Kordofan province, some communities destroyed assets such as pastureland and reservoirs to avoid competition with nomadic herders. This action contributed to food insecurity and potential desertification and drought. Conflict has also been observed to affect people’s capacity to cope with disasters. The civil war created pressure when the South blocked dry season migration at a time when people from the Baggara in Bahir el Arab and the Nuba Mountains areas traditionally move to seek better pastures. This forced them to stay longer in areas ill suited to continuous grazing. Conversely, and perhaps surprisingly, conflict **also contributed to a decrease in disaster risk** in the Nuba mountains region of Sudan before the CPA was signed.

During the war, the area’s violence and insecurity had severely limited access to forests which allowed them to regenerate. However, since peace, this has been reversed as migrating herds have returned to the area.

There is a close relationship between **livelihoods, natural hazards/environmental degradation, governance and conflict** in Sudan. About 80% of Sudan’s people depend directly on the natural environment for survival. Livelihoods and traditional systems of environmental management are closely associated with cultural identity and most Sudanese rely on agricultural livelihood options, either as nomadic herders or as settled farmers. In the past, these two groups adopted livelihood strategies and approaches to environmental management that allowed them to coexist within traditional natural resource and land management systems. These systems effectively met the demands of diverse livelihoods groups. However, increasing population density and greater levels of drought and insecurity increased competition between the groups, and sometimes generated conflict.

For example, farming schemes that were not authorized or that had faulty boundaries were particularly blamed for farmers growing too many crops. Other harmful practices including charcoal production that degraded land productivity and increased soil erosion and flood risk. These dynamics were further manipulated by political groups to the point that people’s distress and unsustainable livelihood coping strategies have led to increased political tension and/or additional disaster risk.

Furthermore, **international community** relief efforts have the potential to cause overexploitation of scarce materials. For example in Darfur, the growing number of IDP camps created by international aid agencies after conflicts put pressure on limited resources such as wood and water.

**Private sector** involvement in oil extraction is already contributing to natural hazards, as poorly planned construction intensifies flood risk. It may also worsen future conflicts, as revenues from oil wealth remain a highly contentious issue under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. For example, road infrastructure developed by oil companies in Sudan was linked with increased flooding.

**Programming in response to the interface**

Several NGOs working in Sudan have referred to their conflict-sensitivity tools as being based on the concept of ‘Do No Harm’. However, few organizations explicitly used conflict analysis as a basis for their programmes. However, there were several **interesting analytical processes underway with the potential to have an impact on the disaster-conflict interface**. A group of donors and international agencies including UNDP were proposing to carry out a strategic conflict analysis for the Protocol Areas. This had the potential to lead to increased emphasis on conflict sensitivity in the future. In 2007, the UK-based aid NGO, Tearfund, produced a report on conflict in Darfur called ‘Relief in a Vulnerable Environment’ that appeared to have had a catalytic impact on environmental issue thinking and programming. In addition, the UNEP-led Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment (PCEA) was expected to build on this momentum.

A key factor in Sudan was the weakness of national crisis management capacities, institutions and legal frameworks that blocked effective crisis prevention and recovery. At the same time, the ongoing conflict in Darfur presented an **important challenge to the international community over the inherent politicization of their aid** efforts, including their support for crisis prevention. Several UN agencies and other international organizations were attempting to remedy the problem by supporting efforts to achieve decentralization governance in Sudan and by engaging more deeply at state level instead of only dealing with central authorities.
At the time of the case study in 2007, the UNDP’s **Sudan Bridging Strategy for 2007-2009** provided a framework for working in five identified regions in Sudan (Darfur, North, South, East and the Protocol States). This had the potential to enable better analysis on how crisis-related factors were interrelated within distinct regions, and to address conflict and environmental issues through multisectoral programmes. However, success would depend on greater cross-thematic collaboration within UNDP’s Country Office. Another challenge emerged in 2007; the rules of the Government’s National Execution (NEX) Modality. NEX determines how UNDP operates in Sudan, and its rules have sometimes made it difficult for the agency to achieve support for ongoing disaster-conflict interface-sensitive approaches.

**Conclusions and implications**

In Sudan, there is a very close connection between disaster risk and the creation of conflict due to a situation that combines natural resource-based violence and high politicization and weak governance. Natural-resource scarcity and mismanagement is a direct cause of both disasters and conflict. In turn, disasters such as drought put more pressure on existing resource-based tensions. The destruction of water points and pastureland in the aftermath of conflict can increase vulnerability to drought. Then, weakened government capacity can limit the capacity of the State to manage disaster risk.

There are other critical cross-cutting issues.

- **Livelihoods.** Changes that include desertification and periodic drought have contributed to increased tensions over livelihood options and contribute to inter-communal violence and conflict.

- **Population displacement and movement.** Resource scarcity, desertification and drought, have meant that Sudan’s pastoralists and herders were increasingly coming into conflict. In addition, groups forcibly displaced by conflict can have a harmful impact on scarce natural resources, either directly or as a result of the aid efforts set up to help them, thereby creating undue pressure on the environment.

- **A widespread culture of violence** that condones GBV encourages the violent behaviour of men and boys from early ages, socializes women into accepting violence against them, and has profound consequences on social cohesion and survival strategies; all of which are significantly worsened by conflict and disaster impacts.
### Table 11. Examples of interface interactions in Sudan

**DISASTER**

**Disaster impact intensifies conflict risk**
- Water scarcity causes conflict between settled farmers and nomadic herders over access to land and water resources.
- Population movement in response to climate change and desertification potentially creates conflict, as communities have to share resources and adjust livelihood strategies. This increases risks of violence against women and girls.

**Disaster intervention intensifies conflict risk**
None observed.

**Disaster impact reduces conflict risk**
- In Abeyi region, natural-resource scarcity created a need for cooperation over grazing routes and access to water.
- Large-scale flooding in Kassala Province prompted the Government to allow NGOs and other participants greater access to the tense area, and this may provide potential opportunities for peacebuilding.

**CONFLICT**

**Conflict impact intensifies disaster risk**
- Insecurity in Darfur led people to abandon cultivation and create urban slums and IDP camps which put pressure on scarce resources such as wood and water.
- International participants were unwilling to engage with the Government due to the ongoing conflict in Darfur. This resulted in undermined capacity development to manage crisis.
- Displacement of communities by the presence of militias in flood-prone areas increased the number of vulnerable people affected.

**Conflict intervention intensifies disaster risk**
- The fact that the Nuba Mountains region is very inaccessible was an advantage during the conflict since this enabled regeneration of the environment, and preservation of resources such as forests and water supplies. However, when security improved, these resources then attracted new groups, creating the potential for renewed conflict.

**Conflict impact reduces disaster risk**
- The presence of humanitarian participants and infrastructure such as the ability to call in UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) helicopters, facilitated a rapid and comprehensive response to disaster. The 2007 OCHA Flood Flash Appeal for global humanitarian aid funding helped Sudanese people displaced and harmed by floodwaters.

**Conflict intervention enhances disaster response**
- The presence of humanitarian participants and infrastructure such as the ability to call in UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) helicopters, facilitated a rapid and comprehensive response to disaster. The 2007 OCHA Flood Flash Appeal for global humanitarian aid funding helped Sudanese people displaced and harmed by floodwaters.

At the time of the case study, there was important potential for programming approaches to address the interface, and for Sudan to gain support through several strategic research undertakings. For example, UNDP’s proposed conflict analysis in the Three Protocol Areas could serve to more systematically consider the inter-linkages between conflict and disaster in Sudan. In addition, projects such as the Security Threat and Socio-Economic Risk Mapping demonstrate that localized approaches and community participation can help identify the complex inter-linkages between disaster and conflict.

Finally, the activities of Sudan’s oil and construction sectors have had a major harmful influence on the disaster-conflict interface. This suggests that UN and NGO aid and development participants can possibly help to resolve problems by strategically engaging with foreign private-sector oil companies that operate there, particularly China’s National Petroleum Corporation whose activities in Sudan have been criticized.
9. Zimbabwe

This case study was undertaken in 2007 and reflects a ‘snapshot’ of conflict-disaster interface dynamics in the country at that time.

Disaster context

Zimbabwe is vulnerable to a range of natural hazards including drought, flooding, cyclones and earthquakes. The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) reports that between 1997 and 2007, almost nine million men, women and children were affected by disasters. The 2001 drought was the single biggest disaster and affected some six million people. Furthermore, the HIV/AIDS pandemic was declared a national disaster in Zimbabwe since it had a major impact on the entire population’s capacity and vulnerability. UNAIDS estimates that in 2006 between 1.6 million and 1.8 million Zimbabweans were affected by HIV/AIDS; it also noted that prevalence rates declined from a high of 24.6% in 2003 to 18% in 2006.

Conflict context

At the time of the case study, Zimbabwe was in a situation of political crisis that bore many of the hallmarks of latent structural conflict. The crisis was caused by militarization of State institutions; use of the military to implement State policy in the civil sector; election rigging; a large and unreformed security sector; State-perpetrated human rights abuses, and significant unmet humanitarian needs coupled with restricted humanitarian opportunities.

The roots of the political crisis can partly be traced to the country’s colonial history, the war for independence, and the 1987 unification of the two liberation movements, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). This unification followed five years of violence that targeted ZAPU supporters in Matabeleland and Midlands. At the time of the case study, power had become increasingly personalized. Politically motivated and State-sanctioned violence had also increased since 2000 as the ruling party sought to exclude opposition.

The political crisis ended up reversing the development gains achieved in the country’s early post-colonial period. By 2007, Zimbabweans faced chronic and increasing poverty, high unemployment, hyperinflation, food insecurity and forced displacement. One result was that domestic violence appears to have increased in response to growing pressures on household coping mechanisms.

The interface between disaster and conflict

The overall finding of the case study research was that there was limited interface between structural conflict and disaster. The study found no examples of natural hazards that increased levels of insecurity. For example, despite high levels of instability in Zimbabwe, potential disaster flash points such as the 2002-2003 drought did not trigger violent conflict.

However, the emerging political crisis had an overwhelmingly harmful impact on Zimbabwe’s poverty levels and on the capacity of the country and its people. These factors combined to increase vulnerability to all risks, particularly disaster risk. Land reform activities and mismanagement of macroeconomics further diminished the already declining capacity of the State to prevent, mitigate and respond to disasters. Furthermore, a drop in domestic grain production and other key exports resulted from the conflict dynamics. The drop in domestic grain production had a direct impact on the food security of poor Zimbabweans. It also left the Government unable to import grain – historically a key intervention in mitigating the impacts of drought. In fact, Zimbabwe’s economic collapse came about because the Government could not maintain infrastructure and basic services. This is a key point: the absence of services reduced the availability of clean drinking water and access to healthcare, further diminishing the State’s capacity to mitigate the impacts of disasters.

By 2003, more than half of Zimbabwe’s people were in dire straits. The proportion of people living below the food poverty line increased from 29% in 1995 to 58% in 2003, and the proportion of people below the total consumption poverty line increased from 55% to 72% in the same period. At the peak of the hunger season in the 2007-2008 agriculture marketing year, it was estimated that over four million people needed food aid. These factors combined to weaken social cohesion and increase vulnerability to natural hazards.

Governance is the most important cause of the country’s vulnerability, political insecurity and disaster risk. Mismanagement of State resources has allowed Zimbabwe’s patronage networks to flourish, ensuring loyalty to the ruling party. The Government had been accused of manipulating food aid to reward party loyalists. This strategy was designed
Disaster-Conﬂict Interface

to weaken political opposition, but has had serious impacts on the country's vulnerability, especially its ability to deal with ongoing disasters such as drought, and has also increased people's vulnerability (for example, to HIV/AIDS). Equally, the national policy of land redistribution led to a substantial decline in agricultural production that meant Zimbabwe could not feed its population in 'normal' years, let alone in years with decreased rainfall or drought.

Conflict and recurrent disasters also cause people to migrate to other countries. In 2007, it was estimated that 3000 people a month were migrating to neighbouring countries such as South Africa and Botswana, and between three to five million Zimbabweans were living abroad. This severely depleted the capacity of the State to cope with or recover from the effects of crisis. For example, in the health sector, between 1999 and 2007, over 60% of registered nurses and 50% of registered doctors left the country. This said, the money that people send home to their families after migrating elsewhere provides an important coping strategy to deal with the many challenges that Zimbabweans face, including disasters such as drought and food insecurity. Meanwhile, pressures on the environment including degradation of key arable land resulted from Government-forced internal displacement. Farm workers had to resettle as part of the Government's fast-tracked land reform process, as did many poor people who lived in urban areas, such as those affected by Operation Murambatsvina which forced more than 700,000 people out of slums. In turn, this displacement made the country more vulnerable to natural hazards including drought.

In responding to crisis, the international community faced a dilemma in addressing the underlying structural causes of both disasters and conflict. Aid agencies often focused their activities on dealing with natural hazards such as drought since the Government of Zimbabwe felt this type of humanitarian assistance was less contentious. This non-politicized approach enabled the international community to address some of crisis's humanitarian consequences, including food insecurity and displacement. However, this was a challenging approach because Zimbabwe's Government reportedly tended to use the label of 'disaster' even when there were other causes of food shortages. For instance, the Government often presented drought as a cause of food insecurity, when in fact it controlled access to grain during acute food shortages so it could weaken support for the main opposition party in the run-up to elections.

In 2007, the Government reluctantly agreed to accept international humanitarian assistance to respond to food shortages, but only if it was provided under the umbrella of ‘drought’ assistance. Tensions over international responses to disasters were further challenged by Government allegations of international involvement in creating disasters. At its most extreme, a pro-Government newspaper accused the UK and US of creating Zimbabwe's drought.

Politicization of humanitarian assistance since 2000 also frequently resulted in the Government refusing to accept international aid. In 2002 and 2004, the Government stated there was no food crisis in Zimbabwe and rejected related support. Moreover, there was widespread concern that international humanitarian assistance effectively substituted humanitarian ‘band-aids’ instead of addressing underlying structural causes of problems. During this period, many donors decided to stop their development assistance to Zimbabwe because they could not accept Government atrocities. Their action contributed to reversing development gains and eroding coping capacities.

Programming in response to the interface

Zimbabwe's political context meant there was only limited programming to directly address the interface. However, in contrast to bilateral donors, UNDP has remained constructively engaged with the Government in order to position it to lead recovery efforts. The strategy relies on using leverage with senior Government officials to challenge them in matters

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**Box 10 EMERGING GOOD PRACTICE**

**Linking UNDP projects on environmental management to conﬂict mediation**

When UNDP implemented various small grants projects on climate change, biodiversity and community rehabilitation, it noted a consistent phenomenon. In the areas it worked there were many low-level conflicts over access to land and other resources, or between competing livestock farmers and cultivators. Several of these conflicts were developed into case studies and shared with another UNDP project on capacity building in conflict mediation and negotiation skills that aimed to provide trainees with real-life examples.

Out of that experience came a suggestion that some graduates of the conflict mediation training project could act as mediators in environment projects. In 2007, it was unclear whether this idea would be pursued. However, linking these projects could effectively demonstrate the impact of the conflict mediation programme, as well as address some of the risks in the environment management programme.
in which constructive debate has essentially ceased. This is a high-risk and relatively low-visibility approach, and few other UN partners or wider international community participants are prepared to do the same. In the final analysis, there are few examples of programming with a positive impact on the disaster-conflict interface.

Conclusions and implications

The most important dimension of Zimbabwe’s disaster-conflict interface was the impact of emerging conflict on the country’s and the people’s vulnerability and capacity – including their ability to cope with the risk of disasters.

In Zimbabwe, governance failures were the key contributing force in the relationship between disasters and conflict. The case study did not demonstrate any examples of disasters intensifying the risk of conflict, but it did demonstrate that Zimbabwe’s political crisis had a substantial impact on vulnerability to disaster risk. In short, its structural conflict reduced the capacity of the State in all matters, including disaster risk reduction.

Politization of the disaster response and humanitarian assistance also played a major role in deepening a disaster such as drought when it occurred.

At the time of the study, Zimbabwe was undoubtedly one of the most challenging contexts for UNDP engagement. Bilateral donors have simply not been willing to support developing and testing creative or innovative approaches. Entry points were limited, national Government capacity and willingness was minimal, and sensitivity to any overt conflict references constrained many interface-related approaches.

Until diplomatic efforts succeed, the only feasible option for international organizations may be to participate only in activities that reduce community-level impacts of disaster and conflict dynamics. This may include a combination of advocacy; including conflict and disaster sensitivity within wider programmes; continued focus on community resilience; and working through non-State partners. However, this approach does not address the underlying structural causes of Zimbabwe’s crisis and, by its nature, is very limited in scope.

Table 12. Examples of interface interactions in Zimbabwe

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<td>Disaster impact intensifies conflict risk</td>
<td>None observed</td>
<td>Disaster impact reduces conflict risk</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disaster intervention intensifies conflict risk</td>
<td>None observed</td>
<td>Disaster intervention reduces conflict risk</td>
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<th>NEGATIVE</th>
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| **Conflict impact intensifies disaster risk**
- The politics of patronage and cronyism undermine the State’s ability to prevent, prepare for and respond to disasters. The country’s strategic grain reserve, water infrastructure and basic health services cannot be maintained
- **Use of food aid to influence elections** increases the risk of food insecurity
- **Forcible relocation of communities** led to settlements in nature reserves and national parks
- **Redistribution of commercial farmland led to deforestation** as a means of immediate income generation, increasing flood risk
- Land reform resulted in a 70% decline in tobacco and related agribusiness that were major income earners. This diminished capacity to import grain during times of scarcity | **Conflict impact reduces disaster risk**
None observed | **Conflict intervention reduces disaster risk**
None observed |

<p>| | |</p>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict intervention intensifies disaster risk</strong></td>
<td>None observed</td>
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</table>

Remittance flows from neighbouring countries and the from Zimbabweans who had emigrated to high-income countries were used to increase access to food and other basic goods. This enhanced capacity to cope with the impacts of drought.
The lack of shared understanding of certain concepts mentioned in this study, and variations in terminology use are issues both within the disaster and conflict-communities, as well as between them. The Glossary below provides a fundamental basis for promoting more effective work at the interface of these issues. The clarification of terminology within individual UNDP COs can also be a useful starting point for initiating discussions on opportunities and challenges to achieve more integrated approaches.

In cases in which there appears to be less global consensus on specific terminology, the definitions given below will be used throughout this document.

** Armed violence** – means the use of armed force, usually with weapons, to achieve specific political, social and economic goals (http://www.undp.org/cpr/we_do/armed_violence.shtml). This can cover the full spectrum of physical violence from inter-state war to organized criminal and domestic violence. Outside of the context of the domestic environment and criminality, inter-group violence involving weapons is also commonly called ‘armed conflict’.

** Capacity** – “A combination of all the strengths and resources available within a community, society or organization that can reduce the level of risk, or the effects of a disaster or conflict. Capacity may include physical, institutional, social or economic means, as well as skilled personal or collective attributes such as leadership and management. Capacity may also be described as capability.” – International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR).

** Climate change and climatic variation** – when relevant, the study has sought to differentiate between climate change in relation to macro-level long-term changes in climate that are influenced by human activity, and shorter term climate variation such as the El Niño/La Niña-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) that occurs across the tropical Pacific Ocean about every five years. The Oscillation warms or cools the temperature of the surface of the tropical eastern Pacific Ocean.

** Conflict** – the result of parties disagreeing over the distribution of material or symbolic resources, and acting on the basis of these perceived incompatibilities (International Alert et al. Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance, and Peacebuilding: A Resource Pack. London: Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER), International Alert and Saferworld, 2003, Section 1, p2). This includes:

** Latent conflict** – situations that are tense and may escalate into violence. One form of latent conflict is structural violence, defined by Galtung as situations in which unequal, unjust and unrepresentative structures prevent people from realizing their full potential. This extends the definition of violence beyond direct physical harm to the organization of society (International Alert et al. ob. cit, p.3).

** Violent conflict** – is when one resorts to psychological or physical force to resolve a disagreement. (International Alert et al. ob.cit, p.3).

** Conflict sensitive** – practices and approaches based on understanding the interaction between organization, intervention and context and that seek to limit the potentially harmful impacts of aid on conflict.

** Crisis** – covers a range of situations that have reached a critical phase. This includes disasters, conflict or both.
Disaster – “A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources.” – International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. ISDR’s guidance on this definition focuses on disasters, including those generated by natural hazards (geological, hydro-meteorological, biological) and covers technological or nuclear hazards, as well as climate-related hazards such as sea level rise, and glacial lake outburst flooding in relevant cases.

Disaster-conflict interface – this is when disaster risk, events and recovery factors have some relationship to conflict risk, events and recovery factors, or vice versa. This may be in the form of overlaps or connections in geographical, demographic and temporal terms and relates to common underlying contextual factors, vulnerabilities and coping/management mechanisms that can be linked to policy and programming.

Disaster sensitive – this involves using approaches that do not increase disaster risk within a given context. Disaster sensitivity may also entail identifying opportunities to proactively reduce disaster risk by targeting either the disaster hazard itself or the vulnerability of the target population.

Governance – is the exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It includes the mechanisms, processes, and institutions through which that authority is directed. It also recognizes that governance is exercised by the state, the private sector and civil society.

Intervention – is individual, community, local/international civil society, domestic government and international actions to: i) reduce risk before or after a conflict or disaster; ii) in the event of a disaster or during a conflict; and/or, iii) in relation to post-conflict and post-disaster recovery.

Hazard – is “A potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human activity that may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation. Hazards can include latent conditions that may represent future threats and can have different origins: natural (geological, hydro-meteorological and biological) or induced by human processes (environmental degradation and technological hazards). Hazards can be single, sequential or combined in their origin and effects. Each hazard is characterized by its location, intensity, frequency and probability.” – ISDR

N.B. Hazard is not usually applied to conflict; however, landmines and unexploded military supplies are sometimes referred to as conflict hazards.

Risk – is “the probability of harmful consequences, or expected losses (deaths, injuries, property, livelihoods, economic activity disrupted or environment damaged) resulting from interactions between natural or human-induced hazards and vulnerable conditions. Conventionally, risk is expressed by the notation Risk = Hazards x Vulnerability.”

“Beyond expressing a possibility of physical harm, it is crucial to recognize that risks are inherent and can either exist or be created within social systems. It is important to consider the social contexts in which risks occur and that people therefore do not necessarily share the same perceptions of risk and their underlying causes.” – ISDR

Security – is protection from actual physical violence and the threat of it.

Vulnerability – is the degree to which people are susceptible to the impact of a crisis, including loss, damage, suffering or death. Vulnerability can relate to physical, economic, social, political, legal, technical, ideological, cultural, educational, ecological and institutional conditions.

Compound Vulnerability – is the degree to which people are susceptible to the overlapping impact of crises that result in many reinforcing layers of vulnerability.
**ANNEX 3: BIBLIOGRAPHY**

**Documents**

**Academia/research organizations and popular press**

Disaster-Conflict Interface

- Murthy, RR et al., Gendered Tsunami Relief and Rehabilitation: Issues and Recommendations, Womankind Worldwide, 2005
- Wisner B et al., Climate Change and Human Security, Published in Afes Press, 15 April 2007.

International organizations and Consortia

- International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, World Disasters Report. 2007.
- International Recovery Platform, Post Disaster Damage Data Management Tool.
NGOs

- The International Development Research Centre, Gender and Disaster Sourcebook. www.gdnonline.org/sourcebook.htm
- World Vision Report on LCPs.

Donor Organizations

Disaster–Conflict Interface

- USAID Conducting Conflict Assessment: A framework for strategy and program development, 2005

**UNDP**

- BCPR DR Team 2006–2011 Harmonised Programme Concept.
- BCPR *Gender Approaches in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations*.
  http://www.undp.org/women/docs/gendermanualfinalBCPR.pdf
- Conflict-related Development Analysis and Guidance documents.
- Draft *Guidance on Integrating Violence Reduction into CCA/UNDAF* BCPR intranet.
- EDiscussion: *Crisis in Development: MDGs in Conflict and Disaster Settings*.
- Generic Guidelines for a Strategic Framework Approach for Response to and Recovery From Crisis.
  www.hlcp.unsystemceb.org/reference/02/d/D11_2
- Integrating Disaster Risk Reduction into CCA/UNDAF.
- Practical Applications for Conflict-related Development Analysis.
- *RBM in UNDP Technical Note, Knowing the What and the How*.
Endnotes

1 The types of disasters covered in this publication are disasters generated by natural hazards.


4 Testing the linkage between disaster and conflict statistically, Bhavnani finds that “disasters are important factors in explaining social conflict” since they “create competition for scarce resources, exacerbate inequality with the unequal distribution of aid, change power relationships between individuals, groups, and the organizations that serve them, and can create power vacuums and opportunities for warlords to usurp power.” Renner and Chafe took a specific peacebuilding focus and compared post-disaster developments in Sri Lanka and Aceh, Indonesia and concluded that “disaster often provide unique situations in which political and aid-related decisions can either hasten peacebuilding efforts or deepen existing divides within and between countries.” This supports Anderson’s findings from war-torn societies that international assistance too often reinforces divisions among contentious groups. He calls for assistance programmes to be redesigned so they do not harm while doing their intended good (Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War, Mary B Anderson, 1999). Her ‘Do No Harm’ principle has more recently also been used to refer to situations of disaster when similar concerns have been expressed about not rebuilding or intensifying risk. In addition, in recent years there has been a controversial debate about the correlation between climate change and conflict.

5 The concept of ‘Do No Harm’ was coined by Mary Anderson (Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War, Mary B Anderson, 1999). It refers to the principle of ensuring that international aid (humanitarian and development) stakeholders working in conflict countries do not inadvertently add to political tensions through their work. The term has more recently also been used to refer to situations of disaster when similar concerns have been expressed about not rebuilding or intensifying risk.

6 International Strategy for Disaster Reduction.


8 UNDP defines governance as the exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels, comprising the mechanisms, processes, and institutions through which that authority is directed. It also recognises that governance is exercised by the private sector and civil society, as well as the state (UNDP Governance for Sustainable Human Development, Policy Paper, 1997).

9 Mismanagement of state resources as a means of securing and sustaining political or social loyalties.

10 Bolivia is divided into nine administrative departments: Beni, Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, La Paz, Oruro, Pando, Potosi, Santa Cruz and Tarija.


12 For example, the privatization of water in Cochabamba in 1999 lead to a massive popular uprising that resulted in the Government ultimately reversing the decision. Gender and Water Alliance, Chapter 3.6 Gender and Water Privatization. Retrieved from http://www.genderandwater.org/page/2803


17 Forest coverage is thought to be less than 1% in Haiti. In neighbouring Dominican Republic, it is approximately 28%.

18 For example, 92% of all schools in Haiti are non-State and most do not receive public funds according to the World Bank (2006). The Inter-American Development Bank estimates that only 30% of health facilities are State funded, and reports there are almost no public doctors outside the capital city. (World Bank 2006).


22 Transparency International ranked Haiti 177th out of 179 countries on corruption measures in 2007.


29 Four months before the tsunami, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had been elected on a platform of solving the conflict in Aceh, and secret peace talks had been underway prior to the tsunami.

This included multiple displacements and people also displaced in Nagroo Aceh Darussalam Province, Oxfam GB and UNFPA, December 2005.


At the time of the case study, the MoES estimated there was an average of $35 million per year in direct economic impact.

MoES statistics.


Ibid.


This included multiple displacements and people also displaced by the tsunami, as caseloads were difficult to separate.

Worldwatch.


UNEP, Post Conflict Environmental Assessment.


In 2007, the head of the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office for Africa, Caribean and Pacific argued that the root cause of the food crisis was not the decline in rainfall, but poor governance. He stated that “Zimbabwe has faced droughts before, but was very much capable of dealing with drought thanks to effective governance.” (IRIN, Zimbabwe: Food Aid Welcome, if Crisis Blamed on Drought, 2007. Retrieved from: http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=72488)

Operation Murambatsvina or ‘Take out the Trash’ involved the forcible eviction of approximately 700,000 people from their homes or businesses in high-density areas of major cities across Zimbabwe. It is estimated to have indirectly affected another 2.4 million people.


