From Old Public Administration
to the New Public Service
Implications for Public Sector
Reform in Developing Countries
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1. Introduction
Public administration in the 21st century is undergoing dramatic change, especially in advanced economies, but also in many parts of the developing world. Globalization and the pluralization of service provision are the driving forces behind these changes. Policy problems faced by governments are increasingly complex, wicked and global, rather than simple, linear, and national in focus. And yet the prevailing paradigms through which public sector reform are designed and implemented are relatively static and do not fully encompass the significance or implications of these wider changes. While public sector reforms in the developing world are influenced by policy experiments and organizational practices originating in OECD countries, they tend to operate within the traditional public administration paradigm. Consequently, there is often a discrepancy between the thrust of public sector reform efforts in developing country contexts and wider shifts in the nature of governance and contemporary approaches to public management grounded in OECD experience.

This paper argues that public sector reform efforts in developing countries need to embrace these changes selectively and draw on a range of public management models that are appropriate to different contexts while putting the needs and interests of citizens at the heart of reform efforts consistent with the New Public Service approach. The paper explores the limitations of hierarchy and rigidity associated with the traditional Public Administration approach and the problems of plurality and fragmentation associated with the New Public Management perspective that emerged in the 1980s. The case for a shift in focus reflects changes in the wider global environment, and complex and multi-faceted policy problems which in turn require more coherent responses from governments and greater collaboration across public sector agencies. The emergence of hybrid forms of public management drawing on elements of all three approaches is presented as an inevitable consequence of these changes. Finally, the paper argues for the need to shift from a preoccupation with organizational form and function to place greater emphasis on citizen engagement and the motivations and incentives that drive the public service.

The introductory section examines the major approaches to public administration and how these have shaped the public sector reform agenda in developing countries, highlighting the factors that have impeded the implementation and impact of these reforms. The second section examines the changing nature of public administration, distinguishing between three models of public management and identifying their key attributes and limitations. The following section addresses several shortcomings in existing approaches to public sector reform in the face of new global challenges and growing complexity in public policy, highlighting the need for collaborative approaches and solutions that draw in actors outside government to address wicked problems. The concluding section argues in favour of a heterodox approach to public management reform that acknowledges the importance of context, embraces adaptive responses to complexity, emphasises the significance of motivations and incentives, and privileges the interests and needs of citizens as the primary focus of public service reform, while recognizing the importance of maintaining an efficient and capable core public service.

2. Models of public administration and approaches to public sector reform
There are numerous studies of public administration and public sector reforms in advanced industrialized countries. Models of public administration in developing countries have generally drawn on experience in advanced countries and public sector reforms have often mirrored reform initiatives originating in OECD countries. Several frameworks have been developed to classify and analyse different approaches to public administration and public sector reforms in advanced industrialized countries. Most of these focus on the transition from the Old Public Administration to the New Public Management that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. From 2000 there was a discernible trend towards an emerging model variously termed the “new public service”, the “new public governance” or the “post-New Public Management” (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000; Osborne, 2006).

Each of these approaches to public administration is associated with a distinct philosophy and conceptual framework. The traditional approach to public administration is predicated on a top-down and elitist approach in which public officials are instilled with values of hierarchy, independence, and integrity, and are insulated from politicians and citizens. The focus in
this approach is on structure and organizational efficiency, epitomized by command and control and underpinned by a clear public sector ethos. In contrast, the New Public Management approach is based on public choice theory and the principal-agent approach in which public officials require oversight and supervision to constrain their self-interested behaviour and thereby prevent inefficiency and corruption. The New Public Service perspective, rooted in democratic theory, emphasizes the accountability of officials to citizens, whereby officials serve and respond to citizens rather than steering society. It assumes that public officials will be motivated to serve by virtue of a commitment to the public interest and will respond to citizens’ expectations of a healthy and responsive public service (Osborne, 2006; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2011).

Many developing countries have followed a similar trajectory of approaches and reforms to those in more advanced countries through broader governance agendas supported by aid donors. Other approaches to public sector reform have also featured in these countries, notably decentralization, pay and employment reforms, integrity and anti-corruption reforms and “bottom-up” reforms, designed to improve the development effectiveness of government agencies. These are summarized by McCourt (2013) in Table 1 (above).

In this paper we confine our focus to the broader shift in approach set out by Osborne (2006) who outlines three modes of public administration and management and, by association, their principal characteristics as follows: Public Administration (PA-statist and bureaucratic), New Public Management (NPM-competitive and minimalist) and New Public Governance (NPG-plural and pluralist).  

### Table 1. Public service reform problems and approaches

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Main action period</th>
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<td>1. How can we put government on an orderly efficient footing?</td>
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<td>“Bottom-up” reforms</td>
<td>Late 1990s to present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: McCourt, 2013.

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1 An extensive literature examines these types of reforms in greater depth than is possible here. See, for example, Nunberg and Ellis, 1995; Eaton, Kaiser and Smoke, 2011; and McCourt, 2013.

### 3. The old public administration

Influenced by the ideas of Max Weber, the prevailing approach to public administration for much of the 20th century drew on a model of bureaucracy based on the twin principles of hierarchy and meritocracy. It was initially introduced as part of wide-ranging bureaucratic reforms in the United Kingdom and Prussia in the late 19th century to overcome patrimonial systems of administration where patronage and favouritism dominated government decisions and public appointments. This approach had a number of distinctive features. It relied on centralized control, set rules and guidelines, separated policymaking from implementation, and employed a hierarchical organizational structure (Osborne, 2006). The watchwords were efficiency and effectiveness in the management of budgetary and human resources. Drawing on Minogue (2001), McCourt (2013) sets out the central features of this model:

- A separation between politics and elected politicians on the one hand and administration and appointed administrators on the other;
- Administration is continuous, predictable and rule-governed;
- Administrators are appointed on the basis of qualifications, and are trained professionals;
- There is a functional division of labour, and a hierarchy of tasks and people;
- Resources belong to the organization, not to the individuals who work in it;
- Public servants serve public rather than private interest.

This “command and control” approach to public administration was the reference point for bureaucratic systems introduced around the world under colonial rule and then after
independence in most Commonwealth countries. Other countries introduced variants of this model, primarily drawing on French and Japanese experience, where political factors influence public appointments under a centralized bureaucratic model. This approach worked well in a number of countries, notably in Singapore where the post-independence political leadership built a high quality and efficient civil service along these lines (see Box 1). A similar approach was followed in China in the context of a one-party state. But many post-colonial states experienced a decline in the quality of governance and the effectiveness of public administration in subsequent years as neo-patrimonial pressures asserted themselves and state resources and public appointments were subject to the personal influence of political leaders and their followers (Bayart, 2009; McCourt, 2013).

Box 1. Singapore’s model of public management

The Singapore model of public management is premised on meritocratic principles in recruitment and promotion, a strict bureaucratic hierarchy and administrative impartiality. Success in achieving high scores on international governance indicators and sustained economic growth for almost 50 years largely derives from four policies adopted in the early post-independence period: comprehensive reform of the Singapore Civil Service; strong and enforceable anti-corruption measures; decentralization of the Public Service Commission; and payment of competitive market salaries to attract and retain the best candidates in the public service (Quah, 2013).

While these core features of the public service continue to endure, Singapore’s public administration has evolved over the post-independence period. It selectively introduced New Public Management reforms by adopting market-based principles through privatization and the creation of arm’s-length public corporations, the adoption of new management models and e-government techniques, and the introduction of greater responsiveness in public service delivery (Lee and Haque, 2006; Sarker, 2006). The government established PS21 (Public Service for the 21st Century) as a specialist unit in 1995 to nurture high standards of public service excellence and responsiveness, and to foster an environment of innovation and continuous improvement. The government also proved adept in foresight and long-term contingency planning through the creation of the Centre for Strategic Futures Group in 2009, which seeks to promote whole-of-government thinking on key strategic challenges through engagement across departments and with external stakeholders (Ho, 2012).

Despite evident success in promoting sustained development, the Singapore public management model is not without its challenges: employing, training and retaining public service leaders and officers with the right skills and attitudes (in the face of high levels of turnover and the loss of key staff to the private sector); engaging and catering to the changing needs and rising aspirations of the population; public concerns about meritocracy, accountability and high salary levels in the senior civil service; shortcomings in transparency and responsiveness; and dealing with uncertainty and complexity in cross-cutting policy issues (Saxena, 2011).

Singapore’s success in public management may only have limited potential for replicability: sustained political will on the part of the government, which has remained in power throughout the post-independence period and is wedded to a clear vision of national development in a favourable policy context, represents a continuity rarely found in other developing countries. Singapore is also a small city-state with a population of just over 5 million and has a relatively homogenous Chinese majority population despite the presence of minority ethnic groups and a large number of foreign residents (Quah, 2013).

While recognizing the specific circumstances of Singapore as a wealthy city-state, there are some lessons which may have wider application for developing countries: the importance of integrity and strong anti-corruption measures; meritocracy expressed through selective recruitment of the best talent; results-orientation in which pay and promotion reflect individual performance and contribution to innovation and policy outcomes; and competitive salaries for the public service to mitigate the risk of corruption. There are also more specific institutional reforms that offer additional lessons, including operational autonomy for Boards and public sector corporations while retaining regulatory oversight and policy direction within central agencies; rewarding individual and organizational performance through incentives and recognition; a practice of continuous innovation; and leadership by example (Saxena, 2011).

Governance and public service reform efforts in many developing countries from the 1980s continued to adopt the centralized, bureaucratic model of public administration as the point of departure for effective development. Re-establishing the conditions for a top-down and hierarchical model of development following years of predation and neo-patrimonial rule was the desired goal for many public management reforms (Nunberg, 1992). This was not without justification: the quality of bureaucracy was positively associated with economic growth in the statistical analysis conducted by

Yet the governance approach to public sector reform did not simply set out to re-establish the fundamentals of earlier systems of public administration. Many public bureaucracies were seen as bloated, inefficient and self-serving, shaped fundamentally by underlying political economy factors (Roll, 2014). The fiscal imperatives of structural adjustment programmes meant that the public service was frequently the target of radical reforms aimed at cost containment and efficiency improvements that focused on reducing the size of the civil service, rationalizing the number of departments and agencies, and pushing through pay and employment reforms (Nunberg and Nellis, 1995). These reforms were designed to reduce public spending and to limit the size and scope of government, but they did not depart significantly from the Weberian model of a centralized and hierarchical public service. The goal was a smaller, cheaper and more efficient version of the old public administration, not its wholesale replacement by a new model. This was to change with the advent of the New Public Management (NPM) approach which found increasing support from the 1990s, motivated primarily by the widespread failure of the first wave of public sector reforms in the 1980s (see Box 2) and heavily influenced by the experience of NPM reform in OECD countries (Minogue, Poldiano and Hulme, 1998; McCourt and Minogue, 2001).

Box 2.
Failure and success in civil service reform

There is limited evidence on the implementation of civil service reforms in developing countries. Some of the few available cross-national studies derive from evaluations and assessments conducted by international aid agencies. Ratings by the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG, formerly the Operations Evaluation Department) of civil service reform projects completed between 1987 and 1988 found that 38 per cent of such projects were unsatisfactory, more than the 30 per cent average for the Bank’s overall portfolio (World Bank, 1999). Earlier analysis had found that less than half the Bank’s civil service reform operations in the early 1990s succeeded in reducing wage bills or widening the range of salaries, while reductions in employment were modest and subject to reversals (Nunberg and Nellis, 1995).

A 2008 review of public sector performance by the IEG identified positive results from investments in public financial management and tax reform but not civil service reform, which performed below average (McCourt, 2013). Similarly, a review by the UK Department for International Development of its governance portfolio in the period 2005-09 found that civil service reform projects performed worse than the average score for governance projects as a whole (DFID, 2011).

The literature on civil service reform in developing countries identifies some common challenges (McCourt, 2013; Rao, 2013):

- Insufficient attention to politics and political economy dynamics;
- Attempting to transplant one country’s organizational structures and practices to another without consideration of contextual differences;
- Overemphasising downsizing and cost cutting;
- Failing to integrate reform activities into a wider policy and organizational framework.

Factors explaining successful reforms include (Robinson, 2007, Roll, 2014):

- Sustained support from high-level politicians;
- High level of technical capability and insulation from patronage politics;
- Incremental approaches to reform, building on cumulative success over time;
- Creating pockets of effectiveness in the public sector that can serve as a model for reform.

4. The new public management

The New Public Management (NPM) refers to a series of novel approaches to public administration and management that emerged in a number of OECD countries in the 1980s. The NPM model arose in reaction to the limitations of the old public administration in adjusting to the demands of a competitive market economy. While cost containment was a key driver in the adoption of NPM approaches, injecting principles of competition and private sector management lay at the heart of the NPM approach. The key elements of the NPM can be summarized as follows (Osborne, 2006):

- An attention to lessons from private-sector management;
- The growth both of hands-on “management”, in its own right and not as an offshoot of professionalism, and of “arm’s-length” organizations where policy implementation is organizationally distanced from the policymakers (as opposed to the “inter-personal” distancing of the policy/administration split);
- A focus upon entrepreneurial leadership within public service organizations;
- An emphasis on input and output control and evaluation and on performance management and audit;
The disaggregation of public services to their most basic units and a focus on their cost management; and

The growth of use of markets, competition and contracts for resource allocation and service delivery within public services.

The NPM approach took root in the UK, New Zealand, the USA and Scandinavia from the mid-1980s. Its theoretical foundations lay in public choice and principal-agent theory, which claim that individual self-interest drives bureaucratic behaviour. Competition, delegation, performance and responsiveness offer yardsticks to regulate bureaucratic behaviour and generate improved outcomes (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; McCourt, 2013). NPM resulted in significant changes in the public sector ethos and approach, especially the cultivation of new management practices, marketization and contracting out of core services to private companies and non-profit organizations, and the creation of “arms-length” executive agencies responsible and accountable for implementation. A greater focus on management by results replaced a public sector orientation governed by inputs and outputs, while performance management increasingly pervaded the public sector (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994).

NPM approaches were also adopted by a number of non-OECD countries, often as part of public sector reform programmes supported by international aid agencies, but their influence was uneven (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). Despite claims of universality, few governments in developing countries implemented wholesale NPM reforms, but some experimented with creating executive agencies, citizens’ charters and performance management models (Hood, 1990). Prominent examples include the semi-autonomous tax agencies in Africa and Asia, several of which generated impressive results in terms of revenue targets and reducing corruption (McCourt, 2005). Contracting-out service delivery to private and not-for-profit providers in health, education and water and sanitation became fairly widespread but implementation was patchy and results were mixed because of problems of regulatory capacity, quality and access, leading to a complex and fragmented mosaic of service provision (Batley and McLoughlin, 2009).

In practice NPM reforms in developing countries were adopted very selectively, often alongside organizational structures embodying the old public administration (McCourt and Minogue, 2001; Hope, 2005; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Sarker, 2006; Cheung, 2011). Commentators questioned the appropriateness of NPM reforms in the context of weak capacity and political support, emphasizing the existence of supportive institutional and political conditions as a condition for success, and of building core public sector capacity as the priority for public management reforms (Nunberg, 1992).

McCourt (2013) highlights the use of citizens’ charters in India, introduced in 1997 in the context of an Action Plan for Effective and Responsive Government, as one example of an NPM reform designed to improve government responsiveness. By 2001, 68 citizens’ charters had been formulated by Indian central government agencies and 318 at sub-national level. As reported by McCourt (2013, p.11), “they were posted on government websites and were open to public scrutiny. But the implementation floundered in the face of a series of problems, including the perception that the initiative was seen as coming from the top, with minimal consultation, employees affected received little training or orientation, staff transfers disrupted implementation, the charter concept was not properly understood by clients, and some charter service norms were either too lax or too tight”.

Several concerns bedevilled the Citizen’s Charter movement in the UK, which also ran into criticism on account of perceptions that they were management driven and did not reflect the priorities of citizens.

Tax administration was one area where NPM reforms had a more positive impact in developing country contexts. A number of countries experimented with creation of semi-autonomous tax agencies which were accountable to their respective ministries of finance in return for demonstrable progress against key targets. Not all of these were successful but several agencies made impressive strides in increasing tax yields and improving the efficiency of tax collection. Box 3 summarizes experience from DFID with the creation of revenue authorities in several African countries.

Box 3. Impact of revenue authorities in sub-Saharan Africa

In Uganda the tax/GDP ratio almost doubled from 5.7 per cent to 11 per cent in the first phase of DFID support to the Uganda Revenue Authority. Following stagnation in the late 1990s it rose again from 12.4 per cent in 2004/5 to 13.8 per cent in 2008/9, generating additional revenue of £80 million over the four-year period. This was more than 8 times the total donor expenditure of £9.5 million.

In Tanzania in the period 2000–2006 tax collection performance had stagnated at around 11-12 per cent of GDP. The tax reform programme supported by the UK significantly improved revenue collection, raising the tax/GDP ratio to 14.5 per cent by 2007/08.

In Rwanda revenue collection as a percentage of GDP rose from 12.8 per cent at the end of 2006 to 13.8 per cent at the end of 2008; revenue collections as a percentage of recurrent expenditure moved from 79.7 per cent at the end of 2006 to 90.5 per cent in 2009.

In contrast, country evaluations in 2008 found that less progress was achieved in Zambia and Sierra Leone where revenue authorities did not achieve measurable improvements in tax to GDP ratios because of their inability to overcome policy bottlenecks and capacity constraints.

Source: DFID, 2011.
The consequences of NPM were far-reaching, providing a durable and consistent agenda for reform, but with a mixed record of success and failure (Hood, 2004; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). Key ingredients in successful NPM reforms in OECD countries included consistent political leadership in policy direction and implementation and buy-in from top officials and central departments (Peters and Savoie, 1998). More broadly, NPM reforms were criticized for a singular emphasis on private sector management principles, the weakening of democratic accountability with the creation of executive agencies, and for their failure to foreground the needs of citizens as the primary focus for public sector reform efforts (Minogue, Polidano and Hulme, 1998). There were also concerns that NPM had diminished coherence across government as a result of the fragmentation of policy and delivery across multiple agencies and service providers (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000; Christensen and Laegreid, 2007b). Others contest the claim that NPM was a distinct paradigm and question its conceptual rigour, arguing instead that it consisted of a cluster of different approaches with some shared characteristics (Osborne, 2006). These critiques questioned the efficacy of NPM reforms and fresh approaches began to emerge in the first decade of the new millennium that sought to address problems of coherence and collaboration through “whole-of-government” approaches and that increasingly placed citizens at the centre of reforms rather than privileging the market as the primary driver of reform. This new set of approaches does not simply offer an alternative model of public administration but presents a new and distinctive perspective that emphasizes the role of citizens in policy formulation and the co-production of public services.

5. The new public governance

In the face of the conceptual and practical problems encountered with the old public administration and new public management approaches a number of theorists have developed fresh conceptualizations of public management that depart from earlier schema. These approaches do not yet form a coherent paradigm and they have different frames of reference, but some commonalities can be identified that set them apart from earlier traditions and provide the basis for a coherent alternative.

The New Public Governance (NPG) approach proposed by Osborne (2006, 2010) adopts a very different starting point from the two earlier public management traditions. In contrast with the emphasis on bureaucratic hierarchy and administrative interest as the defining features of the old public administration and the managerial discretion and contractual mechanisms associated with NPM, the NPG approach places citizens rather than government at the centre of its frame of reference. In a similar vein Bourgon (2007) calls for a New Public Administration theory that is grounded in the concepts of citizenship and the public interest, expressed as the shared interests of citizens rather than as the aggregation of individual interests determined by elected officials or market preferences. The centrality of citizens as co-producers of policies and the delivery of services fundamentally distinguishes the New Public Governance approach from both the statist approach associated with the old public administration and market-based NPM approaches, rather than simply proposing a new form of public administration.2

NPG incorporates a number of features of this emerging literature: the state is both plural in that public service delivery is undertaken by multiple inter-dependent actors and pluralist in that multiple processes and inputs shape policy making. In this respect Bourgon (2011) highlights the fragmentation of policy space with the emergence of multiple actors and jurisdictions alongside growing interdependence between actors operating at local, national and global levels. Government is treated as just one actor alongside others engaged in policy deliberation and service delivery and is no longer assumed to be the sole or predominant force shaping public policy and implementation (Weber and Khademian, 2008). According to Denhardt and Denhardt (2000, p.553), “the policies that guide society are the outcome of a complex set of interactions involving multiple groups and multiple interests ultimately combining in fascinating and unpredictable ways”.

The NPG approach emphasizes inter-organizational relationships and the governance of processes, in which trust, relational capital and relational contracts serve as the core governance mechanisms, rather than organizational form and function (Osborne, 2006). In this respect NPG runs counter to conventional approaches to public administration, which tend to emphasise intra-organizational processes within the domain of government as distinct from inter-organizational processes between government and private and non-profit actors (Osborne, Radnor and Nasi, 2013).

In practice there are several distinct strands of thinking that constitute the New Public Governance approach, each differing in the emphasis they give to core governance mechanisms. Until now, the contextual frame of reference for this set of approaches has been the United States of America and a few

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2 I am grateful to a reviewer for emphasizing this point.
OECD countries, but the contention of this paper is that this group of approaches has wider application in providing a stronger foundation and conceptual reference point for public sector reform in developing countries than earlier models.

6. The new public service

The New Public Service (NPS) approach is perhaps the most coherent of these approaches. It starts with the premise that the focus of public management should be citizens, community and civil society. In this conception the primary role of public servants is to help citizens articulate and meet their shared interests rather than to control or steer society (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000). This is in sharp contrast to the philosophical premise of the NPM approach in which transactions between public managers and customers reflect individual self-interest and are framed by market principles. It is also distinct from the old public administration approach where citizens related to the bureaucracy as clients or constituents and were treated as passive recipients of top-down policy making and service delivery mechanisms (Bourgon, 2007). Control and hierarchy rather than plurality and engagement characterized these relationships. These differences in philosophy and approach are set out in Table 2 (below).

The New Public Service model approaches public management from the vantage point of democratic theory, premised on the notion of an active and involved citizenship. Citizens look beyond narrow self-interest to the wider public interest and the role of public officials is to facilitate opportunities for strengthening citizen engagement in finding solutions to societal problems. Public managers need to acquire skills that go beyond capacity for controlling or steering society in pursuit of policy solutions to focus more on brokering, negotiating and resolving complex problems in partnership with citizens. In seeking to address wider societal needs and develop solutions that are consistent with the public interest, governments will need to be open and accessible, accountable and responsive, and operate to serve citizens. Prevailing forms of accountability need to extend beyond the formal accountability of public servants to elected officials in the management and delivery of budgets and programmes to accommodate a wider set of accountability relationships with citizens and communities. Finally, the NPS approach also reasserts the importance of a

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<th>New Public Management</th>
<th>New Public Service</th>
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<td>Political theory, naïve social science</td>
<td>Economic theory, positivist social science</td>
<td>Democratic theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rationality and models of human behaviour</td>
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<td>Strategic rationality, citizen interest</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conception of the public interest</td>
<td>Political, enshrined in law</td>
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<td>Dialogue about shared values</td>
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<tr>
<td>To whom are civil servants responsive?</td>
<td>Clients and constituents</td>
<td>Customers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Role of government</td>
<td>“Rowing”, implementation focused on politically defined objectives</td>
<td>“Steering”, serving as catalyst to unleash market forces</td>
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<td>“Serving”, negotiating and brokering interests among citizens</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mechanisms for achieving policy objectives</td>
<td>Administering programmes through government agencies</td>
<td>Creating mechanisms and incentives through private and non-profit agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Building coalitions of public, non-profit private agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Approach to accountability</td>
<td>Hierarchical - administrators responsible to elected leaders</td>
<td>Market-drive-outcomes result from accumulation of self-interests</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multifaceted-public servants guided by law, values, professional norms and citizen interests</td>
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<td>Administrative discretion</td>
<td>Limited discretion granted to public officials</td>
<td>Wide latitude to meet entrepreneurial goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discretion needed but constrained and account able</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assumed organizational structure</td>
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<td>Decentralized public organisations with primary control within agency</td>
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<td>Collaborative structures with shared leadership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assumed motivational basis of public servants</td>
<td>Pay and benefits, civil-service protections</td>
<td>Entrepreneurial spirit, desire to reduce size and functions of government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public service, desire to contribute to society</td>
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Table 2. Comparing perspectives: Old public administration, New Public Management, and the New Public Service

Source: Adapted from Denhardt and Denhardt (2000, p.554)
public service ethos, emphasizing the values and motivations of public servants dedicated to the wider public good (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000, pp. 556-57).

Similarly, Bourgon (2007) uses the concept of democratic citizenship to open up fresh perspectives, where the role of public administrators is not confined to responding to the demands of users or carrying out orders. Her proposed approach to new public administration contains four elements:

- Building collaborative relationships with citizens and groups of citizens;
- Encouraging shared responsibilities;
- Disseminating information to elevate public discourse and to foster a shared understanding of public issues;
- Seeking opportunities to involve citizens in government activities.

In placing a fresh emphasis on the public interest and citizens as the focus of public service, the New Public Service model provides a useful corrective to prevailing notions of control and steering associated with earlier models of public administration and management. But it is still far from providing an all-encompassing paradigm that offers the comprehensive solutions which public sector reforms grounded in earlier approaches have failed to deliver (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2011; Christensen and Laegreid, 2011). With its emphasis on engaging citizens as the primary focus of public management the NPS framework is highly normative and value-driven. Other scholars also highlight the importance of integrating inter-organizational dimensions of the new public service to capture the significance of the pluralization of service provision (Perry, 2007). Several other strands of the “post-New Public Management” perspective therefore merit attention in the pursuit of a more comprehensive approach. These respectively focus on whole-of-government approaches, digital governance, and motivation to redress the problems of organizational coherence and responsiveness associated with NPM, placing the needs and interests of citizens at the centre of public management endeavour and extolling a public sector ethos.

The whole-of-government approach arose in response to the lack of coherence and the coordination problems associated with NPM. In particular, the transfer of central government responsibilities to specialized single-purpose organizations such as regulatory authorities and service delivery agencies has undermined the coherence of central government authority and weakened its capacity to respond to crises and complex problems. Strengthened central oversight and increased horizontal collaboration implied in the whole-of-government approach is seen as a necessary corrective to the problems of fragmentation generated by NPM, though efforts to coordinate government policymaking and service delivery across organizational boundaries are not a new phenomenon. The “whole-of-government” approach emerged in countries such as Australia, New Zealand and the UK which had progressed furthest with NPM reforms and in which problems of coordination were most evident, though whole-of-government initiatives have tended to complement rather than supplant NPM reforms in their entirety, in effect rebalancing the pure NPM model (Christensen and Laegreid, 2007a, 2007b). In this respect, the creation of the UK Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit under the Labour government in 2001 sought to drive up delivery standards and results in priority policy areas through greater co-ordination, clarity on goals, the formulation of delivery plans, and continuous measurement of performance. The delivery unit approach has since gained traction in various parts of the world as a means of realizing the benefits of a more joined-up approach to policy implementation (Barber, 2008; Ho, 2012).

A second strand of the post-New Public Management literature is rooted in the transformative potential of digital governance. Much of the early literature on digital governance focused on the efficiency gains that could be realized by the use of new technology to improve service delivery, which is consistent both with the old public administration and NPM models of public management (Heeks and Bailur, 2007; Yildiz, 2007). Several analysts have drawn attention to the potential for new digital technologies to change the relationship between government agencies and civil society and to transform the way the government transacts its business (Dunleavy et al, 2006). Others point to the complementarity of digital governance with a revitalized approach to the co-production of public services that recognizes its potential to generate genuine user and citizen engagement in public service delivery (Osborne, Radnor and Nasi, 2013). The potential of new technologies for opening up government information to public access and scrutiny has gained considerable momentum with the advent of the new transparency agenda and the increasing sophistication and prevalence of digital governance. Technological innovations designed to increase transparency and accountability offer the potential to bring citizens closer to the policymaking process through new and improved channels of participation as well as citizen monitoring of government (Avila et al, 2011).
A third strand in the contemporary public management literature focuses on the motivation of public officials, arguing that changes in organizational arrangements need to be complemented by greater attention to the values and incentives that govern behaviour and performance. The question of the motivation of public officials has given rise to a voluminous literature concerned with explaining how rewards and sanctions have a critical bearing on motivation and in turn on organizational performance. One of the early analysts of motivation in public service distinguished between intrinsic motivations associated with a public sector ethos and extrinsic motivations that focus on rewards and incentives (Perry and Wise, 1990). There are also compelling linkages with the emerging agenda that relates democracy to the New Public Service approach (Perry, 2007). The agenda is rich and demands more research, especially in developing countries where there is growing interest in motivation but relatively little empirical work to date (Perry, Hondeghem and Wise, 2010). Tendler’s seminal study of public officials in a state government in Brazil identified four elements in motivation and dedication: a sense of dedication and civic duty that was appreciated by the communities they served; recognition in the form of rewards and public information campaigns; voluntarism exhibited in the willingness of officials to carry out a larger range of tasks; and downward accountability in the form of scrutiny of performance by local communities (Tendler, 1997).

There is growing recognition in the scholarly community that many contemporary public policy problems are complex, relentless (i.e. not amenable to time-bound solutions) and contested (Bourgon, 2011). These are sometimes defined as wicked problems which cannot be addressed through single interventions and technical fixes administered by individual public agencies working alone. By definition wicked problems "cut across hierarchy and authority structures within and between organizations and across policy domains, political and administrative jurisdictions, and political ‘group’ interests (Weber and Khademian, 2008, p.336). Wicked problems cut across policy arenas and political boundaries. Phenomena experienced in one part of the world, whether pertaining to security, climate change or public health, have impacts elsewhere that are often unexpected, hard to predict, and difficult to measure.

Wicked problems require solutions generated by collaboration across organizations and specialisms rather than through technical fixes developed and delivered to public agencies in a linear manner (Ramalingam, 2013). Networks of public, private and non-profit organizations have been identified as critical to the development of government capacity to address complex problems and achieve collective goals (Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004). In this respect Weber and Khademian (2008) emphasize the role of ‘collaborative capacity builders’ who assume a lead role in developing the capacity of such networks to undertake problem-solving exercises by virtue of their legal authority, expertise or reputation as ‘honest brokers’. Such brokers need not be public managers even though they often have the legal authority and resources to serve in this capacity. In order to frame and resolve wicked problems core government responsibilities need to be combined with an obligation to build capacity for addressing, managing, and coping with wicked problems through collaborative means. Box 4 offers an example of such an approach from Malaysia’s PEMANDU agency which is developing highly innovative and collaborative initiatives to tackle deep-seated problems of corruption.
Malaysia faces problems of public sector corruption which are reportedly among the worst in Southeast Asia. These are a major source of public concern and a top political priority for the Government. The Government embarked on a novel approach following setbacks for the ruling coalition in the 2008 general elections. The Performance Management and Delivery Unit (PEMANDU-Malay for “driver” or “guide”) was established in 2009 with a remit to advance the twin goals of economic and government transformation. The Government Transformation Programme is focused on improvements in public services in seven National Key Results Areas (NKRA). Key results areas with numerical targets have been established at the national and ministerial levels under the programme, following a series of extended consultations (also known as “laboratories”) involving public officials and a range of external stakeholders in the private sector and civil society.

The new approach to anti-corruption was initiated following a two-month laboratory which identified a series of collaborative initiatives that went beyond the remit of the existing national Anti-Corruption Agency. A team was brought in from the public and private sectors to be part of the Anti-Corruption NKRA group under the leadership of a former aviation executive. The new anti-corruption effort involves complementary work across government departments combined with sustained efforts to engage civil society, the private sector and the media, with a more active role for the legislature. The Anti-Corruption Agency was relaunched as the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) and given greater powers of investigation and enforcement.

A new online procurement portal provides details of government procurement and the winning bids. Ministers and Secretary-Generals are now held to account for progress in addressing corruption in their respective departments based on the findings of the Auditor-General’s (AG) reports which are placed before parliament three times a year. The AG’s office produces an online dashboard to track progress on reported cases of corruption. In June 2014, Ministries’ Secretary-Generals were subject to public scrutiny on national television over progress in their efforts to respond to the findings of the AG’s report. PEMANDU’s portal offers the opportunity for public feedback on overall progress with the reforms.

PEMANDU’s anti-corruption task force draws on reporting of corruption incidence by Transparency International and the National Integrity Perceptions Index to gauge progress on key results areas. The latest index pointed to a significant improvement in public perceptions in 2012 with 64 per cent of the public reporting confidence in the work of the MACC compared with 42 per cent the previous year.

While progress appears to be impressive, independent verification is hard to obtain at this early stage of the reform. Concerns have been raised about the presentational risks in PEMANDU’s use of performance management techniques (McCourt, 2013). There is healthy legislative scrutiny and public debate about PEMANDU in the parliament, press and social media, centred on salaries paid to top officials and stated claims about its effectiveness. And yet there is continued demand for PEMANDU to offer advice to governments and public agencies outside Malaysia based on its achievements to date.

Sources: Personal interviews; Government of Malaysia, 2014.

Collaborative networks between public managers, citizens and not-for-profit actors become critical vehicles for addressing wicked problems, serving as alternatives to hierarchical and fragmented systems in public policy formulation and delivery (Keast and others, 2004; Bingham, Natabachi and O’Lear, 2005; Weber and Khademian, 2008). According to Weber and Khademian (2008, p.341), no single government agency will have the capacity to define and design solutions to wicked problems and so “the need to share, understand and integrate diverse understandings of the wicked problem is paramount”. This has fundamental implications for the design of public management reforms, shifting attention from a preoccupation with internal processes and local context to global factors and organizational responses.

A number of scholars recognize the limitations of singular approaches to public sector management in the face of growing complexity. According to Goldsmith and Eggers (2004, p.7), “one-size-fits-all solutions have given way to more customized approaches as the complicated problems of diverse and more mobile populations increasingly defy simplistic solutions... Rigid bureaucratic systems that operate with command-and-control procedures, narrow work restrictions and inward-looking cultures and operating models are particularly ill-suited to addressing problems that often transcend organizational boundaries”. Bourgon acknowledges the reality of hybrid approaches in existing public management systems, arguing that in practice many such systems combines elements of different approaches, and calls for a synthetic approach that draws on elements of various public administration traditions (Bourgon, 2011).
8. Implications for public sector reform

This final section considers the implications of these trends in public management and their wider context for the future of public sector reform efforts in developing countries. A record of failure in public sector reform was summarized in the first section, in which excessive ambition, political obstacles, and lack of capacity for implementation were the key explanatory factors. Most approaches to public sector reform have tended to focus on structural and organizational reforms located within the old public administration paradigm with a more effective hierarchical and meritocratic model as the desired outcome. Indeed, there may well be a case for maintaining this focus in view of the organizational challenges of New Public Management approaches which were adopted only very selectively in developing countries, usually in conjunction with conventional public administration models. In this respect Nunberg (1992) argued that developing countries should focus on strengthening centralized civil service management models because decentralized agency systems require technological and human resources beyond their capabilities. Moreover, Nunberg claimed that selective adoption of agency type reforms is only possible in better endowed countries and that public sector reforms should prioritize establishment control and staff recruitment. Problems encountered in the implementation of New Public Management reforms in OECD countries were also experienced by developing countries that experimented with this approach, often resulting in fragmentation and diminished coherence across government agencies.

In practice many developing countries have ended up adopting a hybrid approach that combines elements of different models of public administration in response to shifting international fashions and reforms shaped by aid donors and the selective application of lessons from OECD experience. Organizational hybridity in the public sector has several distinct features, signifying a mix of organizations at the interface of the public and private sector, located in the market or civil society, a mix of market and hierarchy, or a mixture of different organizational forms inside ministries that encompasses specialized agencies, state enterprises and different levels of government (Christensen and Laegreid, 2011). In some African countries this produced what Harrison terms “governance states” in which finance ministries acquired strong internal capacity and adopted NPM-style market reforms, often at the expense of other parts of the government machinery, as a means of driving forward development goals (Harrison, 2004). Elsewhere organizational reforms and efforts to improve pay and conditions through successive civil service reforms did not substantially improve efficiency or reduce corruption, which continues to plague many public administration systems in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (McCourt, 2013).

Critics maintain that this failure to address fundamental structural problems in public bureaucracies reflects the underlying political economy in many countries, where the bureaucracy serves to maintain the power and interests of political elites rather than being oriented towards economic development and societal improvement (Ferguson, 1990; Booth, 2011). According to this perspective, the balance of power and vested interests in many neo-patrimonial regimes run counter to efforts to introduce public management reforms of a statist or market-oriented variety. This experience has informed a “back-to-basics” approach in countries that lack administrative capacity and are marked by political instability. The current emphasis on state-building, focusing on security, taxation and the rule of law, increasingly shapes public sector reform efforts in fragile and post-conflict states to create the institutional framework for basic service delivery to address public expectations and improve state legitimacy (Egnell and Halden, 2013). In contrast, the more successful types of governance reform initiatives in Africa are associated with what some analysts refer to as developmental patrimonialism, going “with the grain” of African institutions and acknowledging local context and institutional imperatives in shaping reform trajectories (Booth, 2011; Kelsall, 2011).

This paper has outlined the opportunities presented by the New Public Governance and New Public Service approaches. While they offer a useful corrective to the problems of earlier models of public management by focusing on inter-organizational relationships and citizen engagement, these approaches are still very new and are largely grounded in OECD and US experience. They do not yet offer a comprehensive approach to problems of public service efficiency and effectiveness in developing countries, and simply substituting these approaches for earlier models of public management runs the risk of replicating approaches that may have limited applicability in developing country contexts (Hood, 1990). In this respect Andrews (2013) cautions against best practice solutions that seek to replicate experience from advanced industrialized countries. Nevertheless, placing citizens at the centre of public sector reform efforts and focusing on the public sector ethos has important implications for the design and sustainability of reforms.
9. Next steps?

Three main conclusions arise for public sector reforms in developing countries in the light of the approaches to public administration and management reviewed in this paper. First, public sector reform efforts should be sensitive to context and draw on various approaches; no single model of public management offers a magic bullet to deep-set problems of public administration. The central challenge in many post-conflict and fragile states entails the gradual rebuilding of the institutional fabric of authoritative and capable public institutions from a very low base, usually along the lines of vertically organised “old” forms of public administration through a state-building lens (UNDP, 2013). In developing countries with bloated and inefficient bureaucracies some measure of downsizing and efficiency reforms will continue to remain a priority to bring spending on public administration within manageable fiscal limits.

Second, only those countries that have established the basic organizational requirement of a functioning public administration will be in a position to experiment with New Public Management reforms to increase internal competition and the accountability of service providers. Some high-performing economies, such as Singapore and Malaysia in East Asia, and Chile and Brazil in Latin America, possess the political direction and administrative capacity to enable them to design and manage complex multi-agency forms of public service delivery. A whole-of-government perspective can mitigate the risks of incoherence and fragmentation associated with the NPM approach and digital governance offers the potential to increase efficiency and transparency simultaneously.

There is a compelling case for drawing on elements of the New Public Service approach to ensure that public sector reforms are grounded in the interests and needs of citizens rather than driven by the technocratic impetus of public officials or the self-interested imperatives of elected politicians. But for such an approach to gain traction in developing countries, especially those characterized by weak governance and patrimonial politics, two sets of conditions would need to prevail. Most public servants in neo-patrimonial regimes are hired on the basis of political loyalty and self-interest rather than impartiality and serving the public interest. Placing citizens at the forefront of public service requires a fundamental change in mindset on the part of public officials, in which reforms are directed to changing values and behaviours as much as enhancing administrative capacity, centred on efforts to deepen motivation and instil a public service ethos. In addition, such efforts would require a very different approach to recruitment and professional development and stand a greater chance of success in political environments that cultivate accountability and transparency and expose public officials to political oversight and responsiveness to citizens.

Third, and by extension, a heterodox approach that draws selectively on a range of public management traditions will be more appropriate for many developing countries than an approach to reform grounded in models that have evolved in the political and economic conditions of advanced industrialized countries. Such an approach would emphasise different elements in a menu of potential options that offer “best fit” rather than “best practice” solutions. This would argue in favour of a hybrid approach to public sector reform that embraces adaptive responses to complexity, emphasizes
the significance of motivations and incentives, and privileges
the interests and needs of citizens as the primary focus of
public service reform, while recognizing the importance of
maintaining an efficient and capable core public service. Such
a model is potentially attractive to reformers in developing
countries, who are seeking to overcome the limitations of
traditional approaches to public sector reform and who would
be wary of market-oriented NPM reforms. Proposing a radically
different approach along these lines would entail a conscious
effort, going against the grain of patrimonial politics, in which
the scope for success would lie with building constituencies of
support among citizens to support reform-minded politicians
committed to a very different vision of the public service.

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Mark Robinson is Global Director for Governance at the World Resources Institute, Washington DC. He has held senior leadership and management positions in think tanks, research organisations and government over a career in international development spanning more than 25 years. Mark is also an Emeritus Fellow of the Global Centre for Public Service Excellence.

The author is grateful to Vijay Liew for assisting with a comprehensive literature summary and to Leah Chan for help with compiling references and accessing materials.