



PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AFRICA: A DEVELOPMENT APPROACH

Photo on the cover: A man prays at dawn where a mausoleum once stood at the Three Saints Cemetery in Timbuktu, Mali. The site was destroyed by violent extremists during their seizure of the North in early 2012, Timbuktu, Mali , UN Photo/Marco Dormino

PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AFRICA:
A DEVELOPMENT APPROACH

United Nations Development Programme
Regional and Multi-Country Project Document

Project Title:

Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa: A Development Approach.

Expected Regional Programme Outcome:

Outcome 3: Countries & regions are able to reduce the likelihood of conflict arising from violent extremism

Expected Output(s):

Output 1 - Rule of law and security: National institutions (including government, police and criminal justice systems) and communities are able to prevent and address violent extremism.

Output 2 - Disengagement and reintegration: Members of extremist groups are disengaged from extremist groups and reintegrated into communities.

Output 3 - Socio-economic factors: ‘At risk’ youths and vulnerable people in hot-spot areas benefit from livelihood initiatives

Output 4 – Media, technology and public awareness: Violent narratives and extremist propaganda are countered

Output 5 - Community resilience in response to violent extremism: Communities and religious institutions are resilient to the effects of violent extremism (capacity to prevent and respond to violent extremism).

Output 6 - Gender-specific engagements: Women are empowered to play a leading role in prevention and response to violent extremism.

Output 7 - Research, policy and advocacy: Regional and national policies and programming are informed by research and analysis on violent extremism

Output 8 - Regional level intervention: Regional and sub-regional entities are coordinated and enabled to prevent and address violent extremism.

Executing Entity:

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Implementing Agencies:

UNDP, African Union Commission, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Governments, Faith Associates, Universities/Research Institutions and Civil Society

Photo on the cover: A man prays at dawn where a mausoleum once stood at the Three Saints Cemetery in Timbuktu, Mali. The site was destroyed by violent extremists during their seizure of the North in early 2012, Timbuktu, Mali , UN Photo/Marco Dormino

This four-year regional development project is designed to strengthen the development responses to mitigate the growth of violent extremism in Africa; this is a long-term process and this project should be seen as the first phase of a long-term engagement. This focus is motivated by the ever-increasing presence of violent extremist groups on African soil causing, in the words of UN Security-General Ban Ki-moon, an “arc of upheaval and distress”. Violent extremism is having a devastating impact on the lives and livelihoods of populations across the continent - particularly the most vulnerable, and including youth, women and children. The project will be implemented at the regional and country level. At the regional level the project will support the capacity of the African Union Commission (AUC) and Regional Economic Communities (IGAD and ECOWAS) to prevent and respond to violent extremism. At the country level the project will be implemented in three categories’ of countries: ‘epicentre countries’ – Mali, Nigeria and Somalia; ‘spill-over countries’- Cameroon, Chad, Kenya, Mauritania and Niger; and, in ‘at-risk’ countries - the Central African Republic, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. The project focuses on interventions in six key areas: socio-economic; rule of law and security; disengagement and reintegration; media and technology; community resilience and gender-specific initiatives. Programming in these areas is supported by two cross-cutting initiatives: research, policy and advocacy; and, capacity-building for regional and sub-regional organizations. It should be noted that the project is designed to focus on the immediate and underlying causes of violent extremism which is aligned to UNDP’s ‘core’ programming, including areas which address weak State capacity, poor service delivery, endemic marginalization and poverty, and the lack of coordination at the national and regional level. This project forms part of Outcome 3 (“Countries are able to reduce the likelihood of conflict”) of the Regional Project Document and is in line with the African Union’s Agenda 2063.

Programme Period:	2016-2019
Key Result Area (Strategic Plan)	_____
Atlas Award ID:	_____
Start date:	January 2016
End Date	December 2019
Management Arrangements	DIM

Total resources required	USD 45.7 M
Total allocated resources:	USD 6 M
• Regular	USD 6 M
• Other:	
• Donor	_____
• Donor	_____
• Donor	_____
• Government	_____
Unfunded budget:	USD 39.7 M

Agreed by (Regional Bodies):

Agreed by (UNDP):

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Situation analysis 1

1.1 Overview

The growth of violent extremism - and the devastating impact of groups espousing violent ideologies – is not only setting in motion a dramatic reversal of development gains already made, but threatening to stunt prospects of development for decades to come. As a result of the activities of Al Shabaab¹ for example, there has been an estimated 25 percent drop in tourism in Kenya², a sector that provides a vital source of jobs and income for the country. Similarly, following the increasing number of attacks by Boko Haram³ foreign direct investment flows into Nigeria have declined by 21 percent between

¹ Al-Sehbab, also known as Haraka Al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin, is an Islamic extremist group operating out of Somalia and Kenya.

² Kenya Tourist Board June 2015, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/africaandindianocean/kenya/11669880/Kenya-visitor-numbers-fall-25-per-cent-as-terrorism-hits-tourism.html>

³ Boko Haram, which calls itself Wilayat Gharb Ifiqiyyah is an Islamic extremist group based in north-eastern Nigeria and is active in Chad, Niger and northern Cameroon.

2011 and 2012⁴, leading to even more worrying levels of unemployment. The impact on the lives and livelihoods of those who have lost family members, friends and colleagues in the multiple tragedies in market places, universities, places of worship and schools is immeasurable. As a result of increasing levels of violence and insecurity, many children and students across the African continent are no longer able to attend school or university, undermining their quality of life both now and in the future. Indeed, the phenomenon is disproportionately impacting the youth. Marginalised from political processes, lacking in viable employment options and suffering from an increasing sense of desperation, the youth are easy targets for radicalised recruiters who lure or coerce boys and girls and young men and women with a diverse mix

⁴ World Investment Report, Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2013.



A view of battle-damaged buildings and businesses along the deserted streets of Bakara Market in central Mogadishu, Somalia, August 2011, UN Photo/Stuart Price

of religious narratives, financial incentives, a glimmer of hope, and often, with violence.

Attacks as a result of religiously-inspired violent extremism have reached unprecedented levels, and the impacts are far reaching (see Figure 1, page 12); from 2011 to 2015, over 21,245 fatalities are estimated to have been caused by religiously inspired extremism in Africa. The presence and operations of Boko Haram, for example, have displaced 1.2 million people internally and forced more than 200,000 Nigerians to flee to Cameroon Chad and Niger.⁵ Internal displacement often feeds into and exacerbates pre-existing conflicts and dynamics of displacement amongst pastoralists – not least since Boko Haram implements a strategy of stealing livestock and burning farmlands in rural communities.⁶ Increasing levels of insecurity forced Cameroon to close its border with Nigeria, hitting hardest those whose livelihoods depend on cross-border informal trade. In Kenya, there have been over 200 attacks/incidents involving explosives or automatic weapons linked to Al Shabaab between 2011 and 2015 alone; the attackers target night-clubs, markets, bus stops and places of worship, killing innocent people and instilling a sense of fear and insecurity, and exacerbating inter-religious tensions. The movement has successfully built a clandestine support network spreading from the northeast of the country to the capital Nairobi and the Indian Ocean coast⁷ - and beyond - enabling them to easily recruit vulnerable populations. In the Sahel, violent extremist groups are becoming increasingly active: in Mali, it is estimated that several hundred children have been radicalised and recruited, and harsh corporal punishments, often against women and children, have reportedly been inflicted for failure to observe strict Islamic family codes.⁸ The dramatic increase in security checks and controls in public places is also transforming day-to-day life, with significant psychological impact on populations across the region. The phenomenon shows every sign of growing, unless steps are taken now to address the drivers and enablers of violent extremism.

1.2 The urgency of preventing and responding to violent extremism

This four-year regional development project will contribute to preventing and responding to the growth of violent extremism across Africa; the struggle against violent extremism will be a long-term endeavour and, as such, this project should be seen as the first phase of a longer-term engagement. This approach is motivated by three key factors. First, the project focuses

⁵ UNDP Sub-regional Strategic Scoping Report, Central Africa, Draft I, August 2015.

⁶ Ibid

⁷ International Crisis Group, 'Kenya Somali Islamist Radicalisation, Policy Briefing, International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing No. 85, Nairobi/Brussels, 25 January 2012, page 1.

⁸ Alao, Abiodun, 'Understanding radicalisation and the challenges posed to development', paper prepared for UNDP, 2015, page 28-29.

on *violent extremism inspired by certain interpretations of Islam*⁹ - manipulated and distorted to serve the ends of the vast majority of violent extremist groups we are witnessing in Africa today¹⁰. Momentarily putting aside the worrying growth of support – both in terms of 'foot soldiers' and financial backing for Boko Haram, Al Shabaab and the various affiliations of Al-Qaeda - which are relatively well known both regionally and globally - the rise of other groups with similar ideological leanings and violent manifestations is alarming.¹¹ To mention a few, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) operates across the Sahelian states; Ansar Dine functions predominantly from Mali and Hizb Islam from Somalia. Diverse in form, funding sources, political leanings, capacity and reach, all these groups are united by radical forms of Islamist ideology,¹² political aspirations that go beyond national borders, and the unrelenting use of violence to achieve their goals.

Second, the project focuses on the *regional dimensions of the crisis* because violent extremism does not respect borders; far from it, it thrives on their porous nature, and on the incapacity of the State to monitor, curb or control the trafficking of people, weapons, drugs and goods – all of which nourish and sustain their very existence. Indeed, the links between violent extremism and organized transnational networks of crime that also benefit from border insecurity are increasingly blurred. In the Sahel for example both entities are adept at forming alliances and have instituted overlapping systems of governance.¹³ Furthermore, with the aim of further undermining the credibility of the State and exacerbating inter-communal tensions and strife, attacks by extremist groups against innocent victims frequently cross state borders and even entire continents. Lastly those fleeing violence and insecurity are forced to cross multiple borders in search of a new life and source of livelihoods. For example, it is projected that between 80,000 and 120,000 refugees will pass through Niger from diverse countries over the course of 2015,¹⁴ many of them escaping the causes and consequences of violent extremism. The trans-national nature of these groups has been underscored by Boko Haram's recent pledge of allegiance to Islamic State of Syria (ISIS), and Al Shabaab's pledge to Al-Qaeda several years ago.¹⁵ Similarly, intelligence

⁹ UNDP, Third Expert Consultation, Addis Ababa, 2015

¹⁰ The particularities of these beliefs will be covered in greater detail in the next section.

¹¹ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 'Radicalization in Africa, Some Initiatives', UNDP Meeting on Radicalization, July 2015, page 4.

¹² UNDP, Third Expert Consultation, Addis Ababa, 2015

¹³ International Crisis Group, 'The Central Sahel: A Perfect Sandstorm', Africa Report N. 227, 25 June 2015, page 15.

¹⁴ Ibid, page ii.

¹⁵ There are internal disagreements reported within Al-Shabaab concerning whether it should maintain its allegiance to Al-Qaeda or follow in the footsteps of Boko Haram and pledge allegiance to ISIS/ISIL. The latter move could prove disastrous for the region as it would likely increase the radical nature of the attacks and the vision of the group.

reports suggest the two groups are also inter-linked¹⁶ and collaborating on operational activities.¹⁷ Too often in the African context addressing a problem within national borders has simply meant displacing it beyond them. An integrated regional response that helps coordinate the efforts of national governments and which supports the engagements led by regional and sub-regional organizations is imperative.

Thirdly the project *articulates a development response to violent extremism* because the security response alone is proving insufficient. The response of governments to date has been a security-dominated and somewhat ‘reactive’ approach to countering violent extremism. In Mali for example Operation Serval and Barkhane have had some success disrupting extremist networks.¹⁸ In addition, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has largely pushed Al Shabaab out of the capital Mogadishu and Operation Usalama Watch in Kenya has resulted in over 4,000 people being arrested and detained on suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities.¹⁹ Military operations alone, however, can only hope to curb some of the outward manifestations of violent extremism but will not be able to address the endemic levels of poverty and marginalisation, lack of governance, corruption and instability driving it, and increasing its appeal. On the contrary military campaigns, when not conducted sensitively, can bolster extremist narratives concerning an international war

16 United Nations Development Program, Sub-Regional Strategic Scoping Report: Central Africa, Draft I, August 2015.
17 Alao (2015), page 26.
18 International Crisis Group, ‘The Central Sahel: A Perfect Sandstorm’, Africa Report N. 227, 25 June 2015, page 22
19 <https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/kenyas-current-probe-on-terror-why-operation-usalama-watch-wont-cut-it>



A Somali boy greets a soldier serving with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in the town of Buur-Hakba. The Somali National Army (SNA), supported by AMISOM forces, has re-captured the town from extremist group Al-Shabaab, February 2013, Buur-Hakba, Somalia, UN Photo/Stuart Price

against Islam by ‘non-believers’²⁰ and the reductionist “*us*” *versus* “*them*” discourse they seek to propagate. In many African countries the security approach has included a combination of increased military operations, extra-judicial killings of “targeted” individuals,²¹ security “crackdowns” and increased “ethnic” profiling.²² To pay for these activities, significant funds are often diverted away from development activities towards security policy, planning and operations. Combined, these elements further perceptions amongst marginalised populations that they are being victimised by the State, thereby increasing rather than decreasing levels of radicalization. Indeed, the security response is short-term, while the development response is long-term.

This four year regional project, therefore, is directly informed by an analysis of the context: on the African continent today. At its core, the growth of violent extremism that we are currently witnessing across the continent is an attack on Islam itself, and on the African continent as a whole; it feeds upon existing ethnic divisions, unequal distribution of resources, and the failure of the State to build an inclusive national identity. Whilst people of all religions have lost their lives and been affected by the rising insecurity and socio-economic impacts of violent extremism, as Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon underscored at the summit on violent extremism in Washington in 2015, “*the vast majority of the victims are Muslims, across a broad arc of upheaval and distress*”.²³

1.3 Project Summary

This four-year regional development response to preventing and addressing violent extremism is underpinned by a theoretical framework which maintains that individuals, ideology and institutions must be consistently engaged for the effective implementation of this programme.²⁴ The project will be implemented simultaneously at the regional and national levels to ensure coherence and maximize results. At the national level the project will be implemented in three categories’ of countries: ‘epicentre countries’ such as Mali, Nigeria and Somalia where extremist groups are already active; ‘spill-over countries’, where the ramification of extremist groups’ operations are being sorely felt on many levels, including in Cameroon, Chad, Kenya, Mauritania and Niger, and in ‘at-risk’ countries which exhibit some of the same underlying and root causes of violent extremism as both epicentre and spill-over countries, including Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. The project,

20 Saltman, Erin Marie and Smith, Melanie, ‘Till martyrdom do us part’, Gender and the ISIS phenomenon, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2015.
21 <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/jihad-comes-kenya?page=show>
22 International Crisis Group, (Africa Briefing No. 85, Nairobi/Brussels, 25 January 2012), page 10.
23 <http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8408>
24 See next section on Project Rationale for more information.

which focuses on both prevention and response activities, targets interventions in six key areas: socio-economic; rule of law and security; disengagement and reintegration; media and technology; community resilience and gender-specific initiatives. Interventions in these key areas are under-pinned and enhanced by two cross-cutting programmes: research, policy and advocacy, and capacity-building for regional and sub-regional organizations. It should be noted that the project is designed to focus on the immediate and underlying causes of violent extremism, in a manner that supports and complements UNDP’s ‘core’ programming, on addressing weak state capacity, poor service delivery and endemic marginalization and poverty, and the lack of coordination at the national and regional level.

Consequently, this project builds upon the work of the UN system as a whole and seeks to complement the work of other actors working in this domain through partnerships, collaboration and coordination.²⁵ In 2014, the UN Security Council passed a resolution²⁶ condemning violent extremism and called upon Member States to support efforts to adopt longer-term solutions to address the underlying causes of radicalization and violent extremism, including by empowering youth. The resolution, which provides a basis for the UN Global Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism that was presented to the UN General Assembly in late 2015 insists that an effective response will require “promoting political and religious tolerance, economic development and social cohesion and inclusiveness, ending and resolving armed conflicts, and facilitating reintegration and rehabilitation”²⁷. This project builds upon the work being done on the Plan of Action and seeks to tailor it to the African context.

Furthermore, UNDP’s Strategic Plan for 2014-2017 calls on the organization to further strengthen its support for inclusive and accountable governance, human rights, rule of law, and to support the development of national and local capacities for conflict prevention, all of which serve to curb violent extremism in Africa. This project is anchored in UNDP’s flagship Regional Programme for Africa, and is therefore fully tailored to respond to the priorities and aspirations of Africa, as articulated by the AU’s Agenda 2063.

25 See section on Partnerships for more information.
26 S/RES/2178/2014
27 <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51084#.VjsbINlrLIU>

2.1 What drives and enables violent extremism in Africa?

The drivers and enablers of violent extremism are multiple, complex, context-specific and have religious, ideological, political, economic and historical dimensions. They defy easy analysis and our understanding of the phenomenon remains incomplete. Recent attacks²⁸ such as the one conducted at Garissa University in Kenya, where 147 people, mostly students, were killed, confront us with the problematic nature of many of our common assumptions: one of the main attackers, a successful lawyer from a wealthy family was not necessarily “marginalised” or “poor”. Furthermore, while we understand that youth grievances, alienation and poor governance play a significant role in violent extremism motivated by religion, we do not know why such youth do not opt for non-violent Tahrir Square-styles of protest²⁹ as opposed to the extreme forms of violence we are witnessing in Mali, Nigeria, Somalia and beyond. Lastly, while we are certain that context matters, we do not know why two children raised in the same family, who experience similar socio-economic foundations and have similar levels of education and communal integration might take such dramatically different paths.

²⁸ See Figure 1 for an overview of the fatalities from terrorist attacks, Africa 2005-2015
²⁹ Abdalla, Amr, 'Africa and the Growth of Violent Radicalization in the Name of Islam: The Need for a Doctrine Revision Approach', Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University, 2015, page 2.



At the individual level, susceptibility to powerful messaging, narratives and imagery via social media networks and person-to-person channels has been highlighted by several researchers as being particularly significant in the context of violent extremism.

Despite these gaps and uncertainties, we can identify common processes, drivers and enablers that operate at individual, group, community, national, regional and global levels. However, ‘when-why-and-how’ these diverse constellations converge to produce violent extremism requires deeper context-specific analysis.³⁰ First, at the **individual level**, susceptibility to powerful messaging, narratives and imagery via social media networks and person-to-person channels has been highlighted by several researchers as being particularly significant in the context of violent extremism.³¹ The predisposition to adopt new or adapted value systems and world views focused on, for example, “**us**” versus “**them**” narratives, the singularity of claims and the desire to restore Islam to an ancient utopia³² is however dependent both on the psychological make-up of the individual in question and the extent to which other factors at the group, community, national and international levels have increased his/her vulnerability to processes associated with violent extremism. At this level, an understanding of radicalization as a **dynamic process**³³ is paramount. However, such processes are non-linear and the “tipping point” at which violence becomes perceived as an acceptable, necessary or even desirable means to express one’s radical viewpoint and achieve one’s goals is not fully understood.

At the **group level**, the family is a fundamental unit for understanding violent extremism, but not the only one. The vulnerability of youth appears to be increasing, in part as a result of weak family cohesion and the absence of critical family support.³⁴ In societies already affected by conflict and fragility, vulnerability may be enhanced as a result of an absent father who may be active in the conflict or seeking employment opportunities abroad. Consequently, both ‘bread-winning’ and child-rearing responsibilities fall solely on the mother. Whilst these traditional gender roles are being increasingly challenged by the rise of violent extremism – with an increasing number of direct or indirectly active female fighters – they remain largely relevant for consideration of the family as a social structure for at-risk youth. Furthermore,

³⁰ See the Problem Tree Analysis in Annex One for more information.

³¹ Saltman and Smith (2015); Alao (2015) and others.

³² Abdalla (2015), page 2.

³³ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, ‘Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: Community-Policing Approach’, OSCE-ODIHR, 2014, page 15.

³⁴ UNDP, Third Expert Consultation, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2015.

as youth increasingly gravitate towards cities in search for jobs, many simply lose touch with both their immediate and extended families, which may otherwise have provided a ‘safety-net’ or source of support. Even in instances where none of these factors may be present, many families are simply unaware or unable to cope with the signs and behaviours associated with radicalization. The family unit aside, peer groups – on and offline – can also play a critical role in preventing or facilitating processes associated with violent extremism. Recruiters, especially, play a key role in seeking out vulnerable youth, and providing them with new identities and/or serving as potential father-figures. Lastly, at the group level, youth often have no access to extra-curricular activities such as sports and other hobbies or access to role models and mentors that can help to enhance social cohesion.

At the **level of the community**, several formal and informal institutions and dynamics play critical roles. First, religious institutions are particularly key. Imams, mosques and madrassas may be insufficiently prepared to play the effective guidance role that may be required of them, especially when internal institutional governance mechanisms are weak or lacking.³⁵ In such instances, religious institutions become easy targets for recruiters, takeover by extremist groups and for the propagation of extremist-related messaging.³⁶ In recent years, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of madrassas (1:7 ratio of mosque to madrassa)³⁷, which, in many communities are the sole providers of education for the youth. However, as there is little quality control over the curriculum, mosques and madrassas have free reign to teach and preach what they choose. As a result, religious institutions become easy targets for the proliferation of extremist ideologies.³⁸ Second, many communities feel excluded from political structures and processes due to the absence of State-society platforms and suffer from low capacity to manage local conflicts peacefully. Lastly, socio-economic exclusion and deprivation is an important driver of radicalization; poverty and under-development create grievances that can be easily exploited by extremist groups.³⁹ In instances where such exclusion at the community level coincides with weak or non-existent governance processes – and/or religious, ethnic or political cleavages – radicalization can flourish.

The manner in which the responsibilities of **the State** are/are not executed, can be a significant driver of violent extremism, especially when combined with several of the other elements already discussed.⁴⁰ The weak capacity of the State,

³⁵ UNDP, Third Expert Consultation, Addis Ababa, 2015

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ <http://www.faithassociates.co.uk/>

³⁸ UNDP, Third Expert Consultation, Addis Ababa, 2015

³⁹ Alao, (2015), page 21.

⁴⁰ UNDP, Third Expert Consultation, Addis Ababa, 2015

combined with high levels of corruption, unaccountable public administration, weak or ineffective judicial systems and security services perceived as serving the political interests of elites rather than protecting the rights of citizens are all actively fuelling the rapid growth of radicalization across the African continent. In some sub-Saharan countries, the inability of the State to provide for basic services and governance mechanisms is creating contested and/or ungoverned spaces. In such instances, religious groups are often stepping in to address the need for services such as healthcare, education and infrastructure.⁴¹ Radicalization that gives rise to violence can appear strongest in those regions where marginalisation is combined with a desire for political autonomy, and often a resurgence of patriotic zeal.⁴² Evidently, instances of State failure or collapse can provide a haven for extremist groups.

Diverse factors conflate at both the **regional and trans-national levels** to foster the conditions that can ignite and sustain the growth of violent extremism in Africa. As already highlighted, at the trans-national and regional level, porous borders facilitate the trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW), people, drugs and goods that are vital for such groups, often blurring the distinction between violent armed groups and trans-national criminal networks. The high levels of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees is further destabilising the continent,⁴³ exacerbating the vulnerability of already marginalised populations, and making refugee camps and on-the-move populations easy targets for radicalised groups.

At the **global level**, many factors can fuel violent extremism and three in particular have been highlighted in the context of UNDP’s consultations. First, the so-called Arab Spring period provided a catalyst for the rapid growth of violent extremism in Africa.⁴⁴ Although the uprising itself evidently did not serve as a catalyst, the response, or lack thereof, of many States across the region to the protests fuelled frustration, marginalization and, in some cases, extremism.⁴⁵ The situation in Libya, for example, has helped create a wave of insurgencies that are engulfing the sub-region and perpetuating instability. Many narratives of violent extremists are based on the notion that the international community is failing to defend Muslims and such rhetoric is often used to justify violence against ‘the West’.⁴⁶ Second, globalisation and the rapid spread of access to media and new technologies appears to be exacerbating the perceptions of relative deprivation and the ever-increasing gap between rich and poor. Lastly, post-9/11 international

⁴¹ UNDP, Third Expert Consultation, Addis Ababa, 2015

⁴² Ibid, page 24.

⁴³ UNDP, Third Expert Consultation, Addis Ababa, 2015.

⁴⁴ Alao (2015), page 24.

⁴⁵ UNDP, Third Expert Consultation, Addis Ababa, 2015

⁴⁶ Saltman and Smith (2015), page 12.

coalition interventions in the Middle East, foreign policy towards Israel and Palestine, and general perceptions of selective and aggressive foreign policies on the part of ‘the West’ more broadly feed into and are manipulated by extremist groups in a polarising discourse used to justify violence as part of an on-going war of “us” versus “them”.⁴⁷

2.2 Why UNDP?

UNDP is the lead development agency in the UN system with presence in all 54 countries in Africa and regional presence in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; Nairobi, Kenya; and Dakar, Senegal. At the regional level UNDP has over 120 technical experts covering the areas of governance and rule of law, conflict prevention, gender, youth empowerment, livelihoods, coordination of development assistance and supporting the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In addition to our presence in the project’s 11 target countries, UNDP’s regional technical capacities will be deployed to support the implementation process. UNDP also brings to this project decades-old established networks and partnerships

47 UNDP Third Expert Consultation, Addis Ababa 2015



UNDP brings to this project decades-old established networks and partnerships with civil society, faith-based groups, the African Union, Regional Economic Communities, host governments and academic institutions to achieve the results articulated in this project. An example of partnerships is its pilot projects within the Integrated Crisis Prevention and Recovery Programme “Strengthening national capacities for Early Recovery, Peace Building and Reconciliation” at the UN-House Protection of Civilian (PoC) site in Juba. UNDP developed the Programme in response to the crisis gripping South Sudan since December 2013. It seeks to enhance national capacities for early recovery, peace building and reconciliation in the country. Peter Gatkuoth Koi (standing), Chairman of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) at the UN-House PoC in Juba, speaks at the official launch, 20 October 2014, Juba, South Sudan, UN Photo/JC McIlwaine.


with civil society, faith-based groups, the African Union, Regional Economic Communities, host governments and academic institutions to achieve the results articulated in this project. Furthermore, UNDP’s impartiality makes it a unique operator in an extremely delicate and politically-sensitive area of work.

More specifically, for the past 18 months, UNDP has been working to develop a deeper and more nuanced understanding of violent extremism. In May 2014, UNDP convened its first global expert consultation on the topic titled, ‘Radicalization and its implications for development, violence prevention and conflict resolution’ in Istanbul, Turkey. The aim of the consultation was to create a shared understanding of the key issues, and to foster greater coherence amongst international development actors. Over 50 participants from around the world attended the event, including representatives from academia, research centres and civil society organizations, as well as partner institutions such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC); Islamic Development Bank (IDB); the European Union (EU); African Leadership Centre of Kings College, University of London in the United Kingdom (UK); and, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC).

With the aim of building upon the insights garnered during this pioneering session and to help drill down further into the regional specificities of the dynamics highlighted, in July 2015 UNDP’s Africa Regional Service Centre convened a second experts meeting in Nairobi, Kenya titled, ‘Framing the development solutions to radicalization in Africa’. The consultation was attended by over 60 experts and practitioners from academia, think-tanks and research institutions (from Africa, Australia, Germany the UK and the United States of America (USA)), the AUC; IGAD, the EU; faith-based experts; and representatives from the UN, civil society organizations, international media and bilateral actors, including Finland, Sweden and the UK. The document also builds upon the UNDP-led experts meeting in Cameroon that examined the crises in Central Africa including in the Central African Republic (CAR), Northern Cameroon and Nigeria, and which has subsequently informed the UN’s response to Boko Haram and CAR.

The meeting helped advance our understanding of radicalization in Africa and to begin elaborating the elements of a strategic framework that could lead to a UNDP regional project on the issue. To further narrow down and deepen the ideas raised at the Nairobi meeting, a third consultation was organized in Addis Ababa in August 2015, with a smaller

Figure 1: Fatalities from terrorist attacks, Africa 2006-2015



group of individuals and in a more informal setting. This format allowed the group of experts – including from faith-based entities, the AUC, the EU, IGAD, civil society, Amnesty International, bilateral partners and UNDP - to scrutinize the thematic areas recommended as the development response to prevent and counter radicalization and violent extremism in the context of the Nairobi meeting. It also, therefore, provided an opportunity to test and validate these ideas (particularly their suitability to the Africa context) and expand them, focusing on both the short-, medium- and long-term, regional, national and local level responses. The consultation was designed to develop a response that is multilateral, multifaceted and which addresses causative and perpetuating factors including exclusion and marginalization.

Programme Strategy: Prevent and Respond to Violent Extremism 3

3.1 Project strategy overview

This project on *'Preventing and responding to violent extremism in Africa'* is a four-year multi-country and regional engagement. The project is designed to address the immediate and underlying factors that foster the growth of violent extremism and leverages UNDP's on-going work on the long-term root causes of violent extremism - such as weak governance, under-development and marginalisation. It is anchored in a human security approach, which builds a conceptual link between human security and development i.e. "a people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented response."⁴⁸ It is, furthermore, rooted in the SDGs, many of which can help reduce the spread of violent extremism.

The engagement will be implemented in partnership with national governments, regional and sub-regional organizations, bilateral donors, civil society organizations, media groups, faith-based groups and, community representatives – as and where relevant. The project has been designed in a way that fully recognises that no actor alone is able to prevent and address this destructive phenomenon, and that coordination and partnership are essential elements of a successful strategy.

The project strategy is informed by a theoretical framework, guidelines concerning particular engagements according to country categories, three different 'modes' of intervention, a theory of change, and eight intervention areas. In each of the areas, a mix of prevention-oriented and response-oriented activities will be implemented, depending on the nature of the issue being addressed. All interventions will be thoroughly informed by the country context, as well as by international, regional and local policy, research and best practices.

3.2 Theoretical framework

The strategy, which is designed to help curb the spread and mitigate the growth of violent extremism, is guided by a theoretical framework that informs the overall intervention and each of the result areas. On the basis of this theoretical framework all interventions will involve and address individuals, institutions and ideology to different degrees.

Some interventions, for example will focus more predominantly on **ideology**, with a focus on 'meso' level (or group-level) interventions. This involves looking at how extremist narratives are being propagated, who they are targeting and assessing the impact and potential for radicalization processes to begin. These engagements are designed to understand processes of manipulation and coercion, through engagement with formal and informal channels of communication (virtual and real) and with a view to intercept, counter and manage the impacts of ideologies designed to inspire acts of violence, especially amongst vulnerable populations. Interventions focused on ideology may seek to engage in inter- and intra-faith activities as a way to expose doctrinal fallacies and areas where religion is being manipulated to serve political ends and to justify violence.

Other interventions may include some elements of ideology, but will be more focused specifically on **institutions**, both

Figure 3: Theoretical Framework





Figure 2: Programme Strategy, Response and Activities



48 General Assembly Resolution, 2012: <http://www.un.org/humansecurity/sites/www.un.org/humansecurity/files/hsu%20documents/GA%20Resolutions.pdf>

formal and informal, thereby focusing on ‘macro’ (or societal) level dynamics. These engagements are designed to address areas where the weakness or absence of certain institutions facilitates the growth of violent extremism, with a view to strengthening their resilience. State institutions in this regard are particularly important; assisting governments to design and implement comprehensive and inclusive development-based responses to violent extremism – including enhancing effective governance in ‘at risk’ areas - will form a key part of this programme. Furthermore, State institutions such as prisons, have become significant radicalization and recruitment locations. The manner in which security agencies, and law enforcement and military specifically, respond to extremism is a critical component in the radicalization process that needs to be addressed. Other State institutions such as government schools, intelligence apparatus, political parties and parliaments also have vital roles to play and form an integral part of the programme strategy. Informal, quasi-formal and non-State institutions are equally important. Businesses, religious institutions, non-governmental organizations, elders, civil society organizations, social clubs and traditional community structures – to mention only a few - can all be engaged to prevent, hinder or stall radicalization processes. By strengthening both formal and informal institutions, interventions will strengthen State-society relations and ensure approaches are both holistic and inclusive.

Whilst addressing ideology and institutions is vital, interventions must also focus on key **individuals** in order to increase their chances of successfully reducing and addressing the growth of violent extremism. Certain individuals – and groups of individuals serve as facilitators, catalysts and active ‘agents’ of violent extremism. Others may be victims or provide the social network around such individuals. Interventions that target individuals are tailored to ensure that they prevent and hinder the growth of violent extremism.

3.3 Project Approach


As an integral part of the UNDP Regional Programme for Africa, this project on preventing and responding to violent extremism is informed by a) a rights-based approach, with particular attention to regional initiatives that benefit women⁴⁹ youth and other marginalised groups; (b) a sustainable human development approach and emphasis on capacity-development; and, (c) a collaborative stance which seeks to leverage, complement and build upon the work of other actors in this space.

Country-level engagement categories

49 Cross-cutting initiatives will take full account of the UNDP gender equality strategy.


It should be noted that over the four-year life span of this project, there is the possibility that other countries not currently included in this project will need to be brought into this engagement; consequently, a proactive and flexible approach is adopted. In this spirit, three key clusters of countries form the focus of this engagement:

- **‘Epicentre’ countries:** Countries defined as being at the epicentre of the growth of violent extremism are those countries where violent extremist groups are already present and enacting regular attacks against innocent populations. Such groups are well-entrenched in these countries with significant




sources of funding, expansive networks of recruiters, and relatively effective recruitment strategies. In such countries, there will be an equal focus on prevention and response. Engagements in epicentre countries will focus on Mali, Nigeria and Somalia.

- **‘Spill-over’ countries:** Spill-over countries suffer from the effects of the presence and operations of violent extremist groups from a neighbouring country. As such, they experience regular violent attacks (such as gun-attacks, cattle raids, and land-razing) and experience the effects of increased numbers of refugees whose presence can feed into pre-existing tensions and conflicts. Poorly-managed borders and the increasingly blurred lines between trans-national networks of crime, armed groups and violent extremist groups further compound the dynamics of



violent extremism. In such countries, there will be a strong focus on prevention, but also many activities related to delivering an effective response to the problem. Engagements in spill-over countries will focus on Cameroon, Chad, Kenya, Mauritania and Niger.

- **‘At-risk’ countries:** Countries at risk of violent extremism exhibit some of the same socio-economic and governance-related factors as epicentre and spill-over countries, but have no violent extremist groups actively present in the country. However, some at-risk countries have small populations exhibiting some signs of radicalization and isolated attacks or



incidents. Such countries are at risk due to national contextual factors, but also as a result of porous borders and the activities of trans-national criminal networks, and other ongoing crises and conflicts. In such countries, the focus will be solely on prevention-related activities. Engagements in at-risk countries will focus on CAR, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.⁵⁰

3.4 ‘Modes’ of intervention

This regional project will be implemented through three major modalities that will focus on country support; regional engagements and a policy, research and advocacy strategy; the first two represent levels of engagement, and the third is a cross-cutting strategy that will occur at regional level, and will benefit countries at the national level. See below for more information:⁵¹

- **Country support:** Support will be provided to all target countries through UNDP Country Offices. The project intervention will be tailored to local context and implemented at the national level by UNDP Country Offices and national partners.
- **Regional engagement:** UNDP’s Regional Service Centre in Addis Ababa will provide support to AU,

50 The case of CAR is relatively unique on the African continent; the conflict has religious dimensions and is already fundamentally destabilizing the country. The country is at-risk of morphing into violent extremism of the nature we are targeting more specifically in the context of this engagement.
51 It is important to emphasize that support to governments and other actors will be led by UNDP Country Offices, and the UN Resident Coordinators, as well as the respective UN Country Teams (UNCTs), in collaboration with local partners.

IGAD and ECOWAS. Specifically, these entities will be supported to develop joint and harmonised strategies on preventing and addressing violent extremism in the region, thereby enhancing inter-State cooperation on this issue. Lastly, efforts will be undertaken to support existing joint platforms to ensure that on-going security-based discussions on how to address violent extremism are combined with development-based responses and discussions.

- **Policy, research and advocacy:** Academic work on violent extremism does exist, but it is not always well-known amongst policy-makers and practitioners and it is not well-integrated into programming. Besides these issues related to the nexus between academia and policy, there remain some significant gaps in research, advocacy and policy. This project will invest in research, coordination of research and enhance the distribution and dissemination of research and policy work to influence regional and national policy initiatives on responding to violent extremism. This will be done in close collaboration with the soon-to-be-established Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Terrorism in Djibouti.

3.5 Project Areas: Theory of change⁵²

This project is underpinned by a theory of change which maintains that there are eight inter-linked processes that create a development pathway for preventing and addressing the growth of violent extremism in Africa. These eight inter-linked dynamics include strengthened socio-economic conditions, effective rule of law and security, disengagement and reintegration strategies with a development lens, efficient leveraging of media and technology, resilient and cohesive communities and gender-specific engagements that take into account the differential impacts of violent extremism on men, women, boys and girls. These six dynamics are shaped by two cross-cutting processes which can further improve the impact of these development processes. First, coordinated policy, research and advocacy strategies and second, engagements which seek to strengthen the regional approach to the phenomenon by enhancing the capacity and coordination of regional and sub-regional organizations. Taken together, these elements form a comprehensive and inclusive development response to violent extremism. Figure 4 visually demonstrates the analysis of the informing the strategy.

It should be noted that all of these approaches are informed by a gender-sensitive lens. Furthermore, all of these dynamics involve the intersection of ideology, individuals and institutions in different combinations and to varying degrees,

52 A theory of change is a conceptual tool which helps map out the assumptions that inform project design, and the mechanisms that are expected to bring about change; the theory of change helps ensure the complexity of issues are fully taken into account when designing interventions, and clarifies how the intervention will lead to the desired change

as outlined in the theoretical framework. The following section provides additional information on the context, causal mechanisms and enabling factors that make up the theory of change.

Context

- Firstly, the project targets those who are **‘at-risk’** of radicalization and processes associated with violent extremism, as well as those suffering from the consequences of violent extremism, including at-risk youth, marginalised populations such as minority tribes/clans, IDPs and refugees, those living in ungoverned spaces, women and children.
- Secondly, the project also targets those who have **already been radicalized** and/or who are part of extremist groups, including ‘foot soldiers’, recruiters, funders, advocates, facilitators and indirect supporters of various kinds.
- Thirdly, the project focuses on the immediate, underlying and root causes of radicalization and violent extremism.
 - The **immediate causes/enablers** of radicalization and violent extremism include heightened perceptions of relative economic deprivation, increased dissemination of extremist narratives (through direct speech, the internet and media campaigns), easy access to weapons and sources of funding, weak governance/management of religious institutions, a judicial system/rule of law that exacerbates levels of radicalization, the absence/weak of local grievance mechanisms and a heightened sense of desperation and vulnerability amongst youth.
 - The **underlying causes/enablers** of radicalization and violent extremism include increasing resonance of polarising discourses, security-dominant/reactive approaches, identity ‘loss’/loss of meaning, loss of legitimacy of traditional structures, ungoverned spaces/spaces beyond the reach of government, growth of unregulated madrassas, low awareness of anti-radicalization practices, under-trained Imams and management boards, high levels of corruption, low levels of employment and livelihoods, increasing rural/urban divides, repeated humanitarian/food crises, illicit funding mechanisms, weak regional border management, intersection with trans-national crime, low levels of regional intelligence coordination, strong focus on law and order over justice, prisons as sources of recruitment; reactive ‘crackdowns’ by police; insufficient and ineffective investigation of cases; exclusion from political structures/public life, weak government-society

- relations, low community conflict resolution capacity, weakened social cohesion, insufficient access to adequate education, alienation from ‘real’ networks and over-reliance on virtual networks, discrimination and violence towards women and weakened family structures.
- The **root causes/enablers** of radicalization and violent extremism include weak state capacity, inefficient governance and poor service delivery, high levels of societal divisions along ethnic or religious lines, exacerbated by elites and combined with low levels of trust, endemic sense of political and economic marginalisation, low levels of development/high levels of poverty, geo-political forces and sense of injustice/inequality on global scale and the divisive perception of a ‘Western war on Islam’.
- Causal mechanisms**
- Causal mechanisms are the processes/pathways through which an outcome is brought into being; the project considers the following to be key causal mechanisms:⁵³
- Improving the **livelihoods** of at-risk youths and other vulnerable populations through a greater focus on ‘hot spots’ and improved access to jobs, skills-building programmes and education.
 - Enhancing the capacity and levels of trust in the **judicial system and rule of law** as a result of national institutions with the capacity to effectively deal with radicalization and violent extremism and which effectively balance law and order with justice; prison systems which can serve as centres for de-radicalization and reform; police and communities which can effectively cooperate towards shared goals of protection; effective investigation and protection of key stakeholders; and good regional cooperation.
 - Increasing levels of **disengagement and improving reintegration processes** as a result of effective disengagement/rehabilitation centres; consistent psycho-social support and mentoring; good awareness of de-radicalization processes; and increased community sensitization to help lower the stigmatization of returnees.
 - **Discrediting violent narratives** through diffusion of counter-narratives via journalists skilled in ethical reporting; a greater focus on the voices of victims, survivors and returnees; greater media engagement by religious leaders; and youth who are empowered to be leaders on- and off-line.
 - **Lowering intra- and inter-religious tensions and heightened community resilience** of religious institutions thanks to greater intra- and inter-religious dialogue; effectively governed madrassas, mosques

53 See Annex One for a visual of these processes.

- and well-trained Imams; and effective early-warning mechanisms.
- Improving **differentiated and tailored responses to men, women, boys and girls** as a result of greater support for women affected by radicalization and violent extremism; empowerment of women leaders and advocates for de-radicalization, and by supporting young men and women to serve as ambassadors for anti-radicalization processes.

Enabling factors

- A **research, policy and advocacy strategy** that enhances collaboration between researchers, policy-makers and practitioners on violent extremism; helps coordinate and disseminate research to ensure research gaps are addressed and research is made available; and trends are monitored and best practices gathered.
- A **regional strategy** that enhances the capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations to effectively cooperate and coordinate activities designed to prevent and address violent extremism across borders.

3.6 Partnerships

This project builds upon and seeks to complement the work of a wide range of other actors working in this space. More specifically, we will seek to engage these actors not simply as implementers but as active participants in the design and tailoring of the engagements contained in this document to ensure they are informed both by cutting-edge thinking and lessons learned, as well as the country context. This will also help ensure a continuous process of cross-fertilisation and adaptation between our project and those of our partners. This project, therefore, seeks to fill a critical gap – one which helps enhance the ability of communities, countries and the continent to reverse the growth of extremist violence, and ensures the development gains in Africa are safeguarded.


- The below lists serves only as an example of actors and initiatives we will be drawing upon and/or, where possible, working with, to ensure the success of this engagement:
- **UN System broadly:** This work will build upon and further the implementation of the UN Global Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. Furthermore, it will leverage the knowledge and expertise of the UN Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) and the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT). The CTITF has led the development of the Southern African strategy on counter-terrorism and helped a number of countries to develop national strategies; this project will build upon and further

- the work of the UN system. At the national level, a range of partnerships with local entities will further strengthen the engagement.
- **Regional and sub-regional organizations:** UNDP will build upon its strong relationships with regional and sub-regional organizations across the African continent to help ensure coherence and complementarity of programming in this area. Specifically, we will work with the AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, and the soon-to-be established Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism in Djibouti. Beyond the African continent, UNDP intends to work closely with the EU, amongst others. The project will also leverage the expert team that helped design the project.
 - **Bilateral actors/Member States:** This project will also build upon and collaborate with a wide range of Member States who are already working extensively on issues related to violent extremism including Australia, the UK, the US, etc.
 - **Civil society:** We will work closely with civil society in all target countries as appropriate, and seek to draw upon the knowledge and expertise of actors also in countries that do not necessarily form part of this project. For example, the work of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) will be particularly relevant, as will the work of the Africa Skills Initiative. Similarly our work with media outlets will be instrumental, including partnerships with Al-Jazeera, BBC, France 24, and regional and local media outlets. Religious entities also form a highly strategic partner in this project.
 - **Academia and think-tanks:** UNDP is already working with the Institute for Security Studies (Ethiopia), the University of Lancaster (UK), and Kings College, London. UNDP will expand partnerships with academia including those in Africa. African universities will be leveraged as important impartial platforms for bringing together diverse groups of young people to dialogue on sensitive issues.

3.7 Outputs and activities

The outputs and activities detailed below complement and reinforce one another. Consequently, they should be understood as forming part of a comprehensive, holistic approach. The activities are based on a solid understanding that it is impossible to design an effective response that separates regional dynamics and approaches from global ones. The below outputs and activities simultaneously engage at the regional and national levels in order to effectively respond to the transnational nature of the challenges posed by violent extremism. The approach ensures coherence between regional and national activities and interventions.

Figure 4: Problem tree analysis





Output 1 - Rule of law and security: National institutions (including government, police and criminal justice systems) and communities are able to prevent and address violent extremism.

Countries suffering from the growth of violent extremism often have rule of law systems ill-equipped to deal with this rising phenomenon or have failed to effectively implement the laws that are in place. Many countries that form part of this project lack the legal capacity to effectively prosecute those that have been engaged in criminal activities related to violent extremism. Due to the non-conventional way extremists engage in violence, many states respond by going above the law, thereby often making the State increasingly part of the problem, rather than the response: such actions easily feed into the narrative of extremists and exacerbate the perception amongst certain communities that they are treated unjustly by the state. The challenges are often amplified by the failure to develop regional wide approaches, helping to curb cross-border tensions and the tendency for problems to be displaced across national borders.

On the security side, many countries are implementing strategies which are aggravating the problem. The tendency to be reactive and to over-react results in a situation where many vulnerable populations feel they are the target of politically motivated and often ethnically-biased security practices and unjust judicial systems. The lack of inter-agency coordination and information-sharing between criminal justice and law enforcement sectors is further undermining due process, including the ability to effectively conduct investigation and monitoring of those accused and/or convicted of being engaged in activities related to violent extremism.

Often communities are not active participants in strengthening the rule of law, community-based responses are lacking and creating gaps where extremism can flourish. Lastly, due to the weaknesses of the criminal justice system and low awareness of radicalization processes amongst prison officials, prisons are increasingly becoming a location for recruitment by violent extremist groups.

Activity result 1.1 Target countries (epicenter, spillover and at-risk) have national strategies on preventing and responding to violent extremism in place. Governments

will be supported to complete and/or develop national strategies and legislation for preventing and responding to violent extremism, including through a prevention and response lens; those with robust frameworks already in place will be assisted with the implementation of the strategies and legislation. These efforts will ensure that governments have robust frameworks for approaching the issue in a collaborative and coordinated manner. In order to support government efforts in this regard, an informal cross-sector advisory group will be established to provide support to governments to address violent extremism; the group – established in select countries where there is political will – will advise decisionmakers at the highest level of government on appropriate strategies, policies and responses, ensuring such responses are informed by the latest thinking and best practices on preventing and responding to violent extremism. This advisory group can also serve as an avenue for civil society to be able to share their views with decisionmakers. In addition to the advisory group, there is a significant role for regional organizations to help countries to roll out regional approaches to preventing the growth of violent extremism, by helping ensure that regional standards influence national work across the continent. This activity will be facilitated by the development of an implementation strategy.

Activity result 1.2 Criminal justice system in epicenter, spillover and at-risk countries supported to deal with radicalization and violent extremism. This activity will help build the capacity of actors in the criminal justice chain – including police, investigators, detectives, instructors, judges, prosecutors etc. - to deal with cases related to violent extremism and radicalization, through training, support and other programmes; it is vital that the whole criminal justice system works in tandem, so efforts will also be made to strengthen relationships between the police and judiciary. Support will also be provided to ensure those participating in criminal cases with individuals accused of involvement in violent extremism, including judges, witnesses and victims, are given adequate protection to prevent them from being targeted by extremist groups. De-radicalization programmes will also be developed and implemented in prisons, with significant attention paid to issues of gender.

Activity result 1.3 Build trust and confidence between law enforcement and communities. Capacity-building will be provided to police on how to engage with communities, including through the adaptation of tools from the Police Training Facilities and review of police rules of engagement with the public. With a view to improving the relationships – and levels of trust - between police forces and communities

and, therefore, to enhance the effectiveness of prevention and response, a series of crisis simulations will be developed to improve how local government, police and communities work together and respond following a crisis or attack; this will lead to the development of coherent operational response procedures. To further achieve this objective, community safety and neighbourhood policing plans will be developed between local government, police and communities.

Output 2 - Disengagement and reintegration:



Members of extremist group are disengaged from extremist groups and reintegrated into communities.

Disengagement from violent extremist groups is a complex, delicate and multi-faceted process that requires careful planning and support, and is one of the first steps of an effective de-radicalization process. Those who wish to disengage often fear the dual consequence of being targeted by the police and military forces in their national home on the one hand, and of being targeted and possibly executed from the group they desire to leave on the other. These dynamics often prevent young people from leaving such groups, a situation which is sustaining and helping violent extremism to grow.

Disengaged people can play a crucial part of the broader puzzle of decreasing the growth of violent extremism: they can provide vital sources of intelligence and serve as powerful messengers about the reality of life on the 'front-line' of such groups, which is often a marked departure from the narrative that convinced them to join. Therefore an environment that fosters their safety and ability to reconstruct a life outside of the group in their communities upon their return is absolutely vital. This means creating the right legislative framework, fostering clear political commitment and building trust with those who wish to disengage.

Activity result 2.1 Support to transitional/rehabilitation centres at national levels in epicentre and spill-over countries. Pre-existing local and national transitional and rehabilitation centres will be provided with support to effectively rehabilitate those disengaging from extremist groups, including inputs on transitional justice mechanisms

where relevant. Engagements of this nature will be tailored to the country context and the dynamics of rehabilitation of the country at hand. This intervention will ensure that such centres are equipped with effective de-radicalization strategies and curricula and informed by best practices. Through these Centres, at-risk individuals will be provided with psycho-social support to prevent them being radicalized and/or to facilitate their reintegration. This part of the intervention will involve the development of curriculum for mentoring and Training of Trainers programmes and advice on appropriate livelihoods/employment opportunities – all under the supervision of national entities. This activity will leverage expertise from the soon-to-be established Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism in Djibouti.

Activity result 2.2 Community sensitization programmes developed to ensure stigmatization of disengaged members is lowered and communities are more ready to accept them. In hot-spot areas, communities will be engaged in a series of dialogue processes and sensitization programmes to lower tensions and help ensure that those disengaging from violent extremist groups and their families are able to successfully reintegrate into their communities without stigma and discrimination.

Output 3 - Socio-economic factors: At-risk youths and vulnerable people in hot-spot areas benefit from livelihood initiatives.



In the African context, socio-economic issues are key for radicalization processes. Poverty and under-development create grievances that can easily be exploited by extremist groups, especially when such factors are combined with poor governance and the absence of even basic service delivery. Youth are increasingly vulnerable as a result of low standards of education, which are failing to equip them for the competitive job market and making them easy targets for radicalization processes. Indeed, the nexus between literacy, numeracy and the growth of radicalization has been observed in many areas across sub-Saharan Africa, including in the Sahel, North-east Nigeria, North Cameroon, North-East Kenya and Somalia. This situation is aggravated by high-levels of unemployment, leaving many youth frustrated, lacking in viable prospects for the future and available for relatively easy recruitment into extremist groups, especially since most groups offer financial incentives and provide a sense of purpose.

UNDP and many other actors are already actively working in this area to improve job opportunities, youth entrepreneurship programmes, skills-building activities, and levels of education etc., with a view to lowering unemployment rates and improving livelihood opportunities. The problem is that such programmes are not currently targeted/tailored specifically towards those at risk and/or already engaged in the activities of violent extremist groups. Activities in this area will leverage existing programmes to ensure they are targeting vulnerable groups, especially in ungoverned spaces where such populations are particularly at risk. Where such interventions do not yet exist, this programme will help design interventions that fill in the gaps.

Activity Result 3.1: Detailed overview of programming 'landscape' in key countries related to youth, skills-building, employment and livelihoods in epicenter, spillover and at-risk countries produced. This detailed overview will provide an analysis of all the current programming related to employment and livelihoods currently being implemented by the UN, regional actors, NGOs, the private sector and others, as appropriate. This mapping will also enable UNDP to identify its own programming needs to be adapted, tailored and/or better targeted to those at risk of radicalization processes on the one hand, and the ability to advise and support other actors to do the same on the other. Existing programmes will then be supported/tailored to address vulnerable populations in key 'hot spots' such as border areas and refugee camps.

Activity Result 3.2: New programmes created in areas where gaps are identified in target countries (epicenter, spillover and at-risk). Where gaps in employment and livelihoods programming do exist, new interventions will be designed that include skills-building, entrepreneurship, employment and other livelihoods opportunities targeting at-risk youth and other vulnerable populations in hot-spot areas. Efforts will also be made – where necessary – through mentorship and leadership initiatives to foster a sense of purpose and cohesion.

Output 4 – Media, technology and public awareness: Violent narratives and extremist propaganda are countered.



Today's youth have grown up on-line with easy access to information and social media networks. The use of the Internet

to disseminate violent imagery and to engage with vulnerable populations is well-documented. Social network platforms are being used to create networks that sustain the activities of such groups and to spread hateful ideologies and instigate violence. Mainstream media has helped compound the problem by paying too much attention to violent extremists "prowess" and "sophisticated" use of social media, often airing their graphic promotional materials. Social media, however, is not the only medium extremists are using. They are also propagating their messages through other means such as in-person contact.

The media, however, can either worsen some of the conditions that nourish the growth of violent extremism, or form a vital part of the de-radicalization efforts, especially if credible messengers and channels of communication are nourished. Media and technology in this regard can act as a powerful disrupter to discredit extremist narratives. Currently, however, insufficient attention is being paid to this medium and therefore important opportunities to engage with youth in particular, but also with the broader public in general, are being missed. This output would ensure media and technology are effectively leveraged to the full extent possible to counter the growth of violent extremism, while simultaneously contributing to an environment that is receptive to those who choose to disengage.

Activity Result 4.1 Communities/civil societies given a voice through media engagement and partnerships in target countries (epicenter, spillover and at-risk). Training programmes will be provided to communities, NGOs and religious associations to serve as first responders in engaging national, regional and international media houses in the wake of attacks and to better understand how they can help foster a counter narrative. To support this initiative, networks will be created and sustained between communities, journalists and editors/media houses (at the local, regional and international levels). In addition, journalists and communities will be provided with support on how to mitigate security risks. This will be complemented by partnerships with religious leaders on how to engage on social media to counter extremist narratives through engagement with youth on-line.

Activity Result 4.2 Video and radio programmes created for targeted audiences and for wide dissemination. Currently, counter-narratives on violent extremism are weak or ineffectual. Consequently, even mainstream media ends up focusing on the destruction caused, and gives a voice to divisive individuals and their beliefs. This activity will focus on developing short documentaries and radio programmes with a view to supporting the development of a counter-

narrative. These programmes will focus on stories of survivors, the impact of terrorism on communities and the reality of the 'front line' told by those who have disengaged from violent extremist groups, with the intension of de-legitimising the propaganda used by such groups. The documentaries will be shown in the context of targeted engagements in schools, universities, religious institutions and other public spaces, whilst international, regional and local networks will also be engaged to ensure dissemination.

Activity result 4.3 Public awareness programmes launched to encourage individuals to disengage/not join extremist groups. National institutions, local government, religious entities and community representatives will be brought together to design and launch a public awareness campaign directed at members of extremist groups and those considering joining them. The campaign will be launched in schools, universities, religious institutions, refugee camps and work places.

Output 5 - Community resilience: Communities and religious institutions are resilient to the effects of violent extremism (capacity to prevent and respond to violent extremism)



Marginalized from political processes and suffering from the effects of under-development, poor service delivery and high levels of unemployment, many communities are extremely vulnerable to the activities and operations of violent extremist groups. By empowering communities to be a vital part of the solution to the growth of violent extremism, this strategy will ensure communities are provided with the resources and support to serve as a life-line for those at-risk of radicalization and those suffering from the consequences of radicalization. The strategy focuses on building the resilience of communities by engaging with key formal and informal institutions – such as the family unit and faith-based entities.

Activity result 5.1 Governance and capacities of mosques, madrassas and Imams integrated into the prevention/response initiatives. Mosques, madrassa and Imam toolkits will be developed and adapted to the local context to ensure that they are effective standards to promote good governance, high standards of education/curriculum, training on effective governance, good leadership and safeguarding

– all with a view to strengthening the resilience of religious institutions. They will be tailored to country contexts and cascaded through Training of Trainer programmes. Regional-wide incentive structures will be put in place to promote the development of resilient mosques and madrassas. Lastly, this activity will support the development of a region-wide network of mosques and madrassas against violent extremism.

Activity result 5.2 Inter and intra-religious tensions are lowered in targeted communities. A series of inter-faith and intra-faith dialogues will be organised in key hot-spot areas to help lower tensions and raise awareness about radicalization processes. Where possible, traditional leaders will be leveraged to help reduce tensions and build inter-linkages within and between communities to strengthen resilience. In some contexts, this could involve setting up committees of wise-men/women.

Activity result 5.3 Early warning system developed. Key individuals and groups of individuals at the community level – such as community leaders, religious figures, youth representatives, businessmen/women and key women-leaders – will be capacitated on how to identify and address the key signs of radicalization activities and processes. Similarly, civilian officers will be trained to work directly with communities to enable them to protect themselves against radicalization and violent extremism – through the development of close-knit neighbourhood-watch associations/Peace and Security Committees that can prevent clandestine operations and serve as an early-warning network.

Output 6 - Gender-specific engagements: Women are empowered to play a leading role in prevention and response to violent extremism.



Radicalization and the dynamics of violent extremism affect men and women in different ways. Whilst young men appear to be more susceptible to joining such groups (as evidenced by the higher number of young men and boys), women serve as mothers, partners and friends of those radicalised and are increasingly being targeted and/or are choosing to serve as direct and indirect sources of support for these violent groups. There is evidence that women are being used increasingly for logistics, recruitment, political safeguarding, operations, suicide bombings and combat.

Furthermore, women are vulnerable to being drugged, raped

and physically or socially coerced to join such groups; once recruited, their conditions inside extremist groups leave them vulnerable to sexual exploitation and abuse. Lastly, just as young boys are highly susceptible to recruitment (there has been a dramatic increase in the number of child soldiers being used by such groups), there is an alarming growth of gender-based violence justified on religious grounds, including targeted killings of women and girls. This strategy elaborates a gender-differentiated approach to the issue of violent extremism, thereby ensuring that the different drivers of radicalization amongst men and women, as well as the different needs are fully taken into consideration in such programming. It should be noted that gender issues are mainstreamed throughout all other activities in this project. This engagement strategy will focus on capacity-building, participation, protection and engagement.


Activity result 6.1: Women are empowered to identify early signs of radicalization and capacitated to participate in initiatives at communities/national/regional level such as early-warning, regional and national strategy development/dialogues and community policing. This will be undertaken with a culturally-sensitive and country-specific lens to enable women to be valuable players in the violent extremism paradigm from the household and community level. The activity will bring together local community representatives, women and police to help foster trust between them in order to create more effective prevention responses. Through a prevention lens, both women and men will be empowered through training, mentorship, effective dialogue skills and other forms of support to ensure effective dialogue and advocacy; through this activity young men and women will be identified as mentors and role models who can be engaged during capacity-building initiatives. Women will also be trained to serve as peer-to-peer supporters to assist other women at risk of recruitment or suffering from the impacts of violent extremism.

Activity result 6.2: Psycho-social support is provided for families and victims. As a curative measure, women and men whose spouses, family members or friends have joined violent extremist groups, will be provided with psycho-social support – including mentoring, counselling and peer-to-peer support. Support groups will be established where possible and desirable to suit the needs to specific groups. Support will also include capacity-building and guidance on the importance of reporting so as the affected individuals can better understand the judicial process and their rights.

Activity result 6.3: Women and youth as agents of peace/

peace ambassadors. At the regional level, women and youth will be trained and empowered to serve as agents of peace/peace ambassadors to bolster efforts to combat the growth of violent extremism. These individuals will be united at the regional level and provided with opportunities to network amongst themselves with a view to supporting one another's activities, while also being provided with training in capacity-building, mentoring and coaching – skills they will then pass onto others in their own communities (trainer of trainer approach).

Output 7 - Research, policy and advocacy:
Regional and national policies and programming are informed by research and analysis on violent extremism.



While academic research on violent extremism does exist, it is not well-disseminated or actionable for policy-makers and practitioners and therefore does not get tailored and integrated into strategies and programming on the African continent. This is, in large part, due to the absence of networks that help link academics with policy-makers and practitioners, channels which could help direct research efforts to areas where vital gaps exist and where more research is needed.

While connecting academics with policy-makers and practitioners will solve part of the problem, in other areas more research on issues related to violent extremism in Africa will be required. As this project document has outlined, some significant gaps in our knowledge persist in this area, such as understanding why some youth choose not to join violent extremist groups despite suffering many of the same socio-economic conditions and levels of hopelessness as those who do. We also need to understand better how those formerly engaged in violent extremist groups can be effectively (and safely) engaged in programmes to help counter radicalization processes – amongst many other gaps. Given the increasing threat posed by violent extremism and the upsurge in interest to find ways to prevent and respond to it, one of the risks is that there is a duplication of efforts, thereby undermining the efficacy of the response and wasting precious resources.

UNDP has already launched a USD100,000-per-year initiative dedicated to policy, research and advocacy and to encourage and support think-thanks and universities to do more research in this area. This research will complement work

being undertaken by the UNDP Regional Service Centre, such as the Journey Mapping/Tipping Point initiative, which charts not only the socio-economic family structure but also what compels an individual to reach the tipping point from radicalization to violence with a view to identifying potential entry-points for intervention. Partnerships will be established with key entities from in Africa, building on those already established with the Institute for Security Studies, the University of Lancaster and Kings College London.

Activity results 7.1 Enhanced collaboration between African and international research and policy institutes. This activity will facilitate the production of cutting-edge research and effective advocacy on de-radicalization and violent extremism in partnership with key think-tanks, policy institutes and academic institutions. Collaboration will focus on the exchange of best practices amongst experts, policy-makers, academics and practitioners.

Activity result 7.2 Database on research on preventing and responding to violent extremism, created, regularly updated and available. The database will serve as a key platform for bringing together existing research and initiatives on violent extremism, as well as researchers and practitioners. Information from the database will be made available on a request-basis and will serve the needs of policy-makers and practitioners working in this area. Support will be provided in this regard to the soon-to-be established Center of Excellence on Countering Violent Extremism in Djibouti.

Activity result 7.3 Increased capacity at the regional level to monitor and disseminate information on preventing and responding to violent extremism. A 2-3 persons unit will be formed to serve as a research team responsible for looking at regional and global trends on the growth of and responses to violent extremism. The team will be responsible for producing quarterly and annual reports and briefings for key partners and will be based at the forthcoming Center of Excellence on Violent Extremism based in Djibouti.

Output 8 - Regional level intervention:
Regional and sub-regional entities are coordinated and enabled to prevent and address violent extremism.



As previously underscored, a regional approach to the

challenge of preventing and addressing the growth of violent extremism is imperative. The challenge does not limit itself to national borders. Consequently, by supporting the capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations and by facilitating active cooperation in planning, coordination and implementation of strategies related to preventing and addressing violent extremism, the above strategies in substantive areas are more likely to be effective.

Activity result 8.1 Strategies of regional and sub-regional organizations for preventing and responding to the growth of violent extremism updated or developed. Support will be provided to regional and sub-regional organizations in order to help them develop and/or finalise their strategies on violent extremism, which will also be used to inform the development of relevant national legislation. All countries will be encouraged to coordinate their strategies with regional organizations and vice-versa.

Activity result 8.2 Responses to preventing and addressing violent extremism are effectively coordinated through increased shared information and planning. UNDP will support the AUC and RECs to provide a convening platform in order to facilitate dialogue between regional, sub-regional and regional economic organizations. This initiative seeks to promote coordination and collaboration to enhance the effectiveness of responses and to address gaps in programming.

Activity result 8.3 Support coordination and training capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations on countering violent extremism. The AU, IGAD, ECOWAS and potentially other regional and sub-regional entities will be provided with ad hoc support to enhance research, coordination and training capacity. More specifically, UNDP will assist with the harmonising policy and strategies across the region and the development of a region-wide communications strategy on countering extremist

Results and Resources Framework

4

propaganda and narratives.

Results and Resource Framework: Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa, A Regional Project					
Intended outcome as stated in the Regional Programme Results and Resource Framework: Outcome 3: Countries are able to reduce the likelihood of conflict (SP outcome 5)); while this is linked to Outcome 3, it is cross-cutting.					
Outcome indicators as stated in the Regional Programme Results and Resources Framework, including baseline and targets:					
Applicable Key Result Areas (from 2014-17 Strategic Plan): Sustainable development pathways; inclusive and effective democratic governance; resilience building.					
Partnership Strategy: at the regional level the project will work with Regional civil society, RECs, IGAD, ECOWAS, AU, Universities, global and regional Faith Associations. At the national level, the project will work with governments, faith associations, universities, civil society, think-tanks.					
Project title and ID (ATLAS Award ID): Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa.					
INTENDED OUTPUTS	OUTPUT TARGETS FOR (YEARS)	INDICATIVE ACTIVITIES	PROGRAMME LINKAGES	RESPONSIBLE PARTIES	INPUTS (USD)
<p>Output 1: [Rule of law and security]</p> <p>National institutions (including government, police and criminal justice systems) and communities are able to prevent and address violent extremism.</p> <p>Indicators 1. Number of national and regional institutions using strategies to prevent and address violent extremism. Baselines: tbd Targets: tbd</p> <p>2. Number of trainees having at least 75% scoring in the final assessment. Baselines: tbd Targets: tbd</p> <p>3.% of communities' leaders that trust the law enforcement. Baselines: tbd Targets: tbd</p>		<p>1.1. Target countries (epicenter, spillover and at-risk) have national strategies on preventing and responding to violent extremism in place.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Provide support to governments to develop national strategies on preventing and responding to violent extremism.• Support provided to governments to use strategies to inform and finalise national legislation related to preventing and responding to violent extremism.• Support is provided to governments to ensure strategies are informed by and in line with regional strategies.• Training programmes provided to different line ministries, police forces, civil society representatives, etc. on the different components of the strategy.• Informal, cross-sector advisory group established to provide support to the President/Prime Minister on addressing violent extremism (in epicentre and spill-over countries). <p>1.2. Criminal justice system in epicenter, spillover and at-risk countries supported to deal with radicalization and violent extremism.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Training programmes designed and implemented for police, investigators, prosecutors, judges, defence lawyers etc. on investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating cases and adapted to local context.• Support government to develop and implement protection schemes for personnel dealing with sensitive cases.• Gender-sensitive de-radicalization programmes developed and implemented in prisons. <p>1.3. Build trust and confidence between law enforcement and communities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Support provided to police to improve engagement with communities at the local level including local accountability and strengthening partnerships with all sections of communities including women, youth and children.• Series of crisis simulations developed to improve coordination and collaboration between local government, police and communities to work together following crisis/attack.• Development of community safety and neighbourhood policing plans on preventing and responding to violent extremism.	<p>Output 5: To ensure that community safety and neighbourhood policing plans complement early-warning strategies and engage consistently with religious institutions;</p> <p>Output 8: To ensure that national governments are cooperating at the regional level.</p>	UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), IGAD, ECOWAS, AUC.	12,100,000

<p>Output 2: [Disengage and reintegrate:]</p> <p>Members of extremist groups (at least 40 % of youth) are disengaged from extremists groups and reintegrated into communities.</p> <p>Indicators: 1. Number of youth disengaged from extremist groups. Baselines: tbd Targets: tbd</p> <p>2. % of disengaged members of extremist groups (women and men) who haven't re-joined violent extremist group 6 months after leaving a rehabilitation center. Baselines: tbd Targets: tbd</p>		<p>2.1. Support to transitional/ rehabilitation centres at national levels in epicentre and spillover countries</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical and advisory support provided to the local transitional/rehabilitation centres to effectively rehabilitate those disengaging from extremist groups, including advice and guidance on transitional justice mechanisms. • Rehabilitation centres equipped with de-radicalization curriculums. • Disengaging and 'at-risk' individuals are provided with adequate psycho-social support to prevent them being radicalized and/or facilitate their reintegration. • Development of curriculum for mentoring and establishment of case monitoring system. • Identify appropriate mentors. TOT for individuals in community who are providing mentoring. • Mentoring partnerships undertaken with religious institutions and communities. <p>2.2. Community sensitization programmes developed to ensure stigmatization of disengaged members is lowered and communities are more ready to accept them.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide support to "hot-spot" communities to engage them in dialogue processes to ease tension and help promote resolution. 	<p>Output 3: To ensure disengaged are prioritized for livelihoods opportunities;</p> <p>Output 1: To ensure policies and practices on disengagement and reintegration are in line with national strategy and legislation;</p> <p>Output 4: To ensure public awareness programme are harmonised through the media and technology component. programme.</p>	<p>Local government, religious institutions, civil society organizations, police, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)/ the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), where appropriate.</p>	<p>6,900,000</p>
<p>Output 3: [Socio-economic]</p> <p>At risk' youths and vulnerable people in hot-spot areas benefit from livelihood initiatives.</p> <p>Indicators: 1. Number of at risk youths benefiting from livelihood initiatives. Baseline: tbd Target: tbd</p>		<p>3.1. Detailed overview of programming 'landscape' in key countries related to youth, skills-building, employment and livelihoods in epicentre, spill-over and 'at risk' countries produced.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mapping of UN system, regional, government and non-governmental organizations, private sector, work on entrepreneurship, youth and livelihoods programmes [epicentre; spill-over and 'at-risk' countries]. • Desk-based research and interviews on current programming related to youth, livelihoods, entrepreneurship and skills. • Tailor, extend and/or re-orient programmes to target violent extremism 'hot-spots' and vulnerable groups, especially youth, women and young boys/girls, IDPs, minority tribes and clans, and those who are disengaging from extremist groups. • Provide technical advice and guidance to existing relevant programmes (UN and non-UN actors) to support them to tailor and adapt their programming to prevent and address violent extremism. • Engage key actors in selected countries to coordinate strategies to help ensure maximum numbers of at-risk youth are targeted, and provide additional funding to reduce gaps in programming. <p>3.2. New programmes created in areas where gaps are identified in target countries (epicentre; spillover and 'at risk' countries).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New programmes designed with partners where gaps exist to target hot-spot areas for youth and vulnerable groups. 	<p>Output 2: On disengagement and reintegration to ensure livelihoods programming also targets youth who are disengaging from extremist groups; and to ensure that such populations are provided with counselling and mentoring.</p>	<p>UNICEF, ILO, AMSCO, Africa Skills Initiative, INGOs.</p>	<p>3,200,000</p>

<p>Output 4: [Media and technology] Violent narratives and extremist propaganda are countered.</p> <p>Indicators: 1. Number of people (audience) listening to video and radio programmes on countering violent extremism. Baseline: tbd Target: 1.2 million</p> <p>2. % of people from schools, universities, religious institutions and communities having positive perception of counter narrative. Baseline: tbd Target: tbd</p> <p>3. Number of youth engaged as online leaders in countering the extremist narratives. Baseline: tbd Target: tbd</p>		<p>4.1. Communities/civil society given a voice through media engagement and partnerships in epicentre, spillover and ‘at risk’ countries.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training programmes provided to communities, NGOs and civil society representatives on how to engage with the media. • Create and sustain networks between communities, journalists and editors/media houses (local, regional and international). • Training provided to both journalists and communities on how to mitigate security risks. • Training of religious leaders to understand how extremist groups are using social media to spread violent messages and propaganda, and how they can use social media to counter such messaging and engaging with youth. <p>4.2. Video and radio programmes created to use on targeted audiences and for wide dissemination.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop short documentaries and radio programmes on stories of survivors, impact of terrorism on communities and livelihoods, the reality of the ‘front line’ as told by disengaged members, etc. • Show documentaries in targeted engagements in schools, universities, religious centres, public events. • Engage international, regional and local media networks to disseminate documentaries and facilitate regional debates. <p>4.3. Public awareness programmes launched to encourage individuals to disengage/not join extremist groups.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide support to national institutions, local government, religious entities and community representatives to design and launch a public awareness campaign directed at members of extremist groups and those considering joining. • Anti-radicalization campaign launched in schools, universities, religious institutions, refugee camps and work places. 	<p>Output 2: Those disengaging from extremist groups can be documented in programmes.</p>	<p>Al-Jazeera, BBC, France 24, local TV and radio networks/stations and UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), UN Office to the African Union.</p>	<p>5,800,000</p>
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<p>Output 5: [Community resilience violent extremism]</p> <p>Communities and religious institutions are resilient to the effects of violent extremism (capacity to prevent and respond to violent extremism)</p> <p>Indicators:</p> <p>1. Number of incidents related to intra- and inter-religious tensions. Baseline: tbd Target: tbd</p> <p>2. Number of attacks on communities linked to extremism. Baseline:4107 Target: 2700</p> <p>3. Number of mosques, madrassas and Imams involved in anti-radicalization movement. Baseline: tbd Target: 4050</p> <p>4. Percentage of religious institutions that achieved at least a 'bronze' certification in the implementation of the toolkit. Baseline: 0 Target: 75%</p>		<p>5.1. Governance and capacities of mosques, madrassas and Imams integrated into the prevention/ response initiatives.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop toolkit for mosques, madrasa and Imams on effective standards to promote good governance, curriculum development, training on effective governance, building resilience against violent extremism and radicalisation, developing effective leadership and safeguarding. • Toolkit tailored to suit country contexts and cascaded through TOT programmes throughout country. • Develop regional-wide incentive structures (bronze, silver and gold certification) to improve resilience of mosques and madrassas. • Support the development of region-wide network of mosques and madrasas against violent extremism. <p>5.2. Inter- and intra-religious tensions are lowered in targeted communities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Roll out of a series of inter-faith and intra-faith dialogues in key hot-spots. • Identify and work with traditional leaders where possible, forming committee of the wised where constructive. • Identify and train key spokespersons for media engagements. <p>5.3. Early-warning system developed.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Train key individuals at community level – (community leaders, religious figures, youth representatives, businessmen/women and key women-leaders) to identify key signs of radicalization activities and processes. • Train civilian officers on how to work directly with communities to enable them to protect themselves against radicalization and violent extremism – through the development of close-knit neighbourhood associations and community-led Peace and Security Committees that prevent clandestine operations in communities and recruitment. 	<p>Output 2: Ensure harmonisation between this programme on community resilience and the programme on disengagement and reintegration.</p> <p>Output 1: As strong community and local policing partnerships will be key to ensure the success of an early-warning system and will also contribute towards strengthening cohesiveness in communities</p>	<p>Local civil society organizations, religious groups. Faith Associates. Ministry of religious affairs, Adams Centre, inter-religious community of Kenya, IGAD, ECOWAS.</p>	<p>5,300,000</p>
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<p>Output 6: [Gender-specific]</p> <p>Women are empowered to play a leading role in prevention and response to violent extremism.</p> <p>Indicators:</p> <p>1. % of women members of initiatives supported or created by the project to prevent and respond to extremist violence. Baseline: 0 Target: 40%</p> <p>2. Number of women benefiting from socio-economics initiatives. Baseline: tbc Target: tbc</p> <p>3. Number of women/youth engaged as peace ambassadors at regional and national level. Baseline: tbc Target: tbc</p> <p>4. Number of women-leaders in public eye. Baseline: tbc Target: tbc</p>		<p>6.1. Women are empowered to identify early signs of radicalization and capacitated to participate in initiatives at communities/national/regional level such as early-warning, regional and national strategy development/dialogues and community policing.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Training and mentoring for women to identify the signs of radicalization and to participate in security and early-warning initiatives. Training also provided to enable women to serve as mentors in peer-to-peer programmes in affected/hot-spot areas.• Community support networks for women will be formed to address isolation and identify signs of radicalization.• Support women leaders to engage in regional and national dialogues and initiatives on violent extremism. <p>6.2. Psycho-social support is provided for families and victims.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Women and men whose spouses, family members of friends have joined extremist groups are provided with psycho-social support. <p>6.3 Women and youth as agents of peace/peace ambassadors.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Develop skills of women and youth leaders at the regional level in order to serve as mentors, coaches and ambassadors in their communities.	<p>Linkage will be made with all outputs.</p>	<p>UN-Women.</p>	<p>5,200,000</p>
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<p>Output 7: [Cross-cutting programme One]</p> <p>Regional and national policies and programming are informed by research and analysis on violent extremism.</p> <p>Indicators: 1. Number of quality research products developed on violent extremism Baseline: tbc Target: 50</p> <p>2. Number of new partnerships with global research, policy and advocacy entities. Baseline: tbc Target: 50</p> <p>3. Number of people accessing the database on research on preventing and responding to violent extremism, Baseline: 0 Target: 10,000</p>		<p>7.1. Enhanced collaboration between African and international research and policy institutes.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • \$100,000 annual grant launched and calls for applications sent to universities, think-tanks and other institutions in Africa and internationally. • Conduct research on gaps related to our understanding of violent extremism. • Convene workshop/seminar of experts, policy-makers, academics, practitioners etc. to exchange insights and best practices on preventing and addressing violent extremism. <p>7.2. Database on research on preventing and responding to violent extremism, created, regularly updated and available.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop database to collect and disseminate research on preventing and responding to violent extremism. • Make information contained in database available upon request. <p>7.3. Increased capacity at the regional level to monitor and disseminate information on preventing and responding to violent extremism.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expert 'research team' formed at the centre on violent extremism in Djibouti. • Team undertakes research on trends, best practices and insights, and disseminates knowledge. • Produce annual report and quarterly briefings for key partners. 	<p>Linkage will be made with all outputs.</p>	<p>Institute for Security Studies, the University of Lancaster and Kings College London, Princeton university, Columbia university, University of Addis Ababa, University of Mogadishu, Kaduna University, Bamako University, University of Dakar, University of Uppsala, Koffi Annan International Peacekeeping Center.</p>	<p>3,300,000</p>
<p>Output 8: [Cross-cutting programme Two]</p> <p>Regional and sub-regional entities are coordinated and enabled to prevent and address violent extremism.</p> <p>Indicators: 1. Number of national and regional coordination frameworks established and functioning. Baseline: tbd Target: 13</p> <p>2. Number of national strategies that are informed by and aligned to regional strategies. Baseline: 0 Target : 11</p>		<p>8.1. Strategies of regional and sub-regional organizations for preventing and responding to the growth of violent extremism updated or developed.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support regional and sub-regional organizations to develop, finalise and harmonise strategies. • Develop regional coordination frameworks • Domesticating regional strategies at the national level. <p>8.2. Responses to preventing and addressing violent extremism are effectively coordinated through increased shared information and planning.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a convening platform for regional and sub-regional economic organizations to convene, promote coordination and collaboration and to address gaps. <p>8.3. Support coordination and training capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations on countering violent extremism.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assist with the development of a regional wide communications strategy on countering extremist propaganda. • Training of trainers provided to requesting regional and sub-regional organizations to enhance understanding of and approaches to violent extremism as required. 	<p>Linkages will be made with all outputs.</p>		<p>3,900,000</p>

Monitoring and evaluation plan

5

In accordance with UNDP's programming policies and procedures, the project will be monitored through the following monitoring and evaluation plans. In accordance with UNDP's programming policies and procedures, the project will be monitored through the following monitoring and evaluation plans.

Monitoring Plan

Monitoring activity	Purpose	Frequency	Expected action
Track results progress	Progress data against the results indicators in the RRF will be collected and analysed to assess the progress of the project in achieving the agreed outputs.	Quarterly, or in the frequency stated for each indicator in the RRF.	Slower than expected progress will be addressed by project management.
Monitor project implementation	Field mission should be conducted on a regular basis to monitor the implementation of the project. The monitoring mission should include direct meetings and discussions with the stakeholders, among which beneficiaries should be targeted primarily.	At least quarterly	Detailed field mission reports should be developed, including specific recommendations to improve the project implementation.
Monitor and manage risks	Identify specific risks that may threaten achievement of intended results. Identify and monitor risk management actions using a risk log. This includes monitoring measures and plans that may have been required as per UNDP's Social and Environmental Standards. Audits will be conducted in accordance with UNDP's audit policy to manage financial risk.	Quarterly	Project management identifies risks and actions are taken to manage risk. The risk log is actively maintained to keep track of identified risks and actions taken.
Learn	Knowledge, good practices and lessons will be captured regularly, as well as actively sourced from other projects and partners and integrated back into the project.	At least annually	Relevant lessons are captured by the project team and used to inform management decisions.
Annual project quality assurance	The quality of the project will be assessed against UNDP's quality standards to identify project strengths and weaknesses and to inform management decision making to improve the project.	Annually	Strengths and weaknesses will be reviewed by project management and used to inform decisions to improve project performance.
Review and make course corrections	Internal review of data and evidence from all monitoring actions to inform decision-making.	Quarterly	Performance data, risks, lessons and quality will be discussed by the project board and used to make course corrections.
Project report	A progress report will be presented to the Project Board and key stakeholders, consisting of progress data showing the results achieved against pre-defined annual targets at the output level, the annual project quality rating summary, an updated risk log with mitigation measures and any evaluation or review reports prepared over the period.	Annually and at the end of the project (final report)	
Project review (Project Board)	The Project Board will hold project reviews to assess the performance of the project and appraise the Annual Work Plan for the following year. In the project's final year, the Project Board shall hold an end-of project review to capture lessons learned and discuss opportunities for scaling-up and to distribute project results and lessons learned with relevant audiences.	Recommended quarterly. Mandatory at least annually	Any quality concerns or slower than expected progress should be discussed by the project board and management actions agreed to address the issues identified.

Evaluation Plan

Evaluation Title	Related Strategic Plan Outcome	RPD Outcome	Planned Completion Date	Key Evaluation Stakeholders	Cost and Source of Funding
Project Mid-Term Evaluation	Outcome 5	Outcome 3	December 2017 (2 years after the beginning of the project)	AU, IGAD, host governments	USD 150,000
Project final evaluation	Outcome 5	Outcome 3	October 2019	AU, IGAD, host governments	USD 150,000

Management arrangements 6

This Regional Project Document is derived from the Regional Programme Document (RPD) as approved by the UNDP Executive Board. As such, this project is subject to the regional programme's business processes and accountability framework. This Project was prepared under the leadership of the Regional Bureau for Africa (RBA) and the Regional Bureau for Arab States (RBAS) through a consultative process involving the AU, RECs, development partners (the EU, Finland, Sweden, Netherlands, the United Kingdom and United States), civil society, including faith-based organizations from Africa and globally, as well as research and academic institutions. The management arrangements detailed below reflect the fact that the project cuts across two geographical regions: UNDP-Arab States and Africa.

Project board

A project board will be established in line with the oversight and accountability frameworks established by UNDP's Executive Board for the efficient and effective implementation of this project. The board serves as a vital element of the project's strategic advisory mechanism to deliver on institutional effectiveness - especially on transparency and accountability underpinned by Results-Based Management (RBM) and timely reporting to the relevant UNDP corporate oversight bodies on development results.

Consistent with this, the Board is broad-based, drawing from the full range of project stakeholders, among them: the inter-governmental regional bodies including the AUC, ECOWAS and IGAD, donor partners, civil society organizations (CSOs) and UNDP (Corporate, Regional Service Centre and Country Offices). This participatory approach and due regard for ownership builds upon the consultative process employed during the formulation of this Project which involved all of these stakeholders in design, development and review of the final project document.

In ensuring that the development results of the Project are achieved (and aligned to UNDP's Strategic Plan 2014-2017 and the Regional Programme), the overarching responsibility of the Project Board is to assist the RSC Director to carry-out their broad oversight responsibilities, especially with regard to accountability, monitoring and evaluation, strategic forward

planning, overall RBM, quality assurance and risk management requirements as a whole. The Board will have the following key functions:

- Provide strategic advice on current and emerging development issues (economic, political, social) which could be addressed by the Project to ensure that (i) policy, programme advisory and capacity development support is responsive to addressing the development solutions, priorities and emerging challenges to radicalization and violent extremism in Africa and (ii) the initiatives of this Project are linked to and draw upon those from Regional and Country Programmes, whenever appropriate;
- Approve the annual work-plan for the regional project;
- Review past year's annual report on achievements, challenges, lessons learned and innovations and eventually reports from mid-term reviews/evaluations, and provide strategic advice on corrective actions, future direction, substantive scope and focus of the Project.

The project technical implementation will be led by a project manager, supported by a project team working under the supervision of the Regional Governance and Peacebuilding Cluster Leader. These entities will work closely with corresponding clusters in the Arab Region, who will take the lead on providing technical support in Somalia and Sudan. He/she will be responsible for achieving the respective project outputs, which will also contribute to the overall Regional Programme Outcomes.


The Project contains a combination of direct implementation and national execution elements, which will depend on partnerships with government and administrative counterparts, as well as I/NGO implementation modalities. The Project will include initiatives at the Regional and Country Office level. The RSC will be the lead in coordination and facilitation and will also be administratively responsible for the implementation of the whole project in partnership with participating Country Offices. At the national level, the respective Country Offices will lead implementation.

Programme assurance

The programme assurance role supports the Project Board by carrying out objective and independent programme oversight and monitoring functions. This role ensures

appropriate project management milestones are managed and completed. Project assurance takes place independently of the Programme Manager; therefore, the project board cannot delegate any of its assurance responsibilities to the programme manager.

Figure 5: Project Organisation Structure⁵⁴



⁵⁴ The Chairmanship of the Board will rotate between the UNDP Amman hub and the Addis hub.

Risk and Mitigation Strategy 7

Monitoring risk is an integral part of the Project. Initial potential risks have been identified and mitigation strategies proposed. On a regular basis, risk will be monitored, reviewed and if necessary new risks will be added and further mitigation strategies developed. Key to effective mitigation measures is strong direct staff presence on the ground and strengthened engagement with the beneficiary communities.

Figure 4: Problem tree analysis

#	Description and date identified	Type	Probability and impact	Countermeasures / Management response	Status
Risks					
1	Security for staff and beneficiaries involved in the programme. Date identified: 5/9/15	Operational	P: Likely (4) I: Critical (5)	Project will adjust activities to changes in the security situation. Regular monitoring of security environment and consultations with UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) and country level UNCT's Reduce exposure through low-profile approach in sensitive areas; training of partners on security and safety measures; adapt communication strategy and visibility to the security risks; increased implementation through Service Contractors and NGOs. Regular community security assessments and inclusive dialogue processes to reduce risks, and take early programme mitigation measures if required	
2	Neighbouring communities which are not directly at risk feel excluded from programme with adverse effects. Date identified: 5/9/15	Strategic	P: Moderate (3) I: Moderate (3)	Open, consultative programme planning and development approach with geographical areas selected on the basis of clear criteria. Close coordination with key counterparts in each region including local authorities and stakeholders on key programme elements. Continuous engagement and monitoring of perceptions at the community level. Community needs and selection criteria are jointly determined through local committees.	
3	Perception that disengaged members are being rewarded for their perceived participation in violent extremist groups. Date identified: 5/9/15	Other	P: Moderate (3) I: Critical (5)	Close coordination with key counterparts in each region including local authorities on key programme elements. Continuous engagement and monitoring of perceptions at the community level. Awareness raising and communication campaigns will be a core area under the project to mitigate risks (they are part of the project strategy). Case management systems will inform the project if and when problems are likely to arise	
4	Lack of political will to balance law and order response with justice and development programmes (i.e. continuation of security-dominant response). Date identified: 5/9/15	Political	P: Severe (4) I: Severe (4)	Political dialogue with government counterparts from the outset. Maintenance of respectful, collaborative approach and transparency. Regular human rights monitoring with clear 'red lines' articulated in project documents.	
5	Lack of will/levels of fear on the part of religious institutions and religious figures to participate in programme. Date identified: 5/9/15	Other	P: Unlikely (2) I: Severe (4)	Open consultative programme planning and development approach, close coordination with key interlocutors including Ministry of Religious Affairs; national and local religious councils, inclusion of religious representatives in Project Board.	
6	Individuals revert back to extremist behaviour as a result of stigmatisation and other factors. Date identified: 5/9/15	Other	P: Severe (4) I: Moderate (3)	Ensure that the mentors are following closely their mentees (put in place robust case management systems with follow up after the end of the programme); conduct tracer surveys; regular communications with stakeholders; monitor closely attendance of beneficiaries; close collaboration with communities and local governments	
7	Limited national capacities to implement the project Date identified: 5/9/15	Operational	P: Moderate (3) I: Moderate (3)	Training on policy development and security sector governance. Support the Government(s) to convey and chair coordination meetings at State, regional, and district level. Initiate a capacity-building strategy. Facilitate the exchange of knowledge and experience. International technical specialists to back-stop partners.	
8	Inability to adequately fund the programme and/or increased costs. Date identified: 5/9/15	Financial	P: Moderate (3) I: Critical (4)	Strengthening of relationships with bilateral donor partners, involving timely reporting, Regular meetings and alignment of programme priorities with articulated donor interests.	

Consistent with Article III of the Standard Basic Assistance Agreement (SBAA), the responsibility for the safety and security of the Implementing Partner and its personnel and property and of UNDP's property in the Implementing Partner's custody, rests with the Implementing Partner. To this end, the Implementing Partner shall:


- a.* Put in place an appropriate security plan and maintain the security plan, taking into account the security situation in the country where the project is being carried;
- b.* Assume all risks and liabilities related to the implementing partner's security and the full implementation of the security plan.

UNDP reserves the right to verify whether such a plan is in place and to suggest modifications to the plan when necessary. Failure to maintain and implement an appropriate security plan as required hereunder shall be deemed a breach of the Implementing Partner's obligations under this Project Document.

The Implementing Partner agrees to undertake all reasonable efforts to ensure that none of the UNDP funds received pursuant to the Project Document are used to provide support to individuals or entities associated with terrorism and that the recipients of any amounts provided by UNDP hereunder do not appear on the list maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999). The list can be accessed via http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/aq_sanctions_list.shtml. This provision must be included in all sub-contracts or sub-agreements entered into under/further to this Project Document.

Following Page: Annex, Project Areas: Theory of change

This project is underpinned by a theory of change which maintains that there are eight inter-linked processes that create a development pathway for preventing and addressing the growth of violent extremism in Africa.



**United Nations Development Programme
Regional Bureau for Africa**